Complaint For Injunctive and Declaratory Relief

Filing # 148201925 E-Filed 04/22/2022 11:22:38 AM
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA
BLACK VOTERS MATTER CAPACITY

BUILDING INSTITUTE, INC., EQUAL
GROUND EDUCATION FUND, INC., Case No. 2022-ca-______________
LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF
FLORIDA, INC., LEAGUE OF WOMEN
VOTERS OF FLORIDA EDUCATION
FUND, INC., FLORIDA RISING
TOGETHER, PASTOR REGINALD
GUNDY, SYLVIA YOUNG, PHYLLIS
WILEY, ANDREA HERSHORIN,
ANAYDIA CONNOLLY, BRANDON P.
NELSON, KATIE YARROWS, CYNTHIA
LIPPERT, KISHA LINEBAUGH, BEATRIZ
ALONSO, GONZALO ALFREDO
PEDROSO, and ILEANA CABAN,
Plaintiffs,
v.
LAUREL M. LEE, in her official capacity as

Florida Secretary of State, ASHLEY
MOODY, in her official capacity as Florida
Attorney General, the FLORIDA SENATE,
the FLORIDA HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, WILTON SIMPSON,
in his official capacity as the President of the
Florida Senate, CHRIS SPROWLS, in his
official capacity as the Speaker of the Florida
House of Representatives, RAY
RODRIGUES, in his official capacity as Chair
of the Senate Committee on Reapportionment,
and THOMAS J. LEEK, in his official
capacity as Chair of the House Redistricting
Committee,
Defendants.
COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF
Plaintiffs BLACK VOTERS MATTER CAPACITY BUILDING INSTITUTE, INC.,
EQUAL GROUND EDUCATION FUND, INC., LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF
FLORIDA, INC., LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF FLORIDA EDUCATION FUND, INC.,
FLORIDA RISING TOGETHER, PASTOR REGINALD GUNDY, SYLVIA YOUNG,
PHYLLIS WILEY, ANDREA HERSHORIN, ANAYDIA CONNOLLY, BRANDON P.
NELSON, KATIE YARROWS, CYNTHIA LIPPERT, KISHA LINEBAUGH, BEATRIZ
ALONSO, GONZALO ALFREDO PEDROSO, and ILEANA CABAN, file this Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief against Defendant Laurel M. Lee, in her official capacity as
Florida Secretary of State, Defendant Ashley Moody, in her official capacity as Florida Attorney
General, the Florida Senate, the Florida House of Representatives, Wilton Simpson, in his official
capacity as the President of the Florida Senate, Chris Sprowls, in his official capacity as the
Speaker of the Florida House of Representatives, Ray Rodrigues, in his official capacity as Chair
of the Senate Committee on Reapportionment, and Thomas J. Leek, in his official capacity as
Chair of the Chair of the House Redistricting Committee, and allege as follows:
NATURE OF THE ACTION
1. In 2010, the people of Florida voted overwhelmingly to enact the Fair Districts
Amendment to the state’s constitution, imposing constraints on the worst abuses of congressional
redistricting and entrusting the Florida judiciary to enforce those safeguards. Over the next decade,
states across the country have followed Florida’s lead by adopting similar constitutional
amendments, prompting the U.S. Supreme Court to cite the Fair Districts Amendment as an
exemplar of “provisions in state statutes and state constitutions [that] can provide standards and
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guidance for state courts to apply” to ensure that “complaints about districting” are not
“condemn[ed] . . . to echo into a void.” Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2507 (2019).
2. Indeed, just seven years ago, the Florida Supreme Court invalidated the
Legislature’s congressional redistricting plan under the Fair Districts Amendment after finding
that partisan intent tainted the entire redistricting process. See League of Women Voters of Fla. v.
Detzner, 172 So. 3d 363 (2015) (“LWV I”). That litigation demonstrated Florida courts’ “important
duty to honor and effectuate the intent of the voters in passing Florida’s groundbreaking
constitutional amendment,” “not because [courts] seek to dictate a particular result, but because
the people of Florida have, through their constitution, entrusted that responsibility to the judiciary.”
Id. at 416 (cleaned up).
3. At the beginning of this redistricting cycle, the Legislature appeared to follow the
Fair Districts Amendment in good faith. Legislators and their staffs considered redistricting plans
that purported to avoid unnecessary political and geographic splits without intentionally favoring
one political party or diminishing minority voters’ ability to elect their candidates of choice.
4. Governor Ron DeSantis, however, had other ideas. He unilaterally declared the Fair
Districts Amendment unconstitutional. He vetoed the Legislature’s congressional plan and
convened a special legislative session, leaving the Legislature little choice but to consider and pass
his own redistricting scheme, SB 2-C (the “DeSantis Plan”).
5. The DeSantis Plan does not comply with the Fair Districts Amendment. It does not
even purport to.
6. The DeSantis Plan, for example, obliterates Congressional District (“CD-”) 5—an
existing district that allowed North Florida’s Black voters to elect their candidates of choice, and
that the Legislature originally sought to protect this redistricting cycle—plainly resulting in
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unlawful diminishment. When asked on the House floor whether Governor DeSantis’s new CD-4
or CD-5 would perform for Black candidates of choice, Redistricting Committee Chair Leek
responded simply, and honestly, “No.”
7. Both Governor DeSantis and the Legislature well knew that dismantling CD-5
would diminish the voting power of Black residents within the district and violate the plain
command of the Florida Constitution. From the beginning, Governor DeSantis publicly stated that
he would not accept any congressional plan that contained a configuration of CD-5 that protected
Black voters from diminishment, based on his wrongheaded belief that compliance with the Fair
Districts Amendment violates the U.S. Constitution. Governor DeSantis was tireless in his efforts,
attempting to derail the Legislature’s protection of CD-5 through public statements, by filing an
extraordinary request for an advisory opinion from the Florida Supreme Court on the question, and
by hiring a proxy to appear on his behalf during the Legislature’s redistricting hearings. And yet
despite this, the Legislature repeatedly affirmed that CD-5 was a protected district and proposed
plans that maintained the same configuration the district held under Florida’s previous
congressional plan (the “Benchmark Plan”). The Legislature’s about-face in enacting the DeSantis
Plan therefore represents not a change of heart, but rather the knowing destruction of a district it
has for months maintained is protected by the Florida Constitution.
8. The DeSantis Plan also intentionally favors the Republican Party at nearly every
turn, eliminating three Democratic seats and transforming competitive seats into Republican-
leaning ones. And in so doing, it needlessly produces noncompact districts that split geographic
and political boundaries. As Princeton University Professor Sam Wang described, the DeSantis
Plan will result in “one of the most extreme gerrymanders in the country”—precisely the result
Florida voters sought to eradicate in passing the Fair Districts Amendment.
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9. Governor DeSantis believes Florida’s judiciary will, just like the Legislature, stand
aside while he runs roughshod over the Florida Constitution and the will of Florida voters. But
“[i]t is this Court’s duty, given to it by the citizens of Florida, to enforce adherence to the
constitutional requirements and to declare a redistricting plan that does not comply with those
standards constitutionally invalid.” In re S. J. Resol. of Legis. Apportionment 1176, 83 So. 3d 597,
607 (Fla. 2012). Florida’s voters ask this Court to uphold that duty here.
JURISDICTION, PARTIES, AND VENUE
10. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 26.012 and
Article V, Section 5(b) of the Florida Constitution. Venue is proper pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 47.011.
Plaintiffs’ action for declaratory and injunctive relief is authorized by Fla. Stat. § 86.011, as well
as Fla. Stat. § 26.012(3).
11. Plaintiff Black Voters Matter Capacity Building Institute, Inc. (“Black Voters
Matter”) is a 501(c)(4) nonpartisan civic organization. Its goal is to increase power in communities
of color. Black Voters Matter knows that effective voting allows a community to determine its
own destiny, but communities of color often face barriers to voting that other communities do not.
Black Voters Matter focuses on removing those barriers. It does so by engaging in get-out-the-
vote activities, educating voters on how to vote, and advocating for policies to expand voting rights
and access to the political process. While Black Voters Matter reaches voters across the state, it
has its greatest physical presence in North Florida, where it serves and engages with the state’s
historic Black communities. The DeSantis Plan, which will decrease representation for Black
voters in the state of Florida, stands as a barrier to Black Voters Matter’s mission. The DeSantis
Plan will require Black Voters Matter to divert scarce resources away from its other policy
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priorities toward efforts to give Black voters other avenues to make their voices heard where they
no longer have effective representation.
12. Plaintiff Equal Ground Education Fund (“Equal Ground”) is a 501(c)(3)
organization with a mission to register, educate, and increase engagement among Black voters in
Florida. Equal Ground’s principal office is in Orlando, but the organization engages voters
throughout the state. Founded in May 2019 to give the rising American electorate greater influence
on issues that affect them, Equal Ground focuses on ensuring equal access to democracy in
underserved communities. To achieve its goal, Equal Ground conducts extensive voter education,
voter registration, and voter engagement work directly through its staff and in alliance with
hundreds of faith partners throughout the state. The DeSantis Plan will require Equal Ground to
divert scarce resources away from its other policy priorities toward efforts to give Black voters
other avenues to make their voices heard where they no longer have effective representation.
13. Plaintiffs League of Women Voters of Florida, Inc. and League of Women Voters
of Florida Education Fund, Inc. (together, the “League”) are nonpartisan voter-focused nonprofit
organizations formed under section 501(c)(4) and section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code,
respectively. The League has 29 chapters across the State of Florida, from Pensacola to the Keys,
and thousands of members statewide. The League’s mission is to encourage informed and active
participation of citizens in government. For more than 10 years, the League has played a key role
in Florida’s redistricting efforts, first helping to pass the Fair Districts Amendment 12 years ago,
and then helping to defend and successfully enforce the Amendment after the last redistricting
cycle. During this redistricting cycle, the League has educated numerous Floridians about the
redistricting process and advocated for fair maps and adherence to the Fair Districts Amendment
before the Legislature. The DeSantis Plan seeks to nullify those efforts. The DeSantis Plan will
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also require the League to divert scarce resources away from its other policy priorities toward its
efforts to give their members other avenues to make their voices heard where they no longer have
effective representation. The League also brings these claims on behalf of their members, including
its Black, Hispanic, and Asian members, who are harmed by the DeSantis Plan.
14. Plaintiff Florida Rising Together (Florida Rising) is a 501(c)(3) organization with
a mission to increase the voting and political power of marginalized and excluded constituencies.
Florida Rising’s principal office is in Miami, although the organization engages with voters
throughout the state, most extensively in Orange, Hillsborough, Osceola, Pinellas, Miami-Dade,
Broward, Palm Beach, Duval, Leon, Gadsden, and Seminole Counties. Florida Rising’s central
focus is to expand democracy by ensuring that every eligible voter in the state, regardless of party
affiliation, is able to exercise his or her fundamental and constitutionally protected right to vote.
To achieve its goal, Florida Rising conducts massive voter registration, voter education, voter
engagement, and election protection programs. The DeSantis Plan will require Florida Rising to
divert scarce resources away from its other policy priorities toward efforts to give its constituents
other avenues to make their voices heard where they no longer have effective representation.
Florida Rising also brings these claims on behalf of their members and constituents, who are
harmed by the DeSantis Plan.
15. The Voter Plaintiffs are citizens of the United States and are qualified, registered
Florida voters. They are registered Democratic voters and intend to vote in upcoming primary and
general elections for Congress. They reside in the following congressional districts:
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Plaintiff County CD (Benchmark Plan) CD (DeSantis Plan)
Pastor Reginald Gundy Duval CD-5 CD-4
Sylvia Young Leon CD-5 CD-2
Phyllis Wiley Duval CD-5 CD-4
Andrea Hershorin Duval CD-4 CD-4
Anaydia Connolly Seminole CD-7 CD-7
Brandon P. Nelson Orlando CD-10 CD-10
Katie Yarrows Pinellas CD-13 CD-13
Cynthia Lippert Pinellas CD-13 CD-14
Kisha Linebaugh Hillsborough CD-14 CD-14
Beatriz Alonso Miami-Dade CD-27 CD-27
Gonzalo Alfredo Pedroso Miami-Dade CD-27 CD-27
Ileana Caban Miami-Dade CD-26 CD-28
16. Pastor Reginald Gundy is a Black Florida citizen and qualified registered voter in
Jacksonville, Florida. Pastor Gundy was previously a voter in CD-5 under the Benchmark Plan
and resides in the new CD-4 under the DeSantis Plan. Pastor Gundy is a registered Democrat who
has consistently voted for Democratic candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives and
intends to do so in the future.
17. Plaintiff Sylvia Young is a Black Florida citizen and qualified registered voter in
Tallahassee, Florida. Ms. Young was previously a voter in CD-5 under the Benchmark Plan and
resides in the new CD-2 under the DeSantis Plan. Ms. Young is a registered Democrat who has
consistently voted for Democratic candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives and intends to
do so in the future.
18. Plaintiff Phyllis Wiley is a Black Florida citizen and qualified registered voter in
Jacksonville, Florida. Ms. Wiley was previously a voter in CD-5 under the Benchmark Plan and
resides in the new CD-4 under the DeSantis Plan. Ms. Wiley is a registered Democrat who has
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19. Plaintiff Andrea Hershorin is a Florida citizen and qualified registered voter in
Jacksonville, Florida. Ms. Hershorin was previously a voter in CD-4 under the Benchmark Plan
and resides in the new CD-4 under the DeSantis Plan. Ms. Hershorin is a registered Democrat who
20. Plaintiff Anaydia Connolly is a Florida citizen and qualified registered voter in
Altamonte Springs, Florida. Ms. Connolly was previously a voter in CD-7 under the Benchmark
Plan and resides in the new CD-7 under the DeSantis Plan. Ms. Connolly is a registered Democrat
who has consistently voted for Democratic candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives and
21. Plaintiff Brandon P. Nelson is a Black Florida citizen and qualified registered voter
in Orlando, Florida. Mr. Nelson was previously a voter in CD-10 under the Benchmark Plan and
resides in the new CD-10 under the DeSantis Plan. Mr. Nelson is a registered Democrat who has
22. Plaintiff Katie Yarrows is a Florida citizen and qualified registered voter in St.
Petersburg, Florida. Ms. Yarrows was previously a voter in CD-13 under the Benchmark Plan and
resides in the new CD-13 under the DeSantis Plan. Ms. Yarrows is a registered Democrat who has
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23. Plaintiff Cynthia Lippert is a Florida citizen and qualified registered voter in St.
Petersburg, Florida. Ms. Lippert was previously a voter in CD-13 under the Benchmark Plan and
resides in the new CD-14 under the DeSantis Plan. Ms. Lippert is a registered Democrat who has
24. Plaintiff Kisha Linebaugh is a Florida citizen and qualified registered voter in
Tampa, Florida. Ms. Lippert was previously a voter in CD-14 under the Benchmark Plan and
resides in the new CD-14 under the DeSantis Plan. Ms. Linebaugh is a registered Democrat who
25. Plaintiff Beatriz Alonso is a Florida citizen and qualified registered voter in Miami,
Florida. Ms. Alonso was previously a voter in CD-27 under the Benchmark Plan and resides in the
new CD-27 under the DeSantis Plan. Ms. Alonso is a registered Democrat who has consistently
voted for Democratic candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives and intends to do so in the
future.
26. Plaintiff Gonzalo Alfredo Pedroso is a Florida citizen and qualified registered voter
in Miami, Florida. Mr. Pedroso was previously a voter in CD-27 under the Benchmark Plan and
resides in the new CD-27 under the DeSantis Plan. Mr. Pedroso is a registered Democrat who has
27. Plaintiff Ileana Caban is a Florida citizen and qualified registered voter in
Homestead, Florida. Ms. Caban was previously a voter in CD-26 under the Benchmark Plan and
resides in the new CD-28 under the DeSantis Plan. Ms. Caban is a registered Democrat who has
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28. Defendant Laurel M. Lee is sued in her official capacity as the Florida Secretary of
State. Defendant Lee is Florida’s chief election officer and is charged with administering and
overseeing the state’s elections. See Fla. Stat. § 97.012.
29. Defendant Ashley Moody is sued in her official capacity as the Florida Attorney
General. Defendant Moody is Florida’s chief legal officer. See Fla. Const. art. IV, § 4(b); Fla. Stat.
§ 16.01. As Attorney General, she is properly named in an action seeking a statute of the Florida
Legislature to be declared unconstitutional. Fla. Stat. § 86.091.
30. Defendant Florida Senate (the “Senate”) is one of two houses of the Legislature of
the State of Florida. The Senate is responsible for drawing reapportionment plans for the U.S.
House of Representatives from the State of Florida that comply with the Florida Constitution.
31. Defendant Florida House of Representatives (the “House”) is one of two houses of
the Legislature of the State of Florida. The House is responsible for drawing reapportionment plans
for the U.S. House of Representatives from the State of Florida that comply with the Florida
Constitution.
32. Defendant Wilton Simpson is the President of the Florida State Senate and is named
as a Defendant in his official capacity.
33. Defendant Chris Sprowls is the Speaker of the Florida House of Representatives
and is named as a Defendant in his official capacity.
34. Defendant Ray Rodrigues is the Chair of the Senate Committee on
Reapportionment and is named as a Defendant in his official capacity.
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35. Defendant Thomas J. Leek is the Chair of the House Redistricting Committee and
is named as a Defendant in his official capacity.
LEGAL BACKGROUND
I. The people of Florida amended the Florida Constitution to reform the congressional
redistricting process.
36. On November 2, 2010, the people of Florida voted by an overwhelming margin of
62.9% to 37.1% to enact the Fair Districts Amendment to the Florida Constitution.1 The Fair
Districts Amendment established stringent new standards to constrain the Legislature’s once-in-a-
decade exercise of its congressional reapportionment powers.
37. The “overall goal” of the Fair Districts Amendment “is to require the Legislature
to redistrict in a manner that prohibits favoritism or discrimination, while respecting geographic
considerations.” Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Standards for Legislature to Follow in Cong.
Redistricting, 2 So. 3d 175, 181 (Fla. 2009). “These express new standards imposed by the voters
clearly act as a restraint on the Legislature in drawing apportionment plans.” In re S. J. Res., 83
So. 3d at 597.
38. The Fair Districts Amendment standards are enumerated within two “tiers” in
Article III, Section 20 of the Florida Constitution. The “Tier I” standards provide that (1) no
congressional plan “shall be drawn with the intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an
incumbent;” (2) “districts shall not be drawn with the intent or result of denying or abridging the
equal opportunity of racial or language minorities to participate in the political process or to
1
See November 2, 2010 General Election, Fla. Dep’t of State, https://
results.elections.myflorida.com/Index.asp?ElectionDate=11/2/2010&DATAMODE= (last visited
Apr. 15, 2022). Florida voters adopted a virtually identical constitutional amendment—by a
similarly significant margin—to reform Florida’s legislative apportionment process. See id.; Fla.
Const. art. III, § 21. Unless otherwise noted, the “Fair District Amendment” as used in this
Complaint refers specifically to the congressional amendment. See Fla. Const. art. III, § 20.
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diminish their ability to elect representatives of their choice;” and (3) “districts shall consist of
contiguous territory.” Fla. Const. art. III, § 20(a).
39. The “Tier II” standards provide that (1) “districts shall be as nearly equal in
population as is practicable;” (2) “districts shall be compact;” and (3) “districts shall, where
feasible, utilize existing political and geographical boundaries.” Id. § 20(b).
40. The “Tier II” standards “are subordinate and shall give way where compliance
‘conflicts with the [Tier I] standards or with federal law.’” In re S. J. Res., 83 So. 3d at 639 (quoting
Fla. Const. art. III, § 20(b)). But while “the tier-two standards are subordinate to the tier-one
requirements, the constitution further instructs that no standard has priority over the other within
each tier.” Id. (citing Fla. Const. art. III, § 20(c))
41. This Court’s duty to enforce the Fair Districts Amendment “arises from the well
settled principle that the state Constitution is not a grant of power but a limitation upon power.”
Id. at 599 (cleaned up). This principle applies with force in the context of reapportionment.
“Indeed, the right to elect representatives—and the process by which we do so—is the very
bedrock of our democracy. To ensure the protection of this right, the citizens of the state of Florida,
through the Florida Constitution, employed the essential concept of checks and balances, granting
to the Legislature the ability to apportion . . . in a manner prescribed by the citizens and entrusting
this Court with the responsibility to review the apportionment plans to ensure they are
constitutionally valid.” Id. at 600.
A. The Florida Constitution protects racial and language minorities against

discriminatory intent and results in the congressional redistricting process.
42. The protection of racial and language minorities is a Tier I standard, “meaning that
the voters placed this constitutional imperative as a top priority to which the Legislature must
conform during the redistricting process.” In re S. J. Res., 83 So. 3d at 615.
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43. Article III, Section 20(a) of the Florida Constitution provides that “districts shall
not be drawn with the intent or result of denying or abridging the equal opportunity of racial or
language minorities to participate in the political process or to diminish their ability to elect
representatives of their choice.” (emphasis added). This portion of Section 20(a) prevents both
vote dilution and diminishment of a minority group’s ability to elect candidates of its choice.
44. The Florida Supreme Court has labeled this latter requirement as the “non-
diminishment standard.” See Advisory Op. to Gov., No. SC22-139, 2022 WL 405381, at *1 (Fla.
Feb. 10, 2022); LWV I, 172 So. 3d at 402; In re S. J. Res., 83 So. 3d at 677. It prohibits
congressional districting plans that have “the purpose or will have the effect of diminishing the
ability of any citizens on account of race or color to elect their preferred candidates of choice.” In
re S. J. Res., 83 So. 3d at 620 (cleaned up).
45. “Accordingly, the Legislature cannot eliminate majority-minority districts or
weaken other historically performing minority districts where doing so would actually diminish a
minority group’s ability to elect its preferred candidates.” Id. at 625. The non-diminishment
standard accordingly calls for a comparative analysis: “The existing plan of a covered jurisdiction
serves as the ‘benchmark’ against which the ‘effect’ of voting change is measured.” Id. at 624.
46. This comparative or “functional” analysis requires “consideration not only of the
minority population in the districts, or even the minority voting-age population in those districts,
but of political data and how a minority population group has voted in the past.” Id.
47. Unlawful intent can be discerned from both direct and circumstantial evidence. See
LWV I, 172 So. 3d at 388–89. Direct evidence of improper intent is often found in the statements
and communications of those “responsible for drafting districting plans.” Id. (citing Easley v.
Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 254 (2001)).
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48. Circumstantial evidence, however, can be enough by itself to show improper intent.
Indeed, the “specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision also may shed light
on the decisionmaker’s purposes.” LWV I, 172 So. 3d at 389 (quoting Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267 (1977)). “Departures from the normal procedural
sequence also might afford evidence that improper purposes are playing a role.” Id. (quoting
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267).
49. In determining intent, courts have also “considered the role of alternative plans,”
because if “an alternative plan can achieve the same constitutional objectives that prevent vote
dilution and retrogression of protected minority and language groups and also apportions the
districts in accordance with tier-two principles . . . this will provide circumstantial evidence of
improper intent.” In re S. J. Res., 83 So. 3d at 641.
B. The Florida Constitution prohibits the drawing of congressional districts to

favor or disfavor a political party.
50. The Florida Constitution’s prohibition on partisan gerrymandering is also a Tier I
standard.
51. “The acceptability of partisan political gerrymandering in this state dramatically
changed” after the people of Florida amended the Constitution with the Fair Districts Amendment.
LWV I, 172 So. 3d at 374.
52. Article III, Section 20(a) of the Florida Constitution provides that “[n]o
apportionment plan or district shall be drawn with the intent to favor or disfavor a political party
or an incumbent.” This requirement “prohibits what has previously been an acceptable practice,
such as favoring incumbents and the political party in power.” In re S. J. Res., 83 So. 3d at 615.
“While some states have sought to minimize the political nature of the apportionment process by
establishing independent redistricting commissions to redraw legislative districts, Florida voters
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have instead chosen to place restrictions on the Legislature by constitutional mandate in a manner
similar to the constitutions of other states.” Id. at 616.
53. The Florida Constitution “prohibits drawing a plan or district with the intent to
favor or disfavor a political party or incumbent; there is no acceptable level of improper intent.”
Id. at 617. It “does not reference the word ‘invidious’ as the term has been used by the United
States Supreme Court in equal protection discrimination cases, and Florida’s provision should not
be read to require a showing of malevolent or evil purpose.” Id. (cleaned up). The Florida
Constitution’s prohibition on partisan gerrymandering, moreover, “applies to both the
apportionment plan as a whole and to each district individually.” Id.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
II. The Fair Districts Amendment is enforceable against Florida’s congressional

reapportionment plans.
54. When the U.S. Supreme Court held that partisan gerrymandering claims could not
be brought in federal court, it explained that its holding did not “condemn complaints about
districting to echo into a void.” Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2507. The task of reforming the redistricting
process is one for the states and their citizens because “[p]rovisions in state statutes and state
constitutions can provide standards and guidance for state courts to apply.” Id.
55. The U.S. Supreme Court pointed to Florida as a model for the nation. Citing
favorably to the Florida Supreme Court’s decision to strike down the Legislature’s 2012
congressional redistricting plan, the U.S. Supreme Court held that federal courts were not similarly
empowered to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering claims because “[t]here is no ‘Fair Districts
Amendment’ to the Federal Constitution.” Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2507 (citing LWV I, 172 So. 3d at
363). And it observed that other states, including Missouri, Iowa, and Delaware, followed Florida’s
lead by amending their constitutions in similar fashion. Id. at 2507–08.
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56. In LWV I, plaintiffs alleged that Florida’s 2012 congressional plan was drawn to
benefit the Republican Party in violation of the Fair Districts Amendment’s prohibition on partisan
gerrymandering. The trial court agreed, enforcing the Fair Districts Amendment against the
Legislature’s plan. See Romo v. Detzner, No. 2012-CA-000412, 2014 WL 3797315, at *3 (Fla. 2d
Cir. Ct. July 10, 2014).
57. The Florida Supreme Court agreed that the Legislature had made a “mockery” out
of the Fair Districts Amendment in drawing its 2012 congressional plan. LWV I, 172 So. 3d at 377.
The Court gave no deference to the Legislature’s justifications for the challenged district
boundaries given its finding that the entire map had been “tainted by unconstitutional intent to
favor the Republican Party and incumbent lawmakers.” Id. at 369 (cleaned up). It then ordered the
Legislature “to redraw, on an expedited basis, Congressional Districts 5, 13, 14, 21, 22, 25, 26, 27,
and all other districts affected by the redrawing.” Id. at 371–72.
58. The Court also provided precise guidelines to ensure that the Legislature redrew
the map in accordance with the Florida Constitution. For example, the Court ordered the
Legislature to redraw North Florida’s CD-5, which, as shown below, was “visually not compact,
bizarrely shaped” and contravened “traditional political boundaries as it [wound] from
Jacksonville to Orlando, narrowing at one point to the width of a highway.” Id. at 402.
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59. The Florida Supreme Court rejected the Legislature’s assertion that this north-to-
south configuration was necessary to comply with the Fair District Amendment’s non-
diminishment standard, explaining that the Legislature “placed more black voters in the district
than [was] necessary to ensure that they can elect a candidate of choice—thereby diluting the
influence of Democratic minorities in surrounding districts.” Id. at 402. It then ordered the
Legislature to redraw CD-5 in an East-West configuration as legislative staffers had initially done
in draft plans, id. at 403–04, and subsequently affirmed the redrawn configuration as shown below:
See League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Detzner (“LWV II”), 179 So. 3d 258, 271–72 (Fla. 2015).
60. The Florida Supreme Court rejected arguments that the East-West configuration of
CD-5 “causes the redistricting map to become significantly less compact.” LWV I, 172 So. 3d at
405–06. While the redrawn CD-5 had a longer perimeter than the Legislature’s version, “length is
just one factor to consider in evaluating compactness.” Id. at 406. Indeed, “the phrase ‘as compact
as possible’ does not mean ‘as small in size as possible, but rather ‘as regular in shape as possible.’”
Id. (cleaned up). After all, “numerical compactness scores actually favor[ed] the East-West
orientation.” Id. The redrawn CD-5 also produced fewer city and county splits. Id.
61. The Court provided additional guidance for redrawing the Tampa Bay-based CDs-
13 and 14. It explained that the Legislature adopted a configuration of these districts that was
“known to have been favored by political operatives” in which CD-14 “crossed Tampa Bay,
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add[ing] more Democratic voters to an already safely Democratic District 4, while ensuring that
District 13 was more favorable to the Republican Party.” Id. at 406–07. The Court then ordered
CDs-13 and 14 to be “redrawn to avoid crossing Tampa Bay.” Id. at 409.
62. The Court further held that CDs-21, 22, 25, 26, and 27 were likewise drawn with
impermissible partisan intent, in each instance rejecting the Legislature’s justifications for the
district lines and providing specific guidance for redrawing the district boundaries. See id. at 410–
13.
63. After the Florida Supreme Court issued its decision and remanded, the Legislature
quickly convened a special session that ended without agreement. In the absence of an agreed plan,
the trial court analyzed and recommended remedial districts drawn by the House, Senate, and
plaintiffs. LWV II, 179 So. 3d at 261. The Florida Supreme Court adopted the trial court’s
recommendation in December 2015, resulting in the congressional map that would be used in
Florida’s next three congressional elections—the Benchmark Plan. See id.
64. The Court acknowledged that LWV II was “neither the first, nor likely the last time”
that the Florida judiciary would need to “confront a challenge to a redistricting plan enacted by the
Legislature.” 172 So. 3d at 415. Future courts, it pressed, must continue to “endeavor[] to give
meaning to the intent of the framers and voters who passed the Fair Districts Amendment.” Id. at
415.
III. After the Legislature indicated that they would protect CD-5 from diminishment,
Governor DeSantis hijacked the process and declared the Amendment
unconstitutional.
65. The U.S. Census Bureau released the 2020 census data needed for redistricting on
August 12, 2021. The Florida Senate and House commenced the redistricting process by holding
initial hearings in September 2021, kicking off an iterative process of drafting congressional maps.
19
66. Throughout the process, both chambers repeatedly asserted that CD-5 was a
protected district under the Florida Constitution’s non-diminishment standard and explained the
importance of keeping the district intact.
67. That process culminated in the Senate approving, on a bipartisan basis, a
congressional redistricting plan that retained the east-west configuration of CD-5.2 The Senate
Reapportionment Committee voted to advance its congressional plan to the full Senate on January
13, 2022.3 The full Senate then voted overwhelmingly—by a vote of 31 to 4—in favor of the plan.4
That plan was expected to produce 16 Republican seats and 12 Democratic seats.
68. At that time, the House was also in the process of finalizing a congressional map
that retained the core of CD-5. But before it could do so, Governor DeSantis upended the
redistricting process by threatening to veto the House and Senate plans over the configuration of
CD-5. Describing CD-5 as an “unconstitutional gerrymander,” Governor DeSantis then claimed
repeatedly that he would “not be signing any congressional map that has an unconstitutional
gerrymander in it. That is going to be the position that we stick to. Take that to the bank.”5
69. On February 1, 2022, Governor DeSantis requested that the Florida Supreme Court
issue an advisory opinion on whether the Fair Districts Amendment’s non-diminishment standard
“requires the retention” of CD-5 in either the east-west configuration adopted in LWV I or the
2
See CS/SB 102: Bill Analysis and Fiscal Impact Statement at 13, Fla. Sen. (Jan. 14, 2022), https://
www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2022/102/Analyses/2022s00102.re.PDF.
3
See CS/102: Establishing the Congressional Districts of the State, Fla. Sen., https://
www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2022/102 (Mar. 29, 2022).
4
See id.
5
DeSantis Says He Will Not Sign Legislation That Has ‘Unconstitutional Gerrymander,’ WTXL
(Feb. 11, 2022) https://www.wtxl.com/news/local-news/desantis-says-he-will-not-sign-
legislation-that-has-unconstitutional-gerrymander.
20
north-south version preceding it. See Advisory Op., 2022 WL 405381, at *1. The Court denied the
request.
70. The Legislature attempted to appease Governor DeSantis by passing a redistricting
plan on March 4, 2022, that modified CD-5 to make it more compact and eliminated the so-called
“sprawling” nature of the district, which Governor DeSantis had opposed. While the modified
version, as shown below, substantially reduced the Black population of the district, the Legislature
contended that it still would have allowed the Black candidate of choice to prevail in a majority of
elections:6
6
CS/SB 102: Establishing the Congressional Districts of the State, Fla. Sen., https://
www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2022/102/?Tab=BillHistory (Mar. 29, 2022).
21
71. The Legislature’s March 4 plan favored Republicans even more than the Senate’s
version; it was anticipated to produce 18 Republican seats and 10 Democratic seats.
72. The Legislature’s plan also included an alternative map that the Legislature
intended to take effect if courts found that the primary map diminished Black voting power in
violation of the Florida Constitution. The alternative map retained the East-West configuration of
CD-5 and, like the primary plan, was expected to produce 18 Republican seats and 10 Democratic
seats.
73. On March 29, 2022, Governor DeSantis vetoed the Legislature’s plan despite the
changes the House made to appease him and called a special legislative session. Governor
DeSantis claimed that the Legislature’s plan still contained “unconstitutional racial
gerrymanders.”7
74. In advance of the special session, House Speaker Sprowls and Senate President
Simpson informed lawmakers that legislative staff would not draw new maps and that the
Legislature would instead consider a congressional plan from Governor DeSantis.8 The intent of
the special session, they explained, “is to provide the Governor’s Office opportunities to present
[a plan] before House and Senate redistricting committees.”9
75. Governor DeSantis released his proposed congressional plan on April 13, 2022.
76. During the special session, the Governor’s Deputy Chief of Staff, Alex Kelly, and
Legal Counsel, Ryan Newsom, presented the DeSantis Plan to the House and Senate.
7
Gov. DeSantis Vetoes Congressional Redistricting Maps Passed by Florida Lawmakers, WTSP
(Mar. 29, 2022), https://www.wtsp.com/article/news/politics/desantis-vetoes-congressional-
redistricting-maps/67-f04f20fd-9113-4cb7-9704-1fb0aac22159.
8
Associated Press, Florida Legislature Gives up, Asks DeSantis for Congressional Maps, WTXL
(Apr. 11, 2022), https://www.wtxl.com/news/local-news/florida-legislature-gives-up-asks-gov-
for-congressional-map.
9
Id.
22
77. During his testimony, Mr. Kelly confirmed that Governor DeSantis had hired Adam
Foltz, a well-known Republican redistricting operative, to help draw the map.
78. The Legislature passed the DeSantis Plan on April 21, 2022, without amendment,
over the vigorous protest of the chambers’ Black representatives.
IV. The DeSantis Plan violates the Florida Constitution by diminishing the ability of
Black voters to elect representatives of their choice.
79. As the 2020 census revealed, Florida is home to over 3.7 million Black residents, a
substantial increase from the last decennial census. Today, Florida has three times the Black
population of Alabama and a larger Black population than Georgia.
80. Under the Benchmark Plan, as ordered by the Florida Supreme Court in 2015, Black
voters could and did elect their candidates of choice in four districts across the state: CD-5, in
North Florida; CD-10, in Central Florida; and CDs-20 and 24 in South Florida.
81. Under the Benchmark Plan, CD-5 consisted of the historic Black population in
North Florida.
82. While CD-5 was known for its inclusion of Tallahassee and Jacksonville, both of
which have substantial Black populations, Black voters also comprise a substantial portion of the
lower-density counties that made up the rest of CD-5. Gadsden County, for instance, is 55% Black,
and Jefferson, Madison, and Hamilton Counties are all more than 30% Black.
83. Under the Benchmark Plan, Black voters made up 46.2% of the citizen and total
voting-age populations of CD-5. At this threshold, CD-5 elected Black voters’ candidates of choice
in every election since the Benchmark Plan’s adoption:
23
Black Candidate of
Election Vote Share
Choice
2016 Al Lawson (D) 64.2%
2018 Al Lawson (D) 66.8%
2020 Al Lawson (D) 65.1%
84. The DeSantis Plan obliterates CD-5 and Black voters’ ability to elect their
candidate of choice in North Florida.
85. Specifically, the DeSantis Plan takes existing CD-5 and carves up its Black
population among four new districts: the new CD-2, CD-3, CD-4, and CD-5. The resulting Black
populations of those districts are now 23.3%, 16.3%, 29.6%, and 11.8%, respectively. The white
populations of those districts now subsume the Black populations considerably in each district.
86. As a result, there are no districts in North Florida that will permit Black voters to
elect their candidates of choice.
87. While it does so in more subtle ways, the DeSantis Plan also cracks Black voters
and diminishes their ability to elect in other parts of the state, including Central Florida, Tampa
Bay, and South Florida.
88. At the beginning of this cycle’s redistricting process, both chambers of the
Legislature stated they would attempt to comply with the Fair Districts Amendment’s non-
diminishment principle in redrawing Florida’s congressional boundaries. Every legislative staff
member and legislator involved in redrawing those boundaries acknowledged that, as to CD-5 in
particular, compliance with the Fair Districts Amendment required that the Black voters of North
Florida be able to elect their candidates of choice. The Senate’s proposed plan, for example, would
have maintained the voting strength of Black voters in CD-5 as provided in the Benchmark Plan.
And while the Legislature’s March 4 plan was a step backwards from the Benchmark Plan, that
24
plan—which Governor DeSantis nonetheless vetoed—would have given Black voters a plausible
opportunity to elect their candidates of choice, instead of none at all.
89. In passing the DeSantis Plan, the Legislature did not even attempt to argue that the
DeSantis Plan’s obliteration of CD-5 complied with the Florida Constitution’s non-diminishment
standard. Rather, legislative leadership stated only that they believed there was a “legitimate
question” as to whether they were required to honor that provision of the Fair Districts
Amendment.
V. The DeSantis Plan violates the Florida Constitution by intentionally diminishing the
ability of Black voters to elect representatives of their choice.
90. The DeSantis Plan does not result in diminishment by happenstance; it was
intended to have that precise effect.
91. Governor DeSantis stated that he intended to dismantle the historically black CD-
5 when he released his redistricting plan in advance of the special legislative session. At a news
conference following the release of the DeSantis Plan, the Governor stated that “[w]e are not going
to have a 200-mile gerrymander . . . . That is wrong. That’s not the way we’ve governed in the
state of Florida.”10
92. Indeed, the special legislative session came on the heels of months of repeated
statements from Governor DeSantis and his staff pledging to eliminate CD-5. Following the
release of the first iteration of the DeSantis Plan earlier this year, Governor DeSantis’s press
secretary was unequivocal: “We eliminated this flagrant gerrymander.” And Governor DeSantis
10
Jane C. Timm & Marc Caputo, DeSantis Draws Congressional Map That Would Dramatically
Expand GOP’s Edge in Florida, NBC News (Apr. 13, 2022), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/
elections/desantis-draws-congressional-map-dramatically-expanding-gops-edge-flor-rcna24317.
25
used similar language regarding CD-5 in explaining his decision to veto the Legislature’s proposal
in March.11
93. Governor DeSantis’s desire to eliminate CD-5 was also apparent in his request for
an advisory opinion from the Florida Supreme Court on “whether Article III, Section 20(a) of the
Florida Constitution requires the retention of [CD-5].” Advisory Op., 333 So. 3d at 1107–08.
94. The Legislature passed the DeSantis Plan with full knowledge and acceptance of
the fact that the plan would eliminate a historically performing Black district.
95. During the special session, when asked on the House Floor whether new CD-4 or
CD-5 would perform for Black candidates of choice, Chair Leek responded that it would not. He
further explained, “[O]ur [House] staff did a functional analysis and confirmed it does not
perform.”
96. And in signing the plan, Governor DeSantis made good on a promise he had made
months earlier to veto any plan that complied with the Fair Districts Amendment’s protection of
CD-5 as a Black-opportunity district.
97. Beyond knowingly dismantling CD-5, the DeSantis Plan also engages in race-based
line drawing throughout the state to abridge and diminish the voting strength of minority voters.
98. In Central Florida, for example, the DeSantis Plan pulls hundreds of thousands of
minority voters out of their existing districts and subsumes them into white districts. Most notably,
the DeSantis Plan removes approximately 300,000 people from CD-10, which previously
performed for Black candidates of choice and no longer clearly does so. The majority of those
11
Steve Contorno, DeSantis Vetoes New Florida Congressional Map and Calls for Special
Session, CNN (Mar. 29, 2022), https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/29/politics/desantis-vetoes-florida-
congressional-map/index.html (Governor DeSantis describing CD-5 as “pure racial gerrymander”
that must be eliminated).
26
removed are persons of color who have now been pushed into CD-11, a predominantly white
district.
99. In Tampa Bay too the DeSantis Plan splits St. Petersburg’s Black population in
half, cracking Black voters in CD-13 between two congressional districts, thereby diminishing and
abridging the Black community’s ability to influence elections. The picture below shows the new
split of the Black population in Pinellas County, shown in blue:
100. Across the state, the DeSantis Plan intentionally and repeatedly carves out Black
voters from districts where they previously exercised electoral power.
VI. The DeSantis Plan violates the Florida Constitution by intentionally favoring the
Republican Party and disfavoring the Democratic Party.
101. With nearly every line-drawing decision, the DeSantis Plan advantages the
Republican Party.
102. Under the Benchmark Plan, Democrats were expected to consistently win 11 of the
state’s 27 congressional districts: one in North Florida, three in Central Florida, two in Tampa Bay,
and five in South Florida. Several more congressional seats beyond those 11 were competitive
27
between the parties: Under the Benchmark Plan, depending on prevailing national trends, the
Democratic Party could have plausibly claimed 13 or 14 seats (or roughly half) of Florida’s 27
congressional districts.
103. While the Benchmark Plan was widely thought to exhibit a slight Republican bias,
it at least gave Democrats a roadmap to compete for half the state’s congressional seats. This was
a reasonable outcome in a fiercely competitive swing state, which most recently elected a
Republican governor and Republican U.S. senator in 2018 by less than half of a percentage point.
104. During the regular legislative session, the Legislature produced at least some plans
that resulted in a roughly similar breakdown of seats as the Benchmark Plan. For example, while
the Senate’s final congressional plan exhibited a Republican bias, it was still expected to elect 16
Republicans and 12 Democrats to Congress.
105. The DeSantis Plan, however, is expected to consistently elect 20 Republicans and
only 8 Democrats to Congress.
106. As Princeton University Professor Sam Wang described, the DeSantis Plan will
result in “one of the most extreme gerrymanders in the country.”12
107. As a Florida campaign consultant similarly described, the DeSantis Plan “is the
conservative dream map. It aims to compact Democrats into as few districts as possible while
cracking minority communities elsewhere.”13
108. That is exactly what the DeSantis Plan does: It intentionally favors Republicans at
nearly every turn. The result is devastatingly effective, resulting in an anticipated loss of three
12
Paul LeBlanc, Ron DeSantis Is Drawing Democrats out of the Equation in Florida, CNN (Apr.
14, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/14/politics/desantis-florida-redistricting-what-
matters/index.html.
13
Matthew Isabel, Issue 44: A Good Friday Analysis of a Bad Redistricting Map, MCIMAPS
Report (Apr. 15, 2022).
28
safely held Democratic seats and transforming two previously competitive seats into Republican-
leaning seats, as compared to the Benchmark Plan.
109. Both as a whole, and as considered at an individual district level, the DeSantis Plan
is an intentional partisan gerrymander.
110. Below are just a few of the examples of how the DeSantis Plan intentionally favors
Republicans across the state:
A. North Florida
111. In the Benchmark Plan, North Florida consistently elected one Democrat to
Congress: Al Lawson, from CD-5. As discussed, the DeSantis Plan obliterates CD-5, cracking its
Black (and Democratic-leaning) populations across the new CDs-2, 3, 4, and 5, creating four safe-
Republican seats. Because CDs-1 and 6 also remain reliably Republican, no district in North
Florida will elect a Democrat under the DeSantis Plan.
112. Even taken at face value, Governor DeSantis’s articulated desire to comply with
the U.S. Constitution (and the consequent elimination the East-West configuration of CD-5) does
not plausibly explain the elimination of a Democratic seat in North Florida.
113. As the Legislature’s March 4 map demonstrated, before it was vetoed by Governor
DeSantis, it was possible to draw a compact, Jacksonville-only district with a substantial Black
population. That version of CD-5 would have consistently elected Democrats.
114. Governor DeSantis vetoed that plan, decrying what he deemed to be the plan’s
unfair treatment of Jacksonville, which was divided in the Legislature’s plan, even while it kept
the city’s Black population substantially together.
115. Governor DeSantis’s plan, however, still cleaves Jacksonville—and its Black
population—in two. It just now does so in a way that disadvantages both Black voters and
29
Democrats, resulting in two safe-Republican seats. The DeSantis Plan’s division of Jacksonville
is shown below:
B. Central Florida
116. In the Benchmark Plan, Central Florida consistently elected three Democrats to
Congress, from CDs-9, 10, and 7. Of these districts, CD-7 was the most competitive for
Republicans, though it still elected a Democrat by more than 10 percentage points in 2020.
117. The DeSantis Plan ensures that Republicans will safely be elected in CD-7.
118. In the Benchmark Plan, CD-7 sat in the northeast corner of Orlando and its suburbs,
encompassing the University of Central Florida. The Benchmark CD-7 encompassed all of
Seminole County and took a portion of Orange County to the south. The district was relatively
compact.
119. At the start of this redistricting cycle, CD-7 needed to lose only a small amount of
population to reach population equality. It did not need to be drastically reconfigured.
30
120. The DeSantis Plan wholly reconfigures CD-7. The new CD-7 exits Orange County
entirely, then reaches out all the way to the Space Coast to take the southern half of Volusia
County. The new district sheds about 300,000 residents from the prior district, the majority of
whom are persons of color, retaining only about 30% of its prior area. The resulting district is far
whiter and Republican, resulting in a reliably safe-Republican seat.
121. Moreover, by moving into Volusia County, the new CD-7 creates an additional
unnecessary county split in the map, further diminishing its compliance with Tier II criteria.
C. Tampa Bay
122. In the Benchmark Plan, Tampa Bay consistently elected two Democrats to
Congress, from CDs-13 and 14.
123. In the Benchmark Plan, CD-13 was situated wholly in Pinellas County and included
all of St. Petersburg. CD-14 was similarly situated wholly in Hillsborough County.
124. The Benchmark Plan’s configuration of CDs-13 and 14 was the result of three years
of litigation. In LWV I, the plaintiffs alleged that the Legislature’s enacted configuration of these
districts—in which CD-14 jumped across Tampa Bay to pack Democratic voters from St.
Petersburg into CD-14—was an intentional partisan gerrymander. The trial court and Florida
Supreme Court agreed, ordering the configuration of CDs-13 and 14 as found in the Benchmark
Plan.
125. The DeSantis Plan does precisely what the Florida Supreme Court told the
Legislature it could not do in 2015: jump across Tampa Bay to pack Democratic voters into CD-
14 and drain them away from CD-13, thereby turning CD-13 from a safe-Democratic seat to a
safe-Republican seat.
126. The DeSantis Plan’s treatment of CDs-13 and 14 is not easily explained by the need
to meet population equality or improve upon other Tier II criteria.
31
127. At the start of this redistricting cycle, CD-13 needed to gain approximately 40,000
people to reach population equality. CD-14, conversely, needed to lose approximately 20,000
people. CD-13 thus needed to expand slightly, and CD-14 needed to contract slightly.
128. In the DeSantis Plan, however, CD-14 jumps across Tampa Bay to seize nearly
200,000 of Pinellas County’s residents from CD-13, the district that needed to gain population.
This configuration splits one of Florida’s major cities—and specifically, splits St. Petersburg’s
Black population in half, cracking Black voters in CD-13 and packing them into CD-14 to ensure
a new safely held Republican seat in Tampa Bay. In so doing, the DeSantis Plan reduces the
compactness of CD-13.
D. South Florida
129. In the Benchmark Plan, South Florida had two fiercely competitive seats: CDs-26
and 27. Both seats were winnable by either party. For example, both seats switched hands from a
Republican in 2016, to a Democrat in 2018, and back to a Republican in 2020.
130. The DeSantis Plan redraws both districts to ensure Democrats cannot realistically
win either seat going forward. CD-26 (now CD-28), for example, shaves off Palmetto Estates and
West Perrine, communities with substantial Democratic populations. It trades those communities
for Fontainebleau, which is more reliably Republican. CD-27 makes similar moves, trading its
Democratic-heavy portions of Miami Beach for more reliably Republican areas.
131. The result is to put both districts of out of reach for Democrats.
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
COUNT I
Violation of Article III, Section 20 of the Florida Constitution
Diminishment of Minority Ability to Elect (Tier I Violation)
132. Plaintiffs reallege and reincorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 131 of this
Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
32
133. Under the Florida Constitution, districts shall not be drawn with the intent or result
of denying or abridging the equal opportunity of racial or language minorities to participate in the
political process or to diminish their ability to elect representatives of their choice
134. The DeSantis Plan and individual districts in the plan, including but not limited to
CD-5, result in diminishment of Black voters’ ability to elect their candidates of choice in violation
of Article III, Section 20 of the Florida Constitution.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court enter judgment:
a. Declaring that the DeSantis Plan and/or individual districts in the DeSantis
Plan violate Article III, Section 20 of the Florida Constitution;
b. Enjoining Defendants, their respective agents, officers, employees, and
successors, and all persons acting in concert with each or any of them, from implementing
enforcing, or giving any effect to the DeSantis Plan, including enjoining Defendants from
conducting any elections for the U.S. House of Representatives under the DeSantis Plan;
c. Ordering or adopting a new congressional districting plan that complies
with Article III, Section 20 of the Florida Constitution;
d. Issuing an order requiring Defendants to pay Plaintiffs’ costs and expenses
incurred in the prosecution of this action, as authorized by Fla. Stat. § 86.081; and
e. Granting such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
COUNT II
Intent to Abridge and Diminish Minority Voting Strength (Tier I Violation)
33
136. The DeSantis Plan was intended to result in diminishment of Black voters’ ability
to elect their candidates of choice in violation of Article III, Section 20 of the Florida Constitution.
137. The DeSantis Plan further intentionally abridges and diminishes the equal
opportunity of minority voters to participate in the political process by targeting minority
populations in North Florida, Tampa Bay, and Central Florida to draw them out of minority-
opportunity districts.
COUNT III
Intent to Favor or Disfavor a Political Party (Tier I Violation)
34
CDs-4, 5, 7, 10, 11, 13, 14, 26, and 27, were drawn with the intent to favor the Republican Party
and to disfavor the Democratic Party in violation of Article III, Section 20 of the Florida
Constitution.
COUNT IV
Non-Compactness (Tier II Violation)
CDs-7, 13 and 14, are not compact in violation of Article III, Section 20 of the Florida Constitution.
35
These violations were not in service of any Tier I criteria; on the contrary, these violations were
made in service of the Tier I violations set forth in the previous claims.
COUNT V
Political and Geographic Boundary Splits (Tier II Violation)
CDs-4, 5, 13, and 14, do not use political and geographic boundaries where feasible in violation
of Article III, Section 20 of the Florida Constitution. These violations were not in service of any
Tier I criteria; on the contrary, these violations were made in service of the Tier I violations set
forth in the previous claims.
36
37
Dated: April 22, 2022 Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Frederick S. Wermuth Abha Khanna*

Frederick S. Wermuth Jonathan P. Hawley*
Florida Bar No. 0184111 ELIAS LAW GROUP LLP
Thomas A. Zehnder 1700 Seventh Avenue, Suite 2100
Florida Bar No. 0063274 Seattle, Washington 98101
KING, BLACKWELL, ZEHNDER & Telephone: (206) 656-0177
WERMUTH, P.A. Facsimile: (206) 656-0180
P.O. Box 1631 akhanna@elias.law
Orlando, Florida 32802 jhawley@elias.law
Telephone: (407) 422-2472
Facsimile: (407) 648-0161 Christina A. Ford
fwermuth@kbzwlaw.com Florida Bar No. 1011634
tzehnder@kbzwlaw.com Joseph N. Posimato*
Graham W. White*
John M. Devaney* ELIAS LAW GROUP LLP
PERKINS COIE LLP 10 G Street NE, Suite 600
700 Thirteenth Street N.W., Suite 600 Washington, D.C. 20002
Washington, D.C. 20005 Phone: (202) 968-4490
Telephone: (202) 654-6200 Facsimile: (202) 968-4498
Facsimile: (202) 654-6211 cford@elias.law
jdevaney@perkinscoie.com jposimato@elias.law
gwhite@elias.law
Counsel for Plaintiffs
*Pro hac vice application forthcoming
38

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Filing # 148201925 E-Filed 04/22/2022 11:22:38 AM

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

BLACK VOTERS MATTER CAPACITY

LAUREL M. LEE, in her official capacity as

Plaintiffs BLACK VOTERS MATTER CAPACITY BUILDING INSTITUTE, INC.,

EQUAL GROUND EDUCATION FUND, INC., LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF

FLORIDA, INC., LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF FLORIDA EDUCATION FUND, INC.,

FLORIDA RISING TOGETHER, PASTOR REGINALD GUNDY, SYLVIA YOUNG,

PHYLLIS WILEY, ANDREA HERSHORIN, ANAYDIA CONNOLLY, BRANDON P.

NELSON, KATIE YARROWS, CYNTHIA LIPPERT, KISHA LINEBAUGH, BEATRIZ

NATURE OF THE ACTION

Id. at 416 (cleaned up).

Districts Amendment unconstitutional. He vetoed the Legislature’s congressional plan and

his own redistricting scheme, SB 2-C (the “DeSantis Plan”).

even purport to.

responded simply, and honestly, “No.”

has for months maintained is protected by the Florida Constitution.

Florida voters sought to eradicate in passing the Fair Districts Amendment.

standards constitutionally invalid.” In re S. J. Resol. of Legis. Apportionment 1176, 83 So. 3d 597,

JURISDICTION, PARTIES, AND VENUE

as Fla. Stat. § 26.012(3).

no longer have effective representation.

12. Plaintiff Equal Ground Education Fund (“Equal Ground”) is a 501(c)(3)

harmed by the DeSantis Plan.

intends to do so in the future.

intends to do so in the future.

intends to do so in the future.

intends to do so in the future.

overseeing the state’s elections. See Fla. Stat. § 97.012.

Legislature to be declared unconstitutional. Fla. Stat. § 86.091.

as a Defendant in his official capacity.

and is named as a Defendant in his official capacity.

34. Defendant Ray Rodrigues is the Chair of the Senate Committee on

Reapportionment and is named as a Defendant in his official capacity.

is named as a Defendant in his official capacity.

36. On November 2, 2010, the people of Florida voted by an overwhelming margin of

decade exercise of its congressional reapportionment powers.

to redistrict in a manner that prohibits favoritism or discrimination, while respecting geographic

clearly act as a restraint on the Legislature in drawing apportionment plans.” In re S. J. Res., 83

equal opportunity of racial or language minorities to participate in the political process or to

contiguous territory.” Fla. Const. art. III, § 20(a).

feasible, utilize existing political and geographical boundaries.” Id. § 20(b).

each tier.” Id. (citing Fla. Const. art. III, § 20(c))

constitutionally valid.” Id. at 600.

A. The Florida Constitution protects racial and language minorities against

conform during the redistricting process.” In re S. J. Res., 83 So. 3d at 615.

re S. J. Res., 83 So. 3d at 620 (cleaned up).

45. “Accordingly, the Legislature cannot eliminate majority-minority districts or

Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 254 (2001)).

Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267).

improper intent.” In re S. J. Res., 83 So. 3d at 641.

B. The Florida Constitution prohibits the drawing of congressional districts to

50. The Florida Constitution’s prohibition on partisan gerrymandering is also a Tier I

51. “The acceptability of partisan political gerrymandering in this state dramatically

LWV I, 172 So. 3d at 374.

establishing independent redistricting commissions to redraw legislative districts, Florida voters

similar to the constitutions of other states.” Id. at 616.

Constitution’s prohibition on partisan gerrymandering, moreover, “applies to both the

apportionment plan as a whole and to each district individually.” Id.

II. The Fair Districts Amendment is enforceable against Florida’s congressional

empowered to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering claims because “[t]here is no ‘Fair Districts

lead by amending their constitutions in similar fashion. Id. at 2507–08.

Cir. Ct. July 10, 2014).