Workplace health, safety and welfare

Introduction
The Workplace (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations 1992 cover a wide range of basic
health, safety and welfare issues and apply to most workplaces (with the exception of those
workplaces involving construction work on construction sites, those in or on a ship, or those
below ground at a mine). They are amended by the Quarries Regulations 1999, the Health and
Safety (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2002, the Work at Height Regulations 2005,
and the Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 2007.
This article gives a brief outline of the requirements of the Workplace Regulations.

Employers have a general duty under section 2 of the Health and Safety at Work etc
Act 1974 to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the health, safety and welfare of their
employees at work. People in control of non-domestic premises have a duty (under section 4 of
the Act) towards people who are not their employees but use their premises. The Regulations
expand on these duties and are intended to protect the health and safety of everyone in the
workplace, and ensure that adequate welfare facilities are provided for people at work.
These Regulations aim to ensure that workplaces meet the health, safety and welfare needs of
all members of a workforce, including people with disabilities. Several of the Regulations
require things to be ‘suitable’. Regulation 2(3) makes it clear that things should be suitable for
anyone. This includes people with disabilities. Where necessary, parts of the workplace,
including in particular doors, passageways, stairs, showers, washbasins, lavatories and
workstations, should be made accessible for disabled people.

Interpretation

‘Workplace’ - these Regulations apply to a very wide range of workplaces, not only factories,
shops and offices but also, for example, schools, hospitals, hotels and places of entertainment.
The term workplace also includes the common parts of shared buildings, private roads and
paths on industrial estates and business parks, and temporary worksites (except workplaces
involving construction work on construction sites).
‘Work’ - means work as an employee or self-employed person.
‘Premises’ - means any place including an outdoor place.

‘Domestic premises’ - means a private dwelling. These Regulations do not apply to

domestic premises, and exclude homeworkers. However, they do apply to hotels, nursing
homes and to parts of workplaces where ‘domestic’ staff are employed, such as the kitchens of
hostels.
‘Disabled person’ - has the meaning given by section 1 of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995.

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Health

The measures outlined in this section contribute to the general working environment of people
in the workplace.

Ventilation

Workplaces need to be adequately ventilated. Fresh, clean air should be drawn from a source
outside the workplace, uncontaminated by discharges from flues, chimneys or other process
outlets, and be circulated through the workrooms.
Ventilation should also remove and dilute warm, humid air and provide air movement which
gives a sense of freshness without causing a draught. If the workplace contains process or
heating equipment or other sources of dust, fumes or vapours, more fresh air will be needed to
provide adequate ventilation.
Windows or other openings may provide sufficient ventilation but, where necessary,
mechanical ventilation systems should be provided and regularly maintained.

Temperatures in indoor workplaces

Environmental factors (such as humidity and sources of heat in the workplace) combine with
personal factors (such as the clothing a worker is wearing and how physically demanding their
work is) to influence what is called someone’s ‘thermal comfort’.
Individual personal preference makes it difficult to specify a thermal environment which
satisfies everyone. For workplaces where the activity is mainly sedentary, for example offices,
the temperature should normally be at least 16 °C. If work involves physical effort it should be
at least 13 °C (unless other laws require lower temperatures).

Work in hot or cold environments

The risk to the health of workers increases as conditions move further away from those
generally accepted as comfortable. Risk of heat stress arises, for example, from working in high
air temperatures, exposure to high thermal radiation or high levels of humidity, such as those
found in foundries, glass works and laundries. Cold stress may arise, for example, from working
in cold stores, food preparation areas and in the open air during winter.
Assessment of the risk to workers’ health from working in either a hot or cold environment
needs to consider both personal and environmental factors. Personal factors include body
activity, the amount and type of clothing, and duration of exposure. Environmental factors
include ambient temperature and radiant heat; and if the work is outside, sunlight, wind
velocity and the presence of rain or snow.

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Actions arising from assessment may include:

 Introducing engineering measures to control the thermal effects in a workplace

environment, for example heat effects, may involve insulating any plant which acts as a
radiant heat source, thereby improving air movement, increasing ventilation rates and
maintaining the appropriate level of humidity. The radiant heat effects of the sun on
indoor environments can be addressed either by orientating the building so that it
doesn’t suffer from the effects of solar loading, or where this is not possible, by the use
of blinds or shutters on windows. Where workers are exposed to cold and it is not
reasonably practicable to avoid exposure you should consider, for example, using cab
heaters in fork-lift trucks in cold stores;
 restriction of exposure by, for example, re-organising tasks to build in rest periods or
other breaks from work. This will allow workers to rest in an area where the
environment is comfortable and, if necessary, to replace bodily fluids to combat
dehydration or cold. If work rates cause excessive sweating, workers may need more
frequent rest breaks and a facility for changing into dry clothing;
 medical pre-selection of employees to ensure that they are fit to work in these
environments;

 use of suitable personal protective clothing (which may need to be heat resistant or
insulating, depending on whether the risk is from heat or cold);
 acclimatisation of workers to the environment in which they work, particularly for hot
environments;
 training in the precautions to be taken; and
 supervision, to ensure that the precautions identified by the assessment are taken.

 Further advice on thermal comfort in the workplace can be found on HSE’s website at:
www.hse.gov.uk/temperature/thermal

Lighting

Lighting should be sufficient to enable people to work and move about safely. If necessary, local
lighting should be provided at individual workstations and at places of particular risk such as
crossing points on traffic routes. Lighting and light fittings should not create any hazard.
Automatic emergency lighting, powered by an independent source, should be provided where
sudden loss of light would create a risk.

Cleanliness and waste materials

Every workplace and the furniture, furnishings and fittings should be kept clean and it should be
possible to keep the surfaces of floors, walls and ceilings clean. Cleaning and the removal of

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waste should be carried out as necessary by an effective method. Waste should be stored in
suitable receptacles.

Room dimensions and space

Workrooms should have enough free space to allow people to move about with ease. The
volume of the room when empty, divided by the number of people normally working in it,
should be at least 11 cubic metres. All or part of a room over 3.0 m high should be counted as
3.0 m high. 11 cubic metres per person is a minimum and may be insufficient depending on the
layout, contents and the nature of the work.

Workstations and seating

Workstations should be suitable for the people using them and for the work they do. People
should be able to leave workstations swiftly in an emergency. If work can or must be done
sitting, seats which are suitable for the people using them and for the work they do should be
provided. Seating should give adequate support for the lower back, and footrests should be
provided for workers who cannot place their feet flat on the floor.

Safety
Maintenance
The workplace, and certain equipment, devices and systems should be maintained in efficient
working order (efficient for health, safety and welfare). Such maintenance is required for
mechanical ventilation systems; equipment and devices which would cause a risk to health,
safety or welfare if a fault occurred; and equipment and devices intended to prevent or reduce
hazard.
The condition of the buildings needs to be monitored to ensure that they have appropriate
stability and solidity for their use. This includes risks from the normal running of the work
process (eg vibration, floor loadings) and foreseeable risks (eg fire in a cylinder store).

Floors and traffic routes

‘Traffic route’ means a route for pedestrian traffic, vehicles, or both, and include any stairs,
fixed ladder, doorway, and gateway, loading bay or ramp.
There should be sufficient traffic routes, of sufficient width and headroom, to allow people and
vehicles to circulate safely with ease.
Horizontal swinging barriers used as gates at car park or similar entrances should be locked
open or locked shut (preferably by padlock) so that they do not swing open and constitute a risk

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to oncoming vehicles. This guidance also relates to duties under the requirements of the
Regulations covering doors and gates.
To allow people and vehicles to move safely, the best approach is to keep vehicles and
pedestrians apart by ensuring that they use entirely separate routes. If people and vehicles
have to share a traffic route, use kerbs, barriers or clear markings to designate a safe walkway
and, where pedestrians need to cross a vehicle route, provide clearly marked crossing points
with good visibility, bridges or subways. Make sure the shared route is well lit.
It is often difficult for drivers to see behind their vehicle when they are reversing; as far as
possible, plan traffic routes so that drivers do not need to reverse. This can be achieved by
using one-way systems and drive-through loading areas.
Set appropriate speed limits, and make sure they, and any other traffic rules, are obeyed.
Provide route markings and signs so that drivers and pedestrians know where to go and what
rules apply to their route, so they are warned of any potential hazards.
Loading bays should have at least one exit point from the lower level, or a refuge should be
provided to avoid people being struck or crushed by vehicles.

Where a load is tipped into a pit or similar place, and the vehicle is liable to fall into it, barriers
or portable wheel stops should be provided at the end of the traffic route.
Floors and traffic routes should be sound and strong enough for the loads placed on them and
the traffic expected to use them. The surfaces should not have holes or be uneven or slippery,
and should be kept free of obstructions and from any article or substance which may cause a
person to slip, trip or fall.
Criteria for defects such as subsidence, unevenness, pot holes, collection of surface water,
cracks and ruts should be determined and set, and maintenance systems developed to
undertake repair when these limits are exceeded.
Open sides of staircases should be fenced with an upper rail at 900 mm or higher, and a lower
rail. A handrail should be provided on at least one side of every staircase, and on both sides if
there is a particular risk. Additional handrails may be required down the centre of wide
staircases. Access between floors should not be by ladders or steep stairs.

Falls into dangerous substances

The consequences of falling into dangerous substances are so serious that a high standard of
protection is required. Dangerous substances in tanks, pits or other structures should be
securely fenced or covered. Traffic routes associated with them should also be securely fenced.
Duties to prevent falls from height in general are covered by the Work at Height Regulations
2005 .

Transparent or translucent doors, gates or walls and windows

Windows, transparent or translucent surfaces in walls, partitions, doors and gates should,
where necessary for reasons of health and safety, be made of safety material or be protected

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against breakage. If there is a danger of people coming into contact with it, it should be marked
or incorporate features to make it apparent.
Employers will need to consider whether there is a foreseeable risk of people coming into
contact with glazing and being hurt. If this is the case, the glazing will need to meet the
requirements of the Regulations.

Windows
Openable windows, skylights and ventilators should be capable of being opened,closed or
adjusted safely and, when open, should not pose any undue risk to anyone.
Windows and skylights should be designed so that they may be cleaned safely.When
considering if they can be cleaned safely, account may be taken of equipmentused in
conjunction with the window or skylight or of devices fitted to the building.

Doors and gates

Doors and gates should be suitably constructed and fitted with safety devices if necessary.

Doors and gates which swing both ways and conventionally hinged doors on main traffic
routes should have a transparent viewing panel.
Power-operated doors and gates should have safety features to prevent people being struck or
trapped and, where necessary, should have a readily identifiable and accessible control switch
or device so that they can be stopped quickly in an emergency.
Upward-opening doors or gates need to be fitted with an effective device to prevent them
falling back. Provided that they are properly maintained, counterbalance springs and similar
counterbalance or ratchet devices to hold them in the open position are acceptable. Powered
vertical opening doors that are powerful enough to lift an adult or child should be fitted with
measures to prevent this.

Escalators and moving walkways

Escalators and moving walkways should function safely, be equipped with any necessary safety
devices, and be fitted with one or more emergency stop controls which are easily identifiable
and readily accessible.

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Welfare
Sanitary conveniences and washing facilities

Suitable and sufficient sanitary conveniences and washing facilities should be provided at
readily accessible places. They and the rooms containing them should be kept clean and be
adequately ventilated and lit. Washing facilities should have running hot and cold or warm
water, soap and clean towels or other means of cleaning or drying. If required by the type of
work, showers should also be provided. Men and women should have separate facilities unless
each facility is in a separate room with a lockable door and is for use by only one person at a
time.

Drinking water
An adequate supply of high-quality drinking water, with an upward drinking jet or suitable cups,
should be provided. Water should only be provided in refillable enclosed containers where it
cannot be obtained directly from a mains supply. The containers should be refilled at least daily
(unless they are chilled water dispensers where the containers are returned to the supplier for
refilling). Bottled water/water dispensing systems may still be provided as a secondary source
of drinking water. Drinking water does not have to be marked unless there is a significant risk of
people drinking non-drinking water.

Accommodation for clothing and facilities for changing

Adequate, suitable and secure space should be provided to store workers’ own clothing and
special clothing. As far as is reasonably practicable the facilities should allow for drying clothing.
Changing facilities should also be provided for workers who change into special work clothing.
The facilities should be readily accessible from workrooms and washing and eating facilities,
and should ensure the privacy of the user, be of sufficient capacity, and be provided with
seating.

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Facilities for rest and to eat meals
Suitable and sufficient, readily accessible rest facilities should be provided.
Seats should be provided for workers to use during breaks. These should be in a place where
personal protective equipment need not be worn. Rest areas or rooms should be large enough
and have sufficient seats with backrests and tables for the number of workers likely to use them
at any one time, including suitable access and seating which is adequate for the number of
disabled people at work.
Where workers regularly eat meals at work, suitable and sufficient facilities should be provided
for the purpose. Such facilities should also be provided where food would otherwise be likely to
be contaminated.
Work areas can be counted as rest areas and as eating facilities, provided they are adequately
clean and there is a suitable surface on which to place food.
Where provided, eating facilities should include a facility for preparing or obtaining a hot drink.
Where hot food cannot be obtained in or reasonably near to the workplace, workers may need
to be provided with a means for heating their own food (eg microwave oven).
Canteens or restaurants may be used as rest facilities provided there is no obligation to
purchase food.
Suitable rest facilities should be provided for pregnant women and nursing mothers. They
should be near to sanitary facilities and, where necessary, include the facility to lie down.
From 1 July 2007, it has been against the law to smoke in virtually all enclosed public places and
workplaces in England, including most work vehicles. Similar legislation exists in Scotland and
Wales.

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 PART-II

CASE- STUDY

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Space Shuttle Columbia disaster

STS-107 reentry

STS-107 mission patch

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Introduction-
The Space Shuttle Columbia disaster occurred on February 1, 2003, when the Space Shuttle
Columbia disintegrated over Texas stretching from Trophy Club to Tyler and into parts of Louisiana during re-
entry into the Earth's atmosphere, resulting in the death of all seven crew members, shortly before it was
scheduled to conclude its 28th mission, STS-107.

The loss of Columbia was a result of damage sustained during launch when a piece of foam insulation the size
of a small briefcase broke off the Space Shuttle external tank (the main propellant tank) under
the aerodynamic forces of launch. The debris struck the leading edge of the left wing, damaging the
Shuttle's thermal protection system (TPS), which protects it from heat generated with the atmosphere during
re-entry. While Columbia was still in orbit, some engineers suspected damage, but NASA managers limited the
investigation, on the grounds that little could be done even if problems were found.

NASA's original Shuttle design specifications stated that the external tank was not to shed foam or other debris;
as such, strikes upon the Shuttle itself were safety issues that needed to be resolved before a launch was
cleared. Launches were often given the go-ahead as engineers came to see the foam shedding and debris
strikes as inevitable and irresolvable, with the rationale that they were either not a threat to safety, or an
acceptable risk. The majority of Shuttle launches recorded such foam strikes and thermal tile scarring. During
re-entry of STS-107, the damaged area allowed the hot gases to penetrate and destroy the internal wing
structure, rapidly causing the in-flight breakup of the vehicle. An extensive ground search in parts of Texas,
Louisiana and Arkansas recovered crew remains and many vehicle fragments.

Mission STS-107 was the 113th Space Shuttle launch. It was delayed 18 times over the two years from its
original launch date of January 11, 2001, to its actual launch date of January 16, 2003. (It was preceded
by STS-113.) A launch delay due to cracks in the shuttle's propellant distribution system occurred one month
before a July 19, 2002, launch date. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) determined that this
delay had nothing to do with the catastrophic failure six months later.

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board's recommendations addressed both technical and organizational
issues. Space Shuttle flight operations were delayed for two years by the disaster, similar to
the Challenger disaster. Construction of the International Space Station was put on hold, and for 29 months the
station relied entirely on the Russian Federal Space Agency for resupply until Shuttle flights resumed with STS-
114 and 41 months for crew rotation until STS-121.

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Crew members

The crew of STS-107. L to R: Brown, Husband, Clark, Chawla, Anderson, McCool,Ramon

 Commander: Rick D. Husband, a U.S. Air Force colonel and mechanical engineer, who

piloted a previous shuttle during the first docking with the International Space Station (STS-
96).
 Pilot: William C. McCool, a U.S. Navy commander
 Payload Commander: Michael P. Anderson, a U.S. Air Force lieutenant
colonel and physicistwho was in charge of the science mission.
 Payload Specialist: Ilan Ramon, a colonel in the Israeli Air Force and the first Israeli
astronaut.
 Mission Specialist: Kalpana Chawla, an Indian-born aerospace engineer was on her
second space mission.
 Mission Specialist: David M. Brown, a U.S. Navy captain trained as an aviator and flight
surgeon. Brown worked on a number of scientific experiments.
 Mission Specialist: Laurel Clark, a U.S. Navy captain and flight surgeon. Clark worked on
a number of biological experiments.

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Debris strike during launch

Columbia lifting off on its final mission. The light-colored triangle visible at the base of the strut
near the nose of the orbiter is the Left Bipod Foam Ramp . 

Close-up of the Left Bipod Foam Ramp that broke off and damaged the Shuttle wing.

Approximately 82 seconds after launch from Kennedy Space Center's LC-39-A, a suitcase-size
piece of thermal insulationfoam broke off the External Tank (ET), striking Columbia's left
wing Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) panels. As demonstrated by ground experiments
conducted by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, this likely created a 6-to-10-inch (15
to 25 cm) diameter hole, allowing hot gases to enter the wing when Columbia later reentered
the atmosphere. At the time of the foam strike, the orbiter was at an altitude of about
66,000 feet (20 km; 13 mi), traveling at Mach 2.46 (1,870 miles per hour or 840 m/s).

The Left Bipod Foam Ramp is an approximately three-foot (one-meter) aerodynamic

component made entirely of foam, as opposed to being a metal structure coated with foam. As
such, the foam, not normally considered to be a structural material, is required to bear some
aerodynamic loads. Because of these special requirements, the casting-in-place and curing of

13
the ramps may be performed only by a senior technician.The shuttle's main fuel tank is covered
in foam as an insulator, to avoid ice forming on it when full of liquid hydrogen and oxygen,
which itself could damage the shuttle when shed during lift-off. The bipod ramp (having left and
right sides) was originally designed to reduce aerodynamic stresses around the bipod
attachment points at the external tank, but it was proven unnecessary in the wake of the
accident and was removed from the external tank design for tanks flown after STS-107 (another
foam ramp along the liquid oxygen line was also later removed from the tank design to
eliminate it as a foam debris source, after complex analysis and tests proved this change safe).

Bipod Ramp insulation had been observed falling off, in whole or in part, on many previous
flights: STS-7 (1983), STS-32 (1990), STS-50(1992), plus subsequent flights (STS-52 and -62)
showing partial losses. In addition, Protuberance Air Load (PAL) ramp foam has also shed
pieces, plus spot losses from large-area foams. At least one previous strike caused no serious
damage. NASA management came to refer to this phenomenon as "foam shedding." As with
the O-ring erosions that ultimately doomed the Challenger, NASA management became
accustomed to these phenomena when no serious consequences resulted from these earlier
episodes. This phenomenon was termed "normalization of deviance" by sociologist Diane
Vaughan in her book on the Challenger launch decision process.

Video taken during lift-off of STS-107 was routinely reviewed two hours later and revealed
nothing unusual. The following day, higher-resolution film that had been processed overnight
revealed the foam debris striking the left wing, potentially damaging the thermal protection on
the Space Shuttle. At the time, the exact location where the foam struck the wing could not be
determined due to the low resolution of the tracking camera footage.

Flight risk management

In a risk-management scenario similar to the Challenger disaster, NASA management failed to

recognize the relevance of engineering concerns for safety for imaging to inspect possible
damage, and failure to respond to engineer requests about the status of astronaut inspection of
the left wing. Engineering made three separate requests for Department of Defense (DOD)
imaging of the shuttle in orbit to more precisely determine damage. While the images were not
guaranteed to show the damage, the capability existed for imaging of sufficient resolution to
provide meaningful examination. NASA management did not honor the requests and in some
cases intervened to stop the DOD from assisting. The CAIB recommended subsequent shuttle

14
flights be imaged while in orbit using ground-based or space-based Department of Defense
assets.

NASA's chief thermal protection system (TPS) engineer was concerned about left wing TPS
damage and asked NASA management whether an astronaut would visually inspect it. NASA
managers never responded.

Throughout the risk assessment process, senior NASA managers were influenced by their belief
that nothing could be done even if damage was detected. This affected their stance on
investigation urgency, thoroughness and possible contingency actions. They decided to conduct
a parametric "what-if" scenario study more suited to determine risk probabilities of future
events, instead of inspecting and assessing the actual damage. The investigation report in
particular singled out NASA manager Linda Ham for exhibiting this attitude.

Much of the risk assessment hinged on damage predictions to the thermal protection system.
This fall into two categories: damage to the silica tile on the wing lower surface, and damage to
the reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) leading-edge panels. (The TPS includes a third category of
components, thermal insulating blankets, but damage predictions are not typically performed
on them. Damage assessments on the thermal blankets can be performed after an anomaly has
been observed, and this has been done, at least once after the Return to Flight following
Columbia's loss.)

Damage-prediction software was used to evaluate possible tile and RCC damage. The tool for
predicting tile damage was known as "Crater", described by several NASA representatives in
press briefings as not actually a software program but rather a statistical spreadsheet of
observed past flight events and effects. The "Crater" tool predicted severe penetration of
multiple tiles by the impact if it struck the TPS tile area, but NASA engineers downplayed this.
The engineers believed that results showing that the model overstated damage from small
projectiles meant that the same would be true of larger Spray-On Foam Insulation (SOFI)
impacts. The program used to predict RCC damage was based on small ice impacts the size of
cigarette butts, not larger SOFI impacts, as the ice impacts were the only recognized threats to
RCC panels up to that point. Under 1 of 15 predicted SOFI impact paths, the software predicted
an ice impact would completely penetrate the RCC panel. Engineers downplayed this, too,
believing that impacts of the less dense SOFI material would result in less damage than ice
impacts. In an e-mail exchange, NASA managers questioned whether the density of the SOFI
could be used as justification for reducing predicted damage. Despite engineering concerns
about the energy imparted by the SOFI material, NASA managers ultimately accepted the

15
rationale to reduce predicted damage of the RCC panels from possible complete penetration to
slight damage to the panel's thin coating.

Ultimately the NASA Mission Management Team felt there was insufficient evidence to indicate
that the strike was an unsafe situation, so they declared the debris strike a "turnaround" issue
(not of highest importance) and denied the requests for the Department of Defense images.

Destruction during re-entry

The following is a timeline of Columbia's re-entry. The shuttle was scheduled to land at
9:16 a.m. EST.

2:30 a.m. EST, Saturday, February 1, 2003 – The Entry Flight Control Team began duty in
the Mission Control Center.
The Flight Control Team had not been working on any issues or problems related to the
planned de-orbit and re-entry of Columbia. In particular, the team had indicated no
concerns about the debris impact to the left wing during ascent, and treated the re-
entry like any other. The team worked through the de-orbit preparation checklist and
re-entry checklist procedures. Weather forecasters, with the help of pilots in the Shuttle
Training Aircraft, evaluated landing-site weather conditions at the Kennedy Space
Center.

8:00 – Mission Control Center Entry Flight Director LeRoy Cain polled the Mission Control room
for a GO/NO-GO decision for the de-orbit burn.
All weather observations and forecasts were within guidelines set by the flight rules, and
all systems were normal.

 8:10 – The Capsule Communicator (CAPCOM) notified the crew that they were GO
for de-orbit burn.
 8:15:30 (EI-1719) – Commander Husband and Pilot McCool executed the de-orbit
burn using Columbia’s two Orbital Maneuvering System engines.
The Orbiter was upside down and tail-first over the Indian Ocean at an altitude of
175 miles (282 km) when the burn was executed. The de-orbit maneuver was performed
on the 255th orbit, and the 2-minute, 38-second burn slowed the Orbiter from
17,500 miles per hour (7.8 km/s) to begin its re-entry into the atmosphere. During the
de-orbit burn, the crew felt about 10% of the effects of gravity. There were no problems

16
 during the burn, after which Husband maneuvered Columbia into a right-side-up,
forward-facing position, with the Orbiter's nose pitched up.

 8:44:09 (EI+000) – Entry Interface (EI), arbitrarily defined as the point at

which the Orbiter enters the discernible atmosphere at 400,000 feet (120
km; 76 mi), occurred over the Pacific Ocean.
As Columbia descended from outer space into the atmosphere, the heat produced by air
molecules colliding with the Orbiter typically caused wing leading-edge temperatures to
rise steadily, reaching an estimated 2,500 °F (1,370 °C) during the next six minutes. (As
former Space Shuttle Program Manager Wayne Hale stated in a press briefing, the
majority (about 90%) of this heating is the result of compression of the atmospheric gas
caused by the orbiter's supersonic flight, rather than the result of friction.)

8:48:39 (EI+270) – A sensor on the left wing leading edge spar showed strains higher than those
seen on previous Columbia re-entries.
This was recorded only on the Modular Auxiliary Data System, which is similar in concept to
a flight data recorder, and was not telemetered to ground controllers or displayed to the crew.

8:49:32 (EI+323) – Columbia executed a planned roll to the right. Speed: Mach 24.5.

Columbia began a banking turn to manage lift and therefore limit the Orbiter's rate of descent
and heating.

8:50:53 (EI+404) – Columbia entered a 10-minute period of peak heating, during which the
thermal stresses were at their maximum. Speed: Mach 24.1; altitude: 243,000 feet (74 km; 46
mi).

Columbia at approximately 8:57. Debris is visible coming off from the left wing (bottom).

8:52:00 (EI+471) – Columbia was approximately 300 miles (480 km) west of the California
coastline.

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The wing leading-edge temperatures usually reached 2,650 °F (1,450 °C) at this point.

8:53:26 (EI+557) – Columbia crossed the California coast west of Sacramento. Speed: Mach 23;
altitude: 231,600 feet (70.6 km; 43.9 mi).

Columbia debris (in red, orange, and yellow) detected by  National Weather Service radar
overTexas and Louisiana.

A makeshift memorial at the main entrance to the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center  in Houston, Texas

The Orbiter's wing leading edge typically reached more than 2,800 °F (1,540 °C) at this
point.

8:53:46 (EI+597) – Signs of debris being shed were sighted by people out to watch. Speed:
Mach 22.8; altitude: 230,200 feet (70.2 km; 43.6 mi).
The superheated air surrounding the Orbiter suddenly brightened, causing a streak in the
Orbiter's luminescent trail that was quite noticeable in the pre-dawn skies over the West Coast.
Observers witnessed another four similar events during the following 23 seconds. Dialogue on
some of the amateur footage indicates the observers were aware of the abnormality of what
they were filming.

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8:54:24 (EI+613) – The Maintenance, Mechanical, and Crew Systems (MMACS) officer informed
the Flight Director that four hydraulic sensors in the left wing were indicating "off-scale low." In
Mission Control, re-entry had been proceeding normally up to this point.
"Off-scale low" is a reading that falls below the minimum capability of the sensor, and it
usually indicates that the sensor has failed (stopped functioning, due to internal or
external factors), rather than that the quantity it measures is actually below the sensor's
minimum response value.
The Entry Team continued to discuss the failed indicators.

8:54:25 (EI+614) – Columbia crossed from California into Nevada airspace. Speed: Mach 22.5;
altitude: 227,400 feet (69.3 km; 43.1 mi).
Witnesses observed a bright flash at this point and 18 similar events in the next four
minutes.

8:55:00 (EI+651) – Nearly 11 minutes after Columbia re-entered the atmosphere, wing leading-
edge temperatures normally reached nearly 3,000 °F (1,650 °C).

8:55:32 (EI+683) – Columbia crossed from Nevada into Utah. Speed: Mach 21.8; altitude:
223,400 feet (68.1 km; 42.3 mi).

8:55:52 (EI+703) – Columbia crossed from Utah into Arizona.

8:56:30 (EI+741) – Columbia initiated a roll reversal, turning from right to left over Arizona.

8:56:45 (EI+756) – Columbia crossed from Arizona to New Mexico. Speed: Mach 20.9; altitude:
219,000 feet (67 km; 41 mi).

8:57:24 (EI+795) – Columbia crossed just north of Albuquerque.

8:58:00 (EI+831) – At this point, wing leading-edge temperatures typically decreased to 2,880 °F
(1,580 °C).

8:58:20 (EI+851) – Columbia crossed from New Mexico into Texas. Speed: Mach 19.5; altitude:
209,800 feet (63.9 km; 39.7 mi).
At about this time, the Orbiter shed a Thermal Protection System tile, the most westerly
piece of debris that has been recovered. Searchers found the tile in a field in Littlefield,
Texas, just northwest of Lubbock.

19
8:59:15 (EI+906) – MMACS informed the Flight Director that pressure readings had been lost on
both left main landing-gear tires. The Flight Director then told the Capsule Communicator
(CAPCOM) to let the crew know that Mission Control saw the messages and was evaluating the
indications, and added that the Flight Control Team did not understand the crew's last
transmission.

8:59:32 (EI+923) – A broken response from the mission commander was recorded: "Roger, uh,
bu - [cut off in mid-word] ..." It was the last communication from the crew and the last
telemetry signal received in Mission Control.

8:59:37 (EI+928) – Hydraulic pressure, which is required to move the flight control surfaces, was
lost at approximately GMT 13:59:37. At that time, the Master Alarm would have sounded for
the loss of hydraulics and the crew would have become aware of a serious problem.

9:00:18 (EI+969) – Videos and eyewitness reports by observers on the ground in and near
Dallas, Texas revealed that the Orbiter had disintegrated overhead, continuing to break up into
more and smaller pieces, and leaving multiple contrails, as it continued eastward. In Mission
Control, while the loss of signal was a cause for concern, there was no sign of any serious
problem. Prior to orbiter breakup at GMT 14:00:18, the Columbia cabin pressure was nominal
and the crew was capable of conscious actions.

9:05 – Residents of north central Texas, particularly near Tyler, reported a loud boom, a small
concussion wave, smoke trails and debris in the clear skies above the counties east of Dallas.

9:12:39 (EI+1710) – After hearing of reports of the shuttle being seen to break apart, the NASA
flight director declared a contingency (events leading to loss of the vehicle) and alerted search
and rescue teams in the debris area. He made a call to the Ground Controller: "GC; flight, GC;
flight. Lock the doors." Two minutes later Mission Control put contingency procedures into
effect. Nobody was permitted to enter or leave the room, and flight controllers had to preserve
all the mission data for later investigation.

20
President George W. Bush's address on the  Columbia's destruction, February 1,
2003.

At 14:04 EST (19:04 UTC), President George W. Bush addressed the United States: "This day has
brought terrible news and great sadness to our country ... The Columbia is lost; there are no survivors."
Despite the disaster, the president assured Americans that the space program would continue: "The
cause in which they died will continue. [...] Our journey into space will go on."

Recovery of debris
More than 2,000 debris fields, including human remains, were found in sparsely populated
areas southeast of Dallas from Nacogdoches in East Texas, where a large amount of debris fell,
to western Louisiana and the southwestern counties of Arkansas. Within the months following
the tragedy the largest ever organized ground search took place. NASA issued warnings to the
public that any debris could contain hazardous chemicals, that it should be left untouched, its
location reported to localemergency services or government authorities, and that anyone in
unauthorized possession of debris would be prosecuted. Because of the widespread area,
volunteer amateur radio operators accompanied the search teams to provide communications
support.

A group of small (1 mm adult) Caenorhabditis elegans worms, living in petri dishes enclosed

in aluminium canisters, survived re-entry and impact with the ground and were recovered
weeks after the disaster. The culture was verified as still alive on April 28, 2003. They were part
of a Biological Research in canisters experiment designed to study the effect of weightlessness
on physiology, the experiment was conducted by Cassie Conley, NASA's current Planetary
protection officer.

Debris Search Pilot Jules F. Mier Jr. and Debris Search Aviation Specialist Charles Krenek died in
a helicopter crash that injured three others while they were contributing to the ground search
effort.

Some Texas residents recovered some of the debris, ignoring the warnings, and attempted to
sell it on the online auction site eBay, starting at $10,000. The auction was quickly removed, but
auctions for Columbia merchandise such as programs, photographs and patches, went up
dramatically in value immediately following the disaster, creating a surge of Columbia-related
listings.[21] A three-day amnesty offered for looted shuttle debris brought in hundreds of illegally
recovered pieces. There were approximately 40,000 recovered pieces of debris that were never
identified. The largest pieces recovered include the front landing gear, a window frame, and a
large section of the nose cone.

21
On May 9, 2008 it was reported that data from a disk drive on board Columbia survived the
shuttle accident. The drive was used to store data from an experiment on the properties
of shear thinning. Although part of the 340MB drive was damaged, the area that contained the
data was unharmed and could be recovered.
Onboard video

The glow of reentry as seen out the front windows

One item recovered from the debris field was a videotape recording made by the astronauts
during the start of re-entry. The video recording lasts for 13 minutes and shows the flight crew
astronauts conducting routine re-entry procedures and joking with each other, none of them
giving any indication of a problem. The video shows the flight-deck crew putting on their gloves
and passing the video camera around in order to take footage of plasma and flames visible
outside the windows of the orbiter (a completely normal occurrence), and ends approximately
four minutes prior to the start of the shuttle's disintegration. On normal flights, the recording
would have continued through landing. According to the online introduction given by Scott
Altman, the remainder of the tape was destroyed in the accident.
Initial investigation
NASA Space Shuttle Program Manager Ron Dittemore reported that "The first indication was
loss of temperature sensors and hydraulic systems on the left wing. They were followed
seconds and minutes later by several other problems, including loss of tire pressure indications
on the left main gear and then indications of excessive structural heating". [28] Analysis of 31
seconds of telemetry data which had initially been filtered out because of data corruption
within it showed the shuttle fighting to maintain its orientation, eventually using maximum
thrust from its Reaction Control System jets.

The investigation focused on the foam strike from the very beginning. Incidents of debris strikes
from ice and foam causing damage during take-off were already well known, and had damaged

22
orbiters, most noticeably during STS-45, STS-27, and STS-87.[29] Tile damage had also been
traced to ablating insulating material from the cryogenic fuel tank in the past. The composition
of the foam insulation had been changed in 1997 to exclude the use of freon, a chemical that is
suspected to cause ozone depletion; while NASA was exempted from legislation phasing out
CFCs, the agency chose to change the foam nonetheless. STS-107 used an older "lightweight
tank" (a design that was succeeded by the "superlightweight tank", both being upgrades from
the original space shuttle external tank) where the foam was sprayed on to the larger cylindrical
surfaces using the newer freon-free foam. However, the bipod ramps were manufactured from
BX-250 foam which was excluded from the EPA regulations and did use the original freon
formula. The composition change did not contribute to the accident. In any case, the original
formulation had shown frequent foam losses, as discussed earlier in this article.

Columbia Accident Investigation Board

Following protocols established after the loss of Challenger, an independent investigating board
was created immediately following the accident. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board, or
CAIB, consisted of expert military and civilian analysts who investigated the accident in great
detail.

Columbia's flight data recorder was found near Hemphill, Texas on March 20, 2003. Unlike
commercial jet aircraft, the space shuttles do not have flight data recorders intended for after-
crash analysis. Rather the vehicle data is transmitted in real time to the ground via telemetry.
However, since Columbia was the first shuttle, it had a special flight data OEX (Orbiter
EXperiments) recorder, designed to help engineers better understand vehicle performance
during the first test flights. After the initial Shuttle test-flights were completed, the recorder
was never removed from Columbia and was still functioning on the crashed flight. It records
many hundreds of different parameters and contained very extensive logs of structural and
other data which allowed the CAIB to reconstruct many of the events during the process
leading to breakup. Investigators could often use the loss of signals from sensors on the wing to
track how the damage progressed. This was correlated with forensic debris analysis conducted
at Lehigh University and other tests to obtain a final conclusion about the probable events.

On July 7, 2003 foam impact tests were performed by Southwest Research Institute, which used
a compressed air gun to fire a foam block of similar size and mass to that which
struckColumbia and at same estimated speed. To represent the leading edge of Columbia's left
wing, RCC panels from Enterprise and from NASA stock, along with fiberglass mock-up panels,
were mounted to a simulating structural metal frame. Over many days, tens of these blocks of
foam were shot at the wing leading edge model at various angles, aimed at different specific

23
RCC panels, most of which produced only cracks or surface damage to the RCC. In the final
round of testing, a block fired at the side of an RCC panel created a hole 41 by 42.5 centimeters
(16 by 16.7 in) in the protective RCC panel.The tests clearly demonstrated that a foam impact of
the type Columbia sustained could seriously breach the thermal protection system on the wing
leading edge.

On August 26, the CAIB issued its report on the accident. The report confirmed the immediate
cause of the accident was a breach in the leading edge of the left wing, caused by insulating
foam shed during launch. The report also delved deeply into the underlying organizational and
cultural issues that led to the accident. The report was highly critical of NASA's decision-making
and risk-assessment processes. It concluded the organizational structure and processes were
sufficiently flawed and that compromise of safety was expected no matter who was in the key
decision-making positions. An example was the position of Shuttle Program Manager, where
one individual was responsible for achieving safe, timely launches and acceptable costs, which
are often conflicting goals. The CAIB report found that NASA had accepted deviations from
design criteria as normal when they happened on several flights and did not lead to mission-
compromising consequences. One of those was the conflict between a design specification
stating the thermal protection system was not designed to withstand significant impacts and
the common occurrence of impact damage to it during flight. The board made
recommendations for significant changes in processes and organizational culture.

On December 30, 2008 NASA released a further report, entitled Columbia Crew Survival
Investigation Report, produced by a second commission, the Spacecraft Crew Survival
Integrated Investigation Team (SCSIIT). NASA had commissioned this group, "to perform a
comprehensive analysis of the accident, focusing on factors and events affecting crew survival,
and to develop recommendations for improving crew survival for all future human space flight
vehicles." The report concluded that: "The Columbia depressurization event occurred so rapidly
that the crew members were incapacitated within seconds, before they could configure the suit
for full protection from loss of cabin pressure. Although circulatory systems functioned for a
brief time, the effects of the depressurization were severe enough that the crew could not have
regained consciousness. This event was lethal to the crew."

The report also concluded:

 The crew did not have time to prepare themselves. Some crew members were not
wearing their safety gloves, and one crew member was not wearing a helmet. New policies
now give the crew more time to prepare for descent.

24
 The crew's safety harnesses malfunctioned during the violent descent. The harnesses on
the three remaining shuttles have since been upgraded.
The key recommendations of the report included that future spacecraft crew survival systems
should not rely on manual activation to protect the crew
Possible emergency procedures

Hypothetical rescue scenario with Atlantis below Columbia]

Hypothesized rescue EVA

The CAIB determined a rescue mission, though risky, might have been possible provided NASA
management took action soon enough.The CAIB determined that had NASA management acted
in time, two possible contingency procedures were available: a rescue mission by shuttle
Atlantis, and an emergency spacewalk to attempt repairs to the left wing thermal protection.

Normally a rescue mission is not possible, due to the time required to prepare a shuttle for
launch, and the limited consumables (power, water, air) of an orbiting shuttle.
However, Atlantis was well along in processing for a March 1 launch on STS-114,
and Columbia carried an unusually large quantity of consumables due to an Extended Duration
Orbiter package. The CAIB determined that this would have allowed Columbia to stay in orbit
until flight day 30 (February 15). NASA investigators determined that Atlantis processing could
have been expedited with no skipped safety checks for a February 10 launch. Hence if nothing
went wrong there was a five-day overlap for a possible rescue. As mission control could deorbit
a shuttle but could not control the orbiter's reentry and landing, it would likely have

25
sent Columbia into the Pacific Ocean; NASA has since developed the Remote Control
Orbiter system to permit mission control to land a shuttle.

NASA investigators determined on-orbit repair by the shuttle astronauts was possible but risky,
primarily due to the uncertain resiliency of the repair using available materials. [35]
[36]
 Columbia did not carry the Canadarm, or Remote Manipulator System, which would
normally be used for camera inspection or transporting a spacewalking astronaut to the wing.
Therefore an unusual emergencyExtra-Vehicular Activity (EVA) would have been required.
While there was no astronaut EVA training for maneuvering to the wing, astronauts are always
prepared for a similarly difficult emergency EVA to close the external tank umbilical doors
located on the orbiter underside, which is necessary for reentry. Similar methods could have
reached the shuttle left wing for inspection or repair.

For the repair, the CAIB determined the astronauts would have to use tools and small pieces of
titanium, or other metal, scavenged from the crew cabin. These metals would help protect the
wing structure and would be held in place during re-entry by a water-filled bag that had turned
into ice in the cold of space. The ice and metal would help restore wing leading edge geometry,
preventing a turbulent airflow over the wing and therefore keeping heating and burn-through
levels low enough for the crew to survive re-entry and bail out before landing. Because the
NASA team could not verify that the repairs would survive even a modified re-entry, the rescue
option had a considerably higher chance of bringing Columbia's crew back alive.

Sociocultural aftermath

Fears of terrorism
Despite some initial fears after announcement in the news that Columbia suffered an explosion
over Palestine, Texas and that the addition of the first Israeli astronaut to the crew had made
the Columbia a more likely target for terrorists, there is no evidence to support any theory that
terrorism was involved. In any case, security surrounding the launch and landing of the space
shuttle had been increased to ward off any potential terrorist attack.[38] The Merritt
Island launch facility, like all sensitive government areas, had increased security measures put
in place in the wake of the September 11 attack. Gordon Johndroe, spokesman for the United
States Department of Homeland Security, stated: "There is no information at this time that this
was a terrorist incident."

26
Purple streak image
The San Francisco Chronicle reported that an amateur astronomer had taken a five-second
exposure that appeared to show "a purplish line near the shuttle" during re-entry. The CAIB
report concluded that image was the result of "camera vibrations during a long-exposure".
Film hoax
In a hoax inspired by the destruction of Columbia, some images that were purported to be
satellite photographs of the shuttle's explosion turned out to be screen captures from the
opening scene of the 1998 science fiction film Armageddon, where the shuttle Atlantis is
destroyed by asteroid fragments. In reality, Columbia disintegrated rather than exploded. In
response to the disaster, FX pulled Armageddon from that night's schedule, replacing it
with Aliens.

Memorials
On February 4, 2003, President George W. Bush and his wife Laura led a memorial service for
the astronauts' families at the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center. Two days later, Vice
President Dick Cheney and his wife Lynne led official Washington and the rest of the nation in
paying tribute at a similar service at Washington National Cathedral. During that service,
singer Patti LaBelle sang "Way Up There".

Columbia Memorial in Arlington National Cemetery

27
 Columbia memorial on Mars Exploration Rover"Spirit"

On March 26 the United States House of Representatives' Science Committee approved funds

for the construction of a memorial at Arlington National Cemetery for the STS-107 crew. A
similar memorial was built at the cemetery for the last crew of Challenger. On October 28,
2003, the names of the astronauts were added to the Space Mirror Memorial at the Kennedy
Space Center Visitor Complex.

The Houston Astros, who reside in the same city as Johnson Space Center and whose team
name honors the U.S. space program, honored the crew on April 1, 2003, the Opening Day of
the season, by having seven simultaneous first pitches thrown by family and friends of
the Columbiacrew. For the National Anthem, 107 NASA personnel, including flight controllers
and others involved in Columbia’s final mission, carried a U.S. flag onto the field. In addition,
the Astros wore the mission patch on their sleeves and replaced all dugout advertising with the
mission patch logo for the entire season.

In 2004, President Bush conferred posthumous Congressional Space Medals of Honor to all 14

astronauts lost in the Challenger and Columbia accidents.

NASA named several places in honor of Columbia and her crew. Seven asteroids discovered in

July 2001 at the Mount Palomar observatory were officially given the names of the seven
astronauts: 51823 Rick husband, 51824 Mike anderson, 51825 David brown, 51826
Kalpanachawla,51827 Laurel clark, 51828 Ilanramon, 51829 Williem ccool. On Mars, the landing
site of therover Spirit was named Columbia Memorial Station, and included a memorial plaque
to the Columbia crew mounted on the back of its high gain antenna. A complex of seven hills
east of the Spirit landing site was dubbed the Columbia Hills; each of the seven hills was
individually named for a member of the crew, and Husband Hill in particular was ascended and
explored by the rover. Back on Earth, NASA's National Scientific Balloon Facility was renamed
the Columbia Scientific Balloon Facility.

28
Other tributes included the decision by Amarillo, Texas, to rename its airport Rick Husband
Amarillo International Airport, after its native son and commander of STS-107. State Route
904 was renamed Lt. Michael P. Anderson Memorial Highway, as it runs through Cheney,
Washington - the town where he graduated from high school. A mountain peak near Kit Carson
Peak and Challenger Point in the Sangre de Cristo Range was renamed Columbia Point, and a
dedication plaque was placed on the point in August 2003. Seven dormitories were named in
honor of Columbia crew members at the Florida Institute of Technology, Creighton
University, The University of Texas at Arlington, and the Columbia Elementary school in the
Brevard County School District. The Huntsville City Schools in Huntsville, Alabama, a city
strongly associated with NASA, named their most recent high school Columbia High School as a
memorial to the crew. A Department of Defense school in Guam was re-named Commander
William C. McCool Elementary School.[48] The City of Palmdale, the birthplace of the entire
shuttle fleet, renamed a major thorough fare Avenue M to Columbia Way after the disaster in
honor of the lost shuttle and its crew.

In October, 2004, both houses of Congress passed a resolution authored by US Representative

Lucille Roybal-Allard and co-sponsored by the entire contingent of California representatives to
Congress, naming Downey California’s Space Science Learning Center the Columbia Memorial
Space Science Learning Center (CMSSLC is located at the former manufacturing site of the space
shuttles, including the Columbia and the Challenger).

The US Air Force's Squadron Officer School at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama renamed their
auditorium in Colonel Husband's honor. He was a distinguished graduate from the program.

A newly constructed elementary school located on Fairchild Air Force Base, near Spokane,
Washington was named Michael Anderson Elementary School, after LtCol Anderson, who had
attended Blair Elementary (the base's previous elementary school) during his 5th grade year
while his father was stationed at Fairchild. LtCol Anderson later graduated from nearby Cheney
High School in 1977.

NASA later named a supercomputer "Columbia" in the crew's honor.

A U.S. Navy compound at a major coalition military base in Afghanistan is named Camp McCool
in honor of Pilot William C. McCool. In addition, the athletic field at Coronado High
School in Lubbock, Texas, was re-named the "Willie McCool Track and Field" in his honor;
McCool was a Coronado graduate.

A proposed reservoir in Cherokee County in Eastern Texas is to be named Lake Columbia. [49]

29
On February 5, 2003 the space agency of India, ISRO, renamed one of its meteorological
satellites METSAT as Kalpana-1 in memory of the Indian-born American astronaut Kalpana
Chawla.

Ilan Ramon High School was established in 2006 in Hod HaSharon, Israel, in tribute to the first
Israeli astronaut. The school's symbol shows the planet Earth with an aircraft orbiting around it.

Impact on space program

Following the loss of Columbia, the space shuttle program was suspended. The further
construction of the International Space Station was also delayed, as the space shuttles were the
only available delivery vehicle for station modules. The station was supplied using Russian
unmanned Progress ships, and crews were exchanged using Russian-manned Soyuz spacecraft,
and forced to operate on a skeleton crew of two.

Less than a year after the accident, President Bush announced the Vision for Space Exploration,
calling for the space shuttle fleet to continue flying to "fulfill our obligations to our international
partners" by completing the International Space Station (ISS), with retirement by the year 2010
following the completion of the ISS, to be replaced by a newly developed Crew Exploration
Vehicle for travel to lunar orbit and landing and to Mars. NASA planned to return the space
shuttle to service around September 2004; that date was pushed back to July 2005.

On July 26, 2005, at 10:39 a.m. EST, Space Shuttle Discovery cleared the tower on the "Return
to Flight" mission STS-114, marking the shuttle's return to space. Overall the STS-114 flight was
highly successful, but a similar piece of foam from a different portion of the tank was shed,
although the debris did not strike the Orbiter. Due to this, NASA once again grounded the
shuttles until the remaining problem was understood and a solution implemented. After
delaying their re-entry by two days due to adverse weather conditions, Commander Eileen
Collins and Pilot Jim Kelly returned Discovery safely to Earth on August 9, 2005.

Later that same month, the external tank construction site, Michoud Assembly Facility located

in New Orleans, Louisiana was damaged by Hurricane Katrina, with all work shifts canceled up
to September 26, 2005. At the time, there was concern that this would set back further Shuttle
flights by at least two months and possibly more.

The second "Return to Flight" mission, STS-121, launched on July 4, 2006, at 2:37:55 PM (EDT),
after two previous launches were scrubbed because of lingering thunderstorms and high winds
around the launch pad. The launch took place despite objections from its chief engineer and
safety head. This mission increased the ISS crew to three. A 5-inch (130 mm) crack in the foam
insulation of the external tank gave cause for concern; however, the Mission Management

30
Team gave the go for launch. Space Shuttle Discovery touched down successfully on July 17,
2006 at 9:14:43 AM (EDT) on Runway 15 at the Kennedy Space Center.

On August 13, 2006, NASA announced STS-121 had shed more foam than they expected. While
this did not delay the launch for the next mission, STS-115, originally set to lift off on August
27,the weather and other technical glitches did, with a lightning strike, Hurricane Ernesto and a
faulty fuel tank sensor combining to delay the launch until September 9. On September 19,
landing was delayed an extra day to examine Atlantis after objects were found floating near the
shuttle in the same orbit. When no damage was detected, Atlantis landed successfully on
September 21.

The Columbia Crew Survival Investigation Report released by NASA on December 30, 2008

made further recommendations to improve a crew's survival chances on future space vehicles,
such as the Orion moon program. These include improvements in crew restraints, finding ways
to deal more effectively with catastrophic cabin depressurization, more "graceful degradation"
of vehicles during a disaster so crews will have a better chance at survival, and automated
parachute systems.

31
 PART-III

INDUSTRY
PRACTISES

ITC's Employees Health and welfaer Policy

ITC’s mission is to sustain and enhance the wealth-generating capacity of its portfolio of businesses in
a progressively globalizing environment. As one of India’s premier corporations employing a vast
quantum of societal resources, ITC seeks to fulfil a larger role by enlarging its contribution to the

32
society of which it is a part. The trusteeship role related to social and environmental resources,
aligned to the pursuit of economic objectives, is the cornerstone of ITC’s Environment, Health and
Safety philosophy. ITC’s EHS philosophy cognises for the twin needs of conservation and creation of
productive resources.

In the multi-business context of ITC, Corporate Strategies are designed to create enduring value for
the nation and the shareholder, through leadership in each business and the attainment of world-class
competitive capabilities across the value chain. The objective of leadership extends to all facets of
business operations including Environment, Health and Safety.

ITC is, therefore, committed to conducting its operations with due regard for the environment, and
providing a safe and healthy workplace for each employee. Various international and national awards
and accreditations stand testimony to ITC’s commitment to EHS. Such external recognition further
reinforces the need to direct the collective endeavour of the Company’s employees at all levels
towards sustaining and continuously improving standards of Environment, Health and Safety in a bid
to attain and exceed benchmarked standards, whether regulatory or otherwise.

In particular, it is ITC’s Health and Safety policy -

 To contribute to sustainable development through the establishment and

implementation of environment standards that are scientifically tested and meet the
requirement of relevant laws, regulations and codes of practice.

 To take account of environment, occupational health and safety in planning and

decision-making.

 To provide appropriate training and disseminate information to enable all employees to

accept individual responsibility for Environment, Health and Safety, implement best
practices, and work in partnership to create a culture of continuous improvement.

 To instill a sense of duty in every employee towards personal safety, as well as that of
others who may be affected by the employee’s actions.

 To provide and maintain facilities, equipment, operations and working conditions which
are safe for employees, visitors and contractors at the Company’s premises.

 To ensure safe handling, storage, use and disposal of all substances and materials that
are classified as hazardous to health and environment.

 To reduce waste, conserve energy, and promote recycling of materials wherever

possible.

33
  To institute and implement a system of regular EHS audit in order to assure compliance
with laid down policy, benchmarked standards, and requirements of laws, regulations
and applicable codes of practice.

 To proactively share information with business partners towards inculcating world-class

EHS standards across the value chain of which ITC is a part.

All employees of ITC are expected to adhere to and comply with the EHS Policy and Corporate
Standards on EHS.

ITC’s EHS Policy extends to all sites of the Company. It will be the overall responsibility of the
Divisional/SBU Chief Executives, through the members of their Divisional Management Committees,
General Managers and Unit Heads, to ensure implementation of this Policy and Corporate Standards
on EHS, including formation of various committees and designating individuals for specific
responsibilities in respect of their Division/SBU.

The Corporate EHS Department is responsible for reviewing and updating Corporate Standards on
EHS, and for providing guidance and support to all concerned.

34