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Gods, Rituals, and The Moral Order
Gods, Rituals, and The Moral Order
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Gods, Rituals, and the Moral Order
RODNEY STARK
Thefunctionalist "law" that religion sustains the moral ordermustbe amended.As is demonstratedin this study,
religionhas this effectonlyas it is based on belief inpowetful, active,conscious,morally-concernedgods. Contra-r
to Durkheim'sclaims,participationin religious ritualsper se has little independentimpacton moralityand none
when done on behalf of gods conceivedas unconsciousessences, or as conscious gods of small scope and lacking
moral concerns. Thus, the link between gods and morality is limited mainly to societies having more complex
cultures,buteven in some highlydevelopedsocieties a religious basisfor moralityis missing.Quantitativeresults
are based on 427 societies included in the Atlas of WorldCultures,and on surveysof the United States and 33
other nations.
Religion functions to sustain the moral order. This classic proposition,handeddown from
the founders,is regardedby many as the closest thing to a "law"thatthe social scientificstudy of
religion possesses.
In his Burett Lectures,W. RobertsonSmithexplainedthat"evenin its rudestform Religion
was a moral force, the powers that men reveredwere on the side of social orderand moral law;
and the fear of the gods was a motive to enforce the laws of society, which were also the laws
of morality"(1889:53). Emile Durkheim,of course, arguedthat religion exists because it unites
humansinto moralcommunities,and while law and custom also regulateconduct,religion alone
"assertsitself not only over conductbut over the conscience. It not only dictatesactionsbut ideas
and sentiments"([1886] 1994:21). And, according to Bronislaw Malinowski, "every religion
implies some rewardof virtueand punishmentof sin" (1935:viii).
In one formor another,this propositionundoubtedlyappearsin every introductorysociology
and anthropologytext on the market.But, as will be seen, it's wrong. Moreover,it wasn't even
handeddown from the founders,at least not unanimously!Indeed,the founderof Britishanthro-
pology, EdwardTylor,and the founderof British sociology, HerbertSpencer,1both took pains to
point out that only some kindsof religions have moral implications.
Tylor([1871] 1958:446) reported:
To some the statementmay seem startling,yet the evidence seems to justify it, that the relationof morality to
religion is one that only belongs in its rudiments,or not at all, to rudimentarycivilization. The comparisonof
savage and civilized religions bring into view ... a deep-lying contrastin theirpracticalaction on humanlife ...
the popularidea thatthe moralgovernmentof the universeis an essential tenet of naturalreligion simply falls to
the ground.Savageanimism[religion]is almostdevoid of thatethicalelementwhich to the educatedmoder mind
is the very mainspringof practicalreligion. Not, as I have said, that moralityis absentfrom the life of the lower
[cultures].... But these ethical laws stand on their own groundof traditionand public opinion, comparatively
independentof the animistic beliefs and rites which exist beside them. The lower animism is not immoral,it is
unmoral.
Spencer(1896 11:808-09) also noted thatmany religions ignore morality,and he went even
fartherby suggestingthatsome religionsactivelyencouragecrimeandimmorality:"Atthe present
time in India, we have freebooterslike the Domras, among whom a successful theft is always
celebratedby a sacrificeto theirchief god Gandak."
Although little noticed, this dissentingview has continuedamong anthropologists.In 1922,
J. P. Mills (p. 121) noted thatthe religion of the Lhotas includes no moralcode: "Whateverit be
which causes so many Lhotas to lead virtuouslives it is not their religion."In his distinguished
studyof the Manusof New Guinea,Reo Fortune(1935:357) contrastedthe moralaspects of their
religion with that of the typical tribe, agreeing that "Tyloris entirely correct in stating that in
most primitiveregions of the world religion and moralitymaintainthemselves independently."
Ruth Benedict (1938:633) also arguedthat to generalizethe link between religion and morality
"is to misconceive"the "historyof religions."She suggestedthatthis linkageprobablyis typical
only of "thehigherethical religions."RalphBarton(1946) reportedthatthe Ifugaos imputetheir
own unscrupulousexchange practicesto their gods and seize every opportunityto cheat them.
PeterLawrence(1964) foundthatthe Gariaof New Guineahave no conceptionwhateverof "sin,"
and "no idea of rewardsin the next world for good works."And Mary Douglas (1975:77) flatly
assertedthatthereis no "inherentrelationbetweenreligionandmorality:thereareprimitiveswho
can be religious withoutbeing moraland moral withoutbeing religious."
Tylor's observationthat not all religions supportthe moral orderalways should have been
obvious to anyone familiar with Greek and Roman mythology. The Greco-Romangods were
quite morallydeficient.They were thoughtto do terriblethings to one anotherand to humansas
well-sometimes merely for amusement.And while they were quite apt to do wicked things to
humansif the humansfailed to propitiatethem, the gods had no interestin anything(wicked or
otherwise)humansmight do to one another.Instead,the Greekand Romangods only concerned
themselves with direct affronts. For example, no religious sanctions were incurredby young
womenwho engagedin premaritalsex unless they immersedthemselvesin sacredwatersreserved
for virgins(MacMullen1981:58).Because Aristotletaughtthatthe gods were incapableof caring
aboutmere humans(MacMullen 1981:53), he could not have concurredthat religion serves the
functionof sustainingandlegitimatingthe moralorder.Indeed,classical philosopherswould have
ridiculedsuch a propositionas peculiarto Jews andChristians-and they wouldhave been correct
(MacMullen 1981; Meeks 1993; Stark 1996). As will be seen, the propositionabout the moral
functionsof religion requiresa particularconceptionof supernaturalbeings as deeply concerned
aboutthe behaviorof humanstowardone another.Such a conceptionof the gods is found in many
of the majorworld faiths, includingJudaism,Christianity,Islam, and Hinduism,but it appearsto
be largelylacking in the supernaturalconceptionsprevalentin much of Asia and in animismand
folk religions generally.
It would seem to follow, therefore,thatthe moralbehaviorof individualswould be influenced
by theirreligiouscommitmentsonly in societies where the dominantreligious organizationsgive
clear and consistent expression to divine moral imperatives.Thus, for example, were proper
surveydata available,they should show thatthose who frequentedthe temples in Greco-Roman
times were no moreobservantof the prevailingmoralcodes thanwere those who were lax in their
religious practice.As Tylor pointed out, this is not to suggest that societies in antiquitylacked
moralcodes, but only thatthese were not predicatedon religious foundations.
When and why, then, did social scientists get it so wrong?The errorbegan when Durkheim
andthe otherearly functionalists(includingRobertsonSmithandMalinowski)dismissedgods as
unimportantwindow-dressing,stressinginsteadthatrites andritualsare the fundamentalstuff of
religion. In a long reviewof PartVI of HerbertSpencer'sPrinciplesof Sociology,Emile Durkheim
([1886] 1994:19)condemnedSpencerforreducingreligion"tobeing merelya collectionof beliefs
and practicesrelatingto a supernaturalagent."Seen from the perspectiveof real sociology (i.e.,
Frenchfunctionalism):
The idea of God which seemed to be the sum total of religion a short while ago, is now no more than a minor
accident. It is a psychological phenomenonwhich has got mixed up with a whole sociological process whose
importanceis of quite a differentorder.... We might perhapsbe able to discoverwhat is thus hiddenbeneaththis
quite superficialphenomenon...
Thus the sociologist will pay scant attentionto the differentways in which men andpeoples have conceived
the unknowncause and mysteriousdepthof things. He will set aside all such metaphysicalspeculationsand will
see in religion only a social discipline.
GODS, RITUALS,AND THE MORALORDER 621
Durkheimto the contrary,the foundationof all religions rests on some conception of the
supernatural-of essences, forces, entities, realities, or beings beyond or outside nature,which
are thoughtto be able, at least to some extent,to suspend,alter,or ignorephysical forces. Beyond
this vague generalization,however, there is unendingconflict among religions about what the
supernaturalis like, and intense disputesconcerningwhat it does, if anything.In some religions,
the supernaturalis conceived of as an omnipresentessence or principlegoverningall life, but that
is impersonal,remote, and definitely not a being. In others, the supernaturaltakes the form of
conscious beings called gods.
I will examine these variationsin images of God more fully when specific religions are
discussed laterin the article.Here it suffices to recognize thatdivine essences are unableto issue
commandmentsor makemoraljudgments.Thus, conceptionsof the supernaturalare irrelevantto
the moralorderunless the supernaturalis conceived of as a being-a thing having consciousness
and desires.Put anotherway, only beings can desiremoralconformity.Even thatis not sufficient.
Gods can lend sanctionsto the moralorderonly if they are concernedabout,informedabout,and
act on behalf of humans.Moreover,to promotevirtue among humans,gods must be virtuous-
they must favor good over evil. Finally, gods will be effective in sustaining moral precepts
dependingon theirscope-that is, the greaterthe diversityof theirpowers,the greaterwill be the
range of their influence.All-powerful,all-seeing gods ruling the entire universeare the ultimate
deterrent.
Can any hide himself in secretplaces thatI shall not see him? saith the Lord.Do not I fill heaven and earth?saith
the Lord. (Jeremiah23:24)
This analysis does, of course, imply progressfrom less to more complex culturesand that
the linkage between religion and moralityreflectssuch a progression.In a colorful passage, Ruth
Benedict(1938:633) wrotethatmoralconcernsbecomea centralvalueof "religionin man'shistory
just as the pearl constitutesthe value of the oyster."But, she noted,just as oysters must develop
pearls, religions must develop moral engagement. This development occurs as the prevailing
conceptionsof thegods shiftin thedirectionof fewergods orgreaterscope, a shiftthatusuallytakes
place as partof the developmentof a more complex culture(Starkand Bainbridge[ 1987] 1996).
The discussion can be summedup in four hypotheses:
HI: In many societies, religion and morality will not be linked.
H2: This linkage will tend to be limited to more complex cultures.
H3: The effects of religiousness on individual morality are contingent on images of gods as
conscious, morally-concerned beings; religiousness based on impersonal or unmoral gods will
not influence moral choices.
622 JOURNALFOR THE SCIENTIFICSTUDY OF RELIGION
H4: Participationin religious rites and rituals will have little or no independenteffect on
morality.
In the remainderof the essay I test these hypotheses.
Both Tylor and Spencer believed that the connection between religion and moralitywas a
markof culturalprogress-that it was somethingto be foundin the religions of more"advanced"
peoples. They based this conclusion on theirimmense knowledgeof ethnographicreports.How-
ever, a less impressionisticevaluationof this hypothesis became possible with the advent of
quantitativecross-culturalstudies, pioneeredby George Peter Murdock(1949, 1981; Murdock
and White 1969) and his colleagues following WorldWarII. In The Birth of the Gods (1960),
Guy E. Swanson selected 37 premoder societies from Murdock'sthen-currentset of 556 and
coded them as to whetheror not the supernaturalwas believed to impose sanctionson "immoral"
behavior.Even thoughhis criteriafor coding the presenceof such sanctionswere very generous,
Swansonfound no such sanctionsin a quarterof these societies. He interpretedthis as evidence
against Tylor (HI), noting that "Contraryto Tylor's formulation,a considerableproportionof
the simplerpeoples do make a connectionbetween supernaturalsanctionsand moral behavior"
(p. 174). As is obvious, Swanson's study sufferedfrom a very small numberof cases. In addi-
tion, Swanson's theoreticalapproachwas relentlessly psychological and this led him to try to
relate the presence of supernaturalsanctionsto various possible sources of "tension"affecting
the individual.Most of these turnedout not to be correlatedsignificantlywith the presence of
supernaturalsanctions,butfour,includingthe prevalenceof personaldebts,the existence of social
classes, privatepropertyownership,andprimogeniture,were significantlycorrelatedwith super-
naturalsanctioning.Swanson took this as mixed supportfor his hypothesis concerningtension
as the basis for the link between the gods and morality.But, of course, Tylorand Spencerwould
have noticed that the variablesyielding significantresults all measure aspects of cultural and
social complexity,or what they called "civilization."Thus, Swanson'sdiscoverythateach of the
above variableswas significantly,positively associatedwith divine sanctionswas confirmationof
Hypothesis 2. Although Swanson was one of the few contemporarysocial scientists who was
awareof Tylorand Spencer'shypothesis (H2), if he recognizedthese implicationsof his results,
he chose to ignore them. A somewhat abortiveattemptto replicate Swanson's study, based on
72 Native NorthAmericansocieties, also ignoredthe matter(Peregrine1996).
For nearly 20 years it has been possible to test these two key hypotheses on a very large
selection of cases (althoughI can find no indicationsthat anyone has done so). When Murdock
publishedthe Atlas of WorldCultures(1981), he respondedto Swanson'searlierwork by coding
whetheror not the "HighGods"in each of 427 societies were "active,and specificallysupportive
of humanmorality"(183 of these societies lacked any notion of a High God). Moreover,for a
decade,these andotherof Murdock's"samples"havebeen availablein a carefullycross-checked,
electronicformatfrom the MicroCaseCorporation,and that is the version I have used.
The results show that only about a fourth (23.9 percent) of these societies acknowledged
a "High God" who was concernedwith human morality,thus confirmingTylor and Spencer's
judgment that most premoder societies do not link religion and morality.However, some of
the gods in societies lacking High Gods might also promotehumanmorality-that was not part
of the coding scheme. But, even if we omit all societies without High Gods, the High Gods in
58 percentof the remaining244 societies do not supporthumanmorality.Eitherway, in keeping
with Hypothesis 1, a lack of connectionbetween religion and moralityis common in premoder
societies.
What about Hypothesis 2, that this linkage develops as societies become more culturally
sophisticated?Table 1 offers very strikingconfirmation.The presence of "MoralGods" is very
GODS, ANDTHEMORAL
RITUALS, ORDER 623
TABLE 1
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN "CULTURAL
COMPLEXITY" AND "MORAL GODS"
withthePresence
Correlations
of MoralGods
Dairyherds 0.898**
Domesticated largeanimals 0.876**
Existenceof thestate 0.790**
Metalworking 0.777**
Weaving 0.718**
Cereal-based agriculture 0.689**
Potterymaking 0.655**
n = 427.
**Significantabove 0.000.
Please tell me for each of the following statementswhetheryou thinkit can always be justified,never be justified,
or somethingin between.
TABLE 2
GOD, CHURCH ATTENDANCE, AND THE MORAL ORDER IN THE
UNITED STATES
Table 3 shows the correlationsbetween the importanceof God in one's life and the three
measuresof adherenceto the moral order in five nations of the WesternHemisphere:Canada,
Mexico, Brazil,Chile, andArgentina.While these nationsdiffergreatlyin manyways, they share
a generalconceptionof God as an active, divine being who imposes moral standards.Therefore,
the correlationswith the importanceof God should be negative, and they are. Each of the 15
correlations is negative and highly statistically significant. Hypothesis 3 is strongly confirmed.
The table also includes the correlations with church attendance. In 14 of the 15 comparisons
with the God effects, the church attendance effect is weaker-usually substantially weaker. Only
on smoking marijuana in Argentina does this generalization not hold and that probably can be
dismissed as a random fluctuation. Again, Hypothesis 4 is confirmed.
By Durkheim's definition, many nations of Western Europe are quite irreligious, church
attendance being so low that few people are involved in collective religious rituals. But, as defined
GODS, RITUALS,AND THE MORALORDER 625
TABLE 3
GOD AND THE MORAL ORDER IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
by Tylor and Spencer, most people in Western Europe remain religious. Atheists are few (seldom
more than 5 percent) and the great majority consider themselves to be "a religious person"-they
are "believing non-belongers" as Grace Davie (1994) so aptly put it. Moreover, the prevailing
conception of God is the conventional Christian deity. These nations of Western Europe make
it possible to examine the effects of God on morality in settings where belief is not confounded
with participation in religious rituals, as it is in the Western Hemisphere where both belief and
church attendance are high. Indeed, in accord with Hypothesis 4, within the European context
the correlations ought to be as strongly negative in Scandinavia, where religious participation is
extremely low, as in Southern Europe, where participation is high. Put another way, data from
Western Europe allow comparisons of Catholic and Protestant cultures.
Table 4 confirms that belief in God is highly correlated with morality in all these nations,
Protestant or Catholic, having high church attendance or low. Of the 48 correlations shown, all are
negative and only one falls short of statistical significance (smoking dope in Sweden). Moreover,
the correlations are about of equal strength in Scandinavia and Southern Europe. In addition,
(not shown) in only 7 of the 48 comparisons does the church attendance correlation equal or
exceed the God effect. As in the Western Hemisphere, the church attendance correlations typically
were substantially lower, lending support to Hypothesis 4.
Thus far I have been hypothesizing negative correlations between the importance placed
on God and acceptance of moral violations because of the conception of God prevalent in the
nations examined. However, for parts of Eastern Europe I do not anticipate such effects, in part
because Eastern Orthodoxy stresses rite and ritual, icons and incense, and has remarkably little
to say about sin-"The emphasis is not so much on truth and justice as on beauty and love"
(Weaver 1998:76). Consequently, orthodoxy projects a comparatively remote and nonjudgmental
image of God. Unfortunately, in the nations available for analysis, this religious factor is partly
confounded with a long history of Communist repression of religion and with the collaboration
of most orthodox churches with their repressors (Filatov 1994)-both these factors ought to have
weakened the link between religion and morality.
626 FORTHESCIENTIFIC
JOURNAL STUDYOFRELIGION
TABLE 4
GOD AND THE MORAL ORDER IN WESTERN EUROPE
Compared with Christianity in the West, Eastern Orthodoxy far more closely fits the model
of religion proposed by Durkheim and the functionalists in that it is a religion of collective ritual
and rite, putting far greater emphasis on the sacraments than on a direct relationship with God.
An indication of this is the virtual absence of any discussion of sin and the almost exclusive
focus on sacraments in the few discussions of sin that do appear in recent summaries of orthodox
theology (Ware 1997, 1979; Clendenin 1995). Indeed, orthodox writers stress that confession of
sins (if sincere) automatically results in complete forgiveness and they are very critical of the
"Latin church" for "teaching of penalties and punishments," including the concept of purgatory,
"all of which the Orthodox church most strenuously rejects" (Karmiris 1973:29). Nicolas Zemov
(1959:101) offers this contrast:
In the Roman Churchthe role of the priest in the confessional is that of judge .... In the East the priest is not a
judge, but a witness.
However, rather than emphasizing a personal relationship between the penitent and God, this
orthodox approach to confession seems to have quite the opposite effect of making the process
impersonal. Moreover, the distaste for punishment of sin (and even the concept of sin) carries over
into orthodox teaching about salvation. Bishop Kallistos (Anthony) Ware (1997:262) explained
that in the Orthodox view, although:
Hell exists as a final possibility ... several of the Fathershave none the less believed that in the end all will be
reconciledto God. It is hereticalto say that all must be saved, for this is to deny free will; but it is legitimateto
hope thatall may be saved.
GODS, RITUALS,AND THE MORALORDER 627
The greater emphasis on the individual in the West may have originatedin (or been greatly
increasedby) the Reformationand the CounterReformation,neitherof which had any impacton
orthodoxy.In any event, the emphasison collectivity and ritualshows up in prayeras orthodoxy
discouragesattemptsto establish a direct, personalrelationshipwith God of the sort typical of
the devotionallife in the West (albeitthereare denominationaldifferencesin the West too).
These differences in doctrinemay seem subtle, but they are quite apparentas the religion
is experiencedby the laity-from the pew, God seems remote and ratherinactive. However,in
and of itself, I would only expect this aspect of the orthodoxconception of God to reduce, not
eliminate,the link between the individual'scommitmentto God and his or her moralconformity.
That is, I would expect negative, significant,but substantiallyweaker correlationsin orthodox
nations than in the West. Unfortunately,as mentioned,the effects of orthodoxyare confounded
with the effects of Communism,which also ought to reducethe correlations.
In the wakeof the RussianRevolution,the Communistregimeimposedbrutalandunrelenting
religious repression.On ordersfrom Lenin (Troyanovsky1991), thousandsof priests and nuns
were murdered-often in bizarreways afterextendedtorture(Pospielovsky 1988). Partysquads
also looted all the churches, many of which had very valuable art work and altar vessels-
even all the churchbells were confiscatedand melted down for scrap (MacKenzie 1930). Most
churchbuildings were seized, and some of the most famous and beautifulwere convertedinto
museumsof scientificatheism.Following the initialcampaignof terror,repressionwas sustained
at a somewhatless ferocious level throughoutthe Communistera-millions were exiled to labor
campsforpersistingin religion,especiallyfor practicingnonorthodoxreligions.Millionsof others
were discriminatedagainst(excludedfromthe Party,frombetterjobs, andfromhighereducation)
because they were knownto be, or suspectedof being, religious (Pospielovsky 1988). At the start
of the Revolution there were more than 80,000 orthodoxchurches in what became the Soviet
Union. By 1939 therewere only about 1,000 (Barrett1982). Similarly,in 1917 there were more
than 1,200 orthodoxmonasteries,a decade latertherewere none-some had been convertedinto
prisons(Timberlake1995). Then,in responseto the need for nationalunityfollowing the German
invasion,Stalin slightly eased the repression,only to increaseit somewhatagain at the war'send
(Anderson1994;Pospielovsky 1997).Duringthe 1980s therewere about5,000 Christianchurches
in the USSR (not countingsecretProtestantcongregations),or about 1 per 50,000 people (Barrett
1982). Islamic groups also endured intense repression.In the former Soviet of Dagestan, for
example, therehad been more than 1,700 mosques in 1917. By 1988 therewere only 12 to serve
a far largerpopulationthan in 1917 (Bobrovnikov1996).3 Nor were Buddhistsspared(Snelling
1993). Although the antireligiouscampaignwas not directedagainst them until 1930, by 1936
all Buddhistmonasterieshad been destroyedand "Molotovcould rejoice in the liquidationof the
'parasiticallama class' as one of the achievementsof Soviet Policy" (Snelling 1993:243).
Throughoutthe Soviet Union the police (and on holidays volunteersfrom Communistyouth
groups) preventedanyone but elderly, regularmembers from entering a church or mosque to
attendservices. In additionto closing churchesand mosques, and persecutingreligious people,
the Soviet regime conducteda constantprogramof atheisteducation,makingit a regularpartof
the primaryand secondaryschool curricula.One of the primarygoals of this campaignwas to
disconnectmoralityand religion and the schools devotedconsiderableeffort to moraleducation,
combinedwith attackson religion.
628 JOURNALFOR THE SCIENTIFICSTUDY OF RELIGION
TABLE 5
GOD AND THE MORAL ORDER IN EASTERN EUROPE
taking power he did provide a religious funeral for his father. But, from the beginning of his rule he
established very friendly, personal relationships with the heads of all religious bodies in Romania,
including Protestants and Jews. Following the overthrow of the Ceausescu regime, some have
condemned these relationships as collaboration (Tokes 1990). Perhaps so, but they also resulted in
a religious climate unlike that in any other Communist state. For example, rather than demand that
Communist Party members be staunch atheists, Ceausescu merely required that Party members
not hold religious offices-many Party members were openly active Christians. In addition, under
Ceausescu, the government gave extensive financial subsidies to all the churches and exempted
all seminarians and clergy from military service. Most important of all, the churches were freely
permitted to operate a huge system of Sunday schools (Barrett 1982). Thus, in Romania, moral
education remained religious education. Writing approximately 15 years after Ceausescu took
over, Earl A. Pope (1981:4) reported that:
Granted that Ceausescu did not tolerate opposition from anyone, including church leaders, but the
fact remains that the religious situation in Romania was unique among Communist states (Barrett
1982; Pope 1981, 1992).
I am unable to document that the image of God portrayed in these Romanian Sunday schools,
including those that were orthodox (as most of them were), was more vigorous and morally
relevant than was sustained in other orthodox nations such as Bulgaria, Byelorus, or Russia, but
that seems likely given that the Romanian Orthodox Church recently welcomed World Vision,
one of the leading evangelical Protestant world mission agencies, to help with the "spiritual
recovery" of Romania. In fact, the majority of staff and board members of World Vision Romania
are provided by the orthodox church (Athyal 1998). This partnership with World Vision is unique
among orthodox churches in Eastern Europe or the former Soviet Union. Indeed, these other
national orthodox churches have become militant opponents of all possible competitors, especially
"outsiders" such as World Vision.
630 JOURNALFOR THE SCIENTIFICSTUDY OF RELIGION
TABLE 6
GOD, MOSQUE ATTENDANCE, AND THE MORAL ORDER
IN TURKEY
Muslims believe that the God of the Torahand of the New Testamentis the same God who
gave the Qur'anto Muhammad,the final prophetin a line beginningwith Abraham.
TABLE 7
GOD, TEMPLE VISITS, AND THE MORAL ORDER IN INDIA
StolenGoods Hit/Run SmokeDope
Correlations
withImportance
of God -0.25** -0.20** -0.27**
withTempleVisits
Correlations 0.02 -0.05 0.08
**Significantabove 0.01.
* Significantabove 0.05.
and, hence, relationshipswith any given God are short-termand utilitarian,as is typical in poly-
theistic religions. But, this is quite erroneous(Fowler 1997; Knipe 1993; Parrinder1983; Smart
1984; Weightman1984). Firstof all, the Hindugods really numberonly two: Vishnuand Shiva.
Each of the many other apparentgods is regardedas an additionalaspect, avatar,or incarnation
of one of these two. Thus, while thereexist many differentHindusects devotedto differentincar-
nations, it is understoodthateach incarnationreally is eitherVishnuor Shiva. Thus, the popular
Krishnais an avatarof Vishnu. Some scholars claim that, in fact, Hindus do not worship both
Vishnu and Shiva (Fowler 1997; Weightman1984). Following a principleknown as ishtadeva,
"the chosen deity,"the individualHindu worshipsone or the other "exclusively as the supreme
God":
one could spend a lifetime in India and never find a "polytheist"in Westernterms, because even an unlettered
peasantwho has just made offerings at several shrineswill affirmthat ... God is one. (Weightman1984:212)
Indeed, Ninian Smart (1984:136) suggests that Hindus do not really believe that there are two
gods, but only one, who can be worshippedeither in the form of Vishnuor Shiva.
No matterwhich form a Hinduchooses to representGod, moralityis centralto Hinduteach-
ings and is subjectto divine sanctions,which take the form of "badkarma."Moralliving in this
world is specified in the dharmasutras and the dharmashastras, which are essentially religious
law books. And, as Simon Weightman(1984:197) explained,rightliving in this world,or dharma,
is "the very centre of Hinduism."While observing dharma is regardedas an end in itself, it is
crucialin termsof karma,the doctrinethatevery actioninfluencesone's futureincarnations.This
is closely related to anothercentral doctrine concerning the sanctity of the caste system: that
anyone's position in this life is God-givenand earnedthroughsin or righteousness.Hence, if the
lowest castes sufferhell on earth,thatis regardedas simplejustice in thatthey are in hell, having
earnedtheirpunishmentin a priorlife. Thus, in termsof moraledification,for a Hinduto observe
the misery of low caste life is tantamountto an actualvisit to hell. These views have declined and
softened to some extent over the past century,as has the concept of hell within Christianity,but
there still ought to be a strongreligious componentto morality.
It follows thatin Indiathe importancegiven to God will be negativelycorrelatedwithtolerance
for immorality.Table7 confirmsHypothesis3-all threecorrelationsin the top row are negative
and significant.The correlationsin the second row are quite remarkable.Had no question been
asked about God, forcing the use only of temple visits as a measureof religiousness, it would
have seemed thatreligion fails to supportmoralityin India:all three correlationsare trivial.But
this would have been very misleading since, in India, God matters,even if ritual participation
does not. Hypotheses3 and 4 are stronglysupported.
The spiritual life of the Japanese takes the form of individual "religious portfolios"
(Iannaccone1995). There are many gods and most Japaneseselect a subset from whom to seek
632 JOURNALFOR THE SCIENTIFICSTUDY OF RELIGION
TABLE 8
GOD, RITUALS, AND THE MORAL ORDER IN JAPAN
TABLE 9
GOD, PRAYER, AND THE MORAL ORDER IN CHINA
Stolen Goods Hit/Run Smoke Dope
Correlationswith Belief in God -0.01 0.04 -0.11
Correlationswith Prayeror Meditation 0.32** 0.27** 0.42**
**Significantabove 0.01.
*
Significantabove 0.05.
These responses can be convertedinto a three-pointscale of the degree of belief in God. Since
only 22 Chinese expressed faith in a personal God, I combined them with the 311 (of 1,000)
who believed in some sort of spirit or life force and scored them as 3 to indicate belief. Those
who didn't know what to thinkwere scored 2. The nonbelieverswere scored 1. It is precisely in
keeping with my analysis of Chinese religion that 94 percent of the believers (those scored 3)
clearlyrejectedthe existence of God as a supernaturalbeing. And, as in Japan,such a God has no
influenceon moraljudgmentsin China(Table9): all threecorrelationsare tiny and insignificant.
It was impossibleto pursuethe effects of temple visits in Chinasince almost no one goes to
the temples-only 2 percentadmitteddoing so even once a year. On the otherhand, 20 percent
said they sometimesprayedor meditated.Scored as a four-pointscale of the frequencyof prayer
or meditation,this variableresulted in a surprisingeffect, as can be seen in the second row of
correlations.Each correlationis strong,highly significant,andpositive! That is, the more often
they prayor meditate,the more tolerantthe Chinese are of immorality.I suggest thatthis resultis
due to the fact thatin China,"prayer"seldomimpliesa long-standing,deeply-feltrelationshipwith
a God, but merely involves requestsfor favors from various divinities of small scope. As such,
praying tends to reflect a quite self-centered and self-serving activity, consistent with rapidly
shifting from one God to anotheron the basis of results (Chen 1995; Green 1988; Lang and
Ragvold 1993). Seen in this light, a question about prayeris likely to select those somewhat
lacking in terms of a social conscience. In any case, these correlationsoffer no supportto the
"law"concerningreligion and the moralorder.
CONCLUSION
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authorthanksGraemeLang, SharonLinzey, Alan Miller, and Michael Williamsfor helpful advice.
NOTES
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