Every Day The World Consumes Some 100 Million Barrels of Oil and 60 Million Equivalent Barrels of Natural Gas

Mapping the world’s oil and gas pipelines
Every day the world consumes some 100 million barrels of oil and 60 million equivalent barrels of
natural gas.
Over the past 50 years, the world’s annual energy consumption has nearly tripled – from 62,949
terawatt-hours (TWh) in 1969 to 173,340 TWh in 2019.
(Al Jazeera)
Global pipelines – 30 times Earth’s circumference
According to the Global Energy Monitor, there were at least 2,381 operational oil and gas pipelines
distributed across some 162 countries as of December 2020. The combined length of these pipelines is
more than 1.18 million km (730,000 miles) – enough to circle the Earth 30 times.
The countries with the longest network of oil and gas pipelines include:
1. United States – Oil: 91,067km (56,587 miles); Gas: 333,366km (207,145 miles)
2. Russia – Oil: 38,419km (23,872 miles); Gas: 92,831km (57,683 miles)
3. Canada – Oil: 23,361km (14,516 miles); Gas: 84,682km (52,619 miles)
4. China – Oil: 27,441km (17,051 miles); Gas: 76,363km (47,450 miles)
5. Australia – Oil: 1,636km (1,017 miles); Gas: 23,002km (14,293 miles)
The companies that own most of the of oil pipelines by length include:
1. Transneft, Russia – 42,383km (26,335 miles) – 15 percent

2. Enbridge, Canada – 33,750km (20,971 miles) – 12 percent
3. PipeChina, China – 15,947km (9,909 miles) – 5 percent
The companies that own most of the gas pipelines by length include:
1. Gazprom, Russia – 103,212km (64,133 miles) – 11.2 percent

2. TC Energy, Canada – 99,440km (61,789 miles) – 10.8 percent
3. Kinder Morgan, US – 82,075km (50,999 miles) – 9 percent
(Al Jazeera)
Pipelines by region
Americas
A little more than half (51 percent) of the world’s total oil and gas pipelines by length are in the
Americas.
Some of the most noteworthy pipelines include:
The Keystone Oil Pipeline
Length: 3,462km (2,151 miles)
Capacity: 700,000 barrels per day
Start year: 2010
Runs from Alberta province in western Canada down to refineries in Illinois and Texas in the US. In
2021, an expansion to the pipeline known as Keystone XL was cancelled after its permit was revoked
by the administration of US President Joe Biden.
Rockies Express Gas Pipeline
Capacity: 102 million cubic metres (3.6 billion cubic feet) per day
Start year: 2009
The pipeline system is one of the largest natural gas pipelines ever built in North America. It runs
from the Rocky Mountains in Colorado to eastern Ohio, crossing through US eight states.
GASBOL Gas Pipeline
Start year: 1999
Also known as the Bolivia–Brazil pipeline, GASBOL is the longest natural gas pipeline in South
America.
Colonial Pipeline
Capacity: 3 million barrels per day
Start year: 1962
It is the largest pipeline system for refined oil products in the US. In May, hackers launched a
cyberattack against the company that disrupted fuel supplies and led to shortages across the East
Coast.
Europe
About a quarter (27 percent) of the total length of the world’s pipelines are in Europe.
Some key pipelines in Europe are:
Druzhba Oil Pipeline
Capacity: 1.4 million barrels per day
Start year: 1962
It is the world’s longest oil pipeline and one of the largest oil pipeline networks in the world. It carries
oil from the eastern part of Russia to points in Ukraine, Belarus, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, the
Czech Republic and Germany.
Yamal-Europe Gas Pipeline
Start year: 2006
Transports gas from Russia’s Yamal Peninsula to European consumers across Russia, Belarus, Poland
and Germany, among other countries.
Greece-Italy Interconnector Gas Pipeline
Length: 800km (497 miles)
Start year: 2010
It is an onshore and offshore natural gas pipeline that runs from Greece to the Apulia region in
southeastern Italy.
(Al Jazeera)
Middle East and Africa
About 6 percent of the total length of the world’s pipelines cross through the Middle East and Africa.
Some of the main pipelines include:
Trans-Mediterranean Gas Pipeline
Start year: 1983
Begins in Algeria, passes through Tunisia and crosses the Mediterranean Sea on to Italy and Slovenia.
East-West Crude Oil Pipeline
Length: 1,200km (746 miles)
Start year: 1982
Known as the Petroline and Abqaiq-Yanbu oil pipeline, the Saudi oil pipeline runs from Abqaiq in the
east of the country to Yanbu Oil Terminal on the Red Sea coast.
Tazama Oil Pipeline
Capacity: 22,000 barrels per day
Start year: 1968
Runs from the Indian Ocean port of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania onto Ndola in central Zambia.
(Al Jazeera)
Asia Pacific
About 16 percent of the total length of the world’s pipelines cross through the Asia-Pacific region.
Some of the main pipelines include:
Eastern Siberia–Pacific Ocean Oil Pipeline
Start year: 2009
It is used to export Russian crude oil to Asia-Pacific markets, including Japan, China and South
Korea.
West-East Gas Pipeline
Start year: 2005
Consists of four pipelines that run between Xinjiang in the west of China to Shanghai in the east.
Moomba to Sydney Gas Pipeline
Capacity: 13 million cubic metres (463 million cubic feet) per day
Start year: 1976
Runs from gas fields in southern Australia to gas distribution systems in Sydney, Newcastle,
Wollongong, and Canberra.
About 200,000km of planned expansions
Nord Stream 2 Gas Pipeline
This 1,230km (764-mile) gas pipeline is set to run from Ust-Luga in Russia to Greifswald, Germany,
and to carry 151 million cubic metres (5.3 billion cubic feet) of natural gas per day. The pipeline will
cost $11.6bn, and plans to start operations in 2022.
Capline Oil Pipeline
Running from Pakota, Illinois to St James, Louisiana in the US and scheduled to open in 2022, this
pipeline will have a capacity of 300,000 barrels per day and total length of 1,017km (632 miles).
Niger-Benin Oil Pipeline
Stretches from Agadem oil field in Niger to the port of Seme Terminal in Benin. Its capacity is 90,000
barrels per day and its total length is 1,980km (1,230 miles). The pipeline will cost $7bn and is slated
to start operations in 2024.
Xinjiang Coal-to-Gas Pipeline
Runs from Xinjiang Autonomous Territory to Shaoguan, Guangdong, China. Its capacity is 82 million
cubic metres (2.9 billion cubic feet) per day and it has a total length of 8,372km (5,202 miles). The
pipeline was planned to start its operations in 2021.
How much of your country’s gas comes from Russia?

Russia is the world’s largest exporter of gas, accounting for about 45% of the European Union’s
imports in 2021.
The United States has banned imports of oil and gas and the United Kingdom is phasing out oil
imports as part of a series of Western sanctions aimed at cutting off Russia from the world’s financial
arteries. The European Union, meanwhile, has said it will move to end its reliance on Russian gas.
In 2020, the world consumed 3,822.8 billion cubic metres (bcm) of natural gas, according to the BP
Statistical Review of World Energy 2021. The United States alone accounted for more than 20
percent (832 bcm) of the world’s annual gas consumption, followed by Russia (411.4 bcm), and
China (330.6 bcm).
Russia has the largest reserves of natural gas followed by Iran and Qatar. Together, the three countries
accounted for half of the world’s natural gas reserves in 2020.
Russia has proven reserves of about 48,938 bcm, Iran of 34,077 bcm, and Qatar of 23,831 bcm.
Which countries export the most natural gas?
Unlike the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), there is not a multinational
organisation for major gas exporters that adjusts supply to balance the market.
However, the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) exists as an 11-member organisation
comprising Algeria, Bolivia, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Iran, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Russia, Trinidad
and Tobago and Venezuela.
Angola, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Malaysia, Mozambique, Norway, Peru and the United Arab Emirates have
the status of observer members. The consortium represents 71 percent of the world’s proven natural
gas reserves.
More than 80 percent of global exports in gas is tied to 10 major exporters. In 2020, the 10 largest gas
exporters in the world were Russia (199,928 mcm), United States (149,538 mcm), Qatar (143,700
mcm), Norway (112,951 mcm), Australia (102,562 mcm), Canada (70,932 mcm), Germany (50,092
mcm), Netherlands (39,976 mcm), Algeria (34,459 mcm) and Nigeria (35,586 mcm).
Which countries directly import the most Russian natural gas?
In 2019, the world’s top exporters of natural gas were Australia ($34bn), Qatar ($27.5bn), Russia
($24.5bn), Norway ($21bn) and the US ($16bn).
Italy bought about one-quarter (24 percent) of Russia’s total natural gas exports worth $5.8bn. This
made up only 39 percent of the country’s natural gas imports.
At least 37 countries directly imported Russian gas in 2019. The countries directly importing the most
Russian natural gas include: Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Norway and Serbia – each importing
about 99 percent of their natural gas from Russia.
The graphic below shows how much of each country’s total natural gas imports came directly from
Russia in 2019.
European reliance on Russian gas
Russia owns the world’s second-largest gas infrastructure after the US with a total length of almost
100,000km (62,137 miles).
In 2021, European imports of gas from Russia were more than 380 million cubic metres (mcm) per
day via pipeline, totalling about 140 bcm for the year, according to the IEA. An additional 15 bcm
was delivered in liquified natural gas (LNG) form. Russia accounted for about 45 percent of the EU’s
gas imports and 40 percent of its entire gas consumption.
The EU has announced a strategy to reduce its reliance on gas from Russia by two-thirds by the end of
2022. The REPowerEU plan aims to find alternative supplies of gas and greener energy sources.
Russia’s footmark on the global oil and gas market is significant and with tough sanctions on Russia’s
energy sector the effects are being felt globally. Gas prices in Europe and the UK spiked significantly
in March after the invasion, but they have since consolidated as Russia and Ukraine engaged in peace
talks.
How much of your country’s oil comes from Russia?
Oil prices have surged following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24.
Western sanctions are likely to push up oil prices — resulting in even higher prices at the pump.
In 2019, the world consumed 99.7 million barrels of oil per day (mbpd), according to the International
Energy Agency. The United States alone consumes about one-fifth (20.48 mbpd) of the world’s daily
oil consumption, followed by China (13.07 mbpd), and India (4.84 mbpd).
Venezuela (303,806 million barrels), Saudi Arabia (258,600 million barrels), and Iran (208,600
million barrels) have half of the world’s 1.55 trillion barrels of proven oil reserves.
Which countries produce the most oil?
Central to the world’s oil production is OPEC – the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries. Established in Baghdad, Iraq in 1960, this multinational organisation comprises 13 nations
that collectively possess about 80 percent of the world’s proven crude oil reserves.
The largest reserves among non-OPEC countries include Russia and the US.
OPEC member countries produce about 40 percent of the world’s crude oil and represent some 60
percent of the total petroleum traded internationally, according to the United States Energy
Information Administration.
In 2020, the 10 largest oil producers in the world were the US (18.61 mbpd), Saudi Arabia (10.81
mbpd), Russia (10.5 mbpd), Canada (5.23 mbpd) and China (4.86 mbpd).
How crude oil is produced and used
Petrol, diesel and various other fuels are made from crude oil – a yellowish-black fossil fuel that is
pumped out of the ground. Many household products including plastics, detergents and clothing are
also derived from the non-renewable resource.
Higher crude prices have a knock-on effect on several industries, from transport all the way through to
manufacturing.
Crude oil is graded according to thickness (heavy, intermediate and light) and sulphur content (sweet
– low sulphur, sour – high sulphur). Light, sweet crude oil is the highest grade. It is easier and cheaper
to refine, making it the most sought after.
Brent and WTI are the global benchmarks for light, sweet crude oil. Brent is drilled out of the North
Sea between the UK and Norway while WTI (West Texas Intermediate) is sourced from US oil fields.
Once the oil has been extracted and transported to various oil refineries, it must be heated in a furnace
then distilled into various fuels and products. Lighter products including liquid petroleum gases
require lower temperatures to extract while the heaviest products, including asphalt, are extracted at
much higher temperatures.
Which countries rely most on Russian oil?
In 2019, the world’s top exporters of crude oil were Saudi Arabia ($145bn), Russia ($123bn), Iraq
($73.8bn), Canada ($67.8bn), and the US ($61.9bn).
China bought about one-quarter (27 percent) of Russia’s total oil exports worth $34bn. However,
given China’s massive energy needs, this made up only 16 percent of the country’s oil imports.
At least 48 countries imported Russian crude oil in 2019. The countries that rely most on Russian oil
include: Belarus, Cuba, Curacao, Kazakhstan, Latvia – each importing more than 99 percent of their
crude oil from Russia.
The graphic below shows how much of each country’s total crude oil imports come from Russia.
What does a ban on Russian oil mean?
Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a number of other states have imposed sanctions on Russia.
The ensuing energy war has caused oil prices to reach unprecedented highs not seen since the 2008
financial crisis.
On Tuesday, the US and UK announced a ban on imports of Russian petroleum. In 2021, the US
imported an average of 209,000 bpd of crude oil and 500,000 bpd of other petroleum products from
Russia, according to the American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers trade association.
This represented three percent of US crude oil imports and one percent of the total crude oil processed
by US refineries. For Russia, this represented three percent of its total exports. According to analysts,
the ban is something that the US can afford to do.
Earlier this week Brent crude rose to above $140 a barrel before returning to the $120 mark.
With tough sanctions on Russia’s energy sector the effects will be felt worldwide as energy prices rise
in an already inflationary environment.
Which countries buy the most Russian weapons?

Russia is the world’s second-largest arms exporter: India buys one-quarter of those weapons
followed by China, Algeria, Egypt and Vietnam.
Russia is the world’s second-largest arms exporter, behind the United States, accounting for roughly
20 percent of global weapons sales. Between 2016 and 2020, Moscow sold $28bn of weapons to 45
countries.
Russia exports nearly 90 percent of its arms to 10 countries. Its biggest customer, India, bought 23
percent of Russia’s weapons for some $6.5bn over the past five years. Half of India’s total arms
imports, 49.3 percent, come from Russia.
China is the second-largest buyer of Russian weaponry at $5.1bn over the same period followed by
Algeria ($4.2bn), Egypt ($3.3bn), and Vietnam ($1.7bn), according to the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).
The weapons Russia sells
Russia exports a variety of weapons including planes, engines, missiles, armoured vehicles and air
defence systems.
Aircraft make up nearly half (48.6 percent) of Russian arms exports. Between 2016 and 2020 Russia
delivered about 400 fighter jets including the Sukhoi and MiG family of jets, to at least 13 countries.
India bought at least half of them. India is also one of only six countries in the world that
operate nuclear-powered submarines it has on lease from Russia.
While a lot of Russia’s weapons are upgrades to their Soviet-era arsenal, it is increasingly developing
more advanced systems, including the S-400 surface-to-air missile defence system which has been
sold to China, India, Syria and Turkey. Several other countries have expressed interest in purchasing
the long-range mobile systems, which cost about $400m per unit.
AK-47: World’s most prominent weapon
The most famous Russian weapon is the AK-47, or Kalashnikov.
Developed by Soviet army general Mikhail Kalashnikov in the 1940s, the cheap, durable and easy-to-
use assault rifle is the standard infantry weapon for more than 100 countries. The AK refers to
“Avtomat Kalashnikova”, Russian for automatic Kalashnikov, and the number “47” represents the
year the rifle was developed.
There are an estimated 100 million AK-47s, or similar variants, around the world, making it the most
widely owned assault rifle in the world.
The world’s biggest military spenders
In 2020, the US spent $778bn on its armed forces – the largest military spend in the world and more
than the next 10 highest-spending countries combined, according to SIPRI.
China ranked second at $252bn, followed by India at $73bn, Russia at $62bn, and the United
Kingdom at $59bn.
Russia’s military spending
Russian military expenditure has grown significantly over the past three decades. In 2020, Moscow
spent about $62bn (4 percent of its GDP) on its military.
Russia’s arms industry consists of some 1,300 companies employing about two million people. The
largest of these companies is Rostec, founded in 2007 by President Vladimir Putin.
Russia has been in a number of conflicts since it became a federation after the dissolution of
the Soviet Union in December 1991. In 1994, the Kremlin launched an offensive against Chechnya, a
breakaway republic bordering Georgia, in an effort to crush its separatist leadership but were defeated
after a 20-month battle.
Three years later, Russia launched the second Chechen War to retake the republic. It laid such a harsh
siege on Grozny, Chechnya’s capital, that the United Nations called it “the most destroyed city on
Earth”.
In 2014, Russia invaded Ukraine and annexed Crimea. A month later, pro-Russian separatists began
capturing territory in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of eastern Ukraine.
In 2015, Russia formally entered the Syrian civil war on the side of President Bashar al-Assad, and its
heavy weaponry managed to shift the dynamics on the ground. The war, which has displaced tens of
millions and killed hundreds of thousands, is now in its eleventh year.
In 2018, the government of the Central African Republic – embroiled in civil war – invited Russia
to send military contractors to train its armed forces. UN experts have repeatedly expressed concerns
over reports of “grave human rights abuses” by the mercenaries.
Russia-Ukraine war by the numbers: Live Tracker

As the Russian offensive enters its fifty-fifth day, we track where battles are taking place and the
human cost of war, as more than 4.9 million refugees stream out of Ukraine.
Who controls what in Ukraine?
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy says Russia’s military offensive in Ukraine’s eastern
Donbas Region has begun. US President Joe Biden will convene a meeting of allies to discuss the
Ukraine conflict.
(Al Jazeera)
Where are people fleeing to?
According to the UN refugee agency’s data portal, more than 4.9 million people have fled Ukraine
since Russia launched its invasion. Many have sought refuge in Poland and other neighbouring states.
The latest and still growing count had 2,780,913 people entering Poland, 743,880 in Romania,
522,404 in Russia, 461,539 in Hungary, 423,852 in Moldova, 337,311 in Slovakia, and 23,469 in
Belarus.
Most of the arrivals have been women and children. All men aged between 18 and 60 have been
prevented from leaving Ukraine to stay and fight.
(Al Jazeera)
Anti-war protests around the world
Thousands of people have taken to public squares and Russian embassies across the globe to protest
against the invasion.
OVD-Info, which has documented crackdowns on Russia’s opposition for years, says more than
5,000 demonstrators have been arrested across Russia since Putin launched the war on Ukraine.
The map and list below show the locations where sizeable protests have occurred. More protests are
planned in the coming days across cities worldwide.
NATO’s members, mission and tensions with Russia
Founded in 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization now has 30 members and a budget of 1.56
billion euros.
Members of the world’s most powerful military alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), met in Brussels, Belgium on Wednesday to discuss Russia’s military build-up along
Ukraine’s border.
Washington and Kyiv say Moscow has deployed an estimated 100,000 soldiers near the Ukraine
border in recent months, eight years after it seized the Crimean Peninsula from its neighbour.
The NATO-Russia Council will be followed by further talks between Russia and members of the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in Vienna on Thursday.
So, which are these organisations and what do they do?
Members of NATO, OSCE and EU
NATO comprises 30 nations.
Their primary role is to protect its member states by political and military means. The alliance allows
European and North American members to discuss security concerns.
All NATO members are also part of the OSCE.
OSCE’s 57 states are spread across North America, Europe, the Caucasus and Asia. It is the largest
regional security body and serves as a forum for discussing security issues such as arms control and
“terrorism”.
Six European Union (EU) members, of which there are 27 countries, are not NATO members –
Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta, and Sweden.
NATO history and expansion
NATO was founded in 1949 by 12 member states – Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States. Its
aim was to curb Soviet expansion and encourage political integration in Europe.
In recent years, Russian President Vladimir Putin has been seeking guarantees from NATO that it will
halt its expansion and end military cooperation with Ukraine and Georgia.
In 2004, seven Eastern European states joined the alliance.
NATO allows member states to admit new countries by consensus. Of those which joined in 2004, all
but Slovenia were part of the Warsaw Pact – a defence treaty created in 1955 between the Soviet
Union and seven satellite states.
In 2020, North Macedonia became the latest member of the pact.
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia and Ukraine have stated their wishes to join NATO.
NATO military operations
Article 5 of the NATO treaty states the principle of collective defence as being at the core of NATO’s
initial pact. This clause means that an attack against one ally is considered an attack against all
members.
NATO’s military operations started with a naval blockade and air campaign during the Bosnian war
which lasted from 1992 to 1995.
In 1999, NATO launched an air campaign to compel Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic to pull his
forces out of Kosovo and end the conflict there.
Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, NATO invoked Article 5 and joined US and UK forces to
fight the Taliban in Afghanistan. Over the 20-year war, 50 NATO and partner nations contributed
forces to the missions in Afghanistan. At its peak in 2011, nearly 140,000 US and allied forces were
in the country.
NATO’s military expenditure
In 2020, the US spent $778bn on its military – the largest military spender in the world – according to
the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), accounting for 3.7 percent of its gross
domestic product (GDP).
Among NATO members, the UK is the second-highest military spender with $59.2bn spent on its
military in 2020, accounting for 2.2 percent of its GDP.
Iceland does not have a military of its own and so its military expenditure is zero.
NATO budget
For 2022, NATO’s military budget is set at $1.77bn (1.56 billion euros). Member countries contribute
to the budget based upon a cost-sharing formula derived from the gross national income of each
country.
The US and Germany equally contribute the highest percentage, totalling more than 30 percent of the
military budget.
UN to debate Security Council permanent member veto power
The United Nations is on Tuesday set to debate a provision that would require the five permanent
members of the body’s Security Council – the United States, United Kingdom, France, China and
Russia – to justify invoking their veto powers.
The reform to the Security Council has been floated for years at the UN but has regained new traction
following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Currently, the five permanent members can veto any
resolutions put forth by the Security Council. Meanwhile, the rotating 10 other members have no such
power.
Moscow has used its veto power to limit actions by the UNSC since invading Ukraine on February
24, immediately blocking a resolution that called for Moscow to remove troops from Ukraine.
“We are particularly concerned by Russia’s shameful pattern of abusing its veto privilege over the
past two decades,” said the US ambassador to the UN, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, in a statement.
The adoption of the Liechtenstein resolution “will be a significant step toward the accountability,
transparency and responsibility of all” the permanent members of the Security Council, she added.
The latest proposal, put forth by Liechtenstein, is co-sponsored by 50 countries including the US. No
other permanent members are currently co-sponsors, although France has indicated it will support the
move, according to the AFP news agency.
The text of the proposal, obtained by the AFP, calls for the 193 members of the General Assembly to
gather “within 10 working days of the casting of a veto by one or more permanent members of the
Security Council, to hold a debate on the situation as to which the veto was cast”.
Since the first veto ever used – by the Soviet Union in 1946 – Moscow has deployed it 143 times, far
ahead of the United States (86 times), Britain (30 times) or China and France (18 times each).
In early April, the UN general assembly suspended Russia from the Geneva-based UN Human Rights
Council. At the time, 93 members voted in support of the suspension, 24 voted against and 58
abstained.
France, which last used the veto in 1989, proposed in 2013 that the permanent members collectively
and voluntarily limit their use of the veto in the event of a mass atrocity.
How War in Ukraine Is Reverberating Across World’s Regions
conflict is a major blow to the global economy that will hurt growth and raise prices.
Beyond the suffering and humanitarian crisis from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the entire global
economy will feel the effects of slower growth and faster inflation.
Impacts will flow through three main channels. One, higher prices for commodities like food and
energy will push up inflation further, in turn eroding the value of incomes and weighing on demand.
Two, neighboring economies in particular will grapple with disrupted trade, supply chains, and
remittances as well as an historic surge in refugee flows. And three, reduced business confidence and
higher investor uncertainty will weigh on asset prices, tightening financial conditions and potentially
spurring capital outflows from emerging markets.
Russia and Ukraine are major commodities producers, and disruptions have caused global prices to
soar, especially for oil and natural gas. Food costs have jumped, with wheat, for
which Ukraine and Russia make up 30 percent of global exports
Beyond global spillovers, countries with direct trade, tourism, and financial exposures will feel
additional pressures. Economies reliant on oil imports will see wider fiscal and trade deficits and more
inflation pressure, though some exporters such as those in the Middle East and Africa may benefit
from higher prices.
Steeper price increases for food and fuel may spur a greater risk of unrest in some regions, from Sub-
Saharan Africa and Latin America to the Caucasus and Central Asia, while food insecurity is likely to
further increase in parts of Africa and the Middle East.
Gauging these reverberations is hard, but we already see our growth forecasts as likely to be revised
down next month when we will offer a fuller picture in our World Economic Outlook and regional
assessments.
Longer term, the war may fundamentally alter the global economic and geopolitical order should
energy trade shift, supply chains reconfigure, payment networks fragment, and countries rethink
reserve currency holdings. Increased geopolitical tension further raises risks of economic
fragmentation, especially for trade and technology.
Europe
The toll is already immense in Ukraine. Unprecedented sanctions on Russia will impair financial
intermediation and trade, inevitably causing a deep recession there. The ruble’s depreciation is fueling
inflation, further diminishing living standards for the population.
Energy is the main spillover channel for Europe as Russia is a critical source of natural gas imports.
Wider supply-chain disruptions may also be consequential. These effects will fuel inflation and slow
the recovery from the pandemic. Eastern Europe will see rising financing costs and a refugee surge. It
has absorbed most of the 3 million people who recently fled Ukraine, United Nations data show.
European governments also may confront fiscal pressures from additional spending on energy
security and defense budgets.
While foreign exposures to plunging Russian assets are modest by global standards, pressures on
emerging markets may grow should investors seek safer havens. Similarly, most European banks have
modest and manageable direct exposures to Russia.
Caucasus and Central Asia
Beyond Europe, these neighboring nations will feel greater consequences from Russia’s recession and
the sanctions. Close trade and payment-system links will curb trade, remittances, investment, and
tourism, adversely affecting economic growth, inflation, and external and fiscal accounts.
While commodity exporters should benefit from higher international prices, they face the risk of
reduced energy exports if sanctions extend to pipelines through Russia.
Middle East and North Africa
Major ripple effects from higher food and energy prices and tighter global financial conditions are
likely. Egypt, for example, imports about 80 percent of its wheat from Russia and Ukraine. And, as a
popular tourist destination for both, it will also see visitor spending shrink.
Policies to contain inflation, such as raising government subsidies, could pressure already weak fiscal
accounts. In addition, worsening external financing conditions may spur capital outflows and add to
growth headwinds for countries with elevated debt levels and large financing needs.
Rising prices may raise social tensions in some countries, such as those with weak social safety nets,
few job opportunities, limited fiscal space, and unpopular governments.
Sub-Saharan Africa
Just as the continent was gradually recovering from the pandemic, this crisis threatens that progress.
Many countries in the region are particularly vulnerable to the war’s effects, specifically because of
higher energy and food prices, reduced tourism, and potential difficulty accessing international capital
markets.
The conflict comes when most countries have minimal policy space to counter the effects of the
shock. This is likely to intensify socio-economic pressures, public debt vulnerability, and scarring
from the pandemic that was already confronting millions of households and businesses.
Record wheat prices are particularly concerning for a region that imports around 85 percent of its
supplies, one-third of which comes from Russia or Ukraine.
Western Hemisphere
Food and energy prices are the main channel for spillovers, which will be substantial in some cases.
High commodity prices are likely to significantly quicken inflation for Latin America and the
Caribbean, which already faces an 8 percent average annual rate across five of the largest economies:
Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Colombia, and Peru. Central banks may have to further defend inflation-
fighting credibility.
Growth effects of costly commodities vary. Higher oil prices hurt Central American and Caribbean
importers, while exporters of oil, copper, iron ore, corn, wheat, and metals can charge more for their
products and mitigate the impact on growth.
Financial conditions remain relatively favorable, but intensifying conflict may cause global financial
distress that, with tighter domestic monetary policy, will weigh on growth.
The United States has few ties to Ukraine and Russia, diluting direct effects, but inflation was already
at a four-decade high before the war boosted commodity prices. That means prices may keep rising as
the Federal Reserve starts raising interest rates.
Asia and the Pacific
Spillovers from Russia are likely limited given the lack of close economic ties, but slower growth in
Europe and the global economy will take a heavy toll on major exporters.
The biggest effects on current accounts will be in the petroleum importers of ASEAN economies,
India, and frontier economies including some Pacific Islands. This could be amplified by declining
tourism for nations reliant on Russian visits.
For China, immediate effects should be smaller because fiscal stimulus will support this year’s 5.5
percent growth goal and Russia buys a relatively small amount of its exports. Still, commodity prices
and weakening demand in big export markets add to challenges.
Spillovers are similar for Japan and Korea, where new oil subsidies may ease impacts. Higher energy
prices will raise India’s inflation, already at the top of the central bank’s target range.
Asia’s food-price pressures should be eased by local production and more reliance on rice than wheat.
Costly food and energy imports will boost consumer prices, though subsidies and price caps for fuel,
food and fertilizer may ease the immediate impact—but with fiscal costs.
Global Shocks
The consequences of Russia’s war on Ukraine have already shaken not just those nations but also the
region and the world, and point to the importance of a global safety net and regional arrangements in
place to buffer economies.
“We live in a more shock-prone world,” IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva recently told
reporters at a briefing in Washington. “And we need the strength of the collective to deal with shocks
to come.”
While some effects may not fully come into focus for many years, there are already clear signs that
the war and resulting jump in costs for essential commodities will make it harder for policymakers in
some countries to strike the delicate balance between containing inflation and supporting the
economic recovery from the pandemic.
Why Russia has put the rouble on a gold standard – but it’s unlikely to last
The Bank of Russia, the country’s central bank, has surprisingly announced a fixed price for buying
gold with roubles. With a price of RUB5,000 (£45.12) for a gram of gold, to my knowledge it’s the
first time that a nation’s currency has been expressed in “gold parity” since Switzerland decided to
stop doing so in 1999.
Enacting gold parity was common practice by the world’s major powers for facilitating international
trade payments in the era of the gold standard in the 19th and early 20th centuries. The same was true
in a slightly different way during the Bretton Woods era from 1944 until 1971, which was when US
President Nixon decided to end the system by removing the link between gold and the US dollar.
Putin’s new arrangement is envisaged, initially, to hold from March 28 to June 30. It is the latest in a
series of rouble-related moves by the Russians, starting with the announcement on March 23 that they
would only accept roubles for European gas instead of euros and US dollars. I predicted that Russia
would at least extend this policy to oil, but it has gone further and signalled an intention to make it
apply to all the commodities it exports (others include wheat, nickel, aluminium, enriched uranium
and neon).
The main goal of these moves is to try to ensure the credibility of the rouble by making it more
desirable in the forex market, though it also fits into longstanding attempts by Russia and China to
weaken the US dollar’s dominance as global reserve currency (meaning it’s the currency in which
most international goods are priced and which most central banks hold in their foreign reserves).
As one can see in the chart below, the rouble collapsed in late February and early March when
western sanctions were imposed in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (the collapse looks like a
rise in the chart because it’s showing the number of roubles to the US dollar rather than the other way
around).
Rouble/USD chart
Trading View
After the big drop, the rouble recovered somewhat, which is typical in such situations (known in the
literature as “exchange-rate overshooting”). However, the currency strengthened further after the
roubles-for-gas announcement (no matter how serious or implementable the plan actually is – so far,
there has been resistance to Putin’s new rules).
On the back of the gold announcement, the currency has continued to strengthen to about RUB83 to
the dollar. As precious metals analyst Ronan Manly has said, this makes sense if you reflect that the
market price of a gram of gold is currently about US$62 (£47.20). That’s fairly close to Putin’s
announcement that 1 gram of gold equals RUB5,000, which effectively creates a gold-based exchange
rate of RUB81 to US$1.
Previous gold-based systems
To give a sense of the similarities with the gold standard and the Bretton Woods system, let me draw
a historical parallel. The UK’s Coinage Act of 1816 fixed the value of the pound sterling to 113 grains
of pure gold, while the US Gold Standard Act of 1900 determined that the dollar should maintain a
value of 23.22 grains of pure gold. Taken together, the two acts implied an official gold parity
exchange rate of £1 = US$4.87.
It was similar during the post-war Bretton Woods era: 1 ounce of gold was said to be worth US$35,
and all other currencies were fixed to and convertible into the US dollar. Gold was at the centre of the
system as a way of making money credible.
Of course, attaching the rouble to a gold standard comes with certain “rules of the game” that Russia
will have to abide by. It should be willing to exchange gold for roubles with anyone who wants to do
so.
This was what the US did during the Bretton Woods era, and it led to the system’s demise: with US
expenditure rising to wage the Vietnam war, dollar holders became increasingly nervous about the
dollar’s value and sought to exchange it for gold.
Nixon’s unilateral decision to end convertibility was for fear that the US would run out of gold, which
would have destroyed the credibility of the dollar. Since that decision, the world has moved to a
system of floating exchange rates and the price of gold has steadily risen as world currencies have
become weaker in relation to it. The system has effectively been supported by a deal that the
Americans struck in the early 1970s to buy oil from the Saudis and give them military support in
exchange for the Saudis using the dollars to buy US government bonds.
Gold price (US$/ounce)
Gold Hub
The problem for Russia is that if it is willing to exchange roubles for gold, it could soon end up in a
similar situation to the US circa 1971. Wars are an abnormal state of affairs which come with huge
uncertainty: no reliable forecasts are possible, and markets are liable to overreact to new
developments – particularly in the short term. If confidence in the rouble falls again, many investors
might decide to withdraw gold from the central bank, which could be extremely destabilising for
Moscow.
The viability of Russia maintaining a fixed rate of roubles for gold is closely related to what happens
to demand for Russian energy. If the west can only slowly substitute away from its dependence on
Russia’s oil and gas, then demand for roubles will help to keep the currency propped up (especially if
the west does end up paying in roubles).
But if politicians listen to economists and immediately stop importing Russian gas, oil and other
commodities, the rouble could fall dramatically – along with the whole Russian economy. As much as
this would cause a further spike in prices and pain all round, it may be the most efficient and perhaps
even safest way to induce Russia to stop the war
How Russia rescued the ruble
Russia said last week that it wants the European countries that buy its natural gas to make their
payments in rubles, rather than dollars or euros. A month ago, that might have seemed like a pretty
good deal: The ruble was down 40%, at 139 rubles to the dollar, in the wake of Russia's invasion of
Ukraine.
Since that low point on March 7, however, the Russian ruble has staged a dramatic recovery. At the
time of this writing, it was trading at 84 to the dollar, which is right back where it was at the time of
the invasion. And this is no dead cat bounce. It's a sharp and sustained recovery that made the ruble
the world's top-performing currency in March.
Yet all the sanctions imposed when the war began are still in place, and in some cases they're even
more robust. So how have the Russians managed to revive their currency?
The holes in the sanctions wall

This recovery has several components. The first is thanks to the enormous hole in the sanctions that
were imposed by the coalition of countries allied with the U.S.: natural gas. The sanctions are
designed to restrict Russia's ability to acquire foreign currency — dollars and euros in particular. But
several European countries continue to buy Russian gas because they have become so dependent on it
and because there are not enough alternative suppliers to meet demand.
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Add to that the increase in oil and natural gas prices, as well as the resilience of Russia's trading
relations with other big economies such as China and India, and the net result is that there is still a
steady flow of foreign currency into Russia. This has eased concerns that Russia would become
insolvent, and it has helped put a floor under the ruble.
Another hole in the sanctions is worth mentioning here: the sovereign debt carve-out. One of the
biggest and most impactful sanctions on Russia was the freezing of its foreign accounts. Russia holds
about $640 billion worth of euros, dollars, yen and other foreign currencies in banks around the world.
About half that amount is located in the U.S. and Europe. The sanctions blocked Russia's access to
that money, except when it comes to making the interest payments on its sovereign debt. The U.S.
Treasury left a window open to allow financial intermediaries to process payments for Russia. That
window is scheduled to close this month, but it has been a big help to Russia. Without it, Russia might
have needed to raise dollars by selling rubles, which would have put downward pressure on the
currency. And had it not been able to raise those dollars, it would have defaulted.
Financial alchemy
Those are the tangible external factors driving the ruble's recovery. The internal factors are somewhat
less corporeal. On Feb. 28, the Central Bank of Russia increased interest rates to 20%. Any Russian
who might have been tempted to sell their rubles and buy dollars or euros now has a big incentive to
save that money instead. The fewer rubles that go up for sale, the less downward pressure there is on
the currency.
Next comes a government requirement on Russian businesses that 80% of any money that those
businesses make overseas has to be swapped into rubles. This means that a Russian steelmaker that
makes 100 million euros selling steel to a company in France has to turn around and change 80
million of those euros into rubles, regardless of the exchange rate. A lot of Russian companies are
doing a lot of business with foreign companies, making a lot of euros, dollars and yen. The order to
convert 80% of those revenues into rubles creates significant demand for the Russian currency, thus
helping to prop it up.
The Kremlin also issued an edict banning Russian brokers from selling securities owned by
foreigners. Many foreign investors own Russian corporate shares and government bonds, and they
might understandably want to sell those securities. By banning those sales, the government is shoring
up both the stock and bond markets and keeping money inside the country, all of which helps keep the
ruble from falling.
Russian citizens themselves have been targeted by the government, which has restricted them from
transferring money abroad. The initial ban said all foreign exchange loans and transfers were to be
suspended. This served to keep foreign currency in the country and discourage Russians from selling
rubles for dollars or euros, which would put pressure on the currency. Those restrictions have
been eased somewhat recently to give breathing room to Russians who regularly send money abroad,
but conversions of hard currency are limited to just $10,000 for individuals through the end of this
year.
Perhaps the biggest factor juicing the ruble is a risky ploy by President Vladimir Putin that we
mentioned at the top of this story: telling certain buyers of Russian natural gas that they must
henceforth pay their gas bills in rubles. Natural gas contracts are usually written requiring payment in
euros or dollars, and the countries that buy natural gas — EU nations, the U.S., Canada, Australia,
New Zealand, Japan and South Korea — tend not to have big reserves of rubles on hand. So if Putin is
successful in forcing these countries to pay in rubles, they're going to have to go out and buy them. A
lot of them. Demand for the currency will surge, and the price of the ruble will naturally rise. It's the
anticipation of that rise that has helped drive the ruble's market value higher.
A Potemkin currency
You could say that these moves by the Russian government are just business as usual. After all, the
Federal Reserve tweaks interest rates all the time. The U.S. Treasury has restrictions on remittances to
certain countries. And why shouldn't a country be able to stipulate what currency it gets paid in? And
don't governments have a responsibility to defend their currencies anyway? All fair points. What the
Russian government is up to here, though, is more than defense of a currency: It is manipulating the
market for rubles and manufacturing demand that would not otherwise exist.
Some observers are saying that Russia has essentially created a Potemkin currency. This is a reference
to Grigory Potemkin, who was appointed governor of Crimea after Catherine the Great annexed it in
1784. Eager to show Catherine how successful he had been in resettling Crimea with Russian
villagers, Potemkin supposedly built and populated a mobile village that he assembled, disassembled
and then reassembled along her route as she inspected the region. The head of the Central Bank of
Russia, Elvira Nabiullina, is essentially playing Potemkin to Putin's Catherine, using a range of tools
to make the ruble look like a currency that has value when in fact very few people outside Russia
want to buy a single ruble unless they absolutely have to and when many people inside Russia don't
really want rubles either.
There are big risks to all this government intervention. The protectionist measures enacted by the
Central Bank of Russia are effectively a kind of bridge for the ruble. If Russia manages to come to
some kind of resolution over Ukraine that involves the withdrawal of sanctions and the
reestablishment of trade relations with the West, then the ruble might hold its current value once the
measures are withdrawn. If the measures are withdrawn without some kind of resolution, however, the
ruble could collapse, hammering the economy, jacking up inflation and causing enormous pain to the
Russian people. And the measures — some of them, at least — will have to be withdrawn eventually.
Russian borrowers can't keep paying interest rates of more than 20% for long, if they can even
conceive of borrowing at that rate. Growth will be stifled — the Russian economy is already expected
to contract by more than 8% this year — and industry will slump.
Perhaps the greatest risks are those associated with Putin's natural gas ploy. As mentioned earlier, the
natural gas contracts that buyers have signed with Russia all say that payment will be made in euros,
dollars or other foreign currencies. Putin can't just cross out "dollars" or "euros" and write in "rubles"
where those contracts stipulate how to pay. He has to renegotiate the terms of those contracts. And if
he does so, it's likely that those countries will drastically reduce the amount of natural gas they buy
from Russia.
Russia is the world's biggest exporter or natural gas, but it's not the only source out there, and buyers
of Russian gas could pivot to new suppliers. The U.S. is already sending shipments to Europe. There's
talk about supply coming from the U.K., Norway, Qatar and Azerbaijan. Israel is mulling the idea of a
pipeline. The countries that buy large amounts of Russian gas probably couldn't all wean themselves
off it overnight, but if Russia insists on making this move, it risks turning one of its biggest revenue
streams into a trickle. In short, the problem with creating a facade, as Russia has done with its
currency, is not just that it might collapse — it might also collapse on
Russia and China: Partners in Dedollarization
By Mrugank Bhusari and Maia Nikoladze
As the Winter Olympics commenced in Beijing, President Putin visited his Chinese counterpart and
the two released a joint statement endorsing Russia’s position on NATO expansion. With tensions
escalating along Ukraine’s borders, a potential Sino-Russian security alignment is worrying Western
policymakers. However, those concerned about military cooperation should be careful to not overlook
China’s increasing convergence of interests with Russia on another front – finance and
dedollarization.
Dedollarization emerged as a priority for Russia in 2014 in response to the imposition of Western
sanctions following the annexation of Crimea that limited the ability of state firms and banks to raise
financing in Western markets. China also began seeing value in this initiative after the onset of the
US-China trade war in 2018 and the use of punitive financial measures by the US.
Moscow has since made progress in reducing its reliance on the dollar. Long-term success however
will depend on how Russia navigates through two new challenges: (1) increasing reliance on the euro
and thus greater exposure to EU sanctions; and (2) converting euros to rubles while the dollar
dominates the international currency markets. Although Beijing has broadly supported these efforts so
far, it remains to be seen how much farther it will be willing to follow Moscow’s lead on
dedollarization.
Dedollarization: Why and How?

Moscow found an early partner in Beijing to support its dedollarization effort as part of their
expanding economic cooperation. Chinese Premier Li Keqiang signed 38 agreements on a visit to
Moscow in 2014 deepening cooperation on energy and establishing a three-year currency swap deal
worth 150 billion yuan (about $24.5 billion). This deal was renewed for another three years in 2017.
Russia and China shifted further away from using the dollar in bilateral trade in 2018 following the
US imposition of heavy tariffs on Chinese goods and the onset of the US-China trade war. While
Moscow had previously spearheaded the dedollarization initiative, Beijing quickly modeled Russia’s
strategy when it perceived its own risk to punitive US financial measures. This made way for a 2019
agreement to replace the dollar with national currencies in international settlements between them.
Such financial coordination helped Russia reduce its reliance on the greenback in trade. While 80% of
Russia’s total exports were denominated in US dollars in 2013, only a little over half of its total
exports today are settled in dollars. Most of the decrease was absorbed by its trade with China.
Apart from dedollarizing bilateral trade with China, Russia has begun replacing its dollar reserves
with yuans and euros. Between 2013 and 2020, the Russian central bank halved its dollar-
denominated reserves. In 2021, it revealed plans to completely ditch all dollar assets from its
sovereign wealth fund and increase holdings in euros, yuan, and gold instead, thus acquiring a quarter
of the world’s yuan reserves.
It is no wonder Putin acknowledged the importance of the two countries’ joint efforts in “consistently
expanding settlements in national currencies and creating mechanisms to offset the negative impact of
unilateral sanctions” in his piece in Xinhua earlier in February.
New Currencies, New Challenges

This partnership is nevertheless unequal, with Russia taking the lead on finding alternatives to the
dollar. While only 23% of Russian exports to China were settled in the dollar in 2020, 60% of
Chinese exports to Russia were still denominated in the dollar. Moreover, while Russia announced
plans to establish a new international payments system with China in 2019 that would operate as an
alternative to the US-dominated SWIFT, Beijing is yet to fully commit. It hasn’t encouraged Chinese
banks to join the Russian system (“Sisteme Peredachi Finansovykh Soobshchenii” or SPFS), and at
the moment, the Bank of China is the system’s sole Chinese member.
Even if Russia and China were to significantly reduce their reliance on the dollar, new currencies will
present a new set of challenges; Putin has acknowledged just as much. Moving forward,
dedollarization efforts will face two additional challenges. First, as the graph above shows, the euro
unseated the dollar to become the dominant currency in bilateral trade. While using the euro decreases
Russia’s exposure to US sanctions, it does not shield the Russian economy from EU sanctions.
Currently, the EU imposes 150 sanctions on entities and individuals in Russia and has declared its
intent to impose more if Russia continues its aggression in Ukraine. Dedollarization will not
automatically sanction-proof the economy.
Second, given the Dollar’s continued primacy as the medium of exchange in international currency
markets, selling euros in exchange for rubles is likely to be difficult without going through the dollar,
as Iran learned a few years ago. Unless the countries can expand currency swap agreements between
themselves and with other countries or develop alternatives like a central bank digital currency
(CBDC) that bypasses the dollar, this indirect involvement of the greenback blunts the force of
dedollarization.
It will nevertheless take some time for such a CBDC to challenge the role of the dollar in international
payments. Beijing and Moscow will also struggle to convince other countries to replace the dollar
with a more volatile ruble or RMB. Shares of Russian and Chinese currencies in international
transactions reflect this reality. As of December 2021, the share of Chinese RMB in international
payments was only 2.7%, behind the US dollar (40.5%), Euro (36.7%), and British pound (5.89%).
The share of the Russian ruble was only 0.21%.
The Path Moving Forward

As the two countries plan to increase bilateral trade in the short term, it is more important than ever
that the United States and European Union coordinate their sanctions policy towards Russia.
Continued transatlantic coordination will limit the benefits of shifting farther away from the dollar
towards the euro, and preserve the potency of financial instruments in the US toolkit. Even if Russia
dedollarizes its trade with China and replaces dollar reserves with other currencies, it will find it
difficult to sanction-proof its economy – its overarching objective.
Although Russia and China have managed to cooperate on trade dedollarization, misalignment of
their objectives is likely to slow further dedollarization. Russia is actively introducing new initiatives
to dedollarize trade and transactions but China is reluctant on both counts. With three-fifths of
Chinese exports to Russia still dollar-dominated and Chinese banks still not rushing to join SPFS, it
remains to be seen how much farther China will be willing to follow Russia’s dedollarization agenda.
Mrugank Bhusari is a Program Assistant with the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics

Center. @BhusariMrugank
Russia and China are partnering to reduce their dependence on the dollar — a development some
experts say could lead to a “financial alliance” between them. In the first quarter of 2020, the dollar’s
share of trade between Russia and China fell below 50 per cent for the first time on record, according
to recent data from Russia’s Central Bank and Federal Customs Service. The greenback was used for
only 46 per cent of settlements between the two countries. At the same time, the euro made up an all-
time high of 30 per cent, while their national currencies accounted for 24 per cent, also a new high.
Russia and China have drastically cut their use of the dollar in bilateral trade over the past several
years. As recently as 2015, approximately 90 per cent of bilateral transactions were conducted in
dollars. Following the outbreak of the US-China trade war and a concerted push by both Moscow and
Beijing to move away from the dollar, however, the figure had dropped to 51 per cent by 2019.
Alexey Maslov, director of the Institute of Far Eastern Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences,
told the Nikkei Asian Review that the Russia-China “de-dollarisation” was approaching a
“breakthrough moment” that could elevate their relationship to a de facto alliance. “The collaboration
between Russia and China in the financial sphere tells us that they are finally finding the parameters
for a new alliance with each other,” he said. “Many expected that this would be a military alliance or a
trading alliance, but now the alliance is moving more in the banking and financial direction, and that
is what can guarantee independence for both countries.” De-dollarisation has been a priority for
Russia and China since 2014, when they began expanding economic co-operation following
Moscow’s estrangement from the west over its annexation of Crimea. Replacing the dollar in trade
settlements became a necessity to sidestep US sanctions against Russia. “Any wire transaction that
takes place in the world involving US dollars is at some point cleared through a US bank,” said
Dmitry Dolgin, ING Bank’s chief economist for Russia. “That means that the US government can tell
that bank to freeze certain transactions.” This article is from the Nikkei Asian Review, a global
publication with a uniquely Asian perspective on politics, the economy, business and international
affairs. Our own correspondents and outside commentators from around the world share their views
on Asia, while our Asia300 section provides in-depth coverage of 300 of the biggest and fastest-
growing listed companies from 11 economies outside Japan. Subscribe | Group subscriptions The
process gained further momentum after the Trump administration imposed tariffs on hundreds of
billions of dollars worth of Chinese goods. Whereas previously Moscow had taken the initiative on
de-dollarisation, Beijing came to view it as critical, too. “Only very recently did the Chinese state and
major economic entities begin to feel that they might end up in a similar situation as our Russian
counterparts: being the target of the sanctions and potentially even getting shut out of the Swift
system,” said Zhang Xin, a research fellow at the Center for Russian Studies at Shanghai’s East China
Normal University. In 2014, Russia and China signed a three-year currency swap deal worth
Rmb150bn ($24.5bn). The agreement enabled each country to gain access to the other’s currency
without having to purchase it on the foreign exchange market. The deal was extended for three years
in 2017. Another milestone came during Chinese president Xi Jinping’s visit to Russia in June 2019.
Moscow and Beijing struck a deal to replace the dollar with national currencies for international
settlements between them. The arrangement also called for the two sides to develop alternative
payment mechanisms to the US-dominated Swift network for conducting trade in roubles and
renminbi. Russian President Vladimir Putin hosts his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, in June 2019 ©
AFP Beyond trading in national currencies, Russia has been rapidly accumulating renminbi reserves
at the expense of the dollar. In early 2019, Russia’s central bank revealed that it had slashed its dollar
holdings by $101bn — over half of its existing dollar assets. One of the biggest beneficiaries of this
move was the renminbi, which saw its share of Russia’s foreign exchange reserves jump from 5 per
cent to 15 per cent after the central bank invested $44bn into the Chinese currency. As a result of the
shift, Russia acquired a quarter of the world’s renminbi reserves. Earlier this year, the Kremlin
granted permission to Russia’s sovereign wealth fund to begin investing in renminbi and Chinese state
bonds. Russia’s push to accumulate renminbi is not just about diversifying its foreign exchange
reserves, Mr Maslov explained. Moscow also wants to encourage Beijing to become more assertive in
challenging Washington’s global economic leadership. “Russia has a considerably more decisive
position toward the United States [than China does],” Mr Maslov said. “Russia is used to fighting, it
does not hold negotiations. One way for Russia to make China’s position more decisive, more willing
to fight is to show that it supports Beijing in the financial sphere.” Dethroning the dollar, however,
will not be easy. Jeffery Frankel, an economist at Harvard University, told Nikkei that the dollar
enjoyed three major advantages: the ability to maintain its value in the form of limited inflation and
depreciation, the sheer size of the American domestic economy, and the United States having
financial markets that are deep, liquid and open. So far, he argued, no rival currency has shown itself
capable of outperforming the dollar on all three counts. Yet Mr Frankel also warned that while the
dollar’s position is secure for now, spiralling debts and an overly aggressive sanctions policy could
erode its supremacy in the long run. “Sanctions are a very powerful instrument for the United States,
but like any tool, you run the risk that others will start looking for alternatives if you overdo them,” he
said. “I think it would be foolish to assume that it’s written in stone that the dollar will forever be
unchallenged as the number one international currency.
Besides China, Putin Has Another Potential De-dollarization Partner in Asia
Russia’s de-dollarization efforts mean that China and India can help Russia skirt sanctions by
jointly building an alternative global financial system, but they risk facing severe consequences
on their own financial entities.
Russia's President Vladimir Putin, India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi and China’s President Xi
Jinping pose for a picture during a meeting at the G20 summit in Osaka, Japan on June 28,
2019. Mikhail
Within two weeks of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the United States and its allies have
collectively imposed a series of sanctions to isolate Russia’s financial system. Recent stringent
Western sanctions are a stress test of Russia’s de-dollarization initiatives and an emerging
nondollar financial system. Besides de-SWIFTing Russian banks, Western sanctions have
targeted the assets of the Russian central bank and sovereign wealth funds, the Russian Ministry
of Finance, and Russian oligarchs. These punitive measures effectively wiped out the thirty-year
post-Cold War Western financial engagement with Russia. I have discussed a Russia-China de-
dollarization partnership in the Foreign Affairs article titled The Anti-Dollar Axis . It seems that
Putin’s Russia has more partners for de-dollarization in Asia, such as India.
So far, Putin has not been completely isolated, at least in Asia. Asian countries’ response to
President Putin’s war in Ukraine has been far from unified. Japan and South Korea, two key U.S.
allies in East Asia, have slapped severe sanctions on Russian entities. Although not a treaty ally,
Singapore has also imposed sanctions on Russia. In contrast, the Philippines, a U.S. treaty ally,
has decided to proceed with its purchase of 17 Russian military transport helicopters worth $249
million. India, a major U.S. ally, has neither condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine nor
imposed sanctions, although it abstained from the UN Security Council vote. Similar to India,
China has not called Russia’s military action against Ukraine an invasion but abstained from the
UN Security Council vote. China’s abstaining rather than casting a veto has been considered a
diplomatic victory by the West.
An unintended consequence of Western punitive sanctions could be strengthening a Russia-

China de-dollarization partnership. Joining such a partnership may also appeal to India. India
has reportedly expressed interest in jointly exploring with Russia and China an alternative to
SWIFT that would allow it to trade with countries under U.S. sanctions. While India currently
does not have its own domestic financial messaging system, it plans to link a service currently
under development with Russia’s SPFS (System for Transfer of Financial Messages, Russia’s
equivalent of SWIFT), which could connect with China’s CIPS (Cross-Border Interbank
Payment System, the Chinese version of SWIFT). Once materialized, the linked systems would
cover most parts of the world. The global coverage of this alternative system could appeal to
countries that are either vulnerable to U.S. sanctions or discontent about the U.S. dollar’s
dominance. China’s CIPS currently has three direct participants in Europe and none in the
United States.
Although India has not been an enthusiastic advocate for such a de-dollarization partnership, it
has developed ways to trade with Russia while bypassing sanctions. India has been exploring a
rupee-ruble trade arrangement with Russia following Western sanctions on Russia. India is no
stranger to such an exchange arrangement. In the 1953 Indo-Soviet Trade Agreement, India and
the Soviet Union inked a similar exchange scheme in which the two sides agreed to settle all
bilateral payments in rupees. Although this Soviet-era arrangement ceased to exist in 1992, the
Russian state and the Indian state have been developing new mechanisms, such as the use of
rupee debt for joint investment to promote Russian-Indian strategic partnership. Between 2014
and 2019, bilateral trade between India and Russia settled in rupee-ruble exchanges surged by
five times during Prime Minister Modi’s tenure, increasing from 6 percent of the total bilateral
trade to 30 percent.
India and Russia have already arranged a rupee-ruble exchange mechanism to settle Russian
arms sales to India to avoid sanctions under Countering America’s Adversaries Through
Sanctions Act (CAATSA). India is the biggest customer of Russian arms. According to data
from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, between 2016 and 2020, Russia
accounted for about 49.4 percent of Indian arms imports, whereas India consumed about 23
percent of Russian arms exports. In 2019, Russia and India agreed to settle India’s purchase of
more than $5 billion worth of Russian S-400 air defense systems through a rupee-ruble transfer
precisely to avoid sanctions under CAATSA . In 2021, the two countries abandoned the dollar
when conducting arms sales. Rosoboronexport, Russia’s sole state intermediary for arms exports
and the primary target of CAATSA’s sanctions, has almost entirely moved away from dollar
settlement. Anatoly G. Punchuk, deputy director of the Russian Federal Service for military-
technical cooperation, observed that the “dollar is no longer the universal currency for trade in
defense.”
Other actors besides governments have an incentive to develop alternative mechanisms to bypass
sanctions. Corporate entities want to hedge the risk as well. Russian companies that are not
directly impacted by U.S. sanctions have also been actively seeking to develop alternative
payment mechanisms as a hedge against the dominance of the U.S. dollar. Since 2018, Russian
state-owned miner Alrosa PJSC, the world’s largest producer of rough diamonds in carat terms,
has successfully tested ruble payment with foreign clients from India and China.
Russia’s best hope is that its de-dollarization mechanisms developed with China and India could
provide immunization against Western sanctions. China and India now both have their Russian
dilemma. Should they choose to help Russia skirt sanctions, their financial entities will face
severe consequences of secondary sanctions in addition to reputational damage if exposed.
Should they choose not to provide Russia with relief, the bankruptcy of Putin’s government
could cause a major setback to their attempt to build an alternative global financial system. A
failure to save Russia from Western sanctions would suggest that the aspirational de-
dollarization partnership cannot withstand the stress test imposed by the United States and its
allies.
Possible End to Dollar Dominance?: Permanent Alterations to the World Order Post-Ukraine
Sanctions for years against countries like Cuba, Libya, Iraq, North Korea and so on hurt these
economies significantly, but strengthened the regimes and their anti-America discourse, being
dislodged only after the use of physical intervention.
Time will tell whether Putin wins the sweepstakes of expansionism or the cost of economic
distress eventually overwhelms Russia and him. However, some interesting shifts in geo-strategy
are discernible and permanent, regardless of whether Putin wins or doesn’t.
First, these sanctions, SWIFT restrictions, collaring at the UN’s various rights bodies, potential
expulsion from Financial Action Task Force (FATF), measures at the World Health Organisation
(WHO), World Trade Organization (WTO), and so on, will sustain for long, whether Russian
troops stay, return or support a new regime in Kyiv. Putin will have to adjust his economics,
exports, imports and travels accordingly.
The impact in the immediate run is debilitating, as seen from the crash in the Rouble and
stocks, the sudden six-level down junk rating to B and the desperate doubling of the interest rate.
However, sanctions for years against Cuba, Libya, Iraq, North Korea (DPRK), Serbia, Venezuela
and Iran hurt these economies significantly, but strengthened the regimes and their anti-America
discourse, being dislodged only after the use of physical intervention.
However, Putin has friends and several inelastic commercial clients for oil and gas. Some oil
friends produce a large section of the world’s oil, namely Saudi Arabia, Venezuela and Iran, each
of whom would welcome a stronger and more profitable Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) Plus cartel. Biden’s snub to Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud (MBS) and the
latter’s close ties to a resurgent Trump could be a factor in OPEC refusing to raise output
immediately, deciding to stick to the already-announced rise of 0.4 MMB/D from April 1.
Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed (MBZ) of the UAE, a strong voice in the Middle East and
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) matters, has also abstained as at least two times from
UN resolutions.
Also read: Russia-Ukraine: Fuel Prices, Fertiliser Subsidies Are India’s Two Initial Economic
Challenges
Western media is disregarding other rabbits in Putin’s counter-sanctions hat, which he could
choose to use, contrary to the global chorus of Putin looking for an off ramp. Putin controls under
half the world’s palladium, critical for semiconductor chips; along with Ukraine he controls a
quarter of the world’s wheat; and 15% of EU’s natural gas is Russian and already at sky-high
prices, two times more than those post-pandemic.
Smaller issues like manufacture and sale of automobiles in Russia and Ukraine have already hit the
industry with a sledge hammer, EU-maker sales expected to drop by 1.5 million units in this year.
Serious concerns have been raised by aircraft leasing companies, which have leased out more than
500 aircraft to Russian airlines.
Second, Putin is now much more dependent on a resurgent and equally belligerent – though more
circumspect – China. With border disputes resolved and a common enemy in sight, closer
cooperation on trade, investments and currency can be expected.
Several attempts are visible at sowing discord between the two by raising Vladivostok and Chinese
superiority as impediments, but there are no such signs in public or private, except for the fact that
China too was blindsided by the attack on Ukraine, not having moved its students out before the
invasion. Russia will rely more on China for economic partnership, possibly creating more
business opportunities for China.
Such forced cooperation has the potential to lead to more yuan-rouble trade and an significant
energy-metal bubble, with a technological edge in weaponry, cyber-warfare, electronic warfare,
bio-warfare, nuclear cooperation and the end of dominance of the US dollar. The possible return of
Trump in 2024 could de-globalise the world again, for sure this time, making more way for China-
Russia expansionism, economic and otherwise.
Third, the US dollar has committed possible harakiri regarding its image as a safe haven. For so
many decades, the US Federal Reserve prided itself in stating that every single dollar ever printed
is backed by the sovereign and will be honoured. However, ‘Bidenism’ killed this promise twice
over – by freezing half of Afghanistan’s seven billion dollar-denominated foreign exchange
reserves and all of Russia’s foreign exchange dollars. Any central bank will now think several
times before buying US treasuries and will always look for alternative safe assets, even if they are
a shade less safe.
In two decades, the Euro has emerged as a safe asset and attracted 30% of Russian foreign
exchange reserves, 10% each in Germany and France. With 23% reserves in gold, 13% in yuan
and 10% in Germany, Putin seems to have hedged well when he started drawing down reserves in
the US from 2016-17, down to almost zero in 2021.
Fourthly, China will continue to draw down its US dollar-denominated foreign exchange reserves
of about $1 trillion in its war chest of $3.4 trillion. Since 2005, China’s share of dollar securities
has fallen from 80% to just 30%.
The US’s consistent targeting of Chinese foreign exchange reserves and foreign exchange
management, by naming it a ‘currency manipulator’, and its recent last-recourse to economic
sanctions, is not lost on Chinese strategists. Even though the Yuan forms only about 3-5% of
world trade, the trajectory, through trade-expansionism into EU, South America, Africa and
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) nations, is clear.
Coupled with the largest quantum of national central bank digital currency (CBDCs or e-yuans)
already issued, possibilities of a yuan-inspired undeclared non-dollar bloc of nations are becoming
realistic.
Fifthly, Asian and African central banks will be getting to their drawing boards to reassess their
reliance on US dollar, safe havens, trade dependencies and reliability or not of the American hand.
Given the subtle yet silent (but not very comforting) support from the US over Chinese aggression,
India’s sustained abstentions on anti-Russia resolutions are very strong statements of support. That
too, despite sustained pressure from the EU and US.
Also read: ‘Disappointed Over UN Show’: US Lawmakers Call on India to Distance Itself From
Russia
These US sanctions and consistent use of soft weapons, like NGOs, have not really gone down
well with the Indian establishment. Ukraine may have just extracted India from the western grasp
finally and pushed it back into the RIC (Russia, India, China) Forum, with a non-aligned tag, albeit
with a niggling boulder-sized Ladakh problem.
Vaishali Basu Sharma is an analyst on strategic and economic affairs. She has worked as a
consultant with the National Security Council Secretariat for nearly a decade
Why it matters if Saudi Arabia sells oil in Chinese yuan instead of US dollars
Not for the first time, China is attempting to buy oil in yuan rather than dollars, and now it may have
found a willing seller. Saudi Arabia, which sells a quarter of its exports to China, is considering
making these sales in yuan, the Wall Street Journal reported.
These negotiations, which have surged and ebbed over the last half-decade, are not likely to fructify
soon. For one, Saudi Arabia pegs its riyal to the dollar, so any damage inadvertently dealt to the dollar
will hurt its own currency. But the US’ geopolitical hegemony is based so significantly on the
petrodollar—with 80% of global oil transactions denominated in dollars—that the question is ever-
present. What would the world look like if the petroyuan became the oil industry’s currency of
choice?
The US’ economic dominance was built on the petrodollar
The dollar’s robust status as a reserve currency owes much to the strength of the US economy. But it
also derives from the dollar’s ample liquidity, which is partially a result of countries maintaining
pools of dollar reserves to buy oil.
That link was forged in the early 1970s, not long after president Richard Nixon decoupled the dollar
from gold. In 1974, Washington and Riyadh struck a deal by which Saudi Arabia could buy US
treasury bills before they were auctioned. In return, Saudi Arabia would sell its oil in dollars—not
only enlarging the currency’s liquidity but also using those dollars to buy US debt and products. The
political economist David Spiro, in his book The Hidden Hand of American Hegemony, described
how Saudi Arabia convinced other OPEC nations to invoice oil in dollars, rather than in a basket of
different currencies.
If the yuan displaces the dollar to a sufficient degree in the annual $14 trillion global oil trade—
although what that sufficient degree would be is difficult to say—countries will have to maintain yuan
reserves instead. (At the moment, 2.48% of the world’s reserves are held in yuan, compared to 55%
for the dollar, according to IMF data.) Oil producers receiving yuan would have to spend it on
Chinese debt and imports, further strengthening China’s economy, but if the world was particularly
awash in yuan, other trade might start to be yuan-denominated: metals, say, or soybeans.
The effect on both China and the US would be profound. To preserve the yuan’s new role, China
would have to ensure political stability and financial transparency, of the kind the US promised in the
20th century. The US’ abilities to issue dollar debt and earn dollars for exports would decline, so its
economy would shrink. In this situation, the dollar’s weakening may trigger a vicious cycle: capital
flight away from the dollar and towards the yuan, debilitating the dollar further.
These events, experts say, are unlikely to transpire. Analyzing these contingencies, though, is a useful
reminder of how much of our modern moment—from the success of sanctions to the progress of
green energy—is predicated on the strength of the US dollar.
Aramco CEO says news on Saudi oil sale in Yuan is speculation as Capital Economics rules it out
Saudi Arabia considers accepting yuan instead of dollars for Chinese oil sales
By News Desk
March 16, 2022
DUBAI/RIYADH: Saudi Arabia is in active talks with Beijing to price some of its oil sales to China
in yuan, people familiar with the matter said, a move that would dent the US dollar’s dominance of
the global petroleum market and mark another shift by the world’s top crude exporter toward Asia,
The Wall Street Journal reported on Tuesday.
The talks with China over yuan-priced oil contracts have been off and on for six years but have
accelerated this year as the Saudis have grown increasingly unhappy with decades-old U.S. security
commitments to defend the kingdom, the people said.
The Saudis are angry over the US’s lack of support for their intervention in the Yemen civil war, and
over the Biden administration’s attempt to strike a deal with Iran over its nuclear program. Saudi
officials have said they were shocked by the precipitous U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan last year.
China buys more than 25 percent of the oil that Saudi Arabia exports. If priced in yuan, those sales
would boost the standing of China’s currency. The Saudis are also considering including yuan-
denominated futures contracts, known as the petroyuan, in the pricing model of Saudi Aramco.
It would be a profound shift for Saudi Arabia to price even some of its roughly 6.2 million barrels of
day of crude exports in anything other than dollars. The majority of global oil sales—around 80
percent—are done in dollars, and the Saudis have traded oil exclusively in dollars since 1974, in a
deal with the Nixon administration that included security guarantees for the kingdom.
China introduced yuan-priced oil contracts in 2018 as part of its efforts to make its currency tradable
across the world, but they haven’t made a dent in the dollar’s dominance of the oil market. For China,
using dollars has become a hazard highlighted by US sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program and
on Russia in response to the Ukraine invasion.
The US is now among the top oil producers in the world. It once imported 2 million barrels of Saudi
crude a day in the early 1990s but those numbers have fallen to less than 500,000 barrels a day in
December 2021, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration.
By contrast, China’s oil imports have swelled over the last three decades, in line with its expanding
economy. Saudi Arabia was China’s top crude supplier in 2021, selling at 1.76 million barrels a day,
followed by Russia at 1.6 million barrels a day, according to data from China’s General
Administration of Customs.
“The dynamics have dramatically changed. The U.S. relationship with the Saudis has changed, China
is the world’s biggest crude importer and they are offering many lucrative incentives to the kingdom,”
said a Saudi official familiar with the talks.
“China has been offering everything you could possibly imagine to the kingdom,” the official said.
A senior US official called the idea of the Saudis selling oil to China in yuan “highly volatile and
aggressive” and “not very likely.” The official said the Saudis had floated the idea in the past when
there was tension between Washington and Riyadh.
It is possible the Saudis could back off. Switching millions of barrels of oil trades from dollars to
yuan every day could rattle the Saudi economy, which has a currency, the riyal, pegged to the dollar.
Prince Mohammed’s aides have been warning him of unpredictable economic damage if he moves
ahead with the plan hastily.
Doing more sales in yuan would more closely connect Saudi Arabia to China’s currency, which hasn’t
caught on with international investors because of the tight controls Beijing keeps on it. Contracting oil
sales in a less stable currency could also undermine the Saudi government’s fiscal outlook.
Some officials have cautioned Prince Mohammed that accepting payments for oil in yuan would pose
risks to Saudi revenues tied in U.S. Treasury bonds abroad and the limited availability of the yuan
outside China.
The impact on the Saudi economy would likely depend on the quantity of oil sales involved and the
price of oil. Some economists said moving away from dollar-denominated oil sales would diversify
the kingdom’s revenue base and could eventually lead it to repeg the riyal to a basket of currencies,
similar to Kuwait’s dinar.
“If it is (done) now at a time of strong oil prices, it would not be seen negatively. It would be more
seen as deepening ties with China,” said Monica Malik, chief economist at Abu Dhabi Commercial
Bank.
The Saudis still plan to do most oil transactions in dollars, the people familiar with their talks say. But
the move could tempt other producers to price their Chinese exports in yuan as well. China’s other big
sources of oil are Russia, Angola and Iraq.
Talks with China over pricing oil in yuan started before Prince Mohammed, the de facto leader of the
kingdom, made his first official visit to China in 2016, people familiar with the matter said.
The crown prince asked the kingdom’s then-energy minister Khalid al-Falih to study the proposal, the
people said.
Falih instructed Aramco to prepare a memo that heavily focuses on the economic challenges of
switching to the yuan pricing.
“He really did not think that was a good idea but he could not stop the talks as the ship had already
sailed,” said another person familiar with the meetings.
Saudi officials in favor of the shift have argued the kingdom could use part of yuan revenues to pay
Chinese contractors involved in mega projects domestically, which would help mitigate some of the
risks associated with the capital controls over the currency. China could also offer incentives such as
multibillion-dollar investments in the kingdom.
RIYADH: Aramco CEO Amin Nasser said the news on Saudi Arabia considering sales of its oil in
Chinese currency is “speculation” at a time when researchers such as Capital Economics ruled out the
move.
Asked by media on Sunday on the news, the CEO said that he doesn't comments on rumours and
speculation.
A recent report from the Wall Street Journal suggested that Saudi Arabia is in talks with China to
price and receive payments for some of its oil sales in renminbi rather than US dollars. The talks have
been “off and on for six years,” but discussions have intensified in recent months.
Even if Saudi Arabia accepts renminbi for sales to China, it would still be accepting dollars for
around three-quarters of its oil trade. What’s more, the dollar peg has been the fundamental anchor
of macroeconomic stability in Saudi Arabia for decades and policymakers are unlikely to be in a rush
to change.
Jason Tuvey, senior emerging markets economist, Capital Economics
“For many countries (including Saudi Arabia and China), the harsh sanctions imposed by the US on
Russia have raised questions about the wisdom of transacting in dollars and holding dollar-
denominated assets as part of their official reserves,” Jason Tuvey, senior emerging markets
economist, at Capital Economics wrote in a note.
Saudi Arabia is one of those few countries, which run a trade surplus with China. Over the past
decade, it has averaged around $24 billion.
According to Tuvey, if all trade with China were to be conducted in renminbi, Saudi Arabia would
quickly accumulate large holdings of the renminbi. Within five years, all else equal, the renminbi
could easily make up as much as 20-25 percent of the Kingdom’s official FX reserves.
This is a scenario that the economist rejects as unlikely as he believes the Kingdom “may be reluctant
to hold large amounts of FX reserves in renminbi, not least because of concerns regarding
convertibility and the implications for its ability to defend the dollar peg.”
However, the Kingdom may decide to accept renminbi for only a portion of oil sales to China, and/or
it could recycle renminbi receipts and increase goods and services exports from China, wrote the
expert.
It has been suggested that accepting the renminbi for oil sales may prompt Saudi Arabia to move
away from its dollar peg and to adopt a peg to a basket of currencies, similar to Kuwait.
Tuvey, is, however, skeptical. According to him, “even if Saudi Arabia accepts renminbi for sales to
China, it would still be accepting dollars for around three-quarters of its oil trade. What’s more, the
dollar peg has been the fundamental anchor of macroeconomic stability in Saudi Arabia for decades
and policymakers are unlikely to be in a rush to change.”
The exclusion of key Russian banks from the SWIFT system in the wake of the Russian invasion of
Ukraine and reports about the emergence of alternatives developed by Moscow and Beijing has once
again ignited a debate about the future of the greenback.
China has had been working for years to internationalize the yuan. The current crisis, however, has
given a new impetus to those efforts or at least forced the world into rethinking its relationship with
the US dollar.

Every Day The World Consumes Some 100 Million Barrels of Oil and 60 Million Equivalent Barrels of Natural Gas

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Every Day The World Consumes Some 100 Million Barrels of Oil and 60 Million Equivalent Barrels of Natural Gas

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Mapping the world’s oil and gas pipelines

Global pipelines – 30 times Earth’s circumference

1. Transneft, Russia – 42,383km (26,335 miles) – 15 percent

1. Gazprom, Russia – 103,212km (64,133 miles) – 11.2 percent

Some of the most noteworthy pipelines include:

The Keystone Oil Pipeline

Length: 3,462km (2,151 miles)

Capacity: 700,000 barrels per day

Rockies Express Gas Pipeline

Length: 2,702km (1,679 miles)

GASBOL Gas Pipeline

Length: 3,150km (1,957 miles)

Length: 8,850km (5,500 miles)

Capacity: 3 million barrels per day

Some key pipelines in Europe are:

Druzhba Oil Pipeline

Length: 5,100km (3,169 miles)

Capacity: 1.4 million barrels per day

Yamal-Europe Gas Pipeline

Length: 1,660km (1,031 miles)

Greece-Italy Interconnector Gas Pipeline

Length: 800km (497 miles)

Middle East and Africa

Some of the main pipelines include:

Trans-Mediterranean Gas Pipeline

Length: 2,475km (1,538 miles)

East-West Crude Oil Pipeline

Length: 1,200km (746 miles)

Capacity: 5 million barrels per day

Tazama Oil Pipeline

Length: 1,710km (1,062 miles)

Capacity: 22,000 barrels per day

Some of the main pipelines include:

Eastern Siberia–Pacific Ocean Oil Pipeline

Length: 4,857km (3,018 miles)

Capacity: 1 million barrels per day

West-East Gas Pipeline

Length: 18,854km (11,715 miles)

Length: 2,081km (1,293 miles)

About 200,000km of planned expansions

Nord Stream 2 Gas Pipeline

Capline Oil Pipeline

Niger-Benin Oil Pipeline

Xinjiang Coal-to-Gas Pipeline

How much of your country’s gas comes from Russia?

Which countries export the most natural gas?

Which countries directly import the most Russian natural gas?

European reliance on Russian gas

How much of your country’s oil comes from Russia?

Which countries produce the most oil?

Which countries rely most on Russian oil?

What does a ban on Russian oil mean?

Which countries buy the most Russian weapons?

The weapons Russia sells

The most famous Russian weapon is the AK-47, or Kalashnikov.

Russia-Ukraine war by the numbers: Live Tracker

Who controls what in Ukraine?

Where are people fleeing to?

Anti-war protests around the world

So, which are these organisations and what do they do?

Members of NATO, OSCE and EU

NATO comprises 30 nations.

NATO history and expansion