TC - ARTEMIS

LAW COLLEGE DEHRADUN, UTTARANCHAL

UNIVERSITY
SUSHILA DEVI INTRAMURAL MOOT COURT
COMPETITIION, 2020

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDUS

RAMAN..............................................................PETITIONER

V.

UNION OF INDUS.........................................RESPONDENT

PETIOTN HAS INVOKED ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUION

OF INDUS

UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HIS LORDSHIP’S

COMPANION JUSTICES OF THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDUS
 TABLE OF CONTENT
1. LIST OF ABRREVIATION
2. INDEX OF AUTHORTITIES
3. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
4. STATEMENT OF FACTS
5. STATEMENT OF ISSUES
6. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
7. ARGUMENTS ADVANCE
ISSUE 1 – WHETHER THE PRESENT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE?
ISSUE 2 – WHETHER RTI AMENDMENT ACT, 2017 IS UNCONSTITIONAL?
ISSUE 3 – WHETHER THE UAP AMENEDMENT ACT, 2017 IS
UNCONTITUTIONAL?
8. PRAYER
 LIST OF ABBREVIATION
1. Govt. government
2. RTI ACT Right to Information Act
3. UAP ACT unlawful activities prevention act
4. PIL public interest litigation
5. FR fundamental rights
6. Eg. Example
7. V. verses
8. ART. Article
9. Sec. section
10. SC supreme court
11. Aug. august
12. ECI election commission of India
13. HC high court
14. J. justice
15. Mohd. Mohammad
16. IIT Indian institute of technology
17. SIM subscriber identification module
18. CCTV closed circuit television
 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

1. Govt. of India vs The Cricket Association of Bengal

2. Shayara Bano & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors
3. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Dilip Kumar Raghavendranath Nadkarni
& Ors
4. Sajal Awasthi v. union of India
5. Prithipal Singh v State of Punjab
6. is PUCL v Union of India
7. People’s Union for Civil Liberties vs Union of India
8. Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967
9. Indian constitution
10. UAPA, 2017
11. RTI Amendment Act, 2017
 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

32. Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part

(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of
the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed

(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs
in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari,
whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part

(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clause ( 1 ) and ( 2 ),
Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its
jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause ( 2 )

(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided
for by this Constitution
 STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. Indus is the world’s largest democratic country accompanied by the world’s most detailed
Constitution. The country is run according to the parliamentary form of government, where
Executive is derived from the Legislature. Separation of Judiciary is demarcated as a
Constitutional objective. Governments, in the course of the last seven decades of
independence, have emphasized on the safety of the citizens from anarchist elements. In the
wake of several terrorist attacks that the country has faced, various anti-terrorism laws have
been enacted and amended from time-to-time.

2. The Parliament, in the recent years (2016-present) has enacted and amended many citizen
centric laws, viz. the Citizenship Act, 1955, the Right to Information Act, 2005 and the
Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, 1967. The amended Acts of the Right to Information Act
and the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act are hereby attached as Annexures I and II
respectively. These enactments have received mixed responses from the Indus citizenry.

3. Mohd. Irfan, a citizen of Indus, runs a telecommunication shop in the capital city, Deliah.
His shop was located near the Indus Institute of Technology (IIT), where he sells SIM cards
and repairs computers & other electronic devices. A bulk of his customers are the students of
IIT. One of them, Raman, a research scholar at IIT, was one of his regular customers and
with the passage of time, they became good friends. Both of them had been residents of the
capital city for the preceding five (5) years.

4. Raman has always been very vocal in putting forth his opinions on the local administration
as well as various government policies—of the State and the Centre, and was generally
accompanied by Irfan in his demonstrations, et cetera. Both of them have been arrested on
previous occasions in the course of their protest rallies and other instances. They
consequently gained an image of ‘revolutionaries’ in the eyes of the general public in the
capital city.

5. On November 24, 2018, a bomb blast occurred in Karampur, 25 km from the boundaries of
Deliah. The bomb blast didn’t claim any lives but resulted in destruction of a lot of public
property. A few people who were nearby were injured as well. The central investigating
agencies (eg. the National Investigative Agencies), along with local police, immediately
started investigating the matter. At a point in their investigation, in a CCTV footage near the
IIT, one of the five arrested suspects, who were in custody, was seen buying a SIM Card from
Irfan’s shop, 3 days before the blast.
6. On December 2, 2018, police reached Irfan’s shop to investigate and the police found out
that 14 SIM cards sold by him, in the course of the last month, were based on fake
documents. Irfan was arrested and detained for investigation. After a few weeks, he was
declared as a ‘terrorist’ by the Central Government under Section 35 of the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act—as amended in 2017.

7. When Raman came to know about this, he filed an RTI Application under the Right to
Information Act, 2005 [hereinafter “the RTI Act”], requesting the grounds on which Irfan
was declared as a terrorist. This request was denied by the Central Public Information Officer
on the grounds that ‘it will prejudicially affect the security interests of the State’. After
receiving no updates regarding the trial proceedings of Irfan in the upcoming months as well,
he again filed an application under the RTI Act. His application was received by a different
(appointed a month before the receipt of this application) Information Officer this time, who
informed him that there was little to no paperwork in the arrest of Mohd. Irfan, and there was
no liability on the Government to disclose grounds for such a declaration. Raman, on
receiving this information, created a hue and cry on social media and other platforms, about
the indefinite detention of his friend and dubbed the anti-terror law as ‘archaic’ and ‘against
the principles of international human rights’.

8. Following the massive uproar, the Commissioner who supplied the information to Raman
was terminated from service, within 10 months of his appointment.

9. In the meantime, several other RTIs were filed by public-spirited citizens. One such RTI
was filed where a person asked about the total travel expenses of the Cabinet Ministers,
including the Prime Minister for one of his campaigns, the Swadeshi movement of the 21st
century: ‘Make in Indus’. The Chief Information Commissioner who disseminated this
information, was allegedly removed from service. Similar incidents of the like nature kept
occurring in the upcoming months.

10. In the wake of these events, Raman approached Supreme Court and filed a Public Interest
Litigation, seeking direction to declare The Right to Information (Amendment) Act, 2017 and
The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act, 2017 as unconstitutional—the former
being violative of Article 19 of the Constitution, and the latter being violative of Articles 14,
19 and 21 of the Constitution of Indus. Also, a non-governmental organization (NGO) named
Aazadi, also filed a petition challenging the UAP (Amendment) Act, 2017 on grounds of
violating the federal structure of the Constitution.

11. The aforementioned petitions were clubbed by the Supreme Court and hearing is scheduled.
 STATEMENT OF ISSUES

Issue 1

Whether the present petition is maintainable?

Issue 2

Whether the Right to Information (Amendment)

Act, 2017 is unconstitutional?

Issue 3

Whether the Unlawful Activities (Prevention)

Amendment Act, 2017 is unconstitutional?
 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Issue 1 - Whether the present petition is maintainable?

It is humbly submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the present
petitioner is maintainable and invokes art. 32 of the Constitution of india.

Issue 2 - Whether the Right to Information (Amendment) Act, 2017 is

unconstitutional?
The counsel on behalf of the petitioner submits that the RTI amendment,
2017 is unconstitutional because it violates or abridges the peoples`
right to information implied under the right to freedom of speech and
expression.

Issue 3 - Whether the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment

Act, 2017 is unconstitutional?
The counsel on behalf of the petitioner that the UAPA Act, 2017 in
unconstitutional as it does not follow the right of arrest as mentioned
under the supreme law of the land and also the procedure established by
the code of criminal procedure.
 ARGUMENTS ADVANCE

ISSUE 1

WHETHER THE PRESENT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE ?

the present petition are clubbed together by the supreme court of Indus and are
maintainable under Article 32 of the constitution of india.
the arguments in support of the above contention is follows:
Article 32 of the Constitution gives Supreme Court of India the power to issue orders or issue
writs. Five writs provided by the Indian Constitution are habeas corpus, mandamus,
prohibition, Quo Warranto and certiorari, as appropriate for any application of rights.
According to article 32 of the constitution the supreme court of india accpets the cases which
invliove substantial question of law and in the aforementioned petitions it stands for the
substantial question of law.
The Supreme Court these days directed symptom of all public interest petitions for a joint
hearing by a Bench headed by the judge, already hearing petitions about the
simplest bakeshop case.

A Bench, comprising J. S. Rajendra man and J. A.R. Lakshmanan, directed that the petitions
filed by social activists Mallika Sarabhai and Digant Oza and journalist Indukumar
Jani. Seeking appointment of an impartial inquiry into the communal violence within the
State by a special investigation team be heard together. The court had, in April last, issued
notice on the petitions to the Gujarat CM, Narendra Modi, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, the
Bharatiya Janata Party, the State Director General of Police and different senior police
officers.

Public interest litigation can be filed only in that case where any “public interest” is
affecting at large. Because if only one person is affecting then that is not a ground for filing
PIL.

Now a chief question comes in the mind that where should a public spirited person file this
petition to take remedy by this. So the answer of this chief question is this that all PIL are
used to filed in high court or Supreme Court. If a person want to go to high court to filing that
then he can go under article 226 of Indian constitutional law and if any person wants to go to
supreme court then he can go under article 32 of the Indian constitutional law but Article 226
is something distinguished from article 32 of constitutional law. Under article 32 that person
can go to supreme court whose only fundamental rights are violation nothing else but if any
person going through the violation of not only fundamental right but also constitutional right
and any other legal right also or secondly we can see by this view that It will purely and
solely depend on the “Nature of the case”, if the question involves only a small group of
people being effected by action of State authority, the PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION
can be filed in high court. For e.g. if there is a sewage problem in a locality effecting 50
families, the PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION can be filed in High court. If a large section
of people is affected whether by State Government or Central Government, PUBLIC
INTEREST LITIGATION can be filed in Supreme Court For e.g. placing a ban on adult
movies, prohibition industrial unit from causing pollution etc

these are the essential point for that person who can file any public interest litigation.

 He is a member of the public acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in
instituting an action for redressal of public wrong or public injury.
 He is not a mere busy body or a meddlesome interloper.
 His action is not motivated by personal gain or any other oblique consideration.

ISSUE 2
WHETHER RTI AMENDMENT ACT 2017 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court that the Amendment to the right to
information Act, 2017 is unconstitutional. And, hence, the arguments are presented hereforth;

The Rajya Sabha passed a set of amendments to the Right to Information Act of 2005,
clearing the way for their enactment into law (after Presidential assent) which effectively
undermine the independence of the Information Commissioners, by bringing their salaries
and terms of appointment under the control of the central government. Therefore, the
petitioner humbly presents the arguments against the unconstitutionality of these
amendments.

The RTI Act (Amendment) Bill, 2019 gives the central government the power to set the
salaries and the service conditions of the Information Commissioners both at central and state
levels. By amending Section 13 of the RTI Act, 2005, the term of central Chief Information
Commissioner and Information Commissioners—which was earlier set at five years (or until
the age of 65, whichever is earlier)—will now be prescribed by the central government.

Also, the salaries and allowances of central Chief Information Commissioner and Information
Commissioners—which were kept at par with the Chief Election Commissioners and
Election
Commissioners respectively—will now be determined by the central government. The same
is the case with Section 16, which deals with the state-level Chief Information Commissioner
and Information Commissioners.

1.1 Right to information

People’s Union for Civil Liberties vs Union of India (AIR 2004 SC 1442)
Justice S.B. Sinha and Justice B.M. Khare. It was held by the Supreme Court that “Right to
Information is a facet of the freedom of ‘speech and expression’ as contained in article 19(1)
(a) of the constitution of India. Right to Information, thus, indisputably is Fundamental Right.”

Govt. of India vs The Cricket Association of Bengal (1995) 2 SCC 161. The Supreme Court
held that “the freedom of speech and expression includes right to acquire information and
disseminate it. It enables people to contribute to the debate on social and moral issues. Right
to freedom of speech and expression means right to education, to inform, to entertain and
right to be educated, informed and entertained. Right to telecast is, therefore, within the ambit
of Article 19 (1) (a).”

Apart from these leading cases, there are many cases where a person’s right to know and
right to information have been upheld. The purpose of discussing all these is to show that we
already have the right to information as guaranteed by Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution of
India. Moreover, as an extended part of the freedom of speech and expression, the right to
know and to be known is our Fundamental right.

For more than two decades, the Supreme Court of India has recognized the right to
information as a constitutionally protected fundamental right, established under the Article
19 (right to freedom of speech and expression) and Article 21 (right to life) of the
Constitution. The court has recognized the right to access information from government
departments is fundamental to democracy.

1.2 fundamental rights are not illusionary

The Constitution’s guarantee of fundamental rights includes a guarantee of those incidental

and ancillary aspects that are necessary to ensure that the right is effective, and not merely
illusory. This, again, is a venerable and incontestable proposition. It has been upheld in a
number of cases.
One classic example is PUCL v Union of India, where the Supreme Court directed the
Election Commission to provide a “None of the Above” [NOTA] option to voters using
Electronic Voting Machines. This direction was justified on the basis that NOTA was
essential to maintain the secrecy of the ballot as well as the fairness of elections – both of
which, in turn, were linked to the freedom to vote under Article 19(1)(a). Note that the Court
specifically held that by failing to provide the NOTA option, the Conduct of Election Rules
were not only ultra vires the parent statute, but also violated Article 19(1)(a) of the
Constitution.

1.3 positive dimensions of the fundamental rights

Fundamental rights under the Indian Constitution have a negative and positive dimension. In
their negative dimension, they protect the individual against State interference. In their
positive dimension, the State is required to take affirmative action to respect, protect,
promote, and fulfil these rights. This proposition has been affirmed by different judgments in
different contexts. For example, in Prithipal Singh v State of Punjab – a case about police
atrocities – the Supreme Court held that Article 21 “includes both so-called negative and
positive obligations for the State. The negative obligation means the overall prohibition on
arbitrary deprivation of life … [while] positive obligation requires that State has an
overriding obligation to protect the right to life of every person with its territorial jurisdiction.
The obligation requires the State to take administrative and all other measures in order to
protect life and investigate all suspicious deaths.”

The right to information is a fundamental right, under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.
The right to information includes incidental and ancillary aspects that ensure it is an effective
– and not illusory – right, one of which is the independence of the individuals charged with
implementing the right (particularly against the State). And the right to information requires
the State to “adopt suitable measures” guaranteeing its adequate fulfilment. It follows –
necessarily – that these “suitable measures” provide for the effective independence of the
aforementioned individuals (because, naturally, measures providing for an illusory right to
information are hardly “suitable” under any meaning of the word, and hardly effectuate the
positive content of the right).

1.4 The Court cannot direct the Parliament to legislate in order to discharge its positive
obligations
The Court cannot direct the Parliament to legislate in order to discharge its positive
obligations under Part III of the Constitution. However, what the Court can do – and has done
– is (1) in case of a legislative vacuum, to pass guidelines that have statutory force until a law
is enacted, and (2) if a law exists, to test whether it fulfils the State’s positive obligations
under Part III. the Court can issue a mandamus directing Parliament to legislate a Right to
Information Act providing for suitable independence of the Information Commissioners.
Such a move would be a blatant violation of the separation of powers, and the Court has not –
and should not – resort to it.

At the same time, however, the Supreme Court has devised a set of more conservative
remedies to deal with situations where the State refuses to discharge its positive obligations,
or discharges them in an illusory fashion. A legendary example of the first kind of case, of
course, is the Vishaka Judgment. It is important to note that the Vishaka judgment consisted
of two parts. In the first part, the Court returned an affirmative finding that sexual harassment
at the workplace was hit by Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution. In the second part, it found
that the State had failed to discharge its obligations by … doing nothing at all. Obviously, the
obligation that the Court was referring to was the positive obligation to enact an appropriate
law (this much was mentioned, although the Court – admittedly – did not use the word
“positive”).
The Court stated that it would discharge its duty of enforcing fundamental rights under
Article 32 of the Constitution by laying down guidelines, and these guidelines would be
treated as law under Article 141 until replaced by a statute (something that happened many
years later, in 2013). Thus, the Court responded to the State’s failure to discharge its positive
obligations by temporarily standing in for it, until Parliament got its act together and
legislated to do so.

I want to make one basic point here. If Vishaka is still good law – and nobody argues that it is
not – then the argument I make in this essay falls well within the scope of existing judicial
precedent. Because if the Court is entitled to make law to discharge positive obligations under
Part III where the State has failed to act (1), then surely it is entitled to strike down law that
changes an existing judicial precedent. Because if the Court is entitled to make law to
discharge positive obligations under Part III where the State has failed to act (1), then surely
it is entitled to strike down law that changes an existing legislative framework, bringing it
into non- compliance with Part III (2). From the scope of the separation of powers and
judicial overreach, the latter is far, far more restrained than the former (although I submit, of
course, that it is defensible on its own terms).
1.5 The power of judicial review

if the Court finds that the legislation comes up short, it can – and has – interpreted or struck
down parts of the statute with a view to bringing it in compliance with constitutional
requirements. The provisions contained in Section 33(2) of the Act to the extent it gives
power to Joint Secretary is, therefore, struck down giving liberty to the respondents to
suitably enact a provision on the aforesaid lines, which would adequately protect the interest
of individuals.” The provisions contained in Section 33(2) of the Act to the extent it gives
power to Joint Secretary is, therefore, struck down giving liberty to the respondents to
suitably enact a provision on the aforesaid lines, which would adequately protect the interest
of individuals.”

Yes, formally, Information Commissioners are statutory officers, and they do not occupy
constitutional posts. But the RTI, act as a “constitutional statute”, in the sense that it
implemented a core fundamental right under the Constitution which is the right to freedom of
speech and expression inclusive of the right to information.

The RTI is a constitutional statute, implementing a fundamental right. In substance therefore,

the Information Commission” is called a “fourth branch institution“, performing a function
that is as valuable (although not formally equivalent) as that performed by the Election
Commission or the judiciary. And it follows from this that an attack upon the independence
of Information Commissioners needs to be taken as seriously as an attack upon the
independence of other, formally constitutional posts.

The RTI amendments compromise the independence of the Information Commissioners by

bringing them under substantive governmental control. The Information Commissioners are
tasked with implementing the RTI, and stand between the individual and the State, when the
former makes fundamental rights claims upon the latter. Under the existing statutory
framework, therefore, the right to information is illusory without the independence of the
Information Commissioners. Consequently, the amendments violate Article 19(1)(a) of the
Constitution, and deserve to be struck down, with status quo ante being restored.
Issue 3
Whether the Unlawful Activities(Prevention) Amendment Act, 2017 is
Unconstitutional?
The petition challenged the Constitutional validity of Section 35 and Section 36 of the UAPA
that paved the way for government to notify an individual as a terrorist. The NGO, which has
filed the petition, said lifelong stigma gets attached to a person notified as terrorist even after
being denotified.
The plea also sought direction to declare the UAPA violative of fundamental rights as
enshrined under Article 14 (Right to Equality), 19 (Right to Free Speech and Expression) and
21 (Right to life) of the constitution.
This is the second petition filed in the apex court challenging the amendments in UAPA.
Earlier, a similar petition was filed by a Delhi resident Sajal Awasthi. The petition filed by
Awasthi had stated that the recent amendment allows notification of "individuals as
terrorists" while under UAPA, 1967, only organisations could be so notified. The UAPA
2019 has modified Chapter VI of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 along with
Section 35 and 36, it added.
Section 35 of UAPA 2019 does not specify detailed grounds or reasons based on which an
individual can be termed as terrorist, said the plea, adding that conferring of such an
"arbitrary and unfettered power without any limits or bounds" amounts to violation of Article
14 of the Constitution of India.

The petition had stated, "The new or amended Section 35 of the UAPA Act, 1967 empowers
the Central government to categorise any individual as terrorist and add name of such a
person in Schedule 4 of the Act. Conferring of such a discretionary, unfettered and unbound
powers upon the Central government is antithesis to the Article 14 of the Constitution of
India ."The amendments in UAPA, 2019 empowers the ruling government, under the garb of
curbing terrorism,to impose indirect restriction on right
of dissent which is detrimental for our developing democratic society, the plea had said. It
had added that the UAPA, 2019 "does not afford an opportunity to an individual, being
categorised as terrorist, to present his/her case and let such individuals to live on the whim
and caprice of the society thereinafter.

"The amended Section 35 of the UAPA, 1967 "directly and adversely affects the fundamental
right to free speech and expression" as enshrined under Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution
of India. Right of dissent is a part and parcel of fundamental right to free speech and
expression
and therefore, cannot be abridged in any circumstances except for mentioned in Article 19
(2), it further said.

The petition had also stated that UAPA, 2019 also violates right to reputation -- an integral p
part of the right to life, by terming or tagging an individual as terrorist even before the
commencement of trial.

Supreme Court on Friday issued a notice to the Centre while hearing a PIL against the
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act, 2019 (UAPA). The petition seeks to
declare the amended UAPA law unconstitutional.

CJI Ranjan Gogoi has said the court will examine the matter.

Case:

The PIL against UAPA has been filed by Sajal Awasthi who has said that the Act curtails a
citizen's right to dissent. It provides no opportunity to a person declared a 'terrorist' to justify
his case before the arrest. Such an act violates the basic tenants of the Constitution, the
petitioner has said.

"The new or amended Section 35 of the UAPA Act, 1967 empowers the Central government
to categorise any individual as a terrorist and add the name of such a person in Schedule 4 of
the Act. Conferring of such a discretionary, unfettered and unbound powers upon the Central
government is antithesis to Article 14 of the Constitution of India," Sajal Awasthi's petition
stated.It added that the UAPA, 2019 "does not afford an opportunity to an individual, being
categorised as a terrorist, to present his/her case and let such individuals live on the whim and
caprice of the society thereinafter."The Supreme Court bench was also hearing a PIL filed by
an NGO against the UAPA Act. The plea challenges the constitutional validity of Section 35
and Section 36 of the UAPA that paved the way for the government to notify an individual as
a terrorist.

On Wednesday, the Centre declared Jaish-e-Mohammed chief Masood Azhar, Lashkar-e-

Taiba founder Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, Mumbai terror attack accused Zaki-ur-Rehman-
Lakhvi and fugitive gangster Dawood Ibrahim as individual terrorists under the new anti-
terror law.
This was a month after the Parliament cleared crucial amendments to the The Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act, 1967 last month.

Earlier, Bihar MLA Anant Singh was also booked under the UAPA following the recovery of
an AK 47 rifle and some hand grenades from his ancestral house. He was arrested after an
audio went viral wherein the Mokama MLA is heard holding conversations for making a bid
on the life of Bhola Singh, another strongman from Mokama, who is a contractor by
profession.

UAPA 2019 strikes at Right to Reputation

Submitting that UAPA 2019 strikes at Fundamental Rights of an individual at various levels,
the petitioner says it also mars the right to reputation of a person. "…
Right to Reputation is an intrinsic part of fundamental right to life with dignity under Article
21 of the Constitution of India and terming/tagging an individual as "terrorist" even before
commencement of trial or any application of judicial mind over it, does not amount to
following of 'procedure established by law' and is, thus, violative of right to reputation of
such an individual who is being categorised as terrorist and being added in Schedule 4 of the
UAPA Act, 1967."

The petitioner has cited the case of 'Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Dilip
Kumar Raghavendranath Nadkarni & Ors', while stressing on right to reputation as an
integral part of right to life, wherein the Supreme Court had held that, "It is thus amply clear
that one is entitled to have and preserve, one's reputation and one also has a right to protect it.
In case any authority, in discharge of its duties fastened upon it under the law, traverses into
the realm of personal reputation adversely affecting him, must provide a chance to him to
have his say in the matter."

The petition further states that Section 35 of the impugned law is also violative of
international conventions ratified and implemented by India as the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (1965) recognizes right of reputation of others and right to hold
opinions without interference.

Curtails Right to Dissent

Media reports suggest that the petition further states that, "The UAPA, 2019 does not afford
an opportunity to an individual, being categorised as terrorist, to present his/her case and let
such
individuals to live on the whim and caprice of the society thereinafter. The amended Section
35 of the UAPA, 1967 directly and adversely affects the fundamental right to free speech and
expression as enshrined under Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution of India. It is relevant to
note here that Right of dissent is a part and parcel of fundamental right to free speech and
expression and therefore, cannot be abridged in any circumstances except for mentioned in
Article 19 (2)".

"The UAPA, 2019 empowers the ruling government, under the garb of curbing terrorism, to
impose indirect restriction on right of dissent which is detrimental for our developing
democratic society," it says.

Arbitrary powers conferred on State; manifest arbitrariness

The petitioner also raises the issue "whether the Unlawful Activities (Prevention)
Amendment Act, 2019 suffers from the vice of manifest
arbitrariness?" "prior to passing of the impugned law, the Unlawful Activities (Prevention)
Act, 1967 vide its Section 35 authorised only categorising of organisations as terrorist
organisations but after coming into force of the impugned law, the same has been extended to
individuals as well… it is necessary to draw a clear line of distinction between unilateral
categorisation of an organisation as terrorist organisation and unilateral categorisation of
an individual as a terrorist because the latter carries with itself far more prolonged
consequences and repercussions for a person's liberty and to live freely with dignity".

The petition also further argues that the procedure for notification of an individual as a
'terrorist' is flawed and devoid of any impartial procedure, as the same lacks any judicial
member or retired judicial member, especially in the instant case where fundamental rights of
an individual are at stake, the petitioner submits. The petition also argues that Section 35
of UAPA 2019 "does not specify detailed grounds or reasons based on which an individual
can be termed as terrorist and, therefore, conferring of such an arbitrary and unfettered
power without any limits or bounds amount to violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of
India.”

"…thread of reasonableness runs through the entire Part III of the Constitution
(Fundamental Rights) and not even an iota of the provisions contained in Section 35 of the
impugned law be termed as fair and reasonable," it says while citing Supreme Court's
observation in the case of 'Shayara Bano & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors' wherein the court
dealt with the scope of challenging validity of an enactment on grounds of being manifestly
arbitrary and observed,
"Manifest arbitrariness, therefore, must be something done by the legislature capriciously,
irrationally and/or without adequate determining principle. Also, when something is done
which is excessive and disproportionate, such legislation would be manifestly arbitrary. We
are, therefore, of the view that arbitrariness in the sense of manifest arbitrariness as pointed
out by us above would apply to negate legislation as well Under Article 14," says the petition.
 PRAYER

Wherefore in the light of the issue raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is
humbly requested that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to:

 the present petition is maintainable under art.32 of the COI.

 The RTI Amendment Act, 2017 is unconstitutional
 The UAPA ACT, 2017 is unconstitutional.

AND/OR

Pass any other order that this Hon’ble Court of Sessions may deem fit in the interest of
Justice, Equity and Good conscience.
And for this, the Defence as in duty bound, shall humbly pray.