Thoughts on Derailment

PRESENTED BY AMAL CHATTERJEE

 PREFACE
Amal Chatterjee here [Senior Section Engineer - Retired from Central Railway
Mumbai Division, Carriage and Wagon department].

I have been engaged in many derailment investigation cases and have gathered wide
experience in this field. I have tried to ease the difficulties faced by the members by
providing data to be recorded/ collected/ measured/evidences to be noticed while
conducting investigation cases of derailment and prepared these documents which
are not available in one place or easily found. I have referred, different manuals,
circulars, correction slips issued time to time from Railway Board, books published by
Railway authorities or private writers on this subject matters, derailment
investigations and inquiry reports & also my own field experience in derailment
investigation for more than 2 decades. I have tried my very best to provide enough
field documents required in this presentation.

With kind regards,

Amal Chatterjee
 THOUGHTS HAVE BEEN EXPRESSED IN FIVE PARTS

DERAILMENT MECHANISM & PRESERVATION OF CLUES - PART – I

TRACK PARAMETERS – PART - II
ROLLING STOCK PARAMETERS - PART – III
DERAILMENT PROFORMA - PART – IV
DERAILMENT REPORT - PART – V

PRESENTED BY -

AMAL CHATTERJEE/SSE/C&W/BB (RETIRED)

 PART – I
DERAILMENT
MECHANISM &
PRESERVATION
OF CLUES
WHAT IS DERAILMENT –

A Wheel or set of wheel leaving their place from rail table.

DERAILMENT MECHANISM

COMBINATION OF FORCES RESPONSIBLE FOR DERAILMENT:

1. REDUCTION IN INSTANTANEOUS
WHEEL LOAD (Q).
2. INCREASE IN FLANGE FORCE (F).
When the increase in flange force is greater
than. the reduction in instantaneous wheel
load, there is a short and distinct travel mark
on the rail table.

When the increase in flange force is lesser

than the reduction in instantaneous wheel load,
there is a long and faint travel mark on the rail
table.
Major derailment is due to
track defects, stability of
track is most important aspect
in which rail and sleepers and
its fittings plays key role in
this regards.
WHAT AFFECT STABILITY OF TRACK .
• Excessive gauge.
• Excessive variation of Cross- level.
• Incorrect set of Super-elevation.
• Incorrect Versine or track misaligned.
• Other defects of track.
• Improper Packing underneath of sleeper
• Improper ballast size and formation.
• Excessive Rail wear.
• Rail fracture.
• Creep of rail.
• Buckling of track.
• Incorrect expansion of rail joint.
• Improper fastening.
• Defect on point and crossing.
 As soon as you get information about an Accident.

1. Gather the staff required for restoration as well as investigation.

2. Proceed by the quickest means.
3. Walk across the site making a general survey & looking for clues
such as broken parts, wheel travel marks, shifting of track etc.
Sometimes it has been observed that some parts disengaged after
derailment of rolling stocks have been man handled and kept
before accident to mislead that this had happened earlier. Hence,
it has to be carefully observed what the stock derailed first does
have missing of such parts or not.
4. Record joint observations of the important clues and tell-tale
marks.
 You are in charge of a Depot homing an ART and MRV. You get
information that a Goods train is involved in a major accident and there
have been some casualties. What action would you like to take?
(1) Protection of adjacent running lines;

(2) Protection of the site of accident;

(3) Save life and ease suffering;
(4) Protect property including mails;
(5) Provide help to the passengers;
(6) Transportation of stranded passengers;
(7) Assess the requirement of additional Break down Trains and shall liaison with adjoining
Railway/Division for ordering the same.
(8) Monitor the movement of Break down trains.
(9) Quick restoration of traffic obtains the restoration details regarding re-railment /toppling of
wagons/coaches by each individual Break down train.
(10) Details of Rolling Stock involved in accident and their PRO particulars.
(11) Obtain the bio-data particulars of the crew involved in the accident.
(12) Preserve clues and evidences.
(13) Preservation of clue & ascertain the cause of the accident and Restoration of through communication.
 You are the first officer to arrive at the site of a serious passenger train accident involving
loss of human life. What immediate action would you take?

• Prevent loss of human lives by providing medical aid to the injured person within the golden hour.
• Be prompt in providing relief, re-assurance and comfort to the affected Passengers.
• Seek assistance of Doctors traveling on the train to attend the injured.
• Arrange for refreshments and drinking water free of charge to the affected passengers.
• Give timely information to the passengers.
• Collect details of the dead/injured passengers.
• Record evidence of passengers with their names and addresses.
• Arrange for safeguard of Railway and Passengers property.
• Assist other railway staff and the Medical Team to identify the dead and in rendering first-aid to the
injured passengers.
 INVESTIGATION TEAM MUST KNOW

• HOW TO TAKE MEASUREMENT OF TRACK AT SITE AND ROLLING STOCK AND LOCOMOTIVE AT
SHED OF DERAILMENT INVOLVED STOCK.

• EVIDENCE OF MARKING OF FLANGE TRAVEL ON RAIL TABLE TO BE RECORDED AND RAIL PROFILE
TO BE TAKEN.

• TRACK MEASUREMENT( TRACK GAUGE, CROSS LEVEL/SUPER ELEVATION & VERSINE) TO BE

TAKEN

• CONDITION OF TRACK AND ITS FITTINGS TO BE TAKEN AS AN OBSERVATION.

• TO FIND OUT THE REASON OF CLIMBING WHEEL ON RAIL TABLE, RAIL & WHEEL PROFILE PLAY
VITAL ROLE HENCE TO BE TAKEN CAUSESLY.

• REPLACEMENT OF ATTENTION OF TRACK SUCH AS RAIL, TONGUE RAIL AND ITS FITTING CARRIED
OUT AS PER SCHEDULE OR NOT.
• ALL THE SCHEDULE OF TRACK, STOCK AND LOCOMOTIVE TO BE NOTED.
HOW TO TAKE MEASUREMENT
AT THE TIME OF DERAILMENT
• Ahead of site of derailment the station should be taken
positive (+ ve) & rear of site should be negative (-) .

• Cross-level will be measured on left rail only as

determined from direction of movement.

• Measurement will be taken at a station 3 meter apart for

a distance of 45 meters on either side of the zero station.

• Cross-level will be measured under load and no load.

• Measurement to be taken at individual sleepers for a length

of 9 meters in the rear of 0 station.
 1. No flange travel mark on rail table - Wheel
jumped from rail table – to be observed
sudden drop of cross level, sequence of
brake application or combination of both.
2. Single travel mark upto 3 mts. (< 3 mtrs.) on
rail table sudden derailment – angle of
attack of wheel increased - sudden
change of versine , smaller dia wheel
EVIDENCE FROM comparison to larger on same axle flange
comes in contact of rail gauge face, tight

MARKING OF
track gauge with higher super elevation
and sudden change in super elevation,
higher super elevation slow speed train

FLANGE TRAVEL 3.
derailed.
Single travel marks 3 -10 mts. (> 3 mtrs.) on
rail table gradual derailment– off loading,
ON RAIL uneven loading of consignment, sudden
change of super elevation or less super
elevation higher speed train derailed ,
suspension arrangement of vehicle.
4. Several flange travel marks on rail table –
serious track deformation or track fault
occurred , sudden failure of discontinuity of
track or obstruction on track.
5. Flange travel marks inside the track –
wheel breakage, spread gauge due to
failure of track fittings.
 DERAILMENT
CO-EFFICIENT
At the time of derailment when flange
force (Y) is in the process of climbing
on rail, its ratio or comparison with the
instantaneous wheel load (Q) is called

Co- efficient of derailment.

The derailment will take place when
the value of this ration will increase.
DERAILMENT OF 1403 KURLA TERMINUS – MANMAD,
GODAVARI EXPRESS AT KALYAN-IGATPURI ON 30.09.1998

1403 Dn Godavari Express had derailed while negotiating a left-hand curve, the driver
saw bend in track ahead of him and applied emergency brakes.

Observation & Measurement:

8th, 9th and 10th coaches derailed towards the right side.
Interlocking of buffer in between 9 -14 Coaches.
12 points of mounts on outer rail and drops were found within a total distance of 1.6 m.
The track had been shallow screened only few days back.
It was a compound curve of 1.98 and 1.08 degree (Two parallel line connected by curve
it is S curve).
Rubber pads under the rail in the LWR had perished/or worked out and significant
reduction in the toe load of the ERC clips.
The average versines worked out - 1.80-degree curve, against a nominal value of 1.08
degree.
Actual cant – 50 mm cant,
Speed 100 kmph,
Cant deficiency - 90.8 mm (max permissible limit – 75mm),
 Reason:
Incorrect cant imbalance lateral flange forces on the outer wheel –

resulted increasing flange force Y, in the ration Y/Q, derailment

coefficient.

12 points of mounts on outer rail and drops is a proof of wheels gradually

climbing the rails and derailing –

When it happens ;

a) Defects in alignment (as its normal level of longitudinal and lateral

resistance was poor) and in correct super elevation track.

b) Corrosion had also eaten the metal liners and foot of rail section thus
contributing to the decrease in toe load,

c) ERCs were also found deficient

d) Shortage of ballast probably due to shallow screening work.

e) Defects in under gear is present in rolling stock.

CRS Recommendation:
a) Rubber pads of adequate thickness and durability are to
be provided in the LWR and replaced on need basis.
b) M.S. liners should be replaced on need basis without
waiting for any prescribed life to be over.
c) Immediate replacement of Buffer rails with SEJs must be
complied with.
RAIL
FRACTURE
OF
KUSHINAGAR
EXPRESS &
AMRAVATI
EXPRESS
 Train engine derailed by all wheels of rear trolley and following eleven
coaches completely derailed.
Speed of train - 97 kmph.

Defect: Discontinuity in left rail on account of AT weld failure followed by

consequential multiple rail fractures.
There was no reporting of poor track geometry or frequent attention.
DERAILMENT OF 8029
All fastening behind 415 and after 423 were generally intact.
KURLA - HOWRAH Lending rail of 6.3 m had misaligned by 26 cm and had overturned
EXPRESS IN BHUSAVAL and had flange mark on web.
No point of mount as found.
DIVISION OF CR ON
3.12.98 Reason: LWR had been distressed at different temperatures ranging from 44
to 48 centigrade from 1994 to 1997.

CRS Recommendation :
a) No LWR should be under jurisdiction of two SE/P. Ways
b) De-stressing should be carried out at one temperature and in shortest
time not exceeding a week in any case.
DERAILMENT OF 1033 BOMBAY VT – LUCKNOW PUSHPAK
EXPRESS AT BHUPAL DIV ON 12.10.1996
Engine and coach next to it and rearmost five coaches were on rail, while
12 other Coaches had derailed.
Defect: The tongue rail of SEJ had broken at the location of the change of
section at the foot of rail.
SEJ located on the LHS rail had been fractured with the left hand
rail dislodged

Reason: Failure of SEJ due to reduced fracture toughness arising out of gas
cutting in manufacturing process and structural weakness due to
inadequate sleeper support.

CRS Recommendation:

SEJ layouts should strictly conform to RDSO drawing i.e. 6 sleepers.

 The leading loco and first 10 coaches were on rail and the rest of train derailed.

Turn out is 52 kg 1in 12 RH T/O with straight switch on wooden sleeper located on left
DERAILMENT hand curve.
OF 2628 NEW
Cause :
DELHI – a) Gauge/ versine variations exceeding tolerances prescribed and a gap in
BANGALORE tongue rail. Variation in alignment up to 6-station rear was found 0 to42 mm.
EXPRESS AT ON b) Both cant and versine variation beyond permissible limits.
03.03.97 ON c) Gauge at ATS was +8mm.
JHANSI – BINA d) Wheel flange thickness less by 1mm limit.
SECTION OF e) Wheel diameter difference of 2mm on same axle.
JHANSI DIV. CRS Recommendation :
a) RDSO/LKO to precisely lay down gauge tolerances in turnout especially on
the switch portion.
b) Zero missing fittings to be ensured.
c) No two consecutive sleepers should be allowed without rubber pads.
Derailment of Diwa – Sawant wadi passenger train of
50105 – Loco and 07 coaches derailed on 04.05.2014.
• Passenger died in accident – 23 nos.
• Passengers sustained grievous injuries – 37 nos.
• Passenger got minor injury – 50 nos.
• Damage Cost – 2.98 Cr.
• Km – 135/3172 135/765
• Right hand curve – 5 Degree.
• Cant – 75 mm
• Permanent speed restriction – 65 Kmph
• Falling gradient – 1:125
• Rolling mark on fracture rake – 880/52/O/SAIL/VIII/1992 - D
• Rail and weld fracture in PNVL-ROHA section (Rail fracture prone area)
• in last four years – 164 nos.
• In Central Railway D - Mark rail (presence of hydrogen in rail) available - 698 KM
• Point of Mount – 0.67 mm ahead of Rail fracture.
• Point of Drop – 2.13 mm
• Raging distance – 117 m
• GMT – 21.4 - 52 kg rail (525 – 09 UTS rail)
• Due to non-availability of traffic block - deep screening not done
• Average time taken for maintenance of rake – 3.15 hrs. (Stipulated period – 6 hrs).
• Time taken for examination – not adequate
• Staff strength – not adequate
• Loco side bearer plate locating spigot is not available with chassis(Superstructure)
• Corresponding side bearer plate – Locating spigot found inside
• Officers Tenure – (Sr DEN – DEN of the section) – 4 to 11 months.
• Provisional finding of CRS – System failure.
RAIL
FRACTURE
AND
LOCATING
SPIGOT
BROKEN OF
SIDE BEARER
OF ENGINE OF
DIWA –
SAWANTWADI
PASSENGER
CRS recommendation
• High output track machine required – if not available then 02
track machine at a time.
• Voice recorder to be introduce to filter noise in engine
• Software supported rail fracture/Manufacture technology to
be used
• Patrolling of D/Mark rail round the clock and replacement on
priority
• Provision in Guard van should have speedometer with speed and
voice recorder
• Railway should take MOU (memorandum of understanding between
parties) with various ambulance service.
• The sectional officer should have adequate tenure.
• Premature failure of rail and weld manufacturer should be
penalized
• Platform length should be increased.
 Sr. Failure type % of
ACCIDENT No. Failure
TYPE 1 Rail Fracture 44 %
STATICS 2 Distortion of track 24 %
ON CRS
REPORT 3 Derailment due to 12 %
failure of turn out/ SEJ
4 Other 20 %
DERAILMENT OF EMPTY RAKE OF 12138 PANJAB MAIL AT CST YARD ON 10.09.2014
WHILE NEGIOTIATING RIGHT TURN CURVE.

• Cause for derailment on Wheel diameter difference Left shorter than right side, and left
wheel mounted on left rail –

• What will happen if LHS wheel shorter then RHS wheel.

• Positive angularity of larger diameter wheel and negative angularity of shorter diameter
wheel while moving on straight track.

• It should cause climbing over of larger diameter RHS wheel disc due to its positive
angularity at leading edge.
 WHEEL GAUGE
VARIATION IMPACT
1. If
the wheel gauge is more than permissible limit,
there exists a possibility of a relatively newer
wheel hitting the nose of crossing. This happens
because the wheel gauge is one of the
parameters affecting the clearance at check rail
opposite the nose of crossing.

2. If the Wheel gauge is less than minimum value,

there is a possibility of wheel hitting at the back
of a tongue rail while passing through the switch
and thus damaging the tongue rail.
 DERAILMENT OF ONE COACH LHB OF
12598 DN AT 133/8-14 IN BETWEEN TGR –
2 – TGR -1 ON 18.07.2019 AT 3.47 HRS.

1. Coach no. 191676 LS/NER – Manufacturing – ICF –

11/02/2019.
2. Commissioned – 3 months back.
3. Fitted with FIBA – it detect failure of Air spring.
4. No air spring leakage / brake binding in rolling in
/while detaching the train at CSMT.
5. After derailment coach was dragged – 873 mtrs.
6. While dragging the levelling arrangement and the
vertical plate adjoining the levelling valve of the air
spring was damaged due to which it got deflated.
 RECOMMENDATION
1. Increased Awareness & Training of new rolling
stock components such as Air Springs & the
instructions thereof.
2. The committee in their interactions, found that
even train operating staff , Guard, ALP have
poor awareness of instructions to be followed
for new RS equipment's like Air Springs.
3. There is an urgent need that train operating
staff are fully aware & conversant with
instructors for new RS components.
 SHORT COMING
NOTICED
1. Disregard Non recording of evidences: The PSC
sleeper being hit and dragged was not
recorded as a evidence in Joint Note.
2. Non – factual conclusion, no efforts to
investigate / record whether air spring had got
ruptured or damaged was the consequence of
derailment.
3. Poor technical knowledge of supervisors.
4. Poor Co – ordination & efforts to arrive at
consensus., some supervisors not even examined
derailed coach before signing Joint note.
WHEEL DISC BREAKAGE OF COACH NO. CR
16122 LWACCN TRAIN NO.02062 UP (BJU-
LTT HOLIDAY AC EXPRESS) ON 02.06.19
BETWEEN PKE- NGN STATION OF BSL
DIVISION.
 1. The wheel disc has failed at the rim-web
transition area of the wheel disc where
web thickness is 14+3 mm, due to multi

FINDINGS nuclei fatigue.

2. The chemical composition &
microstructure at rim conforms to the
specification IRS-19/93 part II (Rev-4), First
issue, July 2012.
3. This accident falls under the category of
equipment failure of train carrying
passengers and ‘Failure of Material’.
11043 DN MADURAI EXPRESS SLR
99703 CAPSIZED KM 123/18 AT KAD
DATED 06.07.2018 KJT –LNL SECTION.
1. Tubular frame and tough floor welding under luggage
compartment badly corroded.
2. Sole bar body pillars and sliding door pocket badly
corroded.
3. Head stock inner side and stiffening tubes are badly
corroded,
4. Junction of sole bar at head stock badly corroded.
5. Responsibility of this derailment was fixed on train operating
staff Banker Driver for poor coordination .
EVIDENCE OF PARTS DISLODGED AFTER INCIDENCE
CONDITION OF COACH AFTER CLIMBINH ON BANKER
CONDITION
OF BANKER
AFTER
COLLUSION
BREAKAGE
OF HEAD
STOCK
 1. The Video shooting/ still photography of site
showing the position of derailed coaches, the
track and clues i.e. available of broken parts
that these may provide information about
PRESERVATION cause of accident.
2. Sr. Subordinates deputed to prepare the Joint
OF CLUES note and the site sketch, sketch should depict
that position of wheel, parts removed or
broken available location wise, the layout of
good track and damaged track with direction
and reference KM/ Fixed structure so that just
before derailment what type of curve of track
circuit the vehicle crossed and after
derailment condition of vehicle and track can
be assessed.
 STEPS TO BE TAKEN TO PREVENT DERAILMENT

⮚ Specific person or team to be assigned with accountability, is essential to

route cause analysis and corrective action.
⮚ It requires focus from the top, training of field personnel, statistical
analysis, removal of corporate barriers, and a comprehensive systems
approach.
⮚ Irrespective of ownership and accountability to be fixed.
⮚ If you can't measure it, you can't manage it.
⮚ Derailment prevention is everyone's responsibility.
⮚ The adoption of comprehensive maintenance and inspection standards
was found to be highly effective .
⮚ Increasing passenger and worker safety and yielding economic benefits
through decreased maintenance costs .
⮚ By introducing new components to increase the service life of track
work components.
⮚ Derailment cause finding & preventive training.
 PART – II
TRACK
PARAMETERS
TRACK
FASTENING
TRACK FASTENING
• Elastic fastenings are mainly used on concrete sleeper (PSC mono
block) track for laying. It comprises of elastic rail clip (ERC),
metal/Glass Filled Nylon-66 liner and rubber pad.

• These fastening hold the rail with sleeper under continuous vertical
pressure (i.e. toe load), and provide longitudinal /creep resistance in
both the directions.
• Rubber pad resist shock & vibration, lateral movement of rail & electric
insulation.

• This fastening is the force by which clip holds the rail flange with the
sleeper i.e. toe load. During service, actual toe load depends upon :
a) In effective rubber pads
b) Over driven /under driven ERC
c) Broken insulating liner.

• Initial testing of ERC’s is to be done after 4 years or 200 GMT.

PANDROL CLIP Or ERC DOES NOT Fit
properly in an Elongated Insert of Sleeper.
Hence this Hampers its Toe Load and ERCs
even Fall off making it miserable.
TO ELIMINATE SUCH PROBLEM, That
Particular Sleeper to be Replaced or ERC
Should be Replaced Based on the
Elongativeness of Insert Hole.
Pandrol clip not
fitted properly due
to elongation of
Insert.
So a Screw Spike
or Rubber Pad is
used to prevent it
to fall off.
This is the field
practice as its
difficult to
Replace all such
Sleepers in Yards
due to Site and
Traffic conditions
GFN – Glass Filled Nylons Liner, is Plastic Liner
GS – gauge face side
NGS- non gauge face side
 I
Insert distance for 52Kg Sleeper (RT-2595)=148mm
Insert distance for 60kg Sleeper (RT-2596)=162mm

Insert distance
ELECTRONIC
TOE LOAD
TESTING
MACHINE
PERIODICITY
OF THE TOE
LOAD
MEASUREMENT
POINT &
CROSSING
FABRICATED & CMS CROSSING
OBTUSE CROSSING
A VIEW OF THE EXPANSION JOINT MAX PERMISSIBLE LIMIT
IS 120 MM

TONGUE RAIL

STOCK RAIL
IMPROVED
SEJ
IMPROVED
SEJ (RT-
6902) MAX
GAP 80 MM
POINT AND CROSSING
CURVE
CURVE
DETAIL OF
ANY
LOCATION
IS
AVAILABLE
IN
GRADIENT
CHART
GRADIENT CHART
RAIL PARAMETERS

• Classification of rails.
• Measurement of rail profile- various methods.
• Wear of the rail – vertical and lateral wear.
• Reduction in cross section of the rails.
• Rail fractures.
• Ultrasonic testing of rails.
RAIL
SECTION
RECOMMENDED RAIL SECTION FOR 22.1 TON AXLE LOAD
RAIL
WEAR
g

TONGUE RAIL SHOULD BE REPLACED/

RECONDITIONED
RAIL WELD
JOINT AND
PROFILE
 RAIL FRACTURE:

One meter of rail to be cut and following measurement to be carried out.

a. Vehement of Rail.
b. Vertical wear of Rail.
c. Lateral wear of Rail.
d. Rolling mark
e. Last UST.
f. BHN - 240.
g. Structure of failure (Cup and cone shape depicts sudden failure and
Nuclear surrounded by orbits and followed by cup and cone depicts old cracks.)
h. Ultimate tensile strength (for 22.9t axle load 90 kg/ sq. cm.
i. Measurement of Rail head and Rail foot.
j. De-stressing of rail.
RAIL
FACTURE
RAIL
WELD
FAILURE
RAIL FRACTURE
OF KUSHINAGAR
EXPRESS &
AMRAVATI
EXPRESS
RAIL
FACTURE OF
SAWANTWA
DI EXPRESS
UST OF RAIL AFTER PASSING GROSS MILION TON
DESTRESSING
DESTRESSING
DEEP
SCREENING
DEPTH OF
BALLAST
 BALLAST
SCREENING

The entire Ballast of Track should be Deep Screened at least once in ten y ears OR 500GMT Whichever is Earlier.

This Improves Cross Drainage of Water and Improves Elasticity of Cushion which further gives Good Riding Quality .

Ballast Cleaning Machine is Used for the same.

SHALLOW
SCREENING
Creep posts should be erected
at all interlocked facing points
opposite the toe of the switch
and creep should not be
allowed to exceed permissible
limits.
Permissible amount of creep –
Creep in excess of 150 mm.
shall not be permitted.
 CREEP

•Rails have a tendency to move gradually in the direction of the dominant traffic is
call creep

•(a) Inadequate toe loads of the rail to sleeper fastening and rails not secured
properly to sleeper.
•(b) Inadequate ballast resistance to the movement of sleepers.
•(c) Inefficient or badly maintained rail joints.
•(d) Rails too light for the traffic they carry.
•(e) Improper expansion gaps.
•(f) Broken sleepers, uneven spacing of sleepers.
•(g) Lack of proper drainage.

•Creep posts should be erected at all interlocked facing points opposite the toe of
the switch and creep should not be allowed to exceed permissible limits.

•Permissible amount of creep – Creep in excess of 150 mm. shall not be permitted.
MEASURING THE CREEP AT EXPANSION JOINT
BUCKLING

Buckling of track occurs when high

compressive forces are created in the rails
associated with inadequacy of lateral
resistance in the track at the place.
Conditions of Buckling –
(i) Inadequate expansion gaps, maximum
permissible gap is 120 mm
(ii) Failure to counteract creep in time.
(iii) Non-lubrication of rail joints,
(iv) Deficiency of ballast.
(v) Missing in track fittings.
BUCKLING
OF TRACK
In case of buckling severe cut marks may be available on foot board of
derailed or on rail coaches , cut marks on side bearer of coach /wagon,

bending end pull rod may be noticed.

TRACK MEASUREMENT

Gauge.

Cross level (Cant) / Super-elevation.

Versine.
GUAGE LEVEL INSTRUMENT
GAUGE
• Shortest distance between the inner faces of the two rails.

• Measured with equipment called “ Gauge- cum- level”

instrument.

• Checking the gauge for correctness.

• Direct reading of the gauge from the dial.

• Methods to be followed in case of spread gauge.

• Tabulating the readings.

• Effect of gauge in derailments.

TRACK GAUGE -
SHORTEST
DISTANCE
BETWEEN THE
INNER FACES OF
THE TWO RAILS.
IF THE TRACK FITTING ARE UNABLE TO HOLD THE TRACK WITHIN LIMIT AND GAUGE TOO SLACK DUE TO
EXCESSIVE WEAR OF RAIL , WHEELS MAY PASS INSIDE THE TRACK, IS CALLED SPREAD GAUGE, INSUCH
CONDITION ALL THE WHEELS GONE INBETWEEN THE TWO RAILS WILL HAVE GRIND MARKS ON OPPOSITE
SIDE OF WHEEL GAUGE I.E. ON OUTER PRERIPHERY OF TYRE AND ALSO CUT MARK S/GRIND MARK S ON
RAIL GAUGE FACE DUE TO SPEENING OF WHEEL IN GAUGE FACE OF TRACK WILL BE AVAILABLE
CROSS - LEVEL
1. The difference in the levels of the tables of the two rails of the track

2. Measured with the “Gauge- cum- level” instrument & “spirit level”

3. Graduations on the ramps of the gauge.

4. Indication of the levels with reference to left / right

5. Indication of the level as right low or left low

6. Importance of recording the level under load

7. Twist - Difference in cross – level per mts. 3 mm/ mts.

GRADUATION OF CROSS LEVEL MEASURING GAUGE
 VARIATION OF
GAUGE, CROSS
LEVEL AND
VERSINE 607 (1)
 The radius of a curve is determined by measuring the versine on
a chord of known length, from the equation,
R = 125 c2
V
Where R = radius in meters;

VERSINE C = chord length in meters;

V = versine in millimeters.
V = 125 c2 = 125 x 6 x6 6 mtrs. Chord and 1 degree curve
R 1750
= 2.57 mm, for 2 degree value will be 5.14 mm and so on

In case of 20 mtrs chord the value will be = 125 x20x20

1750
= 28.57 mm, for 2 degree curve value will be 57.14 mm and so on
CRITARIA FOR
REALIGHMENT
OF A CURVE
MEASURING VERSINE WITH 25 MM INSTRUEMNT FROM EVERY READING
HAVE TO SUBSTRACT 25 MM TO GET ACTUAL VALUE.
 MEASURING VERSINE WITH 40 MM INSTRUEMNT FROM EVERY
READING HAVE TO SUBSTRACT 40 MM TO GET ACTUAL VALUE.
HOW TO FIND DEFORMATION OF TRACK NORMALLY 15-25 % 0F CURVE ON
EITHER SIDE REMAINS TRANSITION BASED ON FORMULA
Station no. Versine as per design Measured Versine Deformation
value
0 2 0 -2
1 8 28 +20
2 16 34 +18
3 24 32 +8
4 32 34 +2
5 32 38 +6
6 32 26 -6
7 32 32 0
8 32 24 -8
9 32 36 +4
10 32 36 +4
11 32 30 -2
12 24 28 +4
13 16 14 -2
14 8 0 -8
15 2 2 0
TRANSITION
LENGTH
THERE ARE THREE PART IN BETWEEN STRAIGHT TRACK AND
CURVE TRACK.
1. STRAIGHT WHERE VERSINE VALUE IS ZERO
2. TRANSITION WHERE VERSINE & SUPER ELEVATION VALUE
INCRESED
GRADUALLY FROM ZERO AT STRAIGHT TO DESIRED
DEGREE VALUE TO
ENABLE THE VEHICLE TO NEGOCICATED SMOOTHLY ON
CURVE.
3. THEN CURVE WHERE VERSINE VALUE AND SUPER
ELEVATION VALUE
WILL MAINTAIN CERTAIN VALUE OF SPECIFIED DEGREE OF
CURVE TO
DENOTE SPECIFIC DEGREE OF CURVE.
CROSS LEVEL - THE DIFFERENCE IN THE LEVELS OF THE TABLES OF
THE TWO
RAILS OF THE TRACK
SUPER ELEVATION/CANT
TWIST DIFFERENCE IN CROSS- LEVEL PER MTS.- 3 MM/MTRS.

It may directly
be used this
formula
C = V²x D
127
Where D is the
degree of
curve,
V is the
sectional
speed.
 WHAT IS THEORITICAL SUPER ELEVATION & ACTUAL SUPER
ELEVATION?

1. Theoretical super elevation - Super elevation calculated

on max speed on the section .

2. Actual super elevation – Super elevation calculated on

equilibrium speed i.e. ¾ th of max speed of the section.

3. Max. Super elevation/cant A,B,C route – 165 mm

D&E route – 140 mm.

 WHAT IS THEORITICAL SUPER ELEVATION & ACTUAL SUPER
ELEVATION

1. Theoretical super elevation (For mail train) - Super

elevation calculated on max speed on the section. If the
sectional speed is 100 kmph one degree curve, S(Theo
mail) = GXV² = 1750X 100X100
127 R 127X1750
= 78.74 mm
2. Actual super elevation – Super elevation calculated on
equilibrium speed i.e. ¾ th of max speed of the section.
S(Actual) - GXV² = 1750X 75X75 = 44.29 mm
127 R 127X1750
3. Theoretical super elevation (For goos train) - Super elevation
calculated on max speed of goods train on the section. If the
sectional speed is 60 kmph one degree curve,
S(Theo goods) = GXV² = 1750X 60X60
127 R 127X1750
= 28.34 mm
 WHAT IS CANT DEFICIENCY AND CANT EXCESS

Cant deficiency – the difference between theoretical cant of

coaching stock and actual cant provided
As calculated for 1 degree curve max sectional speed 100 kmph, Theo Super
elevation of mail train 78.74 mm and Actual Super elevation is 44.29 mm.
therefore cant deficiency is 34.45 mm. In 2 degrees curve this value become
double i.e. 68.9 mm and 3 degrees 103.35 mm. Max limit is 100 mm hence in 100
kmph mail train can run max 2 degrees curve.

Cant excess - the difference between actual cant and

theoretical cant of Goods stock.
Similarly as per earlier calculation for 1 degree curve max sectional speed of
goods train is 60 kmph, Theo Super elevation of goods train 28.34 mm and
Actual Super elevation is 44.29 mm. therefore cant excess is 15.95 mm. In 2
degree curve this value become double i.e. 31.9 mm and 3 degrees 47.85 mm.
Max limit is 100 mm.
NO CHANGE OF SUPERELEVATION OVER TURNOUTS
 TRACK OBSERVATION AND MEASUREMENT

1. Depth below sleeper bottom in mm (Cushion ballast). Stating whether clean or

caked/sufficient/inadequate – 3 Mts. apart.

2. Packing (loose / sound/)

3. Width of Shoulder Ballast in mm from outside of rail and sleeper.

4. Type of sleeper - (CST-9/PSC etc)

5. Condition of sleeper: New, second hand, damaged, unserviceable.

6. Sleeper Density – M + 4 means – 13/( 13 +4) = 0.76 meter.

7. Square or not

8. Rail wear (Vertical wear/Lateral wear/Angular wear)

9. In case of Rail facture – if one side rail broken multiple flange hit /cut mark on that side wheels
and multiple flange hitting marks to be noticed.

a) Observation of rail

b) Observation of rail welding joint

c) Type of welding (Termite welding/ Flash butt welding)

d) Date and marking of last USFD done.

10. Rolling mark on rail
Leading end - 880 52 O sail x/2005<-
a) 880- Grade tensile strength
b) 52 - rail weight
c) O - First hand rail
d) Sail – Manufacturer
e) X - Month of manufacturing Oct.
f) 2005 - Year of manufacturing.
Trailing end - 880 52 OB sail Viii/92<-D.
a) 880 - Grade tensile strength
b) 52- rail weight
c) OB - Open hearth basic process
d) Sail – Manufacturer
e) Viii - month of manufacturing Aug.
f) 92 - Year of manufacturing.
g) D - Type, presence of high hydrogen content.

11. Life of Rail -

a) 60 kg/m rail – 800 (90 UTS RAIL) divided by GMT, or 800 GMT passed from date of laying means life is over
b) 52 kg/m rail – 525 (90 UTS RAIL) divided by GMT or 525 GMT passed from date of laying means life is over

12. UST Periodicity

a) 16 - 24 GMT – 4 Months
b) 24 - 40 GMT – 3 Months
c) 40 – 60 GMT – 2 Months
13. Rail fastening
a) ERC clip
b) Liner
c) Rubber pad.
d) Condition of tightness of ERC clip
e) Missing of Liner
14.Deficiency of fish plate bolt location wise
15. Speed indication board
16. Level crossing
a) Check rail clearance
b) Depth of space for wheel flange
c) Inter lock / Non interlock system
d) Existence of board(whistle indicator, road approaching stop
board, Stop, look out for trains before crossing Board
e) Provision of speed breakers

17, Throw of switch – Opening on either side

18. Gauge in mm – Tight (-)/ Slack(+), Straight - +/- 6, Curve
upto 5 degree - + 15/ - 6, More than 5 degree +20/-0

19. Cross level/ Super elevation – Under load(With Loco)/ No

load- 9 mm from station to station( Max Super
elevation 43 mm per degree max as per requirement)

20. Versine – Small curve/ Point & crossing 6mts chord 3 mts
apart Long curve 20 mts chord 10 mts apart.

21. In case of Buckling of track

a) Location of buckling with respect of POM & POD.
b) Last distressing date.
c) SEJ gap – 150 mm +/- 20 mm
d) Gap between sleeper and ballast.
ROLLING MARK ON RAIL TO BE RECORDED
 MEASUREMENT AND OBSERVATION AT POINT AND CROSSING
1. Point & crossing – Type of turn out – 1: 8.5, 1: 12 & 1: 16
2, Wear of crossing (wear to be measured with straight edge at 100 mm from ANC):
3. Clearance of wing rail opposite nose of crossing and upto 450 mm towards heel end.
4. Check rail clearance -500 mm ahead towards toe of crossing and 500 mm behind heel of crossing
5. Measurement gauge and cross level 1 mts ahead of ANC, 1 mts behind of ANC and 150 mm behind of ANC.
6. Location of point of mount
7. Gauge on turn outs- with switches Nominal gauge + 6mm.
8. Packing under the crossing and the switch of sleepers must not be loose/ defective
9. Tongue rail chipped/cracked over small lengths aggregating to 200 mm. within a distance of 1000 mm. from
its toe
10 Tongue rail developed knife edged tip (thickness of top edge being less than 2 mm) over a length of more
than 100 mm any where upto a distance of 1000 mm from its toe.
11. Tongue rail bent or twisted not housed properly and creating a gap more than 5 mm
12. Vertical wear – 5 - 8 mm (52 KG/M &60 KG/M rail).
13. Damage of nose indicates – Gauge tight or excessive clearance in check rail.
14. Vertical wear of nose of crossing – 6-8 mm
15. Versine - should not be more than 4mm. and versine at each station should also not be beyond ± 3mm. from
its designed value.
16. Inspection – PWI of the Section should carryout inspection of in passenger running lines once in 3 months and
other lines once in six months by rotation.
 MEASURING THE
HEIGHT OF NOSE OF
CROSSING
 MEASUREMENT AT SWITCH
150 mm behind toe In straight road in
At stock joint
of switch mid of switch

In straight road in
heel of switch.

MEASUREMENT AT CROSSING
1. 1000 mm ahead of nose.

2. 150 mm behind ANC.

3. 1000 mm behind of nose.

THIS PARAMETERS WILL BE APPLICABLE
UNDER LOAD TRACK MEASUREMENT.
THIS PARAMETERS
WILL BE
APPLICABLE
WITHOUT LOAD
TRACK
MEASUREMENT.
 PART – III
ROLLING STOCK
PARAMETERS
 Performa of Diesel/Electrical locomotive.

1. Basic information

2. Brief particular of safety

fittings/ safety items.

3. Check and record

observation

4. Measurement of loco and

service limit.
 Basic information:
(a) Date of accident:
(b) Train number:
(c) Locomotive class:
(d) Locomotive number:
(e) Locomotive manufacture year and place:
(f) Base shed of locomotive:
(g) Date and place of last POH:
(h) Kilometers earned after last POH:
(i) Date and place of last major inspection:
(j) Date and place of last schedule inspection:
(k) Whether any schedules are overdue? :
(l) Damage to the loco (brief description) and Cost of
damage to the loco (in rupees)
BRIEF PARTICULARS OF THE SAFETY FITTINGS/ SAFETY
ITEMS PROVIDED /NOT PROVIDED

Working or not working

1. Head light
2. Speedometer
3. Flasher light
4. VCD
5. Brake system
6. Horn
7. Sanders and wipers.
 CHECK AND RECORD THE OBSERVATIONS
(a) Position of control handles, cut-out cocks etc. after the accident.
(b) Functioning of brake synchronizing valve – Whether working or not
(c) Position of brake blocks after the accident – whether applied or not
d) Condition of cattle guard
(e) Any sign of seizure of roller bearing in axle box
(f) Comments if any coil spring is broken or displaced.

(g) condition of vertical and horizontal hydraulic damper

(h) Condition of pivot and side load bearer arrangement of bogie and obstruction in
rotation
(i) Condition of traction rod /guide rod including its condition.
(j) Condition of traction link including its connection.

(k) Condition of lateral stop components between bogie and brake

(l) Any other observation in respect to mechanical defect of the locomotive,
which might have any bearing on safe running of loco.

Note : Defective and broken material should be send

to CMT for testing, if necessary
WORN ROOT PROFILE
The wheel diameter difference in stock on same
axle

What will happen if LHS wheel will be shorter than RHS

wheel.
•

The smaller left wheel diameter has to match with

right wheel diameter to rotate in same revolution on
same axle, hence will come closer to rail and form
positive angularity with left rail.
THERE IS NO IN SERVICE LIMIT OF VARIATION OF WHEEL
DIAMETER IN TRAIN EXAMINATION.
 DURING SERVICE THE WHEEL DIA LIMIT TO BE AS PER TYRE
DEFECT GAUGE

• During service, the wheel dia reduces due to wear and so the height of
flange above tread increases. The tyre defect gauge permits wear of wheel
dia of individual wheel discs to an extent that flange height above tread
does not exceed by 6.5 mm. The height of new flange above tread is 28.5
mm and tyre defect gauge is designed to allow maximum flange height
upto 35 mm in service on account of wheel diameter wear. Since, extent of
wear on each of the wheel discs of same axle is independent of each other
and may be different in the range of zero to max 6.5 mm, the theoretical
maximum possible variation in wheel diameters of two disc of same axle
can reach even upto 13.
• Wheel diameter to be measured after running out trolley, where cross level
is zero.
AS PER IRCA PART –III 2020 EDITION
TYRE DEFECT GAUGE
 WHEEL GAUGE :

1. Wheel gauge is the distance between inside faces of the flange

on the right and left side wheels of an axle.
2. As per TRCA PART –III 2020 EDITION

3. As per Accident manual limit of gauge is – 1600 +2/-2

 WHEEL GAUGE VARIATION IMPACT
1. If the wheel gauge is more than permissible limit, there
exists a possibility of a relatively newer wheel hitting the
nose of crossing. This happens because the wheel
gauge is one of the parameters affecting the clearance
at check rail opposite the nose of crossing.

2. If the Wheel gauge is less than minimum value, there is a

possibility of wheel hitting at the back of a tongue rail
while passing through the switch and thus damaging the
tongue rail.
DERAILMENT OF ONE COACH LHB OF 12598 DN AT 133/8-14 IN BETWEEN TGR – 2 – TGR -1
ON 18.07.2019 AT 3.47 HRS.

1. Coach no. 191676 LS/NER – Manufacturing – ICF – 11/02/2019.

2. Commissioned – 3 months back.
3. Fitted with FIBA – it detect failure of Air spring.
4. No air spring leakage / brake binding in rolling in /while detaching the train at
CSMT.
5. After derailment coach was dragged – 873 mtrs.
6. While dragging the levelling arrangement and the vertical plate adjoining the
levelling valve of the air spring was damaged due to which it got deflated.
AIR SPRING

1. Air spring made up of rubber bellow

& emergency rubber spring
introduced in secondary suspension
gives spring action and
damping.

2. When the load changes, air

spring reacts by changing the
distance between air spring
support and vehicle body and by
actuation of leveling valve level
maintain thus buffer height.
LEAKY AIR SPRING NOT TO BE ALLOWED. ABRASION OR CUT ON TOP COVER
LAYER IS ALLOWED, REINFORCING MATERIALS ARE EXPOSED AIR SPRING TO
BE CHANGED
 IN CASE, THE AIR SPRING FAILS
1. Air spring supply from Auxiliary reservoir to be isolated.
2. FIBA also to be isolated .
3. As per RDSO instruction after isolation of Air spring
and FIBA train can move at the speed of 60 kmph to
destination.

4. As per operational aspect the Coach detached en –

route also.
FIBA - FAILURE INDICATION BRAKE APPLICATION

1. FIBA indicates Air spring failure is

connected with Air spring.
2. In case of Air spring failure it will
reduce speed and train
bring in halt.
3. FIBA will activate when Air spring
pressure is comes
down from optimum 6 kg /cm2 to
1 kg /cm2 or minimum
3.2-3.8 kg /cm2 to 1 kg /cm2 .
4. Inbuilt valve in FIBA will activate in
such situation which
connected to BP and pressure drop
will lead brake application.
 WHEEL SLIDE PROTECTION DEVICE

1. WSPs provided in the system to avoids wheel sliding.

2. Speed sensors detect the speed of the wheel & sends the
signal to the Micro processor.
3. Micro processor evaluates the received signal & generates
signals enabling the dump valve/antiskid valves to control
the brake cylinder pressure, thus release brake caliper and
eliminate skidding.
 WHEEL SLIDE PROTECTION SYSTEM
Microprocessor

Speed Sensor Dump Valve

UBatt. Vehicle-
Bus

Electric

Pneumatic
WHEEL DISC BREAKAGE OF COACH NO. CR 16122 LWACCN TRAIN NO.02062
UP (BJU-LTT HOLIDAY AC EXPRESS) ON 02.06.19 BETWEEN PKE- NGN STATION
OF BSL DIVISION. AFTER BREAKAGE COACH IS ON TRACK
 BROKEN WHEEL DISC PARTICULARS
1. Diameter of wheel 868mm

2. Location of the wheel disc in coach TTLR

3. Failures detected during Maintenance/ En Enroute, at KM 288/6 – 287/22, Pimparkhed-Nandgaon section of

route BSL division Central Railway.

4. Make of wheel (Name of Wheel VR (Stock HandelsgesMBH, Viena, Austria)

Manufacturer)

5. Identification Code of Failed Wheel Disc 15716600107, Year of manufacturing: 2015

6. Identification Code of other wheel disc on VR 15716600107

the same axle

7. Axle and punching details Failed End: LHB 1511, PO 78T ICF, PR 1101, GPO 29T, RWF, Year of
MFG not legible.
Another End: LHB 1511, PO 77T ICF 16, K 6088 26221

8. Place of wheel disc pressing Place of wheel pressed is not mentioned on wheel set. However,
based on axle end punching, it reveals that the failed wheel disc
was pressed by ICF at 78 T ( PO 78T ICF)
MEASUREMENT OF BUFFER/CBC HEIGHT
 PRESERVATION OF CLUES

1. The Video shooting/ still photography of site showing the position

of coaches, the track and clues o that these may be provided

some information about cause of accident.

2. Sr Subordinates deputed to prepare the Joint and the site sketch,

sketch should depict that position of wheel, parts removed

available location wise, the layout of good track and damaged

track with direction and reference KM/ Fixed structure so that

before derailment the track layout can be assessed.

THERE ARE CASES OF BLC STOCK, DERAILED WHILE PASSING IN YARD LINE
OR LOOP LINE IN 1:8.5 CROSSING REVERSE CURVE
AS PER RDSO BLC CAN NEGOCIATE 1: 8.5 CROSS OVER
NEGOTIATION OF BLC WAGON
RDSO REPLY
 AS PER NEW PROFORMA FOLLOWING MEASUREMENTS HAS BEEN
INTRODUCED FOR CASNUB TROLLEY WAGON DERAILMENT

1. Lateral clearance between side frame & bolster in mm.

2. Lateral clearance between side frame & axle box adopter in mm.

3. Longitudinal clearance between side frame & axle box adopter in mm.

4. Deflected height of coil spring after re-railing on level, uncanted track.

5. Condition of elastromeric pad

6. Condition of Centre Pivot including lubrication and wear.

7.Condition of friction snubber wedge assembly.

 AS PER NEW PROFORMA FOLLOWING ITEMS HAS BEEN INTRODUCED FOR COACH
DERAILMENT

1. Wheel gauge in mm (to be measured at three locations at the

horizontal plane passing
through the center of the axle.

2. Wheel and axle faces particulars (in case of breakage of any wheel/axle).

A) Axle face particulars.

B) Ultrasonic particulars on the hub of the disk.

3. Stamping particulars on wheel discs regarding manufacturer/RA/RD

(in case of breakage of the any wheel/axle).

4. Observations after measuring the profile with wheel defect gauge

(Good/Rejectable)

5. Roller Bearing (To be recorded in case of any abnormalities observed in

Roller/Axle box)

A) Condition of axle box, rear and front covers / end cap (FLAT)

B) Condition of face cover plate.

C) Condition of bearing seal & studs / locking plate and bolts (FLAT).
 AS PER NEW PROFORMA FOLLOWING ITEMS HAS BEEN INTRODUCED FOR
COACH DERAILMENT

6. Condition of coil suspension spring i.e. Normal/Fractured (Old/Fresh).

7. Condition of rubber spring i.e. Normal/Cracked including length of crack
( for LHB only).
8. Condition of Air spring including leakage in piping.
9. Condition of Rubber Disc and Bump Stop of primary Suspension (for LBH).
10.Condition of Hanger (for ICF)
11.Condition of Equalizing Stay (for ICF)
12.Condition of Anchor Link (for ICF)
13.Condition of Control Arm, Rubber element and Bore (for LHB)
 AS PER NEW PROFORMA FOLLOWING ITEMS HAS BEEN INTRODUCED
FOR COACH DERAILMENT

14. Damping System

A ) Condition of Axle Guide Cum Dash Pot including Oil level

(for ICF)

B) Condition of Hydraulic Dampers

C) Condition of Anti Roll Bar (for LBH)

15. Condition of Center Pivot including verticality of Pivot Pin

(for ICF)

16. Condition of side bearer including Oil level and Wear (for ICF)

17.Condition of Longitudinal/Lateral Flexibility of Secondary Spring

(for LBH)
 AS PER NEW PROFORMA FOLLOWING ITEMS HAS BEEN
INTRODUCED FOR COACH DERAILMENT

18. Wheel diameter measurement

19. Deflected height of coil spring after re-railing on a level uncanted track
20. Crown clearance (for ICF)
21. Bogie frame bolster clearance (for ICF)
22. Body bogie frame clearance (for ICF)
23. Height of bogie bolster base plate from rail level (for LHB)
24. Clearance between Traction Centre and Longitudinal/Lateral Bump stop
(for LHB).
 PART – IV

MEASUREMENT PROFORMA
 THERE ARE DISCREPENCIES IN NEW INTRODUCED
PROFORLA, HENCE SUGGESSION HAS BEEN GIVEN
FROM CENTRAL RAILWAY HQ SUGGESTED TO INCLUDE
OR ELEMINATE SOME POINTS AGAINST SUCH
PROFORMA
 PART – V

DERAILMENT REPORT
 STRUCTURE OF JOINT NOTE
✔ Introduction: Derailment date, place, location time Derail Wagons
position.
✔ History: Train/ Load condition in which Wagon Derailed, their Wheel
position, location, PR (POH/ROH).
✔ Observation: How many Wagons derailed, its detail position, Observation
of Track, Signal, Operational Diary extract, Lever position of Carbine,
Loco observation its Log book, Speedometer etc., Sectional Speed.
✔ Repercussion: Section Blocked, Train canceled, Damages for various
Departments.
✔ Brake Down operation:
✔ Conclusion:
✔ Responsibility:
✔ Suggestion:
 ANNEXURE

✔ Site Sketch.
✔ Track Measurement.
✔ Wagon Measurement.
✔ Statements.
✔ Speedometer Chart/ TALOC Chart.
✔ SCADA- Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition.
✔ Data logger report.
SPEEDOMETER CHART
 SCADA CHART
VOLTAGE FLUCTUATION IS PERMISSIBLE FROM 17.5 TO 27.5 KV
 SCADA CHART
CASE OF VOLTAGE DROP LESS THAN 17.5 KV
DATALOGGER REPORT
It an unique derailment in which the Enquiry
officers reverse the finding of Joint note
committee.
JOINT NOTE:
History:
Train no. ABC, consisting 19 bogie, 740T, Loco
no. DEF WAPA, Loco pilot Shri ----, Asst. Loco
Pilot Shri -----, Guard Shri -----, round trip BPC
NO. ------, Banker no. ---, ---, ----(Driving
banker), Ghat Loco Pilot Shri ----, Asst. Loco
Pilot Shri ----started ex CSTM ---- hrs. reached
Kasar – 3/30 hrs., while passing KM 133/30,
train stopped due to BP pressure dropped.
Guard informed on Walki – Talki that the
second coach of the rear coach no. --- IGP
end trolley derailed.
Observation:
Derailed coach no. ----- is on Bhima
bridge, KM 133/12.
Leading trolley left side wheel is
outside the track and right-side
wheel inside the track (between RH
rail & guard rail).
Flair end of guard rail found broken
in two pieces.
Power van and banker are in proper
rail.
Total dragging distance measured
989 mts.
Breath Analyzer test conducted on
crew, found negative, blood
sample collected by Sr DMO/IGP.
Defect card checked; it has found
no previous defect recorded on
card.
Line clearance given TGR – I.
No power supply trip recorded.
Detail observation of track
parameters is attached herewith.
Coach parameter as per proforma
is attached here with.
General observation of coach -
NK end left side pressed from front side.
Bio tank safety bracket shifted towards BB end.
NK end left side foot board slightly bent towards BB end due to lifting at
bottom side.
Ballast crushing mark on all wheels of derailed coaches.
Fresh rubbing mark on LTTL Brake disk about 3-inch length on its periphery.
Levelling valve of LTLR and its bracket damaged, fresh hitting marks also
noticed on trolley frame.
Coach no. ---- It’s one Air suspension damaged remaining three are
alright.
LTLR Rubbing mark notice control arm safety strap and deep hitting mark
on rear lug on same side.
On date ------- same train coach Air suspension BB end trolley leakage was
reported at CSTM, and the train was running with speed restriction 60
KMPH.

BP & FP was charged there was no leakage notice on BB end Air

suspension, but it was in tilted condition.
Speedometer observation

Driving banker speed at POD 46 kmph & current 137 Amps.

Middle banker speed 46 kmph & current 150 Amps.

Last banker was non-functional.

Train Engine speed was 46 kmph and current 56 Amps.

Derailment time permanent speed restriction 45 kmph completed to

maintain speed goods loco pilot notch up, current increased 14
Amps in driving banker, middle banker 16 Amps at an interval of 3
sec.

Max speed noticed 4.9 kmph.

Track observation and parameters:

Wheel travel marks noticed on rail and as it was not prominent and
no clear mark noticed on gauge face, hence point of mount taken
from where it is clearly been seen on rail table at km 132/4.

Track laid on 60 kg rail and 60 kg MBC sleeper.

Ahead of point of mount is 5-degree right turn curve.

Point of mount to drop is 1.2 mts.

Dragging distance is 870 mts.

At km 132/47 OHE structure found hitting mark, structure got bent

15. Track measurement:
Sr. No. Station Gauge X level Versine (6mts. Remarks
Chord)
1. -5 +26 70 R 10
2. -4 +23 70 R 10
3. -3 +23 70 R 11
4. -2 +19 70 R 13
5. -1 +18 75 R 11
6. 0 +28 70 R 11
7. 1 +28 65 R 14
8. 2 +28 69 R 16
9. 3 +20 74 R 15
10. 4 +27 73 R 15
11. 5 +30 63 R 11
12. 6 +34 67 R 17
13. 7 +23 44 R 14
14. 8 +27 67 R 11
15. 9 +32 68 R 11
16. 10 +22 70 R 11
17. 11 +21 70 R 13
18. 12 +18 72 R 14
19. 13 +16 70 R 08
20. 14 +16 66 R 10
21. 15 +16 60 R 14
16. Track fittings deficiencies :
Sleeper Deficiencies of track fittings
no.
1 LH rail Rubber pad deficient, RH rail rubber pad deficient, ERC loose
2 RH rail ERC loose
3 RH rail rubber pad deficient, ERC loose
4 LH rail Rubber pad deficient, RH rail rubber pad deficient
5 LH rail Rubber pad deficient, RH rail rubber pad damaged
6 LH rail Rubber pad deficient
7 LH rail Rubber pad damaged, RH rail rubber pad displaced
8 LH rail ERC deficient
9 LH rail Rubber pad deficient, RH rail ERC loose
10 LH ERC loose, RH rail ERC loose
11 LH rail wooden packing with ERC, RH rail ERC loose
12 LH rail wooden packing with ERC, RH rail ERC loose
13 LH rail wooden packing with ERC, RH rail ERC deficient
14 OK
15 OK
16 OK
17 OK
18 Between 18 &19 Joggle fish plate one side bolt missing clamp provided

19 OK
20 LH rail rubber pad damaged, RH rail ERC loose
21 OK
22 LH rail ERC under driven, RH rail ERC over driven
23 OK
24 LH rail wooden packing to tight ERC, RH rail ERC wooden packing used to
tight ERC
25 OK
26 LH rail Rubber pad deficient, RH rail rubber pad deficient, ERC loose
27 LH rail Rubber pad damaged, inner liner missing, RH rail wooden packing
used to tight ERC
28 LH rail wooden packing to tight ERC, RH rail wooden packing used to tight
ERC
29 LH rail rubber pad damaged, RH rail ERC loose
30 LH rail rubber pad damaged, RH rail wooden packing used to tight ERC
31 LH rail Rubber pad deficient, RH rail rubber pad deficient, ERC loose
32 LH rail Rubber pad deficient, RH rail rubber pad deficient,
33 OK
34 OK
35 LH rail Rubber pad deficient, RH rail rubber pad deficient, ERC loose
36 LH rail Rubber pad damaged, inner liner missing, RH rail wooden packing
used to tight ERC
37 LH rail Rubber pad damaged, RH rail ERC over driven
38 LH ERC loose, RH rail ERC loose
39 LH rail ERC over driven, RH rail ERC over driven
40 LH rail Rubber pad damaged, RH rail ERC loose
Conclusion:
We the undersigned Sr. Subordinate after carefully
examining the witness and record of evidence, site
observation, speedometer chart has concluded
that this derailment occurred due to Coach defect.
The leading trolley RH side air suspension found
tilted/deflated there was PSR of 45 kmph before the
derailment spot. When the speed increased from 45
to 49 kmph coach leading trolley leading left wheel
lifted on left rail table because of RH air suspension
was tilted and deflated.
Responsibility:
Mechanical dept is responsible for coach defect.
Repercussion:
DN NE Ghat line closed from --- hrs to ---hrs.
Damages:
Under investigation.
 Officers Enquiry Report
Accident site photograph
Derailment of Coach /Wagon no. KM,
TIME, DATE, Location, Div. & Railway.
Documents Accompanying
Title page & particulars of accidents.
History and description of site of accident.
Observation and brief details regarding
derailment.
Rough sketch of site of accident &
gradient chart.
Relief Measured.
Findings
Remarks and reasons of finding.
List of damages.
Recommendation.
Other matter brought to light.
List of witness examined through
question and answer
List of Officers committee holding the
enquiry.
 The fact noticed -
Higher banking force in comparison
of pulling loco force.

After PSR banker notch up as per

extent practice.

Banker combine force was higher

than comparative light Coach held
to lift the coach

Poor track maintenance, lower

super elevation at lifting location of
critical 5-degree right turn curve
help to lift lest side wheel while
negotiating the curve.

The committee therefore

considers track defects the cause of
derailment, CTE does not agreed
with the findings.
Remarks and reasons for findings.
Sabotage – no
Obstruction on track – no.
Over speeding of vehicle – no.
Defects on rolling stock – does not
contribute such derailment.
Poor management of traffic – no.
Defects on track – that’s it, huge
deficiencies & defects on tack fittings
resulting excessive track gauge, improper
super elevation cause the derailment.
Recommendation

Other matter brought to light.