The Connection between Aristotle's Ethics and Politics

A. W. H. Adkins

Political Theory, Vol. 12, No. 1. (Feb., 1984), pp. 29-49.

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CLASSICAL GREEK POLITICAL THOUGHT I1

11. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN

ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS A N D
POLITICS

A . W.H. A D K I N S

Unlverslfyof Chicago

H E R E A R E MANY possible ways of discussing the link between

Anstotle's Ethlcs and Politlcs. In the manner of Jaeger and ~ l l a n one '
m ~ g hattempt
t to locate each of Aristotle's works on ethlcs, o r lndiv~dual
books of those works, in the light of one's favored theory of the h ~ s t o r y
of Aristotle's intellectual development, d o the same for the ~ o l i t l c sand
,~
try to argue that the Eudem~anEthlcs o r the Nicomachean ~ t h l c so,r~
some part of one o r both, is closer to the Politlcs In doctrlne than the rest
of Aristotle's ethical writings; and a devotee of Kenny's work on the
~ t h l cm s ~ g hIn
t addition upgrade o r downgrade the Politlcs, o r parts of
~ t according
, to its resemblances t o o r differences from the doctrines of
the Eudem~anEthlcs.
Questions of this kind will not be discussed here. 1 shall be concerned
w ~ t hthe Nicomachean Ethlcs and its relation to the Polit~cs;b ut so far as
I can discern, what I have to say is equally true of the Eudem~anEthlcs.
Thls article has a different genesis. Several tlmes recently I have
endeavored t o convince serious students of Aristotle that Anstotle's
Ethlcs and Politlcs were Intended to be read together, and can be
properly understood only if they are s o read; but I found difficulty in
convlnclng them.
The situation 1s rather surprising. After all, Aristotle says at the
beginning of the Ethlcs that politike is the art o r sclence of the pract~cal
good (EN 1094a27); and elsewhere that the e u d a ~ m o n ~ofathe individual
is the same as the e u d a ~ m o n ~ofathe polis ( P 1324a5); that the polis 1s a n
association of like people for the sake of the best life, o r e u d a ~ m o n ~(P a
1328a35, cf. 1328b34, 1332a7 ff.); and he glves the same c h a r a c t e r ~ z a t ~ o n
POLITICAL THEORY, Vol. 12 No. I, February 1984 29-49
O 1984 Sage Publicat~ons.Inc.
 30 POLI-I ICAL T H E O R Y / F E B R U A R Y 1984

asaIn the Ethlcs (EN 1098a16); that one needs leisure with
of e u d a ~ m o n ~
a view to the development of arete, human excellence, and with aview to
polit~calactivities (P 1329a2), with which should be compared "the
sphere of activity of the practical aretal is the political and the military"
(EN 1 177b6); that the arele of the cltizen and ruler 1s the same as that of
the good man (P 1333all); and that human be~ngshave the same goal
~ndiv~dually and in common, so that the definit~onof the best man and
the best constltut~onmust be the same (P 1334all).
There seems to be a prima f a c ~ ecase for my position. I d o not deny
that there are differences of emphas~sbetween the Ethrcs and Polillcs,
nor that these may create some serious philosophical problems;5 but for
the understanding of Anstotle's ethicopolit~calthought, the resem-
blances and continuities are much more Important.
T o throw light on t h ~ tso p ~ cI, shall br~eflydiscuss the r e l a t ~ o n s h ~ofp
Ar~stotle'svalues and presupposltlons In e t h ~ c sand politics to those of
h ~ culture.
s T o suggest that Aristotle is not a great moral and political
philosopher s~rnplic~ler, but a great moral and polit~calphilosopher who
lived in Greece in the fourth century B.C., is sometimes held to dimin~sh
him. In my view, ~tdimmishes Aristotle solely in comparison with those
great moral philosophers who did not live at a part~culartlme and place;
not a large group. In fact, Artstotle inv~tesus to c o n s ~ d e the r values of
the culture, saying (EN 1095b6) that an adequate member of an
audience for lectures on moral and political philosophy must have been
well brought up morally; and he had already excluded the young and
eth~callyimmature (1095a2). Aristotle will begin from the moral and
political values that the well brought-up Greek-the Greek who shares
Aristotle's values and attitudes-br~ngs t o class. It cannot be Irrelevant,
and may be illuminat~ng,t o consider the relation of Aristotle's values
and presupposltlons t o those of fourth-century, and earlier, Greece.
Ideas are transmitted by words, and Greek Ideas are transmitted by
Greek words, not all of which are readily translatable into English.
Value-terms are the most notorlous examples. I shall discuss several
here. But any Greek word, by virtue of possessing a different range of
usage from any possible English equ~valent, may possess different
connotations from any English equivalent; and sometimes connotations
render a philosophical position more plausible in one language than in
another. The Greek word ergon, I shall argue, performs important
services of this kind for Aristotle.
I begin with Aristotle's definition of euda~rnon~a in the first book of
the Nicomachean Ethlcs, for that is generally held to depend entirely on
Aristotle's metaphysical biology, and hence t o be independent of the
 Adklns / ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS A N D POLITICS 31

values of his, or any, culture. Arlstotle remarks that almost everyone

agrees that the goal of human life is to attaln eudarmonra (EN 1094a17).
(The "almost" is merely a philosopher's caution in the face of an
emplr~caluniversal generalization: w ~ t thhe earlier near-synonym olbos,
euda~monraexpresses the goal of all the Greeks of whose vlews we are
aware, from Homer through Arlstotle, and beyond.) Aristotle works
towards a definition of eudarmonra thus (EN 1097b22-1098a18). The
translation 1s that of Ross, with some Greek words added in brackets:

Presumably, however, to say that happiness [eudarmonra] 1s the ch~efgood

[agarhon] 1s a plat~tude,and a clear account of what it 1s is still desired. This rnlght
perhaps be grven, if we could first ascertain the funct~on[ergon] of man. Forjust as
for a flute-player, a sculptor, o r any artlst, and, In general, for all thlngs that have a
funct~onor actlvlty, the good or the 'well' 1s thought to res~deIn the functlon, so
would ~tseem to be for man, if he has a funct~on.Have the carpenter, then, and the
tanner certaln functions or actlvltles, and has man none? Is he born wlthout a
funct~on?Or as eye, foot, hand and In general each of the parts ev~dentlyhas a
funct~on,may one lay 11 down that man similarly has a functlon apart from all
these? What then can thls be? Life seems to be common even to plants, but we are
seeklng what 1s peculiar to man. Let us exclude, therefore, the life of nutrltlon and
growth. Next there would be a life of perception, but rr also seems to be common
even to the horse, the ox, and every anlmal. There remalns, then, an actlve life of the
element that has a ratlonal prlnclple; Now if the funct~onof man IS an actlvlty of
soul [psuihe] whlch follows o r Implies a ratlonal prlnc~ple,and if we say 'a so-and-
so' and 'a good so-and-so' have a functlon whlch 1s the same In klnd, e.g. a
lyre-player and a good lyre-player, and so w~thoutqualificat~onIn all cases,
emlnence In respect of goodness[arete] belng added to the name of the funct~on(for
the functlon of a lyre-player 1s to play the lyre, and that of agood lyre-player 1s to do
so well); if thls 1s the case, and we state the functlon of man to be a certaln klnd of
life, and thls to be an actlvlty o r actlons of the soul lmplylng a ratlonal pr~nclple,
and the functlon of a m o d man to be the good and noble performance of these, and
if any actlon 1s well performed when ~t 1s performed In accordance w ~ t hthe
approprlateexcellence [arere]: if thls 1s the case, human good [agarhon] turns out to
be actlvlty ofthe soul [psuche] in accordance w ~ t hvlrtue[arete], and if there are more
than one vlrtue, In accordance wlth the best and most complete.

Let me comment on some of the Greek terms. Most of us, when

reading translat~onsof Greek philosophy, acknowledge that some
English words are being used in rather unusual ways, but we may not
always be precise about the nature of what is unusual; and greater
precision 1s needed here.
I begln with Aristotle's conclusion. The human good has been
Identified w ~ t heuda~monra,whlch Ross renders 'happiness'; but slnce
'human flourish~ng'seems now to be an uncontroversial rendering of
eudarmon~a,~ we may restate Aristotle's pos~tionthus:
 32 POLITICAL THEORY / FEBRUARY 1984

Human f l o u r ~ s h ~ turns
n g out to be an actlvlty of the soul In accordance w ~ t hvlrtue,
and if there are more than one vlrtue, In accordance i v ~ t hthe best and most
complete vlrtue

Next, "soul." Any serlous student of Ar~stotleis aware of Aristotle's

meaning, listed as a meanlng "soul" in the OED: " 5 . Methaph. The vltal,
sensitive or rational prlnclple in plants, anlmals or human beings."
Arlstotle's argument In the paragraph under discussion makes his
meaning clear; but thls IS not a common usage of "soul" in modern
English; it is very difficult to exclude connotations derlved from more
common usages; and connotations cloud the clarity of arguments. It is
better to replace "soul" wlth "the characteristic human life-princ~ple,"to
produce:

Human flourlshlng turns out to be an actlvlty of the character~st~c life-pr~nc~ple

In
accordance w ~ t hvlrtue, and if there are more than one vlrtue, In accordance w ~ t h
the best and most complete.

Better, but still neither accurate nor entirely plausible as a conclusion to

Anstotle's argument: he has not justified the appearance of any word
wlth the meaning of the English "virtue." But arete is not used in Greek
in the same way as "virtue" is in modern English. Anythlng that can be
said to be agathos ("good," in the sense of "good specimen of") may be
said to possess an arefe. If one can speak of an agathos horse, one can
speak of the arete of a horse: if of agathos ploughland, then of the arete of
ploughland. Now Aristotle has offered an argument, good o r bad, for
thls use of arete: if a lyre-player discharging his function-so to render
ergon for the moment-well (i.e., efficiently) is performing in accordance
with his proper arete (excellence), then a human being performing his
function well is performing in accordance with his proper arefe
(excellence). S o we may restate Aristotle's definition yet again:

Human flour~shlngturns out to be the actlvlty of the characterlst~chuman life-

prlnc~pleIn accordance w ~ t hhuman excellence, and if there are more than one
excellence, In accordance wlth the best and most complete.

The conclusion, as now stated, bereft of adventitious connotations,

has two advantages over Ross's version:

I . It 1s a more accurate rendering of the Greek.

2. If one grants Ar~stotlehls premises, the conclus~onfollows from them
 Adk~ns 1 ARISTOTLES ETHICS A N D POLITICS 33

It has, however, two evldent disadvantages:

I. It IS a purely formal definrtron, telling the reader nothrng about human

flour~shtngor human excellences.
2. A fortiorl, 11 has no moral content. Thrasymachus could cheerfully accept
It.

s In the Ethlcs and Politics. If we term the

Yet Aristotle ignores t h ~ fact
human arete of the e u d a ~ m o n ~ a - d e f i n l t ~arete*,
on and the "vlrtues" of
Nicomachean Ethzcs 11-IX, those accepted as such by Arlstotle and hls
audience, arete, Arlstotle slmply assumes that arete* 1s ~dentlcalwlth
arete, though ~ h r a s ~ m a c h ucontended
s' that lnjustlce, not justlce, was
the arete.
The account of vlrtue (arete) IS of little help. T o be Informed that an
arete IS a mean disposlt~onbetween extremes allows abundant room for
lnterpretatlon. Misunderstanding of the local lnterpretatlon may lead t o
serlous practical and polit~calproblems, as anyone who supposed that
"moderate" In politlcs had the same sense In London and In Belfast
would rapldly discover. Yet there are extremists, and extremes,
acknowledged In Belfast. The Greeks were aware of the problem, as
Thucydides shows (111.82):~

What used to be described as a thoughtless act of aggresslon was now regarded as

the courage one would expect to find In a party member; to t h ~ n kof the future and
Walt was merely another way of saylng one was a coward; any Idea of moderat~on
was just an attempt t o disgu~seone's unmanly character; ability t o understand a
questlon from all srdes meant that one was totally unfitted for actlon.

Thucydides IS here describing a change of values under stress, and

appeals t o a sense of the customary use of words In hls readers; but
elsewhere he recognizes the possibility of disagreement In the application
of value-terms between one group and another, as In the Melian
D ~ a l o g u e(V. 105), where the Athenlans say. "Of all the people we know
the Spartans are most consp~cuousfor believing that what they like dolng
IS honourable and what s u ~ t s thelr Interests IS just."
These people differ from Plato's Thrasymachus, who IS willing t o say
(R 348~5-10)that lnjustlce IS a n arete. They commend what IS regarded
by a n observer--Thucydides, or the Athen~ansgenerally-as thought-
less aggresslon or self-~nterestedbehavlor as belng courageous or just,
and pursue them under that evaluation. It 1s not clear how Arlstotle
34 POLITICAL THEORY !' FEBRUARY 1984

could convlnce them they were wrong.

But the earlier part of the discussion that led up t o Ar~stotle's
definltlon of eudalmonza (EN 1097b24 ff.) seemed to promlse much
more; for most translators agree wlth Ross In rendering ergon by
''functlon" here; and ''functlon" has very technical, scientific connota-
tlons. Furthermore, the argument by elimlnatlon that follows (1097b33-
1098a7) 1s elliptical and virtually incomprehensible wlthout knowledge
of the De Anzma, on whose teachings ~t depends. It seems prlma facle
justifiable t o clalm, wlth most Interpreters, that the argument to the
ergon of man depends on Ar~stotle's'metaphyslcal b~ology,'part~cularly
as the Metaphyszcs furnishes a very slmilar, though b r ~ e f ,account of
eudazmonza (1050b1-3).~One mlght have hoped that the definltlon
acqulred some factual content from thls source.
It would be pointless to deny that the ergon argument for eudazmonza
IS linked wlth discussions In the De Anzma and Metaphyszcs, and wlth
uses of ergon in the biological works. But there 1s more to be sald: the
argument may not be derlved from these sources alone; ~ t plausibility s
for a member of Ar~stotle'saudience may be derived from elsewhere;
even In the technical works ''functlon" may not adequately represent the
Greek ergon; and we need t o discover not merely why Arlstotle
supposed human belngs t o have an ergon, but why he characterlzed the
ergon as he did, apparently wlthout fear of contradiction from hls
audience.
Let me begin with a brlef discussion of the use of ergon and associated
words In Ar~stotle'sworks. (We may note In passlng that, according to
Bonitz's Index,lo ergon in all ~ t senses s is used about twice as frequently
in the Ethzcs. Politzcs, and Rhetorzc as In the Metaphyszcs and the major
biological works.) In the biological works, in most cases, the translators
render ergon by ''functlon" wlthout causlng thelr readers any problems;
but a n unproblematic translation may not be fully satisfactory
Consider Parts of Anlmals, 694b12: "Some blrds have long legs; the
reason is that the life of such blrds IS spent In marshes; for nature makes
the organa for the ergon, not the ergon for the organa."ll "Organs" and
" f u n c t ~ o n "T~h a t we d o not refer to legs as organs is unimportant; that
organa had meant "tools" since the prevlous century (Sophocles,
Trachznzae 905, Euripides, Bacchae 1208), and ergon "job, task" since
Homer, 1s not. A Greek who had read no other sentence of Aristotle
could understand his words here: "Nature makes the tools for the job,
not the job for the tools." Compare GA 794b27. "Just as we should not
say that fire alone could make a n axe o r any other organon, similarly fire
could not make a foot o r a hand" (termed organa above): It 1s evident
 Adklns / ARISTOTLES ETHICS A N D POLITICS 35

that "tool" is the sense here, even in a biological context; that, as one
would expect, the more recent usage of "organ" is felt as an analogy
from the longer-established usage "tool."
Consider now GA 716a23. Aristotle is discussing the male and female
roles in reproduction: "Since the male and the female are distinguished
by dunamls (ability, power) and some ergon, and organa (tools) are
needed for every work, and the parts of the body are the organa for the
dunameu, both male and female sex organs are required." Note that
here the use of organa in biological contexts is explained by reference to
the sense "tools"; and also that to distinguish male and female by
dunamzs and ergon, with no context specified, would readily suggest
that men are physically stronger than women, and perform different
tasks. At EN 1162a19 Aristotle says that for other animals the
association of male and female extends only as far as reproduction,
whereas human beings associate not only for procreation but for the
other activities of life: "for immediately the erga are distinguished, and
those of a man and a woman are different." Ross translates "functions";
but "tasks, work" is appropriate. At all events, a Greek who knew no
Aristotelian philosophy at all could assign a meaning to Aristotle's
words here; and this suffices for my argument.
Now consider EN 1 129b19. "The law bids one do [poleln] the erga of
the brave man, for example not to leave one's place in the ranks or run
away and the erga of the self-controlled man, for example not to
commit adultery ;the correctly established law does so correctly, the
hastily drawn up law does so worse." Ross reasonably renders "do the
acts of a brave man". no metaphysical biology is needed for compre-
hension, though the same phrase in a biological context would be
rendered ' discharge one's function". At EN I 160a15, Aristotle discusses
arete, and says (in Ross's translation): "We may remark, then, that every
virtue or excellence [arete] both brlngs into good condition the thing of
which it 1s the excellence and makes the work [ergon]of that thing to be
done well; e.g. the excellence of the eye makes both the eye and its work
[ergon]good."The resemblance to EN 1097b22ff., with which we began
this discussion, is close; but there Ross rendered ergon by "function,"
here by "work."
Next, a few examples from the Politzcs. At 1253a18 Aristotle is
arguing that the polis IS naturally prior to the household and the
individual, since the whole IS prlor to the part: "for in the absence of the
whole body there will be neither foot nor hand, except in an equivocal
sense and everyth~ngis defined by its ergon and dunarnis. " Jowett
renders "working and power," Barker "function and capacity," Sinclair
36 POLITICAL THEORY / FEBRUARY 1984

"power and function." The disagreement of the translators makes my

point; and we may note in passing that here the ergon of the individual is
necessarily related to the existence of a larger whole, the polis. At
1299a34 we find, in Jowett's translation,

For in great states it IS possible, and indeed necessary, that every office should have
a specla1 function [ergon]; where the cltizens are numerous, many may hold
office and certainly every work [ergon] is better done which recelves the sole,
and not the divided attention of the worker.

Jowett has two different renderings for ergon; but evidently Aristotle
means the same thing. (Barker has "function function," Sinclair
"tasks assignment.") "Task" seems adequate; at all events, no
Aristotelian philosophy is needed to assign a meaning to the Greek.
Lastly, P 1276b34 ff..

It is clear that it is possible to be a good cltizen w~thouthaving the arete which

would make one a good man. For if the polis cannot consist entirely of good
men, and yet each must do his ergon well, and this comes from arete, since the
cltizens cannot all be alike, the arete of the good citizen and the good man cannot be
the same.

This is not Aristotle's last word on the subject; but it is evident that here
ergon is linked with the different roles of different citizens in the polis,
and cannot be the same as the-single-ergon of the eudalmonra
definition, nor yet derived from metaphysical biology, which specifies a
single ergon. Nevertheless, Aristotle can use the word ergon to express
this too; and it is evident that the (different) ergon of each individual o r
group of citizens is linked with the arete of each. Ergon here denotes the
role o r task of each citizen q u a citizen, whatever the role or task may be.
Once again, one needs no Ar~stotelianphilosophy to understand what
Aristotle is saying here.
T o sum up this discussion of ergon, a noun, common in the earliest
extant-unphilosophical-Greek, which Ar~stotlenowhere defines. It IS
evident that the word is not used solely of biological function, or solely
In technical senses (indeed, lt 1s doubtful whether an undefined term may
be said to possess a t e c h n ~ c a sense);
l that the sense of "task, work" is
frequently appropriate; and that in the contexts In which the translators
render ergon as "funct~on,"that sense is felt as being derived from the
sense that the word has in ordinary Greek. Accordingly, the connotations
of "task, work, job" are always present, even in metaphysical and
 A d k ~ n s/ ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS A N D POLITICS 37

biological contexts, as the versions of the translators inadvertently

Indicate.''
Return now to the definit~onof eudarmonla. There Aristotle begins
by considering the erga of a r t ~ s t and
s craftsmen before passlng on to the
argument that depends on the D e Anlma. Commentators have found ~t
confusing that Ar~stotleemploys both an argument from the ergon of
craftsman q u a craftsman to the ergon of a human being q u a human
being and an argument from the ergon of a b~ologicalpart of a human
being to the ergon of a human being as a biological whole.13 T h e ~ r
complaints are philosophically justified; but Ar~stotleneeds for his
argument not merely ergon as it appears In metaphysics and b~ologybut
ergon as it appears in politics and ordinary life, and chooses examples
that will keep the full range of ergon before the mind. It is the latter part
of its range, as will appear, that mediates the transition from arete as
(unspecified) human excellence of the rational aspect of the psuche to
arete as the virtues recognized by Aristotle and h ~ audience.
s There 1s
even some rhetoric in his argument. When Ar~stotleinqulres whether
man has no ergon, but is argos, the translators render "without a
function"; but argos is the everyday Greek for "lazy," and L~ddell-Scott-
Jones, A Greek-English Lexrcon, cltes no other example of the sense
"without a f u n ~ t i o n . " 'The
~ choice of word is a donnish joke; and it
directs the attention t o the "task, workWsenseof ergon even as Aristotle
embarks upon his biological argument from the De Anlma.
Ar~stotle'schoice of the undefined term ergon in the argument that
leads to a d e f i n ~ t ~ oofneudalmonza gives him a word whose usage ranges
from technical biological contexts to completely unphilosophical ones.
T o throw light on the association between ergon or erga, arete and
eudalmonla, I turn next t o an early, unphilosophical and indeed pre-
philosophical poet: Homer, in whose poems ergon and erga appear
frequently in the senses of "work, activity," "product of activ~ty,"and
"work of art." From the many examples I select a few illum~natingones.
In Iliad 6.521 ff., Hector tells Paris that no one would find fault w ~ t h
his ergon of fighting, for he is warlike." Paris is voluntarily shirking,
and Hector hears arschea, reproaches at which Paris should feel shame.
Paris's failure to perform the ergon, task, of fighting detracts from his
arete. Adult warrlors are disparaged by being compared with children,
"who have no concern w ~ t hwarlike erga" (I. 2.337, cf. 11.719);
Polydamas says that the god gives to one man warlike erga, to another
d a n c ~ n gt,o another lyre-playing; and to yet another Zeus gives counsel
(i.e., the ability t o give counsel), w h ~ c hbenefits many (1. 13.730).
38 POLITICAL THEORY / FEBRUARY 1984

Andromache tells her son Astyanax that when Troy falls he may be
compelled to perform unseemly erga, toiling for a cruel ruler (I. 24.733-
34). Astyanax 1s a prince, an agathos, and it would be the end of hls arete
were he another's slave.
Like children, women have different aretar from men. Hector bids
Ajax remember that Hector is nelther a child nor a woman, who knows
nothing of warlike erga (I. 7.235), and tells Andromache to go home and
attend to her own erga, the loom and the distaff: "war shall be men's
concern"(I.6.492). A woman who 1s chaste and good at household tasks
'knows blameless erga' (I. 9.128, 270, etc.), and possesses-female-
arrte.
Thls 1s ordinary language, not philosophy there 1s no question of
lnqulrlng whether there 1s one ergon for man. But since some of the erga
are related to the arete of men-and women-and ergon 1s related to
arete in EN 1097b23 ff., ~tis appropriate to inqulre about the nature of
arrte In Homer and later. Male arete is the most relevant, slnce if
contemplation is left out of account, Aristotle's human ergon turns out
to be the ergon of a limited number of adult male Greeks.
What characteristics, then, has the agathos, the man of arete, In
Homer? He is the head of a large oikos, or household. He is wealthy, and
his wealth 1s based on the possession of land and the goods and chattels,
anlmate and Inammate, thereon. The society is moneyless; he and hls
like possess the significant wealth. Its possession enables them to
acqulre armor-an expensive and scarce commodity-with whlch t o
defend their oikol: their oikol rather than the community in general, for
the community has little institutional existence. (It is recorded as a
matter of no surprise, and little inconvenlence, that there has been no
assembly in Ithaca during the twenty years of Odysseus's absence ( 0 .
2.26-34). The inconvenlence of Odysseus's absence is not to Ithaca, but
to Odysseus's household. In hls absence, the child Telemachus has been
unable to defend the oikos, and the suitors have ravaged Odysseus's
possessions.) The agathos performs the essential function of defending
the oikos, and In case of a general attack from elsewhere, the wider
community, with his superior weapons and, in Homer's phrase, hls
warlike erga. His wealth furnishes the weapons and the leisure t o
become proficient In thelr use. He performs the servlce without which
the oikos could not contlnue to exist, and consequently has prestige and
authority as well as military power. He ~tis who gives counsel, takes an
actlve part In such political activity as exists: Nestor reminds Aga-
memnon and Achilles of the prowess of his youth before a t t e m p t ~ n gt o
arbitrate thelr quarrel (in I. 1.260-74), and Thersites is beaten about the
 Adklns / ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS A N D POLITICS 39

head for venturing t o glve a n opinion, though what he says is true (I.
2.212-69).
Agathos and arete, then, commend military effectiveness and the
possession of wealth, leisure, and polit~calpower and prestige; and the
role of the agathos in defending h ~ group
s is understood to be the b a s ~ of
s
his c l a ~ mt o be agathos. Achilles, "the most agathos of the Greeks," is
termed by Nestor "agreat fence against woeful war for all the Greeks"(1.
1.283-84); and Sarpedon is said to have been the bulwark of the city of
Troy, though not a Trojan; for many soldiers followed him, and he was
most agathos at fighting ( I . 16.549-51); while Odysseus expects q u ~ c k
repr~salsf or the killing of the suitors, for he and his companions have
killed "the bulwark of the polis, the most agathol of the young men"(0.
23.12 1). Similarly, in the first recorded constitution of the Athenians the
franchise was given t o those who could furnish themselves w ~ t ha
military equipment (Aristotle, Constrtutlon ofthe Athen~ans,4).16
These values continue t o prevail. Had one asked the Greek-in-the-
street In fifth- o r fourth-century Greece what was the most important
ergon (task) of a n agathos, the defense of the city and household would
have been the almost inevitable answer; and since the cavalrymen and
the hoplite continued t o furnish their own equipment, the association of
arete with wealth-more for the cavalryman than the hoplite-and
le~surecontinues, together with the political and social prestige. The
agathos performs certain tasks that are crucial, in the context of a whole
way of life.
Even when a writer is trying t o include among the agathol those
persons and qualities that are not normally included, the same a t t ~ t u d e s
remain. In Euripides's Electra Orestes is praising a poor farmer, not an
agathos, for his self-control, not until now a n arete (367 ff.):

For t h ~ man,
s who ne~therhas a h ~ g hposltlon among the Arglves, nor IS puffed up
by the fame derlvlng from noble lineage, has proved to be most ogorhos. Will you
not come to your senses, you who wander about full of empty oplnlons, and In
future judge men by thew mode of life, and hold those to be noble who lead moral
lives? For such men admlnlster well both thew clt~esand then own households,
whereas those who are nothlng but senseless lumps of muscle are mere ornaments
of the market-place, for a strong arm does not even endure a spear-thrust any better
than a weak one. No; such ability lies In a man's nature and In hls excellence of
splrlt.

Self-control is b e ~ n genrolled among the aretal here, using the

traditional criteria. The self-controlled man is better at performing the
essent~altasks demanded of the agathos, the superior specimen of a
 40 POLITICAL THEORY / FEBRUARY 1984

man, in ancient Greece: ensuring the wellbeing of polis and household

by military and polit~calmeans. Whether o r not self-control does render
one better at these tasks is an empirical question; and Thrasymachus
disagrees.
Plato's Meno furn~shesa fourth-century example of the link between
arete and ergon in popular thought. The sanguine but unphilosophical
Meno gives a number of confident replies to Socrates's question "What
is arete?" The first (7 1 d 1-72a5) employs the word ergon:

It's not difficult to tell you that, Socrates. First, if you want the arete of a man
s the arete of a man, to be capable of transact~ng[prattern]the
[aner], ~ t ' seasy: t h ~ IS
affalrs of the polis, and In so dolng to help h ~ fr~ends
s a nd harm h ~ enemles,
s and to
take care to suffer nothlng of the klnd hlmself. And if you want the arete of a
woman, that's not difficult to tell: she must run her household well, keeplng the
contents safe and obeylng her husband [aner]. And there 1s another arete for a
child, different for male and female children, and for an older man, different for
free and slave. And there are many other aretar, so that there 1s no lack of mater~al
to supply on the subject ofarete; for each of us has arete-and similarly kakla too, I
th~nk-w~threspect to each of the actlvltles and tlmes of life, w ~ t ha vlew to the
performance of each task [ergon].

This use of ergon is ordinary Greek, and depends on no articulated

philosophical position. There are many roles o r tasks, which may be well
o r badly discharged, "well" meaning "efficiently, effectively a n d / or in a
manner pleasing to one's superiors"; and these roles are defined by
reference to the culturally-accepted structure of life in household and
polis.
Socrates sardonically remarks that Meno has glven him not one, but
a swarm of aretar, and creates his wonted dialectical havoc with Meno's
stated views. Meno subsequently offers other definitions of arete: "What
else is ~tthan the ability t o rule over people [anthropoi]?"(73~9),and "to
deslre the kala and be able to get them for oneself," (77b4-5). Socrates
Immediately induces him to replace kala by agatha in the latter
definition, producing "arete is to desire the thlngs that are beneficlal for
oneself and to be able to get them for oneself."
Socrates' counter-arguments need not concern us here. What is
noteworthy 1s that Meno, desplte the profus~onof different arerai In his
first definition, subsequently offers definitions of arete suitable-as
Socrates polnts out-only for a limlted number of free adult males.
There are many erga; but only a few are really important. Note also that,
though he adds the 'cooperatlve' moral excellences'7 to his definltlons
when Socrates Invites him to (73a, d), Meno's immediate thought when
arete 1s mentioned IS of efective action.
 Adkins 1 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS AND POLITICS 41

Conslder now Aristotle's slmilar discussion of the arete of women

and slaves (P 1259b21 ff.): "First we ought to lnqulre about slaves,
whether there 1s a n arete of a slave over and above his tool-like
[organikar] aretal as a menlal." (His efficient performance of tasks is of
course the arete of his role, reckoned from his master's polnt of vlew.)
Does the slave (woman, child) need justice, courage, self-control and the
other aretal dissussed in the Nicomachean Ethrcs, o r are they necesasry
only for the adult male ruler? Arlstotle replies that all need them, but In
different ways, saying 1260a10 ff. (Barker):

It IS true that all these persons possess In common thedifferent parts of the soul; but
they possess them in different ways. T h e slave 1s entlrely wlthout the faculty of
deliberat~on;the female indeed possesses ~ tbut, in a form whlch remalns ~nconcluslve;
and if children also possess ~ t ~t, 1s only In a n immature form.

Similarly, wlth respect to moral arete, "they must all share in ~ tbut, not
In the same way-each sharlng only t o the extent requlred for the
discharge of hls o r her functlon [ergon]. The ruler, accordingly, must
possess moral goodness In its full and perfect form, i.e., the form based on
ratlonal deliberat~on,because his function [ergon],regarded absolutely
and in ~ t full
s nature, demands a master artificer; but all other persons
need only possess moral goodness to the extent required of them by their
particular posltlon."
The discussion invokes the same terms (arete, ergon) as did Nico-
machean Ethrcs 1, 7 , wlth which we began. There is a temptation to
speak of "metaphys~calbiology"; and Barker renders ergon by "func-
tion" But In the light of the Meno, whlch also employs ergon and arete,
and the earlier Greek discussed, metaphysical biology seems to have
little ~mportance; and where, we may ask, did Arlstotle get the
information that slaves d o not have the faculty of deliberation, t o
bouleutikon, while women possess ~tin a form that remains ~nconcluslve?
We may also inquire whence Arlstotle derives hls account of animal-
psuche and plant-psuche, the characterlstlc life-principles of plants and
anlmals. Evidently by observing what plants and anlmals are character-
istlcally able to do: plants to nourlsh and reproduce themselves, anlmals
in addition having perception and motlon. Similarly, Arlstotle observes
what free men, free women, and slaves characteristically d o l a r e able
to d o In fourth-century--and earlier-Greece. "Metaphysical biology"
seems a n inappropriate term: the direction of thought IS not from a
metaphysical b ~ o l o g yIndependently arrived at to an appropriateness of
ergon-function, but from an observation of ergon (behavior) to an
42 POLITICAL THEORY / FEBRUARY 1984

explanation in terms of psuche; and only the translation "soul"

Introduces metaphysical connotations. Not only in the case of plants
and animals but also in that of human beings Aristotle seems to suppose
that actual roles are the only possible ones; but he knew that
circumstances had enslaved many free Greeks, and consequently
distinguished slaves by nature from slaves by nomos ( P 1255a3-b4).
Even in the present passage, note "all other persons need only possess
moral aretal t o the extent required of them by their particular position."
Earlier, "each needing to share" would be closer to Aristotle's Greek
than "each sharing" The implication is not that they are incapable of
more, but that they need no more for the performance of their roles. The
ergon is defined by the society; and though Arlstotle sets out to claim
that women and slaves have defectivepsuchal, so that the defined role is
appropriate "by nature" (phusei), his language here betrays him. S o far
as concerns the erga of mankind, their source is common practice; if any
b~ologyis involved, it is a normative pseudo-empirical sociobiology
I now turn t o the distinctions drawn by Arlstotle between the erga of
different adult male free Greeks, between the qualities of the agathos
man (aner) and the agathos citlzen @elites). In most cities they are
distinct ( P 1276b34):

It 1s clear that ~tis possible for a man to be a good [ here spoudaros] cltlzen and yet
not have the arete In accordance w ~ t hwhlch one 1s a good man: for if ~t 1s
~mpossiblefor a c ~ t to s ergon
y conslst ent~relyof good men, yet each must do h ~ own
well, and th~sderivesfrom some arete; but slnce ~t1s impossible for all the cltlzens to
be alike, the arere of the agathos cltlzen and that of the agarhos man must be
different.

This passage occurs in Polit~cs3.4., a chapter in which, as Barker says

(p. 122), Aristotle "shifts his ground" He has previously argued (P
1276b16-34) that the existence of different kinds of constitutions dem-
onstrates that there must be different klnds of good citizen; for being a
good citlzen is relative to one's task (ergon) in the constitution under
which one lives. Arlstotle does not emphasize the point, but since some
k ~ n d os f c o n s t ~ t u t ~ oare
n bad, being a good citizen under some constitu-
tions might require one to be a bad man. A g a ~ n ,he compares the
different roles of citlzens in the same constitution to those of different
sailors o n a s h ~ p and ; the comparison emphasizes skills and aptitudes
rather than moral excellences.
 A d k ~ n s : ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS A N D POLITICS 43

This passage, however, refers explicitly to the ideal constitution; and

later In the chapter ~t becomes clear that Aristotle is including all the
aretar In "performing one's task well" here. Yet even under the ideal
constltution the agathos man (aner) does not c o l n c ~ d ew ~ t hthe agathos
cit~zen;a fact that 1s puzzling, and may--1napproprlately-suggest that
the definition of the agathos aner 1s independent of civic role. A brief
discussion of the best constltutlon will show that even here there are
tensions In Aristotle's vlew of the human ergon.
T o clear the ground for hls discussion, Aristotle distinguishes these
necessary erga of a city's inhabitants ( P 1328b5 ff.): food, crafts (tech-
nai), weapons, money, a provision for public w o r s h ~ p ,and s ~ x t hand
most necessary, a method of "deciding what is demanded by the public
interest and what is just In man's prlvate dealings" (Barker). "Ergon"
may mean "end-product" as well as "activity"; and Arlstotle seems t o
slide from one sense to the other here. He concludes (Barker): "The polis
must therefore contain a body of farmers to produce the necessary food;
craftsmen; a military force; a propertied class; and a body for deciding
necessary Issues and determlnlng what 1s in the public interest." Each
group has its ergon in the sense of "activity"; and some have an ergon In
the sense of "end-product" that can be used by other inhabitants.
The city needs inhabitants to perform all these erga; but in the best
constltution not all will be citizens; for "being eudarmon necessarily
accompanies the possession of arete, and we must call a polis eudarmon
not with respect to a part of ~t but with respect to all the citlzens" ( P
1329a22-24); and "since the most agathos man and the most agathe
constitution must have the same defin~tion,it is clear that the aretar
w h ~ c hlead to leisure must be present" ( P 1334a11-14). We must call a
polis eudarmon with respect to all its citlzens; but since not all the
inhabitants can have such arete and such eudarmonra, citizenship must
be confined to those who are capable of these attainments.
What then are the characteristics of the good cltizen in Aristotle's best
constitution? He many not be a shopkeeper, a craftsman, o r a farmer,
for arete and polit~calactivities need leisure ( P 1328b24-1329a2); he may
not be a sailor, part of the naval defense of h ~ polis
s (P 1327b8). His
leisure is assured by the possession of a landed estate, t o be farmed for
him by noncitizens ( P 1329a25). He 1s to employ that leisure in politics
and, if need be; war: "the part that engages in warfare and the part that
deliberates about what is expedient and gives judgment about what 1s
44 POLITICAL T H E O R Y / F E B R U A R Y 1984

just are inherent and manifestly especially parts of the polisW(P1329a2-

5). Each of these roles, the warlike and the deliberative-ruling, should be
discharged by the same people; but since each of the erga reaches its
peak at different periods of life, in a sense they should be discharged by
different people: war by the young, deliberation by their elders; for the
one needs physical strength, the other, phronesu, practical wisdom.
(Note that Aristotle adds a practical consideration: those who have
weapons cannot permanently be excluded from power.)
The idea of complete arete is inseparable from that of defending the
polis and exercising political power in it. If theorra is set on one side,
these are the erga, o r taken together this is the essential ergon, of the
good man (aner)and a p p a r e n t l y - t h e good citizen that satisfies the
definition of eudarmonla, the ergon of a man (anthropos) manifested
with appropriate excellence (arete),offered in Nicomachean Ethrcs 1.7
We may return t o Politics 1276b34. There, even in the best
constitution, Aristotle distinguishes between the agathos man and the
agathos citizen. But surely all the agathor citizens are agathol men, in
performing the best erga. The discussion of Politlcs 3.4 indicates the
tensions: 'We say that the good ruler must be agathos and have practical
wisdom, whereas the the good citizen need not bephronlmos '(1 277a 14- 16).
Under political rule, the citizens take it in turns to rule and be ruled
(1277a25 ff.). Ruling and being ruled are not equally praiseworthy,
however (1277a29); when not ruling, the citizen's arete will be inferior,
for phronesis will not be required. The good citizen will strlctly be a n
agathos aner only when ruling; and only so will he satisfy the
requirements of the definition of eudalmonla In Nicomachean Ethrcs
1.7 His eudalmonra is accordingly intermittent, at least when Aristotle
insists that actual ruling is necessary for its attainment.
Whether one takes the broader o r the narrower definition of the
ergon of the agathos man, it is evident that its nature is derived not from
metaphysical biology but from Greek political practice from Homer
onwards. It is also evident that Aristotle can be confident that his
definition of the ergon, thus defined, will not be challenged: that the
agathos should rule, deliberate and defend his city was agreed by
Agamemnon, Socrates and Thrasymachus and every one of Aristotle's
Greek predecessors and contemporaries of whose views we are aware. It
is not surprising that Aristotle felt able to claim that this ergon is related
to the nature of the agathos.
 Adklns / ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS A N D POLITICS 45

In the light of the foregoing discussions, some puzzling aspects of the

argument for the eudarrnonra-definition of Nicornachean Ethrcs 1.7
appear a little more comprehensible. The ergon-argument is undeniably
odd. In the case of other things that have erga, not all of them perform
those erga excellently. not all sculptors are as good as Phidias, not all
eyes have 20-20 vision. But all can perform the ergon t o some extent: for
Aristotle, a blind eye is not really an eye at all, except homonymously
(GA 726b24, etc.). However, in the case of the ergon of man
(anthropos), the function can be discharged, the task performed, by only
a small fraction of mankind; if we take Aristotle seriously, by a limited
number of adult male Greeks with a leisured way of life ( P 1252b7,
1254b20, 1260a10,1260a14,1327b20 ff.). T o repeat an earlier quotation:
"The ruler, accordingly, must possess ethike arete in its full and perfect
form [i.e. the form based on rational deliberation], because his ergon
demands a master artificer, and reason is such a master artificer" ( P
1260a17 ff.). "Perfect" is telera, the same word as is used with arete in the
definition of eudatrnonra with which we began the discussion.
The ergon of a human being (anthropos) has become the ergon of
some men (aner): there is n o ergon that human beings as such can all
perform, and that is constitutive of human eudarrnonla attainable by all.
Aristotle's change of focus, which occurs even within Nicornachean
Ethrcs 1.7, is encouraged by a fact of Greek usage, which reflects the
cultural attitudes under discussion in this article. One can speak of a
good woman, child, o r even slave, in the sense of "good of its kind"; but
rarely of a n agathos anthropos, since anthropos is used pejoratively of
those who d o not possess the prized male arete-qualities: as soon as
agathos o r spoudalos is used, the noun tends to change from anthropos
to aner ' 8 In Nicornachean Ethlcs 1.7 Aristotle begins by seeking the
ergon of a n anthropos (1097b24), but as soon as the ergon, well
performed, is characterized as arete and "good" is applied to its
possessor, anthropos becomes aner (1098a14), and the reference is
already to males only. I Y
It may now be easier to understand why Aristotle feels able to assume
without argument that the formal arete* of Nicornachean Ethrcs 1.7, the
efficient performance of the human task, may be identified with the
arete o r aretar accepted as such by Aristotle and his audience. From the
time of Homer onwards, arete denoted and commended the efficient
performance of tasks, the most important of which were deemed
46 POL1 I ICAL T H E O R Y / F E B R U A R Y 1984

essential for the f l o u r ~ s h ~ neudazmonza,

g, of household and polis. From
Homer through much of the fifth century, the cooperative excellences
were not regarded as aretaz, o r as aspects of arete. Those who wlshed to
enroll them among the aretaz had to demonstrate, o r assert, that these
excellences constituted an essent~almeans to, o r part of, efficient and
successful liv~ng.In Plato's Crrto 48b8, Socrates reminds C n t o that in
the past he has agreed wlth Socrates that to live eu, t o live kalas, and to
live dikaios are the same. In an English translation "to live justly is the
same as to live honorably, and to live honorably is the same as to live
well" IS a claim that seems hardly surprising, for the range of usage of the
adverbs overlaps, and all are used to commend the cooperative
excellences; but In the Greek of the time Socrates'words express a novel
. just life IS glven a new, more powerful commendatlon by
a t t ~ t u d eThe
the use of kalas, whlch belongs-as justlce previously did not-to the
arete-group: Socrates IS clalming that just b e h a v ~ o renders
r one agathos.
The use of eu, the adverb of agathos, emphasizes that the agathos lives
well in the sense of "efficiently." A Greek who acknowledges that any
quality IS an arere IS acknowledging that life is better-more efficlent
and successful- for those who possess that quality than for those who
d o not. It is for thls reason that Thrasymachus c l a m s that Injustlce, not
justice, IS the arete, argulng that Injustlce, notjustlce, brings successful
living in its tram (Plato, R 348c).
Since any Greek who accepts a quality as a n arete regards ~t as a
means to, or component of, successful living, ~tis comparatively easy for
Arlstotle to believe, and carry hls audience along wlth him in believ~ng,
that the aretaz that he and they acknowledge are the qualities that satisfy
the defin~tlonof eudazmonza In Nicomachean Ethics 1.7 (Arlstotle
specified earlier that h ~ audience
s must accept the same range of aretar as
he does, 1095b4 ff.). The Identification of arete* w ~ t ahrete IS not argued,
much less cogently argued, and Aristotle and h ~ audience s m ~ g hst ~ m p l y
be mistaken In identifying them aretaz as the qualities most conducive t o
efficlent and successful liv~ng;but ~t is evidently easier to c l a ~ mthat
Greek arete (in the everyday sense) IS true human excellence (in the sense
of what makes life most worth living) than to make the c l a ~ mabout
vlrtue In the usual twentieth-century English sense.
Ergon In Ar~stotle,then, has a w ~ d erange of usage; but ~ t uses s In
ordinary language have a significant effect on ~ t usage s In technical
contexts, as one might expect in the case of a n undefined term. The
 A d k ~ n s 1 ARISTOT1,ES ETHICS A N D POLITICS 47

effect IS especially noteworthy in ethlcs and polit~cs.Even if biology

played some part in the argument that human b e ~ n g shave an ergon, the
identificat~onof that ergon IS derived from the presupposltlons and
attitudes of daily life In anclent Greece. (If metaphys~calb~ology
contributes anything to Anstotle's thought here, ~tIS the debate between
the claims of contemplation and the pract~callife in Nicomachean
Ethlcs 10, insofar as the c l a ~ m of s the contemplative life are based on the
"div~ne spark" view of nous; but those c l a ~ m scould have been
s t ~ m u l a t e dby a quite unmetaphys~calexcitement over the powers of
human reason, with w h ~ c hGreeks had recently ach~evedso much."
Ergon IS one of the terms and concepts that b ~ n dtogether Ar~stotle's
ethical and political thought, and link both w ~ t hthe values and attitudes
of the culture. If one cons~dersthe r e l a t ~ o n s h ~ofp ergon to arete and
eudalmon~a,a n d the importance of all three in Ar~stotle'se t h ~ c a land
polit~calthought, the necess~ty of reading the Ethlcs and Politlcs
together, and both in the context of Greek values and attitudes, seems
evident.
Let me conclude w ~ t ha few remarks on a wlder theme. Virtue-eth~cs
has recently been increas~ngIn popularity, after a long p e r ~ o dof decline.
If the arguments of this a r t ~ c l eare acceptable, ~tseems clear that, though
we may learn much from Aristotle's analysis of areta~,the psychology of
ethlcs, and similar topics, v~rtue-eth~cs and arete-eth~cs have great
differences, some of w h ~ c hpose serious problems for the vlrtue-eth~c~st.
F o r lt IS not nonsense to ~ n q u l r ewhether the possession of (a) vlrtue IS
c o n d u c ~ v eto life at its best In any sense of "best" that renders the vlrtue
i n d u b ~ t a b l ychoiceworthy In the sense of "morally best" the claim is
lndubltable, for it is tautologous, but may fail to motlvate choice; In the
sense of "most flourish~ng,"the virtue becomes choiceworthy but the
c l a ~ mbecomes dubitable. In anclent Greece, if a moralist could convlnce
others that a quality was a n arete, h ~ problems
s were over, for aretai are
choiceworthy; now the problem is rather to demonstrate the c h o ~ c e -
worthiness of virtue. A g a ~ n ,there IS now no accepted ergon (or most
Important ergon). It IS e v ~ d e n tthat even a small nation-state cannot
satisfy Aristotle's requirement for the best c o n s t ~ t u t ~ that
o n all who have
the capacity of perform~ngthe ergon of ruling should d o so; and
Ar~stotlehas nothing else to say about the ergon of the human being.
The arete of the good cltlzen IS,for Ar~stotle,merely relatlve to the role
o r task he performs In his particular polis. If arete IS based on this
 48 POLITICAL THEORY / FEBRUARY 1984

conception of ergon, it must be relat~veto a constltutlon. At least some

virtue-ethicists hope for more. It is not my purpose to argue against
them, merely to suggest that In some respects Aristotle's arete-eth~cs1s of
little use to them In the effect~veperformance of t h e ~ ergon.
r

NOTES

I . W W Jaeger, Arrstofle, R. R o b ~ n s o n[trans.] (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948):

D.J. Allan, The Philosophy of Ar~sfofle(London: Oxford Un~versityPress, 1952).
2. Ar~stotle,T he Polifrcs [PI. I clte and quote from the verslons of Sir Ernest Barker
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948)[Barker], B. Jowett, in The Works ofAr~sfotlefranslated
info English, W. D. Ross (ed.), (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921) [Jowett], and T. A.
Sinclair (Harmondsworth, England: Penguln Books, 1962)[Sincla1r].
3. Aristotle, The Nicomachean Efhrcs (EN), W.D. Ross (trans.), In The Works of
Arrstofle translafedinto English, W.D. Ross(Ed.), (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921)[Ross].
4. A.J.P Kenny, The Arrsfotelion Efhrcs (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978).
5. See A.W.H. A d k ~ n s'"Theorra'versus
, 'Praxrs'inthe Nicomochean Efhrcs and the
Republic, Classrcal Philology 73 (1 978) pp. 297-3 12. ('Theorla '7.
"

6. See J . M . Cooper, Reason and Human Good rn Arrstotle (Cambr~dge,Mass..

Harvard Un~versltyPress, 1975).
7 Plato, Republrc (R) 1,348c, Allan Bloom[trans.], (New York: B a s ~ cBooks, 1968).
8. Thucydides, The Peloponnesran War. Rex Warner [trans.], (Harmondsworth,
England: Pengu~nBooks, 1954).
9. Aristotle, The Mefaphysrcs (M), W.D. Ross (trans.), in The Works of Arrstofle
franslafed rnto English, W.D. Ross (ed.), (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921).
10. H. Bonitr, Index Arrsfofelicus (Berlin: George Relmer 1870, rpt. Berlin: de
Gruyter, 1960).
I I . Translat~onsare my own where not otherw~se~ndlcated.There 1s an English
verslon of the Parfs of Anrmals(PA), William Ogle (trans.), and Generafron of Animals. (GA),
Arthur Platt (trans.), In The Works of Arrstofle franslated rnto English. W.D. Ross (ed.),
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921).
12. R.G. Mulgan, in Arrsrotlek Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977),
also doubts whether Ar~stotle'sview of the funct~onof man is derived primarily from
metaphys~calbiology; but he offers no detailed arguments.
13. On function in Aristotelian and other e t h ~ c ssee , P T . Geach, "Good and Evil,"
Analysrs 17 (1956-1957), pp. 33-42, R.M. Hare, "Geach, Good and Evil," Anofysu 17
(1956-1957), pp. 101-1 11, A.M. MacIver, "Good and Evil and Mr. Geach," Analysrs 18
(1957-1958), pp. 7-13, R. Sorabji, "Funct~on,"Philosoph~calQuarterly 14 (1964), pp.
289-302, B. S u ~ t s"Ar~stotle
, on the F u n c t ~ o nof Man," Canadian Journalof Philosophy4
(1974), pp. 23-40.
14. A Greek-English Lexrcon. H.G. Liddell, R. Scott and H. Stuart Jones (eds.)
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, n ~ n t hedition, 1968).
 Adklns 1 A R I S T O T L E S ETHICS A N D POLITICS 49

15. Translations of H o m e r are legion. Good and readily available verslons of the Niad
(1) and Odyssey (0)are those of Rlchmond Lattlmore (Chlcago: Unlverslty of Chlcago
Press, 1951 and New York: Harper a n d Row, 1967, respectively).
16. Arlstotle, The Constirutron of Athens. Sir Frederlc G. Kenyon (trans.), In The
Works of Arrsrorle Translated Into English, W.D. Ross (ed.), (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1921).
17 F o r the term see Arthur W.H. Adklns, Merrt and Responsibiliry: A Study m Greek
Values (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960), p. 7
18. I d o not clalm that agarhos and anrhropos are never used together, merely that the
respective ranges a n d emotlve power of anrhropos and aner will be likely t o lead qulckly t o
the substltutlon of aner for anrhropos In any s u s t a ~ n e ddiscuss~on.(In E N 1106 a23
anrhropos 1s the subject and agarhos the predicare.).
19. 1 believe EN 1098al2-16 t o be authentic Arlstotle. If they are a later gloss, thegloss
Indicates w h a t 1s certainly true t h a t the tendency continued after the tlme of Arlstotle.
20. See Adklns, "Theorra." p. 31 1.

A. W .H. Adkrns I S Edward Olson Professor of Greek and Professor of Philosophy

and Early Chrrsrran Lrterature ar the Unrversrry of Chrcago. He w the aurhor of
Merlt and Responsibility: A Study In Greek Values (1960): F r o m the Many t o the
One: A Study of Personality and Views of H u m a n Nature In the Context of
Anclent Greek Soclety, Values and Beliefs (1970); and Moral Values and Political
B e h a v ~ o u rIn Anclent Greece (1972).