Module 1

Ient v. Tullet Prebon (Philippines), Inc.

GR 189158, January 11, 2017
Leonardo-de Castro, J.
Topic: (Nature and Definition)

Case Doctrine/s:

Penal statutes are construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of the accused.
Related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity- when the court is faced with
two possible interpretations of a penal statute, one that is prejudicial to the accused and
another that is favorable to him, the rule calls for the adoption of an interpretation more
lenient to accused.

Facts:

Petitioner Ient is a British national and CFO of Tradition Pacific, Ltd. (Tradition Asia) in
Singapore. Petitioner Schilze is a Filipino/German who does application support for
Tradition Financial Services Ltd. in London (Tradition London). Both Tradition Asia and
London are part of the Tradition Group, third largest group of inter-dealer brokers in the
world. Tullet Prebon is allegedly the second largest. Thus, Tullet and Tradition are
competitors.

Tullet was first to have business presence in PH in 1995. In Aug. 2008, Tradition Group
tasked Ient and Schilze to establish Tradition PH. In Sept., 2008, Tradition PH was
registered with SEC with Ient and Shilze as incorporators and directors.

Tullet filed a complaint with the Makati Prosecution Office against Tradition Group officers
for violating the CorpCode, impleading Ient and Chilze, Villalon (former president of Tullet),
and Chuidian (former Tullet director). Tullet alleges that Villalon and Chuidian violated S31
and 34 of CorpCode and thus are criminally liable under S144.

The complaint alleged that Villalon and Chuidian used their former positions in Tullet to
sabotage Tullet by orchestrating the mass resignation of its entire brokering staff to
convince them to leave Tullet and go to Tradition PH. as for Ient and Schulze, Tullet
claims that they conspired with Villalon and Chuidian.

Ient argues that S144 cannot be applied to S31 and 34 which already contain the penalties
for their violation.

Issue/s:
Whether S144 of the Corporation Code applies to S31 and S34 thereof

Ruling/s:

NO.

SECTION 31. Liability of Directors, Trustees or Officers. — Directors or trustees

who willfully and knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the
corporation or who are guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs
of the corporation or acquire any personal or pecuniary interest in conflict with their
duty as such directors or trustees shall be liable jointly and severally for all
damages resulting therefrom suffered by the corporation, its stockholders or
members and other persons.

When a director, trustee or officer attempts to acquire or acquires, in violation of his

duty, any interest adverse to the corporation in respect of any matter which has
been reposed in him in confidence, as to which equity imposes a disability upon
him to deal in his own behalf, he shall be liable as a trustee for the corporation and
must account for the profits which otherwise would have accrued to the
corporation.

SECTION 34. Disloyalty of a Director. — Where a director, by virtue of his office,

acquires for himself a business opportunity which should belong to the corporation,
thereby obtaining profits to the prejudice of such corporation, he must account to
the latter for all such profits by refunding the same, unless his act has been ratified
by a vote of the stockholders owning or representing at least two-thirds (2/3) of the
outstanding capital stock. This provision shall be applicable, notwithstanding the
fact that the director risked his own funds in the venture.

SECTION 144. Violations of the Code. — Violations of any of the provisions of this
Code or its amendments not otherwise specifically penalized therein shall be
punished by a fine of not less than one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos but not more
than ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos or by imprisonment for not less than thirty
(30) days but not more than five (5) years, or both, in the discretion of the court. If
the violation is committed by a corporation, the same may, after notice and
hearing, be dissolved in appropriate proceedings before the Securities and
Exchange Commission: Provided, That such dissolution shall not preclude the
institution of appropriate action against the director, trustee or officer of the
corporation responsible for said violation: Provided, further, That nothing in this
section shall be construed to repeal the other causes for dissolution of a
corporation provided in this Code.

Petitioners posit that S144 does not apply to S31 and S34 which both prescribe the
penalties for their violation. Respondent argues that the term “penalized” under S144
should be interpreted as referring to criminal penalty (fine/imprisonment) and it does not
contemplate “civil” penalties (damages/accounting/restitution) and thus applies to S31 and
S34.

S144 does NOT apply to S31 and S34.

Penal statutes are construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of the accused.
Related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity- when the court is faced with
two possible interpretations of a penal statute, one that is prejudicial to the accused and
another that is favorable to him, the rule calls for the adoption of an interpretation more
lenient to accused.

In US v. R.L.C., Justice Souter, writing for the majority, refused to resort to the rule of
lenity and held that lenity is reserved for "for those situations in which a reasonable doubt
persists about a statute's intended scope even after resort to 'the language and structure,
legislative history, and motivating policies' of the statute." Justice Scalia, concurring in part
and in the judgment, argued that “"it is not consistent with the rule of lenity to construe a
textually ambiguous penal statute against a criminal defendant on the basis of legislative
history... The rule of lenity, in my view, prescribes the result when a criminal statute is
ambiguous: The more lenient interpretation must prevail." In other words, for Justice
Scalia, textual ambiguity in a penal statute suffices for the rule of lenity to be applied.

Here, there is textual ambiguity to S144, even after examination of its legislative history
and the use of other aids to statutory construction. Thus, the rule of lenity applies.

In Romualdez v. Comelec, we upheld the constitutionality of S45(j) of RA 8189 making any

violation of RA 8189 a criminal offense. RA 8189 (Voter’s Registration Act) S45 and S46
provide:
SECTION 45. Election Offense. —The following shall be considered election
offenses under this Act:
j) Violation of any of the provisions of this Act.
SECTION 46. Penalties. — Any person found guilty of any Election offense under
this Act shall be punished with imprisonment of not less than one (1) year but not
more than six (6) years and shall not be subject to probation. In addition, the guilty
party shall be sentenced to suffer disqualification to hold public office and
deprivation of the right of suffrage. Xxx.
We held that from the wording of S45(j), there is a clear legislative intent to treat as
election offense any violation of RA 8189. Thus, S46 contemplates the term “penalty”
primarily in the criminal law concept. there is no provision in CorpCode using similarly
emphatic language.

Other provisions of CorpCode are of interest:

SECTION 21. Corporation by Estoppel. — All persons who assume to act as a
corporation knowing it to be without authority to do so shall be liable as general
partners for all debts, liabilities and damages incurred or arising as a result thereof;
xxx.
SECTION 22. Effects of non-use of corporate charter and continuous inoperation
of a corporation. —If a corporation does not formally organize and commence the
transaction of its business or the construction of its works within two (2) years from
 the date of its incorporation, its corporate powers cease and the corporation shall
be deemed dissolved.
SECTION 65. Liability of directors for watered stocks. —Any director or officer of a
corporation consenting to the issuance of stocks for a consideration less than its
par or issued value or for a consideration in any form other than cash, valued in
excess of its fair value, or who, having knowledge thereof, does not forthwith
express his objection in writing and file the same with the corporate secretary, shall
be solidarily liable with the stockholder concerned to the corporation and its
creditors for the difference between the fair value received at the time of issuance
of the stock and the par or issued value of the same.
SECTION 66. Interest on unpaid subscriptions. — Subscribers for stock shall pay
to the corporation interest on all unpaid subscriptions xxx.
SECTION 67. Payment of balance of subscription- xxx. Failure to pay on such date
shall render the entire balance due and payable and shall make the stockholder
liable for interest at the legal rate on such balance, unless a different rate of
interest is provided in the by-laws, computed from such date until full payment
SECTION 74. Books to be kept; stock transfer agent.- xxx. Any officer or agent of
the corporation who shall refuse to allow any director, trustee, stockholder or
member of the corporation to examine and copy excerpts from its records or
minutes, in accordance with the provisions of this Code, shall be liable to such
director, trustee, stockholder or member for damages, and in addition, shall be
guilty of an offense which shall be punishable under Section 144 of this Code:

Of all these, only S74 expressly states that a violation thereof is likewise considered an
offense under S144. The lack of specific language imposing criminal liability in S31 and
S34 shows the legislative intent to limit the consequences of their violation to civil liabilities
mentioned therein. had it been the intent to define S31 and S34 as offenses, they could
have easily included similar language as that found in S74.

During the deliberations of the legislators on S31 and 34, their discussions focused on the
civil liabilities or consequences prescribed in said provisions themselves. When S31 and
S34 were being taken up, the legislators did not veer away from the civil consequences as
stated within the 4 corners of these provisions. In contrast, the interpellations on S74 leave
no doubt that the legislators intended both civil and penal liabilities to attach to corporate
officers who violate S74.

It is noteworthy from the deliberations that the legislators intended to codify the common
law concepts of corporate opportunity (S34) and fiduciary obligations of corporate officers
found in American jurisprudence. In common law, the remedies available in the event of
breach of director’s fiduciary duties to the corporation are civil remedies. If a
director/officer breaches his duty of loyalty, an injunction may be issued or damages
awarded. If guilty of fraud, he may be held liable for lost profits. There is nothing in the
deliberations to indicate that the drafters of the CorpCode intended to deviate from
common law practice.
 Minucher vs. Scalzo
G.R. No. 142396, February 11, 2003
Vitug, J.
Topic: Characteristics of Criminal Law - General (Art. 2, RPC)

Case Doctrine/s:

Concededly, vesting a person with diplomatic immunity is a prerogative of the executive

branch of the government. The Court has recognized that, in such matters, the hands of
the courts are virtually tied. Amidst apprehensions of indiscriminate and incautious grant of
immunity, designed to gain exemption from the jurisdiction of courts, it should behoove t he
Philippine government, specifically its Department of Foreign Affairs, to be most
circumspect, that should particularly be no less than compelling, in its post litem motam
issuances. It might be recalled that the privilege is not an immunity from the observance of
the law of the territorial sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is, rather, an immunity
from the exercise of territorial jurisdiction.

Facts:

Sometime in May 1986, an information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed
with the Regional Trial Court against petitioner Khosrow Minucher, an Iranian national.
The narcotics agents who conducted the buy-bust operation were accompanied by private
respondent Arthur Scalzo, who would become one of the principal witnesses for the
prosecution. Later on, a decision was rendered acquitting the accused. Thereafter, the
Minucher filed a civil case for damages before the RTC against Scalzo on account of what
he claimed to have been trumped-up charges of drug trafficking. After almost 2 years
since the institution of the civil action, Scalzo filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that,
being a special agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, he was
entitled to diplomatic immunity.

Issue/s:

Whether or not Scalzo is entitled to diplomatic immunity

Ruling/s:

YES. Concededly, vesting a person with diplomatic immunity is a prerogative of the

executive branch of the government. The Court has recognized that, in such matters, the
hands of the courts are virtually tied. Amidst apprehensions of indiscriminate and
incautious grant of immunity, designed to gain exemption from the jurisdiction of courts, it
should behoove the Philippine government, specifically its Department of Foreign Affairs,
to be most circumspect, that should particularly be no less than compelling, in its post
litem motam issuances. It might be recalled that the privilege is not an immunity from the
observance of the law of the territorial sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is, rather,
an immunity from the exercise of territorial jurisdiction. But while the diplomatic immunity of
Scalzo might thus remain contentious, it was sufficiently established that, indeed, he
worked for the United States Drug Enforcement Agency and was tasked to conduct
surveillance of suspected drug activities within the country on the dates pertinent to this
case. If it should be ascertained that Arthur Scalzo was acting well within his assigned
functions when he committed the acts alleged in the complaint, the present controversy
could then be resolved under the related doctrine of State Immunity from Suit.
The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing
rule of customary international law then closely identified with the personal immunity of a
foreign sovereign from suit and, with the emergence of democratic states, made to attach
not just to the person of the head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the
state itself in its sovereign capacity. If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign
government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage,
but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the
foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is
believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. This immunity principle, however, has its
limitations. The doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where
the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen.
The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the
moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the
public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-
settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity
for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith or
beyond the scope of his authority and jurisdiction. A foreign agent, operating within a
territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it can be established
that he is acting within the directives of the sending state. The consent of the host state is
an indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between the two sovereigns.
 Liang v. People
G.R. No. 125865, January 28, 2000
Ynares-Santiago, J.
Topic: Characteristics of Criminal Law - Generality

Case Doctrine/s:

A diplomatic agent enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except
in the case of an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the
diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official functions. The commission of a
crime is not part of official duty.

Facts:

Jeffrey Liang, an economist working with the Asian Development Bank, was charged
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City for 2 counts of grave oral
defamation for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce
Cabal and was arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by the MeTC. After setting
of bail at Php 2,400, Liant was released to the custory of the Security Officer of the ADB.

The next day, the MeTC judge received an “office of protocol” from the DFA, stating that
Liang is covered by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement
between the ADB and the Philippine Government, which states that ADB staff enjoy
“immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official
capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity.”.

Issue/s:

Is Liang exempt from criminal liability by virtue of the Agreement between the ADB and
the Philippine Government?

Ruling/s:

NO.

Slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because
our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of
official duty. The imputation of theft is ultra vires and cannot be part of official functions. It
is well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private
capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad
faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. It appears that even the
government's chief legal counsel, the Solicitor General, does not support the stand taken
by petitioner and that of the DFA.

Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming

petitioner is such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in
the case of an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the
diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official functions. As already mentioned
above, the commission of a crime is not part of official duty.
 Del Socorro v Van Wilesm
G.R. No. 193707, 10 December 2014
Peralta , J.
Topic: Article 2 - General

Case Doctrine/s:

Territoriality principle in criminal law applies to the unlawful act of foreigner residing in the
Philippines.

Facts:

Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem were
married and were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time
of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age. Thereafter, they got
divorced.

According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their

son in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to
Php17,500.00 more or less). However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the
Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son, Roderigo.

On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support
from respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter.

An information was filed against respondent with RTC for violation of Section 5, paragraph
E (2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter's unjust refusal to support his minor child with
petitioner

Regional Trial Court

The court dismissed the criminal case against respondent on the ground that the facts
charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the respondent who
is an alien.

Issue/s:

Whether or not he can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified
failure to do so.

Ruling/s:

Yes. Territoriality principle in criminal law applies to the unlawful act of foreigner residing in
the Philippines.

Deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is considered an act of violence

against women and children under RA 9262.
Respondent may be made liable under Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly
refusing or failing to give support to petitioner’s son. Under the aforesaid special law, the
deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is considered an act of violence
against women and children.

Territoriality principle in criminal law applies to the unlawful act of foreigner residing in the
Philippines

In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find

strength in petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to
Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides that: penal
laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and
sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public international law and to
treaty stipulations.”

The alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is
committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the Province
of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged
against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent was
acquired upon his arrest.

The act of denying support to a child under R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing offense, hence,
crime has not prescribed

Respondent contends that the criminal liability has been extinguished on the ground of
prescription of crimes under Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262, which provides that:

SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. – Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall
prescribe in twenty (20) years. Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall
prescribe in ten (10) years.

The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a
continuing offense which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the
crime charged in the instant case has clearly not prescribed.
 Gonzales v. Abaya
G.R. No. 164007, 10 August 2006
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J
Topic: General (Art. 2, RPC)

Case Doctrine/s:

Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055, quoted above, is clear and unambiguous. First, it lays
down the general rule that members of the AFP and other persons subject to
military law, including members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units,
who commit crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code (like coup
d’etat),
other special penal laws, or local ordinances shall be tried by the proper civil court.
Next, it provides the exception to the general rule, i.e., where the civil court, before
arraignment, has determined the offense to be service-connected, then the
offending soldier shall be tried by a court martial. Lastly, the law states an
exception to the exception, i.e., where the President of the Philippines, in the
interest of justice, directs before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be
tried by the proper civil court.

Facts:

President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo received intelligence reports that some members of
the AFP, with high-powered weapons, had abandoned their designated places of
assignment. Their aim was to destabilize the government. The President then directed the
AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) to track and arrest
them.

The next day at around 1:00 a.m., more than 300 heavily armed junior officers and
enlisted men of the AFP – mostly from the elite units of the Army’s Scout Rangers and the
Navy’s Special Warfare Group – entered the premises of the Oakwood Premier Luxury
Apartments on Ayala Avenue, Makati City. They disarmed the securityguards and planted
explosive devices around the building. Led by Navy Lt. (SG) Antonio Trillanes IV, the
troops sported red armbands emblazoned with the emblem of the "Magdalo" faction of the
Katipunan. The troops then, through broadcast media, announced their grievances against
the administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.

About noontime of the same day, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 declaring
a state of rebellion.

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) investigated the incident and recommended
that the military personnel involved be charged with coup d’etat defined and penalized
under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

Meanwhile, respondent General Narciso Abaya, then AFP Chief of Staff, ordered the
arrest and detention of the soldiers involved in the Oakwood incident and directed the AFP
to conduct its own separate investigation.

The DOJ filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City an Information for coup
d’etat against those soldiers. Subsequently, this case was consolidated with Criminal Case
No. 03-2678, involving theother accused, pending before Branch 148 of the RTC, Makati
City.

Of the original 321, only 243 (including petitioners herein) filed with the RTC, Branch 148
an Omnibus Motion praying that the said trial court assume jurisdiction over all the
charges filed with themilitary tribunal. They invoked Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7055.

Petitioners filed with the Judge Advocate General’s Office (JAGO) a motion praying for the
suspension of its proceedings until after the RTC shall have resolved their motion to
assume jurisdiction.

The Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its Initial Report to the AFP Chief of Staff
recommending that the military personnel involved in the Oakwood incident be charged
before a general court martial with violations of Articles 63, 64, 67, 96, and 97 of the
Articles of War.

Meanwhile, on November 11, 2003, the DOJ, after conducting a reinvestigation, found
probable cause against only31 (petitioners included) of the 321 accused in Criminal Case
No. 03-2784. Accordingly, the prosecution filed with the RTC an Amended Information.

In an Order, the RTC admitted the Amended Information and dropped the charge of coup
d’etat against the 290 accused.

Subsequently, or on December 12, 2003, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its
Final Pre-Trial Investigation Report to the JAGO, recommending that, following the
"doctrine of absorption," those charged with coup d’etat before the RTC should not be
charged before the military tribunal for violation of the Articles of War.

For its part, the RTC, issued an Order stating that "all charges before the court martial
against the accused…are hereby declared not service-connected, but rather absorbed and
in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d’etat." The trial court then proceeded to hear
petitioners’ applications for bail.

Petitioners maintain that since the RTC has made a determination in its Order of February
11, 2004 that the offense for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman) of the Articles of War is not service connected, but is absorbed in the crime of
coup d’etat, the military tribunal cannot compel them to submit to its jurisdiction.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, counters that R.A. No. 7055 specifies
which offenses covered by the Articles of War are service-connected. These are violations
of Articles 54 to 70, 72 to 92, and 95 to 97. Thelaw provides that violations of these
Articles are properly cognizable by the court martial.

Issue/s:

WON the accused charged with coup d’etat before RTC shall be also
charged before military tribunal for violation of Articles of War.

Ruling/s:

YES.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055, quoted above, is clear and unambiguous. First, it lays down
the general rule that members of the AFP and other persons subject to military law,
including members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes
or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code (like coup d’etat), other special penal
laws, or local ordinances shall be tried by the proper civil court. Next, it provides the
exception to the general rule, i.e., where the civil court, before arraignment, has
determined the offense to be service-connected, then the offending soldier shall be tried
by a court martial. Lastly, the law states an exception to the exception, i.e., where the
President of the Philippines, in the interest of justice, directs before arraignment that any
such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil court.

The second paragraph of the same provision further identifies the "service-connected
crimes or offenses" as "limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and
Articles 95 to 97" of the Articles of War. Violations of these specified Articles are triable by
court martial. This delineates the jurisdiction between the civil courts and the court martial
over crimes or offenses committed by military personnel.

Here, petitioners are charged for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and
a gentleman) of the Articles of War before the court martial.

We hold that the offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is service-
connected. This is expressly provided in Section 1 (second paragraph) of R.A. No. 7055. It
bears stressing that the charge against the petitioners concerns the alleged violation of
their solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted
authorities. Such violation allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the military
profession. In short, the
charge has a bearing on their professional conduct or behavior as military officers. Equally
indicative of the "service-connected" nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the
same – dismissal from the service –imposable only by the military court. Such penalty is
purely disciplinary in character, evidently intended to cleanse the military profession of
misfits and to preserve the stringent standard of military discipline.
It is clear from the foregoing that Rep. Act No. 7055 did not divest the military courts of
jurisdiction to try cases involving violations of Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and
Articles 95 to 97 of the Articles of War as these are considered "service-connected crimes
or offenses." In fact, it mandates that these shall be tried by the court-martial.

The trial court aggravated its error when it justified its ruling by holding that the charge of
Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman is ‘absorbed and in furtherance to the
alleged crime of coup d’etat.’ Firstly, the doctrine of ‘absorption of crimes’ is peculiar to
criminal law and generally applies to crimes punished by the same statute, unlike here
where different statutes are involved. Secondly, the doctrine applies only if the trial court
has jurisdiction over both offenses. Here, Section 1 of R.A. 7055 deprives civil courts of
jurisdiction over service-connected offenses, including Article 96 of the Articles of War.
Thus, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is not applicable to this case.

A civilian government employee reassigned to another place by his superior may question
his reassignment by asking a temporary restraining order or injunction from a civil court.
However, a soldier cannot go to a civil court and ask for a restraining or injunction if his
military commander reassigns him to another area of military operations. If this is allowed,
military discipline will collapse.
 6. People vs. Tulin
G.R. No.111709, August 30, 2001
Melo, J.
Topic: Piracy as exception to Territoriality Principle

Case Doctrine/s:

Although Presidential Decree No. 532 requires that the attack and seizure of the vessel
and its cargo be committed in Philippine waters, the disposition by the pirates of the vessel
and its cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the same need not be
committed in Philippine waters.

Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As such, it
is an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law.

Facts:

In the evening of March 2, 1991, "M/T Tabangao," a cargo vessel owned by the PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation, loaded with 2,000 barrels of kerosene, 2,600 barrels
of regular gasoline, and 40,000 barrels of diesel oil, with a total value of P40,426,793,87,
was sailing off the coast of Mindoro near Silonay Island.

The vessel, manned by 21 crew members was suddenly boarded, with the use of an
aluminum ladder, by seven fully armed pirates led by Emilio Changco, older brother of
accused-appellant Cecilio Changco. The pirates, including accused-appellants Tulin,
Loyola, and Infante, Jr. were armed with M-16 rifles, .45 and .38 caliber handguns,
and bolos. They detained the crew and took complete control of the vessel.
Thereafter, accused-appellant Loyola ordered three crew members to paint over, using
black paint, the name "M/T Tabangao" on the front and rear portions of the vessel, as well
as the PNOC logo on the chimney of the vessel. The vessel was then painted with the
name "Galilee," with registry at San Lorenzo, Honduras. The crew was forced to sail to
Singapore, all the while sending misleading radio messages to PNOC that the ship was
undergoing repairs.

On March 9, 1991, the ship arrived in the vicinity of Singapore and cruised around the
area presumably to await another vessel which, however, failed to arrive. The pirates were
thus forced to return to the Philippines on March 14, 1991, arriving at Calatagan, Batangas
on March 20, 1991 where it remained at sea. On March 28, 1991, the "M/T Tabangao"
again sailed to and anchored about 10 to 18 nautical miles from Singapore's
shoreline where another vessel called "Navi Pride" anchored beside it. Emilio
Changco ordered the crew of "M/T Tabangao" to transfer the vessel's cargo to the
hold of "Navi Pride". Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong supervised the crew of
"Navi Pride" in receiving the cargo. The transfer was completed on March 30, 1991. On
March 30, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" returned to the same area and completed the transfer of
cargo to "Navi Pride."
On April 8, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" arrived at Calatagan, Batangas, but the vessel
remained at sea. On April 10, the members of the crew were released in three batches
with the stern warning not to report the incident to government authorities for a period of
two days or until April 12, 1991, otherwise they would be killed. On April 12, 1991, the
Chief Engineer, accompanied by the members of the crew, called the PNOC Shipping and
Transport Corporation office to report the incident. The crew members were brought to the
Coast Guard Office for investigation.

A series of arrests was thereafter effected. An Information charging qualified piracy or

violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Piracy in Philippine Waters) was filed against
accused-appellants. Tulin, Infante, Jr., and Loyola, notwithstanding some inconsistencies
in their testimony as to where they were on March 1, 1991, maintained the defense of
denial, and disputed the charge, as well as the transfer of any cargo from "M/T Tabangao"
to the "Navi Pride." All of them claimed having their own respective sources of livelihood.

Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong, also known as Ramzan Ali, adduced evidence that
he studied in Sydney, Australia, obtaining the "Certificate" as Chief Officer, and later
completed the course as a "Master" of a vessel, working as such for two years on board a
Vessel. The day before "M/T Tabangao" was seized by Emilio Changco and his cohorts,
Hiong's name was listed in the company's letter to the Mercantile Section of the Maritime
Department of the Singapore government as the radio telephone operator on board the
vessel "Ching Ma." The company was then dealing for the first time with Paul Gan, a
Singaporean broker, who offered to sell to the former bunker oil for the amount of
300,000.00 Singapore dollars. The transaction with Paul Gan finally pushed through on
March 27, 1991. Hiong, upon his return on board the vessel "Ching Ma," was assigned to
supervise a ship-to-ship transfer of diesel oil off the port of Singapore, the contact vessel
to be designated by Paul Gan. Hiong was ordered to ascertain the quantity and quality of
the oil and was given the amount of 300,000.00 Singapore Dollars for the purchase.
Although no inspection of "Navi Pride" was made by the port authorities before departure,
Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. was able to procure a port clearance upon submission of
General Declaration and crew list. Hiong, Paul Gan, and the brokers were not in the crew
list submitted and did not pass through the immigration.

The RTC convicted the accused of the crime charged. On appeal. Cheong San Hiong
raised that the trial court erred in finding him guilty as an accomplice to the crime of
qualified piracy under Section 4 of PD 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Robbery Law of 1974)
when the acts allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside of Philippine
waters and territory, stripping the Philippine courts of jurisdiction to hold him for trial, to
convict, and sentence.
 Issue/s:

Can accused-appellant Cheong be convicted as accomplice when he was not charged as

such and when the acts allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside
Philippine waters and territory?

Ruling/s:

Yes.

As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of
accused-appellant Hiong since the crime was committed outside Philippine waters, suffice
it to state that unquestionably, the attack on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" (renamed
"M/T Galilee" by the pirates) and its cargo were committed in Philippine waters, although
the captive vessel was later brought by the pirates to Singapore where its cargo was
offloaded, transferred, and sold. And such transfer was done under accused-appellant
Hiong's direct supervision. Although Presidential Decree No. 532 requires that the
attack and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be committed in Philippine waters, the
disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still deemed part of the act
of piracy, hence, the same need not be committed in Philippine waters.

Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As such, it
is an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same principle applies even
if Hiong, in the instant case, were charged, not with a violation of qualified piracy under the
penal code but under a special law, Presidential Decree No. 532 which penalizes piracy in
Philippine waters. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 532 should be applied with more force
here since its purpose is precisely to discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters
(People v. Catantan). It is likewise, well-settled that regardless of the law penalizing the
same, piracy is a reprehensible crime against the whole world (People v. Lol-lo).
 People v. Lol-lo
G.R. No. L-17958, 27 February 1922
Malcolm, J.
Topic: Characteristic of Criminal Law - Territorial

Case Doctrine/s:

Piracy may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may
be found or into which he may be carried.

Facts:

Two boats left Matuta for Peta, both of Dutch possession. One of the boats carry a Dutch
individual, while the other carries eleven men, women, and children, all subjects of
Holland.

After a number of days of navigation, the second boat arrived between the Islands of
Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies, where it was surrounded by six vintas manned
by 24 armed Moros. At first, the Moros asked for food but once on-board, they took all of
the cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated two of the women by horrible
methods. Thereafter, everyone on the Dutch boat, except two young women, were again
placed on it and holes were made in it, with the idea that it would submerge. But after
eleven days, they succored. Taking the two women with them and repeatedly violating
them, the Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Among the marauders
were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro the two women
were able to escape.

When Lol-lo and Saraw returned to Tawi-Tawi, they were arrested and charged with piracy
in the CFI-Sulu. The counsel for the defendants moved for a demurrer, contending that the
offense charged was not within the jurisdiction of any court of the Philippine Islands, but
this was denied.

The CFI then found Lol-lo and Saraw guilty as charged. Hence, this.

Issue/s:

Whether or not Lol-lo and Saraw are guilty of the crime of piracy, albeit it being committed
outside the Philippines?

Ruling/s:
Yes. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority
and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility. In this case, all
of the elements of the crime of piracy are present.

It cannot be contended that the CFI was without jurisdiction of the case. Pirates are in law
hostes humani generis and piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all
mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender
may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other
crimes has no territorial limits as it is against all so it may be punished by all.

Further, the Spanish Penal Code dealing with piracy were meant to include the Philippine
Islands. Art. 156 of the said Penal Code, which punishes piracy, in relation to Art. 1 of the
Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, would also make the provisions of the Code
applicable not only to Spaniards but to Filipinos.

By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippines to the US and the logical construction
of articles of the Penal Code would be that wherever “Spain” is mentioned, it should be
substituted by the words “United States” and wherever “Spaniards” are mentioned, the
word should be substituted by the expression “citizens of the United States and citizens of
the Philippine Islands.”

The Court held that Arts. 153-154 of the Penal Code are still in force In the Philippines, in
which case, the crime of piracy was accompanied by (a) an offense against chastity and
(b) the abandonment of persons without apparent means of saving themselves. It is, thus,
only necessary for the Court to determine the penalty.

Lol-lo was sentenced with death by hanging while Saraw was sentenced with cadena
perpetua [or life imprisonment].
 People v. Abilong
G.R. No. L-1960, November 26, 1948
Montemayor, J.:
Topic: Spanish Text of the RPC prevails over the English Text

Case Doctrine/s:

Inasmuch as the Revised Penal Code was originally approved and enacted in Spanish,
the Spanish text governs. It is clear that the word “imprisonment” used in the English text
is a wrong or erroneous translation of the phrase “sufriendo privación de libertad” used in
the Spanish text. It is equally clear that although the Solicitor General impliedly admits
destierro as not constituting imprisonment, it is a deprivation of liberty, though partial, in
the sense that as in the present case, the appellant by his sentence of destierro was
deprived of the liberty to enter the City of Manila.

Facts:

Florentino Abilong was charged in the Court of First Instance of “Manila with evasion of
service of sentence. He was then a convict sentenced and ordered to serve two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of destierro during which he should not enter any place
within the radius of 100 kilometers from the City of Manila, for attempted robbery, but he
evaded the service of said sentence by going beyond the limits made against him and
commit vagrancy.
Upon arraignment he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of prisión correccional, with the accessory penalties of the law and to pay
the costs. He is appealing from that decision. Counsel for the appellant contends that a
person like the accused evading a sentence of destierro is not criminally liable under the
provisions of article 157 of the RPC for the reason that said article 157 refers only to
persons who are imprisoned in a penal institution and completely deprived of their liberty.
He bases his contention on the word “imprisonment” used in the English text of said
article.
The Solicitor General in his brief says that had the original text of the Revised Penal Code
been in the English language, then the theory of the appellant could be upheld, However,
it is the Spanish text that is controlling in case of doubt.

Issue/s:

Whether the englishtext is controlling or the Spanish text?

Ruling/s:
The Spanish text is controlling. It is clear that the word “imprisonment” used in the
English text is a wrong or erroneous translation of the phrase “sufriendo privación de
libertad” used in the Spanish text. It is equally clear that although the Solicitor General
impliedly admits destierro as not constituting imprisonment, it is a deprivation of liberty,
though partial, in the sense that as in the present case, the appellant by his sentence of
destierro was deprived of the liberty to enter the City of Manila. It is clear that a person
under sentence of destierro is suffering deprivation of his liberty and escapes from the
restrictions of the penalty when he enters the prohibited area.” It was held that one evades
the service of his sentence of destierro when he enters the prohibited area specified in the
judgment of conviction, and he cannot invoke the provisions of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law which provides that its provisions do not apply to those who shall have
escaped from confinement or evaded sentence.
 Hernan v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 217874, 5 December 2017
PERALTA, J.
Topic: (Retroactive application when favorable to the accused)

Case Doctrine/s:

When exceptional circumstances exist, such as the passage of the instant amendatory law
imposing penalties more lenient and favorable to the accused, the Court shall not hesitate
to direct the reopening of a final and immutable judgment, the objective of which is to
correct not so much the findings of guilt but the applicable penalties to be imposed.

Facts:

Petitioner Ophelia Hernan joined Department of Transportation and Communication

(DOTC), Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR), CAR in Baguio City wherein she served
as an accounting clerk. In September 1984, she was promoted to the position of
Supervising Fiscal Clerk by virtue of which she was designated as cashier, disbursement
and collection officer. As such, petitioner received cash and other collections from
customers and clients for the payment of telegraphic transfers, toll fees, and special
message fees. The collections she received were deposited at the bank account of the
DOTC at the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), Baguio City Branch. An auditor of COA
conducted a cash examination and noticed that deposit slips did not bear a stamp of
receipt by the LBP nor was it machine validated. It was found out that no deposits were
made by petitioner for the account of DOTC on September 19, 1996 for the amount of
P11,300.00 and November 29, 1996 for the amount of P81,340.20. LBP conducted their
own inquiry. The auditors then found that petitioner duly accounted for the P81,348.20
remittance but not for the P11,300.00.

COA demanded that she pay the said amount. Petitioner, however, refused.
Consequently, the COA filed a complaint for malversation of public funds against petitioner
with the Office of the Ombudsman for Luzon which, after due investigation, recommended
her indictment for the loss of P11,300.00. Accordingly, petitioner was charged before the
RTC of Baguio City in an Information.

RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. CA &
Sandiganbayan affirmed the RTC's judgment of conviction but modified the penalty
imposed.

Subsequently, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10951 was passed entitled An Act Adjusting the
Amount or the Value of Property and Damage on which a Penalty is Based and the Fines
Imposed Under the Revised Penal Code Amending for the Purpose Act No. 3815
Otherwise Known as the "Revised Penal Code" as Amended which accordingly reduced
the penalty applicable to the crime charged.
 Issue/s:

Whether or not the penalty imposed to the accused must also be modified by the passage
of R.A. No. 10951 although the judgment convicting the accused had already become final
and executory?

Ruling/s:

YES. The general rule is that a judgment that has acquired finality becomes immutable
and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is
meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the
court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. When, however, circumstances
transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable, the
Court may sit en banc and give due regard to such exceptional circumstance warranting
the relaxation of the doctrine of immutability. The same is in line with Section 3(c), Rule II
of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, which provides that cases raising novel
questions of law are acted upon by the Court en banc.

We have here a novel situation wherein the judgment convicting the accused, petitioner
herein, has already become final and executory and yet the penalty imposed thereon has
been reduced by virtue of the passage of said law. Because of this, not only must
petitioner's sentence be modified respecting the settled rule on the retroactive effectivity of
laws, the sentencing being favorable to the accused, she may even apply for probation, as
long as she does not possess any ground for disqualification, in view of recent legislation
on probation, or R.A. No. 10707 entitled An Act Amending Presidential Decree No. 968,
otherwise known as the "Probation Law of 1976," As Amended, allowing an accused to
apply for probation in the event that she is sentenced to serve a maximum term of
imprisonment of not more than six (6) years when a judgment of conviction imposing a
non-probationable penalty is appealed or reviewed, and such judgment is modified
through the imposition of a probationable penalty.

Thus, in order to effectively avoid any injustice that petitioner may suffer as well as a
possible multiplicity of suits arising therefrom, the Court deems it proper to reopen the
instant case and recall the Entry of Judgment dated June 26, 2013 of the Sandiganbayan.

Indeed, when exceptional circumstances exist, such as the passage of the instant
amendatory law imposing penalties more lenient and favorable to the accused, the Court
shall not hesitate to direct the reopening of a final and immutable judgment, the objective
of which is to correct not so much the findings of guilt but the applicable penalties to be
imposed.
 People v. Formigones
G.R. No., L-3246, 29 November 1950
Montemayor, J.
Topic: Construction and interpretation - Prescribed but undeserved penalties (Art.
5, RPC)

Case Doctrine/s:

When the court believes that the appellant is entitled to a lighter penalty the case should
be brought to the attention of the Chief Executive who, in his discretion may reduce the
penalty to that next lower to reclusion perpetua to the death or otherwise apply executive
clemency in the manner he sees fit.

Facts:

From November to December 1946, defendant Abelardo Formigones together with his
wife Julia Agricola, and his five children lived in the house of his half-brother, Zacarias
Formigones to find employment as harvesters.

One afternoon, the accused, without any previous quarrel or provocation whatsoever, took
his bolo from the wall of the house and stabbed his wife at the back, the blade penetrating
the right lung which latter caused her death. When she fall on the ground the defendant
carried her up the house, laid her on the floor of the living room and then lay down beside
her. This was how he was found by the people summoned by his eldest daughter, who
witnessed the stabbing.

During preliminary investigation, he pleaded guilty citing jealousy as his motive for he
believed his wife was being intimate with his brother. He was convicted of parricide and
was sentenced to prison. The defendant entered a plea of not guilty. His counsel
presented testimonies of two guards of the provincial jail where defendant was confined.
They said that he behaved like an insane person, that sometimes he would remove his
clothes in front of others, would not take a bath, and remained silent and indifferent to his
surroundings. His counsel claimed that he is an imbecile therefore exempt from criminal
liability.

Dr. Francisco Gomez told that Abelardo was suffering only from feeblemindedness and
not imbecility and that he could distinguish right from wrong. An imbecile so as to be
exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived completely of reason or discernment
and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the defendant is an imbecile - NO!
Whether or not the questioned imbecilic nature of the defendant can affect his punishment
- NO!

Ruling/s:

No, the defendant is not an imbecile, evidenced by the fact that he regularly and dutifully
cultivated his farm, raised five children, and supported his family and even maintained in
school his children of school age, with the fruits of his work. Occasionally, as a side line he
made copra. And a man who could feel the pangs of jealousy to take violent measure to
the extent of killing his wife whom he suspected of being unfaithful to him, in the belief that
in doing so he was vindicating his honor, could hardly be regarded as an imbecile.
Whether or not his suspicions were justified, is of little or no import. The fact is that he
believed her faithless. Although he has procured the sympathies of the court with the
circumstances of his situation.

No, the defendant is still charged with reclusion perpetua. The two mitigating
circumstances, his diminished will power and his act of passion driven by jealousy (Art. 13
of Revised Penal Code) has been considered by the court but he is credited with one-half
of any preventive imprisonment he has undergone.

Decision: Judgment affirmed but this case should be brought to the attention of the Chief
Executive who, in his discretion may reduce the penalty to that next lower to reclusion
perpetua to death or otherwise apply executive clemency in the manner he sees fit.
 Ladonga v. People
G.R. No. 141066, February 17, 2005
Ponente
Topic: Suppletory application of RPC to Special Penal Laws (Art. 10, RPC)

Case Doctrine/s:

Some provisions of the Revised Penal Code, especially with the addition of the second
sentence in Article 10, are applicable to special laws. It submits that B.P. Blg. 22 does not
provide any prohibition regarding the applicability in a suppletory character of the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code to it.

Facts:

In 1989, spouses Adronico and Evangeline Ladonga became Alfredo Oculam’s regular
customers in his pawnshop business. Sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses
obtained a P9,075.55 loan from him, guaranteed by United Coconut Planters Bank
(UCPB) Check No. 284743, post dated to July 7, 1990 issued by Adronico; sometime in
the last week of April 1990 and during the first week of May 1990, the Ladonga spouses
obtained an additional loan of P12,730.00, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 284744, post
dated to July 26, 1990 issued by Adronico; between May and June 1990, the Ladonga
spouses obtained a third loan in the amount of P8,496.55, guaranteed by UCPB Check
No. 106136, post dated to July 22, 1990 issued by Adronico; the three checks bounced
upon presentment for the reason “CLOSED ACCOUNT”; when the Ladonga spouses
failed to redeem the check, despite repeated demands, he filed a criminal complaint
against them. While admitting that the checks issued by Adronico bounced because there
was no sufficient deposit or the account was closed, the Ladonga spouses claimed that
the checks were issued only to guarantee the obligation, with an agreement that Oculam
should not encash the checks when they mature; and, that petitioner is not a signatory of
the checks and had no participation in the issuance thereof. The RTC rendered a joint
decision finding the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P.
Blg. 22. Petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the conviction of petitioner

Issue/s:

Whether or not the cases cited by the CA in affirming in toto the conviction of petitioner as
conspirator applying the suppletory character of the RPC to special laws like BP 22 is
applicable?
 Ruling/s:

YES. Some provisions of the Revised Penal Code, especially with the addition of the
second sentence in Article 10, are applicable to special laws. It submits that B.P. Blg. 22
does not provide any prohibition regarding the applicability in a suppletory character of the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code to it.

Article 10 of the RPC reads as follows:

ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. – Offenses which are
or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the
provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the
latter should specially provide the contrary.

The article is composed of two clauses. The first provides that offenses which in the future
are made punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of the RPC,
while the second makes the RPC supplementary to such laws.

B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory application of the provisions of
the RPC. Thus, in the absence of contrary provision in B.P. Blg. 22, the general
provisions of the RPC which, by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied
suppletorily. Indeed, in the recent case of Yu vs. People the Court applied suppletorily the
provisions on subsidiary imprisonment under Article 39 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22.

The suppletory application of the principle of conspiracy in this case is analogous to the
application of the provision on principals under Article 17 in U.S. vs. Ponte. For once
conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the
act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of
them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals. BUT In the present
case, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any overt act in furtherance
of the alleged conspiracy. Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by
positive and conclusive evidence.
 People v. Simon
G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994
Regalado, J.
Topic:
Suppletory application of RPC to Special Penal Laws (Art. 10, RPC)

Case Doctrine/s:

To harmonize such conflicting provisions in order to give effect to the whole law, the court
hereby hold that the penalty to be imposed where the quantity of the drugs involved is less than
the quantities stated in the first paragraph shall range from prision correccional to reclusion
temporal, and not reclusion perpetua. This is also concordant with the fundamental rule in
criminal law that all doubts should be construed in a manner favorable to the accused.

The court held that Republic Act No. 6425, as now amended by Republic Act No. 7659, has
unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under the Revised Penal Code in their technical terms,
hence with their technical signification and effects. In fact, for purposes of determining the
maximum of said sentence, the court have applied the provisions of the amended Section 20 of
said law to arrive at prision correccional and Article 64 of the Code to impose the same in the
medium period. Such offense, although provided for in a special law, is now in effect punished
by and under the Revised Penal Code. Correlatively, to determine the minimum, the court
applied first part of the aforesaid Section 1 which directs that “in imposing a prison sentence for
an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence
the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in
view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of said Code,
and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by
the Code for the offense.

Facts:

Accused Martin Simon was charged with a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No.
6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. He sold tea bags of marijuana to a Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) poseur-buyer during a buy-bust operation which was sold for P40.00.
The said buy-bust operation was executed on or about October 22, 1988.The confiscated 4 tea
bags, weighing a total of 3.8 grams, when subjected to laboratory examination, were found
positive for marijuana.

Simon denied the accusation against him, claiming that on the day of question, he was picked
up by the police at their house while watching TV. He was told that he was a pusher so he
attempted to alight from the jeep but he was handcuffed instead. When they finally reached the
camp, he was ordered to sign some papers and, when he refused, he was boxed in the
stomach eight or nine times by Sgt. Pejoro. He was then compelled to affix his signature and
fingerprints on the documents presented to him. He denied knowledge of the marked money or
the 4 teabags of dried marijuana leaves, and insisted that the marked money came from the
pocket of Pejoro. Moreover, the reason why he vomited blood was because of the blows he
suffered at the hands of Pejoro.
Dr. Evelyn Gomez-Aguas, a resident physician of Romana Pangan District Hospital, declared
that she treated appellant for three days due to abdominal pain, but her examination revealed
that the cause for this ailment was appellant’s peptic ulcer. She did not see any sign of slight or
serious external injury, abrasion or contusion on his body. Simon was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment, to pay a fine of twenty thousand pesos and to pay the costs. Simon
then seek the reversal of the judgement

Issue/s:

Whether or not the respondent can avail of the lesser punishment pursuant to Art. 22 of the
RPC.Was the conviction of Simon correct?

Ruling/s:

To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the sale must be clearly and unmistakably
established. To sell means to give, whether for money or any other material consideration. It
must, therefore, be established beyond doubt that appellant actually sold and delivered two tea
bags of marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez, who acted as the poseur-buyer, in exchange for
two twenty-peso bills.

After careful review, the Court held that there were 2 tea bags of marijuana that was sold and
there were 2 other tea bags of marijuana confiscated. Thus, Simon should be charged of selling
for the 2 tea bags of marijuana only.

However, there is an overlapping error in the provisions on the penalty of reclusion perpetua by
reason of its dual imposition, that is, as the maximum of the penalty where the marijuana is less
than 750 grams, and also as the minimum of the penalty where the marijuana involved is 750
grams or more. The same error has been committed with respect to the other prohibited and
regulated drugs provided in said Section 20. To harmonize such conflicting provisions in order
to give effect to the whole law, the court hereby hold that the penalty to be imposed where the
quantity of the drugs involved is less than the quantities stated in the first paragraph shall range
from prision correccional to reclusion temporal, and not reclusion perpetua. This is also
concordant with the fundamental rule in criminal law that all doubts should be construed in a
manner favorable to the accused.

The court held that Republic Act No. 6425, as now amended by Republic Act No. 7659, has
unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under the Revised Penal Code in their technical terms,
hence with their technical signification and effects. In fact, for purposes of determining the
maximum of said sentence, the court have applied the provisions of the amended Section 20 of
said law to arrive at prision correccional and Article 64 of the Code to impose the same in the
medium period. Such offense, although provided for in a special law, is now in effect punished
by and under the Revised Penal Code. Correlatively, to determine the minimum, the court
applied first part of the aforesaid Section 1 which directs that “in imposing a prison sentence for
an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence
the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in
view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of said Code,
and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by
the Code for the offense.”

Thus, in the case at bar, appellant should be begrudged the benefit of a minimum sentence
within the range of arresto mayor, the penalty next lower to prision correccional which is the
maximum range have fixed through the application of Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised Penal
Code. For, with fealty to the law, the court may set the minimum sentence at 6 months of
arresto mayor, instead of 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional.
 People v. Sylvestre and Atienza
G.R. No. 35748, December 14, 1931
Villa-real, J.
Topic: Elements of Criminal Liability – Omission

Case Doctrine/s:

Mere passive presence at the scene of another's crime, mere silence and failure to give
the alarm, without evidence of agreement or conspiracy, do not constitute the cooperation
required by article 14 of the Penal Code for complicity in the commission of the crime
witnessed passively, or with regard to which one has kept silent.

Facts:

Accused Romana Silvestre met her son by her former marriage, Nicolas de la Cruz, and
under pretext of asking him for some nipa leaves, followed him home to Masocol and
remained there. The accused, Martin Atienza, who had continued to cohabit with said
Romana Silvestre, followed her and lived in the home of Nicolas de la Cruz.

On the night of November 25, 1930, Martin Atienza told Nicolas de la Cruz and his wife,
Antonia de la Cruz, to take their furniture out of the house because he was going to set fire
to it. Upon being asked by Nicolas and Antonia why he wanted to set fire to the house, he
answered that that was the only way he could revenge upon the people of Masocol who,
he said, had instigated the charge of adultery against him and his codefendant, Romana
Silvestre.

As Martin Atienza was at that time armed with a pistol, no one dared say anything to him,
not even Romana Silvestre, who was about a meter away from her codefendant. Alarmed
at what Martin Atienza had said, the couple left the house at once to communicate with the
barrio lieutenant, Buenaventura Ania, as to what they had just heard Martin Atienza say;
but they had hardly gone a hundred arms' length when they heard cries of "Fire! Fire!"
The fire destroyed about forty- eight houses. Thomas Santiago coming from the barrio
artesian well, and Tomas Gonzalez, teacher at the barrio school of Masocol, and Felipe
Clemente, an old man 61 years of age, coming from their homes, to the house on fire, saw
Martin Atienza going away from the house where the fire started, and Romana Silvestre
leaving it.

Issue/s:

Whether Silvestre should also be held liable for arson

 Ruling/s:

No. Silvestre should not be held liable. The complicity which is penalized requires a certain
degree of cooperation, whether moral, through advice, encouragement, or agreement, or
material, through external acts.

In the case of the accused-appellant Romana Silvestre, there is no evidence of moral or

material cooperation, and none of an agreement to commit the crime in question. Her
mere presence and silence do not constitute cooperation, for it does not appear that she
encouraged or nerved Martin Atienza to commit the crime of arson; and as for her failure
to give the alarm, that being a subsequent act it does not make her liable as an
accomplice.

For all the foregoing considerations, the Court is of the opinion that: (1) Mere passive
presence at the scene of another's crime, mere silence and failure to give the alarm,
without evidence of agreement or conspiracy, do not constitute the cooperation required
by article 14 of the Penal Code for complicity in the commission of the crime witnessed
passively, or with regard to which one has kept silent; and (2) he who desiring to burn the
houses in a barrio, without knowing whether there are people in them or not, sets fire to
one known to be vacant at the time, which results in destroying the rest, commits the crime
of arson, defined and penalized in article 550, paragraph 2, Penal Code.
 Manuel v. People
G.R. No. 165842, November 29, 2005
Callejo, Sr., J.
Topic: (e.g. Mental Element – Deliberate Intent / Dolo)

Case Doctrine/s:

A felony cannot exist without intent. Since a felony by dolo is classified as an intentional
felony, it is deemed voluntary. Although the words "with malice" do not appear in Article 3 of
the RPC, such phrase is included in the word "voluntary." When the act or omission defined
by law as a felony is proved to have been done or committed by the accused, the law
presumes it to have been intentional.

Facts:

Eduardo Manuel was married to Rubylus Gaña on July 28, 1975. Sometime in January 1996,
he met Tina Gandelara, who was then 21 years old, while he was 39. Eduardo went to Baguio
City to visit Tina, and eventually, as one thing led to another, they went to a motel where,
despite Tina’s resistance, Eduardo succeeded in having his way with her. Eduardo proposed
marriage on several occasions, assuring her that he was single. Tina finally agreed to marry
Eduardo, and they got married on April 22, 1996. It appeared in their marriage contract that
Eduardo was single. Three years after their marriage, Eduardo left and did not return. After
making inquiries from the NSO, Tina learned that Eduardo had been previously married. Tina
filed a complaint charging Eduardo with bigamy.

Eduardo argued that he informed Tina of his previous marriage. He insisted that since he has
not heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years, his first marriage was no longer valid. The
trial court found Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy. Eduardo appealed the
decision, arguing that the was not criminally liable for bigamy because when he married Tina,
he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent; that there must be malice for one to
be criminally liable for a felony.

Issue/s:

Whether or not Eduardo’s belief that his first marriage is no longer valid negates his criminal
intent

Ruling/s:

NO. The petitioner is charged with bigamy, a felony by dolo (deceit). Article 3, paragraph 2 of
the Revised Penal Code provides that there is deceit when the act is performed with
deliberate intent. Indeed, a felony cannot exist without intent. Since a felony by dolo is
classified as an intentional felony, it is deemed voluntary. Although the words "with malice" do
not appear in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, such phrase is included in the word
"voluntary."

Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act without legal excuse
or justification from which another suffers injury. When the act or omission defined by law as a
felony is proved to have been done or committed by the accused, the law presumes it to have
been intentional. For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a
confluence of both an evil act and an evil intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.

In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to Gaña in 1975,
and such marriage was not judicially declared a nullity; hence, the marriage is presumed to
subsist. The prosecution also proved that the petitioner married the private complainant in
1996, long after the effectivity of the Family Code. The petitioner is presumed to have acted
with malice or evil intent when he married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake
of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo;
such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an
excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.

It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the private
complainant in 1996, he was of the well-grounded belief that his first wife was already dead,
as he had not heard from her for more than 20 years since 1975. He should have adduced in
evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the presumptive death of his first wife.
Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the petitioner acted in good faith, and
would negate criminal intent on his part when he married the private complainant and, as a
consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such case. The petitioner, however,
failed to discharge his burden.
 People v. Puno
G.R. No. 97471, February 17, 1993
Regalado, J.
Topic: General and Specific Intent

Case Doctrine/s:

It is worth recalling an accepted tenet in criminal law that in the determination of the crime
for which the accused should be held liable in those instances where his acts partake of
the nature of variant offenses, and the same holds true with regard to the modifying or
qualifying circumstances thereof, his motive and specific intent in perpetrating the acts
complained of are invaluable aids in arriving at a correct appreciation and accurate
conclusion thereon.

Facts:

An information dated and filed on May 31, 1989 in the RTC, QC, the appellants were
charged with kidnapping for ransom allegedly committed in the following manner:

"That on or about the 13th day of January, 1988 in Quezon City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then private individuals,
conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, did, then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and carry away one MARIA DEL
SOCORRO SARMIENTO y MUTUC ** for the purpose of extorting ransom, to the damage
and prejudice of the said offended party in such amount as may be awarded to her under
the provisions of the Civil Code.

The appellants pleaded not guilty. The trial ensued which resulted in a judgment finding
them guilty of robbery with extortion committed on a highway, punishable under PD532.
On appeal, the appellants contend that the court a quo erred in convicted under PD532
since they were not expressly charged with a crime therein; and in applying Sec. 4 and 5
of R120 of the Rules of court, since the charge under said presidential decree is not the
offense proved and cannot rightly be used as the offense proved which is necessarily
included in the offense charged.

Version of the prosecution: a kidnapping for ransom is allegedly done on Jan. 13, 1988 by
the two accused. Around 5PM, Isabelo Puno, who is the personal driver of Mrs.
Sarmiento’s husband. Mrs. Sarmiento is an owner of Nika Cakes and Pastries. Puno told
Mrs. Socorro that her driver Fred had to go to Pampanga on an emergency so Puno will
temporarily take his place. On the way home, after the car turned right in a corner of
Araneta Ave., the car stopped then a young man accused Enrique Amurao boarded the
car beside the driver then went beside Mrs. Socorro and poked a gun at her. Puno
announced that Amurao is his nephew and wanted to get money from her. She said that
she only had P7,000 but the two accused told her that they wanted P100,000. She drafted
three checks equal to the demanded amount. Amurao ordered her to swallow a pill but she
refused.. Later, Socorro jumped out of the car.

Issue/s:

Whether accused-appellants committed the felony of kidnapping for ransom under Art.
267, RPC; or a violation of Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law (PD532)

Ruling/s:

No, the Court agrees that the crime could not be kidnapping for ransom as charged in the
information. In the case at bar, there is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any
motive, nurtured prior to or at the time they committed the wrongful acts against
complainant, other than the extortion of money from her under the compulsion of threats or
intimidation. This much is admitted by both appellants, without any other esoteric
qualification or dubious justification. Appellant Puno, as already stated, candidly laid the
blame for his predicament on his need for funds for, in his own testimony," (w)hile we were
along the way ‘Mam (sic) Corina was telling me ‘Beloy, I know your family very well and I
know that your (sic) not (a) bad person, why are you doing this?’ I told her ‘Mam (sic),
because I need money and I had an ulcer and that I have been getting an (sic) advances
from our office but they refused to give me any bale (sic) . . . ." With respect to the specific
intent of appellants vis-a-vis the charge that they had kidnapped the victim, we can rely on
the proverbial rule of ancient respectability that for this crime to exist, there must be
indubitable proof that the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the offended party
of her liberty, and not where such restraint of her freedom of action was merely an incident
in the commission of another offense primarily intended by the offenders. Hence, as early
as United States v. Ancheta, and consistently reiterated thereafter, it has been held that
the detention and/or forcible taking away of the victims by the accused, even for an
appreciable period of time but for the primary and ultimate purpose of killing them, holds
the offenders liable for taking their lives or such other offenses they committed in relation
thereto, but the incidental deprivation of the victims liberty does not constitute kidnapping
or serious illegal detention. That appellants in this case had no intention whatsoever to
kidnap or deprive the complainant of her personal liberty is clearly demonstrated in the
veritably confessional testimony of appellant Puno.

Neither can we consider the amounts given to appellants as equivalent to or in the nature
of ransom, considering the immediacy of their obtention thereof from the complainant
personally. Ransom, in municipal criminal law, is the money, price or consideration paid or
demanded for redemption of a captured person or persons, a payment that releases from
captivity. It can hardly be assumed that when complainant readily gave the cash and
checks demanded from her at gunpoint, what she gave under the circumstances of this
case can be equated with or was in the concept of ransom in the law of kidnappings.
These were merely amounts involuntarily surrendered by the victim upon the occasion of a
robbery or of which she was summarily divested by appellants. Accordingly, while we hold
that the crime committed is robbery as defined in Article 293 of the Code, we, however,
reject the theory of the trial court that the same constitutes the highway robbery
contemplated in and punished by Presidential Decree No. 532.

We further hold that there is no procedural obstacle to the conviction of appellants of the
crime of simple robbery upon an information charging them with kidnapping for ransom,
since the former offense which has been proved is necessarily included in the latter
offense with which they are charged. For the former offense, it is sufficient that the
elements of unlawful taking, with intent to gain, of personal property through intimidation of
the owner or possessor thereof shall be, as it has been, proved in the case at bar. Intent to
gain (animus lucrandi) is presumed to be alleged in an information where it is charged that
there was unlawful taking (apoderamiento) and appropriation by the offender of the things
subject of the robbery. These foregoing elements are necessarily included in the
information filed against appellants which, as formulated, allege that they wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously kidnapped and extorted ransom from the complainant. Such
allegations, if not expressly but at the very least by necessary implication, clearly convey
that the taking of complainant’s money and checks (inaccurately termed as ransom) was
unlawful, with intent to gain, and through intimidation. It cannot be logically argued that
such a charge of kidnapping for ransom does not include but could negate the presence of
any of the elements of robbery through intimidation of persons.
 People v. Delim
G.R. No.142773, January 28, 2003
Callejo, Sr., J.
Topic: General and Specific Intent

Case Doctrine/s:

In determining what crime is charged in an information, the material inculpatory facts recited
therein describing the crime charged in relation to the penal law violated are controlling. Where
the specific intent of the malefactor is determinative of the crime charged such specific intent
must be alleged in the information and proved by the prosecution.

If the primary and ultimate purpose of the accused is to kill the victim, the incidental deprivation
of the victim's liberty does not constitute the felony of kidnapping but is merely a preparatory act
to the killing, and hence, is merged into, or absorbed by, the killing of the victim. The crime
committed would either be homicide or murder.

Facts:

On January 23, 1999, the accused-appellants Marlon, Robert and Ronald, armed with a short
handgun, barged into the home of the victim, Modesto Delim and forcibly abducted the latter by
grabbing and hog-tying the latter and went towards the direction of Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan.
Rita and Randy, the wife and son of the victim, were warned by Leon and Manuel, likewise
armed, who stayed with them until 7 am. Thereafter, as soon as Leon and Manuel had left,
Randy rushed to the house of his Uncle Darwin wherein he was advised to report the incident to
the police authorities. However, Randy opted to first look for his father. It was only on January
27,1999 when they found the remains of Modesto under thick bushes in a grassy area in at the
housing project in Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan. According to the autopsy report, the victim
sustained stab wounds on his left arm and forearm and died of a gunshot wound.

An information was filed against the accused appellant. The RTC rendered judgment finding the
accused guilty of aggravated murder and was sentenced to death.

Issue/s:

Whether the crime charged in the information should be kidnapping or murder

Ruling/s:

Murder.

The Supreme Court held that in determining what crime is charged in an information, the
material inculpatory facts recited therein describing the crime charged in relation to the penal law
violated are controlling. Where the specific intent of the malefactor is determinative of the crime
charged such specific intent must be alleged in the information and proved by the prosecution.
If the primary and ultimate purpose of the accused is to kill the victim, the incidental deprivation
of the victim's liberty does not constitute the felony of kidnapping but is merely a preparatory act
to the killing, and hence, is merged into, or absorbed by, the killing of the victim. The crime
committed would either be homicide or murder.

Specific intent is not synonymous with motive. Motive generally is referred to as the reason
which prompts the accused to engage in a particular criminal activity. Motive is not an essential
element of a crime and hence the prosecution need not prove the same. As a general rule,
proof of motive for the commission of the offense charged does not show guilt and absence of
proof of such motive does not establish the innocence of accused for the crime charged such as
murder. The history of crimes shows that murders are generally committed from motives
comparatively trivial. Crime is rarely rational. In murder, the specific intent is to kill the victim. In
kidnapping, the specific intent is to deprive the victim of his/her liberty. If there is no motive for
the crime, the accused cannot be convicted for kidnapping. In kidnapping for ransom, the motive
is ransom. Where accused kills the victim to avenge the death of a loved one, the motive is
revenge. There is no allegations in the complaint that the offenders intended to deprive the victim
of his liberty.
 U.S. v. Ah Chong
G.R. No. L-5272, March 19, 1910
Carson, J.
Topic: Mistake of Fact

Case Doctrine/s:

There is no criminal liability when one does an act for which he would be exempt from
criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute
the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at
the time when he committed the act. To this question we think there can be but one
answer, and we hold that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided
always that the alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to negligence or bad
faith.

Facts:

On August 14, 1908, at around 10 o’clock at night, Ah Chong, a cook at Officer’s Quarters
No. 27 in Fort McKinley, Rizal Province, who had received for the night, was suddenly
awakened by someone trying to force open the door of his, and his roommate Pascual
Gualberto’s, room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no
answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by
someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. Due to the heavy growth of vines along
the front of the porch, the room was very dark, and the defendant, fearing that the intruder
was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill
you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair which
had been placed against the door. In retaliation, Ah Chong seized a common kitchen knife
he kept under his pillow, and struck the person who he supposed was a burglar, who
turned out to be his roommate. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his
employers who slept in the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure
bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.

There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident
just described, one of which took place in a house in which the defendant was employed
as cook; and as defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated robberies he kept a
knife under his pillow for his personal protection.

Issue/s:

Can Ah Chong be held criminally liable for his act?

 Ruling/s:

NO.

A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the
defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that
the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose
assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and of the property
committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as they must have
presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice,
or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate
right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have
been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be
said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into
his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the
imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and his property and the property
under his charge.
 People v. Oanis
G.R. No. 47722, 27 July 1943
Moran, J.
Topic: General Principles – Elements of criminal liability – Mental element (mens
rea) – Deliberate intent (dolo) – Mistake of fact

Case Doctrine/s:

Mistake of fact or ignorantia facti excusat applies only when the mistake is committed
without fault or carelessness.

In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply
the incident of another act performed without malice (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939).
Where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim
cannot be considered as reckless imprudence (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605).

Facts:

In the afternoon of December 24, 1938, the Provincial Inspector of Nueva Ecija received a
telegram stating: "Information received escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina
named Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive." The Provincial Inspector asked his
sergeant to give him four men. Defendant corporal Galanta, and privates Oralo, Serna,
and Fernandez reported at the Provincial Inspector’s office. Defendant chief of police
Oanis was likewise called to the office. They were instructed to arrest Balagtas and, if
overpowered, to follow the instruction contained in the telegram.

They were divided into two groups. Defendants Oanis and Galanta, and private Fernandez
took the route to Rizal street leading to the house where Irene was supposedly living.
Upon arriving at Irene’s house, Oanis asked one Brigada Mallare where Irene’s room was.
Brigida indicated the place and upon further inquiry also said that Irene was sleeping with
her paramour.

Defendants Oanis and Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and on seeing a man
sleeping with his back towards the door where they were, simultaneously or
successively fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the
gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and looking at the door where the
shots came, she saw the defendants still firing at him. Shocked by the entire scene, Irene
fainted; it turned out later that the person shot and killed was not the notorious
criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent citizen named Serapio
Tecson, Irene’s paramour. The Provincial Inspector, informed of the killing, repaired to the
scene and when he asked as to who killed the deceased, Galanta, referring to himself and
to Oanis, answered: "We two, sir." Defendants were charged with the crime of murder.
Defendants prayed that they incur no criminal liability because they acted in
innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance of their official duties. Sustaining
this theory in part, the lower court declared them guilty of the crime of homicide
through reckless imprudence.

Issue/s:

Whether or not Oanis and Galanta acted in mistake of fact and should thus be exculpated

Ruling/s:

NO. There is no mistake of fact in this case. The crime committed is murder with mitigating
circumstance.

The Latin maxim for mistake of fact is ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only
when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness.

Defendants-appellants rely on the case of U.S. v. Ah Chong. In the Ah Chong case,

defendant therein after having gone to bed was awakened by someone trying to open the
door. He called out twice, "who is there," but received no answer. Fearing that the intruder
was a robber, he leaped from his bed and called out again, "if you enter the room I will kill
you." But at that precise moment, he was struck by a chair which had been placed against
the door and believing that he was then being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and
struck and fatally wounded the intruder who turned out to be his room-mate.

In the instant case, appellants, unlike in the accused in the Ah Chong case, found
no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to immediate action. The
person in the room being then asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity to
ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves, and could even effect a bloodless
arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed,
according to Irene Requinea. This, indeed, is the only legitimate course of action for
appellants to follow even if the victim was really Balagtas, as they were instructed not to
kill Balagtas at sight but to arrest him, and to get him dead or alive only if resistance or
aggression is offered by him.

The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing
being intentional and not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to
another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed
without malice (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939). A deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is
essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil.,
232; People vs. Bindor, 56 Phil., 16). Where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a
mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless
imprudence (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605).
In this case, as the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is murder
with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia. However, there is a privileged
mitigating circumstance consisting in the incomplete justifying circumstance of
performance of duty.

A person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right or office. There are two requisites in order that the circumstance may be
taken as a justifying one: (a) that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the
lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary
consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or
office. In the instant case, only the first requisite is present. The second requisite is
wanting for the crime by them committed is not the necessary consequence of a due
performance of their duty. Their duty was to arrest Balagtas or to get him dead or alive if
resistance is offered by him and they are overpowered. But through impatience or over-
anxiety or in their desire to take no chances, they have exceeded in the fulfillment of such
duty by killing the person whom they believed to be Balagtas without any resistance from
him and without making any previous inquiry as to his identity.

According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by one or two
degrees than that prescribed by law shall, in such case, be imposed.
 Padilla v. Dizon
A.C. No. 3086, February 23, 1988
Per Curiam
Topic: Malum Prohibitum as an exception to Mens Rea

Case Doctrine/s:

The proof of malice or deliberate intent is not essential in offenses punished by laws which
are Mala Prohibita.

Facts:

A tourist, Lo Chi Fai, was caught by Customs guard at the Manila international Airport
while attempting to smuggle foreign currency and foreign exchange instruments out of the
country, at time of apprehension, he was found carrying with him foreign currency and
foreign exchange instruments (380 pieces) amounting to US$355,349.57 where he failed
to declare in the form prescribed by Central bank uponhis arrival in the Philippines.

Information was filed against the accused Lo Chi Fai with the RTC of Pasay city for
violation of Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular no. 960 where Respondent judge presided.

“No person shall take out or transmit or attempt to take out or transmit foreign exchange in
any form, out of the Philippines directly....... tourist and non-resident temporary visitors
bringing with them more than US$ 3,000.00 shall declare their foreign exchange in the
form prescribed by the Central Bank at points of entries upon arrival in the Philippines”
(CB Circular no. 960 sec. 6)

Alexander Padilla, Commissioner of Customs, filed an Administrative complaint

dated August 6, 1987 against Respondent Judge Baltazar R. Dizon for rendering a
manifestly erroneous decision due at the very least, to gross incompetence
and gross ignorance of the law, in Criminal case entitled “People vs. Lo Chi Fai” (no. 86-
10126-P). Acquitting said accused for violation of Central Bank circular no. 960 sec 6. The
acquittal according to him is based on:
(1) No deliberate intent; there must be a clear intention to violate the law in order
for the accused to be prosecuted.
(2) Money brought by the accused is for the purpose of investing in some undefined
business ventures and that the reason why the accused ought to export the money is
because of the fear that the “Attempted Revolution” might spread.

Furthermore, respondent Judge Alleged that he rendered his decision in “good

faith”.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of gross incompetence or gross ignorance
of the law rendering the decision in question.

Ruling/s:

YES, the proof of malice or deliberate intent is not essential in offenses punished by laws
which are Mala Prohibita.

Thus, in requiring proof of malice, the respondent judge has by his gross ignorance
allowed the accused to go scot free. A judge cannot be held to account or answer,
criminally, civilly or administratively, for an erroneous decision rendered by him in good
faith. But these circumstances which make the story invented by the accused as palpably
unbelievable as to render the findings of the respondent judge obviously contrived to favor
the acquittal of the accused, thereby clearly negating his claim that he rendered the
decision “in good faith.”

The court finds the Respondent Judge Baltazar Dizon guilty of gross incompetence,
ignorance of the law. The court thereby ordered that the Respondent Judge be dismissed
from the Service.
 Magno vs. CA
G.R. No. 96132, June 26, 1992
Paras, J.
Topic: Elements of criminal liability - Mental element

Case Doctrine/s:

It behooves upon a court of law that in applying the punishment imposed upon the
accused, the objective of retribution of a wronged society, should be directed against the
"actual and potential wrongdoers."

Facts:

Petitioner Oriel Magno, representing Ultra Sources International Corporation, approached

Corazon Teng, Vice President of Mancor Industries, for the purpose of obtaining funds and
equipment in order to put up a car repair shop. Teng referred Magno to LS Finance and
Management Corporation, advising its Vice President, Joey Gomez, that Mancor was
willing and able to supply the pieces of equipment needed if LS Finance could
accommodate Magno and provide him credit facilities. The arrangement went through on
the condition that Magno has to put up warranty deposit equivalent to 30% of the total
value of the pieces of equipment to be purchased, amounting to P29,790.00. Since Magno
could not come up with the amount, he requested Gomez to look for a third party who
could lend him the equivalent amount of the warranty deposit. However, unknown to
Magno, it was Teng who advanced the deposit in question, on the condition that the same
would be paid as a short term loan. Thereafter, the equipment was delivered to Magno
who in turn issued a postdated check and gave it to Gomez who, unknown to Magno,
delivered the same to Teng. When the check matured, Magno requested through Gomez
not to deposit the check as he was no longer banking with Pacific Bank. To replace the
first check issued, petitioner issued another set of 6 post-dated checks. Among the 6
checks, only 2 were cleared. After joint trial before the Regional Trial Court, Magno was
convicted for violations of BP Blg. 22.

Issue/s:

Whether or not Magno violated BP Blg. 22

Ruling/s:

NO. By the nature of the "warranty deposit" amounting to P29,790.00 corresponding to

30% of the "purchase/lease" value of the equipments subject of the transaction, it is
obvious that the "cash out" made by Mrs. Teng was not used by petitioner who was just
paying rentals for the equipment. It would have been different if petitioner opted to
purchase the pieces of equipment on or about the termination of the lease-purchase
agreement in which case he had to pay the additional amount of the warranty deposit
which should have formed part of the purchase price. As the transaction did not ripen into
a purchase, but remained a lease with rentals being paid for the loaned equipment, which
were pulled out by the Lessor (Mancor) when the petitioner failed to continue paying
possibly due to economic constraints or business failure, then it is lawful and just that the
warranty deposit should not be charged against the petitioner.
Thus, it behooves upon a court of law that in applying the punishment imposed upon the
accused, the objective of retribution of a wronged society, should be directed against the
"actual and potential wrongdoers." In the instant case, there is no doubt that petitioner's
four (4) checks were used to collateralize an accommodation, and not to cover the receipt
of an actual "account or credit for value" as this was absent, and therefore petitioner
should not be punished for mere issuance of the checks in question. Following the
aforecited theory, in petitioner's stead the "potential wrongdoer", whose operation could be
a menace to society, should not be glorified by convicting the petitioner.
 Garcia v. CA
G.R. No. 157171, March 14, 2006
Quisumbing, J.
Topic: malum prohibitum as exception to the requirement of mens rea

Case Doctrine/s:

Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se. For otherwise, even errors
and mistakes committed due to overwork and fatigue would be punishable. Given the
volume of votes to be counted and canvassed within a limited amount of time, errors and
miscalculations are bound to happen. And it could not be the intent of the law to punish
unintentional election canvass errors. However, intentionally increasing or decreasing the
number of votes received by a candidate is inherently immoral, since it is done with malice
and intent to injure another.

Criminal intent is presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act which
the law punishes, unless the contrary shall appear. Thus, whoever invokes good faith as a
defense has the burden of proving its existence.

Facts:

Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senatorial candidate for the 1995 elections filed a complaint-
affidavit alleging that during the canvassing period at Alaminos, Pangasinan accused,
Election Officer Arsenia B. Garcia, Municipal Treasurer Herminio R. Romero, Public
School District Supervisor Renato R. Viray, Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and Member-
Secretary, respectively, of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Alaminos, Pangasinan,
tabulators Rachel Palisoc and Francisca de Vera, of unlawfully decreasing the total
number of votes he received in 169 precincts from 6,998 to 1,912 votes with a difference
of 5,077 votes.

In a Decision dated September 11, 2000, the RTC acquitted all the accused for
insufficiency of evidence, except petitioner who was convicted for violation of Section
27(b) of R.A. 6646, which provides:

SEC. 27. Election Offenses. - In addition to the prohibited acts and election offenses enumerated in Sections
261 and 262 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended, the following shall be guilty of an election offense:
xxx
(b) Any member of the board of election inspectors or board of canvassers who tampers, increases, or
decreases the votes received by a candidate in any election or any member of the board who refuses, after
proper verification and hearing, to credit the correct votes or deduct such tampered votes.

The CA affirmed the RTC Decision with modification, increasing the minimum penalty
imposed on petitioner.
Before the Supreme Court, Garcia claims as a defense, among others, lack of motive on
her part to reduce Pimentel’s votes.

Issue/s:

Is a violation of Section 27(b) of R.A. 6646 classified as mala in se or mala prohibita?

Ruling/s:

Mala in se.

Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code.
When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if
they are punished by a special law. Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established
with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. On the other hand,
in crimes that are mala prohibita, the criminal acts are not inherently immoral but become
punishable only because the law says they are forbidden. With these crimes, the sole
issue is whether the law has been violated. Criminal intent is not necessary where the acts
are prohibited for reasons of public policy.

Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se. For otherwise, even errors and
mistakes committed due to overwork and fatigue would be punishable. Given the volume
of votes to be counted and canvassed within a limited amount of time, errors and
miscalculations are bound to happen. And it could not be the intent of the law to punish
unintentional election canvass errors. However, intentionally increasing or decreasing the
number of votes received by a candidate is inherently immoral, since it is done with malice
and intent to injure another.
 People of the Philippines vs. Fernando Pugay
G.R. No. 74324, 17 November 1988
Medialdea, J.
Topic: Negligence or lack of foresight

Case Doctrine/s:

Having taken the can from under the engine of the ferris wheel and holding it before
pouring its contents on the body of the deceased, this accused knew that the can
contained gasoline. The stinging smell of this flammable liquid could not have escaped his
notice even before pouring the same. Clearly, he failed to exercise all the diligence
necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from any act that may be
committed by his companions who at the time were making fun of the deceased. We
agree with the Solicitor General that the accused is only guilty of homicide through
reckless imprudence defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

Facts:

Fernando Pugay and Benjamin Samson were charged with the crime of murder for the
death of Bayani Miranda, a a 25-year old retardate.

The deceased Miranda and the accused Pugay were friends. During a town fiesta fair, one
of the rides was a ferris wheel. Sometime after midnight, Eduardo Gabion was sitting in
the ferris wheel and reading a comic book with his friend Henry. Later, the accused Pugay
and Samson with several companions arrived and appeared to be drunk as they were all
happy and noisy. As the group saw Miranda walking nearby, they started making fun of
him. They made him dance by tickling him with a piece of wood. The accused Pugay
suddenly took a can of gasoline from under the engine of the ferris wheel and poured its
contents on the body of Miranda. Gabion told Pugay not to do so while latter was already
in the process of pouring the gasoline. Then, Samson set Miranda on fire making a human
torch out of him.

The body of the deceased was still aflame when police officers arrived at the scene of the
incident. Upon inquiring as to who were responsible for the dastardly act, the persons
around spontaneously pointed to Pugay and Samson as the authors thereof.

The trial court rendered a decision finding both accused guilty of the crime of murder but
crediting in favor of Pugay the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so
grave a wrong. Both accused interposed the present appeal. The accused claim that they
were not assisted by counsel during the custodial investigation. They also argue that the
deliberate non-presentation of the other witnesses raises the presumption that their
testimonies would be adverse to the prosecution.
 Issue/s:

Whether or not Pugay is guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence defined in Article
365 of the Revised Penal Code.

Ruling/s:

Yes. Having taken the can from under the engine of the ferris wheel and holding it before
pouring its contents on the body of the deceased, this accused knew that the can
contained gasoline. The stinging smell of this flammable liquid could not have escaped his
notice even before pouring the same. Clearly, he failed to exercise all the diligence
necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from any act that may be
committed by his companions who at the time were making fun of the deceased. We
agree with the Solicitor General that the accused is only guilty of homicide through
reckless imprudence defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

Criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended (Art 4, RPC)
There can be no doubt that the accused Samson knew very well that the liquid poured on
the body of the deceased was gasoline and a flammable substance for he would not have
committed the act of setting the latter on fire if it were otherwise. Giving him the benefit of
doubt, it can be conceded that as part of their fun-making he merely intended to set the
deceased's clothes on fire. His act, however, does not relieve him of criminal
responsibility. Burning the clothes of the victim would cause at the very least some kind of
physical injuries on his person, a felony defined in the Revised Penal Code. If his act
resulted into a graver offense, as what took place in the instant case, he must be held
responsible therefor. Article 4 of the aforesaid code provides, inter alia that criminal liability
shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done
be different from that which he intended.

Penalties and civil liabilities

The proper penalty that the accused Pugay must suffer is an indeterminate one ranging
from four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as maximum.

The proper penalty that the accused Samson must suffer is an indeterminate one ranging
from eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum.

The two accused are solidarily liable for P13,940.00 the amount spent by Miranda's
parents for his hospitalization, wake and interment. The indemnity for death is P30,000.00.
Hence, the indemnity to the heirs of the deceased Miranda is increased to P43,940. Both
accused shall be jointly and severally liable for the aforesaid amount plus the P10,000.00
as moral damages and P5,000.00 as exemplary damages as found by the court a quo.
 Ivler v. San Pedro
G.R. No. 172716, 17 November 2010
CARPIO, J
Topic: (Art. 3 and 365, RPC)-Negligence or lack of foresight

Case Doctrine/s:

The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless
imprudence" is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely
determines a lower degree of criminal liability is too broad to deserve unqualified assent.
There are crimes that by their structure cannot be committed through imprudence: murder,
treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised
Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense and dealt with separately from willful
offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the
act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the
mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or
foresight,the imprudencia punible.

Facts:

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was
charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two
separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal
Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent
Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property
(Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce
and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary
release in both cases.

On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367
and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner
moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No.82366 for placing him in jeopardy of
second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

Issue/s:

Whether petitioner’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.

Ruling/s:
YES.
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime, its Consequences on Persons and Property are
Material Only to Determine the Penalty.

Conceptually, quasi-offenses penalize "the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible," unlike willful
offenses which punish the intentional criminal act. These structural and conceptual
features of quasi-offenses set them apart from the mass of intentional crimes under the
first 13 Titles of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of
crime, separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing
new. As early as the middle of the last century, we already sought to bring clarity to this
field by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the proposition that
"reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it x x x" on
three points of analysis: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to
intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses (as
opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3)
the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes:

The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless
imprudence" is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely
determines a lower degree of criminal liability is too broad to deserve unqualified assent.
There are crimes that by their structure cannot be committed through imprudence: murder,
treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised
Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful
offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the
act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the
mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or
foresight, the imprudencia punible.

The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself
and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such
quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its
various resulting acts, undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double
jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting with People v. Diaz,25 decided in 1954.

Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of
reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the
essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would
be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the
result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the
penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single,
whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense
(criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes
and prosecutions.
 24. People vs. Guillen
G.R. No.L-1477, January 8, 1950
Per Curiam
Topic: Abberatio Ictus

Case Doctrine/s:

In throwing hand grenade at the President with the intention of killing him, the appellant acted with
malice. He is therefore liable for all the consequences of his wrongful act; for in accordance with
article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony
(delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. In criminal
negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of
another act performed without malice.

Facts:

Julio Guillen, although not affiliated with any particular political group, had voted for the defeated
candidate in the presidential elections held in 1946. Manuel A. Roxas, the successful candidate,
assumed the office of President of the Commonwealth. Guillen became disappointed in Pres.
Roxas because of the latter’s campaign for the approval of the parity measure. Hence, he
determined to assassinate the president. After he had pondered for some time over the ways and
means of assassinating President Roxas, the opportunity presented itself at a popular meeting held
by the Liberal Party at Plaza de Miranda, Quiapo, Manila, attended by a big crowd, President
Roxas, accompanied by his wife and daughter and surrounded by a number of ladies and
gentlemen prominent in government and politics, stood on a platform erected for that purpose and
delivered his speech expounding and
trying to convince his thousands of listeners of the advantages to be gained by the Philippines,
should the constitutional amendment granting American citizens the same rights granted to Filipino
nationals be adopted. Guillen had first intended to use a revolver for the accomplishment of his
purpose, but having lost said rearm, which was duly licensed, he thought of two hand grenades
which were given him by an American soldier. Before executing his plan, Guillen went to the house
of Amado Hernandes whom he requested to prepare for him a document called “For the Sake of A
Free Philippines”.

When he reached Plaza de Miranda, (Guillen was carrying two hand grenades
concealed in a paper bag which also contained peanuts. He buried one of the hand grenades in a
plant pot located close to the platform, and when he decided to carry out his evil purpose he stood
on the chair on which he had been sitting and, from a distance of about seven meters, he hurled the
grenade at the President when the latter had just closed his speech and was about to leave the
platform.

General Castañeda, who was on the platform, saw the smoking, hissing, grenade and, without
losing his presence of mind, kicked it away from the platform, along the stairway, and towards an
open space where the general thought the grenade was likely to do the least. harm; and, covering
the President with his body, shouted to the crowd that everybody should lie down. The grenade fell
to the ground and exploded in the middle of a group of persons who were standing close to the
platform. Fragments of the grenade had seriously injured Simeon Varela who died on the following
day as a result of mortal wounds caused by the fragments of the grenade. Fragments of the
grenade injured Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang.

Guillen was arrested by members of the Police Department about 2 hours after the occurrence.
During the investigation conducted by the police he readily admitted his responsibility, although at
the same time he tried to justify his action in throwing the bomb at President Roxas. He also
indicated to his captors the place where he had hidden his so-called last will.

Julio Guillen was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and frustrated
murder as charged in the information. At the beginning of the trial and before arraignment, counsel
de ocio for the accused moved that the mental condition of Guillen be examined. The court,
notwithstanding that it had found out from the answers of the accused to questions propounded to
him in order to test the soundness of his mind, that he was not suffering from any mental
derangement, ordered that Julio Guillen be confined for a period of about 8 days in the
government Psychopathic Hospital. According to the Report of the board of medical experts,
Guillen was not insane. He was found to be intelligent and always able to differentiate right from
wrong, fully aware of the nature of the crime he committed and is equally decided to suffer for it in
any manner or form.

On appeal, Guillen’s counsel imputes error on the trial court, arguing that Guillen is guilty only of
homicide through reckless imprudence in regard to the death of Simeon Varela and less serious
physical injuries in regard to the others injured.

Issue/s:

Whether or not Guillen is guilty of murder and frustrated murder as ruled by the RTC?

Ruling/s:

Yes. In throwing hand grenade at the President with the intention of killing him, the appellant acted
with malice. He is therefore liable for all the consequences of his wrongful act; for in accordance
with article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a
felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. In criminal
negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of
another act performed without malice.

In the words of Viada, "in order that an act may be qualified as imprudence it is necessary that
neither malice nor intention to cause injury should intervene; where such intention exists, the act
should be qualified by the felony it has produced even though it may not have been the intention of
the actor to cause an evil of such gravity as that produced." And, as was held by this court, a
deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless
imprudence/ Where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended
victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence.

There can be no question that the accused attempted to kill President Roxas by throwing a hand
grenade at him with the intention to kill him, thereby commencing the commission of a felony by
overt acts, but he did not succeed in assassinating him "by reason of some cause or accidents
other than his own spontaneous desistance." For the same reason we qualify the injuries caused on
the four other persons already named as merely attempted and not frustrated murder.
 People v. Adriano
G.R. No. 205228, July 15, 2015
Perez, J.
Topic: Aberratio Ictus

Case Doctrine/s:

Treachery may be appreciated in aberratio ictus

Facts:

Accused-appellant Rolly Adriano was charged with two counts of murder for the deaths of
Ofelia Bulanan and Danilo Cabiedes in Brgy. Malapit, Nueva Ecija.

Per the prosecution, at 8AM, PO1 Matthew Garabiles and PO2 Alejandro Santos, in
civilian clothes, were on their way to Camp Olivas, Pampanga via a motorcycle. While they
were at Brgy. Malapit, a blue Toyota Corolla overtook them and the car in front of them, a
maroon Honda CRV. When the Corolla reached alongside the CRV, the front seat
passenger of the Corolla shot the CRV, causing the latter to swerve and fall in the canal.
Four armed men from the Corolla then started shooting at the driver of the CRV,
Cabiedes, whereas Bulanan, a bystander was hit by a stray bullet. When the armed men
left, PO1 Garabiles and PO2 Santos tried to follow them but lost track of the latter.
Bulanan died on the spot while Cabiedes was pronounced dead on arrival (DOA). Per
Antonio Rivera, the registered owner of the Corolla, he leased the car to Adriano. Later
that day, Adriano returned the car to Rivera, where he was identified by the policemen as
one of the four assailants, so Adriano was arrested.

Per the defense, Adriano was at his house at the time of the incident, washing the clothes
of his child. Thereafter, he took his motorcycle to a repair shop and left it there. Then he
went to his friend’s house to ask for a lighter spring, had coffee there, then went home and
brought his child to his mother. On their way there, he met his brother-in-law. Upon leaving
his child at his mother’s house, Adriano went to the cockpit arena then after the fights, he
went home. After resting, Adriano then picked up his motorcycle and went back home
again. He then received a call from Boyet Garcia, who borrowed the Corolla, which he
rented from Rivera, so Adriano met with Garcia to get the car back. He then returned the
Corolla where he was arrested by police officers. Adriano claims that he was brought to a
place where he was tortured. Four witnesses corroborated Adriano’s testimony.

The RTC found Adriano guilty as charged, which was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this
petition.
 Issue/s:

1) Whether or not Adriano was correctly convicted with the crime of murder?
2) Whether or not treachery may be appreciated in aberratio ictus?

Ruling/s:

1) Yes. In cases of murder, the prosecution must establish the following elements: 1)
that a person was killed; 2) that the accused killed him; 3) that the killing was
attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Art. 248; and 4) the
killing is not parricide or infanticide. In this case, the prosecution has established:
1) the fact of death of Cabiedes and Bulanan; 2) the positive identification of
Adriano as one of perpetrators of the crime; and 3) the attendance of treachery as
a qualifying aggravating circumstance and use of firearms and abuse of superior
strength as generic aggravating circumstances.

As to the death of Cabiedes, it was by ambush wherein the crime is carried out to
ensure that the victim is killed and at the same time, to eliminate any risk from any
possible defenses or retaliation from the victim and is a form of treachery under
Art. 14(16) of the RPC. For treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements
must be present: 1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to
defend himself; and 2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the
particular means, methods or forms of attack employed by him. Clearly, treachery
is present in this case as the victims were defenseless at the time of the attack.

As to the death of Bulanan, the fact that the accused killed a person other than
their intended victim is of no moment. Although Adriano’s original intent was to kill
Cabiedes but during the commission thereof, a stray bullet killed Bulanan, Adriano
is still responsible for the consequences of his act of shooting Cabiedes, pursuant
to Art. 4 of the RPC.

The ruling in People v. Nelmida is also applicable in this case, that the accused
should not be convicted of a complex crime but of separate crimes of two counts of
murder and seven counts of attempted murder as the killing and wounding of the
victims were a result of several acts. There are two kinds of complex crime: a)
compound crime, when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, and b) complex crime proper, when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other.

2) Yes. As in People v. Flora, treachery may be appreciated in aberratio ictus. In such

case, the accused was convicted of two separate counts of murder: for the killing of
the intended victim and the victim killed by a stray bullet. The Court, due to the
presence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery, qualified both killings to
murder. Since the material facts in Flora are similar to this case, the Flora doctrine
shall be applied.
 People v. Sabalones
G.R. No.123485, August 31, 1998
Panganiban, J.:
Topic: Error in personae

Case Doctrine/s:

● The fact that they were mistaken does not diminish their culpability. The Court has
held that “mistake in the identity of the victim carries the same gravity as when the
accused zeroes in on his intended victim.”
● Where the case involves the killing of persons other than the intended victims, the
same is better characterized as error in personae or mistake in the identity of the
victims, rather than aberratio ictus which means mistake in the blow, characterized
by aiming at one but hitting the other due to imprecision in the blow.

Facts:

Rolusape Sabalones and Timoteo Beronga was charged and convicted of two counts of
murder and 3 counts offrustrated murder by the trial court. It arose from a shooting
incident which resulted in the killing of two persons and the wounding of three others, who
were all riding in two vehicles which were allegedly ambushed by appellants. Edwin
Santos, and corroborated by Rogelio Presores, testified that during the small gathering at
the house of Maj. Tiempo, Lim called their group and requested them to push his car.
When the engine started, the former asked them to drive to his home. Glenn Tiempo, Rey
Bolo and Alfredo Nardo also went with them riding in an owner-type jeep, driven by the
latter, in order to bring back the group as soon as the car of Mr. Lim was parked in his
home.
The two vehicles traveled in convoy with the jeep 3 to 4 meters ahead of the car. When
they arrived at the gate of the house of Stephen Lim, they were met with a sudden burst of
gunfire. He looked at the direction where the gunfire came, and saw the persons who fired
at the jeep. He identified accused, Teodulo Alegarbes, Rolusape Sabalones and Timoteo
Beronga as the persons who fired at the vehicle. Except for Teodulo Alegarbes, who was
naked from the waist up, the gunmen wore clothes.
After firing at the jeep, the assailants shot the car they were riding, hitting Nelson Tiempo
on the throat and Rogelio Presores on the breast. Despite the injury he sustained, Nelson
Tiempo was able to maneuver the car back to their residence. Glenn Tiempo died.
Appellants interposed denial and alibi. Previously, the rival of Sabalones, Nabing Velez,
got into an altercation with his father in a cockpit, and was killed in a separate incident.
The RTC ruled that the attack by Sabalones and his company was due to their assumption
that the friends of Nabing Velez will attack them. Unfortunately, the vitims of the incident
has nothing to do with the case. They were unarmed and defenseless. The court ruled that
this was not a case of Aberatio Ictus (mistake in blow) but rather error in personae
(mistake in the identity of the victims) and carries a heavier penalty.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue/s:

● Whether of not the group commit Aberatio ictus (mistake in blow) or error in
personae (mistake in the identity of the victims).
● Whether or not the crime is murder or homicide.

Ruling/s:

● It must be stressed that the trial court relied on the concept of aberratio ictus to
explain why the appellants staged the ambush, not to prove that appellants did in
fact commit the crimes. Even assuming that the trial court did err in explaining the
motive of the appellants, this does not detract from its findings, as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals and sustained by this Court in the discussion above, that the guilt
of the appellants was proven beyond reasonable doubt. The conclusion of the trial
court and the Court of Appeals that the appellants killed the wrong persons was
based on the extrajudicial statement of Appellant Beronga and the testimony of
Jennifer Binghoy. These pieces of evidence sufficiently show that appellants
believed that they were suspected of having killed the recently slain Nabing Velez,
and that they expected his group to retaliate against them. Hence, upon the arrival
of the victims’ vehicles which they mistook to be carrying the avenging men of
Nabing Velez, appellants opened fire. Nonetheless, the fact that they were
mistaken does not diminish their culpability. The Court has held that “mistake in the
identity of the victim carries the same gravity as when the accused zeroes in on his
intended victim.” The observation of the solicitor general on this point is well-taken.
The case is better characterized as error in personae or mistake in the identity of
the victims, rather than aberratio ictus which means mistake in the blow,
characterized by aiming at one but hitting the other due to imprecision in the blow.
● The Court agrees with the appellate court that accused-appellants are guilty of
murder for the deaths of Glenn Tiempo and Alfredo Nardo. The allegation of
treachery as charged in the Information was duly proven by the prosecution.
“Treachery is committed when two conditions concur, namely, that the means,
methods, and forms of execution employed gave the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and that such means, methods and
forms of execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused
without danger to his person.” These requisites were evidently present when the
accused, swiftly and unexpectedly, fired at the victims who were inside their
vehicles and were in no position and without any means to defend themselves.
● The appellate court also correctly convicted them of frustrated murder for the
injuries sustained by Nelson Tiempo, Rey Bolo and Rogelio Presores, as
evidenced by the medical certificates and the testimony of Dr. Miguel Mancao who
attended to the victims. The wounds sustained by these survivors would have
caused their death had it not been for the timely medical intervention. Hence, we
sustain the ruling of the Court of Appeals that appellants are guilty of three counts
of frustrated murder.
 People v. Albuquerque
G.R. No. 38773,19 December 1933
AVANCEÑA, J.
Topic: (Praeter intentionem)

Case Doctrine/s:

The mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to cause so grave an injury as the death of
the deceased should be taken into consideration in favor of the appellant.

Facts:

The appellant herein, who is a widower of fifty-five years of age and father of nine living
children, has been suffering from partial paralysis for some time, walks dragging one leg
and has lost control of the movement of his right arm. He has been unable to work since
he suffered the stroke of paralysis. One of his daughters named Maria and another, are
married, while still another one is a nun. With the exception of the other married daughter
and the nun, all of them, including the appellant, live with Maria upon whom they depend
for support.

Among the daughters living with Maria, one named Pilar became acquainted and had
intimate relations later with the deceased Manuel Osma about the end of the year 1928. It
was then that the appellant became acquainted with the deceased who frequently visited
Pilar in his house. The relations between Pilar and the deceased culminated in Pilar's
giving birth to a child. The appellant did not know that his daughter's relations with the
deceased had gone to such extremes, that he had to be deceived with the information that
she had gone to her godfather's house in Singalong, when in fact she had been taken to
the Chinese Hospital for delivery. The appellant learned the truth only when Pilar returned
home with her child.

The appellant was in such a mood when he presented himself one day at the office where
the deceased worked and asked leave of the manager thereof to speak to Osma. They
both went downstairs. What happened later, nobody witnessed. But the undisputed fact is
that on that occasion the appellant inflicted a wound at the base of the neck of the
deceased, causing his death.

After excluding the improbable portions thereof, the court infers from the testimony of the
appellant that he proposed to said deceased to marry his daughter and that, upon hearing
that the latter refused to do so, he whipped out his penknife. Upon seeing the appellant's
attitude, the deceased tried to seize him by the neck whereupon the said appellant
stabbed him on the face with the said penknife. Due to his lack of control of the movement
of his arm, the weapon landed on the base of the neck of the deceased.

The trial court found that the appellant did not intend to cause so grave an injury as the
death of the deceased.
 Issue/s:

Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention should be appreciated as

shown in the testimony of the appellant?

Ruling/s:

YES. In his testimony the appellant emphatically affirmed that he only wanted to inflict a
wound that would leave a permanent scar on the face of the deceased, or one that would
compel him to remain in the hospital for a week or two but never intended to kill him,
because then it would frustrate his plan of compelling him to marry or, at least, support his
daughter. The appellant had stated this intention in some of his letters to the deceased by
way of a threat to induce him to accept his proposal for the benefit of his daughter. That
the act of the appellant in stabbing the deceased resulted in the fatal wound at the base of
his neck, was due solely to the fact hereinbefore mentioned that appellant did not have
control of his right arm on account of paralysis and the blow, although intended for the
face, landed at the base of the neck.

Therefore, the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to cause so grave an injury as

the death of the deceased as well as those of his having voluntarily surrendered himself to
the authorities, and acted under the influence of passion and obfuscation, should be taken
into consideration in favor of the appellant.

The facts as herein proven constitute the crime of homicide defined and penalized in
article 249 of the Revised Penal Code with reclusion temporal. In view of the concurrence
therein of three mitigating circumstances without any aggravating circumstance, the
penalty next lower in degree, that is, prision mayor, should be imposed.
 Bataclan v. Medina
G.R. No., L-10126, 22 October 1957
Montemayor, J.
Topic: Elements of criminal liability - Mental element (Mens rea) - Causation

Case Doctrine/s:

"The proximate legal cause is that the acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion., all constituting a natural and continuous
chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor,
the final event in the chain immediately affecting the injury as a natural and probable result
of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for
the first event should, as ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground
to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might be
probably result therefrom."

Facts:

At about 2 :00 o'clock that same morning, while the bus was running within the jurisdiction
of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into
a canal and turned turtle. Four of its passengers (Juan Bataclan, Felipe Lara, another
passenger apparently from the Visayan Islands whom the witnesses just called Visaya,
apparently not knowing his name, and Natalia Villanueva) could not get out of the
overturned bus. It appeared that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak from the
tank on the side of the chassis, spreading over and permeating the body of the bus and
the ground under and around it. About ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torch,
approached the overturned bus to help those left therein, and almost immediately a fierce
fire started, burning the four passengers trapped inside it.

Issue/s:

What is the proximate cause of the death of the four passengers:

-The negligence of the driver resulting in the fall into the canal and overturning the bus, or
– YES!
-The fire that burned the bus – NO!

Ruling/s:

That the proximate cause of the death of B was overturning of the vehicle thru the
negligence of defendant and his agent.
It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a passenger,
merely causing him physical injuries, if through some event, unexpected and
extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on fire, say, by lightning, or if some highwaymen
after looting the vehicle sets it on fire, and the passenger is burned to death, one might still
contend that the proximate cause of his death was the fire and not the overturning of the
vehicle.

But in the present case and under the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not
hesitate to hold that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was the overturning of
the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely
on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that
the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not
only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves,
and that because it was very dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a
light with them; and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights
were not available, they had to use a torch, the most handy and available; and what was
more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the overturned vehicle to
extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. In other words, the coming of
the men with the torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning
of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help.

That the failure of the driver and the conductor to have cautioned or taken steps to
warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus, constitute
negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier under the provisions of the Civil
Code, particularly, Article 1733, 1759 and 1763 thereof.

What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the
carrier, through its driver and its conductor. According to the witnesses, the driver and the
conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and
must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and
must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this
aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt
and detected even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would
appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch
too near the bus.
 Urbano v. IAC
G.R. No. 72964, 7 January 1988
Gutierrez, Jr., J.
Topic: Art. 4, par. 1. - Causation

Case Doctrine/s:

A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is... "that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred." And more comprehensively, "the
proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events,
each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in
the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause
which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event
should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect
at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result
therefrom."

Facts:

On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was on his way to his rice field. He
found the place where he stored palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal.
Urbano went to the elevated portion to see what happened, and there he saw Marcelino
Javier and Emilio Efre cutting grass. Javier admitted that he was the one who opened the
canal. A quarrel ensued, and Urbano hit Javier on the right palm with his bolo, and again
on the leg with the back of the bolo.

On October 27, 1980, Urbano and Javier had an amicable settlement. Urbano paid P700
for the medical expenses of Javier.

On November 14, 1980, Urbano was rushed to the hospital where he had lockjaw and
convulsions. The doctor found the condition to be caused by tetanus toxin which infected
the healing wound in his palm. He died the following day.

Urbano was charged with homicide and was found guilty both by the trial court and on
appeal by the Court of Appeals. Urbano filed a motion for new trial based on the affidavit
of the Barangay Captain who stated that he saw the deceased catching fish in the shallow
irrigation canals on November 5. The motion was denied; hence, this petition.
 Issue/s:

Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the proximate cause of the latter’s
death

Ruling/s:

No. A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is... "that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred." And more comprehensively, "the
proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events,
each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in
the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause
which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event
should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect
at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result
therefrom."

If the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at
the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a
mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after
the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the
onset time should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day
from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was
inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present.
Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking
incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have
been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence
of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal
conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational
mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct
possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause
later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was,
therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.

There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent
infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the
proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. "A prior and
remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such remote cause did nothing more
than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made
possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct,
successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not
have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition
except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause.
And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances
which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or
condition is the proximate cause."
 Intod v. CA
G.R. No. 103119, October 1992
Campos, Jr.,
Topic: Impossible Crimes (Art. 4, Par. 2, RPC)

Case Doctrine/s:

Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond
his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime.

Facts:

In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino
Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's house and asked him to go with them to the house of
Bernardina Palangpangan.

Thereafter, Mandaya and Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig had a meeting with Aniceto
Dumalagan. He told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land
dispute between them and that Mandaya should accompany the four (4) men, otherwise, he
would also be killed.
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and
Daligdig, all armed with firearms, arrived at Palangpangan's house. At the instance of his
companions, Mandaya pointed the location of Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner,
Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said room. It turned out; however, that Palangpangan
was in another City and her home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one
was in the room when the accused fired the shots. No one was hit by the gun fire. After trial, the
Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder. The Court of Appeals affirmed this
ruling in toto. Petitioner seeks from this Court a modification of the judgment by holding him
liable only for an impossible crime.

Issue/s:

Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his
companions riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible. Whether or not the
crime committed is impossible crime.

Ruling/s:
The Revised Penal Code, inspired by the Positivist School, recognizes in the offender his
formidability, and now penalizes an act which were it not aimed at something quite impossible
or carried out with means which prove inadequate, would constitute a felony against person or
against property. The rationale of Article 4(2) is to punish such criminal tendencies. Legal
impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime.

Thus: Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and
expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is intention to perform the
physical act; (3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the consequence
resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime.

The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category. On the other hand,
factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his
control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. One example is the man who puts his
hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet and finds the
pocket empty.

The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim
would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the petitioner
failed to accomplish his end. In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article 4(2),
expressly provided for impossible crimes and made them punishable. We hereby hold Petitioner
guilty of an impossible crime. Having in mind the social danger and degree of criminality shown
by Petitioner, this Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor,
together with the accessory penalties provided by the law, and to pay the costs.
 Jacinto v. People
G.R. No. 162540, July 13, 2009
Peralta, J.
Topic: Art. 4, Par. 2 – Impossible Crimes

Case Doctrine/s:

The requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an offense
against persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its
accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate
or ineffectual.

Facts:

Baby Aquino handed petitioner Gemma Jacinto a postdated Banco De Oro (BDO) Check
in the amount of P10,000.00 as payment for the latter’s purchases from Mega Foam Int'l.,
Inc. Petitioner was then the collector of Mega Foam. Somehow, the check was deposited
in the Land Bank account of Generoso Capitle, the husband of Jacqueline Capitle; the
latter is the sister of petitioner and the former pricing, merchandising and inventory clerk of
Mega Foam.

Rowena Ricablanca, another employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call from an
employee of Land Bank, who was looking for Generoso Capitle to inform Capitle that the
subject BDO check deposited in his account had been dishonored. Ricablanca then
phoned accused Anita Valencia, a former employee/collector of Mega Foam, asking the
latter to inform Jacqueline Capitle about the phone call from Land Bank regarding the
bounced check. Valencia then told Ricablanca that the check came from Baby Aquino,
and instructed Ricablanca to ask Baby Aquino to replace the check with cash. Valencia
also told Ricablanca of a plan to take the cash and divide it equally into four: for herself,
Ricablanca, petitioner Jacinto and Jacqueline Capitle. Ricablanca, upon the advice of
Mega Foams accountant, reported the matter to the owner of Mega Foam, Joseph
Dyhengco.

Issue/s:

Whether petitioner is guilty of qualified theft

Ruling/s:
No, petitioner is not guilty of qualified theft. Petitioner is guilty of an impossible crime.

The prosecution tried to establish the following pieces of evidence to constitute the
elements of the crime of qualified theft: (1) the taking of personal property — as shown by
the fact that petitioner, as collector for Mega Foam, did not remit the customer's check
payment to her employer and, instead, appropriated it for herself; (2) said property
belonged to another — the check belonged to Baby Aquino, as it was her payment for
purchases she made; (3) the taking was done with intent to gain — this is presumed from
the act of unlawful taking and further shown by the fact that the check was deposited to
the bank account of petitioner's brother-in-law; (4) it was done without the owner's consent
— petitioner hid the fact that she had received the check payment from her employer's
customer by not remitting the check to the company; (5) it was accomplished without the
use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things — the check was
voluntarily handed to petitioner by the customer, as she was known to be a collector for
the company; and (6) it was done with grave abuse of confidence — petitioner is
admittedly entrusted with the collection of payments from customers.

However, it is settled that the personal property subject of the theft must have some value,
as the intention of the accused is to gain from the thing stolen. This is further bolstered by
Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code, where the law provides that the penalty to be
imposed on the accused is dependent on the value of the thing stolen.

Therefore, in this case, petitioner is guilty of an impossible crime.

The requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an offense
against persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its
accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate
or ineffectual.

In this case, petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified theft,
which is a crime against property. Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act
of unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be
unjustly enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she would have received
the face value thereof. Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous circumstance of the
check being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time, that prevented the crime
from being produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to be absolutely
worthless, because the check was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had received
the cash to replace the value of said dishonored check.