People vs.

Abarca
G.R. No.74433, September 14, 1987
Sarmiento J.
Topic: Article 247

Case Doctrine/s:

Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that a legally married person surprises his
spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills any
of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter.

The Revised Penal Code, in requiring that the accused "shall kill any of them or both of
them . . . immediately" after surprising his spouse in the act of intercourse, does not say
that he should commit the killing instantly thereafter. It only requires that the death
caused be the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing
upon his spouse in the basest act of infidelity. But the killing should have been actually
motivated by the same blind impulse, and must not have been influenced by external
factors. The killing must be the direct by-product of the accused's rage

Facts:

Khingsley Paul Koh and the wife of accused Francisco Abarca, Jenny, had illicit relationship.
The illicit relationship apparently began while the accused was in Manila reviewing for the 1983
Bar examinations. His wife was left behind in their residence in Tacloban, Leyte.

Upon reaching home, the accused found his wife, Jenny, and Khingsley Koh in the act of sexual
intercourse. When the wife and Koh noticed the accused, the wife pushed her paramour who
got his revolver. The accused who was then peeping above the built-in cabinet in their room
jumped and ran away. The accused went to look for a firearm at Tacloban City. He went to the
house of a PC soldier, C2C Arturo Talbo, arriving there at around 6:30 p.m. He got Talbo's
firearm, an M-16 rifle, and went back to his house at V & G Subdivision. He was not able to find
his wife and Koh there. He proceeded to the "mahjong session" as it was the "hangout" of
Kingsley Koh. The accused found Koh playing mahjong. He fired at Kingsley Koh three times
with his rifle. Koh was hit. Arnold and Lina Amparado who were occupying a room adjacent to
the room where Koh was playing mahjong were also hit by the shots fired by the accused.

Kingsley Koh died instantaneously of cardiorespiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage as
a result of multiple gunshot wounds on the head, trunk and abdomen. Arnold Amparado was
hospitalized and operated on in the kidney to remove a bullet. His wife, Lina Amparado, was
also treated in the hospital as she was hit by bullet fragments. Arnold Amparado who received
a salary of nearly P1,000.00 a month was not able to work for 1-1/2 months because of his
wounds. He spent P15,000.00 for medical expenses while his wife spent Pl,000.00 for the same
purpose.
The RTC held that Francisco Abarca was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime
of murder with double frustrated murder as charged in the amended information.

Issue/s:

Whether Article 247 should be applied?

Ruling/s:

Yes. There is no question that the accused surprised his wife and her paramour, the victim in
this case, in the act of illicit copulation, as a result of which, he went out to kill the deceased in a
fit of passionate outburst. Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that a legally married
person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; and
(2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter. These elements
are present in this case. The trial court, in convicting the accused-appellant of murder, therefore
erred.

Though quite a length of time, about one hour, had passed between the time the accused-
appellant discovered his wife having sexual intercourse with the victim and the time the latter
was actually shot, the shooting must be understood to be the continuation of the pursuit of the
victim by the accused-appellant. The Revised Penal Code, in requiring that the accused
"shall kill any of them or both of them . . . immediately" after surprising his spouse in the
act of intercourse, does not say that he should commit the killing instantly thereafter. It
only requires that the death caused be the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming
the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the basest act of infidelity. But the killing
should have been actually motivated by the same blind impulse, and must not have been
influenced by external factors. The killing must be the direct by-product of the accused's
rage

It must be stressed furthermore that Article 247, supra, does not define an offense. In People v.
Araque, it was held that Article 247, far from defining a felony, merely provides or grants a
privilege or benefit — amounting practically to an exemption from an adequate punishment —
to a legally married person or parent who shall surprise his spouse or daughter in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another, and shall kill any or both of them in the act or
immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury. Thus, in case of
death or serious physical injuries, considering the enormous provocation and his righteous
indignation, the accused — who would otherwise be criminally liable for the crime of homicide,
parricide, murder, or serious physical injury, as the case may be — is punished only with
destierro. This penalty is mere banishment and, as held in a case, is intended more for the
protection of the accused than a punishment. And where physical injuries other than serious are
inflicted, the offender is exempted from punishment. In effect, therefore, Article 247, or the
exceptional circumstances mentioned therein, amount to an exempting circumstance, for even
where death or serious physical injuries is inflicted, the penalty is so greatly lowered as to result
to no punishment at all.
 People v. Oyanib
G.R. No. 130634-35, March 12, 2001
Pardo, J.
Topic: Article 247

Case Doctrine/s:

Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the following essential elements for such
a defense: (1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another person; (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the
act or immediately thereafter; and (3) that he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution
of his wife (or daughter) or that he or she has not consented to the infidelity of the other
spouse. Accused must prove these elements by clear and convincing evidence, otherwise
his defense would be untenable.

The death caused must be the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused
after chancing upon his spouse in the act of infidelity. Simply put, the killing by the husband
of his wife must concur with her flagrant adultery.

Facts:

Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza (hereafter Manolito) and Tita T. Oyanib (hereafter Tita)
were married on February 3, 1979 and had 2 children, Desilor and Julius. In 1994, due to
marital differences, Manolito and Tita separated, with Manolito keeping custody of their 2
children. Tita rented a room at the second floor of the house of Edgardo Lladas (hereafter
Edgardo), not far from the place where her family lived.

Despite their separation, Manolito tried to win Tita back and exerted all efforts towards
reconciliation for the sake of the children. However, Tita was very reluctant to reconcile with
Manolito. In fact, she was very open about her relationship with other men and would flaunt
it in front of Manolito. One time, he chanced upon his wife and her paramour, Jesus, in a
very intimate situation by the hanging bridge. Manolito confronted Tita and Jesus about this.
He censured his wife and reminded her that she was still his wife. They just ignored him;
they even threatened to kill him.

In the evening of September 4, 1995, Manolito received a letter from his daughter’s school
informing him of a parent-teacher’s meeting, but because he had to work the next day,
Manolito went to TIta’s place in Edgardo’s house to ask her to attend in his behalf. Upon
arriving, he caught Jesus on top of Tita with his pants down to his knees. In the commotion,
Manolito stabbed Jesus several times on the abdomen. Meanwhile, Tita hit Manolito on the
head with a Tanduay bottle and stabbed him with a piece of the broken bottle. This angered
Manolito, he stabbed Tita in the left breast.
Manolito left and attempted to flee to Zamboanga. However, he heard over the radio that
there was a call for him to surrender. He heeded the call and gave himself up to the police
authorities in Iligan City. When asked why he was carrying a knife when he went to his wife's
place, Manolito said that he brought it for self-defense. Prior to the incident, he received
threats from his wife and her paramour, Jesus, that they would kill him so they could live
together.

According to the Medico-Legal Officer, Jesus sustained multiple stab wounds, and those
inflicted in the right and left chests and stomach were fatal. The cause of death was
"cardiorespiratory arrest, hypovolemic shock irreversible, multiple organ injury and multiple
stab wound chest and abdomen." Likewise, Tita sustained several stab wounds, with the
fatal wounds inflicted in the left chest and right side of the abdomen. The cause of death
was "cardiorespiratory arrest, hypovolemic shock and multiple stab wound.

The trial court found Manolito guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Homicide and
Parricide, appreciating 2 mitigating circumstances of passion or obfuscation and voluntary
surrender, without any aggravating circumstances.

In this appeal to the SC, Manolito argued that the trial court erred in not appreciating his
claim that he killed them under the exceptional circumstances provided in Article 247.
Accused contends that the photograph graphically showed that Jesus' pants were wide
open, unzipped and unbuttoned, revealing that he was not wearing any underwear, lending
credence to his defense that he caught his wife and her paramour in the act of sexual
intercourse.

Issue/s:

Whether or not Manolito Oyanib acted within the circumstances contemplated in Article 247

Ruling/s:

YES.

Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the following essential elements for such
a defense: (1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another person; (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the
act or immediately thereafter; and (3) that he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution
of his wife (or daughter) or that he or she has not consented to the infidelity of the other
spouse. Accused must prove these elements by clear and convincing evidence, otherwise
his defense would be untenable.

The death caused must be the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused
after chancing upon his spouse in the act of infidelity. Simply put, the killing by the husband
of his wife must concur with her flagrant adultery.
There is no question that the first element is present in the case at bar. The crucial fact that
accused must convincingly prove to the court is that he killed his wife and her paramour in
the act of sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter. The defense sufficiently proved that
Manolito Oyanib surprised his wife and her lover in the act of sexual intercourse.\

As the Court held in People v. Wagas, "The vindication of a Man's honor is justified because
of the scandal an unfaithful wife creates; the law is strict on this, authorizing as it does, a
man to chastise her, even with death. But killing the errant spouse as a purification is so
severe as that it can only be justified when the unfaithful spouse is caught in flagrante
delicto; and it must be resorted to only with great caution so much so that the law requires
that it be inflicted only during the sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter."

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 02, Iligan City in Criminal Cases Nos. II-6012 and II-6018. The Court sentences
accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza to two (2) years and four (4) months of destierro. He
shall not be permitted to enter Iligan City, nor within a radius of one hundred (100) kilometers
from Iligan City.
DANDY L. DUNGO AND GREGORIO A. SIBAL, JR. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 209464, July 01, 2015
PONENTE: MENDOZA, J.:
Topic: R. A. No. 8049 Anti-Hazing Law of 2018, Malum Prohibitum

Case Doctrine/s:

While it is established that nothing less than proof beyond reasonable doubt is required for
a conviction, this exacting standard does not preclude resort to circumstantial evidence
when direct evidence is not available. Direct evidence is not a condition sine qua non to
prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. For in the absence of direct
evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its
burden. Crimes are usually committed in secret and under conditions where concealment is
highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted on under all circumstances, the prosecution of
vicious felons who commit heinous crimes in secret or secluded places will be hard, if not
impossible, to prove.

Facts:

At around 3:20 o’clock in the morning of January 14, 2006, the victim Marlon Villanueva
(Villanueva) was brought to the emergency room of Dr. Jose P. Rizal District Hospital (JP
Rizal Hospital). Dr. Ramon Masilungan (Dr. Masilungan), who was then the attending
physician at the emergency room, observed that Villanueva was motionless, not breathing
and had no heartbeat. Dr. Masilungan tried to revive Villanueva for about 15 to 30 minutes.
Villanueva, however, did not respond to the resuscitation and was pronounced dead. Dr.
Masilungan noticed a big contusion hematoma on the left side of the victim’s face and
several injuries on his arms and legs. He further attested that Villanueva’s face was cyanotic,
meaning that blood was no longer running through his body due to lack of oxygen; and when
he pulled down Villanueva’s pants, he saw large contusions on both legs, which extended
from the upper portion of the thighs, down to the couplexial portion, or back of the knees.

Dr. Masilungan disclosed that two (2) men brought Villanueva to the hospital. The two told
him that they found Villanueva lying motionless on the ground at a store in Brgy. Pansol,
Calamba City, and brought him to the hospital. When he asked them where they came from,
one of them answered that they came from Los Baños, Laguna, en route to San Pablo City.
He questioned them on how they found Villanueva, when the latter was in Brgy. Pansol,
Calamba City. One of the men just said that they were headed somewhere else.

Dr. Masilungan reduced his findings in a medico-legal report.8 Due to the nature, extent and
location of the injuries, he opined that Villanueva was a victim of hazing. He was familiar
with hazing injuries because he had undergone hazing himself when he was a student and
also because of his experience in treating victims of hazing incidents.

Dr. Roy Camarillo (Dr. Camarillo), Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police
Crime Laboratory (PNP-CL) in Region IV, Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Calamba City,
testified that he performed an autopsy on the body of Villanueva on January 14, 2006 and
placed down his findings in an autopsy report.9 Upon examination of the body, he found
various external injuries in the head, trunk and extremities. There were thirty-three (33)
external injuries, with various severity and nature. He concluded that the cause of death was
subdural hemorrhage due to head injury contusion-hematoma. Based on multiple injuries
and contusions on the body, and his previous examinations of hazing injuries, Dr. Camarillo
opined that these injuries were hazing-related. During the autopsy, he retrieved two (2)
matchsticks from the cadaver with the marking of Alpha Phi Omega (APO) Fratemity.

Issue/s:

Whether the petitioners are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of
Section 4 of R.A. No. 8049 (Anti-Hazing Law of 1995)

Ruling/s:

The petitioners’ guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt by the sequence of
circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution. Their involvement in the hazing of
Villanueva is not merely based on prima facie evidence but was also established by
circumstantial evidence.

While it is established that nothing less than proof beyond reasonable doubt is required for
a conviction, this exacting standard does not preclude resort to circumstantial evidence
when direct evidence is not available. Direct evidence is not a condition sine qua non to
prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. For in the absence of direct
evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its
burden. Crimes are usually committed in secret and under conditions where concealment is
highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted on under all circumstances, the prosecution of
vicious felons who commit heinous crimes in secret or secluded places will be hard, if not
impossible, to prove.

Needless to state, the crime of hazing is shrouded in secrecy. Fraternities and sororities,
especially the Greek organizations, are secretive in nature and their members are reluctant
to give any information regarding initiation rites. The silence is only broken after someone
has been injured so severely that medical attention is required. It is only at this point that the
secret is revealed and the activities become public. Bearing in mind the concealment of
hazing, it is only logical and proper for the prosecution to resort to the presentation of
circumstantial evidence to prove it.

Petitioners Dungo and Sibal, on the other hand, presented the defense of denial and alibi.
These defenses, however, must fail. Time and time again, this Court has ruled that denial
and alibi are the weakest of all defenses, because they are easy to concoct and fabricate.
As properly held by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), these defenses cannot prevail over the
positive and unequivocal identification of the petitioners by prosecution witnesses Sunga
and Ignacio. The testimonies of the defense witnesses also lacked credibility and reliability.
The corroboration of defense witness Rivera was suspect because she was the girlfriend of
Dungo, and it was only logical and emotional that she would stand by the man she loved
and cared for. The testimonies of their fellow fraternity brothers, likewise, do not hold much
weight because they had so much at stake in the outcome of the case. Stated differently,
the petitioners did not present credible and disinterested witnesses to substantiate their
defenses of denial and alibi.

After a careful review of the records, the Court agrees with the CA and the RTC that the
circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was overwhelming enough to
establish the guilt of the petitioners beyond a reasonable doubt. The unbroken chain of
events laid down by the CA leaves us no other conclusion other than the petitioners’
participation in the hazing. They took part in the hazing and, together with their fellow
fraternity officers and members, inflicted physical injuries to Villanueva as a requirement of
his initiation to the fraternity. The physical injuries eventually took a toll on the body of the
victim, which led to his death. Another young life lost.

With the fact of hazing, the identity of the petitioners, and their participation therein duly
proven, the moral certainty that produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind has been
satisfied.
 People v. Bayabos
G.R. No. 171222, February 18, 2015
Sereno, C. J.
Topic: RA 8042 as amended by 11053

Case Doctrine/s:

Absence of allegation in the Information that the purported acts were employed as a
prerequisite for admission or entry into the organization would prevent the successful
prosecution of the criminal responsibility of the accused, either as principal or as accomplice,
for the crime of hazing. Plain reference to a technical term — in this case, hazing — is
insufficient and incomplete, as it is but a characterization of the acts allegedly committed
and thus a mere conclusion of law.

Facts:

Fernando C. Balidoy, Jr. (Balidoy) was admitted as a probationary midshipman at the

PMMA. In order to reach active status, all new entrants were required to successfully
complete the mandatory "Indoctrination and Orientation Period," which was set from May 2
to June 1, 2001. Balidoy died on May 3, 2001.
The National Bureau of Investigation probed the death of Balidoy. It forwarded its findings
to the provincial prosecutor of Zambales for the preliminary investigation and possible
criminal prosecution of those involved in the orientation and indoctrination of the PMMA
Class of 2005. Subsequently, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Zambales issued a
Resolution finding probable cause to charge the following as principals to the crime of
hazing: Aldwin Alvarez (Alvarez), Leotharius C. Montez (Montez), Rudence G. Reyes
(Reyes), and Jed Nicholas S. Simpas (Simpas) — collectively, Alvarez, et al. A criminal case
against Alvarez, et al. was then filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales (RTC-
Zambales).
The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor also endorsed to the Deputy Ombudsman for the
Military the finding of probable cause to charge the following school authorities as
accomplices to hazing: Rear Admiral (RADM) Virginio R. Aris (Aris), Lieutenant Senior
Grade (LTSG.) Dominador D. Bayabos (Bayabos), Lieutenant Junior Grade (LTJG.) Gerry
P. Doctor (Doctor), LTJG. Manny Ferrer (Ferrer), LTJG. Kruzaldo Mabborang (Mabborang),
LTJG. Ronald G. Magsino (Magsino), Ensign (ENS.) Dennis Velasco (Velasco), and ENS.
Dominador Operio (Operio) — collectively, respondents. The Office of the Special
Prosecutor eventually filed with the Sandiganbayan a criminal case charging respondents
as accomplices to the crime of hazing.
Later on, Bayabos, Ferrer, Magsino, Doctor, and Operio (collectively, Bayabos, et al.) filed
a Motion to Quash the Information. They argued that the Information did not contain all the
essential elements of the offense. They also pointed out that there was no allegation that
the purported act had been made a prerequisite for admission to the PMMA, especially
considering that the victim had already been accepted in the academy. Also underscored
was the absence in the Information of any assertion that the alleged hazing was not part of
the "physical, mental, and psychological testing and training procedure and practices to
determine and enhance the physical, mental and psychological fitness of prospective
regular members." Furthermore, they emphasized that there was no allegation that they
were given prior written notice of the hazing and that they had permitted the activity.
As a final point, Bayabos, et al. argued that the case against the principal accused had
already been dismissed with finality by the RTC. There being no more principals with whom
they could have cooperated in the execution of the offense, they asserted that the case
against them must be dismissed.

Issue/s:

1. Whether the prosecution of respondents for the crime of accomplice to hazing can
proceed in spite of the dismissal with finality of the case against the principal accused
2. Whether the Information filed against respondents contains all the material
averments for the prosecution of the crime of accomplice to hazing under the Anti-
Hazing Law

Ruling/s:

1. Yes, the prosecution of respondents for the crime of accomplice to hazing can
proceed in spite of the dismissal with finality of the case against the principal
accused. Sandiganbayan erred when it dismissed outright the case against
respondents, on the sole ground that the case against the purported principals had
already been dismissed. Bayabos,et al. merely presented the Order of Entry of
Judgment dismissing the case against Alvarez, et al. Nowhere is it mentioned in the
order that the case was dismissed against the alleged principals, because no crime
had been committed.
2. No, the Motion to Quash must be granted, as the Information does not include all the
material facts constituting the crime of accomplice to hazing.
The crime of hazing is committed when the following essential elements are
established: (1) a person is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating situation or
subjected to physical or psychological suffering or injury; and (2) these acts were
employed as a prerequisite for the person's admission or entry into an organization.
In the crime of hazing, the crucial ingredient distinguishing it from the crimes against
persons defined under Title Eight of the Revised Penal Code is the infliction by a
person of physical or psychological suffering on another in furtherance of the latter's
admission or entry into an organization.
In the case of school authorities and faculty members who have had no direct
participation in the act, they may nonetheless be charged as accomplices if it is
shown that (1) hazing, as established by the above elements, occurred; (2) the
accused are school authorities or faculty members; and (3) they consented to or
failed to take preventive action against hazing in spite actual knowledge thereof.
Firstly, the Supreme Court rejected the contention of respondents that PMMA should
not be considered an organization. Under the Anti-Hazing Law, the breadth of the
term organization includes — but is not limited to — groups, teams, fraternities,
sororities, citizen army training corps, educational institutions, clubs, societies,
cooperatives, companies, partnerships, corporations, the PNP, and the AFP.
Attached to the Department of Transportation and Communications, the PMMA is a
government-owned educational institution established for the primary purpose of
producing efficient and well-trained merchant marine officers. Clearly, it is included
in the term organization within the meaning of the law.
In this case, however, the Information merely states that psychological pain and
physical injuries were inflicted on the victim. There is no allegation that the purported
acts were employed as a prerequisite for admission or entry into the organization.
Failure to aver this crucial ingredient would prevent the successful prosecution of the
criminal responsibility of the accused, either as principal or as accomplice, for the
crime of hazing. Plain reference to a technical term — in this case, hazing — is
insufficient and incomplete, as it is but a characterization of the acts allegedly
committed and thus a mere conclusion of law.
 Dabalos v. RTC
G.R. No. 193960, January 7, 2013
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
Topic: RA 9262

Case Doctrine/s:

It is immaterial whether the relationship had ceased for as long as there is sufficient evidence
showing the past or present existence of such relationship between the offender and the
victim when the physical harm was committed.

Facts:

Petitioner Karlo Angelo Dabalos is the ex-boyfriend of the victim. A complaint for violation
of Sec. 5(a) of RA 9262 was filed against him for committing personal violence on the
complainant by pulling her hair, punching complainant’s back, should and left eye, thereby
demeaning and degrading the complainant’s intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being.

Petitioner insists that the act which resulted in physical injuries to private respondent is not
covered by RA 9262 because its proximate cause was not their dating relationship, since at
the time of the alleged incident, they were no longer dating. Instead, he claims that the
offense committed was only slight physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code which
falls under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.

Issue/s:

W/N there was a violation under RA 9262.

Ruling/s:

Yes. It is immaterial whether the relationship had ceased for as long as there is sufficient
evidence showing the past or present existence of such relationship between the offender
and the victim when the physical harm was committed.

Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262 reads:

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.- As used in this Act, (a) "Violence against women and their
children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman
who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a
sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child
whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is
likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse
including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty. x x x.

The law is broad in scope but specifies two limiting qualifications for any act or series of
acts to be considered as a crime of violence against women through physical harm,
namely: 1) it is committed against a woman or her child and the woman is the offender’s
wife, former wife, or with whom he has or had sexual or dating relationship or with whom
he has a common child; and 2) it results in or is likely to result in physical harm or
suffering.

In Ang v. Court of Appeals,5 the Court enumerated the elements of the crime of violence
against women through harassment, to wit:

1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended
woman;

2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of

harassment against the woman; and

3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological

distress to her.6

Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship
with the offended woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act
of violence be a consequence of such relationship. Nowhere in the law can such limitation
be inferred. Hence, applying the rule on statutory construction that when the law does not
distinguish, neither should the courts, then, clearly, the punishable acts refer to all acts of
violence against women with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating
relationship. As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial whether the relationship had
ceased for as long as there is sufficient evidence showing the past or present existence of
such relationship between the offender and the victim when the physical harm was
committed. Consequently, the Court cannot depart from the parallelism in Ang and give
credence to petitioner's assertion that the act of violence should be due to the sexual or
dating relationship.

sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts,
battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. x x x.

The law is broad in scope but specifies two limiting qualifications for any act or series of
acts to be considered as a crime of violence against women through physical harm,
namely: 1) it is committed against a woman or her child and the woman is the offender’s
wife, former wife, or with whom he has or had sexual or dating relationship or with whom
he has a common child; and 2) it results in or is likely to result in physical harm or
suffering.
 Melgar v. People
G.R. No.223477, February 14, 2018 Perlas-
Bernabe, J.
Topic: R.A. 9262

Case Doctrine/s:

RA 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against
women and their children perpetrated by women's intimate partners, i.e., husband, former
husband, or any person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the
woman has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or
without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in, inter alia, economic abuse.

Here, the courts a quo correctly found that all the elements of violation of Section 5 (e) of
RA 9262 are present, to wit: (a) Melgar and AAA had a romantic relationship, resulting in
BBB's birth; (b) Melgar freely acknowledged his paternity over BBB; (c) Melgar had failed to
provide BBB support ever since the latter was just a year old; and (d) his intent of not
supporting BBB was made more apparent when he sold to a third party his property which
was supposed to answer for, among others, his support-in-arrears to BBB.

Facts:

An Information was filed charging Melgar with violation Section 5 of RA 9262, for
economically abusing AAA and their 12-year-old minor son, BBB, by depriving them of
financial support, which caused them mental or emotional anguish.

Melgar pleaded not guilty and entered into a compromise agreement on the civil aspect of
the case with AAA, which the RTC's approved. The criminal aspect of the case was
provisionally dismissed with Melgar's conformity. However, a year later, or on June 24,
2011, the prosecution moved to set aside the compromise agreement and to revive the
criminal action, on the ground that Melgar sold the property, which was supposed to answer
for the support-in-arrears of his son, BBB, from 2001 to 2010 pursuant to their compromise
agreement. RTC revived the criminal aspect of the case and allowed the prosecution to
present its evidence.

The prosecution alleged that in 1995, AAA had a romantic relationship with Melgar, which
resulted in the birth of BBB, an illegitimate child. Melgar freely acknowledged the paternity
of BBB as evidenced by the latter's Certificate of Live Birth, as well as numerous
photographs showing Melgar with BBB. However, AAA's relationship with Melgar turned
sour as the latter had an affair with a younger woman. When BBB was just about 1 year old,
Melgar stopped giving support, prompting AAA to file a case for support, which was
eventually granted. This notwithstanding, Melgar still refused to give support for her and
BBB. As such, AAA was constrained to file the instant criminal case against Melgar.
AAA averred that Melgar could afford to provide support of P8,000 per month because he
has a lavish lifestyle with his family. He owns a Toyota Avanza and his children are enrolled
in good schools. On the other hand, her son, BBB, is a scholar at and she spends the
amount of P20,000 a month for his needs, of which she asked Melgar for P8,000 as support.

RTC found Melgar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5 (e) of RA 9262
and, accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate
period of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as maximum. Melgar committed economic abuse against
AAA and their son, BBB, when he stopped supporting them. Worse, he sold the property
which was supposed to answer for his support-in-arrears from 2001 to 2010. CA affirmed
Melgar's conviction.

Issue/s:

Whether or not the CA correctly upheld Melgar's conviction for violation of Section 5 (e) of
RA 9262.

Ruling/s:

YES. The petition is bereft of merit.

RA 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against
women and their children perpetrated by women's intimate partners, i.e., husband, former
husband, or any person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the
woman has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within
or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in, inter alia, economic
abuse. The said law defines economic abuse as follows:

Section 3. Definition of Terms. - x x x.

xxxx

D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent
which includes, but is not limited to the following:

1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any legitimate
profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein the other
spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the
Family Code;
2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and
enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in common;
3. destroying household property;
4. controlling the victim's own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal money or
properties.
xxxx
As may be gathered from the foregoing, "economic abuse" may include the deprivation of support
of a common child of the man-accused and the woman-victim, whether such common child is
legitimate or not.26 This specific act is penalized by Section 5 (e) of RA 9262, pertinent portions of
which read:

Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence against
women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

xxxx
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the
woman or her child has the right to desist from or to desist from conduct which the woman or her
child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's
freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of
physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, but
not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the
woman's or her child's movement or conduct:
xxxx
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support
legally due
her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support;
(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right;xxxx

Under this provision, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is considered
an act of violence against women and children. Notably, case law instructs that the act of
denying support to a child is a continuing offense.

Here, the courts a quo correctly found that all the elements of violation of Section 5 (e) of
RA 9262 are present, to wit: (a) Melgar and AAA had a romantic relationship, resulting in
BBB's birth; (b) Melgar freely acknowledged his paternity over BBB; (c) Melgar had failed
to provide BBB support ever since the latter was just a year old; and (d) his intent of not
supporting BBB was made more apparent when he sold to a third party his property which
was supposed to answer for, among others, his support-in-arrears to BBB.

Melgar argument that he was charged of violation of Section 5 (i) as the Information
alleged that the acts complained of "caused mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or
humiliation to AAA and BBB.” As such, he contends that he cannot be convicted of
violation of Section 5 (e) is untenable.

Section 5 (i), a form of psychological violence, punishes the act of "causing mental or
emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but
not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or
custody of minor children or denial of access to the woman's child/children." Notably,
"psychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5 (i) just like the mental or
emotional anguish caused on the victim. To establish psychological violence as an
element of the crime, it is necessary to show proof of commission of any of the acts
enumerated in Section 5 (i) or similar acts. And to establish mental or emotional
anguish, it is necessary to present the testimony of the victim as such experiences are
personal to this party.” Thus, in cases of support, it must be first shown that the accused's
denial thereof—which is, by itself, already a form of economic abuse—further caused
mental or emotional anguish to the woman-victim and/or to their common child.

In this case, while the prosecution had established that Melgar indeed deprived AAA and
BBB of support, no evidence was presented to show that such deprivation caused
either AAA or BBB any mental or emotional anguish. Therefore, Melgar cannot be
convicted of violation of Section 5 (i) of RA 9262. Taking into consideration the variance
doctrine which allows the conviction of an accused for a crime proved which is different
from but necessarily included in the crime charged - the courts a quo correctly convicted
Melgar of violation of Section 5 (e) of RA 9262 as the deprivation or denial of support, by
itself and even without the additional element of psychological violence, is already
specifically penalized therein.

Section 6 of RA 9262 provides that violations of Section 5 (e) shall be punished by prision
correccional. Notably, while such crime is punishable by a special penal law, the penalty
provided therein is taken from the technical nomenclature in the RPC.
 ESTEBAN DONATO REYES v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 232678, JULY 3, 2019
Peralta, J.
Topic: (Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004 (VAWC))

Case Doctrine/s:

Under the Test of Sufficiency, the fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of
the averments in a complaint or information is whether the facts alleged therein, if
hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of the offense.

Facts:

An information was filed against Esteban Donato Reyes before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) for violating Section 5 (e), paragraph 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. (9262), otherwise
known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004 (VAWC).

AAA was married to Reyes on May 15, 1969 and had four children, three of whom are still
alive and are of legal age. During their marriage, Reyes is seldom home because he served
as a military pilot for the Philippine Airforce and later on as a commercial pilot to Philippine
Airlines. At the time the VAWC case was filed against Reyes, he was serving in Angola
Africa. AAA only found out in 2005 that Reyes got married to one Marilou Osias Ramboanga
who bore him four children and at the present, living with him. During their marriage, AAA
said that Reyes used to give her and their children monthly financial support ranging from
P10,000 to P20,000. Afterhe ceased giving them support, she also suffered various illnesses
and as a result, she had undergone regular consultation and medical check-up. According
to AAA, she filed the case for violation of RA 9262 against Reyes for his failure to give her
support to provide monthly financial allowance which he stopped sometime in July 2005.

For his part, Reyes said that he never really got married to AAA. The signature appearing
on their marriage certificate was forged. They are only living in a common-law relationship.
He admitted having stopped giving support to her because of the bigamy case that was file
against him because he treated it as an act of her ingratitude to him.

On June 11, 2009, he filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the
allegations raised by AAA do not constitute a crime for violation of Section 5 (e), par. 2, of
R.A. 9262. He said that “abandoning without financial support is different from “deprivation
or denial of financial support, which is not criminalized under RA 9262. Since it does not
charge any offense against him, it should be quashed, otherwise, his right to constitutional
due process and right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
would be infringed.
Upon amendment of the information changing the charge for violation of Section 5 (e), par.
2, of R.A. 9262 to violation of Section 5 (i), par. 2, of R.A. 9262, the RTC convicted Reyes
for the crime charged against him saying that the testimony of AAA, her attending
physician, and their daughter are credible and sufficient to adequately establish the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged against him. On
appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), it dismissed the appeal for lack of merit and affirmed
the decision of the trial court that due to Reyes’ act of suddenly giving support to AAA, he
committed psychological violence against her which caused her emotional and mental
anguish.

Issue/s:

Was there sufficient compliance of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, in
filing the information against Reyes?

Ruling/s:

Yes. Under Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the complaint or information is
sufficient if it states the names of the accused; the designation of the offense given
by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name
of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place
where the offense was committed.

Since the Prosecution has the duty to prove each and every element of the crime, they must
be alleged in the Information to warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against
the accused. To prove the sufficiency of the allegations, the fundamental test is the Test of
Sufficiency. This answers the question that, if the facts alleged therein are to be
hypothetically admitted, would constitute the elements of the crime?

In the case ofDinamling v. People, the Court enumerated the elements of violation of Section
5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 as follows:

1. The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;

2. The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom
the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom
such offender has a common child. Asfor the woman's child or children, they may be
legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode;
3. The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and
4. The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal
and emotional abuse,denial of financial support or custody of minor children or
access to the children or similar acts or omissions.
Hence, AAA, being the wife of Reyes; who suffered emotional and mental anguish;due to
Reyes’ act of unlawfully and deliberately denying AAA of financial support.

Lastly, contrary to Reyes’ contention that since they are not lawfully married, he cannot be
charged with a violation of RA 9262 because RA 9262 penalizes acts committed against
women and their children committed by the woman’s husband, former husband, or any
person against whom she has had a sexual or dating relationship with, or with whom the
woman has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or
without the family abode, which will likely result in economic abuse or physical harm or
suffering. In their case, it is evident that AAA and Reyes had four children born out of their
relationship.

Therefore, the Information that was filed against Reyes is sufficient enough to convict him
for his violation of Section 5 (i), par. 2, of R.A. 9262.
 Ang v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 182835, April 20, 2010
Abad, J.
Topic: RA 9262

Case Doctrine/s:

1. Section 3 (e) provides that a "dating relationship" includes a situation where the
parties are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the
course of the relationship. The law did not use in its provisions the colloquial verb
"romance" that implies a sexual act. It did not say that the offender must have
"romanced" the offended woman. Rather, it used the noun "romance" to describe a
couple's relationship, i.e., "a love affair."
2. A single act of harassment, like the sending of the nude picture, already constitutes
a violation of Section 5 (h) of R.A. 9262. Section 3 (a) of R.A. 9262 punishes "any
act or series of acts" that constitutes violence against women. This means that a
single act of harassment, which translates into violence, would be enough. The
object of the law is to protect women and children. Punishing only violence that is
repeatedly committed would license isolated ones.

Facts:

Complainant Irish Sagud and accused Rustan Ang were classmates at Wesleyan University
in Aurora Province. Rustan courted Irish and they became "on-and-off" sweethearts towards
the end of 2004. When Irish learned afterwards that Rustan had taken a live-in partner (now
his wife), whom he had gotten pregnant, Irish broke up with him. Before Rustan got married,
however, he got in touch with Irish and tried to convince her to elope with him, saying that
he did not love the woman he was about to marry. Irish rejected the proposal and told Rustan
to take on his responsibility to the other woman and their child.
In June 5, 2005, Irish received through multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a
naked woman with spread legs and with Irish's face superimposed on the figure. The
sender's cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-8084768, one of the numbers
that Rustan used. Irish surmised that he copied the picture of her face from a shot he took
when they were in Baguio in 2003. After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text
messages from Rustan. He boasted that it would be easy for him to create similarly
scandalous pictures of her. And he threatened to spread the picture he sent through the
internet. One of the messages he sent to Irish, written in text messaging shorthand, read:
"Madali lang ikalat yun, my chatrum ang tarlac rayt pwede ring send sa lahat ng chatter."

Issue/s:

1. Whether a "dating relationship" existed between Rustan and Irish as this term is defined
in R.A. 9262
2. Whether a single act of harassment, like the sending of the nude picture, already
constitutes a violation of Section 5 (h) of R.A. 9262

Ruling/s:

1. Yes, a dating relationship existed between Rustan and Irish. Section 3 (e) provides
that a "dating relationship" includes a situation where the parties are romantically
involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship.
The law did not use in its provisions the colloquial verb "romance" that implies a
sexual act. It did not say that the offender must have "romanced" the offended
woman. Rather, it used the noun "romance" to describe a couple's relationship, i.e.,
"a love affair." Further, an "away-bati" or a fight-and-kiss thing between two lovers is
a common occurrence. Their taking place does not mean that the romantic relation
between the two should be deemed broken up during periods of misunderstanding.
Explaining what "away-bati" meant, Irish explained that at times, when she could not
reply to Rustan's messages, he would get angry at her. That was all. Indeed, she
characterized their three-month romantic relation as continuous.
2. Yes, a single act of harassment, like the sending of the nude picture in this case,
already constitutes a violation of Section 5 (h) of R.A. 9262. Section 3 (a) of R.A.
9262 punishes "any act or series of acts" that constitutes violence against women.
This means that a single act of harassment, which translates into violence, would be
enough. The object of the law is to protect women and children. Punishing only
violence that is repeatedly committed would license isolated ones. Rustan alleges
that today's women, like Irish, are so used to obscene communications that her
getting one could not possibly have produced alarm in her or caused her substantial
emotional or psychological distress. He claims having previously exchanged
obscene pictures with Irish such that she was already desensitized by them.
However, what is obscene and injurious to an offended woman can of course only
be determined based on the circumstances of each case. Here, the naked woman
on the picture, her legs spread open and bearing Irish's head and face, was clearly
an obscene picture and, to Irish a revolting and offensive one. Surely, any woman
like Irish, who is not in the pornography trade, would be scandalized and pained if
she sees herself in such a picture. What makes it further terrifying is that, as Irish
testified, Rustan sent the picture with a threat to post it in the internet for all to see.
That must have given her a nightmare.
 AAA v. BBB
G.R. No. 212448, January 11, 2018
Tijam, J.
Topic: RA9262

Case Doctrine/s:

In Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262, venue undoubtedly pertains to jurisdiction. As correctly

pointed out by AAA, Section 7 provides that the case may be filed where the crime or any
of its elements was committed at the option of the complainant. While the psychological
violence as the means employed by the perpetrator is certainly an indispensable element of
the offense, equally essential also is the element of mental or emotional anguish which is
personal to the complainant.

Facts:

AAA and BBB were married on Aug. 1, 2006 which produced two children CCC and DDD.
In May 2017, BBB started working as a chef in Singapore, where he acquired a status of a
permanent resident. The petition states that his residence is in Quezon City where his
parents and AAA used to reside.

AAA claimed, although not reflected in the Information, that BBB sent little to no financial
support. This allegedly compelled her to fly extra hours and take on additional jobs to
augment her income as a flight attendant. There were also allegations of virtual
abandonment, mistreatment of her and their son CCC, and physical and sexual violence.
To make matters worse, BBB supposedly started having an affair with a Singaporean
woman named Lisel Mok with whom he allegedly has been living in Singapore. Things came
to a head on April 19, 2011 when AAA and BBB had a violent altercation at a hotel room in
Singapore during her visit with their kids.

A warrant of arrest was issued against BBB and a Hold-Departure Order against BBB who
continued to evade the warrant of arrest. The case was later archived. A motion to quash
was filed on behalf of BBB which was granted by the trial court reasoning that, the acts
complained of BBB had occurred in Singapore, thus the trial court does not have jurisdiction
over the offense charged. AAA’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

AAA sought direct recourse to this court via instant petition. , AAA argues that mental and
emotional anguish is an essential element of the offense charged against BBB, which is
experienced by her wherever she goes, and not only in Singapore where the extra-marital
affair takes place; thus, the RTC of Pasig City where she resides can take cognizance of
the case.

Issue/s:
May Philippine courts exercise jurisdiction over an offense constituting psychological
violence under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against
Women and their Children Act of 2004, committed through marital infidelity, when the
alleged illicit relationship occurred or is occurring outside the country?

Ruling/s:

Yes. In Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262, venue undoubtedly pertains to jurisdiction. As correctly
pointed out by AAA, Section 7 provides that the case may be filed where the crime or any
of its elements was committed at the option of the complainant. While the psychological
violence as the means employed by the perpetrator is certainly an indispensable element of
the offense, equally essential also is the element of mental or emotional anguish which is
personal to the complainant.

What may be gleaned from Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262 is that the law contemplates that acts
of violence against women and their children may manifest as transitory or continuing
crimes; meaning that some acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their
consummation occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another. In such
cases, the court wherein any of the crime's essential and material acts have been committed
maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking
cognizance of the same excludes the other. Thus, a person charged with a continuing or
transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in
part committed.

It is necessary, for Philippine courts to have jurisdiction when the abusive conduct or act of
violence under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 in relation to Section 3(a), Paragraph (C) was
committed outside Philippine territory, that the victim be a resident of the place where the
complaint is filed in view of the anguish suffered being a material element of the offense. In
the present scenario, the offended wife and children of respondent husband are residents
of Pasig City since March of 2010. Hence, the RTC of Pasig City may exercise jurisdiction
over the case.

Certainly, the act causing psychological violence which under the information relates to
BBB's marital infidelity must be proven by probable cause for the purpose of formally
charging the husband, and to establish the same beyond reasonable doubt for purposes of
conviction. It likewise remains imperative to acquire jurisdiction over the husband. What this
case concerns itself is simply whether or not a complaint for psychological abuse under R.A.
No. 9262 may even be filed within the Philippines if the illicit relationship is conducted
abroad. We say that even if the alleged extra marital affair causing the offended wife mental
and emotional anguish is committed abroad, the same does not place a prosecution under
R.A. No. 9262 absolutely beyond the reach of Philippine courts.
 Cruz v. People
G.R. No. 166441, October 8, 2014
Bersamin, J.
Topic: Article 266-A Rape

Case Doctrine/s:

The fundamental difference between attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness is the
offender’s intent to lie with the female. In rape, intent to lie with the female is indispensable,
but this element is not required in acts of lasciviousness. Attempted rape is committed,
therefore, when the "touching" of the vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to
penetrate. The intent to penetrate is manifest only through the showing of the penis capable
of consummating the sexual act touching the external genitalia of the female. Without such
showing, only the felony of acts of lasciviousness is committed.

Facts:

Norberto Bartolome and his wife Belinda Cruz were engaged in the selling of plastic wares
and glasswares. Norberto and Belinda employed AAA and BBB. Two tents were fixed in
order that they will have a place to sleep. Belinda and the driver proceeded to Manila in
order to get more goods to be sold. On December 21, 1993, at around 1:00 o’clock in the
morning, AAA and BBB went to sleep. Less than an hour later, AAA was awakened when
she felt that somebody was on top of her. Norberto was mashing her breast and touching
her private part. AAA realized that she was divested of her clothing and that she was totally
naked. Norberto ordered her not to scream or she’ll be killed. AAA tried to push Norberto
away and pleaded to have pity on her but her pleas fell on deaf ears. She fought back and
kicked Norberto twice.

Norberto was not able to pursue his lustful desires. Norberto offered her money and told her
not to tell the incident to her mother. Otherwise, she will be killed. AAA went out of the tent
to seek help from Jess (the house boy) but she failed to wake him up. Thirty minutes later,
when AAA returned to their tent, she saw Norberto touching the private parts of BBB. AAA
saw her companion awake but her hands were shaking. When she finally entered the tent,
Norberto left and went outside.

The accused maintains that it was not possible for him to commit the crimes hurled against
him. On the date of the alleged incident, there were many people around who were preparing
for the "simbang gabi".

Issue/s:

Whether Bartolome is guilty of attempted rape

Ruling/s:
No. The Supreme Court held that the basic element of rape then and now is carnal
knowledge of a female. Carnal knowledge is defined simply as "the act of a man having
sexual bodily connections with a woman," which explains why the slightest penetration of
the female genitalia consummates the rape. In other words, rape is consummated once the
penis capable of consummating the sexual act touches the external genitalia of the female.
Furthermore, as held in the case of People v. Campuhan, there must be sufficient and
convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and
not merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of
consummated rape and absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ,
i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated
rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.

The fundamental difference between attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness is the
offender’s intent to lie with the female. In rape, intent to lie with the female is indispensable,
but this element is not required in acts of lasciviousness. Attempted rape is committed,
therefore, when the "touching" of the vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to
penetrate. The intent to penetrate is manifest only through the showing of the penis capable
of consummating the sexual act touching the external genitalia of the female. Without such
showing, only the felony of acts of lasciviousness is committed.

Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the elements of acts of lasciviousness.
In that regard, lewd is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, lecherous; it signifies that form
of immorality that has relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried on a wanton manner.

In the case at bar, the petitioner’s act of embracing her and touching her vagina and breasts
did not directly manifest his intent to lie with her. Furthermore, the lack of evidence showing
his erectile penis being in the position to penetrate her when he was on top of her deterred
any inference about his intent to lie with her. Hence, the petitioner shall only be made liable
for acts of lasciviousness.
 People v. Baay
G.R. No. 220143, June 7, 2017
Tijam, J.
Topic: Article 266-A (Rape)

Case Doctrine/s:

The term statutory rape should only be confined to situations where the victim of rape is a
person less than 12 years of age. If the victim of rape is a person with mental abnormality,
deficiency, or retardation, the crime committed is simple rape under Article 266-A, paragraph
1(b) as she is considered "deprived of reason" notwithstanding that her mental age is
equivalent to that of a person under 12.

Facts:

Accused Jonathan Baay was charged with rape. AAA, the 22-year old victim, testified that
sometime in July 2005, she was drying palay when Baay invited her to go to the forest. Upon
arrival thereat, Baay pulled down her shorts and underwear, then inserted his penis in her
vagina and started a pumping motion. It lasted until a white liquid came out of the penis of
Baay. After the incident, AAA got pregnant.

On cross-examination, she testified that she practiced and was coached by her mother on
what she had to say in court and to point to Baay as the one who had sex with her but in
fact, the accused-appellant did not have sex with her. The trial court, however, noted that
as the examination continued, AAA made conflicting answers, which prompted the court to
reset the hearing to give the witness time to rest.

BBB, the mother of AAA, testified that she brought her to the doctor for a medical check-up
and therein, AAA told her about the rape incident. BBB also brought AAA to another doctor,
Dra. Adicula-Sicad, to assess AAA's mental status and then to the police for the purpose of
filing the complaint. Dra. Adicula-Sicad testified that the mental faculties of AAA are severely
deficient in areas where the executive functioning judgment and other areas of intellect are
concerned. According the assessment, AAA's age is comparable to a child of around 4-5
years old as a result of mental retardation, which is congenital in nature, wherein the victim
could not have consented or would not be in any position to give consent as to the
consequences of a certain act.

Accused-appellant denied the allegations against him. He testified that he could not have
raped AAA because he was working on a farm which is about one kilometer away from the
forested area where the alleged crime took place. He further averred that AAA's family
accused him of rape because of the trees he planted beside the pigpen owned by AAA's
family.
The RTC found that the prosecution was able to prove that the accused-appellant had carnal
knowledge with AAA, a mental retardate. The RTC convicted him of Rape which is defined
and punished under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d) in relation to Article 266-B.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, with modification the decision of the RTC. The
CA convicted him of Statutory Rape as defined and punished under Article 266-A, paragraph
1 (d) in relation to Article 266-B, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.

Issue/s:

Was the modification of the crime to Statutory Rape proper, although the age of the victim
at the time of the incident was above the statutory limit?

Ruling/s:

NO.

It was erroneous for the RTC and the CA to convict accused-appellant of Statutory Rape
under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d) of the RPC. The gravamen of the offense of statutory
rape under the said provision is the carnal knowledge of a woman below 12 years old. To
convict an accused of the crime of statutory rape, the prosecution must prove: first, the age
of the victim; second, the identity of the accused; and third, the carnal knowledge between
the accused and the victim.
In this case, it is not disputed that AAA was already 22 years old when she was raped albeit
she has a mental age of 4-5 years old.
It should, however, no longer be debatable that rape of a mental retardate falls under
paragraph 1 (b), not Section 1 (d), of the said provision as the same, precisely, refers to a
rape of a female "deprived of reason." This Court, in the case of People v. Dalan, explained:
xxxx
Based on these discussions, we hold that the term statutory rape should only be confined
to situations where the victim of rape is a person less than 12 years of age. If the victim of
rape is a person with mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation, the crime committed is
simple rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(b) as she is considered "deprived of reason"
notwithstanding that her mental age is equivalent to that of a person under 12. In short,
carnal knowledge with a mental retardate whose mental age is that of a person below 12
years, while akin to statutory rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d), should still be
designated as simple rape under paragraph 1(b). (emphasis supplied)
Considering the circumstances of this case, We find that accused-appellant should be held
liable for simple rape.
 People v. Deniega
G.R. No. 212201, June 28, 2017
Peralta, J.
Topic: Article 266-A

Case Doctrine/s:

In determining whether a person is "twelve (12) years of age" under Article 266-A(1)(d), the
interpretation should be in accordance with either the chronological age of the child if he or
she is not suffering from intellectual disability, or the mental age if intellectual disability is
established.

Facts:

AAA was a 16 year old girl who was suffering from mental retardation, with a mental capacity
of a 6 year old. She went out with some neighbors to watch a basketball game in a nearby
basketball court. At about 11 p.m., BBB, AAA’s mother, noticed that AAA’s pants were wet.
Upon inspection, BBB found that AAA’s underwear smelled of semen. AAA admitted that
accused appellant, whom she calls Dodong, and who was known to them as a delivery boy
in their neighborhood, invited her to go to another basketball court where they could talk
with each other but, instead, upon arriving at the said place, he undressed her and made
her lie down. He removed his pants and underwear, went on top of her, inserted his penis
in her vagina and made "up-and-down" movements."

Upon accused-appellant’s arrest, he admitted in front of his employer and BBB that he had
sex with AAA and that he loves AAA and he offered to marry her. A criminal complaint for
statutory rape was filed. Accused-appellant denied the allegations and raised the defense
of alibi, that on that day he was painting the house of a neighbor, then had his electric fan
repaired, then had a drinking session with his friend at the latter’s house.

The RTC found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of statutory rape. The
CA affirmed in toto. Hence this appeal.

Issue/s:

Whether or not Deniega is guilty of statutory rape for having had carnal knowledge with a
16 year old suffering mental retardation with a mental capacity of a 6 year old

Ruling/s:

YES. Deniega is guilty of statutory rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d) of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 16 (RA 8353), in relation to
Republic Act No. 76101. The provision states:
Art. 266-A Rape – When and How Rape is Committed:
 1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

Rape under Article 266-A (1) (d) is termed statutory rape as it departs from the usual modes
of committing rape. It is enough that the age of the victim is proven and that there was sexual
intercourse. The law presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a will of her own
on account of her tender years; the child's consent is immaterial because of her presumed
incapacity to discern good from evil.

In People v. Quintos, 25 this Court held that if a mentally- retarded or intellectually-disabled

person whose mental age is less than 12 years is raped, the rape is considered committed
under paragraph 1 (d) and not paragraph 1 (b).

In holding as such, this Court differentiated the term "mentally-retarded" or "intellectually

disabled" from the terms "deprived of reason" and "demented".
• Deprived of reason - associated with insanity or madness; has mental abnormalities
that affect his or her reasoning and perception of reality and, therefore, his or her
capacity to resist, make decisions, and give consent.
• Demented - suffers from a mental condition called dementia or the deterioration or
loss of mental functions such as memory, learning, speaking, and social condition,
which impairs one's independence in everyday activities.
• Intellectually disabled - his or her maturity is not there despite the physical age; he
or she is deficient in general mental abilities and has an impaired conceptual, social,
and practical functioning relative to his or her age, gender, and peers. Because of
such impairment, he or she does not meet the "socio- cultural standards of personal
independence and social responsibility.
Hence, a person's capacity to decide whether to give consent or to express resistance to an
adult activity is determined not by his or her chronological age but by his or her mental age.
Therefore, in determining whether a person is "twelve (12) years of age" under Article
266-A(1)(d), the interpretation should be in accordance with either the chronological
age of the child if he or she is not suffering from intellectual disability, or the mental
age if intellectual disability is established.

In this case, the prosecution sufficiently proved, based on the medical and psychiatric
evaluation of AAA, that she has moderate mental retardation and that she has the mental
age of a six-year-old child. Moreover, it was established that accused-appellant had
knowledge of her mental disability.
 People v. Caga
G.R. No. 206878, 22 August 2016
Del Castillo, J.
Topic: Article 266A

Case Doctrine:

At the core of almost all rape cases, the credibility of the victim's testimony is crucial in view
of the intrinsic nature of the crime where only the participants therein can testify to its
occurrence. In this regard, a restatement of a consistent ruling is in order. The rule is that
'the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and
its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said
findings, are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect.

Facts:

On September 17, 2006, “AAA” and her boyfriend, Randy Bomita, went to accused
Marcelino Caga’s residence at Pandacan, Manila for a drinking spree. Along with other
guests, AAA, Bomita, and Caga drank until the early hours of the following day. While still
intoxicated and asleep, AAA felt someone kiss her vagina. Believing it was her boyfriend,
AAA pushed him away as she had menstruation at that time. Caga, however, succeeded in
mounting her and penetrating her private parts with his penis. When she opened her eyes,
AAA became hysterical. She started hitting and slapping Caga. She then reported the
incident. Caga admitted that he had raped AAA.

The RTC found Caga guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Caga appealed to the CA on the
ground that AAA’s testimony was incredible, implausible, and uncorroborated. The CA,
however, ruled against Caga. Thus, Caga appealed to the SC. Caga argues that while the
Information alleged that force, violence, and intimidation were employed to consummate the
alleged rape, the prosecution's evidence failed to establish the existence thereof. He claims
that AAA did not offer any resistance against his sexual advances, "because she thought
that it was her boyfriend who was then making love with her."

Issue:

Whether or not the prosecution failed to establish the existence of force, violence, and
intimidation

Ruling:

NO. The Court finds that Caga did have sexual intercourse with AAA when she was asleep
and still under the influence of alcohol. The case thus falls under the second paragraph of
rape: "when the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise
unconscious." It is altogether immaterial that the prosecution's evidence failed to establish
the presence of physical force, threat, or intimidation because, as the evidence at bar shows,
Caga raped an unconscious and extremely intoxicated woman - a fact that was duly alleged
in the Information and duly established by the prosecution's evidence during the trial. In the
case at bench, physical force, threat or intimidation is not necessary, for the simple reason
that an unconscious and extremely intoxicated woman cannot freely and voluntarily give her
consent to engaging in sexual intercourse.

At the core of almost all rape cases, the credibility of the victim's testimony is crucial in view
of the intrinsic nature of the crime where only the participants therein can testify to its
occurrence. In this regard, a restatement of a consistent ruling is in order. The rule is that
'the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and
its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said
findings, are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect.

The complainant's testimonies and the pieces of evidence, taken together, all point to the
accused-appellant's complicity to the crime charged. There is nothing in the records to
render suspicious the evidence put forth by the complainant. The accused-appellant is the
uncle of her boyfriend. She has no known ill-motive to impute such a grave crime to him
and, like the trial court, we did not find any motive why she would fabricate a story that could,
in fact, subject herself to public ridicule and humiliation. As settled, no woman would want
to go through the process, the trouble and the humiliation of trial for such a debasing offense
unless she actually has been a victim of abuse and her motive is but a response to the
compelling need to seek and obtain justice.
 PEOPLE v. JUMAWAN
G.R. No., 187495, April 21, 2014
Reyes, J.
Topic: (ARTICLE 266-A)

Case Doctrine/s:

The Court held that since the Philippines is a signatory of the CEDAW, recognized that a
change in the traditional role of men as well as the role of women in society and in the family
is needed to achieve full equality between them. Accordingly, R.A. No. 8353 was enacted
to eradicate the notion that marital rape cannot exist because a husband has propriety rights
over his wife’s body. It removed the presumption that the consent of the wife is presumed in
every act of sexual intimacy with her husband. Clearly, it is now acknowledged that rape, as
a form of sexual violence, exists within a marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without
her consent or against her will commits sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a
State Party to the CEDAW and its accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act
as rape under R.A. No. 8353. The court also explained that to treat marital rape cases
differently from non-marital rape is violative of the equal protection clause. Consequently,
since the law does not separately categorize marital rape and non-marital rape nor provide
for different definition or elements for either, there exists no legal or rational reason for the
court to apply the law and the evidentiary rules on rape differently if the aggressor is the
woman’s own legal husband.

Facts:

KKK, wife of accused-appellant Edgar Jumawan, alleged that her husband raped her on two
separate occasions. She also alleged that accused-appellant boxed her for refusing to have
sex with him. Two informations for rape was filed against Jumawan.

VERSION OF THE PROSECUTION:

After a year of courtship. KKK and Jumawan got married. They engaged in several
businesses which included a sari-sari store, trucking, ricemill and hardware. KKK managed
the business except for the rice mill which was under the supervision of Jumawan. Sometime
after, KKK and the accused bought a lot and built a house in Villa Ernesto, Gusa, Cagayan
de Oro City. Three of their children resided therein while KKK, the accused and one of their
sons stayed in Dangcagan Bukidnon.

It was alleged that there were no marital problems between them. However, in 1997,
accused become brutal in bed. His method of lovemaking was physically painful for her so
she would resist his sexual ambush but he would threaten her into submission. Thereafter,
in 1998. KKK and the accused started quarelling usually upon his complaint that she failed
to attend to him.

On the night of October 16. 1998, after their usual festive (supper and prayer of the rosary),
accused fetched KKK and bid her to come with him to their conjugal bedroom. KKK then
changed into a daster and rested in a cot near the bed. Accused ordered KKK to transfer to
the bed, but she insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had a headache and
abdominal pain due to her forthcoming menstruation. Accused however, lifted the cot and
threw it against the wall causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK transferred to the
bed. Accused then expressed his desire to copulate by tapping his fingers on her lap. When
she declined, accused forcefully tore down KKK panty. KKK refused to bend her legs, to
which accused stretched her legs apart and rested his own legs. He then proceeded with
his carnal desires, KKK continued to protest by desparately shouting at accused. The cries
of KKK were heard by their daughters, MMM and OOO. When MMM and OOO, came to the
aid of their mother, their father repeatedly told them not to interfere because it is a family
trouble. MMM forcefully entered the room and took her mother away. KKK then slept with
MMM and OOO in their bedroom. When the children asked their mother what happened she
replied “Your father is an animal, a beast; he forced me to have sex with him when I’m not
feeling well”

The following night, on October 17. 1998, KKK decided to sleep with the children. Accused
then asked whyshe was sleeping in the children bedroom.When KKK still refused to go with
him, he become infuriated and he lifter her from the bed and attempted to carry her out of
the bed. When the children tried to stop him, he was not pacified, instead he yelled at them
and ordered them to leave. Frightened, the girls obliged and went to the staircase where
they heard, once again, the cries of their mother. Accused then forced himself against KKK.
When the commotion in the bedroom has ceased, MMM and OOO scurried to their mother
and asked what happened, KKK then again replied “Your father is a beast and animal, he
again forced me to have sex with him even if I don’t feel well.

VERSION OF THE DEFENSE:

Accused-Appellant denied raping his wife. He alleged that at the dates of the alleged rape
he was in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, peeling corn. His testimony was corroborated by their
driver, Ryle Equia. He also alleged that the reason for the case filed against him was
because KKK was trying to cover up for her extra-marital affairs, stating that KKK had more
than 10 paramours. He also alleged that another reason for the case was because he took
control and management of their businesses after KKK failed to account for bank deposits
and business earnings.

RTC RULING: The RTC sustained the version of the prosecution.

CA RULIN: The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC.

Issue/s:

Whether the crime of rape was committed in the case?

Ruling/s:

THE CRIME OF RAPE WAS COMMITTED

The Court found KKK and her testimony as credible and spontaneous. She was asked to
testify on six separate occasions and in those occasions she never waivered, neither did
her statements show uncertainty. She remained consistent, categorical, straightforward,
and candid during the examinations conducted in the court. She vividly recounted how
accused-appellant forced her to have sex with him despite her refusal. She was also able
to accurately remember and testify both incidents of the rape.
Contrary to accused-appellants allegation, KKK’s consent was wrestled from her through
force and intimidation, both of which were established beyond moral certainty through the
testimony of KKK. From the testimony of KKK, it can be ascertained that the accused-
appellant forced his wife when he knowingly overpowerd her by gripping her hands, flexing
her legs and then resting his own legs thereon in order to facilitate the consummation of his
much-desired non- consensual sexual intercourse.

The Court also found that accused-appellant employed sufficient intimidation upon KKK, His
actuations prior to the actual moment of the felonious coitus revealed that he imposed his
distorted sense of moral authority on his wife. He furiously demanded for her to lay with him
on the bed and thereafter coerced her to indulge his sexual craving. The fury the accused-
appellant exhibited when KKK refused to sleep with him on their bed, when she insisted to
sleep in the children's bedroom and the fact that he exercises dominance over her as
husband all cowed KKK into submission.

The fact that KKK voluntarily went with the accused-appellant to their conjugal bedroom on
October 16, 1998 cannot be stretched to mean that she consented to the forced sexual
intercourse that ensued. The accused- appellant was KKK's husband and hence it was
customary for her to sleep in the conjugal bedroom. No consent can be deduced from such
act of KKK because at that juncture there were no indications that sexual intercourse was
about to take place.

ABSENCE OF BLOOD AND MEDICAL CERTIFICATE

The Court found that the absence of blood traces in KKK’s panties or the lack of medical
certificate do not negate rape. it is not the presence or absence of blood on the victim's
underwear that determines the fact of rape inasmuch as a medical certificate is dispensable
evidence that is not necessary to prove rape. These details do not pertain to the elements
that produce the gravamen of the offense that is — sexual intercourse with a woman against
her will or without her consent.

TESTIMONIES OF MMM AND OOO

MMM and OOO's testimonies substantiated significant points in KKK's narration. The
testimonies of KKK, MMM and OOO coherently depicted that the accused-appellant,
through the use of force and intimidation, had non-consensual and forced carnal knowledge
of his wife, KKK on the nights of October 16 and 17, 1998. KKK's helpless screams and
pleas from inside the bedroom coupled with her verbal and physical resistance were clear
manifestations of coercion. Her appearance when MMM saw her on the bed after the
accused appellant opened the door on October 16, 1998, her conduct towards the accused-
appellant on her way out of the room, and her categorical outcry to her children after the two
bedroom episodes — all generate the conclusion that the sexual acts that occurred were
against her will.

FAILURE TO REPORT IMMEDIATELY

The testimonies of KKK and her daughters cannot be discredited merely because they failed
to report the rape incidents to the police authorities or that KKK belatedly filed the rape
charges. Delay or vacillation by the victims in reporting sexual assaults does not necessarily
impair their credibility if such delay is satisfactorily explained. At that time, KKK and her
daughters were not aware that a husband forcing his wife to submit to sexual intercourse is
considered rape. In fact, KKK only found out that she could sue his husband for rape when
Prosecutor Benjamin Tabique, Jr. (Prosecutor Tabique) told her about it when she filed the
separate charges for grave threats and physical injuries against the accused-appellant

All told, the presumption of innocence endowed an accused-appellant was sufficiently

overcome by KKK's clear, straightforward, credible, and truthful declaration that on two
separate occasions, he succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her, without her
consent and against her will. Evidence of overwhelming force and intimidation to
consummate rape is extant from KKK's narration as believably corroborated by the
testimonies of MMM and OOO and the physical evidence of KKK's torn panties and short
pants. Based thereon, the reason and conscience of the Court is morally certain that the
accused-appellant is guilty of raping his wife on the nights of October 16 and 17, 1998
 LUTAP VS PEOPLE
G.R. No. 204061, February 5, 2018
TIJAM, J
Topic: ARTICLE 266A

Case Doctrine/s:

Rape by sexual assault with use of one’s finger, to prosper, there should be evidence of at
least slightest penetration of the sexual organ and not merely a brush or a graze of its
surface, being that rape by sexual assault requires that the assault be specifically done
through the insertion of the assault object into the genital or anal orifices of the victim. The
touching of a female's sexual organ, standing alone, is not equivalent to rape, not even an
attempted one.
Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated and
not merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface
of the female organ or touching the mans pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute
consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female
organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated
rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.

Facts:

AAA was then wearing short pants and was sitting on the floor with her legs spread apart
while watching television and playing with "text cards." BBB, on the other hand, was
seated on a chair beside CCC, some five steps away from AAA. Petitioner was seated
on the sofa which was one foot away from AAA. Petitioner then touched AAA's vagina.
AAA reacted by swaying off his hand. The prosecution presented victim AAA’s and her
sibling, BBB’s testimonies to prove the sexual assault charge. The victim testified that
the petitioner touched her vagina while BBB testified that there was no penetration.
In defense, petitioner denied the accusations against him. Petitioner testified that he
merely pacified AAA and BBB who were quarreling over the text cards. When petitioner
separated the children, BBB then said, "bad yan, bad." After which, DDD talked to her
two children in the kitchen and when she came out, she asked petitioner if he touched
AAA. Petitioner denied having touched AAA and suggested that AAA be examined.
The RTC found accused guilty of sexual assault while the CA modified it to attempted
rape.

Issue/s:

Whether the CA erred in convicting petitioner for the crime of attempted rape on the
basis of the evidence thus presented
 Ruling/s:

The petition is partly meritorious.

The Supreme Court agreed with the CA's ruling that the fact of insertion of petitioner's
finger into AAA's sexual organ was not established beyond reasonable doubt to support
petitioner's conviction of rape by sexual assault. The Supreme Court also agreed with
the CA that there was sexual molestation by petitioner's established act of touching
AAA's vagina. Be that as it may, the act of touching a female's sexual organ, standing
alone, is not equivalent to rape, not even an attempted one. At most, therefore,
petitioner's act of touching AAA's sexual organ demonstrates his guilt for the crime of
acts of lasciviousness, an offense subsumed in the charge of rape by sexual assault.
The direct examination of AAA and BBB, as well as the clarificatory questions interposed
by the RTC, while convincingly prove that there was malicious touching of AAA's sexual
organ, nevertheless invite doubts as to whether petitioner indeed inserted his finger
inside AAA's vagina.
Thus, absent any showing that there was actual insertion of petitioner's finger into AAA's
vagina, petitioner cannot be held liable for consummated rape by sexual assault.
 Ricalde V. People
G.R. No. 211002, July 22, 2019
Leonen, J.
Topic: Article 266-A

Case Doctrine/s:

Rape under par. 2, Article 266-A is also known as "instrument or object rape," "gender-free
rape," or "homosexual rape." The gravamen of rape through sexual assault is "the insertion
of the penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into
another person’s genital or anal orifice." The trial court found that XXX’s "straightforward,
unequivocal and convincing testimony" sufficiently proved that petitioner committed an act
of sexual assault by inserting his penis into XXX’s anal orifice.

Facts:

Even men can become victims of rape. On January 30, 2002, XXX requested his mother to
pick up Ricalde at McDonald’s Bel-Air, Sta. Rosa at past 8:00 p.m. Ricalde, then 31 years
old, is a distant relative and textmate of XXX, then 10 years old.
After dinner, XXX’s mother told Ricalde to spend the night at their house as it was late. He
slept on the sofa while XXX slept on the living room floor. It was around 2:00 a.m. when XXX
awoke as "he felt pain in his anus and stomach and something inserted in his anus." He saw
that Ricalde "fondled his penis." When Ricalde returned to the sofa, XXX ran toward his
mother’s room to tell her what happened. He also told his mother that Ricalde played with
his sexual organ.
XXX’s mother then accompanied XXX to the barangay hall where they were directed to
report the incident to the Sta. Rosa police station. Dr. Roy Camarillo examined XXX and
found no signs of recent trauma in his anal orifice that was also "NEGATIVE for
[s]permatozoa."
On February 4, 2002, XXX and his mother executed their sworn statements at the Sta. Rosa
police station, leading to the criminal complaint filed against Ricalde. The RTC found Ricalde
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape through sexual assault. The CA affirmed the
conviction with modifications lowering amounts of damages.

Issue/s:

Whether or not Ricarde is guilty of rape through sexual assault?

Ruling/s:
YES. Rape under par. 2, Article 266-A is also known as "instrument or object rape," "gender-
free rape," or "homosexual rape." The gravamen of rape through sexual assault is "the
insertion of the penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object,
into another person’s genital or anal orifice." The trial court found that XXX’s "straightforward,
unequivocal and convincing testimony" sufficiently proved that petitioner committed an act
of sexual assault by inserting his penis into XXX’s anal orifice.
ALLEGED INCONSISTENCIES IN XXX’S TESTIMONY
Petitioner contends that XXX did not categorically say that a penis was inserted into his anal
orifice, or that he saw a penis or any object being inserted into his anal orifice.
In a long line of cases, this court has given full weight and credit to the testimonies of child
victims. Their "[y]outh and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity." XXX, then
only 10 years old, had no reason to concoct lies against petitioner. Also, "[l]eeway should be
given to witnesses who are minors, especially when they are relating past incidents of
abuse."

In People v. Soria, this court discussed that a victim need not identify what was inserted into
his or her genital or anal orifice for the court to find that rape through sexual assault was
committed.

MEDICO-LEGAL’S FINDING OF NO RECENT TRAUMA IN XXX’S ANAL ORIFICE, OR

ANY TRACE OF SPERMATOZOA
The absence of spermatozoa in XXX’s anal orifice does not negate the possibility of an
erection and penetration. This result does not contradict the positive testimony of XXX that
the lower courts found credible, natural, and consistent with human nature.
This court has explained the merely corroborative character of expert testimony and the
possibility of convictions for rape based on the victim’s credible lone testimony.
VARIANCE DOCTRINE (SEC. 4 IN RELATION TO SEC. 5 OF RULE 120 OF THE RULES
ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE)
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof.—When there is
variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and
the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused
shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the
offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another.—An offense charged
necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients
of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense
charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the
former continue or form part of those constituting the latter.
In the instant case, no variance exists between what was charged and what was proven
during trial. The prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt all elements of the crime
of rape through sexual assault.
SLIGHTEST PENETRATION INTO ONE’S ANUS CONSTITUTES RAPE THROUGH
SEXUAL ASSAULT
People v. Bonaagua considers a woman’s private organ since most if not all existing
jurisprudence on rape involves a woman victim. Nevertheless, this interpretation can apply
by analogy when the victim is a man in that the slightest penetration to the victim’s anal
orifice consummates the crime of rape through sexual assault. The gravamen of the crime
is the violation of the victim’s dignity. The degree of penetration is not important. Rape is an
"assault on human dignity.”