Republic of the Philippines and that its development was not caused by employment and employment
SUPREME COURT conditions. Dissatisfied with the respondent System's decision of denial, claimant
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-65680 May 11, 1989
JOSE B. SARMIENTO, petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION & GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
(National Power Corporation), respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision rendered by the Employees' Compensation Commission in
ECC Case No. 2134 on August 25, 1983 which affirmed the decision of the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) denying the petitioner's claim for death benefits as surviving spouse of the
late Flordeliza Sarmiento.
The findings of the respondent Commission are as follows:
The record shows that the late Flordeliza Sarmiento was employed by the National
Power Corporation in Quezon City as accounting clerk in May 1974. At the time of
her death on August 12, 1981 she was manager of the budget division. History of
the deceased's illness showed that symptoms manifested as early as April 1980 as a
small wound over the external auditory canal and mass over the martoid region.
Biopsy of the mass revealed cancer known as "differentiated squamous cell
carcinoma." The employee sought treatment in various hospitals, namely, Veterans
Memorial Hospital, United Doctors Medical Hospital and Makati Medical Center. In
March 1981, a soft tissue mass emerged on her left upper cheek as a result of which
her lips became deformed and she was unable to close her left eye. She continued
treatment and her last treatment at the Capitol Medical Center on July 12, 1 981
was due to her difficulty of swallowing food and her general debility. On August 12,
1981, she succumbed to cardiorespiratory arrest due to parotid carcinoma. She was
40 years old.
Believing that the deceased's fatal illness having been contracted by her during
employment was service-connected, appellant herein filed a claim for death
benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended. On September 9, 1982,
the GSIS, through its Medical Services Center, denied the claim. It was pointed out
that parotid carcinoma is "Malignant tumor of the parotid gland (salivary gland)"
wrote a letter dated October 8, 1982 to the GSIS requesting that the records of the
claim be elevated to the Employees' Compensation Commission for review pursuant
to the law and the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation. (At pp. 17-18,
Rollo)
On August 25, 1983, the respondent Commission affirmed the GSIS' decision. It found that the
deceased's death causation by parotid carcinoma is not compensable because she did not contract
nor suffer from the same by reason of her work but by reason of embryonic rests and epithelial
growth.
It may be noted that the petitioner was earlier paid GSIS benefits in the amount of P142,285.03 but
the claim for employee's compensation was disallowed.
Hence, the instant petition.
The petitioner, while principally stressing the compensability of the deceased's ailment, attacks the
constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, the law on employees' compensation
which superseded the Labor Code and the of the Workmen's Compensation Act. He alleges that
provisions the said law infringes upon the guarantees of promotion of social justice, substantive due
process, and equal protection of laws, and also permits unjust discrimination and amounts to class
legislation in its enforcement. He prays for the application of the Old Workmen's Compensation Act
which provided for a presumption of compensability whenever an ailment supervened during the
course of the employment.
We dismiss the petition.
We cannot give serious consideration to the petitioner's attach against the constitutionality of the
new law on employee's compensation. It must be noted that the petitioner filed his claim under the
provisions of this same law. It was only when his claim was rejected that he now questions the
constitutionality of this law on appeal by certiorari.
The Court has recognized the validity of the present law and has granted and rejected claims
according to its provisions. We find in it no infringement of the worker's constitutional rights. It is
now settled jurisprudence (see Sulit v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 98 SCRA 483; Armena
v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 122 SCRA 851; Erese v. Employees' Compensation
Commission, 138 SCRA 192; De Jesus v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 142 SCRA 92) that
the new law discarded the concepts of "presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" to restore
what the law believes is a sensible equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay workmen's
compensation and the employees' rights to receive reparation for work-connected death or disability.
1
In the case of De Jesus v. Employees' Compensation, (supra), this Court explained the new scheme of
employees' compensation as follows:
The new law establishes a state insurance fired built up by the contributions of
employers based on the saries of their employees. The injured worker does not
have to litigate his right to compensation. No employer opposes his claim. There is
no notice of injury nor requirement of controversion. The sick worker simply files a
claim with a new neutral Employees' Compensation Commission which then
determines on the basis of the employee's supporting papers and medical evidence
whether or not compensation may be paid. The payment of benefits is more
prompt. The cost of administration is low. The amount of death benefits has also
been doubled.
On the other hand, the employer's duty is only to pay the regular monthly
premiums to the scheme. It does not look for insurance companies to meet sudden
demands for compensation payments or set up its own funds to meet these
contingencies. It does not have to defend itself from spuriously documented or long
past claims.
The new law applies the social security principle in the handling of workmen's
compensation. The Commission administers and settles claims from a find under its
exclusive control. The employer does not intervene in the compensation process
and it has no control, as in the past, over payment of benefits. The open ended
Table of Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. A covered claimant
suffering from an occupational disease is automatically paid benefits.
Since there is no employer opposing or fighting a claim for compensation, the rules
on presumption of compensability and controversion cease to have importance.
The lopsided situation of an employer versus one employee, which called for
equalization through the various rules and concepts favoring the claimant, is now
absent. (At pp. 99-100)
The petitioner's challenge is really against the desirability of the new law. These is no serious attempt
to assail it on constitutional grounds.
The wisdom of the present scheme of workmen's compensation is a matter that should be addressed
to the President and Congress, not to this Court. Whether or not the former workmen's
compensation program with its presumptions, controversions, adversarial procedures, and levels of
payment is preferable to the present scheme must be decided by the political departments. The
present law was enacted in the belief that it better complies with the mandate on social justice and is
more advantageous to the greater number of working men and women. Until Congress and the
President decide to improve or amend the law, our duty is to apply it.
Under the present law, a compensable illness means any illness accepted as an occupational disease
and listed by the Employees' Compensation Commission, or any illness caused by employment
subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working
conditions (Bonifacio v. Government Service Insurance System, 146 SCRA 276).
Applying the law to the present case, parotid carcinoma or cancer of the salivary glands is not an
occupational disease considering the deceased's employment as accounting clerk and later as
manager of the budget division. The petitioner must, therefore, prove that his wife's ailment was
caused by her employment or that her working conditions increased the risk of her contracting the
fatal illness.
The petitioner alleges that as budget manager, the deceased visited regional and field operations and
was, naturally, exposed to the elements. According to the petitioner, the deceased's field trips
necessitated her to take frequent plane travels which caused deafening and numb sensations in her
ears. This, he says, caused her "differentiated carcinoma" which, according to the certificate of Dr.
Ariston Bautista, "apparently started on external auditory canal."
We find these allegations as mere conjectures. As with other kinds of cancer, the cause and nature of
parotid carcinoma is still not known. A medical authority, however, declares that:
SALIVARY GLANDS —
Painless swelling of the parotid glands is often noted in hepatic cirrhosis in sarcoidis,
in mumps, following abdominal surgery, or associated with neoplasm or infections.
The common factors may be dehydration and inattention to oral hygiene. The latter
promotes the growth of large numbers of bacteria which, in the absence of
sufficient salivary flow, ascend from the mouth into the duct of a gland. Another
cause of a painful salivary gland is sialolithiasis (salivary duct stone). The
submandibular glands are most commonly affected. Pain and swelling associated
with eating are characteristic. Saliva promotes retention of artificial dentures
because of its mucin content. Thus, conditions characterized by diminished saliva
flow often adversely affect the ease with which dentures may be worn. Calcium
phosphate stone tend to form because of a high pH and viscosity of the
submandibular gland saliva which has a high mucin content. Stones are removed by
manipulation or excision.
Autoimmune sialosis is the Mikulics—Sjogren Syndrome, a unilateral or bilateral
enlargement of the parotid and/or submandibular gland, and often the lacrimal
glands. Occasionally painful, it is associated with xerostomia (dry mouth) due to
impaired saliva formation that is most common in older women. Beriow et al., The
Merek Manuel, 14th Edition, pp. 2095-2096).
2
Another author states the following regarding squamous cell carcinoma:

Moreover, when the salivary gland is almost totally destroyed and replaced by
epidermoid cancer it may be difficult or even impossible to ascribe the origin of the
growth to salivary gland tissue. Indeed many squamous cell carcinomas, especially
of the parotid, may be metastatic lesions that develop in lymph nodes included
within the parotid. And it is important to stress that the juxtaparotid and
intraparotid lymph nodes are not merely accumulations of lymphoid tissue but
nodes with efferent and afferent lymphatics.

Squamous cell carcinomas of the major salivary glands are generally fixed to the
skin and the underlying tissues and, in the case of the parotid, are often the cause
of facial palsy.

Epidermoid cancers grow swiftly and the clinical course is usually rapid. A few
tumours, however, have been present for as long as two years before the patient
seeks advice. Some patients remain alive and asymptomatic after radical surgery,
but ordinarily the lesions are highly malignant, infiltrating locally and metastasizing
to the regional nodes Distant metastasis is seldom a prominent clinical feature. In
the case of the submandibular gland the tumor may simulate osteomyelitis of the
mandible or an abscess in the gland itself, and if such lesions are incised a chronic
sinus is liable to persist until radical treatment is undertaken. (Evans and
Cruickshank, Epithelial Tumours of the Salivary Glands, Vol. 1, p. 254)

Given the preceding medical evaluations, we affirm the findings of the public respondents which
found no proof that the deceased's working conditions have indeed caused or increased the risk of
her contracting her illness.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The decisions of the Government Service Insurance System
and the Employees' Compensation Commission denying the claim are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

3
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-35800 July 23, 1987
ROSALINDA PA-AC, for herself and in behalf of the minors, MARCELO, JR., GENOVEVA,
DOMINADOR, BONIFACIO and ROSALINDA, all surnamed PA-AC, petitioners,
vs.
ITOGON-SUYOC MINES, INC., and WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the defunct Workmen's Compensation Commission in WCU
Case No. ROI-388 entitled "Rosalinda Pa-ac v. Itogon Suyoc Mines, Inc." which reversed the decision
of Mr. Erudito E. Luna, Workmen's Compensation Section Chief of the Baguio City Sub-Regional
Office, and denied the claim for death benefits filed by petitioner Rosalinda Pa-ac.
The factual findings of the Workmen's Compensation Commission are as follows:
The record shows that the deceased, Marcelo Pa-ac worked for the respondent company
from 1951 to 1968 or a period of 17 years. He started as a laborer, shovelling sand and
gravel in connection with the construction work of the respondent. After two years, Pa-ac
was Promoted as a shifter in the mill department as a precipitation man. His primary duty as
such was to conduct precipitation color test-The process which lasted for about 15 minutes
at a time was repeated every hour, and involved the mixing of chemical solutions. On
January 1, 1960, Pa-ac was assigned as sand fin operator and charged with the duty of
maintaining the specific gravity of the fed while he makes a record of the readings. He also
saw to it that the pump was functioning smoothly. On January 1, 1961, the deceased was
assigned as ball mill operator whose duty it was to regulate the ball mill fed by opening and
controlling a 48-square inch (8" x 6") fed gate by pushing the fed lips. It was also his work to
charge the steel balls by means of an electric machine which starts by pressing a button and
to see to it that the machine was running smoothly while he balanced the fed. Three years
thereafter, or on June 17, 1964, Pa-ac was reassigned to the precipitation section. On
September 1, 1967, he was promoted as mill general capataz whose duty it was to supervise
the men working in the mill. As such, he worked seven days a week and received a daily
wage of P8.15. He worked in shifts rotated every 15 days. The morning shift was from 7:00
o'clock a.m. to 3:00 o'clock p. m. the afternoon shift was from 3:00 o'clock p. m. to 11:00
o'clock p.m., and the night shift was from 11:00 o'clock p.m. to 7:00 o'clock a.m.
On June 14, 1968, Pa-ac was a guest in a wedding party. Before luncheon consisting of fatty
foods was served, Pa-ac joined the other male guests in drinking San Miguel gin and Tanduay
rhum. It seems that he had one drink too many because he became talkative and when it
was time to leave, he could not walk straight. He had to be supported by Mr. Alexander
Olivar, the respondent's safety engineer, to the service pick-up which brought them to the
bus terminal. Sensing that Pa-ac was in no condition to work, Olivar advised Pa-ac who was
supposed to report for work with the afternoon shift, not to report for duty anymore. From
the bus terminal, where the two parted ways, Pa-ac headed home on foot to the
Mountaineers's Store, some 500 meters away. At quarter past 2:00 o'clock p.m., that day,
two laborers, Basilio Sabado, a crane helper and Camilo Valloyas, a hoistman while on their
way to work, came upon Pa-ac sitting alone by the roadside. He was in a state of dizziness
and his hands were shaking. Summoning the service pick-up, the two laborers rushed Pa-ac
to the respondent's hospital in Sangilo.
When admitted in the hospital, Pa-ac was weak and semi conscious. He was immediately
attended to by Dr. Carmen Chunuan. All efforts of the doctor notwithstanding which
included medication, stimulant injection, oxygen and cardiac massage, Pa-ac died within two
hours from admission. Safety Engineer Olivar volunteered a mouth-to-mouth resuscitation,
but this, too, did not help. The cause of death was attributed to myocardial infarction.
The record also shows that the deceased was twice married. On September 23, 1945, he
married Natividad Saloy according to the rites of the Roman Catholic Church. In July, 1960,
after living together as husband and wife for 15 years, Pa-ac and Natividad were. divorced
according to the tribal customs of the Mountain Province, In September of the same year,
Pa-ac married Rosalinda Palki following the customs of their tribe. Whereas, Pa-ac had no
issue with Natividad after years of married life, his second marriage proved fruitful for
Rosalinda bore him five children, namely, Marcelo, Jr., Genoveva, Dominador Bonifacio and
Rosalinda, all surnamed Pa-ac Rosalinda Palki instituted the instant claim for herself and for
her five children. The claim was filed by Rosalinda with the knowledge and tacit consent of
Natividad who had chosen to nurse her frustration and disappointment in her hometown of
Bauko, Mountain Province." (pp. 33-35, Original Record).
On February 2, 1970, the Chief of the Workmen's Compensation Section, Baguio City Sub-Regional
Office, decided in favor of the petitioner. He found the claim to be within the purview of Section 2 of
the Workmen's Compensation Act (Act. No. 3428), as amended, which states that:
Grounds for compensation. — When an employee suffers personal injury from any accident
arising out of and in the course of his employment or contracts tuberculosis or other illness
directly caused by such employment, or either aggravated by or the result of the nature of
such employment, his employer shall pay compensation in the sums and to the person
hereinafter specified. The right to compensation as provided in this Act shall not be defeated
or impaired on the ground that the death, injury or disease was due to the negligence of a
4
 fellow servant or employee, without prejudice to the right of the employer to proceed
against the negligent party.
Relying on the pronouncement of this Court in the case of Magalona v. Workmen's Compensation
Commission and National Shipyard and Steel Corporation (21 SCRA 1199), he held: "Considering that
the work of the deceased involved strain and exposure to the inclemencies of the weather, even
when he worked as a capataz the conclusion is inevitable that his employment contributed to the
acceleration of his illness. In any event, since the seriousness of his illness occurred while going to
work, there is a rebuttable presumption that the same arose out of, or was at least aggravated by his
employment. Hence, the claimant is relieved from the burden of proving causation. The burden to
overthrow the presumption is laid by the statute on the employee." (Rollo, p. 15).
On these bases, he ordered the respondent to pay the petitioner and her children the sums of
P6,000.00 as compensation benefits, P200.00 as burial expenses, P300.00 as attorney's fees, and to
the Workmen's Compensation Sub-Regional Office, the sum of P61.00 as administrative costs. (p. 17,
Rollo).
On appeal by the respondent to the Workmen's Compensation Commission, the aforementioned
decision was reversed. The Commission found that the petitioner failed to establish a preliminary link
between the illness and the employment of the deceased. Moreover, it found that "the rebuttable
presumption which the Workmen's Compensation Unit Chief invoked in favor of the claimant has
been successfully overthrown by the respondent by substantial evidence." (p. 22, Rollo)
Hence, this petition. The petitioner assails the Commission's decision on the grounds that it is
contrary to law and existing jurisprudence and that its conclusions are not supported by the evidence
on record.
We sustain the Commission's decision.
In the case of Vda. de Cardiente v. Workmen's Compensation Commission (134 SCRA 66, 70), this
Court, in construing Section 2 of Act 3428, held that: "... compensable illnesses or diseases are those
which are. (1) directly caused by such employment; or (2) either aggravated by the employment, or
(3) the result of the nature of such employment."
The records disclose that the deceased died of myocardial infarction. Medical authorities reveal the
nature of such illness as follows:
myocardial infact. A region of dead or dying tissue in the muscle of the heart which is the
result of an obstruction to the blood circulation, usually by a clot. Schmidt Attorney's
Dictionary of Medicine and Word Finder, [19651, p. 531)
Myocardial (mi'o-kar-de-al) pertaining to muscular tissue of the heart.
m. infarction. formation of an infarct in the heart muscle, due to interruption of the blood
supply to the area (see also CORONARY OCCLUSION). (Miller and Keane, Encyclopedia and
Dictionary of Medicine and Nursing, [1972], p. 618)
Cross-referring to CORONARY OCCLUSION, the same shows:
CORONARY (kor'o-na-'re) encircling in the manner of a crown, a term applied to vessels,
ligaments, etc.
xxx xxx xxx
Occlusion, the occlusion, or closing off, of a coronary artery. It may occur when the artery is
suddenly plugged by a blood clot developing within the vessel (coronary thrombosis), or it
may result when mounting fatty deposits in the wall of the vessel finally clog the artery.
Coronary occlusion and coronary thrombosis are commonly referred to as a "heart attack"
because the situation is usually acute with severe symptoms resulting from damage to the
heart muscle (myocardial infarction and subsequent heart failure. (Ibid., p. 231.)
In supporting her claim, the petitioner alleged that the strain involved in the deceased's work caused
him to suffer the abovementioned ailment. Reviewing the records of the case, however, we find that
no causal relation between the illness and the employment of the deceased has been established.
The duties of the deceased as stated in his job description are light and do not involve strenuous
physical exertion. As capataz he merely acted as overseer of the mill. It is not' unreasonable,
therefore, to conclude that such duties could not have directly caused the deceased's ailment.
The records also belie the theory of aggravation. They show that the illness was not pre-existing. Prior
to his death, the deceased never complained of any symptoms of the disease. He was never admitted
and treated in the hospital for the said ailment. The attack was the first time he suffered the ailment
and that one time proved fatal.
The petitioner emphasizes the presumption of compensability provided by the law in these
cases.1avvphi1 We note, however, that this presumption is rebuttable. The presumption stands
unless the employer clearly establishes that the death or ailment was not caused or aggravated by
such employment or work. In this case, there is substantial evidence which shows that the deceased's
ailment was not traceable to his employment. The respondent presented medical authority and
opinions which state that myocardial infarction occurs without relation to ef forts or other discernible
clinical event. (Records, p. 123). It also showed that the deceased, prior to his death, had been
drinking and eating fatty food.
We agree with the ruling of the Commission that while the Workmen's Compensation Act is a social
legislation designed to give relief to the workman who has been the victim of workconnected
5
accident and should be liberally construed in favor of the workman, it cannot be reconstructed to fit
particular cases ... ."

In Afable v. Singer Sewing Machine Co. (58 Phil. 39, 42), this Court held:

xxx xxx xxx

... It was not the intention of the legislature to make the employer an insurer against all
accidental injuries which might happen to an employee while in the course of the
employment, but only for such injuries arising from or growing out of the risks peculiar to
the nature of the work in the scope of the workman's employment or incidental to such
employment, and accidents in which it is possible to trace the injury to some risk or hazard
to which the employee is exposed in a special degree by reason of such employment. Risks
to which all persons similarly situated are equally exposed and not traceable in some special
degree to the particular employment are excluded.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the assailed decision is AFFIRMED, and the present
petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

6
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-26341 November 27, 1968
ILOILO DOCK & ENGINEERING CO., petitioner,
vs.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and IRENEA M. PABLO, for herself and in behalf of her
minor children EDWIN, EDGAR and EDNA, all surnamed PABLO, respondents.
CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal by the Iloilo Dock and Engineering Company (hereinafter referred to as the IDECO)
from the decision dated February 28, 1966 of the Workmen's Compensation Commission (hereinafter
referred to as the Commission) affirming the decision of the Regional Office VII in Iloilo City, and
ordering the IDECO to pay to the widow and children of Teodoro G. Pablo (Irenea M. Pablo and the
minors Edwin, Edgar and Edna, all surnamed Pablo) the sum of P4,000, to pay to the widow P89 as
reimbursement for burial expenses and P300 as attorney's fees, and to pay to the Commission the
amount of P46 as fees pursuant to section 55 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended.
At about 5:02 o'clock in the afternoon of January 29, 1960, Pablo, who was employed as a mechanic
of the IDECO, while walking on his way home, was shot to death in front of, and about 20 meters
away from, the main IDECO gate, on a private road commonly called the IDECO road. The slayer,
Martin Cordero, was not heard to say anything before or after the killing. The motive for the crime
was and still is unknown as Cordero was himself killed before he could be tried for Pablo's death. At
the time of the killing, Pablo's companion was Rodolfo Galopez, another employee, who, like Pablo,
had finished overtime work at 5:00 p.m. and was going home. From the main IDECO gate to the spot
where Pablo was killed, there were four "carinderias" on the left side of the road and two
"carinderias" and a residential house on the right side. The entire length of the road is nowhere
stated in the record.
According to the IDECO, the Commission erred (1) in holding that Pablo's death occurred in
the course of employment and in presuming that it arose out of the employment; (2) in applying the
"proximity rule;" and (3) in holding that Pablo's death was an accident within the purview of the
Workmen's Compensation Act.
The principal issue is whether Pablo's death comes within the meaning and intendment of that
"deceptively simple and litigiously prolific",1 phrase The two components of the coverage formula —
"arising out of" and "in the course of employment."2 The two components of the coverage formula —
"arising out of" and "in the course of employment" — are said to be separate tests which must be
independently satisfied;3 however, it should not be forgotten that the basic concept of compensation
coverage is unitary, not dual, and is best expressed in the word, "work-connection," because an
uncompromising insistence on an independent application of each of the two portions of the test can,
in certain cases, exclude clearly work-connected injuries.4 The words "arising out of" refer to the
origin or cause of the accident, and are descriptive of its character, while the words "in the course of"
refer to the time, place and circumstances under which the accident takes place. 5
As a matter of general proposition, an injury or accident is said to arise "in the course of
employment" when it takes place within the period of the employment, at a place where the
employee reasonably may be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing something
incidental thereto.6
The general rule in workmen's compensation law known as the "going & coming rule," simply stated,
is that "in the absence of special circumstances, an employee injured in, going to, or coming from his
place of work is excluded from the benefits of workmen's compensation acts." 7 This rule, however,
admits of four well-recognized exceptions, to wit: (1) where the employee is proceeding to or from
his work on the premises of his employer; (2) where the employee is about to enter or about to leave
the premises of his employer by way of the exclusive or customary means of ingress and egress; (3)
where the employee is charged, while on his way to or from his place of employment or at his home,
or during his employment, with some duty or special errand connected with his employment; and (4)
where the employer, as an incident of the employment, provides the means of transportation to and
from the place of employment.8
We address ourselves particularly to an examination and consideration of the second exception, i.e.,
injuries sustained off the premises of the employer, but while using a customary means of ingress and
egress.
This exception, known as the "proximity rule," was applied in Philippine Fiber Processing Co., Inc. vs.
Ampil.9 There, the employee, at about 5:15 a.m., while proceeding to his place of work and running to
avoid the rain, slipped and fell into a ditch fronting the main gate of the employer's factory, as a
result of which he died the next day. The sole question was whether or not the accident which caused
the employee's death arose out of and in the course of his employment. This Court ruled in favor of
the claimant thus:
The very case of Afable vs. Singer Sewing Machine Co. invoked by the petitioner intimated
that "we do not of course mean to imply that an employee can never recover for injuries
suffered while on his way to or from work. That depends on the nature of his employment."
Considering the facts found by the Commission, namely, that the deceased Angel Ariar was
not under any shift routine; that his assignment covered the entire working hours of the
factory; that the first working hour starts at 6:00 o'clock in the morning; that it takes at least
thirty minutes before the machine operates at full speed or load; that the spot where he fell
7
 (ditch fronting petitioner's factory or sidewalk of its premises), is immediately proximate to
his place of work, the accident in question must be deemed to have occurred within the
zone of his employment and therefore arose out of and in the course thereof. In Salilig vs.
Insular Lumber Co., G.R. No. 28951, September 10, 1928, referred to in the Comments on
the Workmen's Compensation Commission Act by Morabe and Inton, 1955 edition,
compensation was allowed for injury received by a laborer from an accident in going to his
place of work, along a path or way owned by his employer and commonly used by the
latter's laborers.
In contrast is Pampanga Sugar Development Co., Inc. vs. Quiroz,10 which concerned injuries sustained
by a centrifugal operator. He had reported for work at 9:30 p.m. (March 7, 1958) and was dismissed
at 5:30 the following morning. Soon "after he stepped out of the company gate, and while standing
about 2-½ meters from it between the shoulder of the highway and a railroad that came from inside
the compound and intersected the highway, waiting for a ride home, he was bumped by a jeepney, as
a result of which he sustained" injuries. In holding that these injuries were "not produced by an
accident "arising out of and in the course of employment," " this Court reasoned thus:
The compensability of an injury suffered by an employee proceeding to or coming from his
work depends upon whether or not it is "work-connected." As Chief Justice Kenison of New
Hampshire has put it, "the fact that the employee is travelling to or from work on a public
highway does not necessarily exclude coverage (Brousseau vs. Blackstone Mills, 130 A 2d
543, 545). Conversely, it is not enough to say that the employee would not have been on the
public highway had it not been for his job, since the same can usually be said of the general
public (Payne & Dolan vs. Industrial Commission, 46 NE 2d 925). The law, in effect, insures
the employee against losses arising from the perils of his work. In other words, the
Workmen's Compensation Act covers occupational injuries, which, as such, must have
a causative connection with something, not merely in common with the public,
but peculiar to the employment. In order to warrant recovery for off-the-premises injuries, it
must be shown that there has been a very special danger, some particular risk which the
employer could have caused or allowed to exist. Hence,
It is significant that practically all successful off-the-premises cases have
involved normal route of access to the plant, or an icy sidewalk adjacent to the
premises and therefore identified with the premises in the sense that the employer
should have removed the ice. (Emphasis ours.)
It is true that in Philippine Fiber Processing Co. v. Ampil, G.R. No. L-8130 (June 30, 1956), we
held the employer liable for an injury sustained by an employee who, as he was running to
his place of work to avoid the rain, slipped and fell into a ditch in front of the factory's main
gate and near the same. The ditch was, however, in itself an obvious hazard which, owing to
its proximity to the gate, the employer should have taken measures to remove. Thus, thru
his inaction, he had contributed, in a special way, to the occurrence of the accident.
In the case at bar, no such special circumstance appears to exist. There is
no particular causative connection between the injury sustained by the employee and either
his work or his employer. Although, as stated in the decision appealed from, the record does
not show that the company "had taken measures to make the waiting place safe for the
employees," neither does the record show either that the accident occurred at the usual
waiting place of the employees, or that said place was particularly unsafe.
Our Workmen's Compensation Act being essentially American in origin and text, it is not amiss to pay
deference to pertinent American jurisprudence. In the precise area of law here involved, we can draw
guidance from an affluence of Federal and State precedents.
From Samuel B. Horovitz' Injury and Death under Workmen's Compensation Laws (1944), pp. 159 to
165, we glean the following observations:
Suppose, however, that the injury occurs on the way to work or on the way home from work.
Injuries going to or from work have caused many judicial upheavals.
The question here is limited to whether the injuries are "in the course of" and not "out of"
the employment. How the injury occurred is not in point. Street risks, whether the employee
was walking or driving, and all other similar questions deal with the risk of injury or "out of"
the employment. "In the course of" deals mainly with the element of time and space, or
"time, place and circumstances."
Thus, if the injury occurred fifteen minutes before working hours and within one hundred
feet of the employer's premises, on sidewalks or public roads, the question of "in the course
of" the employment is flatly raised.
Some of our states refuse to extend this definition of "in the course of" to include these
injuries. Most of the states will protect the employee from the moment his foot or person
reaches the employer's premises, whether he arrives early or late. These states find
something sacred about the employment premises and define "premises" very broadly, not
only to include premises owned by the employer, but also premises leased, hired, supplied or
used by him, even private alleyways merely used by the employer. Adjacent private premises
are protected by many states, and a few protect the employee even on adjacent public
sidewalks and streets. Where a city or any employer owns or controls an island, all its streets
are protected premises.
There is no reason in principle why states should not protect employees for a reasonable
period of time prior to or after working hours and for a reasonable distance before reaching
or after leaving the employer's premises. The Supreme Court of the United States has
declared that it will not overturn any state decision that so enlarges the scope of its act.
Hence, a deaf worker, trespassing on railroad tracks adjacent to his employer's brick-making
8
 premises (but shown by his superintendent the specific short crossing over the track), and
killed by a train, was held to be in the course of his employment when hit by an oncoming
train fifteen minutes before his day would have begun. So long as causal relation to the
employment is discernible, no federal question arises.
The narrow rule that a worker is not in the course of his employment until he crosses the
employment threshold is itself subject to many exceptions. Off-premises injuries to or from
work, in both liberal and narrow states, are compensable (1) if the employee is on the way to
or from work in a vehicle owned or supplied by the employer, whether in a public (e.g., the
employer's street car) or private conveyance; (2) if the employee is subject to call at all hours
or at the moment of injury; (3) if the employee is travelling for the employer, i.e., travelling
workers; (4) if the employer pays for the employee's time from the moment he leaves his
home to his return home; (5) if the employee is on his way to do further work at home, even
though on a fixed salary; (6) where the employee is required to bring his automobile to his
place of business for use there. Other exceptions undoubtedly are equally justified,
dependent on their own peculiar circumstances.
Schneider (supra, at p. 117) makes this significant statement:
The proximity rule exception to the general going and coming rule is that an employee is
generally considered to be in the course of his employment while coming to or going from
his work, when, though off the actual premises of his employer, he is still in close proximity
thereto, is proceeding diligently at an appropriate time, by reasonable means, over the
natural, practical, customary, convenient and recognized way of ingress, or egress either on
land under the control of the employer, or on adjacent property with the express or implied
consent of the employer.
On pp. 98 to 99 of 85 ALR, we find the following disquisition:
The compensation acts have been very generally held not to authorize an award in case of
an injury or death from a peril which is common to all mankind, or to which the public at
large is exposed. 28 R.C. L. 804. And they do not as a general rule cover injuries received
99 C.J.S., at pp. 807-814, has this to say:
while going to or from work on public streets, where the employee has not reached, or has
left the employer's premises. The question whether an injury arises out of and in the course
of the employment, however, is one dependent upon the facts of each case, and in some
cases, where an injury occured while the employee was going to or from work, but was in
the street in front of the employer's premises, it has been held compensable.
Thus, in the reported case (Barnett v. Brtiling Cafeteria Co., ante, 85) the injury was held to
have arisen out of and in the course of the employment, where the employee slipped on ice
on the sidewalk immediately in front of the employer's place of business, while on her way
to report for duty, and just before entering by the only entrance to her place of
employment. The court here recognized the general rule that, if an employee is injured while
going to or from his work to his house, or to or from some point not visited for the discharge
of a duty arising out of the employment, or while in the use of a public highway, he does not
come within the protection of the Workmen's Compensation Act, but stated that there is an
exception to this rule and that the employment is not limited by the actual time when the
workman reaches the scene of his labor and begins it, or when he ceases, but includes a
reasonable time and opportunity before and after, while he is at or near his place of
employment. The court reasoned that in the case at bar, although the employee had not
entered the employer's place of business, and the sidewalk was a public highway so much
therefore as was in front of the employer's place of business was a necessary adjunct, used in
connection with the business, and that the sidewalk was to a limited degree and purpose a
part of the employer's premises.
In Industrial Commission v. Barber (1927) 117 Ohio St 373, 159 NE 363, the injury was held
to have arisen in the course of the employment where an employee, about five minutes
before the hour when he was to go on duty, was struck by an automobile owned and driven
by another employee, within a short distance from the employer's plant, which was located
at the dead end of a street maintained by the employer from its plant to the intersection with
another street, and, although the street was a public one, it led nowhere except to the
employer's plant, and all of its employees were obliged to use it in going to and from their
work. The court stated that where the conditions under the control of an industrial plant are
such that the employee has no option but to pursue a given course with reference to such
conditions and environments, the pursuance of such course is an implied obligation of the
employer in his contract with such employee, and that when he, for the purpose of entering
his employment, has entered into the sphere or zone controlled by his employer and is
pursuing a course with reference to which he has no option, he is then not only within the
conditions and environments of the plant of his employer, but is then in the course of his
employment; and that, when he receives an injury attributable to such conditions and
environments, there is a direct causal connection between his employment and his injury,
and the injury falls within the class of industrial injuries for which compensation has been
provided by the Workmen's Compensation Law.
It is laid down as a general rule, known as the "going and coming" rule, that, in the absence
of special circumstances, and except in certain unusual circumstances, and where nothing
else appears, harm or injury sustained by an employee while going to or from his work is not
compensable. Such injury, or accident, is regarded by the weight of authority of many courts
as not arising out of his employment, and as not being, or not occurring, in the course
thereof.
9
 However, this rule is not inflexible, is not of inevitable application, and is subject to
qualifications, and to exceptions which depend on the nature, circumstances, and conditions
of the particular employment, the circumstances of the particular case, and the cause of the
injury.
Jaynes vs. Potlach Forests11 expresses with enlightening clarity the rationale for extending the scope
of "course of employment" to certain "off-premises" injuries:
We are urged here to again recognize and apply the distinction between off-premises
injuries which occur on private property and those which occur on public streets and
highways. The extension of the course of employment to off-premises injuries is not based
upon the principle which would justify a distinction upon the narrow ground of private and
public property; it is not sound to say that while an employee is on public highway he is
always there as a member of the public and in nowise in the exercise of any right conferred
by his contract to employment; nor is it a complete answer to say that while he is on his
employer's premises his presence there is by contract right, otherwise he would be a
trespasser. The question of whether or not one is a covered employee should not be
resolved by the application of the law relating to rights to enter upon lands, or by law of
trespass, licensee, invitee or otherwise.
A substantial and fair ground to justify the extension of the course of employment beyond
the premises of the employer is to extend its scope to the necessary risks and hazards
associated with the employment. These risks may or may not be on the premises of the
employer and for this reason there is no justification to distinguish between extended risks
on public highways and private pathways. In fact it is at most a distinction without a
difference. Under the better reasoned cases the technical status as public or private is
obviously of no moment or in any event in and of itself is not conclusive.
Likewise enlightening is the following explanation of the premises rule exceptions:
We have, then a workable explanation of the exception to the premises rule: it is not
nearness, or reasonable distance, or even the identifying or surrounding areas with the
premises; it is simply that, when a court has satisfied itself that there is a distinct "arising out
of" or causal connection between the conditions under which claimant must approach and
leave the premises and the occurrence of the injury, it may hold that the course of
employment extends as far as those conditions extend. (Larson's Workmen's Compensation
Law, 1965 ed., vol. 1, pp. 210-211)
We now direct our attention to the cause of the employee's death: assault.
An "assault," although resulting from a deliberate act of the slayer, is considered an "accident" within
the meaning of sec. 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, since the word "accident" is intended to
indicate that "the act causing the injury shall be casual or unforeseen, an act for which the injured
party is not legally responsible."12
In the cases where the assault was proven to have been work-connected, compensation was
awarded. In Nava, supra, the helmsman of a boat was engaged in hauling the ship's cable and in
coiling the cable partly occupied by a folding bed of one of the passengers. This passenger, upon
being asked, declared his ownership of the bed. Nava expressed his intention of pushing it out of the
way and proceeded to do so. Angered by this, the passenger exchanged hot words with Nava, and
then, with a piece of wood, jabbed Nava at the pit of the stomach. At this point, the passenger's
brother ran up to Nava and stabbed him to death. The death was adjudged compensable.
In Bohol Land Transportation Co. vs. Vda. de Mandaguit,13 the truck which Mandaguit was driving
collided with a cyclist going in the opposite direction. The latter turned around and immediately
pursued the bus. He overtook it a few minutes later when it stopped to take on passengers. The
driver then disembarked from the bus to wash his hands at a drugstore nearby. The cyclist followed
him there and knifed him to death. We affirmed the grant of compensation upon the finding that the
death arose out of and in the course of employment.
In Galicia vs. Dy Pac,14 the employee, Pablo Carla, was asked to work in lieu of another employee who
had been suspended from work upon request of his labor union; while Carla was working, the
suspended employee asked him to intercede for him, but Carla refused; an altercation resulted;
shortly thereafter the suspended employee stabbed Carla to death. The death was held compensable
because "the injury sustained by the deceased was caused by an accident arising out of his
employment since the evidence is clear that the fight which resulted in the killing of the deceased had
its origin or cause in the fact that he was placed in the job previously occupied by the assailant."
In the three cases above-cited, there was evidence as to the motive of the assailant.
In A. P. Santos, Inc. vs. Dabacol,15 the death of an employee-driver who, while driving a cab, was killed
by an unidentified passenger, was held compensable by the Commission. However, the question of
whether the assault arose out of the employment, was not raised on appeal to this Court.
In Batangas Transportation Company vs. Vda. de Rivera,16 that question was raised. While the
employee-driver was driving a bus, a passenger boarded it and sat directly behind the driver. After
about thirty minutes, during which the passenger and the driver never so much as exchanged a word,
the passenger shot the driver to death and then fled. There was no competent proof as to the cause
of the assault, although there were intimations that the incident arose from a personal grudge. The
majority decision17 ruled the death compensable. The bases: (1) Once it is proved that the employee
died in the course of the employment, the legal presumption, in the absence of substantial evidence
to the contrary, is that the claim "comes within the provisions of the compensation law" (sec. 43), in
other words, that the incident arose out of the workman's employment. (2) Doubts as to rights to
compensation are resolved in favor of the employee and his dependents. (3) The Commissioner's
10
declaration on the work-connection might be binding on the Court. (4) There are employments which
increase the risk of assault on the person of the employee and it is in that sense that an injury or
harm sustained by the assaulted worker arises out of the employment, because the increased risk to
assault supplies the link or connection between the injury and the employment. Among the jobs
enumerated as increasing the risk of assault are (a) jobs having to do with keeping the peace or
guarding property; (b) jobs having to do with keeping or carrying of money which subject to the
employee to the risk of assault because of the increased temptation to robbery; (c) jobs which expose
the employee to direct contact with lawless and irresponsible members of the community, like that of
a bartender; and (d) work as bus driver, taxi driver or street car conductor.
It has been said that an employment may either increase risk of assault because of its nature or be
the subject-matter of a dispute leading to the assault. The first kind of employment, the so-called
"increased risk" jobs comprehend (1) jobs involving dangerous duties, such as that of guarding the
employer's property, that of carrying or keeping money, that where the employee is exposed to
lawless or irresponsible members of the public, or that which subjects him to increased or
indiscriminate contact with the public, such as the job of a street car conductor or taxi-driver;18 (2)
jobs where the employee is placed in a dangerous environment;19 and (3) jobs of employees whose
work takes them on the highway. On the other hand, the employment itself may be the subject-
matter of a dispute leading to the assault as where a supervisor is assaulted by workmen he has fired,
or where the argument was over the performance of work or possession of tools or the like, or where
the violence was due to labor disputes.20
In Rivera, supra, the unexplained assault on the employee was considered to have arisen out of the
employment because it occurred in the course of employment. This Court relied on the presumption
of law that in any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim, the claim is presumed to come within
the provisions of the Act.21 According to this Court, "this statutory presumption was copied from New
York." Concerning the corresponding New York provision of law, Larson has this to say:
In a few jurisdictions, notably New York and Massachusetts, a statutory presumption in favor
of coverage has figured in unexplained-accident cases. The Massachusetts statute provides:
In any claim for compensation, where the employee has been killed, or is physically
or mentally unable to testify, it shall be presumed, in the absence of substantial
evidence to the contrary, that the claim comes within the provisions of this chapter,
that sufficient notice of the injury has been given, and that the injury or death was
not occasioned by the wilful intention of the employee to injure or kill himself or
another.
This provision was largely copied from the New York section on presumptions, except that
the New York act creates the presumption in all cases, not merely those involving an
employee's death or inability to testify.
The sweeping inclusiveness of this language might seem at first glance to mean that the
mere making of a claim is also the making of a prima facie case, as long as death or injury is
shown to have occurred. The New York and Massachusetts courts have not so interpreted
these statutes, however. It seems to be necessary to establish some kind of preliminary link
with the employment before the presumption can attach. Otherwise, the claimant widow
would have merely to say, "My husband, who was one of your employee, has died, and I
therefore claim death benefits," whereupon the affirmative burden would devolve upon the
employer to prove that there was no connection between the death and the environment.
It is not yet entirely clear what initial demonstration of employment-connection will give the
presumption a foothold. Apparently, the idea is to rule out cases in which claimant can show
neither that the injury occurred in the course of employment nor that it arose out of it, as
where he contracted a disease but has no evidence to show where he got it. If there is
evidence that the injury occurred in the course of employment, the presumption will usually
supply the "arising-out-of-employment" factor." Larson's Workmen Compensation Law
(1965) vol. 1, pp. 123-124.
We also quote from the decision of the Court of Appeals of New York in Daus vs. Gunderman &
Sons:22
The statute is not intended to relieve completely an employee from the burden of showing
that accidental injuries suffered by him actually were sustained in the course of his
employment. "It is not the law that mere proof of an accident, without other evidence,
creates the presumption under section 21 of the Workmen's Compensation Law (Consol.
Law, c. 67) that the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment. On the
contrary, it has been frequently held, directly and indirectly, that there must be some
evidence from which the conclusion can be drawn that the injuries did arise out of and in the
course of the employment." Proof of the accident will give rise to the statutory presumption
only where some connection appears between the accident and the employment.
Likewise of relevance is the following treatise:
The discussion of the coverage formula, "arising out of and in the course of employment,"
was opened with the suggestion that, while "course" and "arising" were put under separate
headings for convenience, some interplay between the two factors should be observed in
the various categories discussed.
A few examples may now be reviewed to show that the two tests, in practice, have not been
kept in air-tight compartments, but have to some extent merged into a single concept of
work-connection. One is almost tempted to formulate a sort of quantum theory of work-
connection: that a certain minimum quantum of work-connection must be shown, and if the
"course" quantity is very small, but the "arising" quantity is large, the quantum will add up to
11
the necessary minimum, as it will also when the "arising" quantity is very small but the
"course" quantity is relatively large.
But if both the "course" and "arising" quantities are small, the minimum quantum will not be
met.
As an example of the first, a strong "arising" factor but weak "course" factor, one may cite
the cases in which recoveries have been allowed off the employment premises, outside
business hours, when an employee going to or coming from work is injured by a hazard
distinctly traceable to the employment, such as a traffic jam overflowing from the
employment premises, or a rock flying through the air from a blast on the premises. Here, by
normal course of employment standards, there would be no award, since the employee was
not on the premises while coming or going. Yet the unmistakable character of the causal
relation of the injury to the employment has been sufficient to make up for the weakness of
the "course" factor. Another example of the same kind of balancing-out is seen in the line of
cases dealing with injury to travelling men or loggers while sleeping in hotels or bunkhouses.
It was shown in the analysis of these cases that, although the "course" factor is on the
borderline when the employee is sound asleep at the time of injury, a strong causal relation
of the injury to the conditions of employment — as where a fellow-logger runs amok, or a
straw falls into the bunkhouse-inmate's throat from the mattress above, or the employee is
trapped in a burning hotel — will boost the case over the line to success; while a weak causal
connection, as where the salesman merely slips in a hotel bath, coupled with a weak
"course" factor due to the absence of any direct service performed for the employer at the
time, will under present decisions add up to a quantum of work-connection too small to
support an award. It was also shown that when the "course" element is strengthened by the
fact that the employee is at all times on call, the range of compensable sources of injury is
broader than when the employee, although living on the premises is not on call.
A somewhat similar balancing-out process is seen in the holding that a borderline course-of-
employment activity like seeking personal comfort or going to and from work falls short of
compensability if the method adopted is unusual, unreasonable and dangerous, while no
such restriction applies to the direct performance of the work.
As an example of the reverse situation, a strong "course" element and a weak "arising"
element; one may recall the "positional" cases discussed in section 10, as well as the
unexplained-fall and other "neutral-cause" cases. Here the course of employment test is
satisfied beyond the slightest doubt: the employee is in the midst of performing the active
duties of his job. But the causal connection is very weak, since the source of the injury —
whether a stray bullet, a wandering lunatic, and unexplained fall or death, or a mistaken
assault by a stranger — is not distinctly associated with employment conditions as such, and
is tied to the employment only by the argument that the injury would not have occurred to
this employee but for the obligation of the employment which placed him in the position to
be hurt. Yet, since the "course" element is so strong, awards are becoming increasingly
common on these facts.
Incidentally, it may be observed that this "quantum" idea forms a useful yardstick for
measuring just how generous a court has become in expanding compensation coverage; for
if a court makes an award when a case, by the above standards, is weak both on course of
employment and on causal connection, one can conclude that the court is capable of giving
the act a broad construction. Thus, an award was made in Puffin v. General Electric, where
the course element was weak (rest period) and the causal element was weak (setting fire to
own sweater while smoking). Both factors were likewise very weak in O'Leary v. Brown
Pacific-Maxon Inc., where the course of employment consisted of a recreation period
interrupted by a rescue of a stranger, and the arising factor consisted of drowning in a
channel where decedent was prohibited from going. And, in Martin v. Plaut, the course of
employment factor was weak (a cook dressing in the morning) and the causal factor was also
weak (an unexplained fall); yet an award was made in New York.
But another New York case shows that the simultaneous weakness of course and arising
factors may reach the point where the requisite quantum is not found. In Shultz v. Nation
Associates, compensation was denied to an employee who while combing her hair
preparatory to going to lunch negligently struck her eye with the comb. Here we see
thinness on all fronts: as to course of employment time factor, we have a lunch period; as to
the course of employment activity factor, we have care of personal appearance; and as to
the causal factor, we have negligence of the employee. Each weakness standing alone —
lunch period, care of appearance, negligence — would not be fatal; there are many awards
in which one or another of these is present. But when all are present, while an award is not
impossible and could be defended on a point by point basis, it cannot be relied upon in most
jurisdictions by the prudent lawyer. Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law1965 ed. Vol. 1,
pp. 452.97 to 452.100.
In resume:
1. Workmen's compensation is granted if the injuries result from an accident which arise out
of and in the course of employment.
2. Both the "arising" factor and the "course" factor must be present. If one factor is weak
and the other is strong, the injury is compensable, but not where both factors are weak.
Ultimately, the question is whether the accident is work-connected.
3. In a proceeding for the enforcement of a claim, the same is presumed to come within the
provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. But a preliminary link must first be shown
to exist between the injury and the employment. Thus if the injury occurred in the course of
employment, it is presumed to have arisen out of the employment.
12
 4. The "course" factor applies to time, place and circumstances. This factor is present if the
injury takes place within the period of employment, at a place where the employee may be,
and while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing something incidental thereto.
5. The rule is that an injury sustained while the employee goes to or comes from his place of
work, is not of the employment.
6. The exception to the rule is an injury sustained off the employee's premises, but while in
close proximity thereto and while using a customary means of ingress and egress. The
reason for extending the scope of "course of employment" to off-premises injuries is that
there is a causal connection between the work and the hazard.
7. An "assault" may be considered an "accident" within the meaning of the Workmen's
Compensation Act. The employment may either increase risk of assault because of its nature
or be the subject-matter of a dispute leading to the assault.
From the milestones, we now proceed to take our bearings in the case at bar, having in mind always
that no cover-all formula can be spelled out with specificity, that the particular facts and
circumstances of each case must be inquired into, and that in any perceptive inquiry, the question as
to where the line should be drawn beyond which the liability of the employer cannot continue has
been held to be usually one of fact.
We shall first dwell on the question of ownership of the private road where Pablo was killed. In
granting compensation, the Commission said that "the road where the deceased was shot was of
private ownership, was called the IDECO road, and led straight to the main IDECO gate, thus raising
the reasonable assumption that it belonged" to the IDECO. The Commission reasoned out that "even
if the ownership of the road were open to question, there was no doubt that its private character was
obviously exploited by the respondent for the purpose of its own business to such an extent as to
make it to all intents and purposes an extension of its premises," so that the "shooting of the
deceased may be considered to have taken place on the premises, and therefore within the
employment;" and that "while respondent allowed its name to be used in connection with the private
road for the ingress and egress of the employees it did not apparently take the necessary precaution
to make it safe for its employees by employing security guards."
But the IDECO denies ownership of the road. In its memorandum filed with the Regional Office,
IDECO averred that Pablo's death did not originate from his work as to time, place and circumstances.
This, in effect, is a denial of ownership of the road. The decision of the Regional Office does not state
that the road belongs to the IDECO. All that it says is that Pablo was shot "barely two minutes after he
was dismissed from work and while walking along the IDECO road about twenty (20) meters from the
gate." In its "motion for reconsideration and/or review," the IDECO emphasized that "the place where
the incident happened was a public road, not less than twenty (20) meters away from the main gate
of the compound, and therefore not proximate to or in the immediate vicinity of the place of work."
Again, the ownership of the road was implicitly denied. And in its "motion for reconsideration and/or
appeal to the Commission en banc," the IDECO alleged outright that the "road where the incident
took place, although of private ownership, does not belong to IDECO. There is absolutely no evidence
on record that shows IDECO owns the road." If the road were owned by the IDECO, there would have
been no question that the assault arose "in the course of employment." 23 But if it did indeed own the
road, then the IDECO would have fenced it, and place its main gate at the other end of the road
where it meets the public highway.
But while the IDECO does not own the private road, it cannot be denied that it was using the same as
the principal means of ingress and egress. The private road leads directly to its main gate. 24 Its right to
use the road must then perforce proceed from either an easement of right of way or a lease. Its right,
therefore, is either a legal one or a contractual one. In either case the IDECO should logically and
properly be charged with security control of the road. The IDECO owed its employees a safe passage
to its premises. In compliance with such duty, the IDECO should have seen to it not only that road was
properly paved and did not have holes or ditches, but should also have instituted measures for the
proper policing of the immediate area. The point where Pablo was shot was barely twenty meters
away from the main IDECO gate, certainly nearer than a stone's throw therefrom. The spot is
immediately proximate to the IDECO's premises. Considering this fact, and the further facts that
Pablo had just finished overtime work at the time, and was killed barely two minutes after dismissal
from work, the Ampil case is squarely applicable here. We may say, as we did in Ampil, that the place
where the employee was injured being "immediately proximate to his place of work, the accident in
question must be deemed to have occurred within the zone of his employment and therefore arose
out of and in the course thereof." Our principal question is whether the injury was sustained in
the course of employment. We find that it was, and so conclude that the assault arose out of the
employment, even though the said assault is unexplained.
American jurisprudence supports this view.
In Bountiful Brick Company vs. Giles,25 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled:
Employment includes both only the actual doing of the work, but a reasonable margin of
time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the place where the work is to
be done. If the employee to be injured while passing, with the express or implied consent of
the employer, to or from his work by a way over the employer's premises, or over those of
another in such proximity and relation as to be in practical effect a part of the employer's
premises, the injury is one arising out of and in the course of employment as much as though
it had happened while the employee was engaged in his work at the place of its
performance. In other words, the employment may begin in point of time before the work is
entered upon and in point of space before the place where the work is to be done is
reached. Probably, as a general rule, employment may be said to begin when the employee
reaches the entrance to the employer's premises where the work is to be done; but it is clear
13
 that in some cases the rule extends to include adjacent premises used by the employee as a
means of ingress and egress with the express or implied consent of the employer.
The above ruling is on all fours with our facts. Two minutes from dismissal and twenty meters from
the main IDECO gate are "a reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to
and from" the IDECO's premises. The IDECO employees used the private road with its consent,
express or implied. Twenty meters on that road from the main gate is in close proximity to the
IDECO's premises. It follows that Pablo's death was in the course of employment.
In Carter vs. Lanzetta,26 it was held that "such statutes envision extension of coverage to employees
from the time they reach the employer's premises until they depart therefrom and that hours of
service include a period when this might be accomplished within a reasonable interval;" and that
"under exceptional circumstances, a continuance of the course of employment may be extended by
allowing the employee a reasonable time not only to enter or leave the premises but also to
surmount certain hazards adjacent thereto."
The private road led directly to the main IDECO gate. From this description, it would appear that the
road is a dead-end street. In Singer vs. Rich Marine Sales,27 it was held that, where the employee,
while returning to work at the end of the lunch period, fell at the curb of the sidewalk immediately
adjacent to the employer's premises and one other located thereon, and the general public used the
street only in connection with those premises, and the employer actually stored boats on the
sidewalk, the sidewalk was within the precincts of employment. In that case there were even two
business establishments on the dead-end street. Here, it is exclusively the IDECO premises which
appear to be at the end of the private road.
We find in Jean vs. Chrysler Corporation28 a meaningful statement of the obligation of the employer
to its employees: "That the employer owes, so to speak, a duty of 'safe passage' to an employee to
the point where he can reach the proper arrival or departure from his work seems without question."
We next quote extensively from Kelty vs. Travellers Insurance Company:29
The rule has been repeatedly announced in Texas that an injury received by an employee
while using the public streets and highways in going to or returning from the place of
employment is not compensable, the rationale of the rule being that in most instances such
an injury is suffered as a consequence of risk and hazards to which all members of the
travelling public are subject rather than risk and hazards having to do with and originating in
the work or business of the employer....
Another exception, however, which is applicable is found in the so-called "access" cases. In
these cases a workman who has been injured at a plane intended by the employer for use as
a means of ingress or egress to and from the actual place of the employee's work has been
held to be in the course of his employment. The courts have said that these access areas are
so closely related to the employer's premises as to be fairly treated as a part of the
employer's premises. We shall discuss the principal authorities dealing with this exception to
the general rule.
The leading cases in Texas dealing with the "access" exception, and one which we think is
controlling of this appeal, is Lumberman's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Behnken, 112 Tex. 103, 246
S.W. 72, 28 A.L.R. 1402. In that case the employee was employed by Hartburg Lumber
Company, which company operated and owned a sawmill in Hartburg, Texas, which was a
lumber town, consisting solely of the employer's facilities. A railroad track ran through the
town and a part of the lumber company's facilities was situated on either side of the right-of-
way. A public road ran parallel to the railroad tracks which led to the various buildings on the
property of the lumber company. This crossing was used by any member of the public
desiring to go to any part of the lumber company facilities. On the day in question the
decedent quit work at noon, went home for lunch and while returning to the lumber
company plant for the purpose of resuming his employment, was struck and killed by a train
at the crossing in question. The insurance company contended (as it does here) that the
decedent's death did not originate in the work or business of his employer and that at the
time of his fatal injuries he was not in or about the furtherance of the affairs or business of
his employer. The Supreme Court, in an extensive opinion, reviewed the authorities from
other states and especially Latter's Case 238 Mass. 326, 130 N. E. 637, 638, and arrived at
the conclusion that the injury and death under such circumstances were compensable under
the Texas Act. The court held that the railroad crossing bore so intimate a relation to the
lumber company's premises that it could hardly be treated otherwise than as a part of the
premises. The Court pointed out that the lumber company had rights in and to the crossing
which was used in connection with the lumber company's business, whether by employees
or by members of the public. In announcing the "access" doctrine Justice Greenwood said:
Was Behnken engaged in or about the furtherance of the affairs or business of his
employer when he received the injury causing his death? He was upon the crossing
provided as the means of access to his work solely because he was an employee. He
encountered the dangers incident to use of the crossing in order that he might
perform the duties imposed by his contract of service. Without subjecting himself
to such dangers he could not do what was required of him in the conduct of the
lumber company's business. He had reached a place provided and used only as an
adjunct to that business, and was injured from a risk created by the conditions
under which the business was carried on. To hold that he was not acting in
furtherance of the affairs or business of the lumber company would be to give a
strict interpretation to this remedial statute, which should be liberally construed
with a view to accomplish its purpose and to promote justice.
xxx xxx xxx
14
 In Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Anderson, Tex. Civ. App., 125 S. W. 2d 674, wr. ref., this
court followed the rule announced in Behnken, supra. In that case the employee was killed
while crossing the railroad track near his place of employment. In discussing the question of
the situs of the injury Justice Looney said:
Its use as a means of ingress to and exit from his place of work not only conduced his
safety and convenience, but contributed to the promptness and efficiency with
which he was enabled to discharge the duties owing his employer; hence the reason
and necessity for his presence upon the railroad track (that portion of the pathway
leading over the railroad right of way) when injured, in our opinion, had to do with,
originated in and grew out of the work of the employer; and that, the injury
received at the time, place and under the circumstances, necessarily was in
furtherance of the affairs or business of the employer.
Again, in Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Boecker, Tex. Civ. App. 53 S. W. 2d 327, err. ref., this
court had occasion to follow the "access" doctrine. In that case Chief Justice Jones quoted
from the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Bountiful Brisk Company, et al. v.
Giles, 276 U.S. 154, 48 S. Ct. 221, 72 L. Ed. 507, 66 A. L. R. 1402, as follows:
An employment includes not only the actual doing of the work, but a reasonable
margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the place
where the work is to be done. If the employee be injured while passing, with the
express or implied consent of the employer, to or from his work by a way over the
employer's premises, or over those of another in such proximity and relation as to
be in practical effect a part of the employer's premises, the injury is one arising out
of and in the course of the employment as much as though it had happened while
the employee was engaged in his work at the place of its performance. In other
words, the employment may begin in point of time before the work is entered upon
and in point of space before the place where the work is to be done is reached.
The ruling enunciated above is applicable in the case at bar. That part of the road where Pablo was
killed is in very close proximity to the employer's premises. It is an "access area" "so clearly related to
the employer's premises as to be fairly treated as a part of the employer's premises." That portion of
the road bears "so intimate a relation" to the company's premises. It is the chief means of entering
the IDECO premises, either for the public or for its employees. The IDECO uses it extensively in pursuit
of its business. It has rights of passage over the road, either legal, if by virtue of easement, or
contractual, if by reason of lease. Pablo was using the road as a means of access to his work solely
because he was an employee. For this reason, the IDECO was under obligation to keep the place safe
for its employees. Safe, that is, against dangers that the employees might encounter therein, one of
these dangers being assault by third persons. Having failed to take the proper security measures over
the said area which it controls, the IDECO is liable for the injuries suffered by Pablo resulting in his
death.
As therefore stated, the assault on Pablo is unexplained. The murderer was himself killed before he
could be brought to trial. It is true there is authority for the statement that before the "proximity"
rule may be applied it must first be shown that there is a causal connection between the employment
and the hazard which resulted in the injury.30 The following more modern view was expressed
in Lewis Wood Preserving Company vs. Jones:31
While some earlier cases seem to indicate that the causative danger must be peculiar to the
work and not common to the neighborhood for the injuries to arise out of and in the course
of the employment (see Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peek, 36 Ga. App. 557 [137 S.E. 121];
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Cox, 61 Ga. App. 420, 6 S.E. 2d 189), later cases have
been somewhat more liberal, saying that, "to be compensable, injuries do not have to arise
from something peculiar to the employment." Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. Bardon, 79
Ga. App. 260, 262, 54 S.E. 2d 443, 444. "Where the duties of an employee entail his presence
(at a place and a time) the claim for an injury there occurring is not to be barred because it
results from a risk common to all others ... unless it is also common to the general public
without regard to such conditions, and independently of place, employment, or pursuit."
New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Sumrell, 30 Ga. App. 682, 118 S.E. 786, cited in Globe
Indemnity Co. v. MacKendree, 39 Ga. App. 58, 146 S.E. 46, 47; McKiney v. Reynolds &
Manley Lumber Co., 79 Ga. App. 826, 829, 54 S.E. 2d 471, 473.
But even without the foregoing pronouncement, the employer should still be held liable in view of
our conclusion that that portion of the road where Pablo was killed, because of its proximity, should
be considered part of the IDECO's premises. Hence, the injury was in the course of employment, and
there automatically arises the presumption — invoked in Rivera — that the injury by assault arose out
of the employment, i. e., there is a causal relation between the assault and the employment.
We do say here that the circumstances of time, two minutes after dismissal from overtime work, and
space, twenty meters from the employer's main gate, bring Pablo's death within the scope of
the course factor. But it may logically be asked: Suppose it were three minutes after and thirty meters
from, or five minutes after and fifty meters from, would the "proximity" rule still apply? In answer, we
need but quote that portion of the decision in Jean vs. Chrysler Corporation, supra, which answered a
question arising from an ingenious hypothetical question put forth by the defendant therein:
We could, of course, say "this is not the case before us" and utilize the old saw, "that which
is not before us we do not decide." Instead, we prefer to utilize the considerably older law:
"Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof" (Matthew 1:34), appending, however, this
admonition: no statute is static; it must remain constantly viable to meet new challenges
placed to it. Recovery in a proper case should not be suppressed because of a conjectural
posture which may never arise and which if it does, will be decided in the light of then
existing law.
15
Since the Workmen's Compensation Act is basically a social legislation designed to afford relief to
workmen, it must be liberally construed to attain the purpose for which it was enacted. 32 Liberally
construed, sec. 2 of the Act comprehends Pablo's death. The Commission did not err in granting
compensation.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is affirmed, at petitioner's cost.

16
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 90204 May 11, 1990
MANUEL BELARMINO, petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM, respondents.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
This seven-year-old case involves a claim for benefits for the death of a lady school teacher which the
public respondents disallowed on the ground that the cause of death was not work-connected.
Before her death on February 19, 1982, petitioner's wife, Oania Belarmino, was a classroom teacher
of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports assigned at the Buracan Elementary School in
Dimasalang, Masbate (p. 13, Rollo). She had been a classroom teacher since October 18, 1971, or for
eleven (11) years. Her husband, the petitioner, is also a public school teacher.
On January 14, 1982, at nine o'clock in the morning, while performing her duties as a classroom
teacher, Mrs. Belarmino who was in her 8th month of pregnancy, accidentally slipped and fell on the
classroom floor. Moments later, she complained of abdominal pain and stomach cramps. For several
days, she continued to suffer from recurrent abdominal pain and a feeling of heaviness in her
stomach, but, heedless of the advice of her female co-teachers to take a leave of absence, she
continued to report to the school because there was much work to do. On January 25, 1982, eleven
(11) days after her accident, she went into labor and prematurely delivered a baby girl at home (p.
8, Rollo).
Her abdominal pains persisted even after the delivery, accompanied by high fever and headache. She
was brought to the Alino Hospital in Dimasalang, Masbate on February 11, 1982. Dr. Alfonso Alino
found that she was suffering from septicemia post partum due to infected lacerations of the vagina.
She was discharged from the hospital after five (5) days on February 16, 1982, apparently recovered
but she died three (3) days later. The cause of death was septicemia post partum. She was 33 years
old, survived by her husband and four (4) children, the oldest of whom was 11 years old and the
youngest, her newborn infant (p. 9, Rollo).
On April 21, 1983, a claim for death benefits was filed by her husband. On February 14, 1984, it was
denied by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) which held that 'septicemia post partum
the cause of death, is not an occupational disease, and neither was there any showing that aforesaid
ailment was contracted by reason of her employment. . . . The alleged accident mentioned could not
have precipitated the death of the wife but rather the result of the infection of her lacerated wounds
as a result of her delivery at home" (p. 14 Rollo).
On appeal to the Employees Compensation Commission, the latter issued Resolution No. 3913 dated
July 8, 1988 holding:
We agree with the decision of the system, hence we dismiss this appeal.
Postpartum septicemia is an acute infectious disease of the puerperium resulting
from the entrance into the blood of bacteria usually streptococci and their toxins
which cause dissolution of the blood, degenerative changes in the organs and the
symptoms of intoxication. The cause of this condition in the instant case was the
infected vaginal lacerations resulting from the decedent's delivery of her child
which took place at home. The alleged accident in school could not have been the
cause of septicemia, which in this case is clearly caused by factors not inherent in
employment or in the working conditions of the deceased. (pp. 14-15, Rollo.)
Hence, this petition for review.
After a careful consideration of the petition and the annexes thereof, as well as the comments of the
public respondents, we are persuaded that the public respondents' peremptory denial of the
petitioner's claim constitutes a grave abuse of discretion.
Rule III, Section 1 of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation enumerates the grounds for
compensability of injury resulting in disability or death of an employee, as follows:
Sec. 1. Grounds — (a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all
of the following conditions:
(1) The employee must have been injured at the place where his
work requires him to be;
(2) The employee must have been performing his official
functions; and
(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have
been executing an order for the employer.
17
 (b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the
sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of
these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be
shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working
conditions.
(c) Only injury or sickness that occurred on or after January 1, 1975 and the
resulting disability or death shall be compensable under these Rules.
The illness, septicemia post partum which resulted in the death of Oania Belarmino, is admittedly not
listed as an occupational disease in her particular line of work as a classroom teacher. However, as
pointed out in the petition, her death from that ailment is compensable because an employment
accident and the conditions of her employment contributed to its development. The condition of the
classroom floor caused Mrs. Belarmino to slip and fall and suffer injury as a result. The fall
precipitated the onset of recurrent abdominal pains which culminated in the premature termination
of her pregnancy with tragic consequences to her. Her fall on the classroom floor brought about her
premature delivery which caused the development of post partum septicemia which resulted in
death. Her fall therefore was the proximate or responsible cause that set in motion an unbroken
chain of events, leading to her demise.
. . . what is termed in American cases the proximate cause, not implying however,
as might be inferred from the word itself, the nearest in point of time or relation,
but rather, [is] the efficient cause, which may be the most remote of an operative
chain. It must be that which sets the others in motion and is to be distinguished
from a mere preexisting condition upon which the effective cause operates, and
must have been adequate to produce the resultant damage without the
intervention of an independent cause. (Atlantic Gulf vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil.
166,171.)
The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury
as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result
therefrom. (Bataclan v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181.)
Thus in Enriquez v. WCC, 93 SCRA 366, 372, this Court ruled:
. . . Verily, the right to compensation extends to disability due to disease
supervening upon and proximately and naturally resulting from a compensable
injury (82 Am. Jur. 132). Where the primary injury is shown to have arisen in the
course of employment, every natural consequence that flows from the injury
likewise arises out of the employment, unless it is the result of an independent
intervening cause attributable to complainants own negligence or misconduct ( I
Larson Workmen's Compensation Law 3-279 [1972]). Simply stated, all the medical
consequences and sequels that flow from the primary injury are compensable.
(Ibid.)
Mrs. Belarmino's fall was the primary injury that arose in the course of her employment as a
classroom teacher, hence, all the medical consequences flowing from it: her recurrent abdominal
pains, the premature delivery of her baby, her septicemia post partum and death, are compensable.
There is no merit in the public respondents' argument that the cause of the decedent's post partum
septicemia "was the infected vaginal lacerations resulting from the decedent's delivery of her child at
home" for the incident in school could not have caused septicemia post partum, . . . the necessary
precautions to avoid infection during or after labor were (not) taken" (p. 29, Rollo).
The argument is unconvincing. It overlooks the fact that septicemia post partum is a disease of
childbirth, and premature childbirth would not have occurred if she did not accidentally fall in the
classroom.
It is true that if she had delivered her baby under sterile conditions in a hospital operating room
instead of in the unsterile environment of her humble home, and if she had been attended by
specially trained doctors and nurses, she probably would not have suffered lacerations of the vagina
and she probably would not have contracted the fatal infection. Furthermore, if she had remained
longer than five (5) days in the hospital to complete the treatment of the infection, she probably
would not have died. But who is to blame for her inability to afford a hospital delivery and the
services of trained doctors and nurses? The court may take judicial notice of the meager salaries that
the Government pays its public school teachers. Forced to live on the margin of poverty, they are
unable to afford expensive hospital care, nor the services of trained doctors and nurses when they or
members of their families are in. Penury compelled the deceased to scrimp by delivering her baby at
home instead of in a hospital.
The Government is not entirely blameless for her death for it is not entirely blameless for her poverty.
Government has yet to perform its declared policy "to free the people from poverty, provide
adequate social services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and improve the quality of life
for all (Sec. 7, Art. II, 1973 Constitution and Sec. 9, Art. II, 1987 Constitution). Social justice for the
lowly and underpaid public school teachers will only be an empty shibboleth until Government
adopts measures to ameliorate their economic condition and provides them with adequate medical
care or the means to afford it. "Compassion for the poor is an imperative of every humane society"
18
(PLDT v. Bucay and NLRC, 164 SCRA 671, 673). By their denial of the petitioner's claim for benefits
arising from the death of his wife, the public respondents ignored this imperative of Government, and
thereby committed a grave abuse of discretion.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The respondents Employees Compensation
Commission and the Government Service Insurance System are ordered to pay death benefits to the
petitioner and/or the dependents of the late Oania Belarmino, with legal rate of interest from the
filing of the claim until it is fully paid, plus attorney's fees equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the
award, and costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

19
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 84307 April 17, 1989
CIRIACO HINOGUIN petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
(Armed Forces of the Philippines), respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
This Petition for Review is directed against the Decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission
("ECC") in ECC Case No. 3275 (Ciriaco Hinoguin v. Government Service Insurance System [Armed
Forces of the Philippines]) which affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System
("GSIS") denying petitioner's claim for compensation benefit on account of the death of petitioner's
son, Sgt. Lemick G. Hinoguin
The deceased, Sgt. Hinoguin started his military service in 1974, when he was called to military
training by the Philippine Army. He later on enlisted in the Philippine Army as a private first class. At
the time of his death on 7 August 1985, he was holding the rank of Sergeant per Special Order P-
4200, HPA dated 15 October 1985, in "A" company 14th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division, PA.
The Headquarters of the 14th Infantry Battalion was located at Bical, Muñoz, Nueva Ecija. Sgt.
Hinoguin was Detachment Non-Commissioned Officer at Capintalan, Carranglan, Nueva Ecija, "A"
Company being stationed at Carranglan, Nueva Ecija.
On 1 August 1985, Sgt. Hinoguin and two (2) members of his Detachment, Cpl. Rogelio Clavo and Dft.
Nicomedes Alibuyog, sought permission from Captain Frankie Z. Besas, Commanding Officer of "A"
Company to go on overnight pass to Aritao, Nueva Viscaya, "to settle [an] important matter
thereat." 1 Captain Besas orally granted them permission to go to Aritao and to take their issued
firearms with them, considering that Aritao was regarded as "a critical place " 2 that is, it had peace
and order problems due to the presence of elements of the New People's Army ("NPA!') in or in the
vicinity of Aritao.
Sgt. Hinoguin, Cpl. Clavo and Dft. Alibuyog left Carranglan, Nueva Ecija, about noon on 1 August 1985
3 RECOMMENDATION:
and arrived in Aritao, Nueva Viscaya, about 1:30 o'clock P.M. on the same day. They proceeded to
the home of Dft. Alibuyog's parents where they had lunch. About 4:00 o'clock P.M., the three (3)
soldiers with a fourth man, a civilian and relative of Dft. Alibuyog, had some gin and beer, finishing a
bottle of gin and two (2) large bottles of beer. Three hours later, at about 7:00 o'clock P.M., the
soldiers left the Alibuyog home to return to their Company Headquarters. They boarded a tricycle,
presumably a motor-driven one, Sgt. Hinoguin and Cpl. Clavo seating themselves in the tricycle cab
while Dft. Alibuyog occupied the seat behind the driver. Upon reaching the poblacion of Aritao, Dft.
Alibuyog dismounted, walked towards and in front of the tricycle cab, holding his M-16 rifle in his
right hand, not noticing that the rifle's safety lever was on semi automatic (and not on "safety"). He
accidentally touched the trigger, firing a single shot in the process and hitting Sgt. Hinoguin, then still
sitting in the cab, in the left lower abdomen. The Sergeant did not apparently realize immediately
that he had been hit; he took three (3) steps forward, cried that he had been hit and fell to the
ground.
His companions rushed Sgt. Hinoguin to a hospital in Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya, for treatment. Their
Company Commander, Capt. Besas, hurried to the hospital upon being notified of the shooting and
there talked with the wounded Sergeant. The latter confirmed to Capt. Besas that he had indeed
been accidentally shot by Dft. Alibuyog Sgt. Hinoguin was later moved to the AFP Medical Center in
Quezon City and there he died on 7 August 1985. The Death Certificate lists "septic shock" as
immediate cause of death, and "generalized septicemia of peritonitis" as antecedent cause, following
his sustaining a gunshot wound.
An investigation conducted by H.Q., 14th Infantry Battalion on 11 August 1985 concluded that the
4
shooting of Sgt. Hinoguin was "purely accidental in nature." On 19 November 1985, a "Line of Duty
Board of Officers" was convened by H.Q. 14th Infantry Battalion, "to determine Line of Duty Status of
[the] late Sgt. Lemick Hinoguin 640407 (Inf.) PA, a member of "A" Co., 14IB, 5 ID, PA who died ... due
to Gun Shot Wound as a result of an accidental fire (sic) committed by Dft. Nicomedes Alibuyog 085-
5009 (Inf.) PA ... ." After receiving and deliberating . g on the Investigation Report dated 11 August
1985 together with the sworn statements of witnesses Alibuyog, Clavo and Besas, and after some
further questioning of Capt. Besas, the Line of Duty Board reached the following conclusion and
recommendation:
Sgt. Hinoguin was then the designated Detachment Commander of Capintalan
detachment. On or about 011300H August 1985 Dft. Alibuyog invited Sgt. Hinoguin
and Cpl. Clavo to his home to celebrate at Aritao, Nueva Viscaya. They asked
permission to go on overnight and to allow them to carry their firearms with them
because the place where they were going is critical. They were given such
permission verbally by their Commanding Officer. The death of Sgt. Hinoguin was
purely accidental as the Investigation Report presented here proved beyond
reasonable [doubt] the fact that Dft. Alibuyog had no grudge either [against] Cpl.
Clavo or Sgt. Hinoguin
The recommendation written by the Chairman and unanimously voted for by the
members contain the following:
20
 The Board after a thorough deliberation on presented evidences declares that the
Death of Sgt. Lemick Hinoguin 640407 (Inf.) PA is in Line of Duty.
The Board recommend farther that all benefits due the legal dependents of the late
Sgt. Lemick Hinoguin be given.5 (Emphasis supplied)
Sometime in March 1986, petitioner filed his claim for compensation benefits under P.D. No. 626 (as
amended), claiming that the death of his son was work-connected and therefore compensable. This
was denied 6 by the GSIS on the ground that petitioner's son was not at his work place nor performing
his duty as a soldier of the Philippine Army at the time of his death.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which Motion was, however, denied by the GSIS. This
denial was confirmed by the Workmen's Compensation Commission ("WCC") in a Decision dated 24
May 1988 which stated that:
[F]rom the recital of the facts therein [we found it] very difficult for us to perceive
where the work-connection of the events that led to appellant's son's death lies.
Under the law, death resulting from injury is considered compensable if it arises out
of and in the course of employment. Definitely, the death of Hinoguin did not arises
out of employment. Clearly, the facts showed that he was not on his place of work
nor was he performing official functions. On the contrary, he was on pass and had
just came from a merrymaking when accidentally shot by his
companion, 7 (Emphasis supplied)
The sole issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the death of Sgt. Lemick Hinoguin is
compensable under the applicable statute and regulations.
Considering that Sgt. Hinoguin died on 7 August 1985, the applicable law is to be found in Book Four,
Title III of the Labor Code, as amended. It may be noted at the outset that under Article 167 (g) of the
Labor Code, as amended and Section 4 (b) (1) of Rule I of the Amended (Implementing) Rules on
Employees' Compensation, the term "employee" includes a "member of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines." Rule XIII entitled "Death", of the Amended (Implementing) Rules provides in part as
follows:
SECTION 1. Conditions to Entitlement. — (a) The beneficiaries of a deceased
employee shall be entitled to an income benefit if all of the following conditions are
satisfied:
(1) The employee had been duly reported to the System;
(2) He died as a result of injury or sickness; and
(3) The System has been duly notified of his death, as well as the injury or sickness
which caused his death. His employer shall be liable for the benefit if such death
occurred before the employee is duly reported for coverage of the System.
xxx xxx xxx
Article 167 (k) of the Labor Code as amended defines a compensable "injury" quite simply as "any
harmful change in the human organism from any accident arising out of and in the course of the
employment." The Amended (Implementing) Rules have, however, elaborated considerably on the
simple and succinct statutory provision. Rule III, Section 1 (a) reads:
SECTION 1. Grounds. (a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all
of the following grounds:
(1) The employee must have been injured at the place work requires him to be;
(2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and
(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an
order for the employer.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
It will be seen that because the Amended (Implementing) Rules are intended to apply to all kinds of
employment, such rules must be read and applied with reasonable flexibility and comprehensiveness.
The concept of a "work place" referred to in Ground 1, for instance, cannot always be literally applied
to a soldier on active duty status, as if he were a machine operator or a worker in an assembly line in
a factory or a clerk in a particular fixed office. Obviously, a soldier must go where his company is
stationed. In the instant case, Aritao, Nueva Viscaya was not, of course, Carranglan, Nueva Ecija.
Aritao being approximately 1-1/2 hours away from the latter by public transportation. But Sgt.
Hinoguin, Cpl. Clavo and Dft. Alibuyog had permission from their Commanding Officer to proceed to
Aritao, and it appears to us that a place which soldiers have secured lawful permission to be at cannot
be very different, legally speaking, from a place where they are required to go by their commanding
officer. We note that the three (3) soldiers were on an overnight pass which, notably, they did not
utilize in full. They were not on vacation leave. Moreover, they were required or authorized to carry
their firearms with which presumably they were to defend themselves if NPA elements happened to
attack them while en route to and from Aritao or with which to attack and seek to capture such NPA
elements as they might encounter. Indeed, if the three (3) soldiers had in fact encountered NPAs
while on their way to or from Aritao and been fired upon by them and if Sgt. Hinoguin had been killed
21
by an NPA bullet, we do not believe that respondent GSIS would have had any difficulty in holding the benefits in respect of the death of Sgt. Lemick G. Hinoguin, to petitioner. No pronouncement as to
death a compensable one. costs.

Turning to the question of whether Sgt. Hinoguin was performing official functions at the time he SO ORDERED.
sustained the gunshot wound, it has already been pointed out above that the Line of Duty Board of
Officers of the 14th Infantry Battalion Headquarters had already determined that the death of Sgt.
Hinoguin had occurred "in line of duty." It may be noted in this connection that a soldier on active
duty status is really on 24 hours a day official duty status and is subject to military discipline and
military law 24 hours a day. He is subject to call and to the orders of his superior officers at all times,
7 days a week, except, of course, when he is on vacation leave status (which Sgt. Hinoguin was not).
'Thus, we think that the work-connected character of Sgt. Hinoguins injury and death was not
effectively precluded by the simple circumstance that he was on an overnight pass to go to the home
of Dft. Alibuyog, a soldier under his own command. Sgt. Hinoguin did not effectively cease performing
"official functions" because he was granted a pass. While going to a fellow soldier's home for a few
hours for a meal and some drinks was not a specific military duty, he was nonetheless in the course of
performance of official functions. Indeed, it appears to us that a soldier should be presumed to be on
official duty unless he is shown to have clearly and unequivocally put aside that status or condition
temporarily by, e.g., going on an approved vacation leave. 8 Even vacation leave may, it should be
remembered, be preterminated by superior orders.

More generally, a soldier in the Armed Forces must accept certain risks, for instance, that he will be
fired upon by forces hostile to the State or the Government. That is not, of course, the only ask that
he is compelled to accept by the very nature of his occupation or profession as a soldier. Most of the
persons around him are necessarily also members of the Armed Forces who carry firearms, too. In
other words, a soldier must also assume the risk of being accidentally fired upon by his fellow
soldiers. This is reasonably regarded as a hazard or risk inherent in his employment as a soldier.

We hold, therefore, that the death of Sgt. Hinoguin that resulted from his being hit by an accidental
discharge of the M-16 of Dft. Alibuyog, in the circumstances of this case, arose out of and in the
course of his employment as a soldier on active duty status in the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and hence compensable.

It may be well to add that what we have written above in respect of performance of official functions
of members of the Armed Forces must be understood in the context of the specific purpose at hand,
that is, the interpretation and application of the compensation provisions of the Labor Code and
applicable related regulations. It is commonplace that those provisions should, to the extent possible,
be given the interpretation most likely to effectuate the beneficient and humanitarian purposes
infusing the Labor Code.

ACCORDINGLY, the Decision of the GSIS taken through its Claim Review Committee dated 20
November 1986 and the Decision dated 24 May 1988 of the Employees' Compensation Commission in
ECC Case No. 3275, are hereby REVERSED and the GSIS is hereby DIRECTED to award all applicable

22