Building Democracies in South Asia

Author(s): Anirudha Gupta

Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 35, No. 13 (Mar. 25-31, 2000), pp. 1071-1074
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4409077
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 reprimandby thecourtto thechief investigating
officer inspector Jai Singh.
4 Accordingto seniorgovernmentofficials, "The
new legislation which is essentially aimed at
combating internationalterrorism, will take
care of all hijacking incidents that flow from
such criminal activities"quoted in Hindustan
Times,January14, 'Tough anti-terrorismlaw
in pipeline'. Not mentioned is the fact that
existing law alreadyprovidesfor offences like
hijacking. India has been signatory to three
internationalconventions against hijacking -
Tokyo (1963), Hague (1970), and Montreal
(1971) - which are already in force through
the Suppressionof Unlawful Activities against
the Safety of Civil Aviation Act, 1982. Under
this law hijackers are punishable with life
imprisonment.But this fact seems to have been
missed in the furious debates on the need for
a 'strong'law to tackle terrorism.All the three
'terrorists'whowerereleasedafterthehijackhad
beenarrestedunderaparticularlystronglaw, the
TADA. Whathappenedto theircases? Maulana
MassodAzhar,a leaderof Harkat-ulAnsar,was
first arrestedin February1994. Even six years
laterno challanhasbeenproducedin the courts.
The case underTADA was finally dismissed
by the designatedcourt for want of evidence.
The case for which he is actually facing trial
is one of attempted jailbreak (The Hindu,
Building Democracies
in
South Asia
Thisarticle examinespolitical and legal institutions,demographic
compulsionsand partypolitics infour countries- India, Sri Lanka,
Bangladeshand Nepal - to assess the progress of democracyin
these countries.
ANIRUDHAGUPTA
T he fact of political independence
has not ensured democraticfree
dom to the peoplesof southAsia.
In some countriessuch freedomis alto-
gether unknown;but even in countries
where civil liberties are guaranteedby
constitution,large patchesof autocratic,
arbitrary,and feudalisticpracticesvitiate
theareaof governance.Thus,despitebeing
the world'slargestdemocracy,the Indian
administrationstill runs on old British
coloniallines. Its centralisedstate struc-
turestaysdistant- andover and above -
civil society.Its policeandsecurityforces
function as an apparatusto decimate
oppositionandterrorisethe public,andin
someregionsof thecountry,as in Kashmir
and north-eastern states, it is the rule of
gun that prevails over the rule of demo-
cratic consensus-building. In short,
Economicand PoliticalWeekly March25, 2000
January3). MushtaqAhmed Zargar,known to
be a leader of Al Omar-Mujahadeen,has been
facing a trial in a TADA case since 1992. In
this instancetoo a challanis yet to be produced.
The third'terrorist',AhmedUmarSyed Sheikh,
was arrestedundersections of TADA in 1994.
Five years later charges have still not been
framed.So of the three terroristsone has been
acquittedof TADA charges.The othertwo are
still waiting, after more thanfive years behind
bars, for chargesto be framed!This then is the
working of a 'stringent' law like TADA. As
a matterof fact this is the story of TADA trials
in mostcases.Anextraordinary legislationseems
to produceextraordinarylaxityin investigation.
An ironicspin-offof the releaseof threeTADA
undertrialsin exchange for the safe returnof
thepassengersof IC814 was a petitionsubmitted
by 30 accused in the 1992-93 serialbomb blast
case to the prime minister.The petition cited
delays in disposalof TADA cases, as the reason
why 'hijackerswere able to get away with their
demands'. Arguingthat despite the provisions
in Section 17of TADA, whichgives precedence
to TADA cases over othercases, TADA cases
are not being disposed of for many years. So
given the long andprotractedtrialstill pending
before these TADA detenues, who have been
in jail for more than five years, the petition
seeks their release on bail.
despiteits lengthof success andsurvival,
democracy has failed to secure good
governancein India.
The over-centralisedstateof Sri Lanka
too seemsto be farremovedfromtheday-
to-dayexistenceof itscitizens.Beingover-
whelmedby two contraryforces- Sinhala
majoritarianism and Tamil separatism-
the statehas used mostof its resourcesin
augmentingits militarymachine.
At the other end, two new entrantsto
democracyareNepalandBangladesh. Both
had undergonelong periodsof despotic,
dynasticor militaryruleuntilwidespread
popular unrest secured the space and
freedomfor democraticgovernance.But
theirexperienceshowsthatinstallationof
representative government does not
necessarilycreatea climateforresponsive
government.
In this paperwe try to assess both the
advance and the retreatof 'democracy-
building'in south Asia in the contextof
(a) politicalandlegal institutions;(b) de-
mographiccompulsion; and (c) political
leadership and democratic choices as
availableto each of these four countries.
Political and Legal Institutions
Among colonial powers, Britainalone
developeda set of objectivesfor eventual
transferof powerto its colonies.Thisdoes
not meanthatBritainconsciouslytriedto
implantWestminstermodel in the coun-
triesunderits subjugation.Farfromit, its
colonialpolicieswereas harshandrepres-
sive as those practisedby othercolonial
powers.Yet, thesepolicies werebasedon
a vague assumptionthatat some pointor
otherpoliticalpowershoulddevolveto the
peoplesof the colonies once they became
fit to govern themselves. This was the
principleof trusteeshipwhich assumed,
albeit theoretically,that Britain'srule in
the colonies cannotbut be transitional.It
was over the lengthof this transitionthat
its local representativesand nationalists
clashedandsometimesendedin violence.
Besides, as a trustee,the British admin-
istrationcould not wholly abandonthe
interestsof those who stayed outside or
opposedthenationalists.IntheIndiancase,
these interests were representedby the
princes,the minoritiesandotherpolitical
formations.The differencesbetweenthe
nationalistCongress and these interest
groups also held up talks for ultimate
transferof power.Nevertheless,the tran-
sitionalphaseinIndiaandSriLankabegan
in real earnestaroundthe 1930s, when
limitedfranchiseandlimitedauthority were
grantedto local and provincialbodies.
The 1935 ConstitutionalAct provided
for settingup of electedlegislaturesin the
Indianprovinces.Though short in dura-
tion (1937-39), the responsibilityof ad-
ministeringat the provinciallevel gave
India'sCongressleadersthemuch-needed
lessonthattheirroleas ministerswas very
differentfrom the role of rabblerousing.
The experiencealso broughtto the fore
several weaknesses in the Congress
organisationas infighting, scandal and
corruptionbecamerampantin manyareas
of governance.This,however,did notrob
theCongressof its fightingspiritas shown
duringthe Quit India movement.
The experienceof Sri Lankawas some-
what different. By 1930, under the
DonoughmoreCommissionReport,adult
franchisewas grantedbut the affairsof
governancewere entrustedto a systemof
committeesratherthan to a ministerial
1071
cabinet on the Westminster model. This
introduced what can be described as
governance by an elite composed of lead-
ers from majority and minority communi-
ties. From 1930 till 1948, the device worked
remarkablywell and produced a galaxy of
outstanding Sinhala and Tamil leaders. In
addition, the committee system proved
resilient enough to check the growth of
communalism in politics. The prospects of
Sri Lanka flowering into a full-fledged
democracy were indeed so good that, in
1947, Soulbury assured the house of lords
that, "with such natural resources and
with leaders of proven experience, I feel
that Ceylon can face the future under the
highest auspices".
The contrast between the Indian and Sri
Lankan experience was that, whereas the
first had advanced politically to both un-
leash and control mass popularmovement;
the second had advanced administrative
institutions with a weak popularbase. Both
had to adopt different paths for democratic
development. Indians were required to
evolve institutionsof parliamentarygovern-
ment andresolve the divisive consequences
of mass franchise. Sri Lankans needed to
widen the base of politics to confer a sense
of effective participationto the masses. In
this, the transitionfrom colonial to demo-
cratic politics in India owes much to
Jawaharlal Nehru's untiring emphasis on
the building of parliamentarygovernment
based on free and fair elections. In so
doing, Nehru often acted as an autocrat;
but in the context of large-scale violence,
breakdown of law and order, and linguis-
tic-communal clashes, a 'charismatic
autocrat' was perhaps needed to keep
India on the democratic path.
In Sri Lanka, on the other hand, the
committee system came under great strain
as class and mass dichotomy became
increasingly apparent.Pressed by different
elements - Buddhist priesthood, Sinhala
chaunim, n demands
and
vinism, mn fr better
for tt living
- major political formations faced the
problem of winning over majority votes.
Among the leading political families,
S W R D Bandaranaikeof the Sri Lanka
FreedomParty(SLFP) realised that unless
the elite-mass gapwas drasticallynarrowed,
winning majority support was unthink-
able. Hence, he gave the populist call to
make Sinhalathe 'official language' within
48 hours. This call galvanised all sections
of the Sinhala community. In no time, the
politics of language gave birth to twin
demands to make Buddhism the official
religionandSriLanka'landofSinhaleseonly'.
1072
The 1956 election was thus 'the water-
shed' and, as Urmila Phadnis puts it,
"Bandaranaike's volte-face reflected the
stridency of forces for religio-cultural
revivalism...MeanwhiletheUNP leadership
too could feel the intensity of the popular
mood. As a result it also decided to reverse
its previous policy of parity" (Larry Dia-
mond et al Democracy in Asia, p 148).
Thus, parliamentary democracy in Sri
Lanka faced two problems. First, once
majoritarian rights became the principal
theme of political debate, its extremist
advocates went out of control and began
dictating policy choices to the leadership.
When Bandaranaikeresisted, he was elimi-
nated by extremist elements. Second, it
pushed the minority Tamils into ghetto
politics. They were discriminated against
in jobs, in higher education, and finally,
in public life. Thus, paradoxically, politics
based on appeasement of the majority
community did not widen the base of
parliamentary politics. In fact, it threw
it overboard.
In contrastto Sri Lanka and India, Nepal
and Bangladesh still lack the administra-
tive infrastructureto stand the challenges
of democratic governance. Until 1950,
Nepal languished under a century-old
family oligarchy. Its laws were framed
according to the wishes of Rana prime
ministers. Civil liberties were unknown,
and the kingdom was run by a complicated
network of patronage and 'chakrigiri'. All
this came to an abrupt end when a small
group of Nepali intelligentsia and ex-
soldiers launchedan armeduprisingagainst
Rana rule from the Indian soil. The upris-
ing itself was weak and haphazard- and
it might not have succeeded had not the
political climate of south Asia undergone
radical change with the end of British rule
(JNehru's Lettersto ChiefMinisters,vol 2).
The displacement of the Ranas restored
the king's lost authority.But the weakness
of partyorganisations and factional infight
among leading politicians did not help the
building of civil institutions. In 1960, after
a brief stint in parliamentarypolitics, Nepal
went back to authoritarianrule under the
crown. It took 30 long years for the Nepalis
to regain political freedom, start party
activities and hold elections undera demo-
cratic constitution. But, as we shall see,
the restoration of multi-party democracy
under a defined constitutional monarchy
has not succeeded in reinventing political
stability or popular faith in party politics.
The political evolution of Bangladesh is
not very different. Until 1970-71, it con-
Economic and Political Weekly
stituted the eastern wing of Pakistan when
a bloody war brought it to independent
existence. But with a huge population of
some 110 million, the new state lacked
even the rudimentary apparatus to keep
law and order. The first few years of
independence witnessed social, political
and communal disorder which Mujibur
Rahman's Awami League governmentwas
unable to check. The result was an army
coup in 1975, which climaxed in the
assassination of Mujib and his family
members (barring one daughter), and dis-
solution of all party activities. Since then
the country passed from one military rule
to another until a popular movement
brought about the restoration of civilian
rule, a new constitution, party politics and
general elections. But the movement also
ignited a bitter family feud between two
charismatic ladies, Hasina, daughter of
Mujib and leader of the Awami League,
and Begum Zia, widow of General Zia
Rahman and president of Bangladesh
National Party (BNP).
Since the restoration of civilian rule,
politics has turned into a battle supreme
between the two ladies with each harping
on revenge - Hasina calling for the heads
of her father's killers, and Begum Zia for
the heads of those behind the assassination
of her husband. Other actors too have
gained in strength. One is Jatiya Party of
an ex-army dictator, General Ershad.
Another is the fundamentalist Muslim
outfit, the Jamaat-e-Islam. Ershad's popu-
lar support is not clear; but the Jamaat has
a sizeable base in the countryside. These
mutually hostile forces have given rise to
a political culture which is least amenable
to democratic behaviour.
Demographic Compulsions
Broadly speaking, both Sri Lanka and
India have an advanced middle class, well
equippedin moderneducation,professions,
skills and technology. But, as we have
noted, the middle class in Sri Lanka is split
down the middleby a single line of ethnicity,
language and religion. This has come in
the way of any communication between
majority and minority communities. This
is not so in the case of India, where the
middle class has come to be recruitedfrom
different ethnic, religious and linguistic
components and represents an all-India
class. It is this class that provides the
country's bureaucratic-politicalelite as also
a countrywide entrepreneur class. There
are numerous fissures within each layer of
the Indian middle class just as there are
March 25, 2000
numberlesspointsof intercommunication peasant society, but caste and ethnicity that scare them. There is an abiding fear
between different classes, cultures and have a very definite impact, which is that India might encroach on their inde-
interestgroups.Insuchacontextof multiple reflectedin the 'Bahun-Khatriya' domi- pendence. Such fears get magnified in
contradictionand antimonies,no single nanceas the rulingstrataof society. It is times of elections, yet, this does not lead
lineof fissioncanovercastthepoliticalsky to this caste groupingthatmost of Nepali to efforts at self-sufficiency or self-reliance.
on a similar scale as the Sinhala-Tamil middle class, intelligentsiaand political Such fearsdo not makefor political stability.
conflicthas donein Sri Lanka.In a word, leadersbelong.
as theEconomistonceputit, India'sgrand Does this createpopulardistrustin the Party Politics
muddlehasprovedless of a dangerto unity political class? It does not appear so, The stability of a democratic polity
than a single split has in Sri Lanka. becausethe distancebetweencaste-class depends on party formation and institu-
It is admittedlya fact that caste and elite and the depressedcastes is so great tions such as free press, free elections and
communalriotsbreakout andcreatelaw- thatthereis hardlyanyinteractionamong right to assembly and dissent as guaran-
lessnessanddisorderin differentpartsof them(barringof coursein timesof excep- teed by laws and constitution. If party
India.Butnoneassumesanall-Indiashape tionalstressas duringthe pro-democracy formations are weak or brittle, no party in
to disturb India's democratic political movementin 1990). government - or in opposition - can be
system.Besides,theIndianstatehasgained Yet, notwithstandingpolitical and so- sure of its own survival. The relation bet-
an over-archingauthorityover andabove cialdominance,theBahun-Khatriya middle ween government and opposition, on the
caste, classand otheridentities.
Curiously, class lacksan autonomous economic base. other hand, if based on grounds of mutual
the notion of an over-developed,even Ithasproducednoindigenousentrepreneur respect and trust, can make a democratic
imperialstate,has given Indiaa measure class. As in the case of parasite,it lives system less disruptive and more resilient.
of stabilitythatis notcommonlyavailable off rather than for the well-being of Accordingly, single-party dominance of
to otherthirdworldcountries.At the same society.Besides,as a leadingNepalisocio- the Congress provided the base for build-
time,as twohighlyinformedauthorspoint logist pointsout, this class (as an intelli- ing democratic institutions (including
out, "theIndianstate'ssourceof strength gentsia)lacks initiativeor creativity.It is precedence, norm and convention) of par-
has been a centrist patternof partisan fatalistic in its outlook. "In Nepal, the liamentary government. But the pattern
politics that minimises the political sa- cultureof fatalismdevaluesthe concept changed when, in 1969-70, the Congress
lience of major cleavages. Under state of productivity...Mostdevelopmentand broke into two, with one section support-
guidance,the countryseems agreedideo- the risingstandardof living has been at- ing Indira Gandhi's leadership and other
logically on secularism,socialism, and tainedthroughthe heavy infusionof ex- joining veteranCongress leaders.The crisis
democracy, on the merits of a mixed ternalaid.Thebeneficiaries havenotalways was overcome after Gandhi was carried to
economy...and on a nonalignedforeign been thosewho contribute
actually togrowth a resounding victory in the 1971 election.
policy"(RudolphandRudolph,In Pursuit and production" (Fatalism and Develop- This victory, however, was largely won by
of Lakshmi, p 1). ment, Adds Dor BahadurBista, p 2). promoting Gandhi's charisma and by re-
It is also understate guidanceand pa- No wonderthat such a class is neither sorting to populism in competitive poli-
tronagethat traditionssuch as caste and representativenor stable.In view of their tics. Both proved inimical to the cause of
communalsolidaritysurviveas alsobreak, utterdependency,membersof this class parliamentarydemocracy. In a bid to save
thatcapitalistand tradeunionsclash and continuethe practiceof 'chakari',thatis her own leadership, Gandhi imposed
compromise, and arch political rivals "apassiveformof instrumental behaviour emergency which lasted from 1975 till
condemneach otherin the mediaandyet whose object is to demonstratedepen- 1977. When the constitutional rights were
share the same vegetariandishes at the dency,withtheaimof...elicitingfavourof restored, enough harm had been done to
dinnertable.In some ways, India'spoliti- the persondependedupon"(ibid, p 3). the partyand government. Insteadof being
cal stabilityand liberaldemocracyhave The case of Bangladesh is not very a widely based, representative and all-
produceda rarebrew. differentfromNepal'sexceptthatits main India party,the Congress had been reduced
If demographic homogeneitybe a factor unifying force is religion and language. to a helpless appendage of a single family,
to contributeto democraticgovernance, The rulingstrata,or 'bhadralok'classes, or dynasty. Populism on the otherhandhad
thenNepalandBangladeshshouldbemiles is concentratedin Dhaka,the capital,and corruptedand politicised most institutions
aheadof othersouthAsianstates.Yet, this perhapsa few urbanpockets elsewhere. of government,both at the centre andstates.
is not so. Over 90 per cent of Nepali Unlike its Nepali counterpart, the For a while dynasty held together the
populationis Hindu, generally Nepali- Bangladeshi bhadralokis considerably Congress until the 1989 election, when it
speakingandcomprisessubsistencepeas- accomplishedin western educationand did not win enough seats to form govern-
ants.Thereis a minorityof Newars,mostly skills,buthe/sheshunsmanualwork,lacks ment. Out of the ruin of Congress sprang
urban-based and adherentsof Buddhism. enterpriseandsubsistson salariedjobs. It up several regional parties and splinter
The size of Muslimsis negligible. Such is politics that holds the prime place in groups aspiring for power at the centre.
a demographiccompositionexplains the discussionamongfriendsand familiesof One by one such groups were given the
absenceof separatistor ethnicchallenge the middle class. chance to form government but failed to
to the traditionalHinduway of life. But There is also a sense of lost identity muster majority or last in power. This also
it is precisely because Hindus face no amongmost Bangladeshis.Havingcome brought coalition formation which came
challengethatthereis no militantmove- out of the bondageof erstwhilePakistan, into full force in the period between 1996
mentof the type of RSS, Jan Sangh, as theycannotreturnto it even as theIslamic and 1999. At the end of this period, the
exist amongtheHindusin northernIndia. pullremains.At thesametime,it is India's BharatiyaJanataPartyrealisedthatits single
Communalismhas no roots in Nepal's big size, militaryand economic strength plank of a Hindu majority state could not

Economic and Political Weekly March 25, 2000 1073

takeit farunlessit won the confidenceof
regionalparties.This about-turnfetched
handsomereturninthe1999election.BJP's
National Alliance with regional parties
gaineda big majorityin Lok Sabha and
formed,aftera gap of six years, a stable
government.
Congressinsistedonsinglepartygovern-
anceandfailedto retainits formerstrength
inparliament. Ideologybasedparties,which
focusedon secularismfaredbadly.Some
of theregionalparties,particularlyTelegu
Desamof AndhraPradesh,improvedtheir
tally in Lok Sabha.
The basic issue beforethe government
and the opposition now appears to be
economicreform,globalisationandgood
governance.This does not mean thatthe
problemsof eradicatingpoverty,supply-
ing clean water,housingand workto the
underprivileged have been pushedto the
backburner.On the contrary,they have
come to be viewed very differentlyfrom
the bureaucratic-cum-populist behaviour
of a patronstate.To this extent,perhaps,
Indian democracy will become more
vibrantand responsive.What we must
conclude from the Indian experience is
that there is institutionalautonomyin a
parliamentary systemof government, which
if notinterferedwith,beginsto assertitself
in relationto other political actors. The
strengthof this assertionlies in a ready
acceptanceof popularchoice in elections,
limits to arbitrary government and
opposition'sobligationto co-operatewith
thegovernmentandabandonment of rigid
positionsinpolitics.The50 yearsof India's
democraticexperienceshows that it has
gatheredthe strengthto overcomeforces
of disruption, religious and sectarian
onslaught,andassertcivilianauthorityover
militaryorganisations.In the 1970s,India
overcamethethreatof personaliseddynas-
ticruleand,in the 1980sa directclashwith
Hindu majoritarianism. Surprisingly,all
this could be achievedwithoutresortto
force and bloodshed.
The same unfortunatelycannotbe said
aboutSri Lanka.Fromthe 1960s despite
having majorpolitical formationsunder
able leaders,the island's politicalevolu-
tion on parliamentarylines floundered
becauseof the invocationof majoritarian
principles,whichinturnmarginalised inter-
ethnicco-operationin publiclife. Populist
measuresgave rise to widespreaddisillu-
sionmentamongSinhalayouth.Theyrose
in an armeduprisingunderthe bannerof
JVP,while an angrygroupof Tamillead-
ers gave the call for Tamil autonomy.A
1074
little later,theseleaderswerereplacedby may not create space for Bangladeshi
militantyouth who openly called for the democracy.
constructionof a separatestate - Tamil Nepal is not Bangladesh in the sense that
Eelam. Startingwith fratricidalwarfare it was not violently tom away from its
amongrivalarmedgroups,themajorityof traditional roots. As a Hindu state it con-
Tamil youths was organisedwholly on tains many caste and ethnic divisions, but
militarylines by the LiberationTigersfor for the same reason it is more conservative
Tamil Eelam (LTTE). As the conflict in outlook. The Nepali Congress and
escalated,the LTTEsucceededin estab- various avatarsof Nepali communists may
lishingextensiveconnectionsfor the sup- be political rivals but not in the sense of
ply of money,armsandammunition.The a class war between reactionaries and
LTTE's guerrillawar, and its tactics of revolutionaries. After the 1990 movement
assassinatingimportant leadersby sendingfor the restorationof democracy succeeded
suicidebombersspreadterroramongboth in toppling the panchayati system, every
Sinhalaand Tamil population.Yet, it is political group in Nepal has turned into a
not clearwhatthe LTTEaims to achieve. democrat. This includes also shadowy
It insistson thegrantof Eelambeforeany figures of the panchayatperiodonce known
talkswithColombo.Buteven thispicture as 'bhumigato giroho'. Barring a lunatic
appearssomewhathazy, for the state of fringe of so-called Maoist group, few
permanentterror has given the LTTE believe either in armed revolution or
leadershipa kindof freedomand income abolition of monarchy. The future of
(from business in drugs, narcotics and democracy in Nepal depends much more
exportof small arms).As a killer outfit, on the manner in which the monarchy
it does not appearthateven the grantof exercises its constitutional powers. The
EelamwouldsatisfytheLTTE'sappetite. monarch has certainly lost his arbitrary
BangladeshandNepaldo not face such powers, but reverence for him and his
threatstotheirexistence.Civildisturbancesposition as a linchpin of Nepali democracy
in Dhakaor occasionally,peasantunrest remain undiminished. In fact, behaviour
in the countrysidedo not appearto have of all political parties, including Congress,
damagingpotentialssuch as LTTE'swar communists and ex-panchayatis illustrates
in Sri Lanka. Politics, or the arena of that they expect the king to act as a referee
effectivegovernance,is verymuchlimited in the political battlefield. The Maoist
to the doings of an urban-basedmiddle groups are of no consequence because the
class. The infightsin thisclass havecome Nepali state has a formidable coercive
to be channelised by two major party apparatus.Besides, unlike the Sri Lankans,
formations - Awami League and BNP - Nepal can always depend on India for help
in a struggleforthecaptureof statepower. if the need arises. Perhaps such a need will
Insofaras thesepartiesdivertor dissipate never arise, for so long as the Nepali
popularangeragainstthestateitself,party experiment enjoys India's goodwill, its
politics would avertany revolution.This multi-party democracy will survive.[Il
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