SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY

School of Law

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
(CASE DIGEST COMPILATION)

Submitted by:

CASTRO, JANELLE MARIE

DUMLING, ELIJAH JAN

ISISA, RODELIO
STA. MARIA, JERICHO LUIS

TABILIN, CHRISTIAN DELL

Course/Year/Block:
Juris Doctor – I (Block D)

Submitted to:

Atty. Jennifer Asuncion

Date:
December 15, 2019

Page 1
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

CASE TITLE PAGE

NUMBER
People v Silton
600 SCRA 476 8
Sabio v. Gordon
504 SCRA 704 (2006) 9
Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita
488 SCRA 1; 495 SCRA 170 11
Gudani v. Senga
495 SCRA 671 & 498 SCRA 671 14
Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers
564 SCRA 152 16
Balag v. Senate of the Philippines
G.R. No. 234608, July 3, 2018 19
Belgica, et. al. v. Honorable Executive Secretary Ochoa, et. al.
G.R. No. 208493, November 19, 2013 21
Araullo, et. al. v. Aquino III, et. al.
G.R. No. 209135, July 01, 2014 25
TESDA V. COA
G.R. No. 196418, February 10, 2015 29
COMELEC v. Judge Quijano-Padilla, et. al.
September 8, 2002 31
Mandanas v. Ochoa
July 3, 2018 33
Dela Cruz v. Ochoa
January 23, 2018 35
Tan v. Del Rosario
237 SCRA 324 38
Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corp.
548 SCRA 485 40
Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos
253 SCRA 559 42
Macalintal v. PET
G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010 43
Pimentel, Jr. v. Committee of Congress
to canvass votes for President and Vice President. 44
G.R. No. 163783, June 22, 2004
Estrada v. Macapal-Arroyo
G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001 45
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary
194 SCRA 317 46

Page 2
Funa v. Acting Secretary Alberto Agra 47
G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013
Republic v. Sandiganyan 48
G.R. No. 1522154, July 15, 2003
Senate v. Ermita 50
488 SCRA 1
Estrada v. Desierto 51
G.R. No. 146710-15, March 2, 2001
Gloria v. CA 52
G.R. No. 119903, August 15, 2000
Lagman v. Pimentel 53
February 6, 2018
Zabal v. President of the Philippines 54
February 12, 2019
National Artist for Literature Virgilio Almario v. The Executive Secretary 55
G.R. No. 189028, July 16, 2013
Banda v. Ermita 56
618 SCRA 488
In re: Appointment of Hon. M. Valenzuela 57
A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, November 9, 1998
Pimentel v. Ermita 58
G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005
De Castro v. JBC 59
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
Domingo v. Rayala 60
G.R. No. 155831, February 18, 2008
Drilon v. Lim 61
235 SCRA 135
Banda v. Executive Secretary Ermita 62
G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010
Pichay v. Office of the Deputy 63
Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs
G.R. No. 196425, July 24, 2012
DENR v. DENR Region XII Employees 64
G.R. No 149 724, August 19, 2003
Hontiveros-Baraquel v. Toll Regulatory Board 65
G.R. No. 181293, February 23, 2015
Datu Zaldy Ampatuan v. Hon. Pun 66
G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011
Biraogo v. The Phil. Truth Commission of 2010 67
637 SCRA 78
Kulayan v. Gov. Abdusakar Tan 68
675 SCRA 482 (2012)
Page 3
Gonzales v. Abaya 69
498 SCRA 445 (2006)
Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary 70
421 SCRA 656 (2004)
David vs. Arroyo 71
G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006
Lagman v. Executive Secretary 72
G.R. No. 231658
IBP v. Zamora 73
August 15, 2000
Lacson v. Perez 74
G.R. No. 14780, May 10, 2001
Lagman v. Pimentel 75
February 6, 2018
Lagman v. Medialdeia 76
February 19, 2019
Gonzales v. Narvasa 77
177 SCRA 668
Marcos v. Manglapus 78
177 SCRA 668
Borja v. COMELEC 79
295 SCRA 157
Petitioner Organizations v. Executive Secretary 80
669 SCRA 49
Villavert v. Desierto 81
G.R. No. 133715, February 13, 2000
Ifurung v. Ombudsman 82
April 24, 2018
Genuino v. De Lima 84
April 17, 2018
PHAPI v Medialdea 85
November 6, 2018
Chavez v. JBC 87
679 SCRA 579
De Castro v. JBC 88
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
Bengson v. Drilon, 89
208 SCRA 133
In re: Appointment of Mateo Valenzuela 90
298 SCRA 408
In re: Request for Creation of a Special Division 91
A.M. No. 02-1-09-SC
January 21, 2002
Page 4
Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College 92
G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014
Infant Julian Yusay Caram v. Segui 94
G.R. No. 193652, August 5, 2014
Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr., 96
requesting for exemption from payment of IPB dues
B.M. No. 1370, May 9, 2005
Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. 97
Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp.
605 SCRA 100
CJ Renato Corona v. Senate of the Philippines 99
G.R. No. 200242, July 17, 2012
Araullo v. Benigno Aquino III 101
G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014
CSC v. Moralde 103
August 15, 2018
Pagdangan v. Court of Appeals 104
September 5, 2018
Labay v. Sandiganbayan 105
July 23, 2018
Tan v. Barrios 106
190 SCRA 686
Gayo v. Verceles 107
452 SCRA
Re: 1989 Election of the IBP 108
178 SCRA 398
Republic of the Phils. v. Maria Lourdes Sereno 109
G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018
Fuentes v. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao 110
368 SCRA 36
People v. Gacott 112
246 SCRA 52
City Government of Tagaytay v. Guerrero 113
600 SCRA 33
Linkaichong v. COMELEC 114
594 SCRA 434
Malacora v. CA 115
117 SCRA 435
In re: Problems of Delays 116
in cases before the Sandiganbayan
A.M. No. 00-8-05-SC, November 8, 2001
Spouses Marcelo v. Judge Pichay 117
A.M. No. MTJ-13-1838, March 12, 2014
Page 5
Brillantes v. Yorac 118
192 SCRA 358
Funa v. The Chairman 119
COA, 670 SCRA 579
Funa v. CSC 120
G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014
Gaminde v. COA 121
G.R. No. 140335, December 13, 2000
PAGCOR v. CA. 123
202 SCRA 191
Casino Labor Association v. CA 125
554 SCRA 323
UP v. Regino 126
221 SCRA 598
DOH v. NLRC 127
251 SCRA 700
CSC v. CA 129
G.R. No. 185766,
November 23, 2010
Geronimo v. Ramos, 131
135 SCRA 435
BANAT Partylist v. COMELEC 132
595 SCRA 477
GMA v. COMELEC 133
G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014
SWS v. COMELEC 135
G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001
Dela Llana v. The Chairperson 137
COA, 665 SCRA 176
Yap v. COA 140
619 SCRA 154
Pacete v. Acting of the COA 142
185 SCRA 1
Albon v. Fernando 144
494 SCRA 141
Funa v. MECO 146
G.R. No. 193462, February 4, 2014
Nacion v. COA 147
G.R. No. 204757,
March 17, 2015
Corona v. Senate of the Philippines 148
G.R. No. 200242,
July 17, 2012
Page 6
Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice 150
G.R. No. 193459,
February 15, 2011
Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman 151
248 SCRA 566
Lastimosa v. Vasquez 152
243 SCRA 497
Disni v. Sandiganbayan, 154
G.R. No. 180564, June 22, 2010
University of San Agustin, Inc. v. CA, 155
230 SCRA 761
Ateneo De Manila v. Capulong 157
222 SCRA 644
University of San Carlos v. CA 158
166 SCRA 570
UP Board of Regents v. CA and Coline 159
G.R. No. 134625,
August 31 1999
Cudia v. PMA 161
G.R. No. 211362,
February 24, 2015

Page 7
 People v. Silton, 600 SCRA 476

Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J.

Facts:

Vagrancy pursuant toArt. 202 (2) were charged to Evangeline Siton and
Krystel Kate Sagarano in two separate Information. Accused were found
wande/ring and loiteringaround San Pedro and Legaspi Streets of Davao City,
without any visible means to support herself norlawful and justifiable purpose.

Respondents filed Motions to quash on the ground that Art. 202(2) is

unconstitutional for being vague and overboard. The municipal trial court denied
the motions because of the reason that law on vagrancy was enacted pursuant
to the state’s police power or the promotion of public welfare through restraining
and regulating by the use of liberty and property justified by the Latin maxim “salus
populiest suprema lex” (which calls for the subordination of individual benefit to
the interest of the greater number).
A petition for certiorari and prohibition with the RTC challenging the
constitutionality of the anti-vagrancy law and claiming that Art 202 (2) violated
the equal protection clause. the petition was granted.

Issue:

Does Article 202 (2), RPC on vagrancy violate the equal protection clause?

Ruling:
No. There is no violation of Article 202 (2) of the RPC or the equal protection
clause, neither does it discriminate against the poor and the unemployed.
Offenders of public order laws are punished not for their status, as for being poor
or unemployed, but for conducting themselves under such circumstances as to
endanger the public peace or cause alarm and apprehension in the community.
The reason of being poor or unemployed is not a license or a justification to act
or to engage in immoral conduct.

Page 8
 Sabio v. Gordon, 504 SCRA 704 (2006)

Ponente: Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.

Facts:

On February 28, 1986, former President Corazon C. Aquino installed her

regime by issuing Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1 creating the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG). She gave trust to Commission the
herculean task of recovering the ill-gotten wealth by the deposed President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family, relatives, subordinates and close associates.
Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 provides that:

No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or

produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding
concerning matters within its official cognizance.

The purpose is to ensure PCGG’s unhampered performance of its task. On

February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago presented Senate Res. No.
455 which states that:
Directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred
by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC),
Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and
PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties
in their operations by their respective Board of Directors.”

On May 8, 2006, Senator Richard Gordon invited Chairman Camilo Sabio

of the PCGG to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly
conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public
Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. Chairman Sabio declined the
invitation. At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 state that:

“No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or

produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding
concerning matters within its official cognizance.”

Page 9
Issue:
Is Section 4 of EO No. 1 constitutional?

Ruling:

No.
It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry gained solid existence
and expansive constr]ual. The Court’s regard to such power is extracted evidently
in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that “the power of inquiry is broad
enough to cover officials of the executive branch.” The Court reinforced the
doctrine in Arnault that “the operation of government, being a legitimate subject
for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation” and that “the power of inquiry
is co-extensive with the power to legislate”. Subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

Page 10
 Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita

488 SCRA 1; 495 SCRA 170

Ponente: Carpio Morales, J.:

Facts:

In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail

Project as well as the Garci tapes surfaced. The Senate to conduct a public
hearing to investigate the said on the overpricing in the NRP. Invitation where
issued by the investigating Senate committee to certain department heads and
military officials to speak before the committee. Ermita submitted that he and
some of the department heads cannot attend the said hearing due to matters
that needed immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga sent a similar letter.
Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said.
GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately. EO 464 prohibited
Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the
judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege,
Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other
officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive
privilege, Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief
superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief
of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege, Senior national security officials
who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the
executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined by the
President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first
securing the president’s approval.
The department heads and the military officers invoked EO 464 to except
themselves. The scheduled hearing still proceeded Despite EO 464 with only 2
military personnel attending. For defying President Arroyo’s order excepting
military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval,
Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and
were made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464’s constitutionality was
assailed for it is suspected that it infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to
conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the
implementation of laws.
Issue:

Is EO 464 constitutional?
Page 11
Ruling:

The SC ruled EO 464 is constitutional in some part. To determine the validity

of the provisions of EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section
22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The Congress’ power of inquiry is expressly
recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. But there is no provision
in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to
make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its
legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to
the legislative function as to be implied. The power of inquiry – with process to
enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.

A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of

information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect
or change and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite
information – which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who
do possess it.
on the other hand, Section 22 provides for the Question Hour. The
Question Hour is related with the legislative power, and it is as a complement to
or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. Appearance of the members of
Cabinet would be very essential not only in the application of check and
balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question
Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer to inquiries in aid of legislation where
anybody may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of
the House.

A distinction was made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the

question hour. The attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question
hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22,
therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not
be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically
relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of
which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other
pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to
obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function. The power of
Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21
and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation
of powers, while the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it
Page 12
cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its
demands for information. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only
way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim
of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department
heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power and that is
the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of
Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being
the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a
co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing
custom.

The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1,

limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For
under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department
heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot,
however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of
legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the
department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is
subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive
Secretary. Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are
implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not
as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such
department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty.
In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states
that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the
inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is ‘in aid of legislation’
under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in
Arnault.

Page 13
 Gudani v. Senga

498 SCRA 671 (2006)

Ponente: Tinga, J.:

Facts:

On September 22, 2005, Senator Rodolfo Biazon invited several senior

officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to appear at a public
hearing before the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security
scheduled on September 28, 2005. The hearing was scheduled after topics
concerning the conduct of the 2004 elections emerged on the allegations of
massive cheating and the surfacing of copies of an audio extract purportedly of
a phone conversation between President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and an
official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) supposed as then COMELEC
Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano. Brigadier General Francisco Gudani and
Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Balutan. They are both assigned to the Philippine
Military Academy as PMA Assistant Superintendent and Assistant Commandant
of Cadets, respectively, as well as AFP Chief of Staff Lieutenant General
Generoso Senga were among the AFP officers who received a letter of
invitation from Sen.
On the evening of September 27, 2005, a message was transmitted to the
PMA Superintendent from Gen. Senga stating that “Per instruction of Her
Excellency PGMA, No AFP personnel shall appear before any congressional or
senate hearing without her approval” and to inform Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col.
Balutan of the same. But the two were already en route to Manila from Baguio
and did not receive the message, still both were present at the hearing and
testified as to the conduct of the 2004 elections. The office of Gen. Senga issued
a statement noting that Gudani and Balutan had appeared before the Senate
Committee in spite of the fact that a guidance had been given that a
Presidential approval should be sought prior to such an appearance that such
directive was in keeping with the time-honored principle of the Chain of
Command; and that the two officers disobeyed a legal order, in violation of
Articles of War 65 (Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer) such that the two will be
subjected to General Court Martial proceedings and were likewise relieved of
their assignments. The Office of the Provost Marshal General (OPMG)
recommended that petitioners be charged with violation of Article of

Page 14
Issue:

Does the President have the authority to issue an order to the members of
the AFP preventing them from testifying before a legislative inquiry?

Ruling:

Yes. The vitality of the tenet that the President is the commander-in-chief
of the Armed Forces is most crucial to the democratic way of life, to civilian
supremacy over the military, and to the general stability of our representation
system of government. The Constitution reposes final authority, control and
supervision of the AFP to the President, a civilian who is not a member of the
armed forces, and whose duties as commander-in-chief represent only a part of
the organic duties imposed upon the office, the other functions being clearly
civil in nature.

Civilian supremacy over the military also countermands the notion that
the military may bypass civilian authorities, such as civil courts, on matters such
as conducting warrantless searches and seizures. The commander-in-chief
provision in the Constitution is denominated as Section 18, Article VII, which
begins with the simple declaration that the President shall be the Commander
in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines. Outside explicit constitutional
limitations, the commander-in-chief clause vests on the President, as
commander-in-chief, absolute authority over the persons and actions of the
members of the armed forces. Such authority includes the ability of the President
to restrict the travel, movement and speech of military officers, activities which
may otherwise be sanctioned under civilian law.

Page 15
 Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers

564 SCRA 152

Ponente: De Castro, J.

Facts:
On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication
(DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications
Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National
Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290
(approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the
People’s Republic of China. The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the
NBN deal. In the September

18, 2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive
officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of
the NBN Project by the NEDA. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify
before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was
interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC
tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project.
He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt
and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed
further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to
answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the
questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,

(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and

(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.

He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the
senate averring that the communications between GMA and Neri are privileged
and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was
cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and
detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.

Page 16
Issue:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions

covered by executive privilege?

Ruling:
The communications are covered by executive privilege. The revocation
of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by
the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the
case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of
legislation.), does not in any way diminish the concept of executive privilege.
This is because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings. The claim of
executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry
relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such
as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President
is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and
diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the
information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than
others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential
communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and
nondelegable presidential power.”

2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a

close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is
that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the President.

3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege

that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the
information sought “likely contains important evidence” and by the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.

In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive
privilege on the ground that the communications elicited by the three (3)

Page 17
questions “fall under conversation and correspondence between the President
and public officials” necessary in “her executive and policy decisionmaking
process” and, that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair our
diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.”
Simply put, the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive
privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations. Using the above
elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the
three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege.
First, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power”
of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other
countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements
without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in
Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are “received” by a
close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner
can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s
cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that
would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner’s

claim of executive privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of
the people to information on matters of public concern might have agreed with
such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all. But petitioner
made himself available to them during the September 26 hearing, where he
was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested his
willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the exception only
of those covered by his claim of executive privilege. The right to public
information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III
provides:

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall

be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.

Page 18
 Balag v. Senate of the Philippines

G.R. No. 234608, July 3, 2018

Ponente: Gesmundo, J.:

Facts:
This is case about petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer of an
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
seeking to annul, set aside and enjoin implementation of the Senate P.S.
Resolution No. 504 and October 18, 2017 order of complaint by the Senate
committee on Public order and dangerous drugs filed by Arvin R. Balag –
petitioner, against the Senate of the Philippines, et. al. respondent. In September
17, 2017, a first-year law student from the University of Santo Tomas named
1oracio (Castillo 22, allegedly died due to hazing related activities. According to
Sen. Grace Poe, the petitioner’s signature appeared on the document for the
application of the Aegis Juris Fraternity in the organizational sheet submitted in
the school administration and it was indicated therein that

The petitioner was the President, yet he still refuses to answer the simple
Question asked. The petitioner was then cited in contempt and was ordered to
place in detention under the Senate Sergeant at Arms supervision after the
senate hearing. Sen. Panfilo Lacson gave the petitioner a chance to purge out
of contempt, however, the petitioner still refused to answer and invoked his right
to self-incrimination. Then the petitioner was asked of the question of whose
decision it was to bring the victim to the hospital, the petitioner submitted a plea
to lift his contempt and stated that he was a member of the Aegis Juris
Fraternity, however, he does not know who the president was because he was
enrolled at another university at the time of the incident. The question asked
before his plea was again repeated and the petitioner invoked again his right to
self-incrimination

Issue:

Did the Senate Committee acted in grave abuse of discretion in

conducting a legislative inquiry?

Page 19
Ruling:
YES. However, the court denied the petition for being moot and
academic. 2n the present case, the court finds that there is no more justiciable
controversy to be decided up since in its resolution dated).

December 12, 2017, the court ordered in the interim the immediate
release of petitioner pending resolution of the instant petition. Petitioner was no
longer detained under the Senates authority. However, the court still resolved
the case despite being moot and academic. The court ruled that the period of
imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt of the Senate during
inquiries in aid of legislation should only last until the termination of the legislative
inquiry. The court stated that the interests of the Senate and the witnesses
appearing in its legislative in7uiry should be balanced. The Senate can
continuously and effectively exercise its power of contempt during the
legislative inquiry against recalcitrant witnesses, even during recess. Such power
can be exercised by the Senate immediately when the witness performs a
contemptuous act, subject to its own rules and the constitutional rights of the
said witness. During recess, the Senate will be presented from effectively
conducting legislative hearings. But the Senate may still exercise its power of
contempt during legislative hearings while on recess provided that the period of
imprisonment shall only last until the termination of the legislative injury upon the
approval or disapproval of the committee Report. Thus, the Senates inherent
power of contempt is still potent and compelling even during its recess. At the
same time, the rights of the persons appearing are respected because their
detention shall not be indefinite.

Page 20
 Belgica, et. al. v. Honorable Executive Secretary Ochoa, et. al.

G.R. No. 208493, November 19, 2013

Ponente: Perlas-Bernabe, J.

Facts:
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since
about 1922. Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds
of the members of the Congress. It underwent several legal designations from
“Congressional Pork Barrel” to the latest “Priority Development Assistance Fund”
or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the annual General
Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following
manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to – P40
million for “hard projects” (infrastructure projects like roads, buildings,
schools, etc.), and P30 million for “soft projects” (scholarship grants,
medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to – P100 million for hard
projects, P100 million for soft projects;

c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to – P100 million for
hard projects, P100 million for soft projects. The PDAF articles in the GAA
do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet members
may request for the realignment of funds into their department provided
that the request for realignment is approved or concurred by the
legislator concerned.

Presidential Pork Barrel The president does have his own source of fund albeit
not included in the GAA. The so-called presidential pork barrel comes from two
sources:
(a) the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project – this has
been around since 1976, and
(b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the earnings of
PAGCOR – this has been around since about 1983.
Page 21
 Pork Barrel Scam Controversy Ever since, the pork barrel system has been
besieged by allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers, headed
by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork
barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been
helping lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus
NGO’s (non-government organizations) which would make it appear that
government funds are being used in legit existing projects but are in fact going
to “ghost” projects. An audit was then conducted by the Commission on Audit
and the results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al. Motivated by the
foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the
Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.

Issues:
I. Is the congressional pork barrel system constitutional?

II. Is Whether or not presidential pork barrel system constitutional?

Ruling:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is
unconstitutional because it violates the following principles:

a.) Separation of Powers As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It

regulates the release of funds (power of the purse). The executive, on the
other hand, implements the laws – this includes the GAA to which the
PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may implement the law but under
the pork barrel system, what’s happening was that, after the GAA, itself a
law, was enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as to which projects
their PDAF funds should be allocated to – a clear act of implementing the
law they enacted – a violation of the principle of separation of powers.
(Note in the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork
barrel, then called as CDF or the Countrywide Development Fund, was
constitutional insofar as the legislators only recommend where their pork
barrel funds go). This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the
PDAF, the executive will still have to get the concurrence of the legislator
concerned.
b.) Non-delegability of Legislative Power As a rule, the Constitution vests
legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant the
people legislative power but only insofar as the processes of referendum
Page 22
and initiative are concerned). That being, legislative power cannot be
delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate further that which was
delegated to it by the Constitution. Exceptions to the rule are:

(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but

this shall involve purely local matters;

(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers

necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy
in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within
specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions
as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government.

In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to
identify the projects to which his PDAF money should go to is a violation of
the rule on non delegability of legislative power. The power to appropriate
funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it)
collectively and not lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in
the exceptions does it state that the Congress can delegate the power to
the individual member of Congress.
c.) Principle of Checks and Balances One feature in the principle of
checks and balances is the power of the president to veto items in the
GAA which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already
being undermined because of the fact that once the GAA is approved,
the legislator can now identify the project to which he will appropriate his
PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto the appropriation
made by the legislator if the appropriation is made after the approval of
the GAA – again, “Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which
effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President
useless.”
d.) Local Autonomy As a rule, the local governments have the power to
manage their local affairs. Through their Local Development Councils
(LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies
concerning their localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of
the members of the house of representatives, what’s happening is that a
congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC and

Page 23
 later on claim it as his own. This is an instance where the national
government (note, a congressman is a national officer) meddles with the
affairs of the local government – and this is contrary to the State policy
embodied in the Constitution on local autonomy. It’s good if that’s all that
is happening under the pork barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes
more of a personal fund on the part of legislators.

II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid. The main issue raised by Belgica
et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional because it
violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides:

No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an

appropriation made by law. Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork
comes from the earnings of the Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any
appropriation from a particular legislation. The Supreme Court disagrees as it
ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as
amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided for the
appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others,
collected from certain energy-related ventures shall form part of a special
fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy
resource development and for other purposes which the President may
direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of
PAGCOR’s earnings shall be allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential
Social Fund) which shall be used in government infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article
VI of the Constitution. The appropriation contemplated therein does not
have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general
appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.

Page 24
 Araullo, et. al. v. Aquino III, et. al.

G.R. No. 209135, July 01, 2014

Ponente: Bersamin, J.:

Facts:
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed
the sluggish growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy
needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad then came
up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP). The
DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects.
DAP enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority
projects instead of waiting for next year’s appropriation. So what happens under
the DAP was that if a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by
a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the
Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as “savings” by the
Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other priority projects. The
DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in
fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted
by the Supreme Court).

Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the
General Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby
appropriations made by Congress in the GAA. Meanwhile, in September 2013,
Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé claiming that he, and other Senators,
received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the
impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed
that the money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of
the Senators. This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP
does not only realign funds within the Executive. It turns out that some non-
Executive projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA
(Cordillera People’s Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National
Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators
each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc. This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo,
Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several other

Page 25
concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning
the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions was:

DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which

provides that “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”

Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly
the GAA (savings and augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the
Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive
Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and authority to use
savings, respectively).

Issues:
I. Does the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art.
VI, Constitution)?
II. Can the DAP realignments be considered as impoundments by the
executive?

III. Are the DAP realignments/transfers constitutional?

IV. Is the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP Constitutional?

V. Is the Doctrine of Operative Fact applicable?

Ruling:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP
was merely a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an
appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As such, it did
not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the
Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury
otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds,
which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned
via the DAP.

Page 26
 II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of
funds refers to the President’s power to refuse to spend appropriations or to
retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually
prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national
government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, there’s no
impoundment in the case at bar because what’s involved in the DAP was the
transfer of funds.

III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true
that the President (and even the heads of the other branches of the
government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds,
however, such transfer or realignment should only be made “within their
respective offices”. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be
allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by
the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other
non-Executive agencies. Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also
contemplate realignment of funds to an existing project in the GAA. Under the
DAP, even though some projects were within the Executive, these projects are
non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were
appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be
legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were not
provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional
and is without legal basis.

On the issue of what are “savings” These DAP transfers are not “savings”
contrary to what was being declared by the Executive. Under the definition of
“savings” in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when there is
an excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally
discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to “savings” as
funds withdrawn from a slow-moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition
of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the
transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year.
But under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain projects in
the middle of the year and then being declared as “savings” by the Executive
particularly by the DBM.

IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money
source for the DAP because under the law, such funds may only be used if there
is a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue
Page 27
collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such
certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were used.

V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects
of an act prior to it being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is
applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has funded
numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the
DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer
be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return what they
received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the
Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors, implementers,
and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil,
criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.

Page 28
 TESDA V. COA

G.R. No. 196418, February 10, 2015

Ponente: Tijam

Facts:
The TESDA audit team discovered that for the calendar years 2004-2007,
TESDA paid Extraordinary and Miscellaneous Expenses (EME) twice each year to
its officials from two sources: (1) the General Fund for locally-funded projects
and (2) the Technical Education and Skills Development Project (TESDP) Fund for
foreign-assisted projects. Payment of EME was authorized under the General
Provisions of the 2004-2007 General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) subject to
certain conditions. TESDA argued further that the General Fund and the TESDP
Fund are distinct from each other, and TESDA officials designated as project
officers concurrently with their regular functions were entitled to separate EME
from both funds. The COA denied the appeal for lack of merit prompting TESDA,
through its Director-General to file a petition for review with COA. The same was
denied. The COA ruled that failure of TESDA officials to conform to the 2004-2007
GAAs negated their claim of good faith. Hence this petition for certiorari with
prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction
to annul COA decision.

Issue:

1.) Did the COA properly disallow the payment of excessive EMETESDA?
2.) Should the TESDA officials refund the excess EME granted to them?

Ruling:
"No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law." COA did not act with grave abuse of discretion
when it disallowed the disbursement of EME to TESDA officials for being excessive
and unauthorized by law. Provisions in the GAA are clear in stating that the EME
shall not exceed the amount fixed therein. Those entitled to claim EME not
exceeding the amount provided in the GAA are as follows: (1) the officials
named in the GAA, (2) the officers of equivalent rank as may be authorized by

Page 29
the DBM, (3) and the offices under them. However, TESDA had a different
interpretation of the law. It contends that there was no prohibition under the
2004-2007 GAAs regarding the additional EME chargeable against TESDP Fund.
This argument deserves scant consideration. It is worth noting that TESDA, an
instrumentality of the government established under the TESDA Act of 1994, is
accorded with budget for its implementation which is included in its annual
GAA.

The TESDP Fund, which is being sourced from the Treasury, belongs to the
government. The Constitution provides that, o money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.No law was
pointed out by TESDA authorizing it to grant additional reimbursement for EME
from the TESDP Fund, contrary to the explicit requirement in the Constitution and
the law.

Page 30
 COMELEC v. Judge Quijano-Padilla, et. al.,

G. R. No. 151992, September 18, 2002

Ponente: Sandoval-guiterrez, J.

Facts:
In 1996, the Philippine Congress passed Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise
known as the "Voter's Registration Act of 1996," providing for the modernization
and computerization of the voters' registration list and the appropriate of funds
therefor "in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent and updated list of
voters. "Pursuant thereto, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) promulgated
Resolution No. 00-0315[5]approving in principle the Voter's Registration and

Identification System Project (VRIS) Project for brevity). The VRIS Project
envisions a computerized database system for the May 2004 Elections. The idea
is to have a national registration of voters whereby each registrant's fingerprints
will be digitally entered into the system and upon completion of registration,
compared and matched with other entries to eliminate double entries. A
tamper-proof and counterfeit-resistant voter's identification card will then be
issues to each registrant as a visual record of the registration. On September 9,
1999, the COMELEC issued invitations to pre-qualify and bid for the supply and
installations of information technology equipment and ancillary services for its
VRIS Project. Private respondent Photokina Marketing Corporation (PHOTOKINA)
pre-qualified and was allowed to participate as one of the bidders.

Issue:

Is a petition for mandamus the appropriate remedy to enforce

contractual obligations?

Ruling:

No, rule of law is better settled than that mandamus does not lie to
enforce the performance of contractual obligations. The writ of mandamus has
never been considered as an appropriate remedy for the enforcement of

Page 31
contract rights of a private and personal nature and obligations which rest
wholly upon contract and which involve no questions of public trusts or official
duty. It never lies where the party aggrieved has adequate remedy at law, and
its aid is only to be invoked to prevent an absolute failure of justice in cases
where ordinary legal processes furnish no relief.” PHOTOKINA sought to enforce
therein are its rights under the accepted bid proposal. Its petition alleged that
notwithstanding the COMELEC’s issuance of a Notice of Award and its
(PHOTOKINA’s) subsequent acceptance, the COMELEC still refused to formalize
the contract. As a relief, PHOTOKINA prayed that after trial, petitioners be
directed “to review and finalize the formal contract” and to “implement the
VRIS Project. Petitioners, on their part, specifically denied the existence of a
perfected contract and asserted that even if there was one, the same is null
and void for lack of proper appropriation.

Page 32
 Mandanas v. Ochoa

G.R. No. 199802, July 3, 2018

Ponente: Bersamin, J

Facts:
One of the key features of the 1987 Constitution is its push towards
decentralization of government and local autonomy. Local autonomy has two
facets, the administrative and the fiscal. Implementing the constitutional
mandate for decentralization and local autonomy, Congress enacted Republic
Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code (LGC). The share
of the LGUs, heretofore known as the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA), has
been regularly released to the LGUs. According to the implementing rules and
regulations of the LGC, the IRA is determined on the basis of the actual
collections of the National Internal Revenue Taxes (NIRTs) as certified by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).

Mandanas, et al. allege herein that certain collections of NIR Ts by the

Bureau of Customs (BOC) - specifically: excise taxes, value added taxes (VATs)
and documentary stamp taxes (DSTs) - have not been included in the base
amounts for the computation of the IRA; that such taxes, albeit collected by the
BOC, should form part of the base from which the IRA should be computed
because they constituted NIRTs; that, consequently, the release of the
additional amount of ₱60,750,000,000.00 to the LGUs as their IRA for FY 2012
should be ordered; and that for the same reason the LGUs should also be
released their unpaid IRA for FY 1992 to FY 2011, inclusive, totaling
₱438,103,906,675.73.

Issue:
Is Section 284 of the LGC unconstitutional for being repugnant to Section
6, Article X of the 1987 Constitution?

Page 33
Ruling:

1. There is no issue as to what constitutes the LGUs' just share expressed in

percentages of the national taxes. Yet, Section 6, supra, mentions national taxes
as the source of the just share of the LGUs while Section 284 ordains that the
share of the LG Us be taken from national internal revenue taxes instead.

Although the power of Congress to make laws is plenary in nature,

congressional lawmaking remains subject to the limitations stated in the 1987
Constitution. The phrase national internal revenue taxes engrafted in Section 284
is undoubtedly more restrictive than the term national taxes written in Section 6.
As such, Congress has actually departed from the letter of the 1987 Constitution
stating that national taxes should be the base from which the just share of the
LGU comes. Such departure is impermissible. Verba legis non est recedendum
(from the words of a statute there should be no departure). Equally
impermissible is that Congress has also thereby curtailed the guarantee of fiscal
autonomy in favor of the LGUs under the 1987 Constitution. Although it has the
primary discretion to determine and fix the just share of the LGUs in the national
taxes (e.g., Section 284 of the LGC), Congress cannot disobey the express
mandate of Section 6, Article X of the 1987 Constitution for the just share of the
LGUs to be derived from the national taxes. To read Section 6 differently as
requiring that the just share of LGUs in the national taxes shall be determined by
law is tantamount to the unauthorized revision of the 1987 Constitution.

Page 34
 Dela Cruz v. Ochoa

GR No. 219683, January 23, 2018

Ponente: Bersamin, J

Facts:

The Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) is the

primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating,
and administrative entity of the Executive Branch of the government in the
promotion, development and regulation of dependable and coordinated
networks of transportation and communications systems as well as in the fast,
safe, efficient, and reliable postal, transportation and communication services.
One of its line agencies is the Land Transportation Office (LTO) which is tasked,
among others, to register motor vehicles and regulate their operation. In
accordance with its mandate, the LTO is required to issue motor vehicle license
plates which serve to identify the registered vehicles as they ply the roads.

Recently, the LTO formulated the Motor Vehicle License Plate

Standardization Program (MVPSP) to supply the new license plates for both old
and new vehicle registrants. On February 25, 2013, the DOTC Bids and Awards
Committee (BAC) issued BAC General Bid Bulletin No. 002-2013 setting the
Submission and Opening of Bids on March 25, 2013. On February 28, 2013, the
first Pre-Bid Conference was held at the offices of the BAC. On July 22, 2013, the
DOTC issued the Notice of Award to JKG-Power Plates. Despite the notice of
award, the contract signing of the project was not immediately undertaken. On
February 17, 2014, the DOTC issued the Notice to Proceed to JKG-Power Plates
and directed it to commence delivery of the items within seven (7) calendar
days from the date of the issuance of the said notice.

On February 21, 2014, the contract for MVPSP was finally signed. On
March 11, 2014, the Senate Committee on Public Services, pursuant to
Resolution No. 31, conducted an inquiry in aid of legislation on the reported
delays in the release of motor vehicle license plates, stickers and tags by the
LTO. On April 4, 2014, The Commission on Audit (COA) issued three Audit
Observation Memoranda (AOM) to the LTO, namely: AOM No. 14-013 dated
September 2, 2014; AOM No. 14-014 dated November 17, 2014; and AOM No.
15-004 dated March 5, 2015. The COA later on issued Notice of Suspension No.
Page 35
15- 002-101-(14) dated April 10, 2015. On September 1, 2015, the petitioners
instituted this special civil action. The petitioners herein do not seek the review of
the COA's issuance of Notice of Disallowance No. 2015001-101-(14). They only
assail the constitutionality of the implementation of the MVPSP using funds
appropriated under the 2014 GAA.

Issue:
Is the use of the appropriation under 2014 GAA for the implementation of
the MVPSP was constitutional?

Ruling:

The implementation of thee MVPSP was properly funded under the

appropriation for Motor Vehicle Registration and Driver's Licensing Regulatory
Services in the 2014 GAA; hence, no unconstitutionally transfer of funds took
place The Court holds that the appropriation for motor vehicle registration
naturally and logically included plate-making inasmuch as plate-making was an
integral component of the registration process. Plate-making ensured that the
LTO fulfilled its function to "aid law enforcement and improve the motor vehicle
registration database. Although the Details of the FY 2014 Budget seemed to
present a discrepancy from the main text of the 2014 GAA given that the total
allotment indicated for the MF02 was only ₱2,354,153,000, and a separate
allocation of ₱1,527,556,000 appeared for Motor vehicle registration system, the
discrepancy can be easily clarified by referring to the 2014 NEP, and the letter of
respondent former DOTC Secretary Joseph Emilio Aguinaldo Abaya.

The proposed budget for the MF02 stated in the 2014 NEP, which was only
₱2,354,653,000.00, would be inadequate to fund the implementation of the
MVPSP. Thus, on September 1, 2013, respondent Secretary Abaya wrote to DBM
Secretary Florencio B. Abad to request the modification of the 2014 NEP by way
of a realignment to increase the MF02 budget by ₱2,489,600,100.00 for the LTO
Plate Standardization Program. That Congress approved the request for the
₱2,489,600,100.00 increase was indubitable. This is borne out by the fact that the
final amount appropriated for MF02 under the 2014 GAA aggregated to
₱4,843,753,000.00 (i.e., ₱2,489,600, 100.00+₱2,354,153,000.00). We can see that
such final increased amount was almost exactly identical to the total appearing

Page 36
in Details of the FY 2014 Budget. Indeed, the legislative intent to fund the MVPSP
under the 2014 GAA was manifest. Considering that Congress appropriated
₱4,843, 753,000.00 for the MF02 (inclusive of the requested increase of
₱2,489,600,100.00) for the purpose of funding the LTO's MVPSP, the inescapable
conclusion is that the 2014 GAA itself contained the direct appropriation
necessary to implement the MVPSP. Under the circumstances, there was no
unconstitutional transfer of funds because no transfer of funds was made to
augment the item Motor Vehicle Registration and Driver's Licensing Regulatory
Services to include the funding for the MVPSP.

Page 37
 Tan v. Del Rosario,

237 SCRA 324

Ponente: Vitug:

Facts:

Two consolidated cases assail the validity of RA 7496 or the Simplified Net
Income Taxation Scheme ("SNIT"), which amended certain provisions of the
NIRC, as well as the Rules and Regulations promulgated by public respondents
pursuant to said law. Petitioners posit that RA 7496 is unconstitutional as it
allegedly violates the following provisions of the Constitution:

Article VI, Section 26(1) — Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
Article VI, Section 28(1) — The rule of taxation shall be uniform and
equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
Article III, Section 1 — No person shall be deprived of property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws.

Petitioners contended that public respondents exceeded their rule-

making authority in applying SNIT to general professional partnerships. Petitioner
contends that the title of HB 34314, progenitor of RA 7496, is deficient for being
merely entitled, "Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme for the Self Employed
and Professionals Engaged in the Practice of their Profession" (Petition in G.R. No.
109289) when the full text of the title actually reads, 'An Act Adopting the
Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme For The Self-Employed and Professionals
Engaged In The Practice of Their Profession, Amending Sections 21 and 29 of the
National Internal Revenue Code,' as amended. Petitioners also contend it
violated due process.

Issue:

Does the tax law is unconstitutional for violating due process?

Page 38
Ruling:

NO. The due process clause may correctly be invoked only when there is
a clear contravention of inherent or constitutional limitations in the exercise of
the tax power. No such transgression is so evident in herein case. Uniformity of
taxation, like the concept of equal protection, merely requires that all subjects
or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike both in privileges
and liabilities. Uniformity does not violate classification as long as:

(1) the standards that are used therefor are substantial and not arbitrary,
(2) the categorization is germane to achieve the legislative purpose,

(3) the law applies, all things being equal, to both present and future
conditions, and

(4) the classification applies equally well to all those belonging to the
same class.

What is apparent from the amendatory law is the legislative intent to

increasingly shift the income tax system towards the schedular approach in the
income taxation of individual taxpayers and to maintain, by and large, the
present global treatment on taxable corporations. The Court does not view this
classification to be arbitrary and inappropriate.

Page 39
 Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corp.,

548 SCRA 485

Ponente: Reyes:

Facts:
President Ferdinand Marcos, exercising his legislative powers, issued LOI
No. 1465 which provided, among others, for the imposition of a capital recovery
component (CRC) on the domestic sale of all grades of fertilizers which resulted
in having Fertiphil paying P 10/bag sold to the Fertilizer and Perticide Authority
(FPA). FPA remits its collection to Far East Bank and Trust Company who applies
to the payment of corporate debts of Planters Products Inc. (PPI) After the Edsa
Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the P10 levy. Upon return of
democracy, Fertiphil demanded a refund but PPI refused. Fertiphil filed a
complaint for collection and damages against FPA and PPI with the RTC on the
ground that LOI No. 1465 is unjust, unreasonable oppressive, invalid and unlawful
resulting to denial of due process of law. FPA answered that it is a valid exercise
of the police power of the state in ensuring the stability of the fertilizing industry
in the country and that Fertiphil did NOT sustain damages since the burden
imposed fell on the ultimate consumers. RTC and CA favored Fertiphil holding
that it is an exercise of the power of taxation ad is as such because it is NOT for
public purpose as PPI is a private corporation.

Issue:

Does Fertiphil has locus standi?

Ruling:
Yes. In private suits, locus standi requires a litigant to be a "real party in
interest" or party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit. In public suits, there is the right of the ordinary citizen to petition the courts to
be freed from unlawful government intrusion and illegal official action subject to
the direct injury test or where there must be personal and substantial interest in
the case such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result. Being a
mere procedural technicality, it has also been held that locus standi may be

Page 40
waived in the public interest such as cases of transcendental importance or with
far-reaching implications whether private or public suit, Fertiphil has locus standi.
As a seller, it bore the ultimate burden of paying the levy which made its
products more expensive and harm its business. It is also of paramount public
importance since it involves the constitutionality of a tax law and use of taxes for
public purpose.

Yes. Police power and the power of taxation are inherent powers of the
state but distinct and have different tests for validity. Police power is the power
of the state to enact the legislation that may interfere with personal liberty on
property in order to promote general welfare. While, the power of taxation is the
power to levy taxes as to be used for public purpose. The main purpose of
police power is the regulation of a behavior or conduct, while taxation is
revenue generation. The lawful subjects and lawful means tests are used to
determine the validity of a law enacted under the police power. The power of
taxation, on the other hand, is circumscribed by inherent and constitutional
limitations.

Page 41
 Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos

253 SCRA 559

Facts:
The protestant lost in the May 1992 Election. In her Motion of 16 August
1995, reiterated in her Comment of 29 August 1995, Protestant Defensor
Santiago prayed that the revision in the remaining precincts of the pilot areas
be dispensed with and the revision process in the pilot areas be deemed
computed. The Court deferred action on the motion and required, instead, the
protestant and protestee to submit their respective memoranda. Hence, this
petition.

Issue:

Is the election protest filed by Santiago moot and academic by her

election as a Senator in the May 1995 election and her assumption of office as
such on June 30, 1995?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in the Affirmative. The Court held that the
election protest filed by Santiago has been abandoned or considered
withdrawn as a consequence of her election and assumption of office as
Senator and her discharge of the duties and functions thereof. The protestant
abandoned her “determination to protest and pursue the public interest
involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate. Moreover, the
dismissal of this protest would serve public interest as it would dissipate the aura
of uncertainty as to the results of the 1992 presidential elections, thereby
enhancing the all – too crucial political stability of the nation during this period
of national recovery.

Page 42
 Macalintal v. PET, G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010

Ponente: Nachura

Facts:

Par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: “The Supreme Court,
sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose.” Sec 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides:
The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall
not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative
functions. The case at bar is a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of
the SC’s decision dismissing the former’s petition and declaring the
establishment of the respondent PET as constitutional. Petitioner argues that PET
is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution does not
provide for the creation of the PET, and it violates Sec 12, Art VIII of the
Constitution. The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on
firm footing on the basis of the grant of authority to the Supreme Court to be the
sole judge of all election contests for the President or Vice-President under par 7,
Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution.

Issue:
1.) Is PET constitutional?
2.) Does PET exercises quasi-judicial power?

Ruling:

1.) Yes. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional

Commission to a Presidential Electoral Tribunal, with Fr. Joaquin Bernas
categorically declaring that in crafting the last paragraph of Sec. 4, Art VII of the
1987 Constitution, they “constitutionalized what was statutory.” Judicial power
granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary. And under
the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by
the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide
presidential and vice-presidential elections contests includes the means
necessary to carry it into effect.
Page 43
 2.) No. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution which provides that the power “shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.” The set
up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterize the resolution of
electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power. When the
Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election
contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power. The COMELEC, HRET and
SET are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of
law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which
involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power, because of the explicit
constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the
COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral
Tribunals) of the Constitution.

Page 44
 Pimentel, Jr. v. Joint Committee of Congress

G.R. No. 163783, June 22, 2004

Ponente: J. Puno:

Facts:

Senator Pimentel Jr. seeks to declare null and void the continued
existence of the Joint Committee and prohibit it with its continuous action. He
claims that with the adjournment on June 11, 2004 by the 12 th Congress of its last
regular session, its legal existence has ended thus all pending matters and
proceedings end upon the expiration of the Congress.

Issue:

Will Senator Pimentel’s action prosper?

Ruling:
NO. Petitioner's claim that his arguments are buttressed by legislative
procedure, precedent or practice as borne out by the rules of both Houses of
Congress is directly contradicted by Section 42 of Rule XIV of the Rules adopted
by the Senate, of which he is an incumbent member. This section clearly
provides that the Senate shall convene in joint session during any voluntary or
compulsory recess to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President not
later than thirty days after the day of the elections in accordance with Section
4, Article VII of the Constitution. Moreover, as pointed out in the Comment filed
by the Senate Panel for respondent Joint Committee and that of the Office of
the Solicitor General, the precedents set by the 1992 and 1998 Presidential
Elections do not support the move to stop the ongoing canvassing by the Joint
Committee, they citing the observations of former Senate President Jovito
Salonga. Thus, during the 1992 Presidential elections, both Houses of Congress
adjourned sine die on May 25, 1992.

On June 16, 1992, the Joint Committee finished tallying the votes for
President and Vice-President. Thereafter, on June 22, 1992, the Eighth Congress
convened in joint public session as the National Board of Canvassers, and on
even date proclaimed Fidel V. Ramos and Joseph Ejercito Estrada as President
Page 45
and VicePresident, respectively. Upon the other hand, during the 1998
Presidential elections, both Houses of Congress adjourned sine die on May 25,
1998. The Joint Committee completed the counting of the votes for President
and VicePresident on May 27, 1998. The Tenth Congress then convened in joint
public session on May 29, 1998 as the National Board of Canvassers and
proclaimed Joseph Ejercito Estrada as President and Gloria MacapagalArroyo
as President and Vice-President, respectively.

Page 46
 Estrada v. Macapal-Arroyo

G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001

Ponente: J, Puno:

Facts:

In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis “Chavit” Singson, a close friend
of the President, alleged that he had personally given Estrada money as payoff
from jueteng hidden in a bank account known as “Jose Velarde” – a grass
roots-based numbers game. Singson’s allegation also caused controversy across
the nation, which culminated in the House of Representatives’ filing of an
impeachment case against Estrada on November 13, 2000.

House Speaker Manny Villar fast-tracked the impeachment complaint.

The impeachment suit was brought to the Senate and an impeachment court
was formed, with Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding officer. Estrada,
pleaded “not guilty”. The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. On
January 18, a crowd continued to grow at EDSA, bolstered by students from
private schools and left-wing organizations. Activists from the group Bayan and
Akbayan as well as lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other bar
associations joined in the thousands of protesters. On January 19, The Philippine
National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines also withdrew their
support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.

Issue:
Is the case at bar a political or justiciable issue?

Ruling:

The Court defines a political issue as “those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative
or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.” The Court made a
distinction between the Aquino presidency and the Arroyo presidency. The
Court said that while the Aquino government was a government spawned by
Page 47
the direct demand of the people in defiance to the 1973 Constitution,
overthrowing the old government entirely, the Arroyo government on the other
hand was a government exercising under the 1987 constitution, wherein only the
office of the president was affected.

In the former, it the question of whether the previous president (president

Estrada) truly resigned subjects it to judicial review. The Court held that the issue
is legal and not political. For the president to be deemed as having resigned,
there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment. It is important to follow the succession of events that struck
petitioner prior his leaving the palace. Furthermore, the quoted statements
extracted from the Angara diaries, detailed Estrada’s implied resignation On top
of all these, the press release he issued regarding is acknowledgement of the
oath-taking of Arroyo as president despite his questioning of its legality and his
emphasis on leaving the presidential seat for the sake of peace. The Court held
that petitioner Estrada had resigned by the use of the totality test: prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a
material relevance on the issue.

Page 48
 Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary

194 SCRA 317

Ponente: Fernan, C.J.:

Facts:

In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No.
284 which allowed members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant
secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their
primary positions subject to limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU)
assailed this EO averring that such law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of
EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the principal submission that it adds
exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution which provides:
“Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet,
and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure.
They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other
profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of
their office.”

CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution“, the only exceptions against holding any other office or
employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (i)
The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3,
par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the
Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.

Issue:

Is EO 284 constitutional?

Page 49
Ruling:

No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to

prohibit the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or
assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the
government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as
above clarified with respect to posts held without additional compensation in
an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary
functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers)
as examples during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down
for all appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which
cannot override the constitution’s manifest intent and the people’s
understanding thereof.

In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7,
par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly
restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or
assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more
than 2 positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284
actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct
contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution
prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987
Constitution itself.

Page 50
 Funa v. Acting Secretary Alberto Agra

G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013

Ponente: Bersamin

Facts:

The petitioner alleges that on March 1, 2010, President Gloria M.

Macapagal Arroyo appointed Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice following
the resignation of Secretary Agnes VST Devanadera in order to vie for a
congressional seat in Quezon Province; that on March 5, 2010, President Arroyo
designated Agra as the Acting Solicitor General in a concurrent capacity; that
on April 7, 2010, the petitioner, in his capacity as a taxpayer, a concerned
citizen and a lawyer, commenced this suit to challenge the constitutionality of
Agra’s concurrent appointments or designations, claiming it to be prohibited
under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution; that during the pendency
of the suit, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed Atty. Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz
as the Solicitor General; and that Cadiz assumed as the Solicitor General and
commenced his duties as such on August 5, 2010.

Agra renders a different version of the antecedents. He represents that on

January 12, 2010, he was then the Government Corporate Counsel when
President Arroyo designated him as the Acting Solicitor General in place of
Solicitor General Devanadera who had been appointed as the Secretary of
Justice; that on March 5, 2010, President Arroyo designated him also as the
Acting Secretary of Justice vice Secretary Devanadera who had meanwhile
tendered her resignation in order to run for Congress representing a district in
Quezon Province in the May 2010 elections; that he then relinquished his position
as the Government Corporate Counsel; and that pending the appointment of
his successor, Agra continued to perform his duties as the Acting Solicitor
General. Notwithstanding the conflict in the versions of the parties, the fact that
Agra has admitted to holding the two offices concurrently in acting capacities is
settled, which is sufficient for purposes of resolving the constitutional question
that petitioner raises herein.

Issue:

Is Agra’s holding of concurrent position unconstitutional?

Page 51
Ruling:

Yes. At the center of the controversy is the correct application of Section

13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, viz: Section 13. The President, Vice-
President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not,
unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or
indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be
financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege
granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.

They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office. A
relevant and complementing provision is Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B of
the 1987 Constitution, to wit: Section 7. Unless otherwise allowed by law or the
primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office
or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently
with his position of Acting Solicitor General, therefore, Agra was undoubtedly
covered by Section 13, Article VII, supra, whose text and spirit were too clear to
be differently read. Hence, Agra could not validly hold any other office or
employment during his tenure as the Acting Solicitor General, because the
Constitution has not otherwise so provided.

Page 52
 Republic v. Sandiganyan

G.R. No. 1522154, July 15, 2003

Ponente: Corona, J.:

Facts:

The Republic seeks to nullify and set aside resolutions of the

Sandiganbayan ordering PCGG to pay private respondent Roberto Benedicto
or his corporations the value of 277 shares of stock of NOGCCI registered in his
name. Petitioner invokes state immunity from suit claiming that the order to pay
the value of the delinquent shares would fix monetary liability on a government
agency thus necessitating the appropriation of public funds to satisfy the
judgment claim.

Issue:
Does petitioner have state of immunity?

Ruling:

Petition granted, resolution set aside. PCGG failed to take stock of one of
the exemptions to the state immunity when the government itself is the suitor.
The state itself is no less the plaintiff in the main case, ergo immunity from suit
cannot be effectively invoked.

Page 53
 Senate v. Ermita

488 SCRA 1
Ponente: Carpio Morales, J.:

Facts:

In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail

Project as well as the Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to
conduct a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies particularly the
alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued
invitations to certain department heads and military officials to speak before the
committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and some of the
department heads cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing matters that
need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter.
Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said requests for they were sent
belatedly and arrangements were already made and scheduled. Subsequently,
GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately.

EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of

executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are
covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the
Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National Police
(PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers
who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive
privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National
Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers
as may be determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings
conducted by Congress without first securing the president’s approval.

The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the
Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464,
the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel attending. For
defying President Arroyo’s order barring military personnel from testifying before
legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan
were relieved from their military posts and were made to face court martial
proceedings. EO 464’s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it
Page 54
infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of
legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws.

Issue:

Is EO 464 constitutional?

Ruling:
The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity
of the provisions of EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section
22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The Congress’ power of inquiry is expressly
recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. Although there is no
provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with
power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may
exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far
incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power
of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary
to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does
not itself possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently true –
recourse must be had to others who do possess it.

Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question
Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a
complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of
the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the
application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation.
Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer
specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that matter,
may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House.
A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the
question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question
hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22,
therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not
be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically
relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is

Page 55
to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to
the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain
information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function. Ultimately, the power of
Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21
and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation
of powers.

While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it

cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its
demands for information. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only
way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim
of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department
heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power — the
President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of
Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being
the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a
co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing
custom. The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1,
limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For
under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department
heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot,
however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of
legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the
department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is
subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive
Secretary.

When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads

are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is
not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such
department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty.
In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states
that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the
inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is ‘in aid of legislation’
under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in
Arnault.

Page 56
 Estrada v. Desierto

G.R. No. 146710-15, March 2, 2001

Ponente: Puno, J.:

Facts:

Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on

June 30, 1998 with Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as his Vice President.

In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis “Chavit” Singson, a close friend
of the President, alleged that he had personally given Estrada money as payoff
from jueteng hidden in a bank account known as “Jose Velarde” – a
grassrootsbased numbers game. Singson’s allegation also caused controversy
across the nation, which culminated in the House of Representatives’ filing of an
impeachment case against Estrada on November 13, 2000. House Speaker
Manny Villar fast-tracked the impeachment complaint. The impeachment suit
was brought to the Senate and an impeachment court was formed, with Chief
Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding officer. Estrada, pleaded “not guilty”.

The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a

crowd continued to grow at EDSA, bolstered by students from private schools
and left-wing organizations. Activists from the group Bayan and Akbayan as well
as lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other bar associations
joined in the thousands of protesters. On January 19, The Philippine National
Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines also withdrew their support for
Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine. At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on
television for the first time since the beginning of the protests and maintains that
he will not resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment trial to continue,
stressing that only a guilty verdict will remove him from office. At 6:15pm, Estrada
again appeared on television, calling for a snap presidential election to be held
concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added
that he will not run in this election.

On January 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency
was vacant, saying that Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. Noon of the
same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of

Page 57
the crowd at EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the Philippines. At 2:00 pm,
Estrada released a letter saying he had “strong and serious doubts about the
legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as president”, but saying he
would give up his office to avoid being an obstacle to healing the nation.
Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace.

A heap of cases then succeeded Estrada’s leaving the palace, which he

countered by filing a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from “conducting
any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as president
ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming petitioner to be the lawful and
incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to
discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her
oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.”

Issue:

1.) Is the case at bar a political or justiciable issue?

2.) May petitioner invoke immunity from suits?

Ruling:
The Court defines a political issue as “those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative
or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.” The Court made a
distinction between the Aquino presidency and the Arroyo presidency. The
Court said that while the Aquino government was a government spawned by
the direct demand of the people in defiance to the 1973 Constitution,
overthrowing the old government entirely, the Arroyo government on the other
hand was a government exercising under the 1987 constitution, wherein only the
office of the president was affected. In the former, it The question of whether the
previous president (president Estrada) truly resigned subjects it to judicial review.
The Court held that the issue is legal and not political.

Page 58
 For the president to be deemed as having resigned, there must be an
intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. It is
important to follow the succession of events that struck petitioner prior his
leaving the palace. Furthermore, the quoted statements extracted from the
Angara diaries, detailed Estrada’s implied resignation On top of all these, the
press release he issued regarding is acknowledgement of the oath-taking of
Arroyo as president despite his questioning of its legality and his emphasis on
leaving the presidential seat for the sake of peace. The Court held that
petitioner Estrada had resigned by the use of the totality test: prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a
material relevance on the issue.

As to the issue of the peitioner’s contention that he is immuned from suits,

the Court held that petitioner is no longer entitled to absolute immunity from suit.
The Court added that, given the intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to
the policy that a public office is a public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting
President, cannot claim executive immunity for his alleged criminal acts
committed while a sitting President. From the deliberations, the intent of the
framers is clear that the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only
with his tenure (the term during which the incumbent actually holds office) and
not his term (time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of
right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed
one another).

Page 59
 Gloria v. CA

G.R. No. 119903, August 15, 2000

Ponente: Purisima, J.

Facts:

The respondents, are public school teachers. Some time in September and
October 1990, during the teacher’s strikes, they did not report for work. For this
reason they were administratively charged with grave misconduct, gross
violation of Civil Service Rules, gross neglect of duty, refusal to perform official
duty, gross insubordination; 6) conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service
and AWOL. They were placed under preventive suspension. Investigation has
been ended before the 90 day period elapse. Margallo was dismissed from the
service of being a teacher. Others were suspended for 6 months from the service.
On appeal to the CA, the court mitigated the punishment to reprimand only.
Hence their reinstatement. Teachers are asking for back wages during the period
of their suspension and pending appeal for suspending them, without true
grounds caused them damage.

Issue: Are the teachers entitled to backwages for the period pending their
appeal if they are subsequently exonerated?

Ruling:
YES, they are entitled to full pay pending their appeal. To comeback
wages, the respondent must be exonerated from the charges and his suspension
be unjust. Preventive suspension pending appeal is actually punitive, and it is
actually considered illegal if the respondent is exonerated and the administrative
decision finding him guilty is reversed. They should be reinstated with full pay for
the period of the suspension. Section 47 (4) of the CivilService Decree states that
the respondent “shall be considered as under preventive suspension during the
pendency of the appeal in the event he wins.” In the case at bar the respondents
won in their appeal, therefore the period of suspension pending their appeal
would be considered as part of the preventive suspension, entitling them to full
pay because they were eventually exonerated and their suspension was
unjustified. They are still entitled to back salaries even if they were still
reprimanded.

Page 60
 Banda v. Ermita, 618 SCRA 488

Ponente: Leonardo-De Castro, J.

Facts:

An Executive Order No. 378 was issued by President Gloria Macapagal

Arroyo (President Arroyo) class suit co-employees at the National Printing Office
(NPO)

SECTION 6. Creation of the National Printing Office. - There is hereby

created a National Printing Office out of the merger of the Government Printing
Office and the relevant printing units of the Philippine Information Agency.

President Arroyo issued the herein assailed Executive Order No. 378...
amending Section 6 of Executive Order No. 285 by, inter alia, removing the
exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO over the printing services requirements of
government agencies and... instrumentalities

SECTION 1... shall no longer enjoy exclusive jurisdiction over the printing
services requirements of the government... over standard and accountable
forms. It shall have to compete with the private sector, except in the printing of
election paraphernalia which could be shared with the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas, upon the discretion of the Commission on Elections
`
SECTION 3. In the exercise of its functions, the amount to be appropriated
for the programs, projects and activities of the NPO in the General Appropriations
Act (GAA) shall be limited to its income without additional financial support from
the government.

Perceiving Executive Order No. 378 as a threat to their security of tenure as

employees of the NPO, petitioners now challenge its constitutionality, contending
that: (1) it is beyond the executive powers of President Arroyo to amend or repeal
Executive Order No. 285 issued by... former President Aquino when the latter still
Page 61
exercised legislative powers; and (2) Executive Order No. 378 violates petitioners'
security of tenure, because it paves the way for the gradual abolition of the NPO

Issue:

Is the Executive Order an invalid exercise of legislative power on the part of the
President?

Ruling:

Sc dismiss the petition.

Here, the petition failed to indicate the number of NPO employees who
were affected by the assailed Executive Order and who were allegedly
represented by petitioners... about 549 employees... in the NPO... only 20
petitioners effectively instituted the present case. Manifestation of Desistance, to
which the previously mentioned Affidavit of Desistance was attached, was filed
by the President of the National Printing Office Workers Association (NAPOWA).
The said... manifestation expressed NAPOWA's opposition to the filing of the
instant petition in any court. There is here an apparent conflict between
petitioners' interests and those of the persons whom they claim to represent.

Since it cannot be said that petitioners sufficiently represent the interests of

the entire class, the instant case cannot be properly treated as a class suit. Anent
the first ground raised in the petition, we find the same patently without merit. In
the executive department in line with the President's constitutionally granted
power of control over executive offices and by virtue of previous delegation... of
the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes.

The Court pointed out that Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative
Code of 1987 gives the President continuing authority to reorganize and redefine
the functions of the Office of the President.

Page 62
 In re: Appointment of Hon. M. Valenzuela,
A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, November 9, 1998

Ponente: Narvasa, CJ.

Facts:

Referred to the Court en banc are the appointments signed by the

President of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta as judges of the
RTC of Bago City and Cabanatuan City, respectively. These appointments
appear prima facie, at least, to be expressly prohibited by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the
Constitution. The said constitutional provision prohibits the President from making
any appointments two months immediately before the next presidential elections
and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.

Issue:

Is the President nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view

of Secs. 4 (1) and 9 of Art. VIII

Ruling:

During the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution “two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term”
the President is neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed
to do so; and that Secs. 4(1) and 9 of Art. VIII simply mean that the President is
required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein
unless prohibited by Sec. 15 of Art. VII. This prohibition on appointments comes
into effect once every 6 years.

The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta were unquestionably made

during the period of the ban. They valid in the prohibition relating to
appointments. While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the
public interest, there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify
the making of the appointments during the period of the ban.

Page 63
 De Castro v. JBC,

G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010

Ponente: Bersamin, J.

Facts:

The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno occurs just days after
the coming presidential elections. The JBC, in its en banc meeting unanimously
agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice. Conformably
with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the position of
Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely:
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona;
Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J.
Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the
last two declined their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and
January 25, 2010, respectively.

The OSG contends that the incumbent President has the power appoint
the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the
Constitution does not apply to appointments in the department of Supreme
Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90
days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution;
that had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court
appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution,
which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department) was
not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers also
incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the President’s power
to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from
“political vicissitudes” and its “insulation from political pressures,” such as stringent
qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period
within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.

Issue:

Can the incumbent President appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno
upon his retirement.

Page 64
Ruling:

Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to
fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict. The first, Section 15, Article
VII (Executive Department), provides: Section

15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments,
except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

Page 65
 Domingo v. Rayala, GR NO. 155831

Nachura

Facts:

Ma. Lourdes Domingo filed a complaint against secretary Laguesma of the

Department of Labor and Employment against the NLRC chairman Rogelio
Rayala. Petitioner alleged that the Respondent called her at her office and
touched her shoulder and subsequently tried tickling her ear. She then
subsequently filed for a leave of absence for what happened and consequently
a complaint was filed for sexual harassment on the basis of AO no. 250. Upon the
receipt of the complaint, it was referred to the DOLE secretary. Thereafter was
received by the executive secretary Ronald Zamora and the latter sought that
the matter be investigated by the then-Secretary Laguesma. The committee that
found Rayala guilty of sexual harassment and therefore dismissed from his duties.
The CA held that the Respondent was indeed guilty of sexual harassment and
likewise the decision of the lower arbiter affirmed in toto. Hence, respondent filed
a motion for reconsideration, which modified the penalty from dismissal to a mere
suspension. Hence the present petition by Domingo.

Issue:

Is dismissal of Rayala the sole prerogative of the President?

Ruling:

Yes. SC found that indeed Rayala was guilty of sexual harassment and thus
it was binding for the SC to decide in favor of the three bodies. It is held that since
Rayala avers that AO 250 does not cover NLRC, because the NLRC was under the
DOLE at that time and second is that, NLRC is not within coverage because he is
a presidential appointee. But the SC stated that the President is indeed the body
that should execute the judgment only in the first offense and not the second as
stated in the case.

PAGE 66
 Drilon v. Lim, 235 SCRA 135

Cruz

Facts:

Constitutionality of the provision of the LGC specifically Sec. 187 of the said code
is the subject of this case. One taxpayer and four oil companies filed a complaint
against the Ordinance of the Manila Revenue Code specifically the said tax
ordinance before the secretary of Justice. Hence the Secretary of Justice said the
above stated ordinance null and void for non-compliance with the procedures
and that it was contrary to law that it did not under through proper process.
Consequently, RTC averred the said ruling of the Secretary and thus sustained the
ordinance because sec. 187 was unconstitutional because it gave the secretary
supervision powers over Local Government Units. It was contrary to the
Constitution. But later was argued by the Secretary that the said provision was
indeed constitutional and that the said ordinance was the one that was invalid
because it did not follow the procedure as specified in the LGC.

Issue:

Is section 187 of the Local Government Code is Constitutional.

Ruling:

Yes, The SC held that section 187 authorizes the petitioner only to review the
legality and the constitutionality of tax ordinances. And that indeed, the said
ordinance was not contrary to law. And that Secretary has no authority to control,
but merely supervision that laws are passed legally. Hence, the SC said that the
RTC ruling in the Constitutionality of section 187 is revoked and that the trial court’s
ruling of the said tax ordinance legality of procedure was faithfully complied with.

PAGE 67
 Pichay v. Office of the deputy executive secretary for legal affairs, et al
GR NO. 196425

Perlas-Bernabe

Facts:

President Aquino issued an EO abolishing the Presidential Anti-Graft

Commission or PAGC transferring its functions to the Investigative and
Adjudicatory Division of the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for legal
affairs and that EO was number 13. That on sometime, the then-finance secretary
Purisima later on and filed a complaint against petitioner the Chairman of the
board of trustees of the LWAUA because the purchase of the shares of stocks of
a certain bank. Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion for dismissal of the same
complaint on the grounds that the case was pending in the office of the
Ombudsman and that it was the only speedy remedy for such. Hence, Purisima
appealed for a petition for certiorari and prohibition thus questioning the
constitutionality of the Executive Order 13.

Issue:

Is EO 13 constitutional?

Ruling:

Yes. Sc held that the constitution and the administrative code of 1987
grants the chief executive the power to reorganize offices at his whim. Transfering
of powers and the abolition of the PAGC to Investigative and Adjudicatory
Division of the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for legal affairs is thus
constitutional and that is justified within the power of the president.

PAGE 68
 DENR V. DENR Region XII EMPLOYEES GR NO.149724

Ynares-Santiago

Facts:

The regional executive director of DENR, Director issued a memorandum to

transfer DENR region twelve offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal. The
memorandum is inclined with the DENR administrative order no. 99-14, issued by
DENR secretary Cerilles. The said administrative order’s reason was for efficiency
and centralization of government services in the city of Koronadal. In addition,
the employees of DENR region twelve, filed a motion to dismiss the said
memorandum on the ground of its legality, stating that the secretary of
environment has no power to reclassify offices. The Court of Appeals Denied the
Petition of the petitioners.

Issue:

Does DENR secretary has the power to reorganize office?

Ruling:

Yes. The SC that being the alter-ego of the president, the secretary’s action
of reorganizing the office under region twelve and transferring it to Korondal City,
is presumed be the act of the president himself. Hence, it is also stated in the
Constitution and the Administrative Code, that the power to reorganize offices
under the executive department is given to the president. In which in this case,
the act of secretary Cerilles to transfer the said offices is valid, given the
presumption of the alter-ego doctrine and the power to reorganize offices, as
stated in the above mentioned sentence.

PAGE 69
 Hontiveros-Baraquel v. Toll Regulatory Board, GR NO.181293

Sereno

Facts:

PD 1112 creating the Toll Regulatory Board and that the subsequent PD, PD
1113 thus creating Phil. National Construction Corporation. And that the former
and the latter consolidated authority to construct main toll facilities of Manila
Express ways. PNCC then entered into a contract with PT Citra Lamatoro Gung
Persada. And that the following parties had a toll operation agreement known as
ASTOA and thus revised it with some modifications for the construction of stage 2
of south Manila metropolitan station. Then PNCCT traffic management filed a
motion for strike for unfair labor practices. It alleged that the following contracts
were contrary to law and public policy.

Issue:

Is the approval of the ASTOA by the DOTC secretary valid.

Ruling:

Yes. The doctrine of qualified political agency declares that, save in matters
on which the Constitution or the circumstances require the President to act
personally, executive and administrative functions are exercised through
executive departments headed by cabinet secretaries, whose acts are
presumptively the acts of the President unless disapproved by the latter. This
doctrine is rooted in the Constitution and the administrative code of 1987.

PAGE 70
 Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission, 637 SCRA 78

Ponente: Mendoza

Facts:

Executive Order no. 1 was signed by President Aquino establishing the

Philippine Tuth Commission of 2010. PTC’s primary function is to investigate
complaints and cases about graft and corruption committed by public officials
and those who benefitted from the said acts thus, submitting the reports to the
office of the president, ombudsman and the legislature. The PTC had some of
other powers as stated but with it has some limitations. Hence, the petitioners
question the validity of EO no. 1 and thus unconstitutional citing that PTC violates
the separation of powers, in which congress may only be the one to create a
public office and appropriate funds thereof. The second argument of the
petitioners is that the assailed EO that the power of reorganization as mandated
in the constitution and the administrative code does not provide that the
president to create a public office. In reply for the argument against the PTC, the
OSG argued the legal standing of the petitioners and that the power to create a
public office with quasi-judicial power is mandated in RA No. 9970. And that, the
power of appropriation does not conflict with the budgetary powers of congress
since there exist appropriated funds by congress.

Issue: Is EO no.1 unconstitutional?

Ruling: Yes. The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are
faithfully executed. The powers of the President are not limited to those specific
powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President
granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create
ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and
determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc
investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President
is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the
performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws
of the land. SC held Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated
individuals in a similar manner.

PAGE 71
 Kulayan v. Gov. Abdusakat Tan, SCRA 675 482

Ponente: Sereno

Facts:

Three Red Cross members who were just inspected a water sanitation
project for the Sulu provincial jail, were kidnapped by three Abu Sayyaf members.
Later on, the Governor of Sulu – Tan. Formed a committee tasked to investigate
such incident and thus places the province of SULU under a state of emergency
which he issued Proclamation no.1 and thus invoked the Local Government Code
to justify the said proclamation. In the said proclamation, it stated that and called
for the National Police and other civilian forces to set up checkpoints to ensure
safety and alike. Subsequently, petitioner Jamar Petitioner argues that the said
proclamation was out of his capacity and that it was unjustified for violating a
couple of sections as provided in the constitution.

Issue:

Can a governor exercise emergency powers just like the president?

Ruling:

No. The Governor is not bestowed with the power as stated in article 1 and
18 and thus his acts are ultra vires. The president has the only exclusive power to
issues such power to call upon the armed forces in times of acute crisis and state
of emergency. The said powers are summed up to be executive powers and they
are only vested in the chief executive of the Philippines as stated in section 1,
article vii of the Philippine constitution.

PAGE 72
 Gonzales v. Abaya, 988 SCRA 445

Ponente: Sandoval-Gutierrez

Facts:

A group of more than 300 soldiers entered and occupied Oakwood

Apartments in Makati where they planted explosives. The said group was led Navy
Lt. Antonio Trillanes IV, where they proclaimed their detest against the
administration of president Arroyo and that they demanded that she, together
with her cabinet secretaries, resign.

Proclamation no. 427 was issued by President Arroyo, declaring a state of

rebellion, and general order number 4, which in turn called upon the PNP and the
AFP to suppress lawless violence. After the negotiations, the Trillanes-led group
surrendered and were accused and convicted of Article 96 of the Articles of war
and coup d’état and they were prosecuted accordingly.

Issue:

Is proclamation of president Arroyo constitutional.

Ruling:

Yes, the said proclamation and general order was partially constitutional
because as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the Philippines, the
president should call upon the armed forces to suppress lawless violence. And as
the chief executive of the country, he has the power of take over and other
residual powers as the constitution provides.

PAGE 73
 Lagman v. Executive Secretary, GR NO.231658

Ponente: Del Castillo

Facts:

Proclamation no. 216 was issued by the president in Rodrigo Duterte

declaring the whole island of Mindanao under Martial law, invoking article 18
under the 1987 Constitution. The said issuance of the proclamation was to
suppress lawless violence and invasion brought about by the Maute extremist
group. And that petitioners assailed the proclamation of martial because of the
fear of the past that it might turn into an abuse of power by the president. Among
those who petitioned were Edcel Lagman, who was the representative of Albay
and other representatives.

Issue:

Is proclamation reviewable by the court under section 18 of the Philippine

Constitution?

Ruling:

Yes. The Supreme Court held that the said issuance was then reviewable.
The challenge of the validity of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus and declaration of Martial Law in the island of Mindanao has
sufficient factual bases and that the clear reading of the law at hand is that the
court does have authority to do so.

PAGE 74
 IBP V. Zamora, August 15, 2010

Ponente: Kapunan

Facts:

President called upon the AFP and the PNP especially the marines. Thus
then-president Joseph Estrada invoking his power as the president and as the
commander-in-chief under article VII, section 18 of the Constitution. The said
calling out of the service of the marines was justified by the president because of
its nature that it was temporary and given a reasonable period only so that the
situation shall improve. The petitioners, herein Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
filed a petition stating that the said declaration of deployment of the marines was
null and void thus unconstitutional.

Issue:

Does the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols
violate the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and
the civilian character of the PNP?

Ruling:

Yes. Under the 1987 Constitution the President has the power to call the
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he
necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec.
18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial
law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may
review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such
equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s
action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power
in a different category from the power to declare martial law and power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the
Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for
their revocation and review without any qualification.

PAGE 75
 Lacson v. Perez, GR NO. 147780

Ponente: Melo

Facts:

A mass of armed demonstrators that were planning in barging inside of the

Malacanang palace confronted President Arroyo. In response of the said
demonstration by the people or masses, the president then issued a proclamation
no.38 stating that there was a state of rebellion in the National Capital Region.
Subsequently, warrantless arrests were given to some of the demonstrator leaders.
Petitioners were filed before the court, the petitioners namely; Lacson et al,
Defensor-Santiago, Lumbao, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino.

Issue:

Should the Petition be dismissed for being rendered moot and academic.

Ruling:

No. In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort
to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion in the light of Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the circumstances so warrant. The warrantless
arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration of a "state of
rebellion." Petitioners' contention that they are under imminent danger of being
arrested without warrant do not justify their resort to the extraordinary remedies of
mandamus and prohibition, since an individual subjected to warrantless arrest is
not without adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. The prayer for
prohibition and mandamus is improper at this time.

PAGE 76
 Gonzales v. Narvasa, 177 SCRA 668
Ponente: Gonzaga-Reyes, J.

Facts:
Ramon A. Gonzales, on December 9, 1999, in his capacity as a taxpayer, filed a
petition and mandamus questioning the constitutionality of the creation of a
public office, Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform or PCCR.
Said commission was created via of Executive Order no. 43 by then-president
Joseph Estarada on November 26, 1998. It was tasked to study and recommend
proposed amendments and revisions of the present constitution. The said
petitioner questioned the constitutionality based on the ground that only the
legislature can enact a law, thus creating a public office. And that the chief
executive has now powers to do so.

Issue:
Can the petitioner, as a taxpayer, has legal standing on the issue at hand?

Ruling:
No.

Court dismissed the petition. Clearly, petitioner has failed to establish his locus
standi so as to enable him to seek judicial redress as a citizen. Petitioner has not
shown that he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining any personal injury
attributable to the creation of the PCCR. A citizen acquires standing only if he
can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of
the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to
the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable
action. If at all, it is only Congress, not petitioner, which can claim any “injury” in
this case since, according to petitioner, the President has encroached upon the
legislature’s powers to create a public office and to propose amendments to
the Charter by forming the PCCR. Petitioner has sustained no direct, or even any
indirect, injury. Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges have been or
are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any penalties
or burdens as a result of the PCCR’s activities.

PAGE 77
 Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668
Ponente: Cortes, J.

Facts:
After overthrowing President Marcos via the EDSA people power, the family of
the latter then fled to Hawaii. After his death, petitioners, the Marcos family, then
asked to be permitted to go back to the Philippines, however the president at
that time asked to enjoin the respondents to prevent the petitioners to enter the
country. The petitioners then argue that under the provisions of the Bill of rights,
the president does not have the power to do such thing because it is not within
his jurisdiction, but within the courts power.

Issue:
Can the president have the power to prevent the Marcos family from returning
to the Philippines.
Ruling:

Yes.
The petition is denied.

The President him/herself has the power in Article VII of Sec 1 of the Constitution
in exercising residual powers. Since the Philippine’s government at that time was
unstable, the president had to bar the entry of the Marcos family on the sole
reason of peace and order.

PAGE 78
 Borja v. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157
Ponente: Mendoza J.

Facts:
in the 1988 Senatorial Elections, Jose P. Capco was elected as Vice-mayor of
Pateros. And that on September 2, 1988, by rules of succession, he succeeded
the death of the mayor. Subsequently in the 1992 election, he was re-elected as
the mayor of Pateros in 1995 elections. Petitioner on the other hand sought
Capco to be dismissed and disqualified as he cited that the latter would have
served for more three consecutive terms. The second division of the COMELEC
held that Capco be disqualified but was subsequently reversed by the
COMELEC EN BANC and that he be declared eligible to run as mayor of
Pateros. He was then elected as the mayor of the same.
Issue: Is Capco is eligible to run as mayor?

Ruling:
Yes.

Court ruled that Capco was indeed eligible to run in the 1995 elections. The
remaining term in which he served from the death of the Mayor in 1988 should
not be counted as an additional term to which he served. Hence he is not in the
limit of the three limit term as stated in the Law.

PAGE 79
 Petitioner Organization v. Executive Secretary, 669 SCRA 49
Ponente: Abad J.

Facts:
The Congress of the Philippines, on June 19, 1971 enacted R.A 6260 which
created the Coconut Investment Fund. And that coconut farmers would benefit
through the financing of the CI funds. The Code provided that surpluses from the
CCS Fund and the CID Fund collections, not used for replanting and other
authorized purposes, were to be invested by acquiring shares of stock of
corporations, including the San Miguel Corporation (SMC), engaged in
undertakings related to the coconut and palm oil industries. UCPB was to make
such investments and equitably distribute these for free to coconut farmers.
These investments constituted the Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CIIF). P.D.
961 also provided that the coconut levy funds (coco-levy funds) shall be owned
by the coconut farmers in their private capacities.

Issue:
Whether or not (a) Section 2 of P.D. 755, (b) Article III, Section 5 of P.D.s 961 and
1468, (c) E.O. 312, and (d) E.O. 313 are unconstitutional.

Ruling:
The coco-levy funds were raised pursuant to law to support a proper
governmental purpose. They were raised with the use of the police and taxing
powers of the State for the benefit of the coconut industry and its farmers in
general. The Court has also recently declared that the coco-levy funds are in
the nature of taxes and can only be used for public purpose.

PAGE 80
 Villavert v. Desierto, GR NO.133715
Ponente: Bellosillo, J.

Facts:
An administrative case was filed against petitioner, Villavert and that it claimed
for his dismissal of the said administrative charges.
Villavert was a sales and promotion supervisor of PCSO Cebu branch and that
he was responsible for the sale and disposal of PCSO sweepstakes tickets
withdrawn by him which were in fact already sold.

Issue:
Can the appeals of the Ombudsman be appealed to the Supreme Court?

Ruling:
No.

Sec.27 of RA 6770, which authorizes an appeal to this Court from decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases, was declared
violative of the proscription in Sec. 30, Art. VI, of the Constitution against a law
which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and
consent. In addition, the Court noted that Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure precludes appeals from quasi-judicial agencies, like the Office of the
Ombudsman, to the Supreme Court. Consequently, appeals from decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases should be taken to the
Court of Appeals under Rule 43.

PAGE 81
 Ifurung v. Ombudsman, April 24, 2018
Ponente: Martires, J.

Facts:
Petitioner, who claims to be a taxpayer, a concerned Filipino citizen, and a
member of the Bar, invokes the jurisprudence laid down by the Court in Funa v.
Villar, in asserting that he has locus standi to file the instant petition. He avers that
he is seeking the correction of a recurring statutory wrong and a declaration from
the Court that the positions held by the respondents are vacant. Respondents are
the incumbent officials of the Office of the Ombudsman, viz: Conchita Carpio
Morales, Ombudsman (Ombudsman Morales); Melchor Arthur H. Carandang,
Overall Deputy Ombudsman; Gerard Abeto Mosquera, Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon; Paul Elmer M. Clemente as Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas; Rodolfo M.
Elman, Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao; and Cyril Enguerra Ramos, Deputy
Ombudsman for the Military. Petitioner maintains that the constitutional issue
raised in his petition is of transcendental importance since this Court's ruling will
finally determine the correct term and tenure of the Ombudsman and his
deputies and settle the matter as to the constitutionality of Sec. 8(3) of R.A. No.
6770. He alleges that Sec. 8(3), in relation to Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 6770, which provides
that in case of a vacancy at the Office of the Ombudsman due to death,
resignation, removal or permanent disability of the incumbent Ombudsman and
his deputies, the newly appointed Ombudsman and his deputies shall be
appointed to a full term of seven (7) years, is constitutionally infirm as it
contravenes Sec. 11 in relation to Secs. 8 and 10 of Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution.
He avers that like all constitutionally created positions, i.e., President, Vice-
President, Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and Members of
the Civil Service Commission (CSC), the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), and the Commission on Audit (COA), the successor to the
positions of the Ombudsman and deputies should serve only the unexpired term
of the predecessor. Hence, petitioner insists that the incumbent Ombudsman and
deputies have been overstaying in their present positions for more than two years
considering that their terms have expired on 1 February 2015. "To allow them to
stay in the said positions one day longer constitutes a continuing affront to the
1987 Constitution, unduly clips presidential prerogatives, and deprives the nation
of the services of legitimate Ombudsman and Deputies Ombudsman."

Issue:
Is Section 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770 unconstitutional for being violative of Section 11 in
relation to Sections 8 and 10, Article XI of the 1987 Philippine constitution and
applicable jurisprudence?

PAGE 82
Ruling:
A petition for certiorari is the proper remedy to challenge the constitutionality of
Sec. 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770. To justify his claim that a petition for certiorari and
prohibition is the proper remedy to assail the validity of Sec. 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770,
petitioner cites the ruling in Tañada and Imbong that "certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review
and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials, as
there is no plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." To
counter petitioner's justification and to prove that quo warranto was the proper
remedy in this case, respondents cite Topacio v. Ong. Respondents failed to
consider that the factual antecedents in Topacio are not on four-square with the
present petition. In that case, Ferdinand Topacio's petition for certiorari and
prohibition sought, in the main, to prevent Justice Gregory Ong from further
exercising the powers, duties, and responsibilities of a Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice. Topacio chiefly moored his petition on the ground that Ong did not
qualify to be appointed as an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan on the
basis of his citizenship, i.e., whether gauged from his birth certificate which
indicates him to be a Chinese citizen or against his bar records bearing out his
status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. Simply put, the petition principally involved
a review of Ong's qualification for appointment as Associate Justice of the
Sandiganbayan which violated, according to Topacio, Sec. 7, Art. VIII of the 1987
Constitution.

PAGE 83
 Genuino v. De Lima, April 17, 2018
Ponente: Reyes Jr., J.

Facts:
DOJ Secretary Silvestre H. Bello III issued DOJ Circular No. 17 on March 19, 1998,
prescribing rules and regulations governing the issuance of HDOs. The said
issuance was intended to restrain the indiscriminate issuance of HDOs which
impinge on the people's right to travel. April 23, 2007, former DOJ Secretary Raul
M. Gonzalez issued DOJ Circular No. 18, prescribing rules and regulations
governing the issuance and implementation of watchlist orders. In particular, it
provides for the power of the DOJ Secretary to issue a Watchlist Order (WLO)
against persons with criminal cases pending preliminary investigation or petition
for review before the DOJ. Further, it states that the DOJ Secretary may issue an
ADO to a person subject of a WLO who intends to leave the country for some
exceptional reasons.

Issues: Can the Court exercise its power of Judicial Review?

Ruling:

Yes.
The Court may exercise its power of judicial review despite the filing of
information for electoral sabotage against GMA. It is the respondents'
contention that the present petitions should be dismissed for lack of a justiciable
controversy. The power of judicial review is articulated in Section 1, Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution which reads:
“ Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.”

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

PAGE 84
 PHAPI v. Medialdea, November 6, 2018
Ponente: TIJAM, J.

Facts:
Batas Pambansa (BP) Bilang 702 entitled in 1984, An Act Prohibiting the Demand
of Deposits or Advance Payments for the Confinement or Treatment of Patients in
Hospitals and Medical Clinics in Certain Cases was enacted. BP 702 was
described as a landmark legislative measure that aimed to stop the practice of
hospitals and medical clinics of asking for deposits or advance payments for
treatment or confinement of patients in emergency and serious cases. It makes it
unlawful for any director, manager or any other officer of a hospital or medical
clinic to demand any deposit or any other form of advance payment for
confinement or treatment in such hospital or medical clinic in emergency or
serious cases. It penalizes such erring director, manager or any other officer of a
hospital or medical clinic with a fine of not less than one thousand pesos but not
more than two thousand pesos or imprisonment for not less than fifteen days but
not more than thirty days, or both such fine and imprisonment. AAugust 25, 1997,
BP 702 was amended by R.A. No. 8344. Said lawmakes it unlawful not only to
demand, but also to request, solicit, and accept any deposit or advance
payment as a prerequisite for confinement or medical treatment in emergency
or serious cases. R.A. No. 8344 further makes the refusal to administer medical
treatment and support as dictated by good practice of medicine to prevent
death or permanent disability unlawful. In case the hospital or the medical clinic
has no adequate medical capabilities, R.A. No. 8344 outlines the procedure for
the transfer of the patient to a facility where appropriate care can be given.
Under a new provision, R.A. No. 8344 allows the transfer of the patient to an
appropriate hospital consistent with the latter's needs after the hospital or medical
clinic has administered medical treatment and support.

ISSUE: Can the Court discharge its power of Judicial Review?

Ruling:

Petition was dismissed.

Petitioner seeks to declare as unconstitutional certain provisions of R.A. No. 10932
and for this purpose, availed of the remedy of certiorari and prohibition.
Respondents counter that certiorari and prohibition are available only against
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions and not against legislative acts, as in
the instant case. The rule is settled that the allegations in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought determine the nature of the action and the court
that has jurisdiction over it.

PAGE 85
Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the ground for review in certiorari and
prohibition is grave abuse of discretion, and there is grave abuse of discretion
when an act is done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or
executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal
bias. Petitions for certiorari and prohibition are thus appropriate remedies to raise
constitutional questions. Grave abuse of discretion as a ground for review does
not only appear under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court but also under Section
1, Article VIII of the Constitution defining judicial power. As constitutionally
defined, judicial power includes not only the duty to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also, the
duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government. Such innovation under the 1987 Constitution
later on became known as the Court's "traditional jurisdiction" and "expanded
jurisdiction," respectively.

PAGE 86
 Chavez V. JBC 679 SCRA 579
Ponente: Mendoza

Facts:
The case at bar is in relation to the Judicial and Bar council. In 1994, the said
constitutionally created body or an auxiliary of the SC, was significantly altered
and that members of the congress would also constitute the JBC. And that the
respondents namely Francis Escudero as his capacity as Senator, and Niel Tupas,
as his capacity as a House member, sat in the JBC. In which the petitioner
questioned such occupation of the seats in the JBC. The petitioners cited that the
entitlement of seats for the two congressmen would defeat the spirit of the framers
of the law.
The respondents then argued that they are allowed to seat. And that the
Supreme Court stated that it had the power of review to the case at hand.

Issue: Did the practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members,
two (2) of whom are members of Congress, defeats the letter and spirit of the 1987
Constitution.

Ruling:
No.
The current practice of JBC in admitting two members of the Congress to perform
the functions of the JBC is violative of the 1987 Constitution. As such, it is
unconstitutional. Using the principle of statutory construction, that when the
wordings of the law are clear and plain and simple is that, it must be given the
literal meaning. And that 1 member of the congress may only be admitted to the
JBC.

PAGE 87
 De Castro V. JBC GR NO. 191002
Ponente: Bersamin

Facts:
On May 17, 2010, was the compulsory retirement of the then-Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno. And that the 2010 presidential elections were already done on
May 10, 2010. This event gave rise to what seemed to be an odd situation, wherein
section 15 of article VII of the constitution which then prohibits the president or
acting president to make midnight appointments to executive positions. And that
the said section was in conflict again with section 4 paragraph one of article VIII
of the Constitution. Issue: Whether or not the appointment of Chief Justice Renato
Corona by Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is constitutional.
Ruling:

The said appointment is indeed constitutional. Because Section 15 of article VII

said that appointments which were prohibited were only under the executive
branch and not any other. Thus, the appointment of the Chief justice by then-
president Arroyo was indeed constitutional because it was appointment to the
judiciary.

PAGE 88
 Bengson v. Drilon, 208 SCRA 133
Ponente: Guiterrez, Jr.

Facts:

The case revolves around the petitions for readjustments of the pensions of retired
justices. And that in the 1990, the congress sought to reenact some old laws that
were repealed during the administration of Marcos. Thus these group of retired
judges and justices pointed out that RA 1797 was never repealed and that the PD
in which repealed the same, had not been published and thus, they used the
case of Tanada vs. Tuvera in the publication of the said PD. Congress took notice
of the readjustment and son in the General Appropriations Bill (GAB) for 1992,
Congress allotted additional budget for pensions of retired justices. Congress
however did the allotment in the following manner: Congress made an item
entitled: “General Fund Adjustment”; included therein are allotments to
unavoidable obligations in different brances of the government; among such
obligations is the allotment for the pensions of retired justices of the judiciary. But
then was subsequently vetoed by President Aquino which provided for the
pensions of the group of justices and judges.

Issue:
Did the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations bill is
constitutional?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that it was indeed unconstitutional. And that the justices
and the judges have vested rights in accordance to RA no. 1797 which was never
repealed. And that the president has no power to repeal and override the
decision of the SC neither has the president has the power to amend and enact
statutes of the previous administrations.

PAGE 89
 In re Appointment of Mateo Valenzuela 298 SCRA 408
Ponente: Narvasa

Facts:
Referred to the Court en banc are the appointments signed by the President
dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta as
judges of the RTC of Bago City and Cabanatuan City, respectively. These
appointments appear prima facie, at least, to be expressly prohibited by Sec. 15,
Art. VII of the Constitution. The said constitutional provision prohibits the President
from making any appointments two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
Issue:

Is the President prohibited from making midnight appointments days after the
elections?
Ruling:

During the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution “two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term”
the President is neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed
to do so; and that Secs. 4(1) and 9 of Art. VIII simply mean that the President is
required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein
unless prohibited by Sec. 15 of Art. VII. This prohibition on appointments comes
into effect once every 6 years. The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta were
unquestionably made during the period of the ban. They come within the
operation of the prohibition relating to appointments. While the filling of
vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing
in this case of any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments
during the period of the ban.

PAGE 90
In re: Request for Creation of a Special Division A.M. No. 02-1-07-SC January 21,
2002

Ponente: Bersamin
Facts:

In its Request for Re-Raffle, the Defense alleges that it is made "for (a) better
administration of justice" in view of the "shifting and uncertain nature of (the)
composition (of the Third Division)" to which the "Plunder Case" was originally
assigned, citing as bases therefor the compulsory retirement of Associate Justice
Ricardo M. Ilarde on 27 November 2001, and the indefinite leave of absence of
Associate Justice Anacleto D. Badoy, Jr., pursuant to our Resolution of 11
December 2001, thereby leaving a void in the composition of the regular Third
Division. Only Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro remains as
permanent member thereof. Associate Justices Narciso S. Nario, Sr., and
Nicodemo T. Ferrer who were earlier designated to sit in the Third Division as
special members or so-called "warm bodies" are by the nature of their
designations temporary therein.

Issue:
Is the request valid?

Held:
Yes. Under Sec. 5, par. [5], Art. VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court
has the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights and procedure in all courts, including the Sandiganbayan.
Accordingly, given the nature of the Plunder Case and cases related thereto, the
prominence of the principal accused and the importance of the immediate
resolution of the cases to the Filipino people and the Philippine Government, this
Court, in the interest of justice and the speedy disposition of cases, with due
regard to the procedural and substantive rights of the accused, deems it best to
create a Special Division of the Sandiganbayan to be composed of members
mentioned in the immediately preceeding paragraph. This Special Division shall
hear, try and decide with dispatch the Plunder Case and all related cases filed or
which may hereafter be filed against former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada and
those accused with him, until they are resolved, decided and terminated.

PAGE 91
 Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014
Ponente: Del Castillo

Facts:
In January 2012, Angela Tan, a high school student at St. Theresa’s College (STC),
uploaded on Facebook several pictures of her and her classmates (Nenita Daluz
and Julienne Suzara) wearing only their undergarments. Thereafter, some of their
classmates reported said photos to their teacher, Mylene Escudero. Escudero,
through her students, viewed and downloaded said pictures. She showed the said
pictures to STC’s Discipline-in-Charge for appropriate action. Later, STC found Tan
et al to have violated the student’s handbook and banned them from
“marching” in their graduation ceremonies scheduled in March 2012. The issue
went to court but despite a TRO (temporary restraining order) granted by the
Cebu RTC enjoining the school from barring the students in the graduation
ceremonies, STC still barred said students. Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares, mother
of Nenita, and the other mothers filed a petition for the issuance of the writ of
habeas data against the school.

They argued, among others, that:

1. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at “Friends
Only.” They, thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy which must be
respected.
2. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and
reproduced without their consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by
saving digital copies of the photos and by subsequently showing them to STC’s
officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of the children were intruded upon;
3. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information,
data, and digital images happened at STC’s Computer Laboratory; They prayed
that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed
copies of the subject data and have such data be declared illegally obtained in
violation of the children’s right to privacy.
Issue: Can the petition for writ of habeas data prosper?

Held:
Yes, it is proper but in this case, it will not prosper. Contrary to the arguments of
STC, the Supreme Court ruled that: 1. The petition for writ of habeas data can be
availed of even if this is not a case of extralegal killing or enforced disappearance;
and 2. The writ of habeas data can be availed of against STC even if it is not an

PAGE 92
entity engaged in the business of “gathering, collecting, or storing data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party”. First, the Rule on Habeas Data does not state that it can be
applied only in cases of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances. Second,
nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall be
available only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the business of
gathering, storing, and collecting of data.

PAGE 93
 Infant Julian Yusay Caram v. Segui G.R. No. 193652 August 5, 2014
Ponente: Bernabe

Facts:
Petitioner Christina had an amorous relationship with Marcelino and eventually
became pregnant with the latter’s child without the benefit of marriage. After
getting pregnant, Christina mislead Marcelino into believing that she had an
abortion when in fact she proceeded to complete the term of her pregnancy.
During this time, she intended to have the child adopted through Sun and Moon
Home for Children in Parañaque City. On July 26, 2009, Christina gave birth to
Baby Julian at Amang Rodriguez Memorial Medical Center, Marikina City. Sun
and Moon shouldered all the hospital and medical expenses. On August 13, 2009,
Christina voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian by way of a Deed of Voluntary
Commitment to the DSWD. On November 27, 2009, the DSWD, a certificate was
issued declaring Baby Julian as “Legally Available for Adoption.” On February 5,
2010, Baby Julian was “matched” with Spouses Medina and supervised trial
custody was then commenced. On May 5, 2010, Christina who had changed her
mind about the adoption, wrote a letter to the DSWD asking for the suspension of
Baby Julian’s adoption proceedings. She also said she wanted her family back
together. On May 28, 2010, the DSWD, through respondent Atty. Segui, sent a
Memorandum to DSWD Assistant Secretary Cabrera informing her that the
certificate declaring Baby Julian legally available for adoption had attained
finality on November 13, 2009, or three months after Christina signed the Deed of
Voluntary Commitment which terminated her parental authority and effectively
made Baby Julian a ward of the State.
Issue:
Is a petition for a writ of amparo the proper recourse for obtaining parental
authority and custody of a minor child?
Ruling:

The Court held that the availment of the remedy of writ of amparo is not proper
as there was no enforced disappearance in this case. As to what constitutes
“enforced disappearance,” the Court in Navia v. Pardico enumerated the
elements constituting “enforced disappearances” as the term is statutorily
defined in Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9851 to wit: That there be an arrest, detention,
abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty; 2. That it be carried out by, or with
the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political
organization; 3. That it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal
to acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person

PAGE 94
subject of the amparo petition; and, 4. That the intention for such refusal is to
remove subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of
time. The Court held that there was no enforced disappearance because the
respondent DSWD officers never concealed Baby Julian’s whereabouts. In fact,
Christina obtained a copy of the DSWD’s Memorandum explicitly stating that
Baby Julian was in the custody of the Medina Spouses when she filed her petition
before the RTC. Besides, she even admitted in her petition that the respondent
DSWD officers presented Baby Julian before the RTC during the hearing. There is
therefore, no “enforced disappearance” as used in the context of the Amparo
rule as the third and fourth elements are missing.

PAGE 95
 Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.,
requesting exemption from payment

of IBP Dues B.M. No. 1370 May 9, 2005

Ponente: Bersamin

Facts:
Petitioners files a motion for exemption for paying his IBP dues from 1977- 2005 in
the amount of P12,035.00. He contends that after admission to the Bar he worked
at the Phil. Civil Service then migrated to the US until his retirement. His contention
to be exempt is that his employment with the CSC prohibits him to practice his
law profession and he did not practice the same while in the US. The compulsion
that he pays his IBP annual membership is oppressive since he has an inactive
status as a lawyer. His removal from the profession because of nonpayment of the
same constitutes to the deprivation of his property rights bereft of due process of
the law.
Issue:

Was there inactive practice of the law profession is an exemption to payment for
IBP annual membership?
Ruling:

Court held that the imposition of the membership fee is a matter of regulatory
measure by the State, which is a necessary consequence for being a member of
the Philippine Bar. The compulsory requirement to pay the fees subsists for as long
as one remains to be a member regardless whether one is a practicing lawyer or
not. Thus, his petition for exemption from paying his IBP membership fee dues is
denied.

PAGE 96
 Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp. 605 SCRA 100
Ponente: Guitierrez

Facts:
The case involves the “Diwalwal Gold Rush Area” (Diwalwal), a rich tract of
mineral land located inside the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve in Davao
del Norte and Davao Oriental. Since the early 1980s, Diwalwal has been stormed
by conflicts brought about by numerous mining claims over it. On March 10, 1986,
Marcopper Mining Corporation (MMC) was granted an Exploration Permit (EP
133) by the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences (BMG). A long battle ensued
between Apex and MMC with the latter seeking the cancellation of the mining
claims of Apex on the ground that such mining claims were within a forest
reservation (Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve) and thus the acquisition on
mining rights should have been through an application for a permit to prospect
with the BFD and not through registration of a DOL with the BMG. When it reached
the SC in 1991, the Court ruled against Apex holding that the area is a forest
reserve and thus it should have applied for a permit to prospect with the BFD. On
February 16 1994, MMC assigned all its rights to EP 133 to Southeast Mindanao
Gold Mining Corporation (SEM), a domestic corporation which is alleged to be a
100%-owned subsidiary of MMC. Subsequently, BMG registered SEM’s Mineral
Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA)application and the Deed of Assignment.
Several oppositions were filed. The Panel of Arbitrators created by the DENR
upheld the validity of EP 133. During the pendency of the case, DENR AO No.
2002-18 was issued declaring an emergency situation in the Diwalwal Gold Rush
Area and ordering the stoppage of all mining operations therein.
Issue:
Is EP 133 and its subsequent transfer to SEM is valid. W/N the DENR Secretary has
authority to issue DAO 66 declaring 729 hectares of the areas covered by the
Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve as non-forest lands and open to small-
scale mining purposes. Who (among petitioners Apex and Balite) has priority right
over Diwalwal?

Held:
INVALID.

One of the terms and conditions of EP 133 is: “That this permit shall be for the
exclusive use and benefit of the permit tee or his duly authorized agents and shall
be used for mineral exploration purposes only and for no other purpose.” While it
may be true that SEM is a100% subsidiary corporation of MMC, there is no showing

PAGE 97
that the former is the duly authorized agent of the latter. As such, the assignment
is null and void as it directly contravenes the terms and conditions of the grant of
EP 133. a. The Deed of Assignment was a total abdication of MMC’s rights over
the permit. It is not a mere grant of authority to SEM as agent. b. Reason for the
stipulation. Exploration permits are strictly granted to entities or individuals
possessing the resources and capability to undertake mining operatio ns. Without
such acondition, non-qualified entities or individuals could circumvent the strict
requirements under the law by the simple expediency of acquiring the permit
from the original permit tee.

PAGE 98
 CHIEF JUSTICE RENATO C. CORONA, petitioner,

vs.

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES sitting as an IMPEACHMENT COURT, BANK OF THE

PHILIPPINE et al., respondents.

G.R. No. 200242 July 17, 2012

Ponente: VILLARAMA, JR., J.

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for immediate
issuance of temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction
filed by the former Chief Justice of this Court, Renato C. Corona, assailing the
impeachment case initiated by the respondent Members of the House of
Representatives (HOR) and trial being conducted by respondent Senate of the
Philippines.

On December 12, 2011, a caucus was held by the majority bloc of the HOR
during which a verified complaint for impeachment against petitioner was
submitted by the leadership of the Committee on Justice. After a brief
presentation, on the same day, the complaint was voted in session and 188
Members signed and endorsed it, way above the one third vote required by the
Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Senate, sitting as an Impeachment Court committed grave

abuse of discretion in ruling for the former Chief Justice’s impeachment.

PAGE 99
RULING:

No. Impeachment refers to the power of Congress to remove a public official for
serious crimes or misconduct as provided in the Constitution. A mechanism
designed to check abuse of power, impeachment has its roots in Athens and
was adopted in the United States (US) through the influence of English common
law on the Framers of the US Constitution.

PAGE 100
 Araullo, petitioner,
vs.
Aquino III, respondent.

G.R. No. 209287 July 1, 2014

Ponente: BERSAMIN, J.

Facts:

When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed
the sluggish growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy
needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad then came up
with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).

The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects.
DAP enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority
projects instead of waiting for next year’s appropriation. So what happens under
the DAP was that if a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a
certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the
Executive.

Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as “savings” by the Executive and
said funds will then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did
work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in fact reported and
portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme
Court).

Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General
Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations
made by Congress in the GAA.

Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé

claiming that he, and other Senators, received Php50M from the President as an
incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato
Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but
was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.

PAGE 101
Issue:

Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid out
of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law” (Sec.
29(1), Art. VI, Constitution)

Ruling:

No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP
was merely a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an
appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As such, it did
not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the
Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury
otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds,
which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned
via the DAP.

PAGE 102
G.R No. 211077 August 15, 2018
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, PETITIONER,
V.
GABRIEL MORALDE, RESPONDENT.

Ponente: Leonen, J.

Facts:

The assailed Court of Appeals Decision set aside Civil Service Commission
Resolution No. 080805 dated April 28, 2008, and Resolution No. 082249 dated
December 8, 2008. It also ordered Gabriel Moralde's (Moralde) reinstatement to
his former position as Dental Aide of the Province's Provincial Health Office; the
payment to him of backwages for five (5) years counted from November 9, 1998,
the date when he was supposedly illegally dismissed; and the payment to him of
backwages for five (5) years from November 20, 2006, the date when the order
for his reinstatement attained finality.

Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 080805 denied the Province's Motion for
New Trial and/or Modification of Judgement but declared as moot and
academic its Resolution No. 061984 dated November 20, 2006, which directed
Moralde's reinstatement. Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 082249 denied
Moralde's Motion for Reconsideration of Civil Service Commission Resolution No.
080805.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner Civil Service Commission erred in setting aside its
ruling to reinstate respondent Gabriel Moralde on the ground that the same ruling
has become impracticable or unviable, hence, moot and academic.

Ruling:

The Civil Service Commission made no such error. It was the Court of
Appeals which committed reversible error in ruling in favor of Moralde and in
setting aside Civil Service Commission Resolution Nos. 080805 and 082249.

PAGE 103
G.R No. 202678 September 5, 2018
Pagdangaan, petitioner,
vs.
CA, respondent.

Ponente: Leonen

Facts:

On November 23, 2007, Solid Guaranty, through Pagdanganan, a minority

stockholder, filed acomplaint for interpleader before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. The complaint was filed becauseof the alleged conflicting claims
between Ma. Susana A.S. Madrigal, Ma. Ana A.S. Madrigal, and Ma.Rosa A.S.
Madrigal (collectively, the Madrigals), and Citibank N.A. Hongkong (Citibank)
over theshares of stock previously held by the late Antonio P. Madrigal. The case
was docketed as Civil CaseNo. 07-118329.

While Civil Case No. 07118329 was pending, the Madrigals called for a Special St
ockholders' Meetingto be held on November 26, 2007 at the Mandarin Hotel,
Makati City.On November 26, 2007, the Special Stockholders' Meeting was held
at the Mandarin Hotel. Newmembers of the Board of Directors were elected.On
December 17, 2007, Solid Guaranty and Pagdanganan amended their complaint
in Civil Case No.07-118329 to implead as additional defendants the newly elected
directors and officers. They also sought tonullify the stockholders' meeting and
election of the directors and officers.

Issue:

Whether or not the petition is moot and academic.

Ruling:

YES. The Court of Appeals has already rendered its Decision on February 8, 2013. It
issued a Resolution dated March 10, 2014 on petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. CA-
G.R. SP No.104291 has already been fully resolved by the Court of Appeals.

PAGE 104
G.R. Nos. 235937-40, July 23, 2018

JOHANNE EDWARD B. LABAY, petitioner

Vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent

Ponente: VELASCO JR.

Facts: The case arose from the complaint dated May 11, 2015 filed by the Field
Investigation Office I (FIO I) of the Office of the Ombudsman against petitioner
Labay for his participation in the alleged anomalous utilization of the Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) of former Representative of the 1 District of
Davao del Sur, Marc Douglas C. Cagas IV (Rep. Cagas IV). The complaint was for
violation of Article 217 (Malversation of Public Funds or Property), Article 171
(Falsification of Public Documents), paragraphs (1), (2), (4), and (7), Article 217 in
relation to Article 171 (Malversation thru Falsification of Public Documents), all of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as well as Section 3, paragraphs (a) and (e) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended.

The complaint alleged that Rep. Cagas IV, in conspiracy with other public
officials and private individuals such as petitioner Labay, through the Technology
Resource Center (TRC), sought the release and transfer of his PDAF in the total
amount of Php6,000,000.00 to Farmer-business Development Corporation (FDC),
which was led by its then president, petitioner Labay. However, upon field
verification conducted by the FIO I, it appears that the livelihood projects funded
by Rep. Cagas IV's PDAF were never implemented and were considered to be
"ghost projects."

Issue:

WoN the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying Labay’s

Motion For Reinvestigation

Ruling:

YES. There is no dispute that the Ombudsman was unable to serve copies
of the complaint or of its September 1, 2015 Joint Order on petitioner Labay prior
to or even during the preliminary investigation of the case. While the Ombudsman
was correct in resolving the complaint based on the evidence presented in
accordance with Paragraph (e), Section 4 of the Ombudsman Rules of
Procedure.

PAGE 105
G.R. Nos. 85481-82 October 18, 1990

WILLIAM TAN, JOAQUIN TAN LEH and VICENTE TAN, petitioners

Vs.
Department of Justice, THE CITY FISCAL OF CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, THE
HONORABLE LEONARDO N. DEMECILLO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 24, Cagayan De Oro City, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents

Facts:

On 17 April 1975, William Tan, Joaquin Tan Leh and Vicente Tan, with 12 others,
were arrested and charged before the Military Commission 1, for the crimes of:
(1) murder through the use of an unlicensed or illegally-possessed firearm and for
the killing of Florentino Lim of the wealthy Lim Ket Kai family of Cagayan de Oro
City. Because the case was a "cause celebre" in Cagayan de Oro City, Pres.
Marcos withdrew his earlier order to transfer the case to the civil courts. Hence,
the case was retained in the military court.
All the accused were detained without bail in the PC Stockade in Camp Crame.

Issue:

W/N the reprosecution of Tan, et. al. would violate their right to protection against
double jeopardy?

Ruling:

Yes. The doctrine of "operative facts" applies to the proceedings against

the petitioners and their co-accused before Military Commission No. 1. The
principle of absolute invalidity of the jurisdiction of the military courts over civilians
should not be allowed to obliterate the "operative facts" that in the particular
case of the petitioners, the proceedings were fair, that there were no serious
violations of their constitutional right to due process, and that the jurisdiction of
the military commission that heard and decided the charges against them during
the period of martial law, had been affirmed by this Court years before the
Olaguer case arose and came before us.

PAGE 106
G.R. No. 150477 Feb. 28, 2005

Gayo,petitioner
vs.
Verceles,respondent

Facts:

Verceles is running for mayor and was subsequently proclaimed as the

winner in that election. Her proclamation was however questioned for the reason
that she is a greencard holder and has not complied with the residence
requirement.

Issue:

Is Verceles is disqualified to run as an elective official.

Ruling:

Supreme Court held that when Verceles abandoned her “greencard

holder” status when she surrendered her alien registration receipt card before the
Immigration and Naturalization Service of the American Embassy in Manila prior
to her filing for certificate of candidacy. Thus, when Verceles filed her certificate
of candidacy, she was no longer disqualified to run as an elective official
because of such waiver of permanent resident status in a foreign country.

PAGE 107
IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE 1989 ELECTION OF THE INTEGRATED BAR
OF THE PHILIPPINES BM No. 491 – October 6, 1989

Facts:

In June 3, 1989, national officers of the IBP were elected by the House Delegates
(composed of 120 chapter presidents or their alternatives) and were proclaimed
as officers. The newly elected officers were set to take their oath of office the
following day before the SC en banc but was suspended by the same due to
widespread reports received by some members of the Court from lawyers who
had witnessed or participated in the proceeding and the adverse comments
published in the columns of some newspapers about the intensive electioneering
and overspending by the candidates, led by the 3 principal candidates for the
office of the president of the association, namely, Attorneys Nereo Paculdo,
Ramon Nisce, and Violeto C. Drilon. Hence, the SC, in exercising its power of
supervision over the IBP, inquires into the veracity of the reports.

Issue:

WON the IBP By-laws are violated during the 1989 election of IBP officers.

Ruling:

Yes. A basic postulate of the IBP, heavily stressed at the time of its
organization and commencement of existence, is that the IBP shall be non-
political in character and that there shall be no lobbying nor campaigning in the
choice of members of the Board of Governors and of the House of Delegates,
and of the IBP officers, national or regional, or chapter. The fundamental
assumption was that officers, delegates and governors would be chosen on the
basis of professional merit and willingness and ability to serve.

PAGE 108
G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018
REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, represented by SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C.
CALIDA,petitioner
Vs
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO,respondent

Facts:
From 1986 to 2006, Sereno served as a member of the faculty of the
University of the Philippines-College of Law. While being employed at the UP Law,
or from October 2003 to 2006, Sereno was concurrently employed as legal
counsel of the Republic in two international arbitrations known as the PIATCO
cases, and a Deputy Commissioner of the Commissioner on Human Rights.
The Human Resources Development Office of UP (UP HRDO) certified that there
was no record on Sereno’s file of any permission to engage in limited practice of
profession. Moreover, out of her 20 years of employment, only nine (9) Statement
of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) were on the records of UP HRDO. In a
manifestation, she attached a copy of a tenth SALN, which she supposedly
sourced from the “filing cabinets” or “drawers of UP”. The Ombudsman likewise
had no record of any SALN filed by Sereno. The JBC has certified to the existence
of one SALN. In sum, for 20 years of service, 11 SALNs were recovered.

Issue:

Can the Court assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant
petition for quo warranto.

Ruling:

A quo warranto petition is allowed against impeachable officials and SC

has jurisdiction.
The SC have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and RTC to issue the extraordinary
writs, including quo warranto. A direct invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction
to issue such writs is allowed when there are special and important reasons
therefor, and in this case, direct resort to SC is justified considering that the action
is directed against the Chief Justice. Granting that the petition is likewise of
transcendental importance and has far-reaching implications, the Court is
empowered to exercise its power of judicial review. To exercise restraint in
reviewing an impeachable officer’s appointment is a clear renunciation of a
judicial duty. an outright dismissal of the petition based on speculation that
Sereno will eventually be tried on impeachment is a clear abdication of the
Court’s duty to settle actual controversy squarely presented before it.

PAGE 109
JUDGE RENATO A. FUENTES,petitioner
vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN-MINDANAO, GRAFT INVESTIGATION OFFICER II,
MARIVIC A. TRABAJO-DARAY, ANTONIO E. VALENZUELA in his capacity as the
Director for Fact Finding and Intelligence of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for Mindanao, and MARGARITO P. GERVACIO, JR., in his capacity as Deputy
Ombudsman for Mindanao,respondent.

Facts:

Pursuant to the government’s plan to construct its first fly-over in Davao City,
the Republic of the Philippines filed an expropriation case against the owners of
the properties affected by the project. The expropriation case was presided by
Judge Renato A. Fuentes. The government won the expropriation case. DPWH still
owed the defendants-lot owners. The lower court granted Tessie Amadeo’s
motion for the issuance of a writ of execution against the DPWH to satisfy her
unpaid claim. On May 3, 1994, respondent Sheriff Paralisan issued a Notice of
Levy, addressed to the Regional Director of the DPWH, Davao City, describing the
properties subject of the levy as ‘All scrap iron/junks found in the premises of the
Department of Public Works and Highways depot at Panacan, Davao City. The
auction sale pushed through and Alex Bacquial emerged as the highest
bidder. Meanwhile, Alex Bacquial, together with respondent Sheriff Paralisan,
attempted to withdraw the auctioned properties on May 19, 1994. They were,
however, prevented from doing so by the custodian of the subject DPWH
properties, a certain Engr. Ramon Alejo, who claimed that his office was totally
unaware of the auction sale, and informed the sheriff that many of the properties
within the holding area of the depot were still serviceable and were due for repair
and rehabilitation.

Issue:

Can the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation of acts of a judge in the

exercise of his official functions alleged to be in violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, in the absence of an administrative charge for the same
acts before the Supreme Court.

PAGE 110
Ruling:

Held: No.
Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989,
provides:

“Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have
the following powers, functions and duties: (1) Investigate and prosecute on its
own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take
over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the
investigation of such cases.”

Thus, the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative

complaint before his office against petitioner judge, pursuant to his power to
investigate public officers. The Ombudsman must indorse the case to the
Supreme Court, for appropriate action.

Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding
Justice of the Court of Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court clerk.

PAGE 111
PEOPLE,petitioner
V.
GACOTT, JR,respondent

Facts:

Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott Jr. filed a motion for reconsideration in lieu with
the decision of the Court of his penalty. He questions the competence of the
second division of this Court to administratively discipline him

ISSUE:

W/N a division of this Court is competent to administratively discipline a

member of the Judiciary

RULING:

Yes. Only cases involving the dismissal of judges of lower courts are
specifically required to be decided by the Court en banc, it is only when the
penalty imposed does not exceed suspension of more than one year or a fine of
P 10,000 or both that administrative matter may be decided in division.

PAGE 112
G.R. Nos. 140743 &140745, September 17, 2009
CITY GOVERNMENT OF TAGAYTAY,petitioner
Vs
Guerero,respondent

FACTS:

Tagaytay-Taal Tourist Development Corporation (TTTDC) is

the registered owner of two parcels of land. It incurred real estate tax liabilities on
the said properties for the tax years 1976 to 1983. For failure of TTTDC to settle
its delinquent real estate tax obligations, the City Government of Tagaytay
offered the properties for sale at a public auction. Being the only bidder,
a certificate of sale was executed in favor of the City of Tagaytay and was
correspondingly inscribed on the titles of the properties . The City of Tagaytay filed
an unnumbered petition for entry of new certificates of title in its favor before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite. RTC granted the petition. The TTTDC
appealed to the CA. The subject properties were later purchased by Amuerfina
Melencio-Herrera and Emiliana Melencio-Fernando (Melencios) for the amount
equivalent to the taxes and penalties due to the same. Meanwhile, during the
pendency of the case before the CA, TTTDC filed a petition for nullification of the
public auction involving the disputed properties on the ground that the properties
were not within the jurisdiction of the City of Tagaytay and thus, beyond its taxing
authority. On the other hand, the City of Tagaytay averred that based on
its Charter, said properties are within its territorial jurisdiction. The RTC denied this
motion

ISSUE:
WON the City of Tagaytay is liable for damages when it levied real estate
taxes on the subject properties

RULING:

YES. It is basic that before the City of Tagaytay may levy a certain property
for sale due to tax delinquency, the subject property should be under
its jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the failure of the city officials in this case to verify if the
property is within its jurisdiction before levying taxes on the same constitutes gross
negligence. The negligence of its officers in the performance of their official
functions gives rise to a an action ex contractu and quasi ex-delictu. Under
the doctrine of respondeat superior, the City of Tagaytay is liable for all the
necessary and natural consequences of the negligent acts of its city officials. It is
liable for the tortious acts committed by its agents who sold the properties to the
Melencios despite the clear mandate of RA No 1418, separating Barrio Birinayan
from its jurisdiction and transferring the same to the Province of Batangas.
Decision affirmed with modification.

PAGE 113
G.R. No. 178831-32

Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong, petitioner

vs
Comelec, respondent

Facts:

Limkaichong ran as a Representative in the first district of Negros Oriental.

Her rival Olivia Paras, and some other concerned citizens filed a disqualification
case against Limkaichong. The latter allegedly not a natural born citizen of the
Philippines because when she was born, her father was still a Chinese and that
her mom, though Filipino, lost her citizenship by virtue of her marriage to
Limkaichong’s dad. During the pendency of the case, election day came, and
votes were cast. Results came in and Limkaichong won over Paras. Comelec after
due hearing, declared Limkaichong as disqualified. Notwithstanding their
proclamation of disqualification, Comelec issued a proclamation declaring
Limkaichong as the winner. This is in compliance with Resolution no. 8062 adopting
the disqualification cases which shall be without prejudice to the continuation of
the hearing and resolution of the involved cases. Paras countered the
proclamation, filed a petition before the Comelec.

Issue:

WON the proclamation done by the Comelec is valid, and WON Comelec
should still exercise jurisdiction over the matter.

RULING:

The proclamation of Limkaichong is valid. the HRET must exercise jurisdiction

after Limkaichong’s proclamation. The SC has invariably held once a winning
candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath and assumed office as a
member of the House of Rep., the Comelec’s jurisdiction over election contests
relating to his election, returns, and disqualification ends and the HRET’s own
jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the proclamation of a winning candidate
divests the Comelec of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time
of proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should now present his
case in a proper proceeding before the HRET. The use of the word “sole” in Sec.17
Art. VI of the Constitution and in Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code
underscores the exclusivity of the electoral tribunal’s jurisdiction over election
contest relating to its members.

PAGE 114
G.R. No. 51042, September 30, 1982
MALACORA,petitioner
VS.
CA,respondent

Facts:

On December 20, 1953, at about noontime, plaintiffs, husband and wife,

together with their minor daughters, namely, Milagros, 13 years old, Raquel, about
4½ years old, and Fe, over 2 years old, boarded the Pambusco Bus No. 352,
bearing plate TPU No. 757 (1953 Pampanga), owned and operated by the
defendant, at San Fernando, Pampanga, bound for Anao, Mexico, Pampanga.
At the time, they were carrying with them four pieces of baggages containing
their personal belonging. The conductor of the bus, who happened to be a half-
brother of plaintiff Mariano Beltran, issued three tickets (Exhs. A, B, & C) covering
the full fares of the plaintiff and their eldest child, Milagros. No fare was charged
on Raquel and Fe, since both were below the height at which fare is charged in
accordance with the appellant's rules and regulations.

Issue:

Whether as to the child, who was already led by the father to a place
about 5 meters away from the bus, the liability of the carrier for her safety under
the contract of carriage also persisted.

Ruling:

The plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded the culpa or negligence upon which the
claim was predicated when it was alleged in the complaint that "the death of
Raquel Beltran, plaintiffs' daughter, was caused by the negligence and want of
exercise of the utmost diligence of a very cautious person on the part of the
defendants and their agent." This allegation was also proved when it was
established during the trial that the driver, even before receiving the proper signal
from the conductor, and while there were still persons on the running board of the
bus and near it, started to run off the vehicle. The presentation of proof of the
negligence of its employee gave rise to the presumption that the defendant
employer did not exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the
selection and supervision of its employees. And this presumption, as the Court of
Appeals found, petitioner had failed to overcome. Consequently, petitioner must
be adjudged peculiarily liable for the death of the child Raquel Beltran.

PAGE 115
RE: PROBLEM OF DELAYS IN CASES BEFORE THESANDIGANBAYAN.[A. M. No. 00-8-
05-SC. November 28, 2001]

Ponente: PARDO,J:

FACTS:
Submitted to the Court for consideration is a resolution of the Board of Governors,
the IBP, recommending an inquiry into the causes of delays in the resolution of
incidents and motions and in the decision of cases pending before the
Sandiganbayan.

In 2000, the IBP, through its National President, Arthur D. Lim, transmitted to the
Court a Resolution addressing the problem of delays in cases pending before the
Sandiganbayan

ISSUE:
What is the reglementary period within which the Sandiganbayan
mustdecide/resolve cases falling within its jurisdiction?

Ruling:

Period To Decide/Resolve Cases.-- There are two views. The first view is that
from the time a case is submitted for decision or resolution, the Sandiganbayan
has twelve (12) months to decide or resolve it. The second view is that as a court
with trial function, the Sandiganbayan has three (3) months to decide the case
from the date of submission for decision.

Article VIII, Section 15 (1) and (2), of the 1987 Constitution provides:
"Sec. 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must
be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission to the
Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelvemonths for all
lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts.

PAGE 116
AM No. MTJ-13-1838, Mar 12, 2014
SPS. RICARDO AND EVELYN MARCELO,petitioner
v.
JUDGE RAMSEY DOMINGO G. PICHAY,respondent

Facts:

Complainants Sps. Marcelo were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2004-286 for
unlawful detainer before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch
78 (MeTC). By virtue of a Joint Decision dated September 5, 2005 (subject
decision), the defendants therein, Sps. Magopoy, were ordered by the MeTC to
vacate and surrender the possession of the property located at Marcelo
Compound, Philip Street Extension, Barangay Moonwalk, Parañaque City (subject
property) to Sps. Marcelo. On April 14, 2006, a writ of executionwas issued, and
later implemented by Branch Sheriff Hildo D. Epres (Sheriff Epres) on July 27, 2006.
Thus, Sps. Marcelo obtained the possession of the subject property on the said
date, as shown in the Certificate of Turn-over of Possession. However, at around 6
o'clock in the evening of the same day, Sps. Magopoy successfully re-entered the
subject property and regained its possession.

Issue:
Whether or not Judge Pichay should be held administratively liable for
undue delay in the resolution of the pending incidents in Civil Case No. 2004-286.

Ruling:
The Court concurs with the OCA's recommendations, subject to the
modification of the recommended penalty to be imposed against Judge Pichay.

The Constitution requires our courts to conscientiously observe the time periods in
deciding cases and resolving matters brought to their adjudication, which, for
lower courts, is three (3) months from the date they are deemed submitted for
decision or resolution. Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
(1987 Constitution) states this rule, viz.:

Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must
be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the
Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all
lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts.

PAGE 117
192 SCRA 358 December 18, 1990
Brillantes,petitioner
vs.
Yorac,respondent

FACTS:

A coup attempt occurred in December 1989 prompting president Aquino

to create a fact finding commission which would be chaired by Hilario Davide.
Consequently he has to vacate his chairmanship over the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC). Haydee Yorac, an associate commissioner in the
COMELEC, was appointed by then President Corazon Aquino as a temporary
substitute.
The petitioner is challenging the designation on the ground that the choice of the
Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections is an internal matter that should
be resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the President of
the Philippines violates their independence. He cites the practice in this Court,
where the senior Associate Justice serves as Acting Chief Justice in the absence
of the Chief Justice. No designation from the President of the Philippines is
necessary.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the designation of the Acting Chairman of the COMELEC is
unconstitutional.

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that the designation is unconstitutional.

Article IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional
Commissions as “independent.” Although essentially executive in nature, they are
not under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their
respective functions. Each of these Commissions conducts its own proceedings
under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own
discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review on Certiorari
by this Court as provided by the Constitution in Article IX-A, Section 7. The choice
of a temporary chairman comes under that discretion. Such discretion cannot be
exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President of the Philippines.
The Court has not the slightest doubt that the President of the Philippines was
moved only by the best of motives when she issued the challenged designation.
But while conceding her goodwill, we cannot sustain her act because it conflicts
with the Constitution. Hence, even as this Court revoked the designation in the
Bautista case, so too must it annul the designation in the case at bar.

PAGE 118
GR No. 192791, April 24, 2012

Funa,petitioner
v.
COA Chair,respondent

FACTS:

This is a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Dennis A. B. Funa

challenging the constitutionality of the appointment of Reynaldo A. Villar as
Chairman of the Commission on Audit. On February 15, 2001, President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo appointed Guillermo N. Carague as Chairman of the
Commission on Audit (COA) for a term of seven (7) years, pursuant to the 1987
Constitution. Carague’s term of office started on February 2, 2001 to end on
February 2, 2008. Meanwhile, on February 7, 2004, President Macapagal Arroyo
appointed Reynaldo A. Villar as the third member of the COA for a term of seven
(7) years starting February 2, 2004 until February 2, 2011. Following Carague’s
retirement on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth year of Villar as COA
Commissioner, Villar was appointed as COA Chairman on April 18, 2008. He was
to serve as Chairman of COA, as expressly indicated in the appointment papers,
until the expiration of the original term of his office as COA Commissioner or on
February 2, 2011. Villar insists that his appointment as COA Chairman accorded
him a fresh term of seven (7) years which is yet to lapse. His term of office as
chairman is up to February 2, 2015 or 7 years reckoned from February 2, 2008 when
he was appointed to that position.

ISSUE:

WON whether the assailed appointment of respondent Villar as COA

Chairman is unconstitutional. (YES)

RULING:

Yes, the appointment of Villar as COA Chairman is unconstitutional

because according to Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution, “The Chairman and
Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by the President with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven
years, one commissioner for five years, and the other commissioner for three years,
without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In no case shall any member
be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

PAGE 119
G.R. No. 191672 November 25, 2014

DENNIS A. B. FUNA, Petitioner,

vs.
THE CHAIRMAN, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY LEANDRO R. MENDOZA, OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, Respondents.

Facts:

Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution and Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A,
Book V of EO 292 to ascertain the constitutionality of the designation of Duque, in
an ex officio capacity, as Director or Trustee of the GSIS, PHIC, ECC and HDMF.

Petitioner asserts that EO 864 and Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292
violate the independence of the CSC, which was constitutionally created to be
protected from outside influences and political pressures due to the significance
of its government functions. He further asserts that such independence is violated
by the fact that the CSC is not a part of the Executive Branch of Government
while the concerned GOCCs are considered instrumentalities of the Executive
Branch of the Government. In this situation, the President may exercise his power
of control over the CSC considering that the GOCCs in which Duque sits as Board
member are attached to the Executive Department.

Issue:

Does the designation of Duque as member of the Board of Directors or

Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, in an ex officio capacity, impair
the independence of the CSC and violate the constitutional prohibition against
the holding of dual or multiple offices for the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions?

Ruling:

The Court partially grants the petition. The Court upholds the
constitutionality of Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292, but declares
unconstitutional EO 864 and the designation of Duque in an ex officio capacity
as a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH,
ECC and HDMF.

PAGE 120
G.R. No. 140335, December 13, 2000

GAMINDE,petitioner
vs.
COA,respondent

Facts:

Thelma Gaminde was appointed by the President of the Philippines as

Commissioner of the Civil Service Commission, ad interim and assumed office on
June 22, 1993 after oath of office. The Commission on Appointments (COA) and
the Congress of the Philippines confirmed the appointment on September 7, 1993.
Gaminde, on February 24, 1998, sought the Office of the President for clarification
on the expiry date of her term of office. In response to her request, the Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel opined that her term office will expire on February 2,
2000 instead of February 2, 1999. Relying on said advisory opinion, Gaminde
remained in office after February 2, 1999. However, on February 4, 1999, Chairman
Corazon Alma de Leon wrote COA requesting opinion whether or not Gaminde
and her co-terminus staff may be paid their salaries notwithstanding the
expiration of their appointments on February 2, 1999. The General Counsel of COA
issued an opinion on February 18, 1999 that “the term of Commissioner Gaminde
has expired on February 2, 1999 as stated in her appointment conformably with
the constitutional intent.” Consequently, on March 24, 1999, CSC Resident Auditor
Flovitas Felipe issued a Notice of Disallowance, disallowing in audit the salaries
and emoluments of Gaminde and her co-terminus staff effective February 2, 1999.
Gaminde appealed COA’s disallowance but it was dismissed, and affirmed the
propriety of the disallowance; and held that the issue of Gaminde’s office term
may be properly addressed by mere reference to her appointment paper which
set the expiration date of February 2, 1999, and that the Commission was bereft
of power to recognize an extension of her term, not even with the implied
acquiescence of the Office of the President. Gaminde moved for
reconsideration, but was denied by COA.

Issue:

Whether the term of office of Thelma Gaminde, as Commissioner, Civil

Service Commission, to which she was appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on
February 2, 1999, as stated in the appointment paper, or on February 2, 2000, as
claimed by her.

RULING:

PAGE 121
 The term of office of Thelma P. Gaminde as the CSC Commissioner, as
appointed by President Fidel V. Ramos, expired on February 2, 1999. However, she
served as de-facto officer in good faith until February 2, 2000. The term of office
of the Chairman and members of the Civil Service Commission is prescribed in the
1987 Constitution under Article IX-D, Section 1 (2):
“The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President
withthe consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years
without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office
for seven years, a Commissioner for five years, and another Commissioner for
three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only
for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.”
Therefore, COA erred in disallowing in audit such salary and other emoluments.
Gaminde and her co-terminus staff are entitled to receive their salary and other
emoluments for actual service rendered.

PAGE 122
G.R. No. 230084, August 20, 2018
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), Petitioner
v.
COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINE V. PAEZ, Respondents.

FACTS:

On April 17, 2006, petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari and
Prohibition seeking the declaration of nullity of Section 1 of RA 9337 insofar as it
amends Section 27(c) of RA 8424, otherwise known as the NIRC by excluding
petitioner from the enumeration of government-owned or controlled
corporations (GOCCs) exempted from liability for corporate income tax.
On March 15, 2011, SC partly granted the petition insofar as it held that the BIR
Revenue Regulation No. 16-2005 which subjects PAGCOR to 10% VAT is null and
void for being contrary to the NIRC. It also held that Section 1 of RA 9337 is valid
and constitutional.

BIR issued RMC No. 33-2013 on April 17, 2013 pursuant to the decision which
clarifies the “Income Tax and Franchise Tax Due from PAGCOR, its Contractees
and Licensees.” It now subjects the income from PAGCOR’s operations and
licensing of gambling casinos, gaming clubs and other similar recreation or
amusement places, gaming pools, and other related operations, to corporate
income tax under the NIRC.

PAGCOR filed a Motion for Clarification in the case entitled PAGCOR vs The
Bureau of Internal Revenue, et al., which was promulgated on March 15, 2011
which also prays for the issuance of a TRO and/or writ of Preliminary Injunction
against BIR in the implementation of BIR Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 33-
2013 dated April 17, 2013. PAGCOR alleges that said RMC is an erroneous
interpretation and application of the aforesaid decision.

ISSUE:

Whether PAGCOR’s gaming income is subject to both 5% franchise tax and

income tax?

RULING:

Gaming Income: Franchise Tax – YES; Income Tax - NO

PAGE 123
Under PD 1869, as amended, petitioner is subject to income tax only with respect
to its operations of related services. Accordingly, the income tax exemption
ordained under Section 27(c) of RA 8424 clearly pertains only to petitioner’s
income from operation of related services. Such income tax exemption could not
have been applicable to petitioner’s income from gaming operations as it is
already exempt therefrom under PD 1869.

There was no need for Congress to grant tax exemption to petitioner with respect
to its income from gaming operating as the same is already exempted from all
taxes of any kind or form, income or otherwise, whether national or local, under
its Charter, save only for the five percent (5%) franchise tax. The exemption
attached to the income from gaming operations exists independently would be
downright ridiculous, if not deleterious, since petitioner would be in a worse
position if the exemption was granted (then withdrawn) then when it was not
granted at all in the first place.

PAGE 124
G.R. NO. 141020 June 12, 2008
CASINO LABOR ASSOCIATION, Petitioner,
v.
COURT OF APPEALS, PHIL. CASINO OPERATORS CORPORATION (PCOC) and PHIL.
SPECIAL SERVICES CORPORATION (PSSC), Respondents.

FACTS:

The petitioner labor union filed consolidated cases with the Arbitration
Branch of the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the consolidated cases for lack
of jurisdiction over the respondents therein, Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR) and Philippine Casino Operators Corporation (PCOC).
On appeal to the NLRC, the Commission en banc dismissed the separate appeals
filed by the petitioner on the ground that the NLRC has no jurisdiction over
PAGCOR.
Petitioner then elevated the case to this Court, via a petition for review on
certiorari and the Third Division of the Court dismissed the petition for failure of the
petitioner to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC.

ISSUE:
Can the Court of Appeals ignore the mandate of the Honorable Supreme
Court's Resolution In G.R. 85922, that petitions against private respondents PCOC
and PSSC should be tried by the Commission (NLRC) thru its Arbitration Branch?

RULING:

Yes, a close scrutiny of the full text of the 23 January and 15 March 1989
Resolutions in G.R. No. 85922 sheds much needed light. In the first Resolution, the
Third Division of this Court dismissed the petitioner's case in this wise:
The issue in this case is whether or not the National Labor Relations Commission
has jurisdiction over employee-employer problems in the Philippine Amusement
and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), the Philippine Casino Operators
Corporation (PCOC), and the Philippine Special Services Corporation (PSSC).
The present Constitution specifically provides in Article IX B, Section 2(1) that "the
civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies
of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters." (Emphasis supplied)
There appears to be no question from the petition and its annexes that the
respondent corporations were created by an original charter, P.D. No. 1869 in
relation to P.D. Nos. 1067-A, 1067-C, 1399 and 1632.

PAGE 125
G.R. No. 88167 May 3, 1993
University of the Philippines,petitioner
v.
Regino,respondent

FACTS:

Private respondent Angel Pamplina, a mimeograph operator at the

University of the Philippines was dismissed after being found guilty of causing the
leakage of final examination questions. After seeking relief from Merit Systems
Board (MSB), MSB ruled in favor of respondent. Thus, UP appealed to the Civil
Service Commission which sustained the MSB and ordered respondent’s
reinstatement. On RTC, respondent’s immediate reinstatement was also ordered.
However, UP contends that under Section 6(e) of its charter, Act 1870, UP Board
of Regents has the power “to appoint, on recommendation of the president of
the university, professors, instructors, lecturers, and other employees of the
university, to fix their compensation and to remove them for cause after an
investigation and hearing shall have been had.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the administrative cases involving the discipline of

petitioner’s employees come under the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission.

RULING:

Yes. As a mere government-owned or controlled corporation, UP was

clearly a part of the Civil Service under the 1973 Constitution and now continues
to be so because it was created by a special law and has an original charter. As
a component of the Civil Service, UP is therefore governed by PD 807 and
administrative cases involving the discipline of its employees come under the
appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

Under the 1973 Constitution, all government-owned or controlled corporations,

regardless of the manner of their creation, were considered part of the Civil
Service. Under the 1987 Constitution only government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters fall within the scope of the Civil Service
pursuant to Article IX-B, Section 2(1), which states: “The Civil Service embraces all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.”

PAGE 126
GR No. 113212, 1995-12-29

Department of Health,petitioner
vs
NLRC,respondent

Facts:

Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition... filed by the Department of Health in

behalf of the Dr. Jose N. Rodriguez Memorial Hospital (DJRMH) and its Director,
Cesar J. Viardo, seeking to review and set aside the Resolution of the National
Labor Relations Commission... which dismissed herein petitioners' appeal from the
January 2, 1992 Decision of Labor Arbiter Cornelio L. Linsangan. Private
respondent Ceferino R. Laur was a patient of the then Tala Leprosarium (now Jose
N. Rodriguez Memorial Hospital),... treatment of Hansen's disease, commonly
termed leprosy. he was employed at the DJRMH as a patient-assistant by the then
Hospital Director, Dr. Artemio F. Runez... assigned as a member of the Patient-
Assistant Police Force... compensation/salary, initially, in the amount of P110.00...
gradually increased... complaints for Alarm and Scandal, Oral Defamation,
Grave Threats, Concealment of Deadly Weapon, Violation of the Code of Ethics
of Policemen, and Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer were filed against
said private respondent... finding of guilt... penalty of suspension for sixty (60)
days... stern warning... private respondent Laur got involved in the mauling of one,
Jake Bondoc, along with two policemen Private respondent's account of the
incident is... a group of twelve (12) young boys engaged another group of four
male youngsters (4) in a stone-throwing encounter... resulted in damage to the
windows of the nearby Holy Rosary College

Issues:

Which Government agency the National Labor Relations Commission or

the Civil Service Commission has jurisdiction over contests relating to the civil...
service?... whether or not respondents NLRC and Labor Arbiter Cornelio L.
Linsangan committed serious error in their decisions and acted without
jurisdiction... when they took cognizance of the complaint filed by private
respondent Ceferino R. Laur... before the NLRC instead of the Civil Service
Commission.

PAGE 127
Ruling:

We find the petition to be impressed with merit.

DJRMH, originally known as the Tala Leprosarium, was one of three leper colonies
established under Commonwealth Act No. 161 DJRMH... exercises strictly
governmental functions relating to the management and control of the dreaded
communicable Hansen's disease, commonly known as leprosy. it is clearly an
agency of the Government, the DJRMH falls well within the scope and/or
coverage of the Civil Service Law As the central personnel agency of the
Government, the Civil Service Commission administers the Civil Service Law. It is,
therefore, the single arbiter of all contests relating to the civil service. Conformably
to the foregoing, it is, indeed, the Civil Service Commission which has jurisdiction
over the present controversy. it was incorrect for the respondent labor arbiter to
have proceeded to hear the case, simply because private respondent Ceferino
Laur... happened to lodge his complaint before his office,... WHEREFORE, finding
the Dr. Jose N. Rodriguez Memorial Hospital to be within the scope of the Civil
Service Law and not of the Labor Code.

PAGE 128
G.R. No. 185766 November 23, 2010

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitioner,

v.
COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE,Respondents.

Ponente: Mendoza, J.:

FACTS:

OnMarch 16, 2005, the Board of Directors of PCSO resolved to appoint

Josefina A. Sarsonas(Sarsonas)as Assistant Department Manager II of the Internal
Audit Department (IAD) of PCSO under temporary status. Thus, on the same day,
PCSO General Manager Rosario Uriarte issued a temporary appointment
to Sarsonas as Assistant Department Manager II. The Civil Service Commission
Field Office Office of the President(CSCFO-OP)disapproved the temporary
appointment of Sarsonas as she failed to meet the eligibility requirement for the
position PCSO filed an appeal with the CSC-National Capital Region(CSC-
NCR).The CSC-NCR affirmed the disapproval by CSCFO-OP of the temporary
appointment of Sarsonas on the following grounds: (a) that she failed to meet the
eligibility requirement; and (b) that there were two
qualified eligibles who signified their interest to be appointed to the said position,
as certified by CSCFO-OP. The CSC denied the appeal. The CA then reversed the
decision of the CSC upon the appeal of PCSO.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the position of Assistant Department Manager II falls under

the CES.

RULING:

The petition has no merit.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Civil Service Commission

The CES covers presidential appointees only. Corollarily, as the position of Assistant
Department Manager II does not require appointment by the President of
thePhilippines, it does not fall under the CES. Therefore, the temporary
appointments of Sarsonasand Ortega as Assistant Department Manager II do not
require third level eligibility pursuant to the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations.

PAGE 129
In order for a position to be covered by the CES, two elements must concur.First,
the position musteitherbe (1) a position enumerated under Book V, Title I,
Subsection A, Chapter 2, Section 7(3) of the Administrative Code of 1987, i.e.
Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director,
Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department Service,or(2)
a position of equal rank as those enumerated,and identified by the Career
Executive Service Board to be such position of equal rank.Second, the holder of
the position must be a presidential appointee. Failing in any of these
requirements, a position cannot be considered as one covered by the third-level
or CES.

In the case at bench, it is undisputed that the position of Assistant Department

Manager II is not one of those enumerated under the Administrative Code of
1987. There is also no question that the CESB has not identified the position to be
of equal rank to those enumerated.Lastly, without a doubt, the holder of the
position of Assistant Department Manager II is appointed by the PCSO General
Manager, and not by the President of thePhilippines. Accordingly, the position of
Assistant Department Manager II in the PCSO is not covered by the third-level or
CES, and does not require CSE eligibility.

PAGE 130
 Geronimo vs. Ramos 135 SCRA 435, May 14, 1995
Gutierrez, Jr, J.:
Facts:

On January 8, 1980, private respondent Julian Pendre filed a petition with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify petitioner Meliton C. Geronimo
from running as a candidate for the mayorship of Baras, Rizal on the ground of
political turncoatism. After hearing the petition, the COMELEC on January 1980
issued Resolution No. 8305 disqualifying Meliton C. Geronimo. On January 22,
1980, Geronimo filed a motion to reconsider the said resolution, and on January
28, 1980 or two days before the elections, he filed with this Court a petition for
certiorari to restrain the COMELEC from implementing its resolution. Or the same
day, this Court issued a temporary restraining order against the COMELEC. In the
elections of January 30, 1980, Geronimo obtained a margin of 325 votes when he
garnered 2,695 votes as against his opponent Bayani Ferrera’s 2,370 votes. On
March 11, 1980, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9554, reinstating the
proclamation made earlier by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Baras, Rizal
in favor of Geronimo as the winning candidate for mayor. On September 26,
1981, this Court rendered a decision in G.R. No. 52413, entitled "Meliton C.
Geronimo v. Commission on Elections and Julian C. Pendre", dismissing the
petition for certiorari and ordering the lifting of the restraining order of January 28,
1980. We ruled that Geronimo was disqualified to run as a candidate for mayor
for being a political turncoat. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but
it was denied with finality on January 19, 1982.
Issue: Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the COMELEC.

Ruling: There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent

COMELEC when it held the petitioner guilty of contempt. However, we find the
penalty of five (5) months imprisonment to be harsh. Time and again, this Court
has held that the power to punish for contempt should be exercised on the
preservative and not on the vindictive principle, on the corrective and not on
the retaliatory Idea of punishment. (See Repeque v. Aquilizan, 130 SCRA 258;
Lipata v. Tutaan, 124 SCRA 880, citing Gamboa v. Teodoro, 91 Phil. 270; and
People v. Alarcon, 69 Phil. 265; Yangson v. Salandanan, 68 SCRA 43, Balasabas
v. Aquilizan, 106 SCRA 502; and Sulit v. Tiangco, 115 SCRA 211-212).

PAGE 131
 BANAT Partylist vs. COMELEC 595 SCRA 477, August 7, 2009

Carpio, J.:
Facts:

Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT)

filed before the National Board of Canvassers (NBC) a petition to proclaim the
full number of party list representatives provided by the Constitution. However,
the recommendation of the head of the legal group of COMELEC’s national
board of canvassers to declare the petition moot and academic was approved
by the COMELEC en banc. BANAT filed for petition for certiorari and mandamus
assailing the resolution of COMELEC to their petition to proclaim the full number
of party list representatives provided by the Constitution. The COMELEC, sitting
as the NBC, promulgated a resolution proclaiming thirteen (13) parties as
winners in the party-list elections in May 2007. The COMELEC announced that,
upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results, it would determine the
total number of seats of each winning party, organization, or coalition in
accordance with the Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC formula. Bayan
Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action,
Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms asked the COMELEC,
acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula, COMELEC
denied the consideration. Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher filed for
certiorari with mandamus and prohibition assailing the resolution of the
COMELEC in its decision to use the Veterans formula.
Issue: Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections?
Ruling: Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties
fromparticipating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the
Constitutionclearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list
elections throughtheir sectoral wings. Also, in defining a "party" that participates
in party-list elections aseither "a political party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941
also clearly intended thatmajor political parties will participate in the party-list
elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly
against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A.
No. 7941. However, by the vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling
in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections, directly or indirectly.

PAGE 132
GMA vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014
Peralta, J.:

Facts:
The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged unconstitutionality
of Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 limiting the broadcast and
radio advertisements of candidates and political parties for national election
positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one
hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively.

They contend that such restrictive regulation on allowable broadcast time

violates freedom of the press, impairs the people’s right to suffrage as well as
their right to information relative to the exercise of their right to choose who to
elect during the forthcoming elections.

Section 9 (a) provides for an “aggregate total” air time instead of the previous
“per station” airtime for political campaigns or advertisements, and also
required prior COMELEC approval for candidates’ television and radio guesting
and appearances.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on airtime limits
violates freedom of expression, of speech and of the press.

Ruling:
YES. The Court held that the assailed rule on “aggregatebased” airtime limits is
unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of
candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the
people. Here, the adverted reason for imposing the “aggregate-based” airtime
limits – leveling the playing field – does not constitute a compelling state interest
which would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates
and political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and
programs of government. And, this is specially so in the absence of a clear-cut
basis for the imposition of such a prohibitive measure.

It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the aggregate-

based time limits on broadcast time when we consider that the Philippines is not
only composed of so many islands. There are also a lot of languages and
dialects spoken among the citizens across the country.

Accordingly, for a national candidate to really reach out to as many of the

electorates as possible, then it might also be necessary that he conveys his

PAGE 133
message through his advertisements in languages and dialects that the people
may more readily understand and relate to. To add all of these airtimes in
different dialects would greatly hamper the ability of such candidate to express
himself – a form of suppression of his political speech.

PAGE 134
 SWS v. COMELEC GR No. 147571, May 5, 2001
Mendoza, J.:

Facts: Petitioner SWS and KPC states that it wishes to conduct an election
survey throughout the period of the elections and release to the media the
results of such survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioners argue that the
restriction on the publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint
on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to
justify such restraint.
Issue: Are the Comelec Resolutions prohibiting the holding of pre-polls and exit
polls and the dissemination of their results through mass media, valid and
constitutional?

Ruling:
No. The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior
restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a
category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period,
and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by
means other than suppression of freedom of expression.
It has been held that "[mere] legislative preferences or beliefs respecting
matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other
personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of
rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.”
Dela Llana vs. COA 665 SCRA 176, February 7, 2012 Sereno, J.: Facts: On 26
October 1982, the COA issued Circular No. 82-195, lifting the system of pre-audit
of government financial transactions, albeit with certain exceptions. The circular
affirmed the state policy that all resources of the government shall be
managed, expended or utilized in accordance with law and regulations, and
safeguarded against loss or wastage through illegal or improper disposition, with
a view to ensuring efficiency, economy and effectiveness in the operations of
government. After the change in administration due to the February 1986
revolution, grave irregularities and anomalies in the government's financial
transactions were uncovered. Hence, on 31 March 1986, the COA issued
Circular No. 86-257, which reinstated the pre-audit of selected government
transactions. The selective pre-audit was perceived to be an effective, although
temporary, remedy against the said anomalies. Two years later, or on 22
July 2011, COA issued Circular No. 2011-002, which lifted the pre-audit of

PAGE 135
government transactions implemented by Circular No. 2009002. In its
assessment, subsequent developments had shown heightened vigilance of
government agencies in safeguarding their resources. On 15 January 2008,
petitioner filed this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. He alleges that the pre-
audit duty on the part of the COA cannot be lifted by a mere circular,
considering that pre-audit is a constitutional mandate enshrined in Section 2 of
Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. He further claims that, because of the lack
of pre-audit by COA, serious irregularities in government transactions have been
committed, such as the P728-million fertilizer fund scam, irregularities in the P550-
million call center laboratory project of the Commission on Higher Education,
and many others. Issue: Whether or not the COA’s power includes the duty to
conduct pre-audit Ruling: Petitioner's allegations find no support in the
aforequoted Constitutional provision. There is nothing in the said provision that
requires the COA to conduct a pre-audit of all government transactions and for
all government agencies. The only clear reference to a pre-audit requirement is
found in Section 2, paragraph 1, which provides that a post-audit is mandated
for certain government or private entities with state subsidy or equity and only
when the internal control system of an audited entity is inadequate. In such a
situation, the COA may adopt measures, including a temporary or special pre-
audit, to correct the deficiencies. Hence, the conduct of a pre-audit is not a
mandatory duty that this Court may compel the COA to perform. This discretion
on its part is in line with the constitutional pronouncement that the COA has the
exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination. When the
language of the law is clear and explicit, there is no room for interpretation, only
application. 19 Neither can the scope of the provision be unduly enlarged by
this Court. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DISMISSED.

PAGE 136
 YAP vs. COA 619 SCRA 154, April 23, 2010
Leonardo-De Castro, J.

Facts:

Ramon R. Yap is holder of a regular position of Department Manager of the

National Development Company (NDC), a government-owned and controlled
corporation with original charter. He was appointed by the Board of Directors,
Manila Gas Corporation (MGC), a subsidiary of NDC as Vice-President for
Finance effective June 14, 1991while remaining as a regular employee of NDC.
The additional employment entitled him to honoraria equivalent to fifty percent
(50%) of his basic salary at NDC and various allowances attached to the office.

In the course of the regular audit, the Corporate Auditor, MGC issued notices of
disallowances against Mr. Ramon R. Yap which were predicated on the ground
that appellant’s appointment to MGC in addition to his regular position as
Department Manager III of NDC and the subsequent receipt of the questioned
allowances and reimbursements from the former directly contravened the
proscription contained in Section 7 (2) and Section 8, Article IXb of the
Constitution.

Mr. Yap appealed the Auditors disallowances primarily contending that the
questioned benefits were all approved by the MGC Board of Directors.
Petitioners appeal was denied by the CAO II, which affirmed the MGC
Corporate Auditors findings. Unperturbed, petitioner sought a reconsideration of
the CAO II ruling from respondent COA arguing that his assignment to MGC was
required by the primary functions of his office and was also authorized by law,
namely Executive Order No. 284 issued on July 25, 1987.

In turn, respondent COA denied petitioners appeal in herein assailed COA

Decision No. 2002-213.It upheld the CAO IIs ruling that characterized the
disallowed allowances and reimbursements as prohibited by the
Constitution.Furthermore, it also ruled that the said allowances and
reimbursements claimed by petitioner failed to pass the test of public purpose
requirement of the law and further emphasized that it is not enough that
payments made to petitioner be authorized by the Board of Directors of the

PAGE 137
MGC but it is likewise necessary that said payments do not contravene the
principles provided for under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1445 on the
use of government funds, more specifically on the public purpose requirement
that is provided in Section 4(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1445, otherwise known
as the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines.A Motion for
Reconsiderationwas subsequently filed by petitioner, but this was likewise denied
by respondent COA in COA Decision No. 2003-087

Issue: Did the COA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it used as a basis the public purpose requirement in affirming
the questioned disallowances?

Ruling:

Any disbursement of public funds, which includes payment of salaries and

benefits to government employees and officials, must (a) be authorized by law,
and (b) serve a public purpose. Public purpose in relation to disbursement of
public funds means any purpose or use directly available to the general public
as a matter of right. Thus, it has also been defined as an activity as will serve as
benefit to the community as a body and which at the same time is directly
related function of government. However, the concept of public use is not
limited to traditional purposes. Here as elsewhere, the idea that public use is
strictly limited to clear cases of use by the public has been discarded. In fact,
this Court has already categorically stated that the term public purpose is not
defined, since it is an elastic concept that can be hammered to fit modern
standards. It should be given a broad interpretation; therefore, it does not only
pertain to those purposes that which are traditionally viewed as essentially
government functions, such as building roads and delivery of basic services, but
also includes those purposes designed to promote social justice. Thus, public
money may now be used for the relocation of illegal settlers, low-cost housing
and urban or agrarian reform.

In short, public use is now equated with public interest, and that it is not
unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of
persons. In view of the public purpose requirement, the disbursement of public
funds, salaries and benefits of government officers and employees should be

PAGE 138
granted to compensate them for valuable public services rendered, and the
salaries or benefits paid to such officers or employees must be commensurate
with services rendered. In the same vein, additional allowances and benefits
must be shown to be necessary or relevant to the fulfillment of the official duties
and functions of the government officers and employees. Petitioners theory that
the compensation and benefits of public officers are intended purely for the
personal benefit of such officers, or that the mere payment of salaries and
benefits to a public officer satisfies the public purpose requirement is wrong. That
theory would lead to the anomalous conclusion that government officers and
employees may be paid enormous sums without limit or without any justification
necessary other than that such sums are being paid to someone employed by
the government. Public funds are the property of the people and must be used
prudently at all times with a view to prevent dissipation and waste.

PAGE 139
 Pacete vs. Acting Chairman of the COA 185 SCRA 1, July 23, 1971
Fernando, J.

Facts:
Petitioner Felizardo S. Pacete alleged that he was appointed by the then
President of the Philippines on August 31, 1964 as Municipal Judge of
Pigcawayan, Cotabato. He assumed office on September 11, 1964 and
discharged his duties as such. As his appointment, was made during the recess
of Congress, it was submitted to the Commission on Appointments at its next
session in 1965. On February 7, 1966, the then Secretary of Justice, whom he
likewise included in his petition, through the Judicial Superintendent, advised
petitioner to vacate his position as municipal judge, the ground being that his
appointment had been by-passed. Senator Rodolfo Ganzon, wrote to its
Chairman stating that he was filing a motion for the reconsideration of the
confirmation of the appointment of petitioner as municipal judge of
Pigcawayan, Cotabato, in view of derogatory information which he had
received. Respondent Secretary of the Commission on Appointments thus was
led to notify the then Secretary of Justice accordingly, following what he
considered to be the prevailing practice of such body that the mere
presentation of such letter "automatically vacated the confirmation of the
appointment in question". Respondent Secretary of Justice through the Judicial
Superintendent then advised petitioner that he should vacate his position as
municipal judge, as he had not been duly confirmed. The Disbursing Officer of
the Department of Justice was likewise named respondent as he had, as a
consequence, withheld petitioner's salaries.

Issue:

Whether the confirmation of his appointment had become final and executory
upon the adjournment of the fourth regular session of the Fifth Congress at
midnight of May 21, 1965.

Ruling:

Yes. The controlling principle is Altarejos v. Molo which interpreted Rule 21 of the
Revised Rules of Commission on Appointments. It held that mere filing of motion

PAGE 140
for reconsideration did not have the effect of setting aside a confirmation.
Instead, it will only reopen the appointment and submit it for approval or
disapproval by the majority of members of the Commission on Appointments.

Moreover, there is distinction between appointments made during recess of

Congress and appointments while Congress is in session. When Congress is in
session, presidential nominees can only assume office once confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments. When Congress is in recess, the President makes
ad interim appointments which take effect at once. The individual chosen may
qualify and perform his function. The appointment is effective until the
disapproval of the Commission on Appointments or next adjournment of
Congress.

PAGE 141
 Albon vs. Fernando 494 SCRA 141, June 30, 2006
Corona, J.

Facts:
In May 1999, the City of Marikina undertook a public works project to widen,
clear and repair the existing sidewalks of Marikina Green Heights Subdivision. It
was undertaken by the city government pursuant to Ordinance No. 59.
Subsequently, petitioner Albon filed a taxpayer’s suit for certiorari, prohibition
and injunction with damages against respondents City Engineer Alfonso Espirito,
Assistant City Engineer Anaki Maderal and City Treasurer Natividad Cabalquinto.
According to the petitioner it was unconstitutional and unlawful for respondents
to use government equipment and property, and to disburse public funds, of
the City of Marikina for the grading, widening, clearing, repair and maintenance
of the existing sidewalks of Marikina Green Heights Subdivision. He alleged that
the sidewalks were private property because Marikina Green Heights Subdivision
was owned by V.V. Soliven, Inc. Hence, the city government could not use
public resources on them. In undertaking the project, therefore, respondents
allegedly violated the constitutional proscription against the use of public funds
for private purposes as well as Sections 335 and 336 of RA 7160 and the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The trial court ruled in favor of the respondents.
Ordinance No. 59 is a valid enactment. The court recognized the inherent
police power of the municipality and with this it is allowed to carry out the
contested works. The Court of Appeals sustained the decision of the trial court
stating that sidewalks of Marikina Green Heights Subdivision were public in
nature and ownership thereof belonged to the City of Marikina or the Republic
of the Philippines following the 1991 White Plains Association decision. Thus, the
improvement and widening of the sidewalks pursuant to Ordinance No. 59 of
1993 was well within the LGU’s powers.

Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the validity of

Ordinance No. 59.

Ruling: NO. Like all LGUs, the City of Marikina is empowered to enact
ordinances for the purposes set forth in the Local Government Code (RA 7160).
It is expressly vested with police powers delegated to LGUs under the general
welfare clause of RA 7160. With this power, LGUs may prescribe reasonable
regulations to protect the lives, health, and property of their constituents and
maintain peace and order within their respective territorial jurisdictions.

PAGE 142
Also, in the exercise of their inherent police power the cities and municipalities
have the power to exercise such powers and discharge such functions and
responsibilities as may be necessary, appropriate or incidental to efficient and
effective provisions of the basic services and facilities, including infrastructure
facilities intended primarily to service the needs of their residents and which are
financed by their own funds. These infrastructure facilities include municipal or
city roads and bridges and similar facilities. Regarding the nature of ownership
of the sidewalks in question, there is also no hindrance in declaring that the
sidewalks are of public dominion. PD 957, as amended by PD 1216, mandates
subdivision owners to set aside open spaces which shall be devoted exclusively
for the use of the general public.

PAGE 143
 Funa vs. Meco G.R. No. 193462, February 4, 2014
Perez, J.

Facts:
The Manila Economic and Cultural Office (MECO) was organized on December
16, 1997 as a non-stock, non-profit corporation under Batas Pambansa 68 or the
Corporation Code. The purposes underlying the incorporation of MECO, as
stated in its articles of incorporation, are as follows: 1) to establish and develop
the commercial and industrial interests of Filipino nationals here and abroad,
and assist on all measures designed to promote and maintain the trade relations
of the country with the citizens of other foreign countries; 2) to receive and
accept grants and subsidies that are reasonably necessary in carrying out the
corporate. To receive and accept grants and subsidies that are reasonably
necessary in carrying out the corporate purposes provided they are not subject
to conditions defeatist for or incompatible with said purpose; 3) to acquire by
purchase, lease or by any gratuitous title real and personal properties as may be
necessary for the use and need of the corporation, and to dispose of the same
in like manner when they are no longer needed or useful and 4) to do and
perform any and all acts which are deemed necessary to carry out the
purposes. On August 23, 2010, petitioner sent a letter to the COA requesting for
a copy of the latest financial and audit report of the MECO invoking, for that
purpose, his constitutional right to information on matters of public concern. The
petitioner made the request on the belief that the MECO, being under the
operational supervision of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), is a
government owned and controlled corporation (GOCC) and thus subject to the
audit jurisdiction of the COA. Taking the August 25, 2010 memorandum as an
admission that the COA had never audited and examined the accounts of the
MECO, the petitioner filed the instant petition for mandamus on September 8,
2010. Petitioner filed the suit in his capacities as taxpayer, concerned citizen, a
member of the Philippine Bar and law book author. He impleaded the COA and
the MECO.
Issue: Is MECO a GOCC?

Ruling: The MECO is not a GOCC or government instrumentality. The

Administrative Code defines a GOCC; Government-owned or controlled
corporation refers to any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation,
vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or
propriety in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its
instrumentalities either wholly, or, where-applicable as in the case of stock
corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one per cent of its capital. By

PAGE 144
definition, three attributes thus make an entity a GOCC: first, its organization as
stock or non-stock corporation; second, the public character of its function; and
third, government ownership over the same. In this case, there is not much
dispute that the MECO possesses the first and second attributes. It is the third
attribute, which the MECO lacks. The MECO is not owned or controlled by the
Government Organization as a non-stock corporation and the mere
performance of functions with a public aspect, however, are not by themselves
sufficient to consider the MECO as GOCC.

PAGE 145
 Nacion vs. COA G.R. No. 204757, March 17, 2015
Reyes, J.

Facts:
Petitioner was administratively charged by Commission on Audit (COA) for
grave misconduct. She was assigned by COA in Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewage System (MWSS). During the petitioner’s assignment in MWSS from 2001 to
2003, she availed of the MWSS Multi-Purpose Loan Program, such as car loan,
housing loan, and received benefits and bonuses from the latter. Petitioner
avers that she availed of the housing and car loan in an honest belief that she
could avail of the benefits in the absence of any prohibition thereon,
considering that COA Resolution that prohibited COA personnel from availing of
all forms of loan, monetary benefits from agencies under their jurisdiction was
issued only on 2004. She denied receiving any allowances and bonuses and
argued that the documents submitted to establish the same are not conclusive
evidence that she indeed received the money. COA cited violation of Sec. 18
of RA 6758 prohibiting COA personnel from receiving salaries, bonuses,
allowances or other emoluments from government entity, local government
unit, GOCCs and government financial institution, except the compensation
directly paid by COA. She was give one-year suspension as penalty, finding in
her favor mitigating circumstances her waiver of the formal investigation and
admission of availment of MWSS Housing and Car Loans The petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration was denied. She avers that she was denied of the right to
due process as she argues that the records during her tenure with the MWSS
should not have been included by the audit team in its investigations, as no
office order covering it was issued by the COA Chairman.

Issue:
Whether or not COA committed grave abuse of discretion in finding Nacion
guilty of grave misconduct and violation of reasonable office rules and
regulations.

Ruling:
NO. Given the COA’s mandate to look after the compliance with laws and
standards in the handling of funds of government agencies where they are
assigned to, COA personnel must prevent any act that may influence them in
the discharge of their duties. The primary function of an auditor is to prevent

PAGE 146
irregular, unnecessary, excessive, or extravagant expenditure of government
funds. To be able to properly perform their constitutional mandate, COA officials
need to be insulated from unwarranted influences, so they can act with
independence and integrity. The removal of the temptation and aggressively
enforcing the extra emoluments may provide is designed to be an effective
way of vigorously and aggressively enforcing the Constitutional provision
mandating the COA to prevent or disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds and
properties.

PAGE 147
 Corona vs. Senate of the Philippines G.R. No. 200242, July 17, 2012
Villarama, Jr., J.:

Facts:
Citing previous instances when President Aquino openly... expressed his rejection
of petitioner's appointment as Chief Justice and publicly attacked this Court
under the leadership of petitioner for "derailing his administration's mandate,"
petitioner concluded that the move to impeach him was the handiwork of
President Aquino's party... mates and supporters, including "hidden forces" who
will be benefited by his ouster. Petitioner thus prayed for the following reliefs: (a)
Immediately upon filing of this Petition, issue a temporary restraining order or a
writ of preliminary injunction enjoining: (i) the proceedings before the
Impeachment Court; (ii) implementation of Resolution dated 6 February 2012;
(iii) the officers or... representatives of BPI and PSBank from testifying and
submitting documents on petitioner's or his family's bank accounts; and (iv) the
presentation, reception and admission of evidence on paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4
of the Impeachment Complaint; (b) After giving due course to the Petition,
render judgment: (i) Declaring the Impeachment Complaint null and void ab
initio; (ii) Prohibiting the presentation, reception and admission of evidence on
paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 of the Impeachment Complaint; (iii) Annulling the
Impeachment Court's Resolution dated 27 January 2012 and 6 February 2011
[sic], as well as any Subpoenae issued pursuant thereto; and (iv) Making the TRO
and/or writ of preliminary injunction permanent. Other reliefs, just or equitable,
are likewise prayed for. Petitioner also sought the inhibition of Justices Antonio T.
Carpio and Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno on the ground of partiality, citing their
publicly known "animosity" towards petitioner aside from the fact that they have
been openly touted as the likely replacements in the... event that petitioner is
removed from office. Petitioner likewise assails the Senate in proceeding with the
trial under the said complaint, and in the alleged partiality exhibited by some
Senator-Judges who were apparently aiding the prosecution during the
hearings. They argue that unless there is a clear transgression of these
constitutional limitations, this Court may not exercise its power of expanded
judicial review over the actions of Senator-Judges during the proceedings.

By the nature of the functions they discharge when sitting as an Impeachment

Court, Senator- Judges are clearly entitled to propound questions on the
witnesses, prosecutors and counsel during the trial. Petitioner thus failed to prove
any... semblance of partiality on the part of any Senator-Judges

PAGE 148
 Issue: Whether respondents committed a violation of the Constitution or
gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives
that could translate as lack or excess of jurisdiction, which would require
corrective measures from the Court.

Ruling:

Impeachment, described as the most formidable weapon in the arsenal of

democracy was foreseen as creating divisions, partialities and enmities or
highlighting pre-existing factions with the greatest danger that the decision will
be regulated more by the comparative strength of parties, than by the real
demonstration of innocence or guilt. Given their concededly political character,
the precise role of the judiciary in impeachment cases is a matter of utmost
importance to ensure the effective functioning of the separate branches while
preserving the structure of checks and balance in our government.

Moreover, in this jurisdiction, the acts of any branch or instrumentality of the

government including those traditionally entrusted to the political department
are proper subject of judicial review if tainted with grave abuse or arbitrariness.
Petitioner was impeached through the mode provided under Art. XI, par. 4, Sec.
3,... In the meantime, the impeachment trial had been concluded with the
conviction of petitioner by more than the required majority vote of the Senator-
Judges. Petitioner immediately accepted the verdict and without any protest
vacated his office. In fact, the Judicial and Bar Council is already in the process
of screening applicants and nominees, and the President of the Philippines is
expected to appoint a new Chief Justice within the prescribed 90day period
from among those candidates shortlisted by the JBC. Unarguably, the
constitutional issue... raised by petitioner had been mooted by supervening
events and his own acts.

PAGE 149
 Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice G.R. No. 193459,
February 15, 2011

Carpio Morales, J.:

Facts:

wo impeachment complaints were filed against Ombudsman Gutierrez, both

were based betrayal of public trust and culpable violation of the Constitution.
The House Plenary referred the two complaints to the House of Representative
Committee on Justice. After hearing, the House of Representative Committee
on Justice issued a Resolution finding both complaints sufficient in form and
substance. Consequently, Ombudsman Gutierrez contended that the issued the
Resolution violated the one-year bar provision under Article XI, Section 3,
paragraph 5 of the Constitution.
Issue: Did the HR Committee on Justice violated the one-year bar provision
when it issued the Resolution?

Ruling: No. Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution provides that,
no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one year. The act of initiating the complaint means
the filing of the impeachment complaint and the referral by the House Plenary
to the Committee on Justice. Once an impeachment complaint has been
initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same
official within a one year period. Therefore, the one-year period ban is reckoned
not from the filing of the first complaint, but on the date it is referred to the
House Committee on Justice. Hence, in this case, the HR Committee did not
violate the one-year bar provision of the Constitution when it accepted the
second impeachment complaint after the first impeachment complaint was
filed. Also, it was held that the HR committee did not abuse its discretion in
finding the complaints sufficient in form in substance. The Impeachment Rules
are clear in echoing the constitutional requirements and providing that there
must be a verified complaint or resolution, and that the substance requirement
is met if there is a recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee.

PAGE 150
 Acop vs. Office of the Ombudsman
248 SCRA 566, September 27, 1995

Davide, Jr., J:
Facts:

In this case, government agencies, NCR Command, Traffic Management

Command (TMC), Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC), Presidential
Central Police District Command (CPDC) and Criminal Investigation Command
(CIC) were accused of summary killing 11 members of the “Kuratong Baleleng”
gang by S/PO Delos Reyes of Central Intelligence Commission. He stated that
there was no “shootout” but a “summary killing instead”. The complaint went
up to the Office of the Ombudsman of the Military. The Ombudsman addressed
the PNP concerned to submit an “After Operation Report” to the Panel of
Investigators, also created by the Ombudsman. The panel recommended for a
preliminary investigation on a list of officers presented by the PNP. In effect, the
Ombudsman ordered the officers listed to submit their counter affidavit.
Petitioners however, questioned the conduct, stating that the Ombudsman has
no jurisdiction to take preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan has and that
they preempted the Court.

Issue: Does the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case?

Ruling:
The Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case as stated in Sec. 31 of RA 6770 (it
states that the word “cases” includes “non-military cases”) and the
Ombudsman has jurisdiction on Preliminary Investigation as stated in A.O. no. 7
Sec. 2 thus, there is no abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman.

PAGE 151
 Lastimosa v. Vasquez 243 SCRA 497, April 6, 1995
Mendoza, J.:

Facts:
On February 18, 1993 Jessica Villacarlos Dayon, public health nurse of Santa Fe,
Cebu, filed a criminal complaint for frustrated rape and an administrative
complaint for immoral acts, abuse of authority and grave misconduct against
the Municipal Mayor of Santa Fe, Rogelio Ilustrisimo. Initially, the deputy
ombudsman found no prima facie evidence. After review, Omb. Vasquez
reversed and directed that the mayor be charged with a criminal case in the
RTC. The case was referred to provincial prosecutor Lastimosa.

She conducted her own preliminary investigation and found that only acts of
lasciviousness had been committed. She filed a case for acts of lasciviousness
with the MCTC. As no case for attempted rape had been filed by the
Prosecutor's Office, Deputy Ombudsman Mojica ordered on July 27, 1994
Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and petitioner Lastimosa to show cause why they
should not be punished for contempt for "refusing and failing to obey the lawful
directives" of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Petitioner contends, the Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the
case against the mayor because the crime involved (rape) was not committed
in relation to a public office. For this reason, it is argued that the Office of the
Ombudsman has no authority to place her and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar
under preventive suspension for refusing to follow his orders and to cite them for
indirect contempt for such refusal.

Issue:
Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to call on the
Provincial Prosecutor to assist in the prosecution of the case for attempted rape
against Mayor Ilustrisimo.

Ruling:
YES. The office of the Ombudsman has the power to “investigate and prosecute
on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.
“This power has been held to include the investigation and prosecution of any
crime committed by a public official regardless of whether the acts or omissions

PAGE 152
complained of are related to, or connected with, or arise from, the
performance of his official duty.

It does not matter that the office of the Provincial Prosecutor had already
conducted the preliminary investigation and all that remained to be one was
for the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to file the corresponding case in court.
Even if the preliminary investigation had been given over to the Provincial
Prosecutor to conduct, his determination of the nature of the offense to be
charged would still be subject to the approval of the Office of the Ombudsman.

PAGE 153
 Disini v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 180564, June 22, 2010
Abad, J.:

Facts:
In 1989, the Philippine Commission on Good Governance (PCGG) wanted Jesus
Disini to testify against the Westinghouse Electric Corporation before the United
States District Court of New Jersey and in the Arbitration case filed against the
Republic before the International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration.
Disini worked as an executive assistant for the various companies of Herminio
Disini, his second cousin, from 1971-1984.

The Republic believed that the Westinghouse contract for the construction of
the Bataan Power Plant, brokered by one of Herminio’s companies, had been
tended with anomalies. On February 18, 1989, the PCGG and Disini entered into
an Immunity Agreement under which Disini agreed to testify for the government.
the PCGG guaranteed Disini that apart from the two cases, it shall not compel
DIsini to testify in any foreign or local proceeding brought by the Republic
against Herminio. Disini complied with his undertaking, but February 2007,
Sandiganbayan issued a subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum against
Disini. The same commanded him to testify and produce documents before the
Court on March 6 and 30 2007 in an action by the Republic against Herminio.

Issue: Whether the PCGG may revoke or terminate the Immunity Agreement.

Ruling: Section 5 of the Executive Order 14 vests the PCGG to grant immunity to
witnesses. Here, the PCGG offered Disini, not only criminal and civil immunity, but
also immunity against being compelled to testify in any domestic or foreign
proceeding other that the two cases identified in the Immunity Agreement. The
case against the Westinghouse had so huge a financial impact on the Republic
that it was willing to waive its power and right to compel Disini’s testimony in
other cases. Through the government cannot be barred by estoppel based on
unauthorized acts of public officers, such principle cannot apply in this case
since the PCGG acted within its authority when it provided Disini with a
guarantee against having to testify in other cases.

PAGE 154
 University of San Agustin, Inc. v. CA 230 SCRA 761, March 7, 1994
Nocon, J.:

Facts:
The present case involves third year Nursing students who failed to meet the
retention policy of the school, that is, minimum grade of 80% in any major
Nursing subject and in two minor subjects. As a consequence, the school
refused to re-admit them. Private respondents Antonio Marco Ho, Ma. Elaine
Magante, Roy D. Sancho, Michael Kim So and Bernardita Cainoy were third year
Nursing students of petitioner University of San Agustin (USA) who were refused
re-admission in the summer classes of 1989 and last two semesters of school year
1989-1990 on the alleged ground that they failed to obtain grades of not lower
than 80% in Nursing 104 (Nursing Practices II with Related Learning Experience)
Its persistent refusal to re-admit them prejudiced their right to freely choose their
field of study and finish a college degree and worse, no other school within the
city and nearby areas is willing to accept them due to the difference in the
curriculum and school residency requirement. Thus, they filed a petition for
mandamus before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, to command petitioner
USA to re-admit them. Submitting a joint answer to the petition, petitioner USA
and the other petitioners, Dean Concepcion Cajilig and Clinical Instructors
Nenalyn Abioda, Mary Espino, Rhodora Azucena, Ma. Dulce Socorro Posa and
Cosette Monteblanco admitted having barred private respondents from
finishing their Nursing course but justified the decision not to re-admit them as
being in pursuance of the school's policy that only students with grades of at
least 80% in any major Nursing subject, including Nursing 104, and two minor
subjects, are allowed enrollment in the following year. Private respondents were
duly informed and forewarned of their below 80% performance rating. To
buttress petitioner's stance, they placed reliance on Section 9(2) of the
Education Act of 1982 (B.P. Blg. 232) which recognizes the right of students to
freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula, and to continue
their course up to graduation, except in cases of academic deficiency or
violation of disciplinary regulations; and Section 13(2) thereof vesting in
institutions of higher learning the right to determine on academic grounds who
shall be admitted to study, who may teach, and what shall be the subjects of
study and research. Additionally, petitioners contended that private
respondents have no cause of action for mandamus under the premises
because there is no clear and well-defined right of the latter which has been
violated neither do the former have a corresponding ministerial duty to re-admit
them, since petitioner USA is a private educational institution not performing
public functions and duties. Under the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools,

PAGE 155
petitioner USA enjoys the right to academic freedom. The RTC ruled that
mandamus will not lie to compel the respondents to enroll petitioning students
because of their academic deficiencies and that this refusal of respondents’
university falls within its right to do so under the academic freedom clause of our
Constitution. The CA did not agree with the ruling of the trial court.

Issue: Whether or not the students can compel the school to allow them to
complete their course.

Ruling: No. The petition which was filed by private respondents before the trial
court sought the issuance of a writ of mandamus, to command petitioners to
admit them for enrollment. Taking into account the admission of private
respondents that they have finished their Nursing course at the Lanting College
of Nursing even before the promulgation of the questioned decision, this case
has clearly been overtaken by events and should therefore be dismissed.
However, even if a case were moot and academic, a statement of the
governing principle is appropriate in the resolution of dismissal for the guidance
not only of the parties but of others similarly situated. We shall adhere to this view
and proceed to dwell on the merits of this petition.

PAGE 156
 Ateneo De Manila v. Capulong 222 SCRA 644, May 27, 1993
Romero, J.:

Facts:
On February 8, 9, and 10 of 1991, a fraternity in Ateneo Law School named
Aquila Legis conducted its initiation rites upon neophytes. Unfortunately, one
neophyte died as a result thereof and one was hospitalized due to serious
physical injuries. In a resolution dated March 9, 1991, the Disciplinary Board
formed by Ateneo found seven students guilty of violating Rule 3 of the Rules on
Discipline. Fr. Joaquin Bernas, then president of Ateneo, on the basis of the
findings, ordered the expulsion of the seven students. However, on May 17, 1991,
Judge Ignacio Capulong of the Makati RTC, upon the students’ petition for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, ordered Ateneo to reverse its decision
and reinstate the said students.

Issue: Whether or not the Ateneo Law School has competence to issue an order
dismissing such students pursuant to its rules.

Ruling:
Yes, Ateneo has the competence and the power to dismiss its erring students
and therefore it had validly exercised such power. The students do not deserve
to claim such a venerable institution such as Ateneo as their own a minute
longer for they may forseeably cast a malevolent influence on students currently
enrolled as well as those who come after them. This is academic freedom on the
part of the school which includes: a. freedom to determine who may teach; b.
freedom to determine what may be taught; c. freedom to determine how it
shall be taught; d. freedom to determine who may be admitted to study.

PAGE 157
 University of San Carlos v. CA 166 SCRA 570, October 18, 1988
Gancayco, J.:

Facts:
Jennifer Lee was a student of University of San Carlos (USC). She first enrolled in
the College of Architecture, but has failed 2 subjects. When she transferred to
the College of Commerce, she made good grades. The university disqualified
her from graduating with honors taking into consideration, as part of the
university policy, her failing grades in the College of Architecture. She filed an
action for mandamus with damages against petitioners in the Cebu RTC, asking
that the latter be compelled to confer upon her the degree of B.S Commerce,
major in Accounting, cum laude. Petitioners allege that it may not be
compelled to grant graduation honors to students who, according to university
standards, rules, and regulations, do not qualify for such honors.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners may be compelled to grant graduation honors

to Jennifer Lee.

Ruling: No. it is an accepted principle that schools given ample discretion to

formulate rules and guidelines in the granting of honors for purposes of
graduation. This is part of academic freedom. Within the parameters of these
rules, it is within the competence of universities and colleges to determine who
are entitled to the grant of honors among the graduating students. Its discretion
on this academic matter may not be disturbed much less controlled by the
courts unless there is grave abuse of discretion in its exercise. In this case, the
petitioner’s bulletin of information provides all students and all other interested
parties advice on the University policies and rules on enrollment and academic
achievements. A failure in any subject disqualifies a student from honors. Good
moral character and exemplary conduct are as important criteria for honors as
academic achievements. Private respondent should know and is presumed to
know those University policies and is bound to comply therewith.

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 UP Board of Regents v. CA and Coline G.R. No. 134625, August 31, 1999
Mendoza, J.:

Facts:
Arakiaswamy is an Indian national who enrolled at the Univeristy of the
Philippines’ doctoral program in Anthropology at the College of Social Sciences
and Philosophy. After completing the units of work required under her doctoral
program, Arok went on a two-year leave of absence to work at the Vatican
Radio. She returned to the Philippines to work on her dissertation entitled “Tamil
Influences in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines”.

After being certified as ready for oral defense, Director Diokno, the Associate
Dean and Director of the Graduate Program scheduled her oral defense before
a panel composed of five persons.

Dr. Medina, one of the panelists, after going over the dissertation of Arok
informed the CSSP Dean that “there was a portion in private respondent’s
dissertation that was lifted, without proper acknowledgement, from Balfour’s
Cyclopedia of India and Eastern and Southern Asia (1967) and from John Edye’s
article entitled “Description of the Various Classes of Vessels Constructed and
Employed by the Natives of the Coasts of Coromandel, Malabar, and the Island
of Ceylon for their Caosting Navigation” in the Royal Asiatic Society of Great
Britain and Ireland Journal. During the oral defense, four out of five panelists
gave her a passing mark, but two were made with qualifications and required
her to submit a revised dissertation incorporation their observations.
According to the private respondent, she submitted her revised dissertation,
which the petitioners denied. Nevertheless, Arok was allowed to graduate, even
with a formal letter of protest from Dr. Medina that her doctorate be withdrawn
and charge for plagiarism against her. It appears that the protest and the formal
charge did not come to the notice of the CSSP on time because Arok was able
to graduate on April 24, 1993.

After graduation, a series of committees were formed by the UP to investigate

the charge of plagiarism against Arolk. In all these meetings, Arok was allowed
to present her side of the controversy. Nevertheless, Arok’s academic clearance
was withheld.

The committee findings revealed that there were massive incidents of lifting from
other sources found in Arok’s dissertation without proper attribution to its sources.
It further held that even Arok admitted plagiarism.
Issue: May a University withdraw a degree conferred upon a student?

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Ruling:
Yes. The Constitution provides that “academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all
institutions of higher learning.” This is nothing new. The 1935 Constitution and
1973 Constitution likewise provided for the academic freedom or more precisely,
for the institutional autonomy of universities and institutions of higher learning. As
pointed out by this Court in Garcia vs. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola
School of Theology, it is a freedom granted to “institutions of higher learning”
which is thus given “a wide sphere of authority certainly extending to the choice
of the students.” If such institution of higher learning can decide who can and
who cannot study in it, it certainly can also determine on whom it can confer
the honor and distinction of being graduates.

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 Cudia v. PMA G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015
Peralta, J.:

Facts:
Aldrin Jeff Cudia was a member of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Siklab
Diwa Class of 2014. On November 14, 2013, Cudia’s class had a lesson
examination in their Operations Research (OR) subject the schedule of which
was from 1:30pm to 3pm. However, after he submitted his exam paper, Cudia
made a query to their OR teacher. Said teacher, then asked Cudia to wait for
her. Cudia complied and as a result, he was late for his next class (English). Later,
the English teacher reported Cudia for being late. In his explanation, Cudia
averred that he was late because his OR class was dismissed a bit late. The
tactical officer (TO) tasked to look upon the matter concluded that Cudia lied
when he said that their OR class was dismissed late because the OR teacher
said she never dismissed her class late. Thus, Cudia was meted with demerits
and touring hours because of said infraction. Cudia did not agree with the
penalty hence he asked them TO about it. Not content with the explanation of
the TO, Cudia said he will be appealing the penalty he incurred to the senior
tactical officer (STO). The TO then asked Cudia to write his appeal. In his appeal,
Cudia stated that his being late was out of his control because his OR class was
dismissed at 3pm while his English class started at 3pm also. To that the TO
replied: that on record, and based on the interview with the teachers
concerned, the OR teacher did not dismiss them (the class) beyond 3pm and
the English class started at 3:05pm, not 3pm; that besides, under PMA rules, once
a student submitted his examination paper, he is dismissed from said class and
may be excused to leave the classroom, hence, Cudia was in fact dismissed
well before 3pm; that it was a lie for Cudia to state that the class was dismissed
late because again, on that day in the OR class, each student was dismissed as
they submit their examination, and were not dismissed as a class; that if Cudia
was ordered by the teacher to stay, it was not because such transaction was
initiated by the teacher, rather, it was initiated by Cudia (because of his query
to the teacher), although there were at least two students with Cudia at that
time querying the teacher, the three of them cannot be considered a “class”;
Cudia could just have stated all that instead of saying that his class was
dismissed a bit late, hence he lied. The STO sustained the decision of the TO.

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Later, the TO reported Cudia to the PMA’s Honor Committee (HC) for allegedly
violating the Honor Code. Allegedly, Cudia lied in his written appeal when he
said his class was dismissed late hence, as a result, he was late for his next class.
The Honor Code is PMA’s basis for the minimum standard of behavior required of
their cadets. Any violation thereof may be a ground to separate a cadet from
PMA. Cudia submitted an explanation to the HC. Thereafter, the HC, which is
composed of nine (9) cadets, conducted an investigation. After two hearings
and after the parties involved were heard and with their witnesses presented,
the HC reconvened and the members cast their vote. The initial vote was 8-1: 8
found Cudia guilty and 1 acquitted Cudia. Under PMA rules (Honor System), a
dissenting vote means the acquittal of Cudia. However, they also have a
practice of chambering where the members, particularly the dissenter, are
made to explain their vote. This is to avoid the “tyranny of the minority”. After the
chambering, the dissenter was convinced that his initial “not guilty vote” was
improper, hence he changed the same and the final vote became 9-0. Thus,
Cudia was immediately placed inside PMA’s holding center. Cudia appealed to
the HC chairman but his appeal was denied. Eventually, the Superintendent of
the PMA ordered the dismissal of Cudia from the PMA. Cudia and several
members of his family then sent letters to various military officers requesting for a
re-investigation. It was their claim that there were irregularities in the
investigation done by the HC. As a result of such pleas, the case of Cudia was
referred to the Cadet Review and Appeals Board of PMA (CRAB). Meanwhile,
Cudia’s family brought the case to the Commission on Human Rights (CHR)
where it was alleged that PMA’s “sham” investigation violated Cudia’s rights to
due process, education, and privacy of communication. Eventually, the CRAB
ruled against Cudia. This ruling was affirmed by the AFP Chief of Staff. But on the
other hand, the CHR found in favor of Cudia. PMA averred that CHR’s findings
are at best recommendatory. Cudia filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus before the Supreme Court. PMA opposed the said petition as it
argued that the same is not proper as a matter of policy and that the court
should avoid interfering with military matters.

Issue: Can PMA validly dismiss Cudia based on its findings?

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Ruling:
Yes. It is within PMA’s right to academic freedom to decide whether or not a
cadet is still worthy to be part of the institution. Thus, PMA did not act with grave
abuse of discretion when it dismissed Cudia. In fact, Cudia was accorded due
process. In this case, the investigation of Cudia’s Honor Code violation followed
the prescribed procedure and existing practices in the PMA. He was notified of
the Honor Report submitted by his TO. He was then given the opportunity to
explain the report against him. He was informed about his options and the entire
process that the case would undergo. The preliminary investigation immediately
followed after he replied and submitted a written explanation. Upon its
completion, the investigating team submitted a written report together with its
recommendation to the HC Chairman. The HC thereafter reviewed the findings
and recommendations. When the honor case was submitted for formal
investigation, a new team was assigned to conduct the hearing. During the
formal investigation/hearing, he was informed of the charge against him and
given the right to enter his plea. He had the chance to explain his side, confront
the witnesses against him, and present evidence in his behalf. After a thorough
discussion of the HC voting members, he was found to have violated the Honor
Code.

Thereafter, the guilty verdict underwent the review process at the Academy
level – from the OIC of the HC, to the SJA (Staff Judge Advocate), to the
Commandant of Cadets, and to the PMA Superintendent. A separate
investigation was also conducted by the HTG (Headquarters Tactics Group).
Then, upon the directive of the AFP-GHQ (AFP-General Headquarters) to
reinvestigate the case, a review was conducted by the CRAB. Further, a
FactFinding Board/Investigation Body composed of the CRAB members and the
PMA senior officers was constituted to conduct a deliberate investigation of the
case. Finally, he had the opportunity to appeal to the President. Sadly for him, all
had issued unfavorable rulings. And there is no reason for the SC to disturb the
findings of facts by these bodies.

Academic freedom of the PMA Cudia would argue that there is no law
providing that a guilty finding by the HC may be used by the PMA to dismiss or
recommend the dismissal of a cadet from the PMA; that Honor Code violation is
not among those listed as justifications for the attrition of cadets considering that
the Honor Code and the Honor System (manner which PMA conducts
investigation of Honor Code violations) do not state that a guilty cadet is
automatically terminated or dismissed from service. Such argument is not valid.
Even without express provision of a law, the PMA has regulatory authority to
administratively dismiss erring cadets. Further, there is a law (Commonwealth Act

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No. 1) authorizing the President to dismiss cadets. Such power by the President
may be delegated to the PMA Superintendent, who may exercise direct
supervision and control over the cadets.

Further, as stated earlier, such power by the PMA is well within its academic
freedom. Academic freedom or, to be precise, the institutional autonomy of
universities and institutions of higher learning has been enshrined in the
Constitution. The essential freedoms of academic freedom on the part of
schools are as follows; a. the right to determine who may teach; b. the right to
determine what may be taught; c. the right to determine how it shall be taught;
d. the right to determine who may be admitted to study.

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