Literal Rule or Plain Meaning Rule: Concept

S. P. SRIVASTAVA
Introduction
Plain language is a concept which is extremely difficult to define as it means very many different
things to different people. It is also a relative concept. Plain language invites the question: plain
to whom? It is probably best therefore to give a number of descriptions as a starting point.
Eagleson describes plain language as follows:
Plain English is clear, straightforward expression, using only as many words as are necessary. It
is language that avoids obscurity, inflated vocabulary and convoluted sentence structure. It is not
baby talk, nor is it a simplified version of the English language”.
Plain Language” should be defined tautologically as language that is 'plain' to its intended
readers. But language that is 'plain' to one set of readers may be incomprehensible for others.
'Plain language' is a variable, not an absolute. It should be described, measured, and defined in
terms of principles and rules of thumb, not algorithms or rules hard and fast. Operationally, we
can and should define it as language they can understand, language that gives its readers the
information they need 'plain language' refers to process insofar as our readers vary, so too will
'plainness' vary.
Meaning and Concept:
The judges have devised various methods of interpretation amongst which the literal
interpretation has been accepted as the Primary rule. Under this rule the judge considers what
the statute actually says, rather than what it might mean. In order to achieve this, the judge will
give the words in the statute a literal meaning, that is, their plain ordinary everyday meaning,
even if the effect of this is to produce what might be considered as an otherwise unjust or
undesirable outcome. The literal rule says that the intention of Parliament is best found in the
ordinary and natural meaning of the words used. This rule was evolved in England. According
to this rule if the language of the statute is expressly clear, it shuts the possibility of further
speculation. If the word has a single clear meaning and it is precisely in consistency with the aim
that it leaves no room for doubt and no loopholes; it is coextensive with its aim; it is ready to
accomplish its purpose without marring context and object, it is a perfect drafting and it should
be interpreted in line with the plain Meaning. However, Hart argued that attempting to create
perfect rules is technically impossible and undesirable since whenever men attempt to make
certain and in advance regulation, they will meet two handicaps: ‘The first handicap is our
relative ignorance of fact: the second is our relative indeterminacy of aim. If the world in which
we live where characterized only by a finite number of features, and these together with all the
modes in which they combine were known to us, then provision could be made in advance for
every possibility...this would be a world fit for “mechanical” jurisprudence.’ According to the
literal rule, the judges must interpret the provisions, considering only the plain grammatical
meaning of the words regardless whether the conclusion is sensible or senseless even unfair. As
Lord Esher asserted: ‘If the words of an Act are clear, you must follow them, even though they
lead to a manifest absurdity. The court has nothing to do with the question whether the
legislature has committed an absurdity.’
Although the literal rule is received by many critics as being too restrictive, the approach
dominates in the English legal system that judges should look primarily to the words of the
legislation in order to analyze the meaning of the provisions or statutes. Constitutionally it
respects parliamentary supremacy and the right of Parliament to make any laws it might wish
no matter how absurd they may seem. It also encourages precision in drafting and ensures that
anyone who can read English can determine the law, which promotes certainty and reduces
litigation. Only plain or everyday meanings of the words are taken into consideration. To
achieve this aim, the judge pays attention to ‘what the statute actually says rather than
considering what it might mean’. Even in hard cases, judges apply the pure meaning of the
statute due to the fidelity to the legislators. However, the literal rule does not provide a
method for difficult cases in which a proper provision is absent regarding the case.
Application of Literal Rule:
The Fisher v Bell case is one of the significant examples of the literal interpretation. The
defendant shopkeeper had displayed a flick knife marked with a price in his shop window but
he had not actually sold any. The defendant was charged under s1(1) of the Restriction of
Offensive Weapons Act of 1959. The section says that ‘any person who sells or hires or offers
for sale or hire a flick-knife guilty of an offence’. The court found him guilty of offering the knife
for sale. However, the Court of Appeal held that the conviction should be set aside for the
reason that the technical meaning in contract law of ‘offer’ was not equal to the display of an
item in a shop window. This was not an offer; it was only an invitation to treat. Under the literal
legal meaning of ‘offer’, the shop-keeper had not made an offer to sell.
Lord Diplock observed, ““Where the meaning of the statutory words is plain and unambiguous
it is not then for the judges to invent fancied ambiguities as an excuse for failing to give effect to
its plain meaning because they consider the consequences for doing so would be In expedient, or
even unjust or immoral.

In Abley v. Dale (1851)11 CB 378,it was laid down: If the precise words are plain and
unambiguous, in our judgement, we are bound to construe them in their ordinary sense, even
though it do lead, in our view of the case, to an absurdity or manifest injustice.
In Firm L. Hazari Mal v .ITO Ambala AIR 1957 Punj.5, the Division Bench of Punjab HC
observed: The first and foremost rule to which all others are subordinate is where the language
of the statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no
occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory construction. If a statute speaks for itself clearly,
any attempt by court to make it clearer by imposing another meaning would not be construing
statute but enacting one.
The second rule is that the words appearing in a statute must be presumed to have been used in
their sense and should be given their ordinary, natural and familiar meaning.
In Nelson Motis v. UOI, AIR 1992 SC 1981, The Apex Court laid down that when the words of a
statute are plain ,clear and unambiguous i.e; they are reasonably susceptible to only one
meaning, the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences.
Again in Rohitash Kumar v. Om Prakash Sharma, AIR 2013 SC 30, the hon’ble Supreme Court
court laid down that there may be a statute which causes great hardships or inconvenience, the
court has no choice but to enforce it in full rigour. Hardships can’t be used as a basis to alter the
meaning of the language, if such meaning is clear. For the proper application of the rule it is,
therefore, necessary to determine whether the language is plain or ambiguous?
In Ormond Investment Co. v. Betts (1928) AC 143 (HL), it was laid down that by ambiguity is
meant any phrase fairly and equally open to diverse meaning.
There is inherent weakness in the plain meaning rule that it is not always easy to say whether a
word is plain or not? According to Paton, judges frequently disagree as to whether a section is
plain or not, where it is agreed that the meaning is plain each may differ from the other as to
what that plain meaning is? There are certain weaknesses in the literal interpretation or plain
meaning rule:-
1. It is not always easy to say whether a word is plain or not?
2. It is ill suited to modern social legislations.
3. It can’t be applied to the changing needs of a developing society
The use of the literal rule is illustrated by the case of Fisher v Bell (1960). The Restriction of
Offensive Weapons Act 1959 made it an offence to offer for sale certain offensive weapons
including flick knives. James Bell, a Bristol shopkeeper, displayed a weapon of this type in his
shop window in the arcade at Broadmead. The Divisional Court held that he could not be
convicted because, giving the words in the statute a tight literal meaning, Mr Bell had not
offered the knives for sale. In the law of contract, placing something in a shop window is not
technically an offer for sale; it is merely an invitation to treat. (An invitation to treat is an
invitation to others to make offers, as by displaying goods in a shop window.) It is the customer
who makes an offer to the shop when he proffers money for an item on sale. The court upheld
that under the literal meaning of offer, the shopkeeper had not made an offer to sell and so
was not guilty of the offence. Parliament subsequently changed the law to make it clear that
displaying a flick knife in a shop window was an offence.
Leading Indian Cases:
1. In the case of Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh, the main question was the
interpretation of Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The court held that use
of word “shall” leaves no discretion to police officer to hold preliminary enquiry before
recording an FIR. Use of the expression “information” without any qualification also
denotes that police has to record information despite he being unsatisfied by its
reasonableness. So here, the court interpreted the literal meaning of the words used.
2. In Keshavnanda Bharti v. State of Kerela,[3]it was held that a word gets its ‘colour’ in
the context in which it is used. The word gathers its meaning not only in the context that
it has been used but from the words used in similar conditions.
3. In the case of Union of India v. Sankarchand Himatlal Sheth & another, it is held by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court that: “Where the statute’s meaning is clear and explicit, words
 cannot be interpolated. What is true of the interpretation of all ordinary statute is not any
the less true in the case of a constitutional provision and the same rule applies equally to
both. But if the words of an instrument are ambiguous in the sense that they can
reasonably bear more than one meaning, that is to say, if the words are semantically
ambiguous, or if a provision, if read literally, is patently incompatible with the other
provisions of that instrument, the court would be justified in construing the words in a
manner which will make the particular provision purposeful. That in essence is the rule of
harmonious construction.”
IF LANGUAGE IS PLAIN CONSEQUENCES TO BE DISREGARDED
Where the language of an Act is clear and explicit, the Court must give effect to it,
whatever may be the consequences, for in that case the words of the statute speak of the
intention of the Legislature. If any statutory provision is capable of only one interpretation
then it would not be open to the court to put a different interpretation upon the said
provision merely because the alternative interpretation would lead to unreasonable or even
absurd consequences. The rule is well explained in the case of Sussex Peerage.