J-PHIL MARINE, INC.

and/or JESUS CANDAVA and

NORMAN SHIPPING SERVICES, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
WARLITO E. DUMALAOG, respondents.

Facts
Warlito E. Dumalaog who served as cook aboard vessels plying
overseas, a pro-forma complaint against petitioners manning agency
J-Phil Marine, Inc. (J-Phil), for unpaid money claims, moral and
exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.

Labor Arbiter dismissed respondent’s complaint for lack of merit.

On appeal, the NLRC, reversed the Labor Arbiter’s decision.

The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners’ petition for, inter alia,

failure to attach to the petition all material documents, and for
defective verification and certification. Petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration of the appellate court’s Resolution was denied;
hence, they filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Issue
WON a compromise agreement without the assistance of a
counsel is proper.

Ruling
YES. Article 237 of the Labor Code provides:

Any compromise settlement, including those involving labor

standard laws, voluntarily agreed upon by the parties with the
assistance of the Department of Labor, shall be final and binding upon
the parties. The National Labor Relations Commission or any court
shall not assume jurisdiction over issues involved therein except in
case of non-compliance thereof or if there is prima facie evidence that
the settlement was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation, or
coercion.
 CATHOLIC VICARIATE, BAGUIO CITY, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, Secretary of the Department
of Labor & Employment, and GEORGE
AGBUCAY, respondents.

Facts
Petitioner contracted Kunwha Luzon Construction  failed to pay
its employees.

Respondent George Agbucay, along with 81 other employees,

lodged a complaint against CEREBA, KUNWHA and petitioner
before the DOLE-CAR Regional Office for nonpayment of wages,
special and legal holiday premium pay.

DOLE-CAR Regional Director issued an Order  holding

CEREBA, KUNWHA and petitioner jointly and severally liable to the
82 affected workers.

During the pendency of its motion for reconsideration, KUNWHA

voluntarily settled the deficiencies due

Regional Director dismissed the complaint by reason of the said

settlement.

The Secretary of Labor reversed the ruling of the Regional

Director

The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Secretary of

Labor.

Issue
WON the Secretary of Labor acquired jurisdiction over the appeal

Ruling
YES. Article 128(b)18 of the Labor Code and ruled, thus:

It is worthy to note that as regards the power granted to Regional

Director by Article 128 of the Labor Code, as amended, only two (2)
limitations are set forth: first, where the employer contests the
findings of the labor regulations officer, and raises issues which
cannot be resolved without considering evidentiary matters that are
not verifiable in the normal course of inspection, and second, where
the employer-employee relationship no longer exists.

The issue of jurisdiction is clearly intertwined with the existence

of employer-employee relationship. It is undisputed that the existence
of an employer-employee relationship is ultimately a question of fact.

Thus, it can be inferred that this petition also seeks a review of the
factual findings of the Regional Director, as affirmed by the Secretary
of Labor and the Court of Appeals. Such review is beyond the ambit
of a petition for review on certiorari.
 Petitioner is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the
Regional Director when it actively participated in the proceedings
held therein.
 TRADE UNIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES/FEBRUARY SIX
MOVEMENT TUPAS/FSM), petitioner,
vs.
HON BIENVENIDO LAGUESMA, TRANSUNION
CORPORATION-GLASS DIVISION, AND INTEGRATED
LABOR ORGANIZATION (ILO-PHILIPPINES), respondents.

Facts
TUPAS-FSM filed a petition for certification election with the
Regional Office No. IV of the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE), for the purpose of choosing a bargaining representative for
the rank-and-file employees of Transunion Corporation's industrial
plant.

Petitioner had then secured a Certification that "Transunion

Corporation" has no existing collective bargaining agreement with
any labor organization.

It appears, however, that before the filing of said

petition, Integrated Labor Organization (ILO-Phils.) was duly
certified by DOLE as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the
rank-and-file employees of Transunion Corporation-Glassware
Division.

ILO-Phils., intervened in the certification election proceedings

initiated by TUPAS-FSM. It opposed the petition in view of the
existing CBA between ILO and the Transunion Corporation-
Glassware Division. It stresses that the petition for certification
election should be entertained only during the freedom period, or sixty
day before the expiration of the CBA.

Med-Arbiter Orlando S. deal Cruz dismissed the petition on the

ground of prematurity.

 The Secretary of Labor and Employment affirmed the impugned

Order of the Med-Arbiter, ruling that the belated submission of the
CBA was excusable and that the requirement of the law was
substantially complied with upon the filing of a copy of the
CBA prior to the filing of the petition for certification election.

Issue
WON public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to loss of jurisdiction

Ruling
NO. It is inappropriate to review the factual findings of the Med-
arbiter and the Secretary of Labor, regarding the date of filing of the
CBA on March 14, 1990 prior to the filing of the petition for
certification election; the company's voluntary recognition and
DOLE's certification of ILO-PHILS. as the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees of
Transunion Corporation-Glassware Division; and the subsequent
registration of the CBA.
They are binding on this Court as they are supported by
substantial evidence.

In contrast, petitioner’s bare allegation pertaining to the

"antedating" of the date of filing of the CBA is unsubstantiated and
based purely on conjectures.
 ANTONIO M. SERRANO, Petitioner,
vs.
Gallant MARITIME SERVICES, INC. and MARLOW
NAVIGATION CO., INC., Respondents.

Facts
Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and
Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. (respondents) under a Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)-approved Contract of
Employment.

Petitioner was constrained to accept a downgraded employment

contract for the position of Second Officer, upon the assurance and
representation of respondents that he would be made Chief Officer

Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner

Chief Officer.

Petitioner filed a complaint with the LA.

The LA rendered a Decision dated July 15, 1999, declaring the

dismissal of petitioner illegal and awarding him monetary benefits.

Respondents appealed to the National Labor Relations

Commission (NLRC) to question the finding of the LA that petitioner
was illegally dismissed.

NLRC affirmed and modified the LA Decision.

The CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the

applicable salary rate; however, the CA skirted the constitutional issue
raised by petitioner.

Issue
WON The Court of Appeals and the labor tribunals have decided
the case in a way not in accord with applicable decision of the
Supreme Court involving similar issue of granting unto the migrant
worker back wages equal to the unexpired portion of his contract of
employment instead of limiting it to three (3) months

Ruling
YES. It should be borne in mind that the requirement that a
constitutional issue be raised at the earliest opportunity entails the
interposition of the issue in the pleadings before a competent court,
such that, if the issue is not raised in the pleadings before that
competent court, it cannot be considered at the trial and, if not
considered in the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal.

The NLRC is a labor tribunal that merely performs a quasi-

judicial function – its function in the present case is limited to
determining questions of fact to which the legislative policy of R.A.
No. 8042 is to be applied and to resolving such questions in
accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself; thus, its
foremost function is to administer and enforce R.A. No. 8042, and not
to inquire into the validity of its provisions. The CA, on the other
hand, is vested with the power of judicial review or the power to
declare unconstitutional a law or a provision thereof, such as the
subject clause.

Petitioner's interposition of the constitutional issue before the CA

was undoubtedly seasonable. The CA was therefore remiss in failing
to take up the issue in its decision.
 THE HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING
CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND THE
HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION
LIMITED, respondents.

Facts
On December 22, 1993, the officers and members of petitioner
union staged a strike against respondent bank for its (1) arbitrary and
unilateral reduction of the "CBA-established entry level of clerical
pay rates" and (2) whimsical refusal to bargain collectively on wage
rates, among others.

The next day, December 23, 1993, respondent bank filed a petition
for injunction with the National Labor Relations Commission
("respondent NLRC") praying that petitioner union's acts of
obstructing the ingress to and egress from the bank's premises be
enjoined and, in the interim, a temporary restraining order be issued.

NLRC issued a Resolutio on January 6, 1994 granting a temporary

restraining order and setting the hearing of respondent bank's
application for preliminary injunction.

Petitioner union then filed a motion for reconsideration of the said

Resolution but was denied by respondent NLRC.

NLRC issued the questioned Resolution (1) denying petitioner

union's oral motion to dismiss the petition; (2) issuing a writ of
preliminary injunction in favor of respondent bank, and (3) directing
the Labor Arbiter to conduct further hearing for the reception of
additional evidence to sustain the issuance of a writ of permanent
injunction.

Issue
WON acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying its motion
to dismiss and granting respondent bank's prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction.

Ruling
NO. it is not necessary for the respondent bank to allege in
verbatim the requisites for the issuance of the temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction under Article 218 (e) of
the Labor Code.

These allegations, as found by respondent NLRC, were proven by

respondent bank during the proceedings for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. Incidentally, it is not our function in this
certiorari proceedings to review the findings of facts of respondent
NLRC since we are confined only to issues of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion.

ARIEL A. TRES REYES, petitioner,

vs.
MAXIM’S TEA HOUSE and JOCELYN POON, respondents.

Facts
Respondent Maxim’s Tea House (hereinafter Maxim’s for brevity)
had employed Ariel Tres Reyes as a driver.

Petitioner had an accident while working.

Labor Arbiter found that petitioner was grossly negligent in failing

to avoid the collision.

Petitioner filed a "Motion for Partial Reconsideration" with the

NLRC.

NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

Respondents then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals, which was dismissed.

Issue
WON the NLRC commited grave abuse of disretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction

Ruling
Strictly speaking, a motion for reconsideration of a decision,
order, or award of a Labor Arbiter is prohibited by Section 19, Rule V
of the NLRC Rules of Procedure. But said rule likewise allows that a
motion for reconsideration shall be treated as an appeal provided it
meets all the requisites of an appeal. 

Note that all that Section 3, Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of

Procedure requires with respect to material dates is "a statement of the
date when the appellant received the appealed decision." We rule that
petitioner’s declaration in his motion that he received a copy of the
Labor Arbiter’s decision on September 28, 1998 is more than
sufficient compliance with said requirement imposed by Section 3,
Rule VI.
 ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
BIENVENIDO ARICAYOS, respondents.

Facts
In January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed away, so the latter
then took over the management of the business. She then discovered
that there were arrears in the payment of taxes and other government
fees, although the records purported to show that the same were
already paid. Amelita then made some changes in the business
operation and private respondent and his wife were no longer allowed
to participate in the management thereof. As a consequence, the latter
filed a complaint charging that petitioner had illegally terminated his
employment.

The labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of petitioner.

Private respondent appealed to the NLRC.

NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned decision

and remanding the case to the labor arbiter for immediate appropriate
proceedings.

Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which was

denied by the NLRC.

CA dismissed the appeal.

Issue
WON Labor Arbiter made a determination of the presence of an
employer-employee relationship between St. Martin and respondent
Aricayos based on the evidence on record.

Ruling
NO. a formal trial or hearing is discretionary on the part of the
Labor Arbiter, when there are factual issues that require a formal
presentation of evidence in a hearing, the Labor Arbiter cannot simply
rely on the position papers, more so, on mere unsubstantiated claims
of parties.

These facts, as admitted by the petitioner and the affidavits of St.

Martin's witnesses, could have been examined more in detail by the
Labor Arbiter in a hearing to convince himself that there was indeed
no employment relationship between the parties as he originally
found.
 D’ Armoured Security and Investigation Agency, Inc. vs. Orpia

Facts
The respondents who were employed as security guards by
petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal
dismissal and various monetary claims against petitioner and Fortune
Tobacco

The LA rendered a decision against petitioner.

NLRC affirmed the LA.

LA denied the motion to quash.

NLRC denied the motion of petitioner.

CA dismissed the petition.

Issue
WON an order of execution of a final and executory judgment is
appealable

Ruling
NO. We have ruled that an order of execution of a final and
executory judgment, as in this case, is not appealable, otherwise, there
would be no end to litigation.

Section 1, Rule IV of the NLRC Manual on Execution of

Judgment

The above Rule clearly enumerates what properties are exempt

from execution. It is apparent that the exemption pertains only to
natural persons and not to juridical entities. On this point, the Court of
Appeals correctly ruled that petitioner, being a corporate entity, does
not fall within the exemption.
 Roquero vs PAL

Facts
Roquero, along with Rene Pabayo, were ground equipment
mechanics of respondent Philippine Airlines, Inc. And were caught
red-handed possessing and using Methampethamine Hydrochloride or
shabu in a raid conducted by PAL security officers and NARCOM
personnel.

Roquero and Pabayo received a “notice of administrative charge”

for violating the PAL Code of Discipline. They were required to
answer the charges and were placed under preventive suspension.

They were dismissed thereafter thus they filed a complaint for

illegal dismissal.

LA upheld the dismissal. NLRC ruled in favor of complainants.

LA granted the motion for reinstatement. PAL refused.

Ruling
WON the executory nature of the decision, more so the
reinstatement aspect of a labor tribunal’s order be halted by a petition
having been filed in higher courts without any restraining order or
preliminary injunction having been ordered in the meantime

Ruling
Article 223 (3rd paragraph) of the Labor Code, 20 as amended by
Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6715, 21 and Section 2 of the NLRC
Interim Rules on Appeals under RA No. 6715, Amending the Labor
Code, 22 provide that an order of reinstatement by the Labor Arbiter
is immediately executory even pending appeal.

These duties and responsibilities of the State are imposed not so

much to express sympathy for the workingman as to forcefully and
meaningfully underscore labor as a primary social and economic
force, which the Constitution also expressly affirms with equal
intensity. Labor is an indispensable partner for the nation’s progress
and stability.

The order of reinstatement is immediately executory. The

unjustified refusal of the employer to reinstate a dismissed employee
entitles him to payment of his salaries effective from the time the
employer failed to reinstate him despite the issuance of a writ of
execution.
 Genuino vs. National Labor Relations Commission

Facts
Genuino was employed by Citibank as Vice President. Citibank
sent Genuino a letter charging her with “knowledge and/or
involvement” in transactions “which were irregular or even
fraudulent.” In the same letter, Genuino was informed she was under
preventive suspension.

Genuino did not appear in the administrative investigation.

Genuino did not submit her written explanation.

Genuino’s employment was terminated by Citibank on grounds of

(1) serious misconduct, (2) willful breach of the trust reposed upon
her by the bank, and (3) commission of a crime against the bank.

LA ruled in favor of Genuino. NLRC reversed the decision of LA.

CA upheld the decision of LA.

Issue
WON the dismissal was in accordance with due process.

Ruling
NO. In the recent case of King of Kings Transport, Inc. v. Mamac,

“To clarify, the following should be considered in terminating the

services of employees:

The first written notice to be served on the employees should

contain the specific causes or grounds for termination against them,
and a directive that the employees are given the opportunity to submit
their written explanation within a reasonable period.

After serving the first notice, the employers should schedule and
conduct a hearing or conference wherein the employees will be given
the opportunity to: (1) explain and clarify their defenses to the charge
against them; (2) present evidence in support of their defenses; and (3)
rebut the evidence presented against them by the management.

This conference or hearing could be used by the parties as an

opportunity to come to an amicable settlement.

After determining that termination of employment is justified, the

employers shall serve the employees a written notice of termination
indicating that: (1) all circumstances involving the charge against the
employees have been considered; and (2) grounds have been
established to justify the severance of their employment.”
 Laguna Autoparts Manufacturing Corporation vs. Of ice of the
Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)

Facts
The respondent union filed a petition for certification election
before the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
Respondent Union alleged that Obrero Pilipino was a legitimate labor
organization under Registration Certificate No. NCR-LF-11-04-92.

The petitioner company moved to dismiss the petition for

certification election. It claimed that the respondent union was not a
legitimate labor organization for failure to show that it had complied
with the registration requirements

Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition for certification election for

the respondent.

Secretary of Labor reversed the decision of the Med-Arbiter.

CA rendered a decision in favor of respondent union.

Issue
WON respondent is a legitimate labor organization

Ruling
YES. a local or chapter need not be independently registered to
acquire legal personality. Section 3, Rule VI of the Implementing
Rules of Book V, as amended by D.O. No. 9 clearly states— SEC. 3.
Acquisition of legal personality by local/chapter.—A local/chapter
constituted in accordance with Section 1 of this Rule shall acquire
legal personality from the date of filing of the complete documents
enumerated therein. Upon compliance with all documentary
requirements, the Regional Office or Bureau shall issue in favor of the
local/chapter a certificate indicating that it is included in the roster of
legitimate labor organizations.

Such legal personality may not be subject to a collateral attack but

only through a separate action instituted particularly for the purpose
of assailing it.
 HCDC vs Joaquin

Facts
Jose Lagahit, wrote Holy Cross under date of April 12, 1989
expressing his union’s desire to renew the agreement, withal seeking
its extension for two months, or until July 31, 1989, on the ground
that the teachers were still on summer vacation and union activities
necessary or incident to the negotiation of a new agreement could not
yet be conducted.

Holy Cross did not object. Gallera won election as president and
formed a separate organization known as the Holy Cross of Davao
College Teachers Union elected its own officers.

. For its part, the existing union, KAMAPI, sent to the School its
proposals for a new collective bargaining contract; this it did on July
31, 1989, the expiry date of the twomonth extension it had sought.

The new union filed a petition for certification election. Med-

Arbtier upheld the petition for certification. Secretary of Labor
reversed the ruling of the Med-Arbiter.

Issue
WON an employer is liable to pay to the union of its employees,
the amounts it failed to deduct from their salaries — as union dues
(with respect to union members) or agency fees (as regards those not
union members) — in accordance with the check-off provisions of the
collective bargaining contract (CBA) which it claims to have been
automatically extended.

Ruling
NO. A check-off is a process or device whereby the employer, on
agreement with the union recognized as the proper bargaining
representative, or on prior authorization from its employees, deducts
union dues or agency fees from the latter’s wages and remits them
directly to the union.

Authorization to effect a check-off of union dues is co-terminous

with the union affiliation or membership of emplo yees.21 On the
other hand, the collection of agency fees in an amount equivalent to
union dues and fees, from employees who are not union members, is
recognized by Article 248 (e) of the Labor Code. No requirement of
written authorization from the non-union employee is imposed. The
employee’s acceptance of benefits resulting from a collective
bargaining agreement justifies the deduction of agency fees from his
pay and the union’s entitlement thereto.
 Check-offs in truth impose an extra burden on the employer in the
form of additional administrative and bookkeeping costs.

Coastal Subic Bay Terminal, Inc. vs. Department of Labor and

Employment—Of ice of the Secretary

Facts
Coastal Subic Bay Terminal, Inc. Rank-and-File Union (CSBTI-
RFU) and Coastal Subic Bay Terminal, Inc. Supervisory Union
(CSBTISU) filed separate petitions for certification election before
Med-Arbiter insisting they are a legitimate labor organization.

Coastal Subic Bay Terminal, Inc. (CSBTI) opposed both petitions

for certification election.

The Med-Arbiter dismissed, without prejudice to refiling, both

petitions which had been consolidated. The Med-Arbiter held that the
ALU and APSOTEU are one and the same federation having a
common set of officers. Thus, the supervisory and the rank-and-file
unions were in effect affiliated with only one federation.

Secretary of Labor reversed the decision of the Med-arbiter.

CA affirmed the decision of Secretary of Labor.

Issue
WON APSOTEU a valid union

Ruling
YES. Article 235 of the Labor Code which provides that
applications for registration shall be acted upon by the Bureau.
“Bureau” as defined under the Labor Code means the BLR and/or the
Labor Relations Division in the Regional Offices of the Department
of Labor.

Thus, considering further that APSOTEU’s principal office is

located in Diliman, Quezon City, and its registration was filed with
the NCR Regional Office, the certificate of registration is valid.

Once a labor union attains the status of a legitimate labor

organization, it continues as such until its certificate of registration is
cancelled or revoked in an independent action for cancellation.

In addition, the legal personality of a labor organization cannot be

collaterally attacked. Thus, when the personality of the labor
organization is questioned in the same manner the veil of corporate
fiction is pierced, the action partakes the nature of a collateral attack.

Under Article 245 of the Labor Code, supervisory employees are

not eligible for membership in a labor union of rank-and-file
employees. The supervisory employees are allowed to form their own
union but they are not allowed to join the rank-and-file union because
of potential conflicts of interest.

S. S. VENTURES INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner, vs. S.S.

VENTURES LABOR UNION (SSVLU) and DIR. HANS LEO
CACDAC, in His capacity as Director of the Bureau of Labor
Relations (BLR), respondents.

Facts
The Union filed with DOLE-Region III a petition for certification
election in behalf of the rank-and-file employees of Ventures.

Ventures filed a Petition1 to cancel the Union’s certificate of

registration.

DOLE region II rendered decision revoking the certificate of

registration of the union.

BLR reversed the decision of DOLE region II.

CA denies the petition and MR of Venture.

Issue
WON respondent union perpetrated fraud FORGERY,
MISREPRESENTATION AND MISSTATEMENTS IN
CONNECTION WITH THE ADOPTION AND RATIFICATION OF
ITS CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS, AND IN THE
PREPARATION OF THE LIST OF MEMBERS WHO TOOK PART
IN THE ALLEGED ORGANIZATIONAL MEETING

Ruling
NO. The right to form, join, or assist a union is specifically
protected by Art. XIII, Section 3 of the Constitution and such right,
according to Art. III, Sec. 8 of the Constitution and Art. 246 of the
Labor Code, shall not be abridged. Once registered with the DOLE, a
union is considered a legitimate labor organization endowed with the
right and privileges granted by law to such organization. While a
certificate of registration confers a union with legitimacy with the
concomitant right to participate in or ask for certification election in a
bargaining unit, the registration may be canceled or the union may be
decertified as the bargaining unit, in which case the union is divested
of the status of a legitimate labor organization.

The Court, has in previous cases, said that to decertify a union, it

is not enough to show that the union includes ineligible employees in
its membership.

After a labor organization has filed the necessary registration

documents, it becomes mandatory for the BLR to check if the
requirements under Art. 234 of the Labor Code have been sedulously
complied with.

Singer Sewing Machine Company vs. Drilon

Facts
The respondent union filed a petition for direct certification as the
sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all collectors of the Singer
Sewing Machine Company, Baguio City branch.

The Company opposed the petition mainly on the ground that the
union members are actually not employees but are independent
contractors as evidenced by the collection agency agreement which
they signed.

MA granted the certification. Secretary of Labor affirmed the MA.

Issue
WON the employees can be considered as employees

Ruling
NO. The plain language of the agreement reveals that the
designation as collection agent does not create an employment
relationship and that the applicant is to be considered at all times as an
independent contractor. This is consistent with the first rule of
interpretation that the literal meaning of the stipulations in the
contract controls.

The Court agrees with the petitioner’s argument that Article 280 is
not the yardstick for determining the existence of an employment
relationship because it merely distinguishes between two kinds of
employees, i.e., regular employees and casual employees, for
purposes of determining the right of an employee to certain benefits,
to join or form a union, or to security of tenure. Article 280 does not
apply where the existence of an employment relationship is in dispute.
 Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc. vs. Ferrer-Calleja

Facts
Private respondent Federation of Free Workers is a labor
organization registered with the Department of Labor and
Employment. It is interested in representing the said employees for
purposes of collective bargaining

On August 27, 1986, the private respondent filed with the Davao
City Regional Office of the then Ministry of Labor and Employment a
verified Petition for certification election among the rank-and-file
employees of the petitioner.

MA granted the certification.

BLR affirmed the order of the Med-Arbiter.

Issue
WON BLR acted without jurisdiction or in excess thereof, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in
allowing the certification election sought by the private respondent
despite the arguments of the petitioner in opposition thereto.

Ruling
YES. A cooperative, therefore, is by its nature different from an
ordinary business concern, being run either by persons, partnerships,
or corporations. Its owners and/or members are the ones who run and
operate the business while the others are its employees.

An employee therefore of such a cooperative who is a member

and co-owner thereof cannot invoke the right to collective bargaining
for certainly an owner cannot bargain with himself or his co-owners.

Under Section 2 of P.D. No. 175, a cooperative is defined to mean

“organizations composed primarily of small producers and of
consumers who voluntarily join together to form business enterprises
which they themselves own, control, and patronize.”
 Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) vs. Kapisanan ng
mga Manggagawa sa GSIS

Facts
Rallies and en masse walkout waged/held in front of the GSIS
main office in Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City, started it all.

Forming a huge part of the October 4 to October 7, 2004 mass

action participants were GSIS personnel, among them members of the
herein respondent Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa GSIS.

The manager of the GSIS Investigating Unit issued a

memorandum directing 131 union and non-union members to show
cause why they should not be charged administratively for their
participation in said rally since the absence of the participating GSIS
employees was not covered by a prior approved leave.

The plea for reconsideration was, however, effectively denied by

the filing, on October 25, 2004, of administrative charges against
some 110 KMG members for grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

CA dissmissed the admin charges.

Issue
WON the mass action staged by or participated in by said GSIS
employees partook of a strike or prohibited concerted mass action.

Ruling
YES. The erring employees, instead of exploring non-crippling
activities during their free time, had taken a disruptive approach to
attain whatever it was they were specifically after. As events evolved,
they assembled in front of the GSIS main office building during office
hours and staged rallies and protests, and even tried to convince others
to join their cause, thus provoking work stoppage and service-delivery
disruption, the very evil sought to be forestalled by the prohibition
against strikes by government personnel.

Any collective activity undertaken by government employees with

the intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to
realize their demands or force concessions, economic or otherwise, is
a prohibited concerted mass action and doubtless actionable
administratively.
 AIR PH vs BLR

Facts
The case initially centered on the union registration of respondent
Air Philippines Flight Attendants Association (AP-FLAA), which was
issued a Certificate of Registration by the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE).

APFLAA filed on 17 March 1999 a petition for certification

election as the collective bargaining representative of the flight
attendants of APC.

After the Med-Arbiter rendered a ruling ordering the holding of a

certification election, such election was held on 5 August 1999, with
majority of the votes cast in favor of APFLAA.

On 25 November 1999, APC filed a Petition for DeCertification

and Cancellation of Union Registration against APFLAA with the
DOLE. APC alleged that APFLAA could not be registered as a labor
organization, as its composition consisted of “a mixture of
supervisory and rank-and-file flight attendants.”

Issue
WON APFLAA’s union registration may be cancelled considering
that the union is allegedly composed of a mixture of supervisory and
rank-and-file employees.

Ruling
NO. In Tagaytay Highlands International Golf Club v. Tagaytay
Highlands Employees Union-PGTWO, that “the inclusion in a union
of disqualified employees is not among the grounds for cancellation,
unless such inclusion is due to misrepresentation, false statement or
fraud under the circumstances enumerated in Sections (a) and (c) of
Article 239 15 of the Labor Code.”

It is not enough to establish that the rank-and-file union includes

ineligible employees in its membership. Pursuant to Article 239 (a)
and (c) of the Labor Code, it must be shown that there was
misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in connection with the
adoption or ratification of the constitution and bylaws or amendments
thereto, the minutes of ratification, or in connection with the election
of officers, minutes of the election of officers, the list of voters, or
failure to submit these documents together with the list of the newly
elected-appointed officers and their postal addresses to the BLR.
Philcom Employees Union vs. Philippine Global Communications

Facts
Upon the expiration of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA) between petitioner Philcom Employees Union (PEU or union,
for brevity) and private respondent Philippine Global
Communications, Inc. (Philcom, Inc.) on June 30, 1997, the parties
started negotiations for the renewal of their CBA.

While negotiations were ongoing, PEU filed with the National

Conciliation and Mediation Board, a Notice of Strike.

On November 17, 1997, however, while the union and the

company officers and representatives were meeting, the remaining
union officers and members staged a strike.

Acting Labor Secretary Cresenciano B. Trajano issued an Order

assuming jurisdiction over the dispute, enjoining any strike or lockout
and directing the striking workers to return to work.

Issue
WON the Secretary should not have taken cognizance of the issue
on the alleged illegal strike because it was not properly submitted to
the Secretary for resolution.

Ruling
NO. The Secretary properly took cognizance of the issue on the
legality of the strike. As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out,
since the very reason of the Secretary’s assumption of jurisdiction was
PEU’s declaration of the strike, any issue regarding the strike is not
merely incidental to, but is essentially involved in, the labor dispute
itself. (Article 263[g])

The powers granted to the Secretary under Article 263(g) of the

Labor Code have been characterized as an exercise of the police
power of the State, with the aim of promoting public good.

When the Secretary exercises these powers, he is granted “great

breadth of discretion” in order to find a solution to a labor dispute.

Unfair labor practice refers to acts that violate the workers’ right
to organize. The prohibited acts are related to the workers’ right to
selforganization and to the observance of a CBA. Without that
element, the acts, no matter how unfair, are not unfair labor practices
(exception: article 248 (f))
 A strike undertaken despite the Secretary’s issuance of an
assumption or certification order becomes a prohibited activity, and
thus, illegal, under Article 264(a) of the Labor Code. The union
officers who knowingly participate in the illegal strike are deemed to
have lost their employment status.

Colegio De San Juan De Letran vs. Association of Employees and

Faculty of Letran

Facts
On December 1992, Salvador Abtria, initiated the renegotiation of
its Collective Bargaining Agreement with petitioner Colegio de San
Juan de Letran. On the same year, the union elected a new set of
officers wherein private respondent Eleanor Ambas emerged as the
newly elected President.

Ambas wanted to continue the renegotiation of the CBA but

petitioner, through Fr. Edwin Lao, claimed that the CBA was already
prepared for signing by the parties. The parties submitted the disputed
CBA to a referendum by the union members, who eventually rejected
the said CBA.

Petitioner accused the union officers of bargaining in bad faith

before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Labor
Arbiter Edgardo M. Madriaga decided in favor of petitioner.
However, the Labor Arbiter’s decision was reversed on appeal before
the NLRC.

On July 2, 1996, public respondent the Secretary of Labor and

Employment assumed jurisdiction and ordered all striking employees
including the union president to return to work and for petitioner to
accept them back under the same terms and conditions before the
actual strike.

Issue
WON letran is guillty of unfair labor practice.

Ruling
YES. Petitioner’s utter lack of interest in bargaining with the
union is obvious in its failure to make a timely reply to the proposals
presented by the latter. More than a month after the proposals were
submitted by the union, petitioner still had not made any
counterproposals.

This inaction on the part of petitioner prompted the union to file

its second notice of strike on March 13, 1996. Petitioner could only
offer a feeble explanation that the Board of Trustees had not yet
convened to discuss the matter as its excuse for failing to file its reply.
This is a clear violation of Article 250 of the Labor Code governing
the procedure in collective bargaining.
 In order to allow the employer to validly suspend the bargaining
process there must be a valid petition for certification election raising
a legitimate representation issue. Hence, the mere filing of a petition
for certification election does not ipso facto justify the suspension of
negotiation by the employer. The petition must first comply with the
provisions of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules. Foremost is
that a petition for certification election must be filed during the sixty-
day freedom period.
Rivera vs. Espiritu

Facts
On June 5, 1998, PAL pilots affiliated with the Airline Pilots
Association of the Philippines (ALPAP) went on a three-week strike.

PAL adopted a rehabilitation plan and downsized its labor force

by more than one-third.

PALEA went on strike to protest the retrenchment measures

adopted by the airline, which affected 1,899 union members. The
strike ended four days later, when PAL and PALEA agreed to a more
systematic reduction in PAL’s work force and the payment of
separation benefits to all retrenched employees.

Board of Directors of PALEA voted to accept Tan’s offer and

requested the Task Force’s assistance in implementing the same.
Union members, however, rejected Tan’s offer. Under intense
pressure from PALEA members, the union’s directors subsequently
resolved to reject Tan’s offer.

PAL informed the Task Force that it was shutting down its
operations.

Issue
Is the PAL-PALEA agreement of September 27, 1998, stipulating
the suspension of the PAL-PALEA CBA unconstitutional and
contrary to public policy?

Ruling
NO. We find no conflict between said agreement and Article 253-
A of the Labor Code.

A CBA is “a contract executed upon request of either the

employer or the exclusive bargaining representative incorporating the
agreement reached after negotiations with respect to wages, hours of
work and all other terms and conditions of employment, including
proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions arising under such
agreement.”

The primary purpose of a CBA is the stabilization of labor-

management relations in order to create a climate of a sound and
stable industrial peace.
 The assailed PAL-PALEA agreement was the result of voluntary
collective bargaining negotiations undertaken in the light of the severe
financial situation faced by the employer, with the peculiar and unique
intention of not merely promoting industrial peace at PAL, but
preventing the latter’s closure.

Halaguena vs CA

Facts
Petitioners were employed as female flight attendants of
respondent Philippine Airlines (PAL) on different dates prior to
November 22, 1996. They are members of the Flight Attendants and
Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP), a labor
organization certified as the sole and exclusive certified as the sole
and exclusive bargaining representative of the flight attendants, flight
stewards and pursers of respondent.

On July 11, 2001, respondent and FASAP entered into a

Collective Bargaining Agreement3 incorporating the terms and
conditions of their agreement for the years 2000 to 2005, hereinafter
referred to as PAL-FASAP CBA. Section 144, Part A of the PAL-
FASAP CBA, provides that: “A. For the Cabin Attendants hired
before 22 November 1996: x x x x 3. Compulsory Retirement
Subject to the grooming standards provisions of this Agreement,
compulsory retirement shall be fifty-five (55) for females and sixty
(60) for males. x x x.”

In a letter dated July 22, 2003,4 petitioners and several female

cabin crews manifested that the aforementioned CBA provision on
compulsory retirement is discriminatory, and demanded for an equal
treatment with their male counterparts.

Issue
WON the RTC has jurisdiction in this case.

Ruling
YES. The subject of litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation, exclusively cognizable by the RTC, pursuant to Section 19
(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.15 Being an ordinary
civil action, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of labor tribunals.

The said issue cannot be resolved solely by applying the Labor

Code. Rather, it requires the application of the Constitution, labor
statutes, law on contracts and the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,16 and the power to
apply and interpret the constitution and CEDAW is within the
jurisdiction of trial courts, a court of general jurisdiction.

The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC under Article 217
of the Labor Code is limited to disputes arising from an employer-
employee relationship which can only be resolved by reference to the
Labor Code, other labor statutes, or their collective bargaining
agreement.

Philtread Workers Union (PTWU) vs. Confesor

Facts
On May 27, 1994, petitioner Philtread Tire Workers Union
(PTWU), filed a notice of strike on the ground of UFLP. On the other
hand, on May 30, 1994, private respondent Philtreat Tire and Rubber
Corporation filed a notice of lockout and filed a petition to declare
illegal the work slowdowns staged by the petitioner Union.

The parties failed to settle their dispute. Soon after the company
filed a company wide lockout and dismissed about 80 workers.

The National Labor Relations Commission declared the

slowdowns illegal.

Issue
WON the Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code violates the workers’
right to strike which is provided for by Section 3, Article XIII of the
Constitution.

Ruling
NO. Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code does not violate the
workers’ constitutional right to strike. The section provides in part,
viz.: “When in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or
likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the
national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume
jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the
Commission for compulsory arbitration. . . .”

The foregoing article clearly does not interfere with the workers’
right to strike but merely regulates it, when in the exercise of such
right, national interests will be affected. The rights granted by the
Constitution are not absolute. They are still subject to control and
limitation to ensure that they are not exercised arbitrarily. The
interests of both the employers and employees are intended to be
protected and not one of them is given undue preference.
 Filipro, Incorporated vs. National Labor Relations Commission

Facts
Private respondent Danilo C. Parino was hired as salesman of
Petitioner Filipro, Inc. (now known as Nestlfe Philippines, Inc.) on
September 25, 1978. After undergoing the mandatory probationary
period of six (6) months, he became a regular employee on March
25,1979.

Petitioner received several telephone complaints from its

customers and its dealers in the area assigned to private respondent.
Where he made it appear he sold products to different customers but
in fact he only sold it to one owner.

In a confidential memorandum dated April 1, 1980, Mr. Velasco,

the company’s supervisor demanded an explanation from the private
respondent for his misdeeds which violate petitioner company’s
policies and which are detrimental to the company’s interest.

The company put him into a preventive suspension and then filed
with the ministry of labor a clearance to dismiss the private
respondent. Private respnondent filed a complaint for illegal
suspension.

Issue
WON the dismissal of Private respondent is justified.

Ruling
YES. Based on article. 283 (c) of the Labor Code. (Fraud or
willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by the
employer.)

It is an established principle that an employer cannot be compeiled

to continue in employment an employee guilty of acts inimical to the
interest of the einployer and justifying loss of eonfidence in him.
 Sime Darby Pilipinas, Inc. vs. NLRC (2nd Division)

Facts
All company factory workers in Marikina including members of
private respondent union worked from 7:45 a.m. to 3:45 p.m. with a
30- minute paid “on call” lunch break.

On 14 August 1992 petitioner issued a memorandum to all

factory-based employees advising all its monthly salaried employees
in its Marikina Tire Plant, except those in the Warehouse and Quality
Assurance Department working on shifts, a change in work schedule.

Since private respondent felt affected adversely by the change in

the work schedule and discontinuance of the 30-minute paid “on call”
lunch break, it filed on behalf of its members a complaint with the
Labor Arbiter for unfair labor practice, discrimination and evasion of
liability.

Issue
WON the change is considered unfair labor practice.

Ruling
NO. The right to fix the work schedules of the employees rests
principally on their employer. In the instant case petitioner, as the
employer, cites as reason for the adjustment the efficient conduct of
its business operations and its improved production.

It rationalizes that while the old work schedule included a 30-

minute paid lunch break, the employees could be called upon to do
jobs during that period as they were “on call.” Even if denominated as
lunch break, this period could very well be considered as working
time because the factory employees were required to work if
necessary and were paid accordingly for working. With the new work
schedule, the employees are now given a one-hour lunch break
without any interruption from their employer.

The case before us does not pertain to any controversy involving

discrimination of employees but only the issue of whether the change
of work schedule, which management deems necessary to increase
production, constitutes unfair labor practice.
 CREA vs Brilliantes

Facts
Petitioner and private respondent negotiated the terms and
conditions of employment to be contained in a new CBA. Some issues
were unsettled and eight meetings were held to resolve these issues.

Because the parties failed to reach any significant progress in

these meetings, petitioner declared a deadlock and then filed a notice
to strike.

During a strike vote on August 16, 1995, the members of

petitioner opted for a walkout. Private respondent then filed with the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a petition for
assumption of jurisdiction in accordance with Article 263 (g) of the
Labor Code. Which was granted and In defiance of the order
expressly restraining any strike or lockout, petitioner began a strike
and set up a picket in the premises of private respondent and
continued doing so even after repeated demands of respondent but
was thereafter convinced by the Secretary of DOLE to return to work.

The employees were terminated from work.

Issue: WON certiorari is the right remedy in this case.

Ruling:
NO. The ruling in Flores vs. National Labor Relations
Commission provides that: It should be noted, in the first place, that
the instant petition is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Revised Rules of Court. An extraordinary remedy, its use is
available only and restrictively in truly exceptional cases — those
wherein the action of an inferior court, board or officer performing
judicial or quasi-judicial acts is challenged for being wholly void on
grounds of jurisdiction. The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the
correction of errors of jurisdiction including the commission of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It does
not include correction of public respondent NLRC's evaluation of the
evidence and factual findings based thereon, which are generally
accorded not only great respect but even finality.

No question of jurisdiction whatsoever is being raised and/or

pleaded in the case at bench. Instead, what is being sought is a judicial
re-evaluation of the adequacy or inadequacy of the evidence on
record, which is certainly beyond the province of the extraordinary
writ of certiorari. Such demand is impermissible for it would involve
this Court in determining what evidence is entitled to belief and the
weight to be assigned it. As we have reiterated countless times,
judicial review by this Court in labor cases does not go so far as to
evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the proper labor
officer or office based his or its determination but is limited only to
issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.

SEA POWER SHIPPING vs CA

Facts
The husband of private respondent was recruited and hired by Fil-
Pride Shipping Co. Inc. (Fil-Pride) to work as a fitter on board the
vessel M/V Anne Gro (renamed M/V Etoile).

Two months after he was hired, he was hospitalised and was

signed off. He died shortly thereafter.

His wife the private respondent now demands death and burial
benefits from the company. And the petitioner companies therein
denied any liability and argued that his illness was not a direct result
of the work.

Issue: WON a petition under rule 65 is the proper remedy in this case.

Ruling
NO. A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment, or
final order or resolution, of the Court of Appeals x x x, as in this case,
may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on
certiorari within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment, final
order or resolution appealed from.

Petitioner, instead of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule

45 of the Rules of Court, filed with this Court the instant petition for
certiorari under Rule 65, an improper remedy as pointed out by the
Solicitor General in his comment to the petition. By availing of a
wrong or inappropriate mode of appeal, the petition merits an outright
dismissal pursuant to Circular No. 2-90.

Petitioner's failure to comply with the provisions of Section 1,

Rule 65 of the Rules of Court when it filed its petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals is fatal to its cause. A party who seeks to
avail of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari must observe the rules
laid down by law, and non-observance of the said rules may not be
brushed aside as "mere technicality."

It is not one of the circumstances established by jurisprudence

specifically in Tan vs CA, wherein a liberal construction of the
procedural aspect is allowed.
 St. Martin Funeral Home vs NLRC

Facts
Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent was not
its employee but only the uncle of Amelita Malabed, the owner of
petitioner St. Martin's Funeral Home. Sometime in 1995, private
respondent, who was formerly working as an overseas contract
worker, asked for financial assistance from the mother of Amelita.
Since then, as an indication of gratitude, private respondent
voluntarily helped the mother of Amelita in overseeing the business.

The mother of Amelita passed away, so the latter then took over
the management of the business. She then discovered that there were
arrears in the payment of taxes and other government fees, although
the records purported to show that the same were already paid.
Amelita then made some changes in the business operation and
private respondent and his wife were no longer allowed to participate
in the management thereof. As a consequence, the latter filed a
complaint charging that petitioner had illegally terminated his
employment.

Issue: WON the decision of the NLRC can be appealed to the CA.

Ruling
YES. paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 now grants
exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals over all final
adjudications of the Regional Trial Courts and the quasi-judicial
agencies generally or specifically referred to therein except, among
others, "those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court in accordance with . . . the Labor Code of the Philippines under
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, . . . ." This would
necessarily contradict what has been ruled and said all along that
appeal does not lie from decisions of the NLRC.

As stated by Raul Roco in his sponsorship speech the purpose of

the law is to ease the workload of the Supreme Court by the transfer
of some of its burden of review of factual issues to the Court of
Appeals. However, whatever benefits that can be derived from the
expansion of the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals was cut
short by the last paragraph of Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
which excludes from its coverage the "decisions and interlocutory
orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines and by the
Central Board of Assessment Appeals.
 Hawaiian-Philippine Company vs Gulmatico et, al.

Facts
NFSW-FGT filed a claim against petitioner under the Sugar Act
of 1952, the union claimed that the sugar farm workers within
petitioner's milling district have never availed of the benefits due them
under the law.

. Petitioner contended that public respondent Labor Arbiter has no

jurisdiction to entertain and resolve the case, and that respondent
union has no cause of action against petitioner.

Public respondent promulgated the assailed Order denying

petitioner's Motion to Dismiss and Supplemental Motion to Dismiss.

Issue: WON the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction in this case.

Ruling:
NO. while the jurisdiction over controversies involving
agricultural workers has been transferred from the Court of Agrarian
Relations to the Labor Arbiters under the Labor Code as amended, the
said transferred jurisdiction is however, not without limitations. The
dispute or controversy must still fall under one of the cases
enumerated under Article 217 of the Labor Code, which cases, as
ruled in San Miguel, supra., arise out of or are in connection with an
employeremployee relationship.

In the case at bar, it is clear that there is no employer-employee

relationship between petitioner milling company and respondent
union and/or its members-workers. Absent the jurisdictional requisite
of an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and private
respondent, the inevitable conclusion is that public respondent is
without jurisdiction to hear and decide the case with respect to
petitioner.