Agustin vs COMELEC

Facts
Petitioner was a naturalised citizen of the USA. On October, 2012, he
filed his CoC for the position of Mayor in Marcos, Ilocos. He declared that
he is eligible to the office. His rival mayoralty candidate filed in the
COMELEC a Petition To Deny Due Course and/or to Cancel the Certificate
of Candidacy of Agustin, alleging that petitioner made material
misrepresentation in his CoC as petitioner only became a registered voter
there in 2012.

COMELEC ruled in its resolution that it would suffice that petitioner

is a registered voter by the time he filed his CoC.

Respondent moved for the reconsideration of the resolution stating

that the certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration that reflected that
petitioner declared that he was a citizen of the US in 2012. COMELEC
cancelled the CoC of petitioner.

Issue
WON the COMELEC erred in its decision cancelling the CoC of
petitioner.

Ruling
NO. The SC ruled that the observance of due process in administrative
proceedings does not always require or involve a trial-type proceeding, for
the demand of due process is also met whenever a person, being notified, is
afforded the opportunity to explain or defend himself. Also, due process is
satisfied by giving the opportunity to seek the reconsideration of the action
or ruling complained of The rule is the same in election cases.

And that by using his US passport, he thereby effectively repudiated

his oath of renunciation, thus reverting him to the status of a DUAL
CITIZEN which would disqualify him from being elected to office pursuant
to Section 40 of the LGC.

Thus the decision of the COMELEC attained finaliy pursuant to

Section 6 of RA 6646.
 Dela Torre vs COMELEC

Facts
Petitioner Rolando P. Dela Torre via the instant petition for certiorari
seeks the nullification of two resolutions issued by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) allegedly with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction which disqualified him from running for the position
as mayor.

Issue
WON the COMELEC erred in their decision.

Ruling
NO. They did not as the lower court correctly ruled to disqualify
petitioner as based on the fact of the case, the crime committed by petitioner
involves moral turpitude which would fall upon the requirements of
disqualification under Sec. 40 of LGC.

Petitioner’s conviction of fencing which we have heretofore declared

as a crime of moral turpitude and thus falling squarely under the
disqualification found in Section 40(a), subsists and remains totally
unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation. In fact, a judgment of
conviction in a criminal case ipso facto attains finality when the accused
applies for probation, although it is not executory pending resolution of the
application for probation.
 Villaber vs COMELEC

Facs
Villaber, petitioner, seeks the nullification of two Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections disqualifying him as a candidate for the position
of Congressman. He was disqualified because he was convicted of a crime
inovlving moral turpitude. (BP 22). Petitioner argues that the crime punished
under BP 22 does not involve moral turpitude.

Issue
WON the COMELEC correctly ruled that there was moral turpitude in
this case.

Ruling
YES. We reiterate here our ruling in Dela Torre that the
determination of whether a crime involves moral turpitude is a question of
fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the
violation of the statute. In the case at bar, petitioner does not assail the facts
and circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime.

In effect, he admits all the elements of the crime for which he was
convicted. At any rate, the question of whether or not the crime involves
moral turpitude can be resolved by analyzing its elements alone, as we did in
Dela Torre which involves the crime of fencing punishable by a special law.

a conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 “imports deceit” and

“certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person
and transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in
the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The
mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an
injury to the public” since the circulation of valueless commercial
papers “can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce,
injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and
the public interest.”
 Moreno vs COMELEC

Facts
Mejes filed a petition to disqualify Moreno from running for Punong
Barangay on the ground that the latter was convicted by final judgment of
the crime of Arbitrary Detention by the RTC of Catbalogan, Samar.

Moreno filed an answer averring that the petition states no cause of

action because he was already granted probation and pursuant to the
probation law the final discharge of the probation shall operate to restore to
him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully
discharge his liability for any fine imposed.

Issue
WON Moreno is qualified to run for office.

Ruling
YES. those who have not served their sentence by reason of the grant
of probation which, we reiterate, should not be equated with service of
sentence, should not likewise be disqualified from running for a local
elective office because the two (2)-year period of ineligibility under Sec.
40(a) of the Local Government Code does not even begin to run.

The fact that the trial court already issued an order finally discharging
Moreno fortifies his position.

Sec. 16 of the Probation Law provides that “[t]he final discharge of

the probationer shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or
suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for
any fine imposed as to the offense for which probation was granted.” Thus,
when Moreno was finally discharged upon the court’s finding that he has
fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation, his case was deemed
terminated and all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction
were restored to him, including the right to run for public office.
 Jalosjos jr. Vs COMELEC

Facts
Both Jalosjos and Cardino were candidates for Mayor of Dapitan City,
Zamboanga del Norte in the May 2010 elections. Cardino filed a petition to
deny due course and to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Jalosjos.
Cardino asserted that Jalosjos made a false material representation in his
certificate of candidacy when he declared under oath that he was eligible for
the Office of Mayor.

Cardino claimed that long before Jalosjos filed his certificate of

candidacy, Jalosjos had already been convicted by final judgment for
robbery by the RTC of Cebu City. Jalosjos admitted his conviction but
stated that he had already been granted probation and that the RTC has
issued an order declaring Jalosjos complied with the probation.

Issue
WON Jalosjos is qualified to run as candidate for Mayor in
Zamboanga.

Ruling
NO. The perpetual special disqualification against Jalosjos arising
from his criminal conviction by final judgment is a material fact involving
eligibility which is a proper ground for a petition under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code.

Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy was void from the start since he was
not eligible to run for any public office at the time he filed his certificate of
candidacy. Jalosjos was never a candidate at any time, and all votes for
Jalosjos were stray votes. As a result of Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy
being void ab initio, Cardino, as the only qualified candidate, actually
garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor.

Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code perpetual special

disqualification means that “the offender shall not be permitted to hold any
public office during the period of his disqualification,” which is perpetually.
A person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective
public office, and commits a false material representation if he states in his
certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to so run.