Axiomathes

https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-018-9386-2

ORIGINAL PAPER

Roles for Values in Scientific Activities

Hugh Lacey1,2

Received: 10 May 2018 / Accepted: 12 June 2018

© Springer Nature B.V. 2018

Abstract
My aim in this paper is to rebut objections that have been made of the account of the
various roles for values in scientific activities that I have developed, initially in my book
Is Science Value Free?, in response to criticizing the proposal that science is value free.
Specifically I respond to objections that my account does not recognize the significance
of basic science, and that my defense of the ideal of impartiality cannot be sustained.

Keywords  Values · Science · Science as value free · Impartiality · Neutrality

Throughout the tradition of modern science it has been affirmed that science is value
free (SVF). In my book, Is Science Value Free? (Lacey 1999), I offered an explica-
tion and critique of SVF, and introduced an account, clarified and further developed
in later writings, of the various roles that values may play in scientific activities
(RVS). My aim, in this article, is to rebut several criticisms that have been made
of RVS. First, however, in Sects. 1 and 2, I will summarily introduce SVF and RVS
with just enough detail to enable the criticisms to be stated and responded to.

1 Science is Value Free (SVF)

SVF, according to my explication, presupposes that there is a dichotomy between

fact and value, and that scientific knowledge concerns the domain of fact—(its appli-
cations obviously involve considerations of value). It maintains that methodological
choices and the criteria for evaluating the evidential support for scientific (hypoth-
esis) hypotheses do not involve value commitments, and also that science does not
support any particular value-outlooks at the expense of others.1 More precisely, SVF

1
  When "value(s)" is unqualified it substitutes for "ethical, social and other non-cognitive value(s)."

* Hugh Lacey
hlacey1@swarthmore.edu
1
Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, PA, USA
2
University of São Paulo, São Paulo, Brazil

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 Axiomathes

maintains that scientific activities are responsive to the ideals, impartiality (I), neu-
trality (N), and autonomy (A). For present purposes summary statements of I and N,
and brief comments on them, will suffice.2

1.1 Impartiality (I)

In general terms, I states that claims to scientific knowledge and understanding are
(or should be) evaluated in the light of appropriate empirical data (observed facts)
and criteria that are not value-laden. The more precise statement that follows refers
specifically to claims of the type “T expresses knowledge and understanding of F”—
which I will abbreviate as “T (of F)”—where T designates a theory3 and F a domain
of phenomena. It also incorporates the view that the criteria for evaluating a theory
as the bearer of knowledge and understanding of a specified domain of phenom-
ena, in the light of available empirical data obtained from observing phenomena of
this domain, may be analyzed as cognitive values (Lacey 1999, Chap. 3).4 Cogni-
tive values are distinct and separate from ethical, social and other non-cognitive val-
ues (Lacey 2005a, Chap. 3, 2017a). Exemplary ones include empirical adequacy,
explanatory power, capacity to identify possibilities that the phenomena enable and
allow, internal consistency, consistency with understanding of phenomena that is
established in other theories, and minimization of ad hoc hypotheses.
I: T is correctly held of F, if and only if T manifests the cognitive values to
a very high degree, and to a higher degree than any competing theory, in the
light of sufficient and relevant empirical data obtained by observing the phe-
nomena of F; and T is correctly rejected of F if and only if it is inconsistent
with a correctly held theory (of F).
The degree of manifestation of the cognitive values is “measured” according to the
“standards” that have become accepted in scientific practice. They require that all
specifically-identified lines of research have been pursued that could produce out-
comes that would lead to rejecting T (of F); that all objections (including about the
sufficiency of the available data) that have actually been raised, regardless of the
values adhered to by those who make them, have been addressed; and that, after
repeated efforts and a reasonable lapse of time, no additional objections, accom-
panied by specific research proposals, are anticipated (Lacey 1999, pp. 62–66).
According to I, T (of F) is not correctly held, if non-cognitive values or metaphysi-
cal commitments play ineliminable roles alongside of the cognitive values or over-
riding of them in appraisals of it. This leaves open that non-cognitive values may
have legitimate roles in other aspects of scientific activities (Lacey 1999, pp. 17–18).

2
  For more detailed and nuanced statements of I and N, see Lacey (2005a), pp. 23–28; and for discus-
sion of A, Lacey (2016) and Lacey and Mariconda (2012).
3
  "Theory" is used in a broad sense to include, in addition to (those) theories with the logico-mathemati-
cal structures much discussed by philosophers of science, also systematically organized bodies of empiri-
cally based claims.
4
  The statement can readily be extended to apply to all claims of scientific knowledge (Lacey 2015a) and
reformulated to accommodate competing analyses of the criteria (Lacey 1999).

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Axiomathes

E.g., social values, although they have no proper role in appraising whether or not T
(of F) is correctly held, may contribute to explain why a research project, in which T
is deployed, was pursued, and so why the conditions obtained that enabled T (of F)
to become held.
I, as stated, expresses an ideal concerning cognitive appraisal: T (of D) should
be held in accordance with I. Its normative force derives from epistemological and
cognitive considerations, i.e., considerations having to do with the aim of obtaining
knowledge and understanding of phenomena. In actual scientific practice, there are
many departures from this ideal, when ethical/social values are employed alongside
the cognitive values, e.g., when a claim is held in part, or rejected, because of its
service to particular interests. Feminist philosophers of science (e.g., Kourany 2010)
have provided many examples of patriarcal and sexist values having roles alongside
of the cognitive values in what pass as cognitive appraisals made of certain theo-
ries. Not everything that is called “scientific knowledge” is actually held in accord-
ance with I. Departures from the ideal may be mere lapses, and—unlike sustained,
systematic departures—not signify that I is not being upheld, provided that active
measures are taken to identify departures and, when they are identified, to correct
them.

1.2 Neutrality (N)

In the philosophical and scientific literature, the term “neutrality” has been used in a
variety of ways, not all of which are mutually compatible and most are indefensible.
Here I will consider neutrality only in the sense of “inclusiveness and evenhanded-
ness” (Lacey 2013).
N: for any viable value-outlook, there are social practices, in which that out-
look is embodied, that can be served by applications of (or otherwise be
informed by) some items of the stock of established scientific knowledge (i.e.,
the stock of items correctly held in accordance with I); and, overall, this stock
serves all these value-outlooks more or less evenhandedly, without privileging
some at the expense of others.
N concerns the totality of scientific knowledge, not each of its items taken sepa-
rately. Only some items (e.g., some that has informed medical cures) actually serve
all value-outlooks more or less evenhandedly, and some serve a variety of value-out-
looks in addition to the ones that initially were served by applying them; but many
effectively serve one value-outlook (e.g., one that contains values of capital and the
market) at the expense of others (e.g., those that contains values of social justice,
democratic participation and environmental sustainability). Insofar as it is an ideal,
N is an ethical one deriving from the aspiration that science not be subordinated to
special interests and be part of the shared patrimony of humankind. To function as
such, the range of value-outlooks referred to in the formulation of N needs to be lim-
ited to include all and only those that are admissible in democratic societies. I will
interpret N to incorporate a qualification to this effect (although many proponents

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 Axiomathes

of SVF would not accept this). Upholding I does not ensure that N is upheld.5 As
stated, N is a generalization open to empirical test in the historical and social stud-
ies of science. Empirical investigations can also help to identify departures from
responsiveness to N-as-ideal in scientific practices, and to identify how research
agendas could be re-directed in order progressively to reduce the departures. N is
upheld as an ideal only if the generalization is confirmed to apply to a wide number
of instances, and (where it does not) that active efforts are made to reduce and even-
tually eliminate departures from it.

2 Roles for Values in Scientific Activities (RVS)6

RVS distinguishes various logically distinct moments of scientific activities. They

include (among others): ­M1—adopting a strategy for engaging in a research project;
­M2—carrying out the research; ­M3—cognitively evaluating theories and hypothe-
ses; and ­M4—applying scientific knowledge. According to RVS, cognitive values
but not other kinds of values, have essential roles to play at ­M3; at all other moments
ethical/social values may also have legitimate and sometimes essential roles.

2.1 Adopting a Strategy

The most distinctive thesis of RVS, highlighting M ­ 1 as a key moment of scientific

activities, is that all scientific research is conducted under a strategy that is adopted
(explicitly or implicitly) to enable specified kinds of phenomena to be investigated.7
A strategy constrains the types of theories (or hypotheses) that may be deployed
and evaluated in a research project and possibly held of the phenomena investigated,
thereby specifying the kinds of concepts that may be used and the types of possibili-
ties that may be identified in them, as well as the types of models, techniques and
simulations that may be used in the research; and selects the kinds of empirical data
to be procured and reported, of what phenomena, and using what kinds of descrip-
tive categories (Lacey and Mariconda 2014; Lacey 2015a, 2016).
According to RVS, the strategy adopted in a research project should be appropri-
ate in view of the characteristics of the phenomena to be investigated, and different
kinds of strategies may be required for investigating different kinds of phenomena.

5
 Sometimes neutrality is taken to be the view—"cognitive neutrality" [CN] (Lacey and Mariconda
2012)—that claims, held in accordance with I, have no value judgments among their entailments. CN
represents a logical thesis, not an epistemological or ethical ideal. Accepting CN does not imply uphold-
ing N.
6
  Defences of all the views expressed in this section, and elaborations (with examples) of the concepts
introduced (strategy, DSs, CSs, values of technological progress, values of social justice, democratic
participation and environmental sustainability, etc.), can be found in Lacey (1999, 2005a, 2015a, 2016).
In Lacey (1999, 2005a), DSs are called "materialist strategies." The collaboration of colleagues at the
University of São Paulo (especially Marcos Barbosa de Oliveira and Pablo Mariconda) has contributed
significantly to the development of RVS. The most recent version, on which I draw in this section, is pre-
sented in Lacey and Mariconda (2014).
7
  The notion of “strategy” was introduced in Lacey (1999).

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Axiomathes

In this sense, RVS permits strategic pluralism. Furthermore, it recognizes that

selecting the kinds of phenomena to investigate (from the large and variegated
range that might be selected) is often based on judgments of their ethical/social
importance. This underlies the thesis that there can be mutually reinforcing rela-
tions between adopting a strategy (S) and adhering to a value outlook, {V} (Lacey
1999; Lacey and Mariconda 2014). Explaining and justifying the adoption of a strat-
egy may involve reference to these relations—subject to it being a necessary con-
dition for continuing to adopt a strategy in the long run that its capacity to shape
research, which can lead to expanding the stock of established scientific knowledge,
is demonstrated.

2.1.1 
Decontextualizing Strategies (DSs)

Strategies of a particular kind—decontextualizing strategies (DSs)—have been

adopted virtually exclusively in modern scientific research (Lacey 1999). Under
DSs, theories are constrained so that they can represent and explain objects/phe-
nomena and encapsulate their possibilities by reference to their underlying order,
i.e., by reference to their underlying structures, their components and their pro-
cesses and interactions, and to the laws that govern them; and the empirical data
that are selected and sought for are obtained by means of measuring, instrumental
and computer-assisted operations, typically in experimental contexts, and generally
expressed using quantitative categories. Representing phenomena in this way decon-
textualizes them: it dissociates them from any place that they may have in relation to
social organization, human lives and experience, from any link with human agency,
sensory qualities and value, and from any possibilities that they might have in virtue
of their places in human, social and (often) ecological contexts.
DSs are fruitful and versatile: fruitful—they enable knowledge of a vast range of
phenomena to be accumulated, many components and laws of the underlying causal
order to be discovered, and hitherto unknown possibilities to be identified; versa-
tile—new types of DSs regularly are devised for dealing with phenomena that could
not be grasped under previously introduced ones. The variety of fruitful DSs, the
range of objects/phenomena that can be grasped under them, and the novel possi-
bilities for practical application that become identified, all continue to expand appar-
ently without limit.

2.1.2 Context‑Sensitive Strategies (CSs)

The absence of such a limit does not imply that there is not a boundary that can-
not be crossed. It does not imply that (even in the long run) using DSs would in
principle be able to provide understanding of all phenomena, in particular, of those
whose identities are intrinsically connected to their contexts (Lacey 2014a).8 It may
8
  E.g., systematic effects of social change; interactions and processes of the components of sustainable
agroecosystems (Lacey 2015c); consequences (harmful effects and risks) of introducing applications into
social practices that are occasioned by socioeconomic mechanisms; and conditions for effective measures
to protect public health in impoverished areas. Moreover, explaining human action, including engaging
in scientific research using DSs, requires the use of intentional categories.

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 Axiomathes

be possible, however, to obtain knowledge and understanding of phenomena of this

kind by conducting research under strategies that are not reducible to DSs—context-
sensitive strategies (CSs). Some CSs may be fruitful, as exemplified by research in
agroecology (Lacey 2005a, b, Chap. 10, 2015c, 2016).

2.1.3 Mutually Reinforcing Relations Between Adopting a Strategy and Adhering

to Certain Values

Both DSs and CSs are included in the strategic pluralism that RVS permits. There
are mutually reinforcing relations between adopting DSs and adhering to values
of technological progress, {VTP} (Lacey 1999, 2005a, Chap. 1, 2016) (and, today,
adhering to {VTP} goes hand in hand with adhering to values of capital and the mar-
ket, {VC&M}); and between adopting some CSs and adhering to values of social jus-
tice, democratic participation and environmental sustainability, {VSJ/DP/ES} (Lacey
2015b; Lacey and Mariconda 2014).

2.2 Deploying a Theory

Research is carried out at ­M2 aiming to expand the stock of scientific knowledge (in
a given area) that may be established at ­M3. To this end, a theory (T), constrained to
have the features specified by the strategy adopted (at ­M1), is deployed in order to
provide direction to that research, and/or to test the limits of the range of phenom-
ena, of which it can come to be held at M ­ 3. Values are among the various factors
that can influence decisions about which T is to be deployed. T may be deployed
because it is apt for directing research on particular objects/phenomena that have
been selected for research (from the general domain selected at M ­ 1) in the light of
value judgments; e.g., selecting the zika virus, rather than another kind of virus,
because of its relevance to a health crisis. Or, research that requires deploying T may
not be pursued because it frames experimental inquiries that would threaten human
rights. Hence, values influence the selection of the specific objects/phenomena of
which scientific knowledge will actually be obtained. Personal and institutional val-
ues may also play roles in choosing to deploy T, as well as just plain curiosity to find
out the limits of a general theory, whose fruitful deployment has been proven for
investigating a variety of domains of phenomena.

2.2.1 Fruitfulness and Comprehensiveness

Among the values that have impact of which theories are deployed are “fruitfulness”
and “comprehensiveness.” These are not ethical/social values. Moreover, although
they appear on most lists of proffered cognitive values (see Sect.  3.2), they are
not cognitive values (as defined in Sect. 1), for they are not among the criteria for

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Axiomathes

evaluating theories as bearers of knowledge and understanding of specified domains

of phenomena in the light of available empirical data obtained from observing phe-
nomena of the relevant domains. Nevertheless, they are closely connected with cog-
nitive values. They are values of theories deployed for investigating phenomena that
are still under investigation, or not yet investigated—deploy theories that have shown
their fruitfulness for giving rise to theories that have become correctly held of other
domains, or theories that open the possibility of investigating phenomena in new
domains and so promise to expand the comprehensiveness of established scientific
knowledge. They are values of deployed theories, adhered to for the sake of generat-
ing a greater array of theories (of specified domains of phenomena) that manifest the
cognitive values in accordance with I.

2.3 Holding a Theory of a Domain of Phenomena

Holding T (of F) in accordance with I (at ­M3) is an outcome of research activi-

ties (at ­M2) in which T has been deployed. These activities depend on the provi-
sion of various material, social and economic conditions, as well as on the interests,
motives and objectives of researchers. Values may function to maintain social and
institutional conditions that are favorable for coming to correctly hold T (of F), and
avoiding situations where T (of F) may be held, but not in accordance with I.9 They
may also influence the decision to deploy one theory rather than another in research.
Thus, values—when embodied in scientific institutions or adhered to by scientists—
may contribute causally towards determining what theories (of what domains of
phenomena) become held in accordance with I. That values have the roles attributed
to them at M ­ 1 and M­ 2 does not imply that values function among the criteria for
cognitively appraising hypotheses and theories at M ­ 3. Upholding I fits comfortably
with recognizing these roles. They leave intact that whether or not T (of F) is cor-
rectly held is settled by reference only to the empirical data and the cognitive values.
At the same time, the explanation of why T (of F) became a candidate for evalua-
tion, rather than other theories of other domains of phenomena, cannot be dissoci-
ated from the role of values connected with the adoption of the strategy under which
T has been investigated, and with the immediate aims of the research in which T is
deployed (at M­ 2).
Note that T, deployed at M ­ 2, does not become held in accordance with I at M ­ 3.
It is only T (of F), for some F, that may become held—Newtonian theory cannot be
correctly held, but Newtonian theory is correctly held of the planetary motions. A
general theory is never correctly held, for the generalizations it incorporates apply
to domains of phenomena that extend beyond those currently investigated, and sub-
sequent research may provide access to new domains, of which T turns out not to
provide knowledge and understanding. A claim is only held in accordance with I,
however, when (after extensive research and critical interaction with other points
of view) there remain no further research proposals whose outcomes would lead to

9
  For various mechanisms, and associated values, see Lacey (2005b, 2015a, 2016).

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 Axiomathes

rejecting the hypothesis, and none are anticipated (see Sect.  1). That condition is
never met by a general theory.

2.3.1 Neutrality

Values obviously must play many roles at ­M4. Is this consistent with responding
robustly to N? Are the roles currently being played by values at ­M4 in accordance
with N?
Remember that, in contemporary mainstream scientific institutions, adopting DSs
has been prioritized almost to the point of exclusivity, and research conducted under
CSs has been marginalized.
Then, adopting DSs tends to be “built into” the theories that are deployed (at ­M2),
as if it is of the nature of scientific theories to use only categories admissible under
DSs, and so there appears to be no reason to think of M ­ 1 as a moment of scien-
tific activities separate from ­M2. That ensures that the stock of established scientific
knowledge will be generated under DSs—as if “being established under DSs” were
a condition that must be satisfied by any claim held in accordance with I, or a crite-
rion for evaluating claims of scientific knowledge and understanding, alongside of
the cognitive values,10 a criterion guaranteed to be satisfied given the kinds of theo-
ries that become adopted.
In order to explain the predominance given to using DSs, their fruitfulness and ver-
satility are no doubt important factors, but (as indicated above) not decisive for mar-
ginalizing CSs. The key factors, according to RVS, are the mutually reinforcing rela-
tions between adopting DSs and adhering to {VPT} (and {VC&M}), and the fact that
these values are widely held in contemporary societies and embodied in their lead-
ing economic, political and educational—and scientific—institutions. Thus, adopting
DSs is prioritized (at ­M1) in large part because DS-knowledge11 (when applied at ­M4)
can contribute to strengthen interests that embody {VPT} (and {VC&M}.
While interests that embody {VSJ/DP/ES} may also be served to some extent by
applying some DS-knowledge (e.g., medical and agroecological), the central aspects
of the practices that serve them need to be informed by CS-knowledge. When DSs
are adopted virtually exclusively, however, that CS-knowledge is not obtained. Then,
N cannot be manifested; and scientific research serves interests that embody {VPT}
and {VC&M} well, much more than interests that embody {VSJ/DP/ES}, and sometimes
at the expense of them (Lacey 2005a, 2015b, c, 2016). Thus, so long as the trajec-
tory of scientific research is shaped by giving virtual exclusivity to DSs, N cannot be
responded to more fully—and so, contrary to SVF, N is not upheld.
N could be responded to more fully, however, by adopting CSs for investigating
appropriate kinds of phenomena and granting commensurate space for conducting

10
  Hypotheses investigated under DSs have no value judgments among their entailments; adopting DSs
ensures that CN (see Note 5) is satisfied. Insofar as SVF identifies neutrality with CN, it implicitly takes
for granted that scientific research must proceed under DSs. But CN does not imply N.
11
 "DS [CS]-research" stands for "research conducted under DSs[CSs]," "DS[CS]-knowledge" for
"knowledge obtained in research conducted under DSs[CSs]," "DS-theories" for "theories deployed
under DSs," etc.

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Axiomathes

CS-research. Then, provided that the CS-research is fruitful, overall the outcomes
of scientific research would be able to be applied more evenhandedly in service to
interests of {VSJ/DP/ES}, as well as of {VPT} and {VC&M}. How far that would go
towards robustly upholding N is a matter for empirical investigation that incorpo-
rates strategic pluralism; and whether it should be considered far enough a matter to
be judged in the course of democratic deliberations.

2.3.2 
Endorsing a Claim

The judgment (made at M ­ 4) that it is legitimate to introduce an application of sci-

entific knowledge into social practices is a value judgment. In exemplary cases it
presupposes that the relevant T (of F) that informs the development and efficacy of
the application is correctly held. It also depends on making claims about harmful
effects, risks, benefits and alternatives, e.g., the claim that there are no serious risks
to health or environment, occasioned by using the application, that cannot be accept-
ably managed under scientifically informed regulations (I will refer to this claim
as “no risk”). “Risk” is a value-laden term. Thus, affirming “no risk” presupposes
(among other things) the value judgment, about which there may be disagreements,
that all of the kinds of risks that ought to be considered have been considered. Pro-
ponents of SFV presumably would maintain that making this value judgment is not
within the authoritative purview of scientists, qua scientists. (I am inclined to agree.)
At the same time, making the judgment, “no risk,” is also the outcome of empiri-
cal investigation, for which the contribution of scientists is indispensable. However,
research in which only T is deployed is not adequate for investigating “no risk,”
and generally neither is research conducted under the same strategy (an instance of
DSs) that gave origin to the application (e.g., a technoscientific innovation). Since
many risks have dimensions that are inseparable from their contexts, the relevant
investigations must also use CSs (illustrated in the case of GMOs in Lacey 2017b).
Some risks may be investigated under DSs, in so called “scientific risk investiga-
tions.”12 Prior to conducting them, value judgments are explicitly made that certain
potential effects of using the innovation, if they actually occurred, would be harmful
to human health or the environment. Then, these potential effects are investigated
under descriptions that deploy categories available in DS-theories. Because of the
complexities, uncertainties and limited time available for risk investigations, when
judgments have to be made about the legitimacy of using an innovation, rarely is
there sufficient evidence available to hold (or reject) “no risk” in accordance with I.
Nevertheless, at that time, a judgment has to be made about “no risk,” one informed
as best as possible by relevant empirical evidence. I call that judgment endorsement.
To endorse “no risk” is to make the judgment that it has been sufficiently well
confirmed by available empirical data that it is reasonable for actions and public pol-
icies to be informed by it on the supposition that it is true; and this implies that “no
risk” is sufficiently well confirmed that, in making decisions about actions or public

12
  For clarification of "scientific risk investigations," and discussion of their strengths and limitations in
the case of GMOs, see Lacey (2017b).

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 Axiomathes

policies that are informed by it, it is not necessary to take into account the ethically
salient consequences, which would follow from engaging in such actions or forming
such policies, if “no risk” were actually to be false (Lacey 2015a).13 Whether or not
“no risk” is sufficiently well confirmed for this practical purpose can only be decided
case-by-case, so that the ethical seriousness of the harm that is risked can be taken
into consideration: the greater the ethical seriousness of the potential harm, the
greater should be the likelihood that it not actually occur. Endorsing “no risk,” there-
fore, reflects the ethical seriousness of the potential harm, and judgments about this
can vary with the value-outlook adhered to. Nevertheless, endorsed claims are not
simply matters of opinion or convenience.14 Empirical data (obtained at M ­ 2 under
the relevant strategy) constitute the evidential base for an endorsement. Values are
not part of the evidence and they do not function alongside of the cognitive values;
their role concerns judgments made about the sufficiency of the available evidence
to legitimate acting informed by an endorsed claim (cf. Douglas 2009). Recogniz-
ing the role of values in making endorsements is compatible with upholding I. To
endorse a claim is to judge (at M ­ 4) that it is sufficiently well confirmed to justify
its informing practical activities or policies; it is not to judge (at ­M3) that it belongs
to the stock of established scientific knowledge. To confuse endorsing a claim with
holding it in accordance with I is likely to lead to violations of I; and—since value
judgments are implicated in making endorsements—also to further departures from
N.

2.3.3 Principal Matters at Issue Between RVS and SFV

RVS accepts that cognitive values are distinct and separate from other kinds of val-
ues, but not SVF’s presupposition that there is a dichotomy between fact and value
(Lacey 2014b). RVS and SVF agree that values have no logically relevant roles at
­M3. For RVS, however, values can have legitimate roles at all other moments. But
SVF does not recognize the role for values at M­ 1 maintained by RVS: either it does
not recognize that M
­ 1 is a distinct moment from ­M2, or it denies that values properly
affect what strategies are adopted. This fundamental disagreement has far-reaching
consequences concerning strategic pluralism and upholding N. In addition, although
RVS and SVF agree that values have many roles at ­M4, SVF does not recognize the
distinction between holding and endorsing a claim, and the role of values in making
endorsements.

13
 Here I draw extensively on Douglas (2009)—although she does not use the term "endorse," and
rejects the way in which I distinguish between endorsement and holding in accordance with I.
14
  For a brief discussion of what constitutes well made endorsements and the strategies (DSs and CSs)
that need to be adopted so that they are properly informed by the results of scientific investigations, see
Lacey (2015a).

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3 Criticisms and Responses

Objections have been made to various theses of RVS. In Sect.  3.1 I will consider
one that has been raised in discussion by scientists who are committed to “basic”
(“pure”, “fundamental”) research. Then (in Sect.  3.2), I will consider a cluster of
objections—made by philosophers of science, who reject the “value-free ideal”—
whose overall thrust is that it cannot be soundly defended that I is an ideal (at M
­ 3)
pertaining to evaluating claims to scientific knowledge and understanding. I will
argue that none of these objections are compelling.

3.1 Basic Scientific Research

Objection 1  RVS does not recognize the significance of “basic” scientific research.

Many of the most notable contributions of modern science originated in basic

research. Basic research (as ideal type) is research conducted under DSs, motivated
by the aims of expanding the stock of established scientific knowledge and under-
standing, and of discovering the limits of the domains of phenomena that can be
investigated and grasped in the general theories that are being deployed, without
heed to possible socially useful outcomes or contributions to strengthening par-
ticular value-laden interests. Any role, played in basic science by values (other then
fruitfulness and comprehensiveness—see Sect. 2.2), is said to be contextual, subsidi-
ary, heuristic, and eliminable; and, furthermore, since there is no feedback in it from
­M4 to ­M1, its results may be, to a reasonable approximation, in accordance with
N. The objection is that the distinctive theses of RVS—e.g., that there are mutually
reinforcing relations between adopting strategies, S, and adhering to value-outlooks,
{V}, including between adopting DSs and adhering to {VPT and ­VC&M}—do not
allow space for research not motivated by values, and so fail to provide an adequate
account of major achievements of science.

3.1.1 Response

The theses of RVS do not imply that DSs are always adopted for the sake of fur-
thering the embodiment of {VPT} and/or {VC&M}. It is true that many scientists
today (like many others in modern societies) do adhere to {VPT} and {VC&M}, that
they often engage in research conducted under DSs largely for the sake of further-
ing interests that embody those values (as well as for personal ends, e.g., to gain
a salary), and that widespread adherence to {VPT} (and {VC&M}) largely explains
why DSs are adopted almost exclusively in modern scientific research (Lacey 1999,
2015a, 2016). Nevertheless, there can be good reasons for scientists to engage in
DS-research that have little to do with {VPT} (and {VC&M}: (a) some DS-results are
utilized within CS-research, e.g., research conducted under the strategies of agro-
ecology makes use of results obtained in DS-research, e.g., knowledge about micro-
organisms in the soil (Lacey 2015b); (b) more generally, the underlying causal order

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 Axiomathes

of objects/phenomena is relevant for understanding many of the possibilities that

derive from human interactions with them that are not mediated by technological
objects (Lacey 2014a); (c) adopting DSs serves to generate knowledge that is widely
considered of interest in itself, e.g., of the planetary movements, of the evolution of
the universe, and perhaps of the fundamental principles of physics and chemistry;
and (d) much of basic DS-research unfolds (at M ­ 2) under theories deployed simply
so that their fruitfulness and comprehensiveness can be further explored.15 (a)–(d)
Provide good reasons for scientists to adopt DSs in research projects, but not for the
scientific community to accept that DSs be adopted exclusively in research.
Thus, RVS can accommodate basic science without difficulty, and without deny-
ing (or ignoring) that, in the logical order of things, the “first” questions to be
addressed in a research project are: What are the objects/phenomena to be inves-
tigated, and what strategies should be adopted in order to investigate them ade-
quately? (a)–(d) are all consistent with the strategic pluralism maintained by RVS.
They underlie that results are often produced under DSs that play important roles in
informing practices and modes of life that embody values that bear mutually rein-
forcing relations to adopting CSs; e.g., they might lead to technoscientific innova-
tions that strengthen, and not undermine, the values embodied in agroecology (Nod-
ari and Guerra 2015). It is, thus, appropriate to consider that DSs have a certain
centrality in science. But this does not mean exclusivity; some kinds of objects of
interest have characteristics that make it appropriate to adopt CSs for their inves-
tigation.16 Furthermore, it does not imply that the results of DS-research can be in
accordance with N (inclusiveness and evenhandedness) outside of the context of
strategic pluralism, even if the greater part of them are products of basic research.
However, provided that basic science is conducted in a contest that admits and sup-
ports strategic pluralism, the more distant the results of DS-research are from the
interface of scientific activities and social practices, the closer the results of basic
science can be in accordance with N. E.g., the results of basic research in molecular
biology and biotechnology can be utilized, not only in the current research aimed at
producing the GMOs whose results tend to serve {VPT} and {VC&M} at the expense
of {VSJ/DP/ES}, but also for the analysis of genomes that, in conjunction with rel-
evant CS-results, informs research being conducted on the “participatory breeding”
of new crop varieties, whose uses serve interests that embody {VSJ/DP/ES} (Nodari
and Guerra 2015).

15
  Fruitfulness and comprehensiveness may be interpreted in the light of social values—certainly com-
prehensiveness is often interpreted in the light of commitment to using DSs. This may introduce ambi-
guities in the notion of basic research.
16
  Upholding materialist metaphysics has often motivated attempts to seek explanations in DS-theories
of phenomena (e.g., human action) that normally are explained using intentional, value and other cat-
egories that have no place under DSs. RVS allows a legitimate place for such research in the context of
multi-strategic research. Without CS-research also being conducted on these phenomena, it would not be
possible to test whether or not DS-theories can match or exceed the relevant CS-theories (of these phe-
nomena) in empirical adequacy, explanatory power, and capacity to anticipate future possibilities.

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Axiomathes

3.2 I as Ideal Pertaining to Evaluating Claims to Scientific Knowledge

and Understanding

Objection 2  The presupposition of upholding I, that there is a methodologically sig-

nificant distinction between cognitive and other kinds of values, cannot be sustained.

The arguments, supporting this objection, follow a common pattern (Lacey

2017a). (i) A list of what are typically considered to be cognitive values is pre-
sented, e.g., the list in Longino (2008): empirical adequacy, consistency with the-
ories in other domains, simplicity, explanatory power/generality, fertility, and ref-
utability. (ii) It is assumed that, if there is a methodologically useful distinction,
it would (or should) be possible to define “cognitive values” so that an unambigu-
ous determination can be made about whether an item belongs to the list of cog-
nitive values or not. (iii) Various definitions of cognitive values, proposed in the
literature, are considered; and (iv) It is argued that none of them serve to identify
items on the list to the exclusion of all social values. (v) The conclusion is drawn
that any distinction made between the cognitive and social (non-cognitive) values
will be arbitrary and without methodological significance.

3.2.1 Response

Typical of the definitions of cognitive values considered in these arguments are

the following: “characteristic values of a good scientific theory,” “good grounds
for accepting… a theory,” and “standard criteria for evaluating the adequacy of a
theory” (see Lacey 2017a, for documentation). None of them are sensitive to the
distinctions between hold, deploy and endorse, which are all grouped together
under the single cognitive attitude, accept, or related to other similarly inclusive
notions (e.g., “good theory”). Then, since social values can play legitimate roles
in deploying a theory (at ­M2) and endorsing a claim (at ­M4), it follows that the
lists of cognitive values made on the basis of these definitions will always include
some social values, as well as the items identified as cognitive values (in Sect. 1).
The conclusions, (iv) and (v), do not follow when the definition of cognitive
values (in Sect.  1) is used, namely, criteria for evaluating a theory as bearer of
knowledge and understanding, of a specified domain of phenomena, in the light
of available empirical data obtained from observing phenomena of the domain.

Objection 3  No claim can be held in accordance with I.

According to RVS, T (of F) (or other claim) is held in accordance with I, only
if the cognitive values are manifested in it to a high degree as “measured” by the
standards listed in Sect. 1. The objection is that certainty cannot be obtained that
these standards are met, and so it is always possible that T (of F) will be rejected
in the light of more research.

13
 Axiomathes

3.2.2 Response

It is always logically possible that future research will lead to revising the judgment
that a claim is held in accordance with I (even when there is no dispute among sci-
entists, and other relevant parties, that the high standards are met). Nevertheless,
the experience of investigators throughout the modern scientific tradition has led to
the development of norms (that are taught, sometimes tacitly, in programs for the
formation of scientists) to judge when the standards are met (or not), and so when
sufficient research has been conducted to justify including a claim in the stock of
established scientific knowledge.
The logical possibility, that an item of the vast stock of established scientific
knowledge might be rejected in the light of more research does not mean that, in sci-
entific practice, that item should be treated as needing to be put to further test. The
judgment that a claim is held in accordance with I depends on the practical judg-
ment that the high standards are met, not on refuting the logical possibility that they
might not continue to be met.

Objection 4  No claim is actually held in accordance with I.

We learn from the history of science that a general theory ­(T1), deployed at ­M2 to
give direction in a given area of research, is so deployed only for a limited time, and
then another general theory (­T2) becomes deployed in its place. It can be inferred
from this that all claims of the type ­T1 (of F
­ 1) cease to be held as items of the stock
of scientific knowledge, and become displaced by claims of type T ­ 2 (of F
­ 2) (where
­F1 and ­F2 refer to domains of phenomena, and ­F2 contains ­F1). All claims of the type
T (of F), even those taken to be correctly held, are subject to eventual displacement
in this way.

3.2.3 Response

The inference is not valid. Many claims of the type ­T1 (of ­F1) continue to be cor-
rectly held (and to be reliably used to inform applications) after T ­ 1 ceases to be
deployed at M­ 2 in active research programs. Although there is a regular succession
of general theories deployed in research programs, there is also an accumulation of
items correctly held in the stock of established scientific knowledge.

Objection 5  RVS incorporates the “value-free ideal”

The “value-free ideal” (svf) has been defined as “values should be excluded from
central aspects of scientific reasoning, such as decisions about what methodologies
or standards of evidence to employ” (Elliott 2017, p. 7); and “scientists, when rea-
soning about evidence, should consider only epistemic or cognitive values (Douglas
2009, p. 180). svf entails that there is no proper role for values among the grounds
for accepting a theory or hypothesis, that only the empirical data and appropriate

13
Axiomathes

cognitive criteria are relevant for making judgments of acceptance. The argument
assumes that, by affirming I, RVS incorporates svf.17

3.2.4 Response

svf is not the same as SVF,18 if only because it contains no mention of N. It does
resemble I, but it is neither identical to I nor entailed by it. svf effectively groups
together under the one cognitive attitude, accept, all of deploy, hold and endorse,
and thereby does not concede the methodological significance of the threefold
distinction among these cognitive attitudes that, according to RVS, may be taken
towards theories and hypotheses at different moments of scientific activities. I con-
cerns holding claims; svf, accepting them. Thus, svf is represented as being held
­ 3 (as also is I), but also at M
as an ideal that is pertinent, not only at M ­ 2 and, where
endorsements are relevant, at ­M4 (as I is not). The argument correctly rejects that
svf is an ideal—for, when the judgments of acceptance that scientists actually make
are examined (see Elliott 2017), it is clear that values inevitably play many kinds of
legitimate roles; thus svf cannot function as an ideal. According to RVS, however,
values may play legitimate roles at all moments except ­M3. Thus, for it too svf can-
not be upheld as an ideal. RVS upholds I, however, and leaves open the possibility
that N might be able to be upheld to a significant extent.

Objection 6  Holding as a limiting case of endorsing.

I have maintained that accept—by glossing over the distinctions among deploy,
hold, and endorse, and their different roles at different moments—is too gross a cat-
egory to use fruitfully to illuminate scientific methodology. This objection affirms
that, by making such sharp distinctions, RVS ignores that, before (temporally and
logically) a claim becomes held, it is endorsed; indeed, that a claim is consid-
ered part of the stock of scientific knowledge only when, after prolonged research,
it becomes so well supported by the available empirical data that there is agree-
ment across value outlooks that it should be endorsed. Thus, it maintains, holding
a claim—e.g., T (of F)—depends not only on the empirical data and the cognitive
values (as in RVS), but also on the convergence of judgments across value-outlooks
made at M ­ 4—so that considerations pertaining to M ­ 4 have logically relevant impact
at ­M3. Therefore, no item of the stock of established scientific knowledge is held
in accordance with I, and so I is not an ideal of appraisals actually made at M ­ 3 by
scientists.

17
  I have been said to uphold this ideal, e.g., by Douglas (2009, p 16) and Elliott (2017, p. 17).
18
  SVF represents my attempt to explicate an outlook that has been influential throughout the modern
scientific tradition, whereas, according to Douglas (2009), svf is intended to represent an ideal that has
been defended in discussions that originated with Rudner’s well known article, "The scientist, qua scien-
tist, makes value judgments" (Rudner 1953).

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 Axiomathes

3.2.5 Response

According to RVS, that a claim comes to be held is the outcome of research con-
ducted at M­ 2, in which it may be provisionally entertained, or taken as a suitable
candidate for investigation, or proposed as a hypothesis to be investigated to help
testing the limits of the range of objects/phenomena that can be grasped under a
deployed theory (Lacey 2015a). The claim may, before becoming held, also be
endorsed at ­M4, and be under investigation at ­M2 (under some strategy) because of
its being endorsed, or being considered for endorsement, at ­M4. That certain claims
are endorsed at ­M4, thus, may causally influence what claims that come to be held
at ­M3. Whether or not they do, it is logically irrelevant to appraising these claims as
items of scientific knowledge.

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