Jurisdiction

Case Digests

Submitted To: 9/29/2016

Judge Emmanuel C. Rasing
 SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL v. MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO
SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA BAGUIO
G.R. No. L-21450, April 15, 1968
(Jurisdiction Over the Subject)

FACTS:

The action at bar, which is a suit for collection of a sum of money in the sum of exactly P
1,908.00, exclusive of interest filed by Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog against Spouses
Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio, was originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu on July 19, 1948. A month prior to the filing of the complaint, the Judiciary Act of 1948 (R.A.
296) took effect depriving the Court of First Instance of original jurisdiction over cases in which the
demand, exclusive of interest, is not more than P 2,000.00 (Secs. 44[c] and 86[b], R.A. 296.)

The case has already been pending now for almost 15 years, and throughout the entire
proceeding the appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction until the receipt of the Court of
Appeals' adverse decision.

Considering that the Supreme Court has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases in
which jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue, the Court of Appeals certified the case to the
Supreme Court along with the records of the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant's motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the
Court of First Instance during the pendency of the appeal will prosper.

RULING:

A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for
different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of
estoppel by laches.

Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length
of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that
the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative
relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question
that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of
explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of
the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party
is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive
as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated — obviously for
reasons of public policy.

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 The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31,
1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which,
according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It
failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court
of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its
case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the
Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction
such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the
present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up
their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.

JURISDICTION Page 1
 JOSE C. MIRANDA v. VIRGILIO M. TULIAO
G.R. No. 158763, March 31, 2006
(Jurisdiction Over Persons)

FACTS:
On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela,
which were later identified as the dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of private
respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness protection program.

Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leañ o, SPO1 Ferdinand
Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio
Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City.

The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of Manila convicted all
of the accused and sentenced them to two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who
was yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large. Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal
was arrested. On 27 April 2001, he executed a sworn confession and identified petitioners Jose C.
Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado
Doe, as the persons responsible for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao.

Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners, Boyet dela
Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June 2001,
Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2
Maderal.

On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation,

to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest.
In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of
petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since the court
did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court.

On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took over the case and
issued a Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan. Consequently, he ordered the
cancellation of the warrant of arrest issued against petitioner Miranda.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to
the jurisdiction of the court.

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RULING:

The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his
person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or
other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction thereover, appearing for
arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to
obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of
the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary
surrender.
There is a distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody
of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for
the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor
constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused. Custody of
the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over the person
of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance.  One can be under the custody
of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person
arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the
other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the
custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced. 

As a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court. Seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal
proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.
There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief
constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent submission of one’s person to the
jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance
of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special appearance. These pleadings are: (1) in
civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant,
whether or not other grounds for dismissal are included; (2) in criminal cases, motions to quash a
complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused; and (3) motions to
quash a warrant of arrest. The first two are consequences of the fact that failure to file them would
constitute a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person. The third is a consequence
of the fact that it is the very legality of the court process forcing the submission of the person of the
accused that is the very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest.
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the
person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an
affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning
such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an
accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the
person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court
applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law.
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e., the
accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking
affirmative relief. Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement for him to be in the custody of the
law.

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 ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY v. EVANGELINE C. COBARRUBIAS
G.R. No. 187104. August 03, 2010
(Totality Rule)

FACTS:

Respondent is an associate professor of the petitioner and an active member of the union of
faculty and employees. The Collective Bargaining Agreements contained the following provision
that for teaching employees in college who fail the yearly evaluation, who are retained for three (3)
cumulative years in five (5) years, shall be on forced leave for one (1) regular semester during
which period all benefits due them shall be suspended. Petitioner placed respondent on forced
leave for failing to achieve the required rating points.

Respondent sought recourse from the CBA’s grievance machinery, but to no avail.
Respondent filed a case with DOLE but circulation and mediation again failed. The parties
submitted the issues between them for voluntary arbitration before Voluntary Arbitrator (VA).

Respondent argued that the CA already resolved the forced leave issue in a prior case
between the parties, ruling that the forced leave for teachers who fail their evaluation for three (3)
times within a five-year period should be coterminous with the CBA in force during the same five-
year period. Petitioner argued that said CA decision is not yet final. The VA dismissed the
complaint.

Respondent filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court but
failed to pay the filing fees and to attach the material portion of the records.

Motion for reconsideration was filed, complying with the procedural lapses, and CA
reinstated the petition.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reinstating respondent’s petition despite her
failure to appeal (docket) fee within the reglementary period.

RULINGS:

Yes. The CA erred in its ruling.

Appeal is not a natural right but a mere statutory privilege, thus, appeal must be made
strictly in accordance with the provision set by law.

Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides that appeals from the judgment of the VA shall be
taken to the CA, by filing a petition for review within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice
of judgment. Furthermore, upon the filing of the petition, the petitioner shall pay to the CA clerk of
court the docketing and other lawful fees; non-compliance with the procedural requirements
shall be a sufficient ground for the petition’s dismissal.

Thus, payment in full of docket fees within the prescribed period is not only mandatory, but also
jurisdictional. It is an essential requirement, without which, the decision appealed from would
become final and executory as if no appeal has been filed. Here, the docket fees were paid late, and

JURISDICTION Page 1
without payment of the full docket fees, Cobarrubias’ appeal was not perfected within the
reglementary period.

There are, however, there are recognized exceptions to their strict observance, such as: (1)
most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate
with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by
immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence of
special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable
to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any
showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be
unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without the
appellant’s fault; (10) peculiar, legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the
name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise
of sound discretion by the judge, guided by all the attendant circumstances.

Thus, there should be an effort, on the part of the party invoking liberality, to advance a
reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules.

In Cobarrubias' case, no such explanation has been advanced. Other than insisting that the
ends of justice and fair play are better served if the case is decided on its merits, Cobarrubias
offered no excuse for her failure to pay the docket fees in full when she filed her petition for review.

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 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY and ENGR. CHRISTINE O. BAUTISTA v.
WINSTON JOSEPH Z. CORDERO and SPS. LUCIO CORDERO
G.R. No. 144118, July 21, 2004
(Totality Rule)

FACTS:

This case involves a school chemical accident under the supervision of Engr. Bautista. It’s a
textbook recommendation for students to use safety goggles in experimenting chemicals however,
in this case, there were none available. In the course of the experiment because of the mixture of
chemicals the test tube where it was contained exploded hitting Winston Cordero in the face. After
being confined to SLU Hospital he was then transferred by his parents to St. Lukes. As a result of the
accident Winston became blind in regards to his right eye while his left eye may still see but with
great discomfort. Sps Cordero filled a complaint for damages and negligence against SLU and Engr.
Bautista.

SLU and Engr. Bautista Sps Corderos

January 24. 1996 Filed a complaint
May 30, 1998 Judgment in favor of Corderos
June 25, 1998 Notice of Appeal Motion for Reconsideration to
increase award of damages from
Opposed the Motion for P500,000 to P1 million
Reconsideration of the Corderos for
having been filed out of time
December 17, Trial Court increased award from P500,000 to P1 million
1998
January 6, 1999 Notice of appeal with the trial court
(docket and other lawful fees had not
been paid)
February 23, Motion to Admit Docket and Filling Fees
1993 (motion was accompanied by two
postal money orders dated 19 February
1999. To explain the delay, petitioner’s
counsel stated that he did not know the
amount to be paid or the manner in
which to pay it )
September 1, Court of Appeals denied petitioners’
1999 motion to admit docket and filing fees.
Their motion for reconsideration from
the aforesaid resolution was likewise
denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the technical rules in perfecting an appeal may be relaxed in favor of
petitioners.

JURISDICTION Page 1
RULING:

No. As a general rule payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory to
the perfection of an appeal.

Petitioners argue that they were denied due process and thus were an exception to the said
general rule. There was no violation of due process. An appeal is a statutory right that may only be
exercised when there is strict compliance with its requirements.

Petitioners argue that the rules on appeal should be relaxed else there would be a
frustration in the administration of justice. In order for the court to relax its rules there must be
exceptional circumstances to warrant it. In this case there is no such exceptional circumstance
neither does the alleged gross negligence of petitioners’ former counsel resulting in the late and
improper payment of docket fees constitute a ground to relax the Court’s procedural rules.

Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a notice of appeal must be filed within the 15-day
reglementary period reckoned from receipt of the decision or order appealed from; the docket and
other lawful fees must also be paid within the same period. In this case, the petitioners were able to
take advantage of two opportunities to file a notice of appeal. The first notice of appeal filed on June
25, 1998 manifested their desire to appeal the original decision of the trial court dated May 30,
1998. The second notice of appeal dated January 6, 1999 expressed petitioners’ intent to appeal the
trial court’s order dated December 17, 1998. However, the petitioners failed to tender payment of
the docket fees. The docket fees should have been paid to the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Echague,
Isabela, on or before January 20, 1999 however the postal money orders were issued on February
19, 1999. It took almost one month before the petitioners to tender payment.

Thus since there is no excusable reason to warrant the relaxation of the rules the appealed
case was rightly dismissed.

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 GENERAL v. CLARAVAL
G.R. No. 96724,March 22, 1991
(Manchester Ruling)

FACTS:

Benneth Thelmo filed with the Office of the Public Prosecutor of Rizal a sworn complaint
accusing Honesto General and another person of libel, where he allegedly suffered actual, moral and
exemplary damages in the total sum of P100 million.

The information for libel subsequently filed with the RTC at Pasig, after preliminary
investigation, did not however contain any allegation respecting the damages due the offended
party. The defense raised the issue of non-payment of the docket fees corresponding to the claim of
damages contained in Thelmo's sworn complaint before the fiscal, as a bar to Thelmo's pursuing his
civil action therefor. The trial Court however, overruled the objection. Thus, Thelmo filed for a writ
of certiorari to annul the aforesaid Orders of the Trial Court alleging that the decision had been
rendered with grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the filing fees for the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from
the offense should first be paid in order that said civil action may be deemed to have been impliedly
instituted with the criminal and prosecuted in due course.

RULING:

No. Manchester laid down the doctrine the specific amounts of claims of damages must be
alleged both in the body and the prayer of the complaint, and the filing fees corresponding thereto
paid at the time of the filing of the complaint; that if these requisites were not fulfilled, jurisdiction
could not be acquired by the trial court; and that amendment of the complaint could not "thereby
vest jurisdiction upon the Court."

This Court's plain intent—to make the Manchester doctrine, requiring payment of filing fees
at the time of the commencement of an action applicable to impliedly instituted civil actions under
Section 1, Rule 111 only when "the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint
or information—has thus been made manifest by the language of the amendatory provisions.

In any event, the Court now makes that intent plainer, and in the interests of clarity and
certainty, categorically declares for the guidance of all concerned that when a civil action is deemed
impliedly instituted with the criminal in accordance with Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court—
because the offended party has NOT waived the civil action, or reserved the right to institute it
separately, or instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action.

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 VICTORINO QUINAGORAN v. COURT OF APPEALS and THE HEIRS OF
JUAN DE LA CRUZ
G.R. No. 155179, August 24, 2007
(Judicial Notice)

FACTS:
The heirs of Juan dela Cruz, represented by Senen, filed on October 27, 1994 a Complaint for
Recovery of Portion of Registered Land with Compensation and Damages
against Victorino Quinagoran before the RTC of Tuao, Cagayan. The heirs alleged that they are the
co-owners of a a parcel of land containing 13,100 sq m located at Centro, Piat, Cagayan, which they
inherited from the late Juan dela Cruz;  that in the mid-70s, Quinagoran started occupying a house
on the north-west portion of the property, covering 400 sq m, by tolerance of the heirs; that in
1993, they asked Quinagoran to remove the house as they planned to construct a commercial
building on the property; that Quinagoran refused, claiming ownership over the lot; and that they
suffered damages for their failure to use the same. The heirs prayed for the reconveyance and
surrender of the disputed 400 sq m, more or less, and to be paid the amount of P5,000.00 monthly
until the property is vacated, attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00, costs of suit and
other reliefs and remedies just and equitable.

Quinagoran filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the
case under RA 7691, which expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC to include all
civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein which
does not exceed P20,000.00. He argued that since the 346 sq m lot which he owns adjacent to the
contested property has an assessed value of P1,730.00, the assessed value of the lot under
controversy would not be more than the said amount.

The RTC denied Quinagoran's Motion to Dismiss in an Order dated November 11, 1999,

because present action on the basis of the allegation of the complaint partakes of the nature of
action publiciana and jurisdiction over said action lies with the Regional Trial Court, regardless of
the value of the property. This is so because in paragraph 8 of the complaint, it is alleged that the
plaintiff demanded from the defendant the removal of the house occupied by the defendant and the
possession of which is only due to Tolerance of the said heirs. Quinagoran's Motion
for Reconsideration was also denied by the RTC. Quinagoran then went to the CA on a Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking the annulment of the Orders of the RTC.

On May 27, 2002, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision dismissing Quinagoran's
action and affirming in toto the RTC. CA stated that, it is settled that when the complaint fails to aver
facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry
was effected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be
an accion publiciana or an accion reinvindicatoria in the proper regional trial court.
Quinagoran's Motion for Reconsideration was denied on August 28, 2002 for lack of merit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA Decision and Resolution be annulled and set aside and that the
complaint of the heirs of Juan de la Cruz before the trial court be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction,
because 1) under R.A. No. 7691 the MTC has jurisdiction over the case and 2) that it is an indispensable
requirement that the complaint should allege the assessed value of the property involved.

JURISDICTION Page 1
RULING:
Yes. The doctrine on which the RTC anchored its denial of Quinagoran's Motion
to Dismiss, as affirmed by the CA -- that all cases of recovery of possession or accion publiciana lies
with the regional trial courts regardless of the value of the property -- no longer holds true. As
things now stand, a distinction must be made between those properties the assessed value of which
is below P20,000, if outside Metro Manila; and P50,000.00, if within. Republic Act No. 7691 which
amended Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and which was already in effect when respondents filed their
complaint with the RTC on October 27, 1994. The Court has also declared that all cases involving
title to or possession of real property with an assessed value of less than P20,000.00 if outside
Metro Manila, falls under the original jurisdiction of the MTC. In Atuel v. Valdez the Court likewise
expressly stated that:

Jurisdiction over an accion publiciana is vested in a court of general

jurisdiction. Specifically, the RTC exercises exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil
actions which involve x xx possession of real property. However, if the assessed value
of the real property involved does not exceed P50,000.00 in Metro Manila,
and P20,000.00 outside of Metro Manila, the municipal trial court exercises
jurisdiction over actions to recover possession of real propert.

In no uncertain terms, the Court has already held that a complaint must allege the assessed
value of the real property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to determine which court
has jurisdiction over the action. This is because the nature of the action and which court has
original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined by the material allegations of the
complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff and the law in effect when the action is filed,
irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claims asserted therein.
Nowhere in said complaint was the assessed value of the subject property ever mentioned. There is
therefore no showing on the face of the complaint that the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction over the
action of the respondents.
 
The Court of Appeals's Decision dated May 27, 2002 and its Resolution dated August 28,
2002, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Courts Orders dated November 11,
1999 and May 11, 2000, and all proceedings therein are declared NULL and VOID. The complaint is
dismissed without prejudice.

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 JOVENAL OUANO v. PGTT INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT CORPORATION
and HON. JUDGE RAMON G. CODILLA, JR.
G.R. No. 134230, July 17, 2002
(Manchester Ruling)

FACTS:
PGTT INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT CORPORATION filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Cebu City a complaint against Jovenal Ouano for Recovery of Ownership and Possession of Real
Property and Damages. It alleged that it is the owner of Lot Nos. 1-10, Block 2 of the Sunnymeade
Crescent Subdivision located at Pit-os, Talamban, Cebu City. That PGTT found that Ouano uprooted
the concrete monuments of the said lots, plowed them and planted corn thereon. Despite PGTT’s
demand that he vacate the lots and restore them to their original condition, Ouano refused, claiming
he is the owner and lawful possessor of the 380 square meters he occupied. Thus, PGTT was
deprived of the use of its property and suffered damages. PGTT then prayed that judgment be
rendered ordering defendant to vacate the premises and restore the lots to their original condition;
pay plaintiff P100, 000.00 as damages per year, beginning October, 1996 until he shall have vacated
the premises and restored the lots to their original condition; pay P100, 000.00 as attorney's fees;
and pay P50, 000.00 as expenses of litigation.

Ouano filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it is the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC), not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over it considering that the assessed value of the
lots involved is only P2, 910, as indicated in the latest tax declaration. PGTT contends that the RTC
has jurisdiction since the market value of the lots is P49,760.00.5 Besides, the complaint is not only
an action for recovery of ownership and possession of real property, but also for damages
exceeding P100,000.00, over which claim the RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction.

The trial court ruled that it has jurisdiction over the case because it is of judicial knowledge
that the real properties situated in Cebu City command a higher valuation than those indicated in
the tax declaration.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
2. Whether or not damages of whatever kind should be included in the determination of the
jurisdictional amount.

RULING:
1. RTC has no jurisdiction over the case.
Since the action involves ownership and possession of real property, the jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the claim is determined by the assessed value, not the market value.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. 7691. Section 33 (paragraph 3) of the said law
provides:
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein
does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where
such assessed value does not exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs: 

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 Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such
property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.

Likewise, Section 19 (paragraph 2) of the same law reads:

(2) In all civil actions, which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00)or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings,
original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts

It is undisputed that the assessed value of the property involved, as shown by the
corresponding tax declaration, is only P2, 910.00. As such, the complaint is well within the
MTC’s P20, 000.00 jurisdictional limit. It is elementary that the tax declaration indicating the
assessed value of the property enjoys the presumption of regularity as it has been issued by the
proper government agency.

2. No. The said damages are merely incidental to, or a consequence of, the main cause of action
for recovery of ownership and possession of real property.

Administrative Circular No. 09-94 setting the guidelines in the implementation of R.A. 7691.
Paragraph 2 states:
"2. The exclusion of the term ‘damages of whatever kind’ in determining the jurisdictional
amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. 7691,
applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main
cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one
of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction
of the court.

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 HILARIO v. SALVADOR
G.R. No. 160384, April 29, 2005
(Manchester Ruling)

FACTS:

Cesar, Ibarra, Nestor, Lina and Prescilla, all surnamed Hilario, filed a complaint with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) against private respondent Allan T. Salvador. They alleged that they are
the co-owners by inheritance from Concepcion Mazo Salvador of a parcel of land located in Sawang,
Romblon, which property was adjudged as the hereditary share of their father, Brigido M. Hilario,
Jr. Sometime in 1989, defendant constructed his dwelling unit of mixed materials on the property of
the plaintiff’s father without the knowledge of the plaintiffs or their predecessors-in-interest. To
reach a possible amicable settlement, the plaintiffs brought the matter to the Lupon of Barangay
Sawang, to no avail. Petitioners filed an action to recover property before the Regional Trial Court.

The private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the nature of the action. He averred that (1) the complaint failed to state the
assessed value of the land in dispute; (2) the complaint does not sufficiently identify and/or
describe the parcel of land referred to as the subject-matter of this action; both of which are
essential requisites for determining the jurisdiction of the Court where the case is filed. The
petitioners opposed the motion. They contended that the RTC had jurisdiction over the action since
the court can take judicial notice of the market value of the property

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners.

RULING:

No. The jurisdiction of the court over an action involving title to or possession of land is now
determined by the assessed value of the said property and not the market value thereof. The assessed
value of real property is the fair market value of the real property multiplied by the assessment
level. It is synonymous to taxable value. The fair market value is the price at which a property may
be sold by a seller, who is not compelled to sell, and bought by a buyer, who is not compelled to buy.

The complaint will show that it does not contain an allegation stating the assessed value of
the property subject of the complaint. The court cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or
market value of lands. Absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property,
it cannot thus be determined whether the RTC or the MTC had original and exclusive jurisdiction
over the petitioner’s action. In this case, the MTC had jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners
since the case involved title to or possession of real property with an assessed value of less
than P20,000.00. Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners, all the
proceedings therein, including the decision of the RTC, are null and void. The complaint should
perforce be dismissed.

JURISDICTION Page 1
ARTEMIO INIEGO v. THE HONORABLE JUDGE GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN,
in his official capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 42, City of Manila, and FOKKER C. SANTOS
G. R. No. 166876, March 24, 2006
(Actions Capable or Incapable of Pecuniary Estimation)

FACTS:
On 1 March 2002, private respondent Fokker Santos filed a complaint for quasi-delict and
damages against Jimmy T. Pinion, the driver of a truck involved in a traffic accident, and against
petitioner Artemio Iniego, as owner of the said truck and employer of Pinion. The complaint
stemmed from a vehicular accident that happened on 11 December 1999, when a freight truck
allegedly being driven by Pinion hit private respondent’s jitney which private respondent was
driving at the time of the accident.

On 28 August 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Admit and a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint on the ground, among other things, that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the cause of
action of the case. According to petitioner, the amount which is the basis of the jurisdiction of the
court should be the actual damages only in the amount of P 40, 000.00, excluding the moral and
exemplary damages, because the case of quasi-delict only resulted to the actual damages in the
exclusion of the latter.

The decision of the court states that the court is of the view that the main cause of action is
not the claim for damages but quasi-delict. Damages are being claimed only as a result of the
alleged fault or negligence of both defendants under Article 2176 of the Civil Code in the case of
defendant Pinion and under Article 2180 also of the Civil Code in the case of defendant Iniego. But
since fault or negligence (quasi-delicts) could not be the subject of pecuniary estimation, the court
has exclusive jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the action of quasi-delict is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
2. Whether or not the basis of the jurisdictional amount should exclude the moral and exemplary
damages.

RULING:
It is capable of pecuniary estimation. In a recent case decided by the Court, which was also
cited in the case, the decision is stated as follows: “Respondent Judge’s observation is erroneous. It
is crystal clear from B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, that what must be
determined to be capable or incapable of pecuniary estimation is not the cause of action, but the
subject matter of the action. 9 A cause of action is "the delict or wrongful act or omission committed
by the defendant in violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff.” On the other hand, the "subject
matter of the action" is "the physical facts, the thing real or personal, the money, lands, chattels, and
the like, in relation to which the suit is prosecuted, and not the delict or wrong committed by the
defendant.”

In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal
action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or
in the courts of first instance [now Regional Trial Courts] would depend on the amount of the claim.

JURISDICTION Page 1
 However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of
money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief
sought like suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract (specific performance) and
in actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this court has
considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms
of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance [now Regional Trial Courts]

Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are primarily and effectively actions for the
recovery of a sum of money for the damages suffered because of the defendant’s alleged tortious
acts. The damages claimed in such actions represent the monetary equivalent of the injury caused
to the plaintiff by the defendant, which are thus sought to be recovered by the plaintiff. This money
claim is the principal relief sought, and is not merely incidental thereto or a consequence thereof. It
bears to point out that the complaint filed by private respondent before the RTC actually bears the
caption "for DAMAGES."

The Court rule that the subject matter of actions for damages based on quasi-delict is
capable of pecuniary estimation.

All damages should be included in the basis of the jurisdictional amount for cases of
quasi-delicts are capable of pecuniary estimation and its basis is the amount of the damages
claimed. . The distinction he made between damages arising directly from injuries in a quasi-delict
and those arising from a refusal to admit liability for a quasi-delict is more apparent than real, as
the damages sought by respondent originate from the same cause of action: the quasi-delict. The
fault or negligence of the employee and the juris tantum presumption of negligence of his employer
in his selection and supervision are the seeds of the damages claimed, without distinction.
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the claims for moral and exemplary damages
arose from a cause of action other than the quasi-delict, their inclusion in the computation of
damages for jurisdictional purposes is still proper. All claims for damages should be considered in
determining the jurisdiction of the court regardless of whether they arose from a single cause of
action or several causes of action. Rule 2, Section 5, of the Rules of Court allows a party to assert as
many causes of action as he may have against the opposing party. Subsection (d) of said section
provides that where the claims in all such joined causes of action are principally for recovery of
money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction.

Hence, whether or not the different claims for damages are based on a single cause of action
or different causes of action, it is the total amount thereof which shall govern. Jurisdiction in the
case at bar remains with the RTC, considering that the total amount claimed, inclusive of the moral
and exemplary damages claimed, isP490,000.00.

JURISDICTION Page 1
 SPOUSES HUGUETE v. SPOUSES EMBUDO
G.R No. 49554, July 1, 2003
(Actions Capable or Incapable of Pecuniary Estimation)

FACTS:

Petitioner spouses filed a complaint for the annulment of deed of sale and partition of the
50-square meter portion of land against respondent spouses in the RTC.
Respondent spouses filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case, arguing that the action is one for annulment of title and the total
assessed value of the subject land was only P15,000.00 which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the MTC, pursuant to Sec 33(3) of BP Blg 129, as amended by RA 7691.
Petitioner spouses filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss alleging that the subject matter of
the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation and, therefore, is cognizable by the RTC, as provided
by Sec 19(1) of BP 129, as amended.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the civil action is one in which the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary
estimation.

RULING:

No. The argument that the present action is one incapable of pecuniary estimation
considering that it is for annulment of deed of sale and partition is not well-taken.
What determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it are the
allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought (Cañ iza vs CA).
And in Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill, the Supreme Court ruled that:
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal
action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether the jurisdiction is in the municipal
courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However,
where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the
money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court
has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated
in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now Regional
Trial Courts).

The principal purpose of the petitioners in filing the complaint was to secure title to the 50-
square meter portion of the property which they purchased from the respondents. Their cause of
action is based on their right as purchaser of the subject land from respondents. They pray that
they be declared owners of the property sold. Thus, their complaint involved title to real property
or any interest therein. The alleged value of the land which they purchased was P15,000.00, which
was within the jurisdiction of MTC.

The annulment of the deed of sale, were prayed for in the complaint because they were
necessary before the lot may be partitioned and the 50-square meter portion subject thereof may
be conveyed to petitioners.

JURISDICTION Page 1
 EULALIA RUSSELL v. HONORABLE AUGUSTINE A. VESTlL, ADRIANO
TAGALOG, MARCELO TAUTHO, JUANITA MENDOZA, DOMINGO BANTILAN,
RAUL BATALUNA AND ARTEMIO CABATINGAN
G.R. No. 119347, March 17, 1999
(Actions Capable or Incapable of Pecuniary Estimation)

FACTS:
Spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho own a property situated in Liloan, Cebu and
containing an area of 56, 977.40 square meters, more or less. When Casimero and Cesaria died, the
property was inherited by their heirs, herein Petitioners and Respondents. The property remained
undivided until respondents found a public document denominated "DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND
DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF A PREVIOUS ORAL AGREEMENT OF PARTITION," executed on June 6,
1990. By virtue of this deed, Respondents divided the property among themselves to the exclusion
of petitioners who are also entitled to the said lot as heirs of the late spouses Casimero Tautho and
Cesaria Tautho. Petitioners claimed that the document was false and perjurious as the Respondents
were not the only heirs and that no oral partition of the property whatsoever had been made
between the heirs” Thus, Petitioners filed a complaint against Respondents, denominated
"DECLARATION OF NULLITY AND PARTITION," with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City. The
complaint prayed that the document be declared null and void and an order be issued to partition
the land among all the heirs. In response, Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss saying that the RTC
has no jurisdiction over the case since the property subject of the controversy has an assessed value
of Php 5,000 which is within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court. Petitioners opposed the
motion contending that the issue is one incapable of pecuniary estimation. The RTC granted the
Motion to Dismiss and subsequently denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Petitioners.
Hence, the Petitioners elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via Petition for Certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether the controversy at hand is one capable of pecuniary estimation.

RULING:
No. The complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is doubtless one incapable of
pecuniary estimation and therefore within the jurisdiction of said court.

Examples of actions incapable of pecuniary estimation are those for specific performance,
support, or foreclosure of mortgage or annulment of judgment; also actions questioning the validity
of a mortgage, annulling a deed of sale or conveyance and to recover the price paid and for
rescession, which is a counterpart of specific performance.

The main purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint is to declare null and void the
document in which private respondents declared themselves as the only heirs of the late spouses
Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho and divided his property among themselves to the exclusion
of petitioners who also claim to be legal heirs and entitled to the property. While the complaint also
prays for the partition of the property, this is just incidental to the main action, which is the
declaration of nullity of the document above-described. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the
subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint
and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some
of the claims asserted therein

JURISDICTION Page 1
 RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. v. COURT OF
APPEALS and MANUEL DULAWON
G.R. No. 136109, August 1, 2002
(Actions Capable or Incapable of Pecuniary Estimation)

FACTS:
On June 18, 1997, private respondent Manuel Dulawon filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25, a complaint for breach of contract of lease with damages against
petitioner Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI). Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint for lack of jurisdiction contending that it is the Municipal Trial Court which has
jurisdiction as the complaint is basically one for collection of unpaid rentals in the sum of
P84,000.00, which does not exceed the jurisdictional amount of P100,000.00 for Regional Trial
Courts. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, as well as petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. Hence, petitioner went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari. On April
30, 1998, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by private
respondent.

RULING:
Yes.It is settled that a breach of contract is a cause of action either for specific performance
or rescission of contracts. In Manufacturer’s Distributors, Inc. v. Siu Liong, the Court held that
actions for specific performance are incapable of pecuniary estimation and therefore fall under the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court Here, the averments in the complaint reveal that the suit
filed by private respondent was primarily one for specific performance as it was aimed to enforce
their three-year lease contract which would incidentally entitle him to monetary awards if the court
should find that the subject contract of lease was breached. As alleged therein, petitioner’s failure to
pay rentals due for the period from January to March 1997, constituted a violation of their contract
which had the effect of accelerating the payment of monthly rentals for the years 1997 and 1998.
The same complaint likewise implied a premature and unilateral termination of the term of the
lease with the closure of and removal all communication equipment in the leased premises. Under
the circumstances, the court has to scrutinize the facts and the applicable laws in order to
determine whether there was indeed a violation of their lease agreement that would justify the
award of rentals and damages. The prayer, therefore, for the payment of unpaid rentals in the
amount of P84,000.00 plus damages consequent to the breach is merely incidental to the main
action for specific performance.

Clearly, the action for specific performance case, irrespective of the amount of rentals and
damages sought to be recovered, is incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence cognizable exclusively
by the Regional Trial Court. The trial court, therefore, did not err in denying petitioner’s motion to
dismiss.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 45987 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

JURISDICTION Page 1
 GENESIS INVESTMENT INC., CEBU JAYA REALTY v. HEIRS OF
EBARASABAL
GR No. 181622, November 20, 2013
(Joinder of Issues)

FACTS:

Roman Ebarasabal, during hi lifetime acquired a parcel of land with an assessed value of P
2,890. In 2002 the assessed value of the lot was at P 11,9990. Upon his death, his eight (children
became the co-owners of said lot. The children of Roman are : Ceferino ,Florol,Leona, Pedro, Isidro,
Benito, Julian and Gil. After several years of co- ownership the other Ebarasabal heirs found that the
descendants of Gil Ebarasabal have executed among themselves Extrajudicial Settlement with sale
of parcel of lot to Genesis Investment Inc. for P2, 600,000.00. Genesis was able to have the title
issued under Cebu Jaya Realty.

Other heirs then instituted an action for Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of
Shares, Partition, Damages and Attorney’s Fees before the Regional Trial Court. Genesis filed
motion to dismiss on the ground that based on assessed value of the lot and since case involves title
to or possession of real property, the proper jurisdiction lies with Municipal Trial Court.

ISSUE:
Whether the jurisdiction lies with Regional Trial Court or not.

RULING:
Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction.

In determining whether an action is one of the subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation, the court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the
principal action or remedy sought, where the basis issue is something other than the right to
recover a sum of money, where the money is purely incidental, or a consequence of, the principal
relief sought, such actions where the subject of litigation may not be estimated in terms of money
and are cognizable by RTC.

In this case, it is true that one of the causes of actions pertains to recovery of title or
possession to and interest of each parties over said parcel of land, but the principal relief sought
was for the nullification of said Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale entered into by descendant of Gil
Ebarasabal with the petitioners. Thus, the recovery of the undivided shares or interest simply
becomes a necessary consequence if the deed is annulled.

In joinder of causes of action, the joinder may be allowed in the RTC, provided that one of
the casues of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and venues lies therein. The case
clearly falls within the RTC jurisdiction.

JURISDICTION Page 1
 PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC., and ALEXANDER BUNCAN v.
STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., and MARTINA GICALE
G.R. No. 140746. March 16, 2005
(Joinder of Issues)

FACTS:
On October 1984, Crispin Gicale was driving the passenger jeepney owned by his mother
Martina Gicale. It was raining and one of Pantranco’s passenger bus, driven by Alexander Buncan,
hit the left rear side of the jeepney and sped away.

The total cost of repair was 21, 415.00 but respondent insurance company paid only
8,000.00. Martina shouldered the balance of 13, 415.00.

Respondents then demanded reimbursement from petitioner and its driver, but they
refused.

Respondents then filed for a sum of money. In their answer, petitioner denied and averred
that MTC had jurisdiction.

RTC ruled in favor of respondents. CA affirmed applying the totality rule.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction.

RULING:
Yes. Permissive joinder of parties requires that: (a) the right to relief arises out of the same
transaction or series of transactions; (b) there is a question of law or fact common to all the
plaintiffs or defendants; and (c) such joinder is not otherwise proscribed by the provisions of the
Rules on jurisdiction and venue.

In this case, there is a single transaction common to all, that is, Pantrancos bus hitting the
rear side of the jeepney. There is also a common question of fact, that is, whether petitioners are
negligent. There being a single transaction common to both respondents, consequently, they have
the same cause of action against petitioners. respondents cause of action against petitioners arose
out of the same transaction. Thus, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims.

Respondent Standards claim is P8,000.00, while that of respondent Martina Gicale is

P13,415.00, or a total of P21,415.00. Section 19 of B.P. Blg. 129 provides that the RTC has exclusive
original jurisdiction over all other cases, in which the demand, exclusive of interest and cost or the
value of the property in controversy, amounts to more than twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00).
Clearly, it is the RTC that has jurisdiction over the instant case. It bears emphasis that when the
complaint was filed, R.A. 7691 expanding the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan, Municipal and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts had not yet taken effect. It became effective on April 15, 1994.

JURISDICTION Page 1
 IRENE SANTE AND REYNALDO SANTE v. HON. EDILBERTO T.
CLARAVALL, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 60, Regional
Trial Court of Baguio City, and VITA N. KALASHIAN
G.R. No. 17391, February 22, 2010
(Money Claims Principally For Damages)

FACTS:

While Kalashian was inside the Police Station Sante uttered words, "How many rounds of
sex did you have last night with your boss, Bert? You fuckin’ bitch!" Bert is Kalashian’s friend and
personal security guard. Kalashian also alleges that Sante spread rumors that she is involved in a
killing incident. Kalashian filed before the RTC of Baguio City a complaint for damages against
Sante and prayed that Sante be held liable to pay moral damages in the amount
of P300,000.00; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; P50,000.00 attorney’s fees; P20,000.00
litigation expenses.

Sante alleges that it was the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) and not the RTC of
Baguio who has jurisdiction. They argued that the amount of the claim for moral damages was not
more than P300,000.00, because the claim for exemplary damages should be excluded in computing
the total claim. The trial court ruled that the total claim of respondent amounted toP420,000.00
which was within the jurisdiction of the RTC..

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Regional Trial Court acquire jurisdiction over the case.

RULING:

The jurisdictional amount of the RTC is above P300,000.00. If the case is in Metro Manila,
the jurisdictional amount shall be above P400,000.00.

The exclusion of damages in determining the jurisdictional amount applies to cases where
the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in
cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the
amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.

In this case, the main cause of action is for damages. The complaint principally sought an
award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, for the
alleged shame and injury suffered by Kalashian. In addition to the moral damages, the exemplary
damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, are not merely incidental to the main action but
constitute the primary relief prayed for. Considering that the total amount of damages claimed
was P420,000.00, the RTC had jurisdiction over the case.

JURISDICTION Page 1
 EDUARDO G. AGTARAP v. SEBASTIAN AGTARAP, JOSEPH AGTARAP,
TERESA AGTARAP, WALTER DE SANTOS and ABELARDO DAGORO
G.R. No. 177099 June 8, 2011
(General Rule and Exceptions of the Probate Court)

FACTS:
Joaquin Agtarap died intestate on November 21, 1964 without any known debts or
obligations. During his lifetime he contracted 2 marriages. First to Lucia who died in 1924 and
having 3 children, namely Jesus (died without issue); Milagros; Jose (who is survived by his 3
children, Gloria, Joseph and Teresa). Second to Caridad and they also had 3 children, Eduardo;
Sebastian; and Mercedes (survived by her daughter Cecile). Joaquin left 2 parcels of land with
improvement in Pasay City.

His son Eduardo from his second wife filed petition for settlement of Joaquin’s intestate
estate. The Regional Trial Court issued a resolution appointing Eduardo as administrator. The court
also issued an order of partition which ruled that the “bulk of estate property was acquired during
the existence of the 2nd marriage.

Joseph and Teresa (Jose’s children) filed their motion for reconsideration. The Regional
Trial Court granted the motion and declared that the “real properties belonged to conjugal
partnership of Joaquin and Lucia” and directed partition to reflect the correct sharing of heirs. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court as intestate court has jurisdiction to resolve
ownership of real properties.

RULING:
Yes. The Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to resolve the ownership of real properties. As
a general rule, jurisdiction of trial court, either as probate or intestate court, relates only to matters
having to do with probate of will and or settlement of estate of deceased persons and does not
extend to determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. However, as
an exception, as justified by expediency and convenience, probate court may provisionally pass
upon in an interstate or testate proceeding the question of inclusion or exclusion, from inventory of
a piece of property without prejudice to final determination in a separate action.

If interested parties are all heirs or question is of collation/advancement or parties consent

to the assumption of jurisdiction by the court and the rights of the petitioners are not impaired.

JURISDICTION Page 1
SPS. BRAULIO ABALOS and AQUILINA ABALOS and JUANITO ULANDAY v.
COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF ROMAN SORIANO, ELCOCADIO SORIANO
and LIBRADA SORIANO
G.R. No. 99843 June 22, 1993
(Limited Jurisdiction of the RTC as Land Registration Court)

FACTS:
Spouses Braulio and Aquilina Abalos filed before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
Branch 38, an application for registration of title over Lot No. 60052 and three-fourths (¾) pro-
indiviso of Lot No. 8459, situated in barangay Baay, Lingayen and under Cad-373-D of the Lingayen
Cadastre, with the remaining one-fourth (¼) pro-indiviso portion thereof belonging to Roman
Soriano.

The trial court, sitting as a land registration court, issued an order of general default against
the whole world except the Director of Lands and Roman Soriano. In his opposition, oppositor
Soriano alleged that the two lots mentioned in the application had in fact not yet been divided and
therefore, he is a co-owner to the extent of one-seventh (¹/  7) pro-indiviso of the combined areas of
Lot Nos. 60052 and 8459 and not only one-fourth (¼) of Lot No. 8459. It was established that the
lots in question were originally owned by Adriano Soriano. Thereafter, Adriano's heirs executed a
deed of extrajudicial partition and subsequently sold to petitioners.

The land registration court in its decision granted the application for registration of
petitioners. This Court also confirms the title of the herein private oppositor over the one-fourth
(¼) pro-indiviso portion. A day after the promulgation of the trial court's decision granting the
application of petitioners in the land registration case, oppositor filed a complaint against spouses
Abalos for the annulment of document and/or redemption, ownership and damages before the
Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan, Branch 37. The spouses Abalos filed motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground of res judicata, pendency of another action, lack of cause of action, laches,
misjoinder of parties and lack of jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion. Petitioners filed
petition for certiorari and prohibition before the respondent court alleging grave abuse of
discretion having been committed by the trial court in not dismissing the complaint.

Respondent court disagreed with the petitioners and dismissed the petition. It ruled that
the lower court, acting as a land registration court, exercises limited jurisdiction. Therefore, it
cannot pass upon questions regarding the validity of contracts affecting the disputed property.
Accordingly, a land registration court having limited jurisdiction may not resolve an issue involving
the validity of the deed of sale which is ordinarily cognizable by a court of general jurisdiction.
Concluding, respondent court held that the trial court committed no error when it refused to
adhere to the rule on res judicata which requires that the resolution of the issue in the prior case
should have been made by a court of competent jurisdiction. The appellate court also cited Franco
v. Monte de Piedad and Savings Bank which held that the general rule that a land registration court
has no power to decide matters which are properly litigable in ordinary civil actions admits of
exceptions as when the parties have acquiesced in submitting said matters for determination in the
land registration proceedings and the parties are afforded full opportunity to present their
respective sides and evidence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court, sitting as a land registration court, has jurisdiction to
determine conflicting claims of ownership over the land sought to be registered.

JURISDICTION Page 1
RULING:
Yes. The court reversed the decision of Respondent court. True, a land registration court
exercises special and limited jurisdiction. But this is not without exception. The jurisdiction of a
land registration court being limited in character, deviations have been sanctioned under the
following circumstances where: (1) the parties agreed or have acquiesced in submitting the
aforesaid issues for determination by the court in the registration proceedings; (2) the parties were
accorded full opportunity in presenting their respective arguments of the issues litigated and of the
evidence in support thereof; and (3) the court has already considered the evidence on record and is
convinced that the same is sufficient and adequate for rendering a decision upon the issues
controverted.

Here, the issue of ownership was fully ventilated before the land registration court with
both of the parties presenting oral and documentary evidence to sustain their respective claims. It
was a full-dress trial on the merits of the applicants' claim over the parcels of land with the then
oppositor, Roman Soriano, having been accorded every opportunity to refute the same. Indeed,
Soriano even offered to sell his shares in the property to petitioners spouses but the latter found
the conditions so onerous that the transaction failed to materialize.

Generally, an issue properly litigable in an ordinary civil action under the general
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance (RTC) should not be resolved in a land registration
proceeding. But since in this jurisdiction the Court of First Instance (RTC) also functions as a land
registration court, if the parties acquiesced in submitting that issue for determination in the land
registration proceeding and they were given full opportunity to present their respective sides and
their evidence, the land registration court would have jurisdiction to pass upon that issue.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision of the respondent court is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, of Lingayen, Pangasinan, is
further ordered to dismiss Civil Case No. 15958 with costs against plaintiffs therein. Costs against
private respondents in this instance. SO ORDERED

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 LETICIA P. LIGON v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 107751, June 1, 1995
(Limited Jurisdiction of the RTC as Land Registration Court)

FACTS:

On 19 October 1990 respondent Iglesia ni Kristo (INK) filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City a complaint for specific performance with damages against the Islamic Directorate of
the Philippines (IDP). IDP failed to fulfill this obligation stipulated in the deed of sale to evict all
squatters and illegal occupants in the property within forty-five (45) days from the execution of the
contract.. Hence INK prayed that the trial court order IDP to comply with its obligation of clearing
the subject lots of illegal occupants and to pay damages to INK.

On 12 September 1991 the trial court rendered partial judgment granting the reliefs prayed
for by INK except the prayer for damages which was to be resolved later. On 22 January 1992 INK
filed a motion in the same case praying that petitioner Leticia Ligon, who was in possession of the
certificates of title over the properties as mortgagee of IDP, be directed to surrender the certificates
to the Register of Deeds of Quezon City for the registration of the Absolute Deed of Sale in its name.
On 15 February 1992 petitioner filed an opposition questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court
because the motion involved the registrability of the document of sale, and she was not made a
party to the main case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the petitioner.

RULING:

Yes. The RTC had jurisdiction over the petitioner. Under Sec. 2 of P.D. No. 1529, it is now
provided that “Regional Trial Courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for
original registration of titles to lands, including improvements and interest therein and over all
petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions
arising upon such applications or petitions." The principal action filed by INK before the trial court
was for specific performance with damages based on a document of sale. Such action was well
within the exclusive jurisdictions of the Regional Trial Court. Hence, when INK filed a motion for the
issuance of an order from the same court to compel the holder of the duplicate certificates of title to
surrender the same to the Register of Deeds for the registration of the deed of sale subject of the
principal action, the motion was a necessary incident to the main case. The surrender by petitioner
will not create any substantial injustice to her. On the contrary, to grant the petition and compel
INK to file a new action in order to obtain the same reliefs it asked in the motion before the trial
court is to encourage litigations where no substantial rights are prejudiced. This end should be
avoided. Courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper
administration of justice. The rules are intended to insure the orderly conduct of litigations because
of the higher objective they seek, which is, to protect the parties' substantive rights

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 LA CAMPANA FOOD PRODUCTS, INC. v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND
CASCADE COMMERCIAL CORP.
G.R. No. L-88246 June 4, 1993
(Limited Jurisdiction of the RTC as Land Registration Court)

FACTS:

On February 15, 1982, petitioner La Campana Food Products, Inc. leased a building and lot
in Quezon City to private respondent Cascade Commercial Corporation for a period of 4 years
beginning March 1, 1982.  On February 19, 1986, La Campana filed against Cascade a complaint for
ejectment with preliminary attachment in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. The
complaint alleged non-payment of rentals since August 1985 despite repeated demands by the
plaintiffs on the defendant. It prayed that a writ of preliminary attachment be issued for the amount
of P73,820.60 to answer for the unpaid rentals. The defendant was also asked to vacate the
premises and to pay the unpaid rentals in the sum of P73,820.60 plus the amount of P15,000
monthly starting from March 1986 as the reasonable value of the use of the premises. On April 4,
1986, Cascade filed a Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Discharge of Attachment. The motions
alleged that, in view of the circumstances surrounding the case, the complaint should be considered
an action for a sum of money and not ejectment. Since the amount claimed was over P20,000, the
Metropolitan Trial Court had no jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Metropolitan Trial Court had jurisdiction over the ejectment case.

RULING:

No, the Metropolitan Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the ejectment case.

The reason is that the lack of the averment that there was demand to vacate the premises
was never raised by the private respondent in the Metropolitan Trial court and the Regional Trial
Court, and not even in the Court of Appeals. The private respondent had questioned the jurisdiction
of the Metropolitan Trial Court in its Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the action was not for
ejectment but for the collection of a sum of money. The answer it later filed did not raise the lack of
the said allegation but in fact, recognizing the jurisdiction of the court, actually sought affirmative
relief therefrom. As a general rule, jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case may be rejected to
at any stage of the proceeding even on appeal, but this is not without exception. It is not right for a
party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an
affirmative relief to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape penalty. Upon this same
principle is what we said . . . to the effect that we frown upon the undesirable practice of a party
submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment only if favorable and attacking it
for lack of jurisdiction. Nowhere in the Answer of respondents contain an allegation attacking the
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court based on the issue on demand It is settled that where a
party voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the court and thereafter loses on the merits, he may
not thereafter be heard to say that the court had no jurisdiction after all. The party is barred from
such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an
adjudication but because such a practice cannot be tolerated for reasons of public policy.

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