1. MARIO VERIDIANO V.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (June 7, 2017)

GR NO 200370

FACTS:

Mario Veridiano was charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs in an

Information filed before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Laguna.

That on or about January 15, 2008, in the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Province of

Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously possessed, controlled, and possessed one (1) small
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 2. 72 grams of dried marijuana
leaves, a hazardous substance.

Veridiano was arraigned on October 9, 2008. He entered a not guilty plea to the charge
leveled against him. A merits trial is guaranteed.

According to the prosecution, a concerned citizen contacted PO3 Esteves and informed
him that a man going by the alias "Baho," later identified as Veridiano, was on his way
to San Pablo City to obtain illegal drugs.

PO1 Cabello and PO2 Vergara were directed by the chief of police to set up a
checkpoint in Barangay Taytay, Nagcarlan, Laguna.

Around 10:00 a.m., they discovered Veridiano inside a passenger jeepney traveling
from San Pablo, Laguna. They stopped the jeepney and asked the passengers to
disembark. The officers instructed the passengers to raise their t-shirts to check for any
concealed weapons and to empty their pockets.

Veridiano was found with a tea bag containing what appeared to be marijuana,
according to the officer. That was later on tested positive for marijuana

Veridiano was arrested and apprised of his constitutional rights. He was then brought to
the police station

RTC Decision:
Found Veridiano guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of illegal possession of
marijuana. Veridiano appealed stating that he was illegally arrested and argued that the
teabag is inadmissible as evidence for being the fruit of the poisonous tree

Court of Appeals decision:

Affirming the guilt of Veridiano. That he was caught in flagrante delicto of having
marijuana in his possession. Veridiano argues that the tea bag was seized in violation of
his right against unreasonable searches and seizures. That he was petitioner was
merely seated inside the jeepney at the time of his apprehension.
ISSUE: Whether there was a valid warrantless arrest

RULING:
None.
There are three grounds that will justify a warrantless arrest. Under Rule 113 Sec. 5 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal procedure.
Section 5. Arrest Without Warrant; When Lawful. -A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
a. When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
b. When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
c. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.

The first kind of warrantless arrest is known as an in flagrante delicto arrest. The validity
of this warrantless arrest requires compliance with the overt act test79 as explained for
a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delicto to be affected, "two elements must concur: a.
the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he [or she] has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and b. such overt
act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer."80

Failure to comply with the overt act test renders an inflagrante delicto arrest
constitutionally infirm.

Warrantless search ruling

Petitioner in this case was a mere passenger in a jeepney who did not exhibit any act
that would give police officers reasonable suspicion to believe that he had drugs in his
possession. Reasonable persons will act in a nervous manner in any check point. There
was no evidence to show that the police had basis or personal knowledge that would
reasonably allow them to infer anything suspicious.

Moreover, petitioner's silence or lack of resistance can hardly be considered as consent

to the warrantless search. Although the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures may be surrendered through a valid waiver, the prosecution must prove that
the waiver was executed with clear and convincing evidence.

In the present case, the extensive search conducted by the police officers exceeded the
allowable limits of warrantless searches. They had no probable cause to believe that the
accused violated any law except for the tip they received. They did not observe any
peculiar activity from the accused that may either arouse their suspicion or verify the tip.
Moreover, the search was flawed at its inception. The checkpoint was set up to target
the arrest of the accused.
2. Miguel vs People
GR No. 227038
Facts:
An information was filed with the RTC accusing Jeffrey Miguel (petitioner) of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, a crime punishable under Section 9165 of the
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."

On May 24, 2010, at 12:45 a.m., a Bantay Bayan operative from Brgy. Reynaldo
Bahoyo of San Antonio Village, Makati, was doing his rounds when he received a
report of a man showing off his private parts on Kaong Street! Bahoyo and fellow
Bantay Bayan operative Mark Velasquez then went to said street and saw
a intoxicated person, later identified as petitioner, urinating and exposing his private
parts while standing in front of a gate enclosing an empty lot.

When they asked where the petitioner lived, he replied, "Kaong Street." Bahoyo then
stated that he lived on the same street as the petitioner, but that the petitioner
appeared unfamiliar to him, so he requested an ID, but the petitioner failed to
produce one. Velasquez asked for an ID again, but the petitioner instead emptied his
pockets, revealing a pack of cigarettes with one stick and two pieces of rolled paper
with dried marijuana leaves.

As a result, the Bantay Bayans seized the items, took the petitioner to the police
station, and turned him and the items over to SPO3 Rafael Castillo. SPO3 Castillo
then inventoried the items and prepared a request for a qualitative examination of
the rolled paper as well as drug testing for the petitioner. Tests confirmed that it was
marijuana, and that the petitioner tested positive for methamphetamine but negative
for THC-metabolites.
RTC Ruling
o RTC found petitioner guilty for the crime charged
o They ruled that the Bahoyo and Velasques conducted a valid warrantless
arrest, as petitioner was scandalously showing his private parts at the time
of his arrest
CA Ruling
o CA affirmed conviction
o It held that search made on petitioner was valid as it was done incidental
to his arrest for exhibiting his private parts on public
o As such, said marijuana is admissible in evidence and sufficient to convict
him for the crime charged

Issue:
Whether or not the there was a valid search incidental to a lawful warrantless arrest

Ruling:
NO. The Bantay Bayan operatives are not government agents like the PNP or the NBI
in charge of law enforcement, but are civilian volunteers who act as “force multipliers” to
assist the law enforcement agencies in maintaining peace and security. The Bill of
Rights generally cannot be invoked against the acts of private individuals, however, they
may be applicable if such individuals act under the color of a state-related function
In this case, the acts of the Bantay Bayan relating to the preservation of peace and
order in their respective areas have the color of a state-related function. As such, the
Bill of Rights may be applied to the Bantay Bayan operatives who arrested and
subsequently searched petitioner.
The Bill of Rights provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and
seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding, being the
proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. The law requires that there first be a lawful arrest
first before a search can be made – this process cannot be reversed.

A lawful arrest may be made without a warrant, provided the parameters defined in
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are complied with. In
Section 5(a), or in flagrante delicto arrests, 2 elements must concur, namely: a.) The
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has committed, is
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime. b.) Such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer

Section 5(b), requires that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been
committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
accused had committed it

There must be a lawful arrest FIRST, before a search can be made, the process cannot
be reversed.

3. Maximo V. Soliven vs. Hon. Ramon P. Makasiar

G.R. No. 82585, November 14, 1988
FACTS:

President Aquino hid under her bed during a coup d' etat, according to Soliven. In this
case, Luis Beltran is one of the petitioners. The then-president, Corazon Aquino,
charged him and others with libel. Cory filed a complaint and affidavit against him and
others. The Secretary of Justice denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration on March
30, 1988, as well as their second motion for reconsideration filed on April 7, 1988. On
appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary, upheld the Secretary of
Justice's decision on May 2, 1988. On May 16, 1988, the Executive Secretary denied
the motion for reconsideration.

ISSUES:
(1) whether petitioners were denied due process when libel charges were filed
against them while the Secretary of Justice and, later, the President were still
reviewing the existence of a prima facie case.
(2) whether or not the respondent RTC judge violated Beltran's constitutional rights
by issuing a warrant for his arrest without personally questioning the complainant
and any witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause.

RULING:
The Court resolved to DISMISS the petitions after concluding that the public
respondents had committed no grave abuse of discretion amounted to excess or lack of
jurisdiction.

The first issue is that petitioner Beltran claims he has been denied due process of law.
Petitioners' contention that they were denied administrative remedies available under
the law has lost factual support, according to motions and appeals filed to the Secretary
of Justice and the President. Also, instead of filing counter-affidavits, he filed a "Motion
to Declare Proceedings Closed," effectively waiving his right to refute the complaint by
filing counter-affidavits. Due process does not require the respondent in a criminal case
to file counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed complete. All that
is required is that the respondent be allowed to file counter-affidavits if he so desires.

The second issue requires an interpretation of the constitutional provision governing the
issuance of arrest warrants, which is found in Art. III, Section 2. Petitioner Beltran
believes that the Constitution requires the judge to personally examine the complainant
and his witnesses when determining probable cause to issue arrest warrants. This is not
the correct interpretation.

The Constitution emphasizes the issuing judge's sole and personal responsibility to
satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. As a result, the judge is not required
to personally question the complainant or his witnesses. The judge must, in accordance
with established procedural doctrine, do the following:
(1) Personally evaluate the fiscal's report and supporting documents for the existence of
probable cause (and, based on that, issue an arrest warrant); or
(2) If he finds no probable cause on that basis, he may disregard the fiscal's report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to assist him in reaching a
conclusion as to the evidence of probable cause.

4. LIM, SR. VS JUDGE FELIX

GR NOS. 95954-7 (FEBRUARY 19, 1991)
Facts:
A lone assassin attacked and killed Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security
escorts, namely Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio
Fuentes, on March 17, 1989, around 7:30 a.m., near the airport road of the Masbate
Domestic Airport, located at the municipality of Masbate province of Masbate. Dante
Siblante, another security escort for Congressman Espinosa, Sr., survived the
assassination plot despite receiving a gunshot wound.

Following that, an investigation into the incident was launched.

Following that, and for the purpose of preliminary investigation, the designated
investigator, Harry O. Tantiado, TSg, of the PC Criminal Investigation Service at Camp
Bagong Ibalon Legazpi City, filed an amended complaint with the Municipal Trial Court
of Masbate accusing, among others, Vicente Lim, Sr., Masbate Mayor Susana Lim,
Jolly T. Fernandez, Florencio T. Fernandez, Jr., Nonilon A. Bagalihog, Criminal Case
No. 9211 was assigned to the case.

Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed several motions and manifestations
with the respondent court, requesting that an order be issued requiring the transmittal of
the preliminary records of the preliminary inquiry or investigation conducted by
Municipal Judge Barsaga of Masbate for the best enlightenment regarding the existence
of a probable cause or prima facie evidence, as well as the determination of the
existence of guilt, pursuant to the mandatory mandate of the constitution that no warrant
shall be issued unless the issuing magistrate shall have himself been personally
convinced of such probable cause.

In another manifestation, the Lims requested that the court hold a hearing to determine
whether there is a prima facie case against them based on documents that are
recantations of some witnesses in the preliminary investigation.

It should also be noted that the Lims presented to the respondent Judge documents of
witness recantation whose testimonies were used to establish a prima facie case
against them.

ISSUE: Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply
relying on the prosecution's certification and recommendation that a probable cause
exists.

RULING: The questioned Order of respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix of Branch 56,
Regional Trial Court of Makati dated July 5, 1990 is declared NULL and VOID and SET
ASIDE.

As held in Soliven v. Makasiar, the Judge does not have to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as a
commissioner for the taking of the evidence. However, there should be necessary
documents and a report supporting the Fiscal's bare certification. All of these should be
before the Judge.
We cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the Judge's examination
should be. Usually, this depends on the circumstances of each case. The Judge has to
exercise sound discretion; after all, the personal determination is vested in the Judge by
the Constitution. However, to be sure, the Judge must go beyond the Prosecutor's
certification and investigation report whenever necessary.

The Lims presented documents of recantations of the witnesses. Although, the general
rule is that recantations are not given much weight in the determination of a case and in
the granting of a new trial the respondent Judge before issuing his own warrants of
arrest should, at the very least, have gone over the records of the preliminary
examination conducted earlier in the light of the evidence now presented by the
concerned witnesses in view of the "political undertones" prevailing in the cases.

In making the required personal determination, a Judge is not precluded from relying on
the evidence earlier gathered by responsible officers. The extent of the reliance
depends on the circumstances of each case and is subject to the Judge's sound
discretion. However, the Judge abuses that discretion when having no evidence before
him, he issues a warrant of arrest.

Indubitably, the respondent Judge (Felix) committed a grave error when he relied solely
on the Prosecutor's certification and issued the questioned Order dated July 5, 1990
without having before him any other basis for his personal determination of the
existence of a probable cause.

5. Bache & Co. Inc. et al vs BIR Commissioner Vivencio Ruiz et al

Facts:
On 24 Feb 1970, Commissioner Vera of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to J
Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against petitioners for violation of Sec
46(a) of the NIRC, in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Secs.
53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing Revenue Examiner de Leon make and file the
application for search warrant which was attached to the letter. The next day, de Leon
and his witnesses went to CFI Rizal to obtain the search warrant. At that time J Ruiz
was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of
Court to take the depositions of De Leon and Logronio.

After the session had adjourned, J Ruiz was informed that the depositions had already
been taken. The stenographer read to him her stenographic notes; and thereafter, J
Ruiz asked respondent Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his deposition
was found to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury. J  Ruiz
signed de Leon’s application for search warrant and Logronio’s deposition. The search
was subsequently conducted.

ISSUE: Whether or not there had been a valid search warrant.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Bache on three grounds.

1.  J Ruiz failed to personally examine the complainant and his witness.
Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is necessary to
enable him to determine the existence or non-existence of a probable cause.
2.  The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense.
The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses under the
Tax Code. As ruled in Stonehill “Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed
in connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend
Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court that ‘a search warrant shall not issue
but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense.’ Not satisfied with this
qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that ‘no search warrant
shall issue for more than one specific offense.
3.  The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized.
The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are described in the Search
Warrant

“Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and
disbursements books, customers ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates
of stocks and securities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded
messages; business communications, accounting and business records; checks and
check stubs; records of bank deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign
remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970.”

The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and
of Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly
describe the things to be seized.
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the
description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow or when the
description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which the warrant officer may
be guided in making the search and seizure or when the things described are limited to
those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.

6. Josefino S. Roan vs. Honorable Romulo T. Gonzales

GR No. 71410, November 25, 1986
FACTS:
On May 10, 1984, respondent judge Romulo T. Gonzales issued a search warrant. PC
Capt. Mauro Quillosa personally filed the application for the aforementioned search
warrant. Along with Quillosa, two witnesses, Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida,
testified before the respondent judge, presenting their respective affidavits taken by
police investigator Pat. Lining, Josue V. Because the application had not yet been
subscribed and sworn to, the respondent Judge proceeded to question Quillosa on the
contents of the application to determine whether he knew and understood the same.
Quillosa then subscribed to and swore the said application in front of respondent judge.

Roan's home was searched two days after the search warrant was issued. The search
was carried out by military authorities. Despite the fact that none of the items listed in
the warrant were discovered, the officers conducting the search discovered one Colt
Magnum revolver and 18 live bullets, which they confiscated. The aforementioned items
served as the foundation for the petitioner's charge of illegal possession of firearms.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the search warrant should be revoked because it violates the privacy of
one person's home.

RULING:

YES. In order to be valid, a search warrant must be supported by probable cause, which
is determined by the judge or another authorized officer after examining the complainant
and any witnesses he may produce. To prevent arbitrary and indiscriminate use of the
warrant, the location to be searched and the items to be seized must be specifically
described. According to Judge Escolin in Burgos v. Chief of Staff, probable cause refers
to "such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched." Probable cause
must refer to only one specific offense.

7 Alvarez vs. The Court of First Instance

GR No. L-45358
FACTS:
On June 3, 1936, the chief of the Anti-Usury Board's secret service went to respondent
Judge, alleging that petitioner is keeping documents, receipts, lists, chits, and other
papers used in connection with his activities as a money lender charging usurious rates
of interest in violation of the law in his house in Infanta, Tayabas.
In his oath, the chief of the secret service did not swear to the truth of his statements
based on his knowledge of the facts, but rather on information obtained from a reliable
source. The judge issued the search warrant based on the questioned affidavit, ordering
the search of the petitioner's house at any time of day or night, the seizure of the books
and documents, and their immediate delivery to the respondent Judge.
Using the warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered the petitioner's store
and residence at 7 p.m. and seized and took possession of various articles belonging to
the petitioner.
Petitioner requests that the warrant issued by CFI Tayabas ordering the search of his
residence and the seizure, at any time of day or night, of certain accounting books,
documents, and papers belonging to him in his residence in Infanta, Tayabas, as well
as the order of a later date authorizing the agents of the Anti-Usury board to retain the
articles seized, be declared illegal and set aside, and that all the articles in question be
returned to him.

ISSUE
What is the nature of searches and seizures as contemplated in the law?

RULING:
A search warrant is a written order issued in the name of the people of the Philippines,
signed by a judge or justice of the peace, and directed to a peace officer, commanding
him to search for personal property and bring it before the court.
Of all a citizen's rights, few are more important or essential to his peace and happiness
than the right to personal security, which entails the exemption of his private affairs,
books, and papers from the inspection and scrutiny of others.
While the power to search and seize is necessary for the public good, it must be
exercised and the law must be enforced without infringing on citizens' constitutional
rights.
Because protecting the citizen and upholding his constitutional rights is one of the
highest duties and privileges of the court, these constitutional guarantees should be
given a liberal or strict construction in favor of the individual, to prevent sneaky
encroachment on, or gradual depreciation on, the rights secured by them. Because this
is a serious proceeding, it is the general rule that statutes authorizing searches and
seizures, or search warrants, must be strictly construed.
Unreasonable searches and seizures are a threat against which the constitutional
guarantee provides complete protection. The term "unreasonable search and seizure" is
not defined in the Constitution or in General Orders No. 58, and it is said to have no
fixed, absolute, or unchangeable meaning, despite being defined in general language.
All illegal searches and seizures are unreasonable, whereas all lawful searches and
seizures are reasonable. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or
seizure in any given case is purely a judicial question, which can be determined by
considering the circumstances involved.
8 MICROSOFT CORPORATION and LOTUS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
petitioners,
vs.
MAXICORP, INC., respondent.
G.R. No. 140946             September 13, 2004

FACTS:

This case involves the issuance of search warrant to the respondent MAXICORP Inc for
alleged violation of Section 29 of Intellectual Property and Article 189 of the RPC (unfair
competition).
Armed with the search warrants, NBI agents conducted a search of Maxicorp’s
premises and seized property fitting the description stated in the search warrants.

Maxicorp filed a motion to quash the search warrants alleging that there was no
probable cause for their issuance and that the warrants are in the form of "general
warrants." Where the RTC denied the motion and at the same time denied their motion
for reconsideration.

According to RTC they’ve found a probable cause to issue such warrant after examining
the NBI agent and the computer technician who visited Maxicorp.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not there’s a probable cause on the part of CA to quash the search
warrants issued by RTC
2. Whether or not respondent violated the intellectual property right of the petitioner.

RULING:

According to the SC the offense charged against Maxicorp is copyright infringement

under Section 29 of PD 49 and unfair competition under Article 189 of the RPC. To
support these charges, petitioners presented the testimonies of NBI Agent Samiano,
computer technician Pante, and Sacriz, a civilian. The offenses that petitioners charged
Maxicorp contemplate several overt acts. The sale of counterfeit products is but one of
these acts. Both NBI Agent Samiano and Sacriz related to the RTC how they personally
saw Maxicorp commit acts of infringement and unfair competition.

Probable cause means "such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances as will
warrant a cautious man in the belief that his action and the means taken in prosecuting
it are legally just and proper. Thus, probable cause for a search warrant requires such
facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and the objects sought in connection with that offense are
in the place to be searched.
The testimonies of these two witnesses, coupled with the object and documentary
evidence they presented, are sufficient to establish the existence of probable cause.
From what they have witnessed, there is reason to believe that Maxicorp engaged in
copyright infringement and unfair competition to the prejudice of petitioners. Both NBI
Agent Samiano and Sacriz were clear and insistent that the counterfeit software were
not only displayed and sold within Maxicorp’s premises, they were also produced,
packaged and in some cases, installed there.

The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and
standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. As
implied by the words themselves, "probable cause" is concerned with probability, not
absolute or even moral certainty. The prosecution need not present at this stage proof
beyond reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent
man, not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full-blown trial.
No law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. No
formula or fixed rule for its determination exists. Probable cause is determined in the
light of conditions obtaining in a given situation.

9. People of the Philippines v. Modesto Tee

FACTS:
Modesto Tee is a Baguio City businessman. He asked Danilo Abratique, a taxi driver, to
assist him in transporting the alleged cigarettes. Abratique then led Tee to a building in
Bakakeng where the cigarettes were stored. When the cigarettes turned out to be
marijuana, the building's owner asked them to leave.
Abratique then drove Tee to La Trinidad "to buy strawberries," but they ended up going
to Sablan and loading marijuana into the taxi. They went to Abreau's house in Green
Valley, Abratique's relative. Tee rented a room and kept marijuana in it. Abreau was
bothered by the presence of marijuana in her home, so she confided in her daughter.
Her daughter then informed NBI Agent Fianza of the situation.

Based on this information, the NBI and the PNP set up a stakeout at Abreau's house,
where Tee was expected to arrive. He, however, did not. The authorities asked Abreau
if they could enter Tee's room, fearing that the operation would go wrong. Abreau
agreed. There were thirteen (13) sacks of marijuana (336.96 kg) in the room.

Before Judge Reyes, NBI Agent Lising requested a search warrant, and Abratique
testified. Judge Reyes issued the warrant after questioning Abratique. Mr. Tee was
served it at his home in Green Valley. Twenty-six (26) marijuana boxes were discovered
(591.81 kg). The items were marijuana, according to a lab test.

Tee was charged with two separate offenses. He filed a motion to vacate the search
warrant, claiming that it was too broad. The motion was denied because the warrant
only stated "undetermined amount of marijuana." He refused to enter a plea during his
arraignment. The court entered a not guilty plea on his behalf.

In the first case, involving the 591.81 kg of drugs, he was found guilty and sentenced to
death. On the second count, he was acquitted. The RTC reasoned that the 336.96 kg of
marijuana was illegally seized and thus could not be admitted as evidence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the search warrant is valid

RULING
The warrant is in effect.
The purpose of specifically describing what will be searched and seized is to allow
searching officers to identify the items to be searched and seized. This keeps them from
engaging in illegal searches and seizures. There is no need for technical rigor.
"Undetermined amount of marijuana" is a specific enough description. The items to be
searched and seized were easily identified by the officers. Furthermore, determining the
exact amount of marijuana beforehand was impossible.

10.LEON TAMBASEN
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 2ND ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR
GLORIA LASTIMOSA MARCOS and HON. CICERO U. QUERUBIN in his capacity
as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 44,
Bacolod City,
G.R. No. 89103 July 14, 1995

FACTS:
On August 31, 1988, P/Sgt. Flumar Natuel applied to the MTCC for a search warrant,
alleging that he received information that petitioner had in his possession at his home
"M-16 Armalite Rifles (Mags & Ammos), Hand Grenades,.45 Cal. Pistols (Mags &
Ammos), Dynamite Sticks, and Subversive Documents," which articles were "used or
intended to be used" for illegal purposes. On the same day, the MTCC granted the
application by issuing Search Warrant No. 365, allowing the seizure of the items
specified in the application.

At approximately 6:30 p.m. On September 9, 1988, a police team searched petitioner's

home and seized the following items: two (2) envelopes containing cash totaling
P14,000.00, one (1) handset with antennae (sic), one (1) YAESU FM Transceiver FT
23R w/Antenae (sic), one (1) ALINCO ELH 230D Base, one (1) DC Regulator Supply
150 V. 13.8 V 12 AMP — 128 VAC, one (1) brown Academy

On September 19, 1988, the MTCC issued an order directing Sgt. Natuel to return the
search warrant in response to petitioner's urgent motion for the return of the seized
articles. Sgt. Natuel filed a report with the court the next day. Not viewing the report as a
"return in contemplation of law," petitioner filed a second motion requesting that Sgt.
Natuel submit a complete and verified inventory of the seized items. Following that, Sgt.
Natuel revealed that, despite being the applicant for the issuance of the search warrant,
he was not present when it was served.

On October 7, 1988, petitioner filed a motion with the MTCC, requesting that the search
and seizure be declared illegal and the seized items be returned to him.
The MTCC issued an order on December 23, 1988, directing Lt. Col. Torres to return
the seized funds to petitioner. According to the court, any seizure should be limited to
the specific items covered by the search warrant when it is carried out. It stated that the
funds could not be considered "subversive documents" because they were not stolen or
the result of gambling.

Three months later, the Solicitor General filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC,
Branch 44, Bacolod City, seeking the annulment of the MTCC's order (Civil Case No.
5331). The petition claimed that even if the money seizure was legal, petitioner was not
entitled to its return, citing Alih v. Castro, 151 SCRA 279 (1987) and Roan v. Gonzales,
145 SCRA 687 (1987). (1986). In those cases, the Court ruled that the articles should
remain in custodia legis pending a determination of the legality of the seizure.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC, Branch 44 abused its discretion in ordering that the money
seized from petitioner's house, specifically P14,000.00, be retained and held in custodia
legis.

RULING:
YES. The search warrant appears to be in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which prohibits the issuance of a search warrant for more than
one specific offense. Search Warrant No. 365's caption reflects a violation of two special
laws: P.D. R.A. No. 1866 for unlawful possession of firearms, ammunition, and
explosives; and R.A. The Anti-Subversion Law, No. 1700. As a result, Search Warrant
No. 365 was a "scatter-shot warrant" that was completely null and void.

Furthermore, by seizing items not described in the search warrant, the police went
beyond the scope of their authority under the search warrant. A search warrant must
specifically describe the items to be seized, according to Section 2, Article III of the
1987 Constitution. "The obvious purpose and intent of the requirement is to limit the
things to be seized to those, and only those, specifically described in the search warrant
— to leave officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they should
seize, in order to prevent unreasonable searches and seizures and abuses."

The same constitutional provision aims to prevent violations of security in person and
property, as well as unlawful invasions of the sanctity of the home, and to provide
recourse when such usurpations are attempted. Clearly, the money that was not
mentioned in the search warrant had been illegally taken from the petitioner. The fact
that the members of the police team were carrying out their duty of pursuing
subversives is insufficient justification for the illegal seizure. The presumption juris
tantum of regularity in the performance of official duties cannot be used to override an
individual's constitutionally protected rights. Although the power to search and seize is
founded on public welfare, such power must be exercised and the law must be enforced
without violating citizens' constitutional rights.

The approval of the court that issued the search warrant is required for the retention of
the money seized by the police officers (People v. Gesmundo, 219 SCRA 743 [1993]).
In the same way, only the court that issued the search warrant has the authority to order
their release (Temple v. Dela Cruz, 60 SCRA 295 [1974]; Pagkalinawan v. Gomez, 21
SCRA 1275 [1967]).

Section 3(2) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution states that evidence obtained in
violation of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.

The trial court ordered the information in Criminal Case No. 8517, in which petitioner
was the sole accused, to be quashed, and the prosecution's motion for reconsideration
of the quashal order was denied. Petitioner was dropped as a respondent in BC I.S.
Case No. 88-1239, which was being investigated by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Marcos. As a result, there appears to be no criminal prosecution that can justify keeping
the seized articles in custodia legis.

A subsequent legal development provided yet another reason for the return of all seized
articles to him: R.A. R.A. No. 1700, the Anti-Subversion Law, was repealed. No. 7636,
and thus the crimes defined in the repealed law are no longer in effect.

11. PEOPLE V. VELOSO

FACTS:
The accused, Jose M. Veloso, a member of the House of Representatives, was found
guilty of the crime of resisting authority agents in violation of Penal Code Art. 252 by the
CFI of Manila.

The Parliamentary Club – managed by the accused – used a building at No. 124 Calle
Arzobispo, City of Manila. The Manila police had reliable information that the so-called
Parliamentary Club was nothing more than a gambling den. J.F., the gambling squad's
leader, This was confirmed by Townsend.

The secret service's Detective Andres Geronimo obtained a search warrant, and the
police raided the Parliamentary Club, entering through a window and breaking the outer
doors in the process because the premises' doors were barred.

Nearly 50 people, including Veloso, were apprehended once they entered the premises.
Even after the search warrant was shown to him, Veloso refused to submit to the
search, claiming that he was Representative Velasco, not John Doe. Townsend
demanded that Veloso show him the game's evidence because his pocket was bulging,
as if it contained gambling utensils. After about 5 minutes of heated debate, Veloso was
still adamant about not cooperating with the search.

Finally, the officers' patience had run its course. As a result, a police officer attempted to
arrest Veloso only to be met with resistance. Veloso bit the police officer on the right
forearm and then struck him in another part of the body, injuring him severely. Veloso
was eventually laid down on the floor thanks to the combined efforts of Townsend and
the aforementioned policeman, and his gambling utilities were taken from his pockets. It
also took three officers to load him into the patrol vehicle.

Except for Veloso, who was found guilty of operating a gambling house, all of those
apprehended were eventually acquitted by the trial court due to a lack of proof.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the search warrant and Veloso's arrest were valid.

RULING: YES! The Supreme Court ruled that the Rules of Court provide that a search
warrant shall not be issued unless there is probable cause and an application supported
by oath, specifically describing the location to be searched and the person or thing to be
seized.

After a judge or justice has examined on oath the complainant and any witnesses he
may produce, and has taken their disposition in writing; after the judge or justice is
satisfied of the existence of the facts upon which the application is based, or that there
is probable cause to believe that they exist; the judge or justice must issue the warrant.
The affidavit for the search warrant, as well as the search warrant itself, describe the
building to be searched as "the building No.124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila,
Philippine Islands," which was undeniably a sufficient designation of the premises to be
searched. The prevailing rule is that a description of the location to be searched is
sufficient if the officer with the warrant can ascertain and identify the location with
reasonable effort.

It should be noted that the building was intended to be used for club purposes. It was
NOT the Velasco family's home or place of abode, which the law carefully protects in all
of its sanctity. It was a partially public club where, unlike at home, there would frequently
be varying occupancy, a number of John Does and Richard Roes whose names the
police would not know.

12 YOUSEF AL-GHOUL, v. CA
[G.R. No. 126859.  September 4, 2001]
FACTS:
Judge Geronimo S. Mangay, presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, Branch 125, Kalookan City, issued search warrants 54-95[3]
and 55-95[4] on March 31, 1995, for the search and seizure of certain items in
Apartment No. 2 at 154 Obiniana Compound, Deparo Road, Kalookan City.

Police searched Apartment No. 8 in the same compound on April 1, 1995, and
discovered one (1) .45 caliber pistol. Automatic weapons and ammunition were
discovered in Apartment #2.

The firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other incendiary devices seized at the
apartments were listed on the receipt, which was signed by SPO2 Melanio de la Cruz.
Petitioners were charged in Kalookan City Regional Trial Court, Branch 123, in criminal
cases docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. C-48666-67, accusing them of illegal
possession of firearms, ammunition, and explosives in violation of Presidential Decree
No. 1866. Petitioners were arrested and detained as a result.
On February 7, 1996, at the bail hearing, the RTC "admitted all exhibits being offered for
whatever purpose that they may be worth" after the prosecution had finished presenting
its evidence, despite the petitioners' objections to the admissibility of said evidence.

Petitioners claim that the search and seizure orders violated Sections 2 and 3 of the Bill
of Rights, as well as Section 3 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure,
because the location searched and the items seized were not specifically described.
They claim that the two-witness requirement of Rule 126, was violated when only one
witness signed the receipt for the properties seized during the search and that witness
was not called to testify at the trial. Petitioners also claim that during cross-examination
of prosecution witnesses, the defense rebutted the presumption of regularity of the
search warrant's execution. Petitioners contend that the respondent court overlooked
the fact that the items seized were not turned over to the police evidence custodian as
required by Section 18 of Department of Justice Circular No. 61 dated September 21,
1993. Finally, they object to the lower court's finding that petitioners were in possession
of the items allegedly confiscated from them.

ISSUE:
The question now is whether the respondent court erred and gravely abused its
discretion when it ruled that the search and seizure orders in question were valid and
the objects seized admissible in evidence.

RULING:
According to the decision in PICOP v. Asuncion, the location of the search
cannot be changed, enlarged, or amplified by the police. Police officers may not be
restrained from carrying out their duties with zeal, but they must exercise caution to
ensure that constitutional and legal safeguards are not violated. The only practical way
to enforce the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures is to
exclude evidence obtained illegally. As a result, we are forced to declare that the search
of Apartment No. 8 was unlawful, and the.45 caliber pistol taken there is inadmissible in
evidence against petitioners.

The search at Apartment No. 2, on the other hand, could not be faulted in the same
way. Apartment No. 2 was specifically mentioned in the search warrants. The search
was carried out in the presence of the building's occupants, herein petitioners, in
accordance with Section 7 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Petitioners claim that the descriptions of the objects to be seized under the warrants are
vague. The fact that the items seized during the search of Apartment No. 2 are of the
same kind and nature as those enumerated in the aforementioned search warrant is
beyond dispute. The items seized from Apartment No. 2 were specifically described in
the warrants in question. The nature of the items ordered to be seized, in our opinion,
did not necessitate a technical description. Furthermore, the law does not require that
the items to be seized be described in such precise and minute detail that there is no
room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities; otherwise, it would be nearly
impossible for the applicants to obtain a search warrant because they would not know
exactly what they are looking for. However, once described, the articles subject to the
search and seizure do not need to be so invariant as to necessitate absolute
concordance, in our opinion, between those seized and those described in the warrant.
Significant similarity between those articles described as a class or species would
suffice.

Concerning the two-witness requirement under Section 10, Rule 126 of the Revised
Rules of Court, petitioners contend that the rule was broken because only one witness
signed the receipt for the seized properties. Let us reprint the relevant section for clarity:

SEC. 10. Receipt for the property seized.— The officer seizing property under the
warrant must provide a detailed receipt to the lawful occupant of the premises in whose
presence the search and seizure were made, or in the absence of such occupant, must
leave a receipt in the presence of at least two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion
residing in the same locality.

Clearly, the two-witness rule applies only when the lawful occupants of the premises
searched are not present. Petitioners were present when the police conducted the
search and seizure operation at Apartment No. 2 in the case at hand. Furthermore,
petitioner Nabeel Al-Riyami y Nasser admitted to being an actual occupant/resident of
Apartment No. 2. As a result, we find no violation of Section 10, Rule 126 of the Revised
Rules of Court here.

Petitioners argue that they cannot be charged with violating P.D. 1866 because the
confiscated items were not actually taken from their possession. This argument,
however, cannot succeed in light of the established rule that actual possession of
firearms and ammunition is not required for prosecution under P.D. 1866 is the number.
We clarified in People v. Dela Rosa, 284 SCRA 158, 168-169 (1998) that the type of
possession punishable under P.D. The year 1866 is one in which the accused
physically or constructively possessed a firearm with animus possidendi, or the intent to
possess said firearm. Whether or not the evidence would reveal all of the components
of P.D. In this case, 1866 is a completely different story.

13 Uy vs. BIR
G.R. No. 129651
October 20, 2000

FACTS:
On September 30, 1993, Rodrigo Abos, a former Unifish Packaging Corporation (UPC)
employee, reported to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) that UPC and Uy Chin Ho
alias Frank Uy, UPC's manager, were engaging in activities that violated the National
Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). On October 1, 1993, the BIR applied for and was
granted a search warrant before the RTC of Cebu. On the same day, a second warrant
was issued with nearly identical contents to the first warrant but only one page. These
warrants were issued in connection with Uy's alleged violation of Section 253. On the
same day, however, a third warrant was issued for Uy's alleged violation of Section 238
in relation to Section 263. On the basis of these warrants, BIR agents accompanied by
PNP members searched the UPC's premises on October 2, 1993. They seized the
items specified in the warrant. Labaria filed a return of said search with the RTC of
Cebu. Before the RTC, Uy and UPC filed a motion to quash the warrants. The motion
was turned down. A petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals was also denied
because it was not the proper remedy.

ISSUE:  Whether the search warrant issued was valid.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. It upheld the search warrant's validity
and went over each and every flaw raised by the petitioners.

A search warrant must strictly adhere to the requirements of the constitution and
statutes. One of them is that the warrant must specifically describe the location to be
searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. Although the Court noted
inconsistencies in the descriptions of the places to be searched as indicated on the
warrants, it ruled that the description of the places to be searched is sufficient if the
officers enforcing the warrant can ascertain and identify the place intended and
distinguish it from other places in the community with reasonable effort. It was not
established that the enforcing officers had any difficulty locating the petitioner
corporation's premises; thus, inconsistency in identifying the city where the premises to
be searched are located is not a flaw that would render the warrant invalid in this case.

The warrants were also inconsistent in terms of who should be searched—one warrant
was only directed at Uy, while the other was directed at Uy and UPC. The Court, on the
other hand, ruled that where the warrant was issued not for a search of the persons
occupying the premises, but only for a search of the premises occupied by them, the
search could not be declared unlawful or in violation of the constitutional rights of the
owner or occupants of the premises due to inconsistencies in stating their names.
Furthermore, the Court stated that where the obvious intent of issuing another warrant
was to supersede an earlier warrant, the latter should be deemed revoked by the
former.
Furthermore, the judge's use of generic terms did not clearly define the item to be
seized. In general, the use of a generic term or description in a warrant is permissible
only when a more specific description of the items to be seized is unavailable. However,
where the nature of the goods to be seized requires a more general description, a
technical description is not required, as this would result in no warrant being issued. The
Solicitor General correctly argued that the terms "unregistered delivery receipts" and
"unregistered purchase and sales invoices" do not need to be specified because it is
impossible to do so precisely because they are unregistered.

Lastly, a general description of most of the documents listed in the warrants does not
render the entire warrant void—the search warrant is severable, and those items not
specifically described may be cut off without destroying the entire warrant. As a result,
the warrants remain valid insofar as they allow for the search and seizure of
"unregistered delivery receipts" and "unregistered purchase and sales invoices."

14 GO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Petitioner nearly collided with another vehicle while driving in the wrong direction on a
one-way street. Following that, the petitioner got out of his car, shot the driver of the
other vehicle, and drove away. An eyewitness to the incident was able to take down
petitioner's license plate number and report it to police, who then ordered a manhunt for
petitioner. Six days after the shooting, the petitioner went to the police station,
accompanied by two lawyers, and was detained. As a result, a criminal charge was filed
against him. After the petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case in the lower
court, setting and starting the trial without conducting a preliminary investigation. The
prosecutor contends that because bail has been posted, the petitioner has waived his
right to a preliminary investigation, and that such a situation, in which the petitioner was
lawfully arrested without a warrant, falls under Sections 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule
112 of The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which govern the rules and procedures
governing lawful warrantless arrests. In his petition for certiorari, the petitioner criticizes
such procedure and actions and requests a preliminary investigation.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the warrantless arrest of the petitioner was legal.

(2) Whether or not the petitioner effectively waived his right to a preliminary
investigation.

RULING:
Petitioner and prosecutor err in relying on Umil v. Ramos, in which the Court upheld
warrantless arrests as valid if carried out within 1 to 14 days of the commission of the
offenses, which constituted "continuing crimes," i.e. subversion, membership in an
outlawed organization, and so on. According to Section 5, Rule 113, there was no lawful
warrantless arrest. This is due to the fact that the arresting officers were not present at
the time of the incident, so they had no personal knowledge of the incident, and their
information about the petitioner came from other sources. Furthermore, Rule 112
(Section 7) is inapplicable.

Petitioner was not arrested at all because, when he entered the police station, he made
no expression of surrender or statement that he was or was not guilty of any crime. A
preliminary investigation should have been scheduled when a complaint was filed with
the prosecutor to determine probable cause. Because the prosecutor made a
substantive error, the petitioner is entitled to a preliminary investigation, which must be
included in a criminal charge if it is required to appear therein. Petition granted,
prosecutor ordered to conduct preliminary investigation, criminal case trial postponed
pending preliminary investigation results, petitioner ordered released upon posting bail
bond

15 ROBIN CARIÑO PADILLA “ROBINHOOD PADILLA”, vs. COURT OF APPEALS

and PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 121917 March 12, 1997
FACTS:
Enrique Manarang and his colleague Danny Perez (CRUZ) noticed a vehicle, a
Mitsubishi Pajero, speeding down the highway. Immediately after the vehicle passed,
they heard a screeching sound produced by the sudden and hard braking of a vehicle
speeding down the highway, followed by the sickening sound of the vehicle hitting
something. Manarang made the decision to report the incident to the PNP. By the time
Manarang finished the call, the vehicle had begun to leave the scene of the accident,
heading north. Manarang went to the scene of the accident and discovered that the
vehicle had hit someone.

He asked Cruz to watch over the victim while he returned to the restaurant, rode his
motorcycle, and chased the vehicle. During the chase, he called the Viper again over
the radio, reporting that a vehicle heading north with the license plate PMA 777 had
been involved in a hit-and-run accident. SPO2 Miranda approached the vehicle with the
license plate PMA 777 and told the driver to get out. The driver was identified as Robin
C. Padilla, the appellant in this case. Appellant was dressed in a short leather jacket
that revealed a gun tucked on the left side of his waist when he alighted with both hands
raised. SPO2 Borja made the decision to seize the gun. SPO2 Borja informed appellant
about the hit-and-run incident after disarming him, which appellant angrily denied.

Appellant, on the other hand, arrogantly denied his wrongdoing and instead played with
the crowd by holding their hands with one hand and pointing to SPO3 Borja with his
right hand, saying "iyan, kinuha ang baril ko." His motion revealed a long magazine of
an armalite rifle tucked in appellant's back right pocket. When SPO2 Mercado noticed
this, he confiscated the magazine from the appellant. SPO2 Mercado noticed a baby
armalite rifle lying horizontally in front of the driver's seat. It was semi-automatic and had
a long magazine full of live bullets. He asked appellant for the papers covering the rifle,
and appellant responded angrily that they were at his house. SPO2 Mercado changed
the grounds for the appellant's arrest to include illegal possession of firearms.

SPO2 Mercado then read the appellant's constitutional rights to him. The police officers
took appellant to the Traffic Division, where he voluntarily surrendered a third firearm, a
pietro berreta pistol. Appellant also handed over a black bag containing two more long
magazines and one short magazine. During the investigation, appellant admitted to
having the firearms and claiming to have used them for shooting. He was unable to
produce any carry permit or memorandum receipt for the three firearms.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid arrest, search and seizure.

RULING:
Warrantless arrests are permitted in the following situations: Sec. 5. When lawful, arrest
without a warrant. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person: a.) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; b.) When an offense has in fact just
been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and c.) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.

The Court recognizes police authority to conduct the forcible stop because they had
more than a "reasonable and articulable" suspicion that the vehicle's occupant was
involved in criminal activity. Furthermore, when caught in flagrante delicto with an
unlicensed firearm and ammunition, petitioner's warrantless arrest was proper because
he was committing another offense (illegal possession of firearm and ammunition) and
this time in the presence of a peace officer.

WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE: The five (5) well-established instances

when a warrantless search and seizure of property is valid are as follows:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under
Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing
jurisprudence;
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view", the elements of which are:
(a). a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless
arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of
their official duties;
(b). the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police
who had the right to be where they are;
(c). the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d). "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without
further search.
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government,
the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy
especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly
reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search; and
5. Customs search

In accordance with the respondent court's observation, it appears that the authorities
discovered petitioner's firearms and ammunition without even conducting an active
search, which, as is commonly understood, is a prying into hidden places for that which
is concealed.

The seizure of the Smith & Wesson revolver and an M-16 rifle magazine was justified
because they were in "plain view" of the police officers who inadvertently discovered the
revolver and magazine tucked in petitioner's waist and back pocket when he raised his
hands after alighting from his Pajero. The same justification applies to the seizure of the
M-16 armalite rifle, which was immediately apparent to the cops when they took a
casual glance at the Pajero and noticed the rifle lying horizontally near the driver's seat.
Thus, it has been held that: (W)hen the police officers happen to discover a criminal
offense being committed by any person while pursuing an illegal action or in the
commission of a criminal offense, they are not precluded from performing their duties as
police officers for the apprehension of the guilty person and the taking of the corpus
delicti. Objects whose possession is illegal under the law that are inadvertently
discovered in plain view are subject to seizure even without a warrant.

Petitioner voluntarily surrendered the Berreta pistol and a black bag containing various
magazines to the police. This latter gesture of petitioner indicated a waiver of his right to
challenge the alleged search and seizure, and that his failure to quash the information
barred him from challenging any alleged flaw. POSSESSION OF FIREARMS IS
ILLEGAL.
Two conditions must be met in crimes involving the illegal possession of a firearm:
(1) the presence of the subject firearm; and
(2) the fact that the accused, who owned or possessed the firearm, lacked the
necessary license or permit to possess.

16 Espano vs CA

FACTS
Pat, a police officer Wilfredo Aquino, Simplicio Rivera, and Erlindo Lum boy of
the Western Police District's Narcotics Division went to Zamora and Pandacan Streets
in Manila to confirm reports of drug pushing in the area. They saw the petitioner selling
"something" to another person. After the alleged buyer had left, they approached the
petitioner, identified themselves as cops, and frisked him. The search yielded two
plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana. When asked if he had any more marijuana, he
replied that he had more in his house. The cops went to his house and discovered ten
more cellophane tea bags of marijuana. The petitioner was charged with illegal drug
possession. The accused was found guilty of violating Section 8, Article II, in relation to
Section 2 (e-L) (I) of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended by Batas Pam bansa Blg. 179.

ISSUES
Whether the evidence seized was admissible as evidence against the accused?

RULING:
Even if the search was conducted without a warrant, the marijuana seized from
Espano during the frisking is admissible as evidence.
Rule 113 Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court states that a peace officer or a private
person may arrest a person without a warrant if the person to be arrested has
committed, is currently committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in his
presence.
The arrest of the petitioner falls squarely under the aforementioned rule. He was
apprehended in flagrante as a result of a buy-bust operation carried out by police
officers in response to information received about the illegal trade of drugs in the area of
Zamora and Pandacan Streets in Manila. The officer observed the petitioner handing
something over to an alleged buyer. They searched him after the buyer left and
discovered two cellophanes of marijuana. As the fruits of the crime, his arrest was legal,
and the two cellophane bags of marijuana seized were admissible in evidence.
However, the marijuana discovered at the petitioner's residence is inadmissible in
evidence. The 1987 Constitution guarantees freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures in Article III, Section 2, which states that "the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable," and "no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation."

A warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest for dangerous weapons or

anything that could be used as evidence of the commission of an offense is an
exception to the said rule. 11 It may extend beyond the arrestee's person to include the
premises or surroundings under his direct control. In this case, the marijuana bags
seized at Espano's house following his arrest on Pandacan and Zamo ra Streets do not
fall within the aforementioned exceptions.
17 People v. Mengote
G.R. No. 87059,
June 22, 1992

FACTS:
Accused-appellant Rogelio Mengote was convicted of illegal possession of firearms.
because of the stolen pistol found on him during his warrantless arrest. On August 8,
1987, the Western Police District (WPD) received a call from an informant reporting
three suspicious-looking people near the intersection of Juan Luna and North Bay
Boulevard in Tondo, Manila.

The patrolmen were Rolando Mercado and Alberto Juan, who were sent to the
location in plain clothes. They saw two men (Accused-appellant and Nicanor
Morellos). The accused-appellant was found with a.38 caliber Smith & Wesson
(serial # Serial No. 8720-T) revolver loaded with six live bullets, and Nicanor
Morellos was found with a fan knife in his front right pocket.
The witness, Rigoberto Danganan, identified the weapon as a stolen item from a
previous robbery on his property on June 13, 1987.

ISSUES:
Whether the warrantless arrest of Rogelio Mengote valid.

RULING:
The Court ruled that the warrantless arrest was unlawful because it was not able to
meet the requirements as per Sec. 5, Rule 113, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
as follows:
1) When, in his present, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit and offense
2) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has probable cause
to believe based on personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it
3) When the person is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
The warrantless arrest failed to meet the three requirements because:
1) The mere act of "looking side to side" and holding one's abdomen cannot be
evidence that a person is committing, committing, or attempting to commit an
offense.
2) The apprehending officers had no probable cause or personal knowledge of the
alleged "offense" because all they had was hearsay information from a caller
about a crime that had yet to be committed (they were said to be suspicious-
looking). Furthermore, the robbery of Danganan's house was only discovered by
the police AFTER he had been searched and the investigation revealed that it
was not owned by the accused.
3) The accused-appellant was clearly not a prisoner.
18 Caballes vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 136292, 373 SCRA 221 , January 15, 2002 

FACTS:
During a routine patrol in a Barangay in Laguna, Sgt. Victorino Noceja and
Pat. Alex de Castro noticed a passenger jeep unusually covered in "kakawati" leaves.
The two police officers stopped the jeep because they suspected it was carrying
smuggled goods.

The police officers checked the cargo with appellant's alleged consent and
discovered bundles of galvanized conductor wires solely owned by National Power
Corporation (NPC). Following that, the appellant and the vehicle containing the high-
voltage wires were taken to the Pagsanjan Police Station. Danilo Cabale photographed
the appellant and the jeep loaded with wires, which he then turned over to the
Pagsanjan, Laguna Police Station Commander. Appellant was imprisoned in the
Municipal jail for 7 days.

Appellant's defense included denial and alibi. As a result, the court a quo issued
a decision finding the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of Theft.
The Court of Appeals upheld the conviction judgment on appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the police officers' warrantless search and seizure was valid, as
well as the admissibility of the evidence obtained as a result of it.

RULING:
Our Constitution enshrines the inalienable right of the people to be secure in their
persons and properties against unreasonable searches and seizures, as defined in
Section 2, Article III.

The exclusionary rule in Section 3(2) of Article III of the Constitution prohibits the
admission of evidence obtained in violation of such right.
The constitutional prohibition on warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute, but
allows for the following exceptions: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing
jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of moving vehicles; (4)
consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry
search); and (7) exigent and emergent searches.

In cases where a warrant is required, the steps outlined in the Constitution and
reiterated in the Rules of Court must be followed. In exceptional cases where a warrant
is not required to carry out a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be
carried out without a warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or
seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the
circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or
absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was carried
out, the place or location of the search and seizure
19 Manalili vs CA

Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking reversal of the CA's decision affirming the TC's
decision convicting Manalili of illegal possession of a controlled substance in violation of
RA 6425.
Based on information that drug addicts were roaming around the area, police operatives
Espiritu, Lumabas, and driver Enriquez conducted surveillance along the front of
Kalookan Cemetery, saw a man who appeared to be high on drugs, and introduced
themselves as policemen. When they asked what the man was holding in his hand, the
man held out his wallet and allowed Espiritu to examine it, where he discovered what he
suspected to be crushed mj leaves. Manalili was identified as the man who was brought
to the Anti-Narcotics Unit. The substance discovered in Manalili's wallet was sent to the
NBI Forensic Chemistry Section, where it was identified as MJ

According to Manalili's version of events, he was riding in a tricycle early in the

afternoon when three police officers stopped it and informed them of the suspected
possession of marijuana. The officers then searched both Manalili and the driver and,
finding nothing illegal on their persons, let the driver go but took Manalili to the police
station. Manalili saw a neighbor on the way to the station who he signaled to follow
them, and when he was searched again in the station, he was asked to strip his pants,
where they found nothing illegal. The neighbor then asked the cops to let Manalili go
because they hadn't found anything illegal on his person, but Manalili was put in a cell
and taken to a fiscal later that day, where he was told not to say anything despite the
fact that the cops had not found mj on his person. The tricycle driver and neighbor
testified in court about how the two searches turned up nothing illegal on Manalili's
person.

Issues:
1. Wher evidence seized during a stop-and-frisk is admissible.

Ruling:
In Terry vs. Ohio, a stop-and-frisk was defined as a police officer's right to stop a citizen
on the street, question him, and pat him down for weapons: Where a police officer
observes unusual behavior that leads him to reasonably conclude, based on his
experience, that criminal activity is afoot and that the people with whom he is dealing
may be armed and presently dangerous, where he identifies himself as a police officer
and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter
serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety. Under the Fourth
Amendment, such a search is reasonable, and any weapons seized may be properly
introduced in evidence against the person from whom they were taken.

It did not, however, abandon the rule that police must obtain advance judicial approval
for searches and seizures through the warrant procedure whenever possible, with the
exception of exigent circumstances. According to People vs. Lacerna, there are five
recognized exceptions to the rule against warrantless searches and seizures: 1) search
incidental to lawful arrest; 2) search of moving vehicles; 3) seizure in plain view; 4)
customs search; and 5) waiver of the accused's rights against unreasonable searches
and seizures. Manalili's suspicious behavior was typical of drug addicts who were high,
according to Espiritu's experience as a member of Caloocan City Police's Anti-Narcotics
Unit.
The following are the elements of illegal marijuana possession: a) the accused is in
possession of an item or object that has been identified as a prohibited drug; b) such
possession is not authorized by law; and c) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug. The substance discovered in Manalili's wallet was identified as
mj, which was illegal and knowingly used without authority. Given that he was high and
tried to avoid and resist, such behavior clearly demonstrates that he was aware that he
was in possession of marijuana, which was illegal under the law.

20. ALAIN MANALILI y DIZON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents
G.R. No. 113447. October 9, 1997.

FACTS
Based on information that drug addicts were roaming around the area, police operatives
Espiritu, Lumabas, and driver Enriquez conducted surveillance along the front of
Kalookan Cemetery, saw a man who appeared to be high on drugs, and introduced
themselves as policemen. When they asked what the man was holding in his hand, the
man held out his wallet and allowed Espiritu to examine it, where he discovered what he
suspected to be crushed marijuana leaves. Manalili was identified as the man who was
brought to the Anti-Narcotics Unit. The substance discovered in Manalili's wallet was
sent to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section, where it was identified as marijuana.

According to Manalili's version of events, he was riding in a tricycle early in the

afternoon when three police officers stopped it and informed them of the suspected
possession of marijuana. The officers then searched both Manalili and the driver and,
finding nothing illegal on their persons, released the driver but took Manalili to the police
station. Manalili saw a neighbor on the way to the station who he signaled to follow
them, and when he was searched again in the station, he was asked to strip his pants,
where they found nothing illegal.

Said neighbor then asked the cops to let Manalili go because they hadn't found anything
illegal, but Manalili was put in a cell and taken to a fiscal later that day, where he was
told not to say anything despite the fact that the cops had not found marijuana on his
person. A tricycle driver and a neighbor testified in court about how the two searches
turned up nothing illegal on Manalili's person.

ISSUE: Whether evidence during a stop and frisk is admissible and did not violate the
right of the petitioner against unreasonable searches and seizures.

HELD:
Regional Trial Court, finds the accused ALAIN MANALILI Y DIZON guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 8, Article II, of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended (Illegal Possession of Marijuana residue).

The Court of Appeals, Denied the appeal and affirm the decision of the RTC
Supreme Court, disagrees with the petitioner and holds that the search was valid, being
akin to a stop-and-frisk. In the landmark case of Terry vs. Ohio, a stop-and-frisk was
defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on
the street, interrogate him, and pat him for a weapon.

Furthermore, SC concurs with the Solicitor General’s contention that the petitioner
effectively waived the inadmissibility of any evidence illegally obtained when he failed to
raise this issue or to object thereto during the trial. A valid waiver of a right, more
particularly of the constitutional right against unreasonable search, requires the
concurrence of the following requirements: (1) the right to be waived existed; (2) the
person waiving it had knowledge, actual or constructive, thereof; and (3) he or she had
an actual intention to relinquish the right.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution are hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION.
21. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARI MUSA y
HANTATALU, accused-appellant.

FACTS:

A buy-bust operation was planned against the herein accused-appellant after a civilian
informant revealed that the latter was selling marijuana. Musa went into his house to get
the wrappings after Sgt. Ani handed him the money during the buy-bust operation.
Musa was arrested upon his return and inspection of the wrappings, but the marked
money used as payment was not found with him, prompting the NARCOM agents to go
inside his house. They were unable to locate the marked money, but they did discover
more marijuana leaves hidden in a plastic bag inside the kitchen. Authorities used a
laboratory test to confirm that the leaves were marijuana.

The defense, on the other hand, gave a different version of what happened during the
buy bust operation, claiming that he and his wife, Ahara Musa, saw NARCOM agents
dressed in civilian clothing and then suddenly got inside their house because the door
was open, declaring that they were NARCOM agents and searching the house. The
defense claimed that despite their demands for a search warrant, the said agents
continued to search the house. According to them, the agents discovered a red bag
whose contents were unknown to the Musas as a result of an illegal search. As a
consequence, the current situation.

ISSUE:

Whether the marijuana confiscated arising from the searching of the house admissible
as evidence?

RULING:

No, the marijuana seized is inadmissible as evidence in court. The Supreme Court held
that while Rule 126, Section 12 of the Rules of Court expressly authorizes a warrantless
search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest, the "plain view" doctrine, which states that
objects in the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in that position is subject to
seizure without warrant or search and seizure and may be presented in evidence, does
not apply in this case.

Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched
for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of
an offense, without a search warrant.

The "plain view" doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled searches and
indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find
evidence of defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a police
officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently
comes across an incriminating object. It may not be used to extend a general
exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges.

In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents could not have discovered the inculpatory
nature of the contents of the bag had they not forcibly opened it. The marijuana
contained in the plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence
pursuant to Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution.
22. PEOPLE v. SALANGUIT
G.R. Nos. 133254-55. April 19, 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs. ROBERTO SALANGUIT y
KO, accused-appellant.

FACTS:

In this instance, Sr. Insp. Rodolfo Aguilar was the one who applied for a search warrant
in the RTC of Dasmarinas, Cavite, to look for Roberto Salanguit's house in Novaliches,
Quezon City. SPO1 Edmuns Badua, who testified as a poseur-buyer who was able to
purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from Salanguit inside the latter's room, was the witness
he presented before Judge Espanol.

Ten police officers and one civilian informant served the search warrant on December
26, 1995, around 10:30 p.m. They forcibly entered Salanguit's house because, despite
hearing people panicking inside, no one opened the door. After presenting the search
warrant, the officers proceeded and were able to seize plastic bags and paper clip
boxes containing a white crystalline substance, as well as two bricks of dried leaves,
which will be identified as methamphetamine hydrochloride and marijuana after
laboratory testing. Salanguit refused to sign the receipt for the items seized prepared by
the policemen. Salanguit was taken to PNP Station 10 in EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon
City, along with the items seized.

Salanguit testified, which was corroborated by his mother-in-law, Soledad Arcano, that
on the same night, 20 men dressed in civilian attire and carrying long firearms climbed
over their gate and entered their house through an opening in the roof. He demanded a
search warrant, but when presented with one, he couldn't see it because it had been
abruptly withdrawn while he was still looking for his eyeglasses to read it. He was
ordered to remain in one location while they searched, and they took his bag, which
contained money, a licensed caliber.45 firearm, jewelry, and canned goods. The cops
left around 12.30 a.m. on December 27, 1995, and he was then brought and
interrogated.

Salanguit was found guilty of violating Section 16 of RA 6425, which prohibits the
possession/use of methamphetamine hydrochloride, and Section 8 of RA 6425, which
prohibits the possession of marijuana. He was sentenced to indefinite confinement with
a minimum of six (6) months of arresto mayor and a maximum of four (4) years and two
(2) months of prision correccional for the former and reclusion perpetua with a fine of
P700,000.00 for the latter. The methamphetamine hydrochloride and marijuana were
declared confiscated and turned over to the National Bureau of Investigation.

Salanguit argued in his appeal that the warrant was invalid, and thus the shabu
allegedly obtained from him could not be admitted as evidence. He also claimed that the
alleged marijuana seizure violated the plain view doctrine and that the officers used
excessive force in carrying out the warrant.
ISSUE: Whether the search warrant and its implementation were valid
RULING:
With respect to the seizure of shabu, the search warrant was properly issued. There
was probable cause personally determined by the judge under oath and affirmation of
the witness, the poseur-buyer SPO1 Badua as he was able to personally buy 2.12
grams of shabu worth P2,750.00 and witnessed how Salanguit obtained it from his own
cabinet and house. Badua also had the substance immediately examined in the PNP
Central Crime Laboratory Services and yielded positive result as methamphetamine
hydrochloride. The place to be searched was specifically described also. However, the
search warrant was void only in the seizure of drug paraphernalia but valid as to the
seizure of shabu.

In the contention that the warrant was issued for more than one offense because use of
methamphetamine hydrochloride and possession of drug paraphernalia are punished
under two different provisions of R.A. No. 6425, the Court ruled that as a special law,
only one warrant was necessary to cover its violations.

With regard to the contention that the warrant only contained Binhagan St., San Jose,
QC thus not containing the specific place to be searched was of no merit. The records
of the search warrant contained the sketch and description of the house of Salanguit
which had no number and could not have been mistakenly identified as Sr. Inspector
Aguilar also lived in the same neighborhood. It is a well-settled ruled that description of
the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable
effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched.

As to the case of marijuana, the search warrant did not contain authorization for its
seizure. This can only be valid under the doctrine of plan view which can be applied
only if there are (a) prior justification; (b) inadvertent discovery of the evidence; and (c)
immediate apparent illegality of the evidence before the police. In this doctrine, once a
valid portion of the search warrant has been executed, which in this case is the seizure
of the shabu, there will be no more justification for admitting subsequent articles found.
In this case, the police failed to alleged when the marijuana was found making its
seizure invalid. In addition, the marijuana was wrapped in newsprint and could not have
been discernible as marijuana. Its confiscation must be upheld but it is inadmissible as
evidence against Salanguit.

The RTC’s decision on the violation of Sec. 16 of RA 6425 was upheld. However,
Salanguit was acquitted as to the violation of Sec. 8 of the same act.
23. PEOPLE VS AMMINUDIN
G.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988

FACTS: Idel Amminudin, the accused, was apprehended after disembarking from the
M/V Wilcon 9 in IloIlo City. Pc officers who were waiting for him arrested him and
searched his bag, discovering what appeared to be marijuana leaves. He was detained
with two bundles of suspected articles. The NBI confirmed that the confiscated leaves
were, in fact, marijuana leaves after an examination. An information was filed against
him for violating the Dangerous Drugs Act. The information was later updated to include
Farida Ali y Hassen, who was arrested alongside the accused. They both entered not
guilty pleas. The fiscal filed a motion to dismiss Ali's charge based on a sworn
statement from the arresting officers exonerating her.
According to the Prosecution, the PC officers received information that the accused was
on board a vessel bound for IloIlo City and was carrying marijuana. After the informer
pointed him out, the PC officers waited for him and approached him as he descended
from the gangplank. The accused was detained, and the officers examined the bag he
was carrying. Officers discovered three kilos of marijuana leaves, which were later
identified as such.
The accused claimed that it was not marijuana and that the only thing in his bag was his
clothes. He claimed that he was arbitrarily detained and handcuffed. Without a search
warrant, his bag was seized. He also claimed that he was abused at the headquarters,
forcing him to confess to carrying marijuana leaves.

ISSUE:
Whether the warrantless arrest and search is valid

HELD:
The court held that the warrantless arrest and search is not valid. In the case at bar,
there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of
the government, the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime
about to be committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest
allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.

The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the
PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have
obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V
Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was identified. The date of its arrival was
certain. And from the information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge
that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did
nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored
altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had
determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not necessary."

In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest,
committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done
so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there
was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any
of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the
informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect
and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The
identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and
not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest
him.
24 PEOPLE VS. MARIACOS

FACTS:
On October 26, 2005, in the evening, the San Gabriel Police Station in San Gabriel, La
Union, conducted a checkpoint near the police station in the poblacion to intercept a
suspected marijuana transportation from Barangay Balbalayang in San Gabriel, La
Union. PO2 Lunes B. Pallayoc ("PO2 Pallayoc"), the Chief of Police, and other police
officers were among those present at the checkpoint. When the checkpoint yielded no
suspects or marijuana, the Chief of Police directed PO2 Pallayoc to go to Barangay
Balbalayang and conduct surveillance (sic).

PO2 Pallayoc met with a secret agent of the Barangay Intelligence Network at dawn on
October 27, 2005, in Barangay Balbalayang, who informed him that marijuana had been
loaded on a passenger jeepney about to leave for the poblacion. Three (3) bags and
one (1) blue plastic bag were mentioned by the representative. The agent also
mentioned a backpack bag with the word "OK" written on it. PO2 Pallayoc then boarded
the jeepney and climbed aboard. While the car was moving, he discovered the black
backpack with a "O.K." written on it and looked inside. PO2 Pallayoc discovered bricks
of marijuana wrapped in newspapers. He then inquired of the other passengers on top
of the jeepney about the owner of the bag, but no one knew.

When the jeepney arrived at the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc and the other passengers
alighted. Unfortunately, he was unaware of who had taken the black backpack from
atop the jeepney. He only realized a few moments later that the bag in question, as well
as three (3) other bags, including a blue plastic bag, were being carried away by two (2)
women. He approached the women and introduced himself as a police officer. He
informed them that they were being arrested, but one of the women escaped.

PO2 Pallayoc took the woman and the bags to the police station, where they were later
identified as accused-appellant Belen Mariacos. The investigators at the police station
contacted the Mayor of San Gabriel to witness the opening of the bags. When the
Mayor arrived, the bags were opened, and three (3) bricks of marijuana wrapped in
newspaper, two (2) round bundles of marijuana, and two (2) bricks of marijuana fruiting
tops wrapped in newspaper were recovered.

Following that, the investigators labeled, inventoried, and delivered the confiscated
marijuana to a crime laboratory for analysis. The items discovered in the bags all tested
positive for marijuana, a dangerous drug, according to a laboratory examination.

ISSUE:
The main issue raised by the appellant before the CA was the inadmissibility of the
evidence used against her. Her constitutional right against unreasonable searches, she
claims, was flagrantly violated by the arresting officer.
RULING:
Certain exceptions to the constitutional prohibition on warrantless searches and
seizures are permitted. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless
search had been upheld in cases of a moving vehicle and the seizure of evidence in
plain view.

The search of moving vehicles had been justified on the grounds that the mobility of
motor vehicles allows the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.

This does not, however, give police officers unrestricted authority to conduct
warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle
is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has been
held to be valid only if the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable
cause to believe, prior to the search, that they will find the instrumentality or evidence
pertaining to a crime in the vehicle to be searched.

It is important to remember that in the cases we have identified as exceptions to the

requirement of a judicial warrant, the officer carrying out the arrest or seizure must have
been compelled to do so due to probable cause. Before a warrantless search and
seizure can be lawfully conducted, the essential requirement of probable cause must be
met. The articles seized cannot be used as evidence against the person arrested unless
there is probable cause.

This exception is simple to comprehend. When conducting a search in a store, dwelling

house, or other immobile structure, a search warrant is easily obtained. However,
obtaining a warrant is impractical when the search is conducted on a mobile ship, an
aircraft, or other motor vehicles because they can be quickly moved out of the area or
jurisdiction where the warrant is sought.

Given the preceding discussion, the search in this case is valid. The vehicle transporting
the illegal or contraband drugs was about to leave. PO2 Pallayoc was forced to make a
quick decision and act quickly. Under the circumstances, it would be unreasonable to
require him to obtain a warrant before conducting the search. In this case, time was of
the essence. The officer conducting the search did not have time to obtain a warrant.
He had only enough time to board the vehicle before it left for its destination.
25 PEOPLE VS. ARUTA

FACTS:
P/Lt. Abello was alerted by his informant, Benjie, that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be
arriving from Baguio City the next day with a large amount of marijuana. Abello
assembled a team in response to the tip. At around 4:00 p.m. in the afternoon of 1988,
said team traveled to West Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City, and set up shop near the
Philippine National Bank building on Rizal Avenue and the Caltex gasoline station.
While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus stopped in front of the PNB building at around
6:30 in the evening of the same day from where two females and a male got off.

At this point, the informant pointed out to the team "Aling Rosa," who was carrying a
travel bag. After determining that the accused was "Aling Rosa," the team approached
her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. When Abello inquired about the
contents of "Aling Rosa's" bag, the latter handed it to the former. Upon inspection, it was
discovered that the bag contained dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag
labeled "Cash Katutak."

The team seized the bag as well as the Victory Liner bus ticket, on which Lt. Domingo
had signed. The accused-appellant was then taken to the NARCOM office for
investigation, where a Receipt of Property Seized was prepared for the confiscated
marijuana leaves. Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a "Demurrer to
Evidence" alleging the illegality of the search and seizure of the items, thereby violating
the accused-constitutional appellant's right against unreasonable search and seizure as
well as their inadmissibility in evidence. The RTC found accused-appellant guilty of
violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 by transporting eight (8) kilos and five
hundred (500) grams of marijuana from Baguio City to Olongapo City.

ISSUE/S: WON the warrantless search that resulted in the arrest of the accused-
appellant violated his constitutional rights.

RULING:
Yes. In this instance, the NARCOM agents were not armed with an arrest warrant. To
justify the warrantless search and seizure of the accused-bag, appellant's the accused-
appellant must have been validly arrested under Section 5 of Rule 113, which states:
Sec. 5: Arrest without a warrant; when lawful.- A peace officer or a private person may
arrest a person without a warrant if: (a) the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense while in his presence; or (b)
the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense while in his presence; or (c) the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, Aruta, the accused-appellant, is not committing a
crime. She wasn't about to commit one, nor had she just committed one. Accused-
appellant was simply crossing the street and did not do anything that would give
NARCOM agents reason to suspect and conclude that she was committing a crime. It
wasn't until the informant pointed to the accused-appellant and identified her as the
carrier of the marijuana to the agents that she was singled out as the suspect. The
NARCOM agents would not have apprehended accused-appellant if it had not been for
the informant's pointing finger, because, as clearly demonstrated by the evidence on
record, there was no reason for them to suspect that accused-appellant was committing
a crime, except for the informant's pointing finger. This could not be sanctioned or
tolerated by the Court because it is a clear violation of the constitutional guarantee
against unreasonable search and seizure. There was also no evidence of compliance
with the stringent requirements of probable cause and warrantless arrests.

As a result, there was no legal basis for NARCOM agents to conduct a warrantless
search of the accused-bag appellant's because there was no probable cause and the
accused-appellant had not been lawfully arrested. In other words, because the arrest
was inherently illegal, the subsequent search was similarly illegal, as it was not
incidental to a lawful arrest. The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search
and seizure must inevitably work in favor of the accused-appellant. As such, the seized
articles could not be used as evidence against the accused-appellant because they are
"fruits of a poisoned tree" and thus must be rejected under Article III, Section 3(2) of the
Constitution.
26 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS MIKAEL MALMSTEDT

FACTS:
Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, was discovered carrying Hashish, a derivative of
marijuana, during a routine NARCOM inspection at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay
Mountain Province. He was found guilty of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act by RTC
La Trinidad. The accused petitioned the Supreme Court for a reversal of the decision,
claiming that the search and arrest were illegal due to the lack of a search warrant.

ISSUE:
Whether the trial court's decision should be reversed (or upheld) because the accused
claims the search and arrest were conducted without a warrant.

RULING:
The ruling of the RTC is upheld. According to the constitution, a peace officer or a
private citizen may arrest a person without a warrant if the person to be arrested has
committed, is committing, or is attempting to commit an offense while in his presence.
The offense was recognized by NARCOM's warrantless search, which was prompted by
probable cause: (1) NARCOM receiving information that a Caucasian traveling from
Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession, and (2) the accused's failure to
immediately present his passport.
27 Papa vs. Mago

Facts:
On November 4, 1966, Martin Alagao, head of the Manila Police Department's counter-
intelligence unit, and his group intercepted two trucks at Agripina Circle in Ermita
Manila, and the two trucks were seized on the Chief of Police's orders. The interception
was based on information that the load of the said trucks was misdeclared and
undervalued, which was believed to be illegal. Following that, the cargo owners,
Remedios and Valentin B. Lanopa, petitioned the Court of First Instance of Manila for a
"preliminary injunction" on the grounds that their trucks were seized without a search
warrant. Following that, Judge Hilarion issued an ex parte order, which prevented the
bales from opening. However, by the time the restraining order was issued, some bales
had already been opened.

Furthermore, following a hearing, the lower court, presided over by respondent Judge
Hilarion, issued an order releasing the goods to Remedios Mago in exchange for a
P40,000 bond. The petitioners filed a petition for prohibition and certiorari in response to
Judge Hilarion's decision, claiming that the court and Judge Hilarion have no jurisdiction
over the case.

Issue: Whether or not the arrest and seizure of goods without a warrant violates
constitutional rights.

Ruling:
Despite the lack of a search warrant, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners,
stating that there is no violation of constitutional rights.

In the case at hand, the Tariff and Customs Code does not require such a warrant. The
Code allows officers to enter, pass through, or search any land, enclosure, warehouse,
store, or building that is not a dwelling house, as well as inspect, search, and examine
any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, or envelope or any person on board, or to
stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast, or person suspected of holding or
conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines in violation of
law, without requiring a search warrant.

In this case, the trucks are merely a vehicle designed for travel and transportation on
highways, according to the contention in the sense of private ownership. Their active
use is not in homes or on private property, the privacy of which the law specifically
protects from unwarranted search and seizure.
28 PEOPLE, vs. LO HO WING
FACTS:

In July 1987, the Special Operations Group, a unit of the Philippine Constabulary's (PC)
Criminal Investigation Service (CIS), received a tip from one of its informers about an
organized group involved in the importation of illegal drugs, the smuggling of
contraband goods, and gunrunning. Following an evaluation of the information received,
a project codenamed "OPLAN SHARON 887" was formed in order to bust the
suspected syndicate.

On October 4, 1987, appellant and Tia, the special agenet, embarked on a trip to Hong
Kong. Tia was able to call Captain Palmera before they left to inform him of their
expected return date to the Philippines. On schedule, the two returned to Manila on
October 6, 1987. The operatives' car overtook the taxicab driven by appellant and Tia
on Imelda Avenue and cut into its path, forcing the taxi driver to stop his vehicle. The
operatives asked the suspects for permission to search their luggage. A tin can of tea
was taken from appellant's red travel bag. One of the operatives, Sgt. Roberto
Cayabyab, pried the lid open, pulled out a paper tea bag from the can, and pressed it in
the middle to feel its contents. The bag leaked some crystalline white powder that
looked like crushed alum. The sergeant then opened the tea bag and examined its
contents more closely. He opened the three traveling bags for inspection because he
suspected the crystalline powder was a dangerous drug. Six (6) tin cans, including the
previously opened one, were discovered in the red travel bag. Tia and the appellant
were arrested and taken to the CIS Headquarters in Quezon City for questioning.

During the search and seizure, Sgt. Cayabyab opened a tea bag, which was then sent
to the PC-INP Crime Laboratory for preliminary examination. Tests on a sample of the
crystalline powder contained within the tea bag revealed that the specimen submitted
contained methamphetamine. Each of the fifty-six (56) tea bags had its samples tested
in the same way. Methamphetamine was detected in the tests as well. As a result, all
three suspects have been charged.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the search and seizure was lawful

HELD:

It was legal. As appellee correctly stated, the requirement that a search and seizure be
supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. There are at least three (3) well-
known exceptions. As stated in the case of Manipon, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, these are:
[1] a search incidental to an arrest, [2] a search of a moving vehicle, and [3] seizure of
evidence in plain view (emphasis supplied). The facts of the case clearly show that the
search in question was conducted on a moving vehicle. As a result, a valid warrant was
not required to conduct the search of appellant and his co-accused.
The trial court's factual findings in the instant case established unequivocally that the
authorities had reasonable grounds to believe that appellant would attempt to bring in
contraband and transport it within the country. The belief was founded on intelligence
reports gleaned from surveillance activities conducted on the suspected syndicate, of
which appellant was said to be a member. Aside from that, they were certain of the
accused's expected date and time of arrival from China. However, such knowledge was
clearly insufficient to meet the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. Still,
the important thing to remember is that there was probable cause to conduct the
warrantless search, which must be present in such a case.
29 People vs. Marti

FACTS:
The appellant Andre Marti went to Manila Packing and Export Forwarders with his
common-law wife to send four parcels of boxes containing books, cigars, and gloves as
a gift for his friend Waltier Fierz in Zurich, Switzerland. The attendant, Anita Reyes,
asked if the packages could be examined and inspected, but Marti refused, claiming
they were simply gifts of books, cigars, and gloves. Anita Reyes is no longer adamant
about the inspection. The packages were then placed in a box and sealed with masking
tape for shipping. The proprietor of the forwarding agency, Job Reyes - Anita Reyes's
husband - opened the box for final inspection before delivering packages to the Bureau
of Customs and/or the Bureau of Posts.

When he opened Marti's box, he noticed a strange odor that piqued his interest, so he
cut open one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the contents. Mr.
Reyes wrote to the NBI, reporting the shipment and requesting a laboratory examination
of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper. He handed over the letter
and a sample of appellant's shipment to the NBI's Narcotics Section, informing them
that the rest of the shipment was still in his office. Job Reyes, three NBI agents, and a
photographer went to Reyes' office in Ermita as a result. Job Reyes also opened the
package, which allegedly contained books. He discovered in the package dried
marijuana leaves in the form of bricks or cakes

The package allegedly containing the tabacalera cigars was also opened. Dried
marijuana leaves were discovered neatly stacked beneath the cigars. The NBI agents
made an inventory and took charge of the box and its contents after signing a "Receipt"
acknowledging custody of the said effects. An Information was then filed against Marti
for violation of RA 6425, also known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. Marti filed an appeal
with the court, claiming that his constitutional right to be free from illegal searches and
seizures was violated when his parcels were opened without his consent..

ISSUE: 
Whether or not the evidence obtained violated Marti's constitutional rights against
unreasonable search and seizure and communication privacy (Sec. 2 and 3, Art. III,
Constitution), the evidence should be held inadmissible in evidence.

RULING:
No, the evidence sought to be excluded was discovered and obtained primarily by a
private individual, Mr. Reyes, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention or
participation of State authorities. The liberty guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be
invoked against the State in the absence of governmental interference. The mere
presence of NBI agents does not imply warrantless search and seizure.
Simply looking at what is in plain sight is not a search. Observing that which is open,
where no trespass has been committed, is not a search. According to Bernas, the
protection of fundamental liberties is at the heart of constitutional democracy... is a
safeguard against the state The relationship between the individual and the state is
governed by the Bill of Rights. It is not concerned with the relationship between
individuals, or between a private individual and others. What the Bill of Rights does is to
declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power holder.
The SC held in the negative.The judgment of conviction finding Marti guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged was AFFIRMED.
30 People vs. Bongcarawan

FACTS:
Lorena Canoy, a passenger on Super Ferry 5, reported missing jewelry to security
officer Mark Diesmo. Canoy suspected one of her cabin 106 fellow passengers of being
the perpetrator. Canoy was accompanied by Diesmo and four other members of the
ship's security force as they searched for the suspect, who was later found in the
economy section. The accused, Basher Bongcarawan, was identified as the suspect.
The complaint was reported to Bongcarawan, who was invited to return to cabin 106.
With his permission, he was physically searched, but no jewelry was found.

After that, two security guards escorted him back to the economy section to retrieve his
luggage. Bongcarawan returned to the cabin, this time carrying a Samsonite suitcase.
When security asked me to open the suitcase, I found a brown bag and small plastic
packs containing a white crystalline substance. The security personnel immediately
notified the ship's captain and photographed the accused alongside the suitcase and its
contents, suspecting the substance to be shabu. They also requested assistance from
the Philippine Coast Guard.

The Philippine Coast Guard arrived and arrested both the accused and the seized
items. An NBI Forensic Chemist later confirmed the substance to be shabu.
Bongcarawan was convicted of breaking the Dangerous Drugs Act. Bongcarawan filed
an appeal, claiming that the Samsonite suitcase containing the shabu was forcibly
opened and searched without his consent, infringing on his constitutional right to be free
from unreasonable search and seizure. He also claimed that any evidence obtained as
a result of such unlawful search and seizure is inadmissible in evidence against him. He
also claims that People v. Marti does not apply in this case because a vessel security
officer is deemed to perform the duties of a police officer.

ISSUE: 
Whether or not the evidence obtained is a violation of constitutional rights against
unreasonable search and seizure which should be  inadmissible in evidence

RULING:
No. The accused-luggage appellant's was searched by vessel security personnel. They
only called the Philippine Coast Guard for help after discovering "shabu" inside the
suitcase. As a result, the search and seizure of the suitcase and contraband items
occurred without the intervention of the government, and thus the constitutional
protection against unreasonable search and seizure does not apply.
The accused-contention appellant's that the search and seizure conducted by the
vessel security personnel should be considered as one conducted by the police
authorities has no merit because, like the latter, the former are armed and tasked with
maintaining peace and order. In the case at hand, the vessel security officer is a private
employee who performs no governmental functions. Police officers, on the other hand,
are state agents tasked with the sovereign function of enforcing the law.
Wherefore, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, convicting accused-
appellant Basher Bongcarawan of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No.
6425, as amended, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to
pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of was AFFIRMED.
31 People vs Susan Canton

FACTS:
Susan Canton was a passenger departing Ninoy Aquino International Airport on her
way to Saigon, Vietnam. She passed through a metal detector, which beeped. Mylene
Cabunoc, a civilian employee of the National Action Committee on Hijacking and
Terrorism (NATCH), was summoned to the frisker duty and subjected to a search.
Susan's genital area and thighs were among the areas where Mylene noticed
something bulging.

Susan refused to bring the packages out, saying, "Money, money, money only." Mylene
handed the packages over to SPO4 De los Reyes and reported the incident to his
superior officer, Police Superintendent Daniel Santos. They brought the gray plastic
packs to the customs examination table, opened them, and found white crystalline
substances that tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, or 998.2809 grams
of shabu.

Susan Canton was found to have violated Article 3, Section 16 of the RA 6425, also
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, beyond a reasonable doubt. After being
dissatisfied with the trial court's decision, Susan filed a Motion for Reconsideration
and/or New Trial.

ISSUE: 
Whether or not the warrantless search and subsequent seizure of the regulated drugs,
including Susan’s arrest were violative of her constitutional rights

RULING:
No. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) declares in its Appellant's Brief that Susan
was found in flagrante delicto in possession of a regulated drug without being
authorized by law. As a result, the case falls squarely within the exception, as it involves
a warrantless search in the course of a lawful arrest. Furthermore, she voluntarily
consented to the search and seizure when she allowed herself to be frisked and taken
to the airport security personnel's comfort room for further inspection. It also claims that
the methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from her during a routine airport frisk was
obtained legally in accordance with airport security procedures.

What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search in any given case is a judicial

question that can be determined based on the facts of the case. The rule is that the
Constitution forbids state intrusions into a person's body, personal effects, or residence
unless they are carried out in accordance with the procedure outlined in the Constitution
and reiterated in the Rules of Court.

 The interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute. The
recognized exceptions established by jurisprudence are (1) search of moving vehicles;
(2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs searches; (4) waiver or consented searches; (5)
stop and frisk situations (Terry search); and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. 
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City, Branch 110, in Criminal Case No. 98-0189 finding appellant SUSAN CANTON
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 16, Article III of the
Dangerous Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as amended, and sentencing her to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000) and the costs is hereby AFFIRMED. The appellant’s passport, plane
tickets, and girdles are hereby ordered to be returned to her.