Resources Policy xxx (xxxx) xxxx

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Resources Policy
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/resourpol

Regulatory regime on coal Mine Safety in China and Australia: Comparative

analysis and overall findings
Quanlong Liua, Xinchun Lia,∗, Maureen Hassallb
a
School of Management, China University of Mining & Technology, Xuzhou, 221116, China
b
The University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD 4072, Australia

ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACTS

Keywords: China and Australia are the world's largest coal producers and exporters respectively. Both countries have de-
Coal mining veloped the separate regulatory regime to regulate their coal mine safety. But Australia is far ahead of China in
Safety terms of coal mine safety. It appears that there remains significant scope for improvement on China's separate
Regulatory regimes regulatory regime. This article explores the similarities and differences between the regulatory regimes of China
Fatalities
and Australia, and introduces a slice of the arguments used to explain the distinct gap in mine safety. The first
and foremost, the mining Occupational Health & Safety (OHS) legislation in Australia is based upon duty of care,
risk management principles and workforce representation, while in China the mining OHS legislation could be
characterized as being uniformly prescriptive. Secondly, the regulatory agencies in China, namely the State
Administration of Coal Mine Safety (SACMS) and local regulation department of coal mine safety possess a
multiple of distinctive problems. Thirdly, coal mines in China are divided into the state-owned coal mines
(SOCMs) and township and village coal mines (TVCMs) which differ quite widely, including the mine ownership,
mine objectives, and coal pricing. In addition the mine workers are powerless in the matter of coal mine safety
regulation.

1. Introduction contribute to the frequency and catastrophic nature of China's fatal

China is the largest coal producer in the world, producing an esti-
mated 3.36 billion tonnes of coal output in 2016 according to The State
Administration of Coal Mine Safety, 2014. China is also the largest coal
consumer in the world (Niu, 2014). According to China's National En-
ergy Development Strategy Plan (2014–2020), the coal will continue to
dominate the energy strategy, accounting for more than 60% of China's
energy consumption. This coal-dominated strategy is unlikely to change
during the 13th Five-Year Plan Period (2016–2020). Nevertheless,
China has an appalling record of fatalities in the coal mining industry.
Fatalities in Chinese coal mines account for approximately 70% of
global coal fatalities (Chen et al., 2013). Likewise, Australia is the
fourth coal producer and the largest coal exporter in the world, but in
terms of mine fatalities, it is much better than China. Since 2000,
Australia's annual mine fatalities have been remained below 3, espe-
cially in 2002, 2004, 2007, and 2012 which achieved zero death. Ex-
ploring the underlying causes of China's appalling record of coal mine
fatalities, the complicated geological condition, rudimentary tech-
nology and equipment, insufficient skills of miners, inadequate safety
investment, and poor safety management are all the factors that
mine accidents. Furthermore, it suggests that the shortcomings from the
new coal mine safety regulatory regime might be contributing to Chi-
na's dreadful safety performance (Andrew, 2009; Liu and Li, 2013).
A multiple of scholars from China and elsewhere have studied the
existing problems of China's poor coal mine safety performance from
the perspective of governmental safety regulation. Some scholars ar-
gued that coal mine safety performance, such as accident frequency and
extent of injury in work place, enjoy obvious correlation with the
strength of governmental safety regulation and that the government
should strengthen the safety regulation on coal mines (Lewis-Beck and
Alford, 1980; Gray and Scholz, 1993; William, 2001; Gray and
Mendeloff, 2005; Lu and Shang, 2005; Xiao et al., 2008; Qin, 2013).
However, some other scholars put forward objections and argued that
the governmental safety regulation is ineffective and even hindered the
development of the coal industry (Viscusi, 1979; Baggs et al., 2003;
Wright, 2004). In regulatory terms, the coal mining industry has in-
variably been regarded as a special case. The severity and distinctive-
ness of the hazards the industry confronts, its historically high level of
work related fatalities, injuries and diseases, and its records of periodic
disasters involving multiple fatalities, have all resulted in a perception

∗
Corresponding author. School of Management, China University of Mining and Technology, University RD. 1, Xuzhou, Jiangsu Province, 221116, China.
E-mail address: qll2016@cumt.edu.cn (X. Li).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2019.101454
Received 20 May 2017; Received in revised form 10 March 2019; Accepted 16 July 2019
0301-4207/ © 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Please cite this article as: Quanlong Liu, Xinchun Li and Maureen Hassall, Resources Policy, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2019.101454
Q. Liu, et al.
that mining should be treated differently from other industries. Influ-
ential stakeholders, in particular, have argued that specialized skills are
needed for effective regulatory oversight and that, for this and other
reasons, mining should be the subject of a separate regulatory regime
(Gunningham, 2007).
Both China and Australia have developed a sophisticated and
complex legal regime to regulate their coal mine safety. The regulatory
regimes share a multiple of attributes. Despite similarities between the
separate regulatory regimes, China significantly lags Australia as re-
gards coal mine safety. It may not be completely valid to compare those
two countries due to their differences in economic development, par-
ticularly the Gross National Income (GNI) per capita. However, em-
pirical evidence demonstrates that China is underperforming some even
poorer large coal producing countries which possess similarities in
economic development with regards to safety performance (Andrew,
2009). As an example, India is the third largest coal producer, but its
safety performance is much better than China. It appears that there
remains significant scope for improvement on China's separate reg-
ulatory regime. Therefore, this article is going to explore similarities
and differences between the regulatory regimes of China and Australia,
and introduce a slice of the arguments used to explain the distinct gap
in mine safety, so as to provide implications for the future improvement
of coal mine safety performance in China. The remainder of this paper
is organized as follows. In Section 2, we explore the coal mine safety
performance in China and Australia. In Section 3 and Section 4, we
comparatively analyze the regulatory regime for coal mine safety in
China and Australia. In Section 5, we introduce a slice of the arguments
used to explain the distinct gap in mine safety. Finally, we conclude this
work in Section 6.
2. Coal Mine Safety performance in China and Australia
Coal production is inherently risky. Miners are exposed to hazards
well in excess of those who working in other occupations. The main
coal mining hazards include: strata control, underground explosives,
coal bursts & bumps, slips and falls, fire, collisions, inrush, outburst
et al. (Kirsch et al., 2014). However, China and Australia use different
indicators to reflect their coal mine safety performances. According to
the State Administration of Coal Mine Safety (SACMS), the number of
accidents, number of fatalities, and fatality rate per million tonnes are
widely used to reflect its mine safety performance. Whereas in Aus-
tralia, the number of lost time injuries (LTI), number of disabling in-
juries (DI), number of medical treatments injuries (MTI), number of
high potential incidents (HPI), number of fatalities, fatal injury fre-
quency rate (FIFR), LTI frequency rate, LTI severity rate, LTI duration
rate, etc. are primarily used as the safety performance indicators. The
LTI, DI, FIFR, and other indicators data are arduous to compare inter-
nationally because of the different systems and definitions that apply.
Therefore, in this study the coal output, number of fatalities, and
fatality rate per million tonnes were accessed for the comparison of coal
mine safety performance in China and Australia.
Fatal accidents have been a common occurrence ever since China
began modern excavation of coal in the 1870s (Wang, 2006). A sum-
mary of safety production records in coal mining industry from 1999 to
2014 in China is shown in Table 1. As shown in Table 1, China has an
appalling record of fatalities in the coal mining industry. There were
65501 miners died in workplace accidents from 1999 to 2014. How-
ever, coal mining industry in Australia is generally viewed as being the
safest in the world's coal mining industry. From 1979 to 1999, Australia
has experienced only six major mine accidents, each costing more than
10 lives, which the total number of fatalities is 69 in this period.
Moreover, from 2006 to 2010, there were only 9 miners died in
workplace accidents (Harris et al., 2014). Especially in 2002, 2004,
2007, and 2012, the total number of fatalities achieved zero death. If
the fatalities are considered as a function of production, namely fatality
rate per million tonnes. The average fatality rate per million tonnes
2
Resources Policy xxx (xxxx) xxxx
from 2006 to 2010 in China is 1.27, whereas that number is 0.0036 in
Australia, 350 times as many as that of Australia. Even the state-owned
key mines which possess the best safety performance in China, also
enjoy a worse safety records than Australia, as shown in Fig. 1.
Moreover, China's annual coal output keeps a rapid growth from
1.044 billion tonnes in 1999 to 3.87 billion tonnes in 2014, whereas
Australia's annual coal output maintains stable relatively. The annual
coal output trend since 1999 of the two countries can be seen in Fig. 2
below. Besides, from 2002 to 2014, the decreasing trend in the number
of fatalities and fatality rate per million tonnes are extremely noticeable
in China, as shown in Fig. 3, but the coal mine safety performance is
still overwhelmingly grim compared with Australia.
Coal mine safety performance is impacted by various factors, such
as organizational conditions, technical conditions, and societal condi-
tions which differ quite widely in China and Australia. As an example,
coal mines in Australia are all run and managed by large private cor-
porations in contrast to a mixture of state-owned companies and private
companies in China. Australian coal mines are heavily mechanized and
primarily open cut, whereas coal mines in China are less mechanized
and mostly underground. All of these factors contribute to the above
safety gap between China and Australia. Besides, the maturity of coal
mining OHS governance also differs quite widely between China and
Australia. Therefore, the following sections analyze the regulatory re-
gime for coal mine safety in China and Australia and then introduce a
slice of the arguments used to explain the distinct gap in mine safety.
3. The Chinese Mine Safety regulation regime
China's current regulatory framework for coal mine safety was es-
tablished in the 1998 to 2000 governmental reform (Song and Mu,
2013). At present, China has developed a comprehensive, sophisticated
and complex legal regime to regulate its coal mine safety.
3.1. Legislation
Since 1982, China has established a set of laws, regulations and
rules on coal mine safety, as shown in Table 2 and Table 3. Formally, a
simple hierarchy of laws, regulations and rules and their making in-
stitutions exists in China (Andrews-Speed et al., 2003, 2005).
Firstly, the National People's Congress, holding the power to make
national laws, has enacted a host of laws that deal directly or indirectly
with coal mine safety, including the Constitution, the Mining Safety Law,
the Production Safety Law, the Mineral Resources Law, the Coal Law and
the Labor Law. Among the hierarchy of laws in force, the Constitution has
the highest force of law in which Article 42 is the highest provision of
law on safety production. The Mineral Resources Law ((Articles 31 in
Chapter V)), the Labor Law (Articles 52–57 in Chapter VI) and the Coal
Law (Chapters III, VI, VII and VIII) are the most broad-ranging on
mining safety, whereas the Mining Safety Law is more specific which is
formulated for the purpose of ensuring safety in production, preventing
accidents, protecting personal safety of workers and staff at mines, and
promoting the development of mining industry (Andrew, 2009). The
Production Safety Law is China's first comprehensive legislation with an
emphasis on general workplace and production safety, the law stipu-
lates the rights and duties of employers, trade unions, employees, local
governments, and OHS regulators (Guo and Wu, 2011).
Secondly, the State Council has promulgated a multiple of more
specialized administrative regulations on coal mine safety since the
establishment of new regulatory regime, which mainly include: the
Regulations of Coal Mine Safety Inspection, the Regulations of
Administrative Responsibility Investigation on Extraordinarily Serious
Safety Accident, the Special Regulations of Prevention on Coal Mine
Production Safety Accidents, the Regulations of Labor Security Inspection,
the Regulations of Report, Investigation and Handling on Safety Production
Accidents, and the Regulations of Safe Production License. Among those
administrative regulations, the Regulations of Coal Mine Safety Inspection
Q. Liu, et al. Resources Policy xxx (xxxx) xxxx

Table 1
China's safety production records in the coal mining industry from 1999 to 2016.
Source: China Coal Industry Statistical Yearbook (2012) and the website of the State Administration of Coal Mine Safety (SACMA).
Year Output (MT) Number of fatalities Fatality rate per MT Year Output (MT) Number of fatalities Fatality rate per MT

1999 1043.63 6469 6.198 2008 2748.57 3215 1.170

2000 999.17 5796 5.801 2009 3012.51 2631 0.873
2001 1105.59 5670 5.013 2010 3248.33 2433 0.749
2002 1415.31 6995 4.942 2011 3498.23 1973 0.564
2003 1727.87 6434 3.724 2012 3660.00 1384 0.378
2004 1997.35 6027 3.017 2013 3700.00 1073 0.290
2005 2151.32 5938 2.760 2014 3870.00 931 0.241
2006 2331.78 4746 2.035 2015 3684.85 588 0.159
2007 2523.42 3786 1.500 2016 3363.99 528 0.156

Note: The China's current regulatory framework for coal mine safety was established in the 1998 to 2000 governmental reform.

Fig. 1. The coal fatality rate per million tonnes for China's state-owned key
mines and Australia.
Fig. 3. China's number of fatalities and fatality rate per million tonnes in coal
Source: China Coal Industry Statistical Yearbook (2012) and the website of the
mine from 1999 to 2014.
State Administration of Coal Mine Safety (SACMA), and Australia commodity
Note: The People's Republic of China was established in 1949; The China's
statistics 2009, minerals and energy commodities – coal.
current regulatory framework for coal mine safety was established in the 1998
to 2000 governmental reform.
Source: China Coal Industry Statistical Yearbook (2012) and the website of the
State Administration of Coal Mine Safety (SACMA).

the national laws and regulations. As an example, the Provision on

Regulation and Administration of Safety Production in Coal Mines was is-
sued by Shanxi province in 2004, which stipulates the responsibilities of
local regulation departments for regulating coal mine safety.

3.2. Regulators and their responsibilities

Before 1998, China's administrative agencies for regulating coal

Fig. 2. The coal annual output trend for China and Australia between 1999 and
2014.
Source: China Coal Industry Statistical Yearbook (2012) and the website of the
State Administration of Coal Mine Safety (SACMA), and Australia commodity
statistics 2009, minerals and energy commodities – coal.
is a specialized regulation for safety inspection of coal industry, which
stipulates the rights and duties of the State Administration of Coal Mine
Safety (SACMS) and inspectors. It provides a legal basis for safety in-
spection and supplement, at least in part, the Mining Safety Law.
Thirdly, the State Administration of Work Safety (SAWS)/State
Administration of Coal Mine Safety (SACMS) have promulgated a set of
more detailed rules according to its rights and duties for inspecting coal
mine safety, as shown in Table 3. Those departmental rules are man-
datory and provide benchmarks for the SAWS/SACMS to carry out their
duties.
Lastly but in no means least, even the above laws, administrative
regulations and departmental rules do not exhaust all the various pieces
of legislation, and in most cases local regulations and rules supplement
mine safety had been changed frequently and repeatedly, as shown in
Fig. 4 below. Those frequent and repeated changes of regulatory
agencies explains, at least in part, China's fluctuations of coal mine
safety performance from 1949 to 1999 (Fig. 3). During this period,
these administrative agencies not only have the responsibility of reg-
ulating coal mine safety but also have the responsibility of setting and
meeting production quotas, which have to make a trade-off and cannot
be able to effectively implement coal mine safety regulation work.
Therefore, at the end of 1999, Chinese government began to fun-
damentally reform its coal mine safety regulation system. The General
Office of the State Council promulgated the “Printing and Distributing the
Implementation Plan on the Reform of Coal Mine Safety Regulation System”
and then drafted the new Regulations of Coal Mine Safety Inspection (Liu
et al., 2014). Meanwhile, the State Administration of Coal Mine Safety
(SACMS) was established under the State Economic and Trade Com-
mission (SETC) to inspect all coal mines' safety in March 2000, and two
years later was made a subordinate agency under the new State Ad-
ministration of Work Safety (SAWS), which is responsible for the reg-
ulation of general safety in all industrial sectors. The SACMS remains a
separate agency under the SAWS which reports directly to the State
Council, and is responsible for crafting and enforcing safety regulations

3
Q. Liu, et al. Resources Policy xxx (xxxx) xxxx

Table 2
Laws and regulations on coal mine safety issued by the National People's Congress and State Council.
Source: the website of the State Administration of Work Safety (SAWS) and the State Administration of Coal Mine Safety (SACMA).
Issuer Year

Law
Constitution The National People's Congress 1982.12.4
Mineral Resources Law The National People's Congress 1986.3.19
Trade Union Law The National People's Congress 1992.4.3
Mining Safety Law The National People's Congress 1992.11.7
Labor Law The National People's Congress 1994.7.5
Coal Law The National People's Congress 1996.8.29
Production Safety Law The National People's Congress 2002.6.29
Administrative regulation
Regulations of Coal Mine Safety Inspection The State Council 2000.11.7
Regulations of Administrative Responsibility Investigation on Extraordinarily Serious Safety Accident The State Council 2001.4.21
Regulations of Safe Production License The State Council 2004.1.7
Regulations of Labor Security Inspection The State Council 2004.10.26
Special Regulations of Prevention on Coal Mine Production Safety Accidents The State Council 2005.9.3
Regulations of Report, Investigation and Handling on Safety Production Accidents The State Council 2007.4.9

for mines. Within the hierarchy of the SACMS, the sub-agencies at local
levels are line-managed by the SACMS from the top so that they can
function independently from local government intervention (Song and
Mu, 2013). For the first time, China's mechanism of coal mine safety
inspection was institutionally separated from its mechanism of mining
production administration (Wang, 2006). In November 2004, the
General Office of State Council promulgated Views on the Relevant Issues
about Strengthening the Coal Industry Regulation System and explicitly
stipulated the responsibility of SACMS and local government for reg-
ulating coal mine safety. Eventually, China has set up the new coal mine
safety regulation system with the characteristics of vertical manage-
ment and grading inspection, which is “State inspection, Local regula-
tion, and Enterprise responsibility”, namely the SACMS and local reg-
ulation department of coal mine safety share the task of administrative
enforcement on coal mine safety production, as shown in Fig. 5.
Specifically, “State inspection” means the SACMS performs inspec-
tion duties for all coal mines' safety according to the Regulations of Coal
Mine Safety Inspection, which mainly include: implementing “three in-
spections” on coal mines’ compliance with safety regulations and
standards including key inspection, special inspection and periodical
inspection; issuing correction notices or administrative penalty for il-
legal behavior of coal mines; inspecting and guiding the work of local
regulation department of coal mine safety; issuing and managing the
safety license, the safety production eligibility license of mine manager,
and the license of mine special operators; designing, inspecting and
accepting safety facilities in mine construction projects; and conducting
the investigation and handling of coal mine accidents. In short, the role
of SACMS is to make rules and standards and then through inspection,
issuing, licensing, and accident investigation to ensure the im-
plementation of rules and standards.
Likewise, “Local regulation” means the local governments, namely
local regulation department of coal mine safety (formerly the Bureau of
Coal Industry) implement territorial management on coal mines' gen-
eral safety and also support and cooperate with SACMS's inspection
work. The main duties of the local regulation departments of coal mine
safety are listed as follows: regulating coal mines' general safety work;
fining the mines and executives for noncompliance with safety reg-
ulations or standards; supervising the rectification of mine accident
threat and recheck; closing mines who do not qualify for safe produc-
tion; conducting coal mine safety special rectification; participating in
the investigation and handling of coal mine accidents; and supervising
coal mines' training for miners.
Since the establishment of new regulatory regime for coal mine
safety, the relationship between “State inspection” and “Local regula-
tion” is defined as: “Local regulation” is the basis of “State inspection”,
and the SACMS inspects and guides the work of local regulation de-
partments on coal mine safety. The SACMS and local regulation de-
partments should strengthen contacts and work co-operatively to build
a strong line of defense for coal mine safety production.
Besides the above direct coal mine safety regulators, there are a

Table 3
Rules on coal mine safety issued by SAWS/SACMS.
Source: the website of the State Administration of Work Safety (SAWS) and the State Administration of Coal
Mine Safety (SACMA).
Name Year

Rules on Administrative Penalty Methods of Illegal Safety Production 2003.5.19

Rules on Management Methods of Coal Mine Safety Inspectors 2003.6.13
Rules on Administrative Review Methods of Coal Mine Safety Inspection 2003.6.20
Rules on Administrative Penalty Methods of Coal Mine Safety Inspection 2003.7.2
Rules on Basic Conditions for Coal Mine Safe Production 2003.7.2
Rules on Management Methods of Coal Mine Safety Inspection Fine 2003.7.2
Rules on Inspection of safety Facilities in Coal mine Construction Project 2003.7.4
Rules on Implementation of Safe Production License in Coal Mines 2004.4.19
Rules on Training and Assessment Methods of Coal Mine Safety Inspectors 2004.4.26
Rules on Interim Management Methods of Safety Production Regulation Fine 2004.10.18
Rules on Management Method of Safety Production Training 2004.12.28
Rules on Management of Industry Standard on Safety Production 2004.12.1
Rules on Safety Inspection on Gas Control in State-owned Mines 2005.1.6
Interim Rules on disciplinary sanctions on Violation of laws in Safety 2006.11.22
Rules on Administrative Review of Safety Production 2007.9.25
Rules on Management of Emergency Plan for Safety Production Accidents 2009.3.20
Rules on Mine Water Prevention and Control 2009.8.17

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Q. Liu, et al. Resources Policy xxx (xxxx) xxxx

number of departments partly responsible for safety production in coal

mines. As an example, the Ministry of Land and Resources is entrusted
to oversee the exploration of coal resources and issue the mining license
which is one of the four requisite licenses for each mine. In China, a coal
mine must obtain four licenses from different regulators before it can
start producing. There are the safety license and safety production
eligibility license of mine manager from the SACMS, the mining licenses
from the Ministry of Land and Resources, and the general business li-
cense from the local Administration for Industry & Commerce. If any
one of the above four licenses is absent, the mine is deemed illegal.

4. The australian Mine Safety regulation regime

In Australia, mine safety regulation is handled at the state level.

Fig. 4. China's regulatory agencies changes of coal mine safety regulation be-
fore 1998.
Each state in Australia has established its own legislative framework,
generally incorporating regulations that encourage the development of
management systems and key processes (Cliff, 2012). There are three
main “mining States”: Queensland, New South Wales, and Western
Australia. Most coal fields in Australia are located in Queensland and
New South Wales, while Western Australia is dominated by the me-
talliferous mining. Each of the main “mining States” has an in-
dependent legal regime which has a extremely different culture, history
and approach to regulate its coal mine safety. Thus, this section will
provide an overview of the traditional approach to mine safety reg-
ulation and its limitations and describe the main features of a new
generation of mine safety legislation (Gunningham, 2007).

Fig. 5. Structure of coal mine safety regulation system in China.

5
Q. Liu, et al. Resources Policy xxx (xxxx) xxxx

4.1. Legislation Table 4

Australian main coal mine safety legislations in the three “mining States”.
4.1.1. Traditional Mine Safety regulation and its shortcomings Source: Gunningham, N., 2007. Mine safety: law regulation policy. The
In essence, Australian OHS law may incorporate four types of Federation Press, Sydney.
standards aimed at influencing behavior through a variety of techni- Name Year
ques, namely the prescriptive standards, the general duties, the per-
New South Wales
formance based standards, and the process based standards
Mine Inspection Act 1901
(Gunningham and Johnstone, 1999; Bluff et al., 2004). Specifically, the Coal Mines Regulation Act 1982
prescriptive standards tell duty-holders precisely what measures to take Occupational Health and Safety Act 1983
and require little interpretation on their part; the General duties set out Coal Mines Regulation (Amendment) Act 1989
principles which duty-holders must follow, such as ensuring health and Mine Inspection General Rules 1994
Mines Legislation Amendment (Mines Safety) Act 1998
safety as far as practicable, leaving it to the discretion of the duty-
Coal Mines (General) Regulation 1999
holders how they achieve those principles or goals; the Performance Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000
based standards specify the outcome of the OHS improvement or the Occupational Health and Safety Regulation 2001
desired level of performance but let the concrete measures to local Coal Mines Health and Safety Act 2002
Explosives Act 2003
circumstance; the Process based standards identify a particular process or
Mine Health and Safety Act 2004
series of steps to be followed in the pursuit of safety, and range from the Explosives Regulation 2005
requirement to identify and assess hazards and risk controls, to the Occupational Health and Safety Amendment (Workplace Deaths) Act 2005
more ambitious requirement to engage in a systemic approach to OHS Coal Mines Health and Safety Regulation 2006
at organizational level. Mine Health and Safety Regulation 2007
Queensland
The most distinctive feature of traditional Australian mine safety
Mines Regulation Act 1964
regulation was that it relied heavily upon the prescriptive approach. Metalliferous Mining Regulations 1985
The prescriptive approach was to some extent softened by virtue of Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995
some legislative amendments which imposed some general duties, Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act 1999
shifted certain requirements from regulation to codes, standards or Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999
Coal Mining Safety and Health Regulation 2001
guidelines, consolidated much of the previous laws, and facilitated the Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Regulation 2001
use of manager's rules individually tailored to each mine. Even then it Western Australia
was still common for the mines inspectorates to focus most of their Coal Mines Regulation Act 1946
attention on prescription. Mines Regulation Act 1946
Occupational Safety and Health Act 1984
In summary, notwithstanding a host of amendments and reforms,
Mines Safety and Inspection Act 1994
the above three main “mining States” continued to place heavy reliance Mines Safety and Inspection Regulations 1995
on the prescriptive regulations. The deficiencies of this approach were Mines Safety and Inspection Amendment Act 2004
well documented in the British Robens Report of 1972, which pointed
that prescription tends to result in regulatory overload as so many in-
dividual obligations are imposed that they become impossible to com- Furthermore, the legislature subsequently enacted two supplementary
prehend, let alone to implement (Robens, 1972). The prescription may mine-specific Acts which are the Coal Mines Health and Safety Act 2002
also give rise to adverse effects on the development of culture in which and the Mine Health and Safety Act 2004. The two Acts established
safety is everybody's responsibility due to reliance upon “going by the additional obligations, protections and procedures necessary for the
book” (Bardach and Kagan, 1982; Hopkins, 2004). Finally, it can im- control of risks arising from mine work. Mine-specific regulations are
pose high costs on mine companies and reduce international competi- further introduced in the Coal Mines Health and Safety Regulation 2006
tiveness without commensurate improvements in mine safety. Cer- and the Mine Health and Safety Regulation 2007. However, the
tainly, the traditional prescriptive approach was supplemented during Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 remains the main Act relating
the 1990s, but as increasing amendments were introduced, it came to to individual's health and safety at work, including mines, and prevails
incorporate a mixture of regulatory approaches which further confuse in the event of any inconsistency. To avoid administrative overlap, it
duty-holders as to what was required of them and how best to discharge has been determined that the Minister for Industrial Relations admin-
their responsibilities. isters the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 for all workplaces
apart from mines, which are the responsibility of the Minister for
4.1.2. Reforms and legislation Primary Industries. By contrast, Queensland and Western Australia
In terms of contemporary legislation, the three mining States en- have adopted the operating parallel not overlapping approach. The
gaged in major reforms between 1999 and 2005. Queensland made Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995 is the general health and safety
major changes to its mine safety legislation in 1999. New South Wales legislation, excluding mines, and the Mining and Quarrying Safety and
enacted the generalist OHS legislation in 2000 and coupled this to Health Act 1999 and the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999 are two
mine-specific statues relating to coal mining in 2002, as well as other Acts relating to mining industry. Similarly, Western Australia enacted
types of mining in 2004. Western Australia amended its mine-specific the general Occupational Safety and Health Act 1984 which excludes
legislation in 2004 and contemplated further reform. The relative coal mines and the separate Acts of Mines Safety and Inspection Act (1994).
mine safety legislations in the three main “mining States” are shown in
Table 4. Although the reforms did not abolish the prescriptive mine- 4.1.3. General duties, regulations and codes
specific legislation, the new approach embraced the sorts of general In New South Wales, when the Occupational Health and Safety Act
duties. The virtue of this new approach is that it establishes responsi- 2000 was introduced, the principle result was to make the mining in-
bilities in broad terms, requires duty-holders to take OHS measures dustry subject to a comprehensive set of “general duties”. These relate
across the board, encourages them to address new hazards as they to the basic responsibilities of employers, employees, and others. The
emerge, and facilitates innovation and least-cost solutions (Johnstone, duty of the employers is to ensure the health, safety and welfare of
2004). employees at work, which is further broken down into subcategories.
In New South Wales, the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 Western Australia also adopted general duties consistent with the
was enacted to update its old mainstream OHS legislation. The legis- general approach taken in the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000
lation was designed to apply to all workplaces including mines. (NSW). The relevant provisions are contained in part 2 of the Mines

6
Q. Liu, et al.
Safety and Inspection Act 1994 and further extended in the Mines Safety
and Inspection Amendment Act 2004. Queensland however, has taken a
somewhat different method to achieve a similar result. Under the Coal
Mining Safety and Health Act 1999 and the Mining and Quarrying Safety
and Health Act 1999, the emphasis is on the management and control of
risk. An acceptable level of risk must be achieved by putting in place
sufficient control and management measures. The risk management
approach has much in common with the general duty approach. There
are nevertheless quite a few crucial differences of which are far from
clear and need to be clarified (Bluff and Johnstone, 2005). As an ex-
ample, the risk management approach implies a ranking of risks, under
which the low ranking risks may not require measures until some late
date, whereas a general duty approach would require immediately ac-
tion.
Although the general duty provisions are of extremely broad and
lacking in specific guidance to the duty-holders, this problem can be
solved through the use of complementary codes of practice. In many
circumstance, these provide the greater practical and detailed guidance
that employers may require but, rather than being prescriptive, simply
offer one acceptable means of achieving the principles set out in the
general duties. Moreover, many of those codes will be performance
based or process based.
4.1.4. Risk management, management plans and management system
By the mid-1990s, a new phase of regulation emerged, namely the
systematic process based standards, which identify a particular process
or series of steps, to be followed in the pursuit of OHS. Process stan-
dards have become increasingly comprehensive and sophisticated
where three distinct but related approaches can be identified - the
general risk management approach, the more detailed risk based re-
quirements approach, and a more systemic approach to manage safety
through the creation of safety and health management systems. The
desirability of the first of the above three approaches is broadly re-
cognized and is incorporated in both the mainstream OHS and mine
safety legislation. However, the second and third approach are still
relatively novel. But mining itself is an industry where hazards are
large, risks are inherent and change is continual, and successful man-
agement of risks associated with mining requires a systematic ap-
proach. Accepting this rationale, Queensland, followed by New South
Wales, has introduced legislative requirements both stipulating the in-
troduction of OHS management systems across the board and estab-
lishing the hazards management plans in specified circumstances.
The general risk management approach was first adopted in the
mainstream OHS legislation primarily through an obligation inserted in
an increasing numbers of regulations to identify hazards and assess and
control risk. The mine-specific statutes in New South Wales and
Queensland have also embraced risk management principles. This is
particularly the case under the two Queensland statutes, namely the
Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999 and the Mining and Quarrying
Safety and Health Act 1999. Both of them specified that all mining op-
erations must be carried out so that risks are managed to an acceptable
level. However, what distinguishes the mine safety legislation of
Queensland and New South Wales is the extent that it goes beyond the
general risk management obligations and requires duty-holders to es-
tablish much more detailed and onerous risk management plans.
Finally, a health and safety management system is required to be in
place before mining both in New South Wales and Queensland mine
safety legislation. The management system involves the assessment and
control of risks and the creation of an inbuilt system of maintenance
and review. In New South Wales, the Coal Mines Health and Safety Act
2002 specifies that system elements must include health and safety
policy, risk management, training and competence, information control
and system evaluation, major hazards management plans, the man-
agement structure of the coal operation, and any contractor manage-
ment plans. And the Coal Mines Health and Safety Regulation 2006 fur-
ther specifies particular elements that must be included in the health
7
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and safety management system including inspection program, super-
vision arrangements, information and communication arrangements,
etc. In Queensland, both the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999 and
the Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act 1999 require the de-
velopment, implementation and documentation of a safety and health
management system that incorporates risk management elements and
practices that ensure safety and health of workers who may be affected
by the mining operation.
4.2. Duty-holders and their responsibilities
The duty-holders mainly include the operator (employer), managers
and supervisors (executive officer), employees, and contractors in the
mining safety legislation. In New South Wales, the Occupational Health
and Safety Act 2000 imposes its primary responsibilities on the “em-
ployer”, with additional duties on employee, manufacturers and others.
In contrast, the Coal Mines Health and Safety Act 2002 and the Mine
Health and Safety Act 2004 impose the principle responsibilities on the
mine operator, with additional obligations on managers and super-
visors, employee, and contractors. Taking the operator for instance,
they will have a number of specific obligations set out in the Coal Mines
Health and Safety Act 2002 or the Mine Health and Safety Act 2004 in
addition to their obligations as an “employer” under the Occupational
Health and Safety Act 2000. In particular, they have duties to: imple-
ment hazard management processes, prepare and ensure compliance
with a health and safety management system, prepare and maintain
mine safety management plans and emergency plans, prepare con-
tractor management plans, etc. The operators must also notify the Chief
Inspector and Industry Check Inspector in certain circumstance and
notify the relevant government department of serious accidents and
incidents that occur at their mines. Likewise, in Queensland, both the
Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act 1999 and the Coal Mining
Safety and Health Act 1999 also impose key obligations on the operator,
executive officer, employee, and contractors. Taking the operator for
example, they have duties to: ensure the risk to employee is at an ac-
ceptable level, ensure the operator's own health and safety and the
health and safety of others is not affected by the way the operator
conducts operations. The operator is also under a duty to appoint a
senior site executive with obligations to develop and implement a safety
and health management system and to develop, implement and main-
tain a management structure. The operator in turn must review this
system and determine whether it is working effectively and require
corrective action if necessary.
OHS legislation has sought to protect employees not just by estab-
lishing and enforcing OHS standards but also by empowering workers
or worker representatives to intervene in the OHS interests of the
workforce. The New South Wales OHS and mine safety legislation have
been to include provisions for worker participation both under the
Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 and also in the mine-specific
safety legislation, namely the Coal Mines Health and Safety Act 2002 and
the Mine Health and Safety Act 2004. In Queensland, worker participa-
tion is also stipulated in the mine-specific safety statutes: the Mining and
Quarrying Safety and Health Act 1999 and the Coal Mining Safety and
Health Act 1999. Taking Queensland for instance, the Coal Mining Safety
and Health Act 1999 vests site safety and health worker representatives
with broad inspection rights, including the right to inspect documents
and to exam whether the procedure in the safety and health manage-
ment system are actually in place in the mine. If the worker re-
presentative believes a safety and health management system is in-
adequate or ineffective, the worker representative must inform the
senior site executive, and if the executive does not respond adequately
then the worker representative must advise an inspector. Worker re-
presentative have the right to stop mining operations where there is an
immediate threat to the health and safety of coal workers, but no right
to issue Provisional Improvement Notices.
Q. Liu, et al.
5. Discussing the safety gap between China and Australia
At present, both China and Australia have developed comprehensive
and sophisticated legal regime to regulate their coal mine safety.
Although the coal mine safety performance is improving significantly in
China, the coal mine safety situation is still overwhelmingly grim
compared with Australia. The following subsections introduce a slice of
the arguments used to explain the distinct gap in mine safety.
5.1. Legislation
Mining OHS legislation in Australia is generally viewed as being the
most progressive in the world. It is based upon duty of care, risk
management principles and workforce representation, with the primary
responsibility for the provision of a safe work place residing with the
operator of the mine site (Clark, 1999; S. Poplion et al., 2008). Gov-
ernment inspectors act as not only enforcers of regulations but also
mentors who encourage promising health and safety performance. En-
forcement protocols are generally risk-based, with action being defined
by both the level and immediacy of risk. Specifically, the key facets of
modern mining OHS legislation in Australia are as follows. Firstly, risk
management, namely, the key to the implementation of modern OHS
legislation is the requirement to reduce health and safety risks to
workers to as low as reasonably possible (Joy, 2004). The legislation
does not specify the definition of acceptable levels – rather, the onus is
on the mine operator to establish risk levels. Secondly, modern Aus-
tralian mining OHS legislation requires mines and workers to exercise a
“duty of care”. The duty of care encourages management of OHS rather
than compliance with regulation, which is shared between employer
and employee. However, primary responsibility rests with the em-
ployer, who largely has control over working conditions. Similarly, high
duty of care exists in hazardous environments. Thirdly, monitoring the
effectiveness of the implementation of mining legislation and OHS
management systems occurs in many ways. Legislation requires the
reporting of all accidents and significant incidents, injuries and serious
illnesses. Significant incidents not only indicate the potential for an
injury or fatality but also the potential for hazardous circumstances to
exist. In addition, the legislation requires that mine sites undertake
regular audit and review processes, which are subject to scrutiny by the
regulator. Finally, an integral part of the modern mining OHS legisla-
tion is the inherent role that the workforce plays in implementing OHS
management.
By contrast, the mining OHS regulation in China could be char-
acterized as being uniformly prescriptive, with an emphasis on detailed
and highly technical specifications and standards, and with compliance
to laws and rules enforced by government-funded independent in-
spectorates with limited inspection powers. The advantages of this type
of approach were that operators knew exactly what the requirements
were, and the legislation was relatively easy to enforce. Simply,
workplaces were deemed to be safe if they complied with the regula-
tions, but these laws and rules are rarely if ever implemented.
Moreover, experience with such rigid approaches also identified a
number of weaknesses, with a number of reviews and investigations
highlighting the following issues:
• The large number of detailed and technical rules were often arduous
to understand, and also challenging to keep current;
• Standards were often developed in an ad hoc manner;
• Regulations often featured a focus on physical hazards only;
• There was uneven coverage across different types of workplaces;
• There was no encouragement for organizations to be innovative, as
the compliance approach focused on minimum standards rather
than excellence;
• The prescriptive approach usually ignored the fact that hazards may
not arise from static features of workplace, but also from the way
that work is organized;
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Resources Policy xxx (xxxx) xxxx
• There was a dependence on top-down regulation, with little in-
volvement of other stakeholders such as workers and unions.
Thus, at least in theory, if the laws, regulations and rules, and local
are rigorously performed, they should effectively control the accidents.
Just as a senior official from SACMS pointed out in an interview in May
2010, “China has strict laws and regulations governing the safety in
coal mines, but these laws and regulations are rarely implemented”
(China Daily, 2010).
5.2. Regulators
China's current regulatory framework for coal mine safety was es-
tablished in the 1998 to 2000 governmental reform, which is “State
inspection, Local regulation, and Enterprise responsibility”, namely the
SACMS and the local regulation departments of coal mine safety share
the task of administrative enforcement on coal mines' safety production.
However, compared to Australian regulators, several factors to some
extent undermine the effectiveness of coal mine regulation.
Firstly, compared with Australian regulators, the rights and re-
sponsibilities between the SACMS and the local regulation departments
of coal mine safety in China are overlapped and lack of unified lea-
dership. Both the SACMS and the local regulation departments in China
have the responsibilities to conduct regulation on mines' compliance
with safety regulations and the rights to fine the mines for non-
compliance. Although this can achieve double regulation on mines'
compliance with safety regulations and reduce likelihood of accidents,
the overlapping responsibilities are an obstacle to the formation of
coherent and unified approach to coal mine safety issues. In Australia,
the regulators' responsibilities and rights are strict and clear. There are
no overlapped rights and responsibilities. Besides, since the distribution
of responsibilities between China's regulators was overlapped, it was
easy for them to make excuses mutually. In particular, when their ac-
tions were consistent with their own interests, the contradiction would
be high. Compartmentalization not only led to conflict, but also di-
minished incentives to treat safety problems seriously, weakened en-
forcement effectiveness. In Australia, Government regulators act as not
only enforcers of regulations but also mentors who encourage good
health and safety performance. Enforcement protocols are generally
risk-based, with action being defined by both the level and immediacy
of risk.
Secondly, compared with Australian regulators, the SACMS is lack
of judicial review and authority, and to some extent acts as “toothless
tiger”. After the mine starts producing, the SACMS conduct periodic
inspections on its compliance with mining safety regulations. If a vio-
lation is found, the SACMS can issue notes for correction or impose
fines. However, according to the current mining legislation, it is mainly
the local regulation departments' responsibility to follow up on recti-
fication measures. Furthermore, the SACMS does not have the authority
to shut down mines even if the mines refuse to correct their actions,
instead they must recommend the local regulation departments to do
so. For serious violations, the SACMS can withdraw the safety license
temporarily while prosecutions are rare. And the prosecutions are
brought only in response to severe injuries or fatalities. Moreover, in
the process of enforcement, the SACMS also do not have the power of
penalty to local regulation departments’ illegal enforcement and only
have the duties to inspect and guide.
Thirdly, the local regulation departments of coal mine safety are
ineffective in regulating and enforcing laws in their territorial mines. In
quite a few localities there is corruption and lack of accountability at
lower levels. In addition, there is no public scrutiny mechanism in their
enforcements, which provides room for rent-seeking or secret dealings
(Kolstad and Wiig, 2009). It was extremely common for local officials to
sit secretly on the board of directors or take kickbacks from mine
owners. The collusion between them makes regulation enforcement
nearly impossible. In addition, there are also to some extent lack of
Q. Liu, et al.
accountability at lower levels of local regulation departments.
Fourthly, the local government has great enforcements in the safety
regulation and only it has the authority to shut down an illegal coal
mine, and in order to develop its local economy, it often turn a blind
eye to the safety regulation and result in the prevalence of local pro-
tectionism. Most coal mines are located in relatively underdeveloped
regions. In those regions, the coal industry is their “life-blood” and the
local government derives most of its income and economic growth from
the coal industry. Therefore, the local government faces a dilemma
between implementing coal mine safety regulations and its income and
economic growth. Usually the need for economic growth and incomes
outweighs the responsibility for safety production in coal industry.
Fifthly, another key factor to undermine the effectiveness of coal
mining regulation is an acute shortage of qualified mine inspectors to
enforce safety rules. The Sichuan SACMS, for instance, covered more
than 1500 coal mines, but only had 128 mine inspectors. The number of
inspectors was especially insufficient in lower levels. Moreover, the
distance between the SACMS offices and a slice of coal mines even can
be as far as 1000 km. Due to the lack of competent inspectors, the in-
spections were carried out randomly for only a small proportion of
mines, safety inspection in most cases was mere a formality. Perhaps
most township and village coal mines in remote areas were outside the
scope of inspection.
5.3. Regulated mines
Conditions in China and Australia differ quite widely within coal
mining companies. As an example, coal mines in Australia are pre-
dominantly large established by multinational mining houses, in com-
parison to a mixture of state-owned coal mines (SOCMs) and private
township and village coal mines (TVCMs) in China. Thus, this section
will introduce a slice of the arguments used to explain the distinct gap
in mine safety from the perspective of different types of coal mines in
China.
Firstly, the problems from the state-owned coal mine (SOCMs). The
SOCMs play a key role in China's energy supply. They bear the re-
sponsibility of earning social benefits. What's more, they meet multiple
objectives from all facets of public needs and political pressures. These
objectives involve consideration of enterprise or national employment,
regional equality, income distribution, and national sovereignty.
Moreover, there is a “two-tier pricing” system in coal industry, which
consisted of two sets of prices, namely fixed price and market price. The
market price is higher than the fixed price. The state has the complete
right to dominate the SOCMs and assigned an output quota (allocated
coal) to the SOCMs which filled the quota and sold to the state at the
fixed price. To encourage the SOCMs, any output beyond the allocated
coal output could be sold at free market price on the open market. The
distortion in coal sale prices reduced the SOCMs' income and profits
which is not conductive to the accumulation of safety investment. In
addition, the SOCMs are also embedded into non-safety regulation
games with the state-owned enterprises, such as the national electric
power enterprise, railway sector. In the above embedded non-safety
regulation games, the SOCMs are often placed in a weaker bargaining
position. By contrast, the township and village coal mines (TVCMs) are
able to sell their coal at higher market prices.
Secondly, the problems from the township and village coal mine
(TVCMs), namely the small scale coal mines. The TVCMs have also
played a significant role in China's energy supply, which accounts for
about 36% of annual coal output. However, the regulatory regime has
failed to effectively regulate the TVCMs, which lacks simplicity and
focus, and is highly complex and diffuse. The TVCMs mostly widely
distributed and located in remote areas, which increases the difficulty
of regulation. It is relatively more expensive for the TVCMs to comply
with safety regulations than larger mines. Besides, there are an ocean of
migrant workers with low education. What make things worse is that
the government policy towards the TVCMs has swung between
9
Resources Policy xxx (xxxx) xxxx
encouraging when there is a supply shortage and suppressing in time of
over-supply (Wright, 2007; Andrews-Speed et al., 2005). The policy
uncertainties discourage the TVCMs from taking on long-term invest-
ments but encourage them to embrace short-term rent-seeking behavior
as they do not know how long they can produce before they are forced
to close. Furthermore, the TVCMs are the “life-blood” in quite a few
remote underdeveloped areas, which result in the prevalence of local
protectionism. Moreover, a multiply of illegal coal mines are typically
in remote areas, and run through a system of corruption. In addition,
the TVCMs are also embedded into non-safety regulation games with
the local government official, local tyrant, and even media. In the above
embedded games, the TVCMs are often placed in a weaker bargaining
position.
5.4. Worker participation and labor organization
The treatment of labor organization and worker participation is a
glaring difference between China and Australia. In Australia, an integral
part of the modern mining OHS legislation is the inherent role that the
workforce plays in implementing OHS management. This occurs in a
range of ways. First, at the highest level, the responsible minister in
each state is advised by a tripartite advisory council which consisted by
government, employer and employee. These boards have the power to
define training competencies and provide advice to the minister re-
garding reforms to the legislation. Second, at each mine site there are
OHS committees with workforce representation that have input into the
development of health and safety procedures and plans. There are
generally site safety and health representatives, elected by the work-
force. These representatives have limited powers to review procedures
and plans but can direct workers to leave a place of work deemed un-
safe. They are usually the first point of contact for a worker with OHS
concerns. The representative will raise issues with mine management. If
he or she cannot obtain satisfactory resolution, he or she can forward
complaints to a mines inspector or the industry-wide workforce re-
presentative for further action. Moreover, in most states there are a
small number of workforce representative inspectors (referred to as
industry safety and health representatives, district worker re-
presentatives, or check inspectors) who are appointed by the govern-
ment, usually on advice from the relevant mining union. These officers
have similar powers to government inspectors, and may be contacted
directly by workers where there are concerns regarding health and
safety. In addition, the risk assessment process involves consulting with
an appropriate cross-section of the workforce and external expertise in
order to identify and characterize the potential hazards at a mine site.
In China, although potentially a paramount force to the coal mine
safe production, the mine workers are powerless in the matter of mine
safety regulation. Several facts may explain this imbalance. First, al-
though the Trade union Law stipulates the right to organize migrant
mine workers, the mine trade union is usually the “obedient children of
Party leaders and mine bosses” (Andrew, 2009). China Labor Bulletin
believes that unless mine workers are allowed to establish independent
trade unions, the mining OHS of workers cannot be effectively pro-
tected. Without properly functioning labor organization, workers
cannot guard their basic legal rights no matter how comprehensive and
sophisticated the regulatory scheme is. A functioning mining labor or-
ganization would allow mine workers to organize independently their
own safety teams and participate directly in safety inspection, as they
do in Australia. Second, there are an ocean of rural farmers or unskilled
laborers who are illiterate, unskilled and unaware of their limited right
to organize. Poverty compelled them to accept hazardous mine working
conditions. The problem of coal mine safety will not be solved until
China's rural population has other, better and safer, ways to increase
family incomes so that they have the option to refuse to risk their lives
(Wright, 2004). Third, the lack of training and awareness makes mine
workers largely ill-equipped to identify hazards, assess and control
risks. If the workers had been well-trained in the technical facets of
Q. Liu, et al.
mine safe production and the relevant law and standards, they would
not only protect themselves from risky production, but also have the
capacity to provide a bottom-up monitoring of operators' compliance
with safety regulations.
6. Conclusions
While China still has the largest record of fatalities in coal mining
industry, the annual statistics demonstrate that it’s improving trends is
overwhelmingly noticeable. However, the coal mine safety perfor-
mance in China is still extremely grim compared with other large coal
producing countries. Australia is the largest coal exporter in the world
but has a significantly lower fatality. It may not be valid to compare
those two countries, particularly considering their large differences in
economic development. However, evidence manifests that with regards
to coal mine safety performance, China is underperforming the third
largest coal producer, namely India which is less developed than China.
Both China and Australia have developed the separate regulatory
regime to regulate their coal mine safety in detail and established the
mine-specific administrative agencies to promulgate and enforce coal
safety standards. However, it appears that there remains significant
scope for improvement on China's separate regulatory regime. Several
arguments have been made as to the safety gap.
The mining OHS legislation in Australia is based upon duty of care,
risk management principles and workforce representation, with the
primary responsibility for the provision of a safe work place residing
with the operator of the mine site. Government regulators act as not
only enforcers of regulations but also mentors who encourage good
health and safety performance. Enforcement protocols are generally
risk-based, with action being defined by both the level and immediacy
of risk. However, the mining OHS legislation in China could be char-
acterized as being uniformly prescriptive, with an emphasis on detailed
and highly technical specifications and standards, and with compliance
to laws and rules enforced by the SACMS and the local regulation de-
partment of coal mine safety. Moreover, the administrative agencies
have a multiple of distinctive problems as follows, the rights and re-
sponsibilities between the SACMS and local regulation departments of
coal mine safety are overlapped and lack of unified leadership, the
SACMS are lack of judicial review and qualified inspectors, the local
regulation departments are lack of accountability at lower levels and
are of malpractice on regulating their territorial mines, and the pre-
valence of local protectionism from local governments.
Moreover, coal mines in China are divided into the state-owned coal
mines (SOCMs) and the township and village coal mines (TVCMs). The
most distinctive differences may lie in issues of mine ownership, mine
objectives, and coal pricing. Specifically, the administrative mono-
polistic SOCMs versus the free market TVCMs, the multi-objectives of
SOCMs versus the sole objective of TVCMs, and the fixed price of
SOCMs versus the free market price of TVCMs. Besides, the mine
workers are powerless in the matter of mine safety regulation. Several
facts may explain this imbalance, including the mine trade union is
usually the “obedient children of Party leaders and mine bosses”, there
are a host of migrant workers who are illiterate and unskilled, and lack
of training and awareness. It is crucial to recognize that the knowledge
and experience of the workforce is a valuable resource. Using this
knowledge and experience to develop an effective mining OHS man-
agement system through consultation and involvement in determining
desired outcomes and targets provides a positive foundation for the
implementation process.
Acknowledgments
This work was supported by the National Natural Science
Foundation of China (Grant no. 71704176), the Think Tank of Energy
Mining Economy (2018 “Double First-Class” Initiative Project for
Cultural Evolution and Creation of CUMT) (Grant no 2018WHCC01),
10
Resources Policy xxx (xxxx) xxxx
the State Key Program of National Social Science Foundation of China
(Grant no. 19AGL030), the Key Construction Bases of Philosophy and
Social Sciences in Jiangsu Universities (Grant no. 2018ZDJD-B009) and
the Fundamental Research Funds for Central Universities (Grant no.
2019CxNL09).
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