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This article is about the psychological process. For more uses, see Introspection (Disambiguation). The examination of one's own thoughts and feelings introspection is the examination of one's own conscious thoughts and feelings. [1] In psychology, the process of introspection is based on the observation of one's own state of mind, while in a spiritual
context it can refer to the examination of one's own soul. [2] Introspection is closely linked to human self-reflection and self-discovery and is contrasted with external observation. Introspection usually offers privileged access to one's own mental states,[3] not mediated by other sources of knowledge, so that individual experience of the mind is unique.
Introspection can determine any number of mental states, including: sensory, physical, cognitive, emotional and so on. [3] Introspection has been the subject of philosophical discussions for thousands of years. The philosopher Plato asked: ... Why shouldn't we calmly and patiently review our own thoughts and examine them thoroughly and see what these
phenomena really are in us? [4] [5] While introspection is applicable to many facets of philosophical thought, it is perhaps best known for its role in epistemology; In this context, introspection is often compared with perception, reason, memory and testimony as a source of knowledge. [6] In psychology, It was often claimed that Wilhelm Wundt, the father of
experimental psychology, was the first to take over the introspection of experimental psychology[1], even though the methodical idea had been presented long before, as had been the case with German philosophers and psychologists of the 18th century such as Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten or Johann Nicolaus Tetens. [7] Wundt's views on introspection
must also be addressed with great care. [8] Wundt was influenced by renowned physiologists such as Gustav Fechner, who used a type of controlled introspection to study human sensory organs. Building on the pre-existing use of introspection in physiology, Wundt believed that the method of introspection was the ability to observe an experience, not just
the logical reflection or speculation that some others interpreted its meaning. [9] In his experimental laboratory at the University of Leipzig, Wundt forced precise control over the use of introspection[1], which enabled other scientists to replicate his experiments elsewhere, a development that proved essential to the development of psychology as a modern
scientific discipline peer-reviewed by experts. Such exact purism was typical of Wundt, and he instructed all introspection observations under the same instructions. 1) The observer shall be able, if possible, to determine beforehand the input of the process to be observed. 2) The introspectionist must capture the phenomenon as far as possible in a state of
tense attention and follow its course. 3) To be sure, any observation must be able to be repeated several times under the same conditions 4) The conditions under which the phenomenon occurs must be determined by the variation of the circumstances, and when this has been done, the various coherent experiments must be varied according to a plan,
partly by the elimination of certain stimuli and partly by the classification of their strength and quality. [9] The Titchenedward Edward Titchener was an early pioneer of experimental psychology and a student of Wilhelm Wundt. [1] After completing his doctorate with Wundt at the University of Leipzig, he went to Cornell University, where he founded his own
laboratory and research. [1] When Titchener came to Cornell in 1894, psychology was still a young discipline, especially in the United States, and Titchener was a key figure in bringing Wundt's ideas to America. Titchener, however, misrepresented some of Wundt's ideas toward the American psychological establishment, especially in his report on
introspection, which, as Titchener taught, served only one purpose in the qualitative analysis of consciousness in its various parts,[1] while Wundt saw it as a means of quantifying the whole conscious experience. [1] Titchener was interested only in the individual components, which include conscious experience, while Wundt, who saw little sense in the
analysis of individual components, concentrated on the synthesis of these components. Ultimately, Titchener's ideas would form the basis of the short-lived psychological theory of structuralism. [1] Historical misconceptions American historiography of introspection, according to some authors,[10][11] is dominated by three misunderstandings. In particular,
psychologists tend to argue 1) that introspection was once the predominant method of psychological investigation, 2) that behavioralism, especially John B. Watson, is responsible for discrediting introspection as a valid method, and 3) that scientific psychology has completely abandoned introspection as a result of these critiques. [10] But introspection was
not the predominant method. This is believed to be because Edward Titchener's student Edwin G. Boring preferred Titchener's views in his influential historical accounts of experimental psychology, while paying little credit to the original sources. [10] Introspection has been criticized by many other psychologists, including Wilhelm Wundt and Knight Dunlap,
who, in his article The Case Against Introspection, makes an argument against self-observation that is not primarily rooted in behavioral epistemology. Introspection is still widely used in psychology, but under different names, such as self-report surveys, interviews and fMRIs. [11] It is not the method, but its name, the the prevailing psychological vocabulary.
Current Developments See also: Introspection Illusion Partly as a result of Titchener's misrepresentation, the use of introspection decreased after his death and the subsequent decline of structuralism. [1] Later psychological movements, such as and behavior, rejected introspection for its lack of scientific reliability among factors. [1] Functionalism originated
in direct opposition to structuralism, which resisted its narrow focus on the elements of consciousness[1] and emphasized the purpose of consciousness and other psychological behaviors. The resistance of behavior to introspection focused much more on its unreliability and subjectivity, which were at odds with Behaviorism's focus on measurable behavior.
[1] [12] The more recently established movement for cognitive psychology has accepted to some extent the usefulness of introspection in the study of psychological phenomena, although usually only in experiments related to internal thinking carried out under experimental conditions. In the think-aloud protocol, for example, investigators instruct participants
to express their thoughts aloud to study an active thought process without forcing a person to comment on the process themselves. [13] As early as the 18th century, authors had criticized the use of introspection, both because they knew their own mind and as a method of psychology. David Hume pointed out that the introspection of a mental state tends to
change the condition itself; a German author, Christian Gottfried Schütz, noted that introspection is often referred to as mere inner sensation, but actually also requires attention, that introspection does not come into unconscious states of mind and that it cannot be used naively - one must know what to look for. Immanuel Kant added that if they are
understood too narrowly, introspective experiments are impossible. Introspection provides, at best, clues as to what is going on in the mind; it is not enough to justify claims of knowledge about the mind. [14] Similarly, the idea between John Stuart Mill and Auguste Comte was discussed further. Recent psychological research on cognition and attribution has
asked people to report on their mental processes, such as explaining why they made a particular choice or how they came to a verdict. In some situations, these reports are clearly mixed. [15] For example, people justify decisions they haven't actually made. [16] Such results undermine the notion that these verbal reports are based on direct introspective
access to mental content. Instead, judgments about one's own mind seem to be inferences about inconspicuous behavior, much like judgments about another person. [15] However, it is difficult to assess whether these results apply only to unusual experimental situations or whether they have anything to do with everyday introspection. [17] The theory of
adaptive unconscious suggests that a very large proportion of mental processes, even high-level processes such as targeting and decision-making, are inaccessible to introspection. [18] Indeed, it is questionable how confident researchers can be in their own introspections. One of the central implications of dissociations between consciousness and meta-
consciousness is that individuals, presumably presumably Researchers, can misrepresent their experiences for themselves. Jack and Roepstorff claim ... there is also a sense in which subjects simply cannot lie wrong about their own states of experience. Presumably, they came to this conclusion by resorting to the seemingly self-evident quality of their own
introspections, and assumed that it must also apply to others. However, if we look at research on this subject, this conclusion seems less self-evident. For example, if extensive introspection can lead to people making decisions they later regret, then a very reasonable possibility is that the introspection caused them to lose contact with their feelings. In short,
empirical studies suggest that people cannot adequately assess their own states of experience (i.e. be wrong). Another question about the inherited accountability of introspection is that if researchers lack confidence in their own introspections and those of their participants, how can they gain legitimacy? Three strategies are accountable: identifying
behaviors that create credibility, finding a common ground that allows mutual understanding, and developing a trust that allows you to know when to give the benefit of the doubt. In other words, words only make sense if they are confirmed by their actions; When people report strategies, feelings, or beliefs, their behavior must be consistent with these
statements if they are to be believed. [19] Even if their introspections are ininformative, people still give confident descriptions of their mental processes because they are unaware of their ignorance. [20] This phenomenon was called an introspection illusion and was used to explain some cognitive prejudices[21] and belief in some paranormal phenomena.
[22] When judging about themselves, subjects treat their own introspections as reliable, while judging other people by their behavior. [23] This can lead to illusions of superiority. For example, people generally see themselves as less conformist than others, and that seems to be because they have no urge for conformity introspective. [24] Another reliable
finding is that people generally consider themselves less biased than everyone else because they probably do not view biased thought processes inspectively. [23] However, these introspections are misleading because prejudices work unconsciously. One experiment tried to give their subjects access to the introspections of others. They made audio
recordings of subjects who had been told what they were Head came when they answered a question about their own bias. [23] Although the subjects convinced themselves that they were unlikely to be biased, their introspective reports did not affect the observers' assessments. When the subjects were explicitly told not to rely on introspection, their
assessments of their own biasbecameped. [23] In the religion Christianity In Eastern Christianity some concepts that require human needs, such as sober sober (nepsis), require vigilance of the human heart and the conflicts of the human nous, heart or mind. A noetic understanding cannot be achieved through rational or discursive thinking (i.e.
systemization). [Quote Required] Jainism Jains practice Pratikraman (Sanskrit Introspektion), a process of remorse for misconduct during their daily lives, and remember to refrain from doing so again. Devout Jains often do Pratikraman at least twice a day. [Quote Required] Hinduism introspection is promoted in schools such as Advaita Vedanta; In order to
know one's own true nature, they need to think about their true nature and become introspective – which is meditation. In particular, Swami Chinmayananda emphasized the role of introspection in five stages, which is described in his book Self-Development. In fiction, introspection (also called Rufus dialogue, inside monologue, self-talk) is the fictional writing
mode used to convey a character's thoughts. As Renni Browne and Dave King explained, one of the great gifts of literature is that it allows the expression of unspoken thoughts... [25] According to Nancy Kress, a character's thoughts can greatly improve a story: deepening characterization, increasing tension, and broadening the scope of a story. [26] As Jack
M. Bickham sketches, thinking plays a crucial role both in the scene and in the sequel. [27] See also Philosophy portal Psychology portal Conceptual proliferation Human self-reflection Insight Introversion Mode (literature) Psychological mindedness Phenomenology (philosophy) Phenomenology (psychology) Pratikramana Psychonautics Psychophysics
Rumination (psychology) Self-awareness Self-awareness Self-awareness Self-awareness Self-discovery Style (fiction) References a b c d e f g h i j k l Schultz, D. P. Schultz, S. E. (2012). A history of modern psychology (10th edition). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning. pp. 67-77, 88-100. Origin and Importance of Psychology of Online Etymology
Dictionary. www.etymonline.com. Retrieved 2020-09-05. a b Encyclopedia of Consciousness. January 2009: 187-199. doi:10.1016/B978-012373873-8.00071-2. Cite journal requires |journal= (help) - Theaetetus, 155 - J Perner et al (2007). Introspection & Remembering. Synthesis. Springer. • Epistemology. (2005). In Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy. Retrieved from see Thomas Sturm, Kant and the Sciences of Man (Paderborn: Mentis, 2009), ch. * Danziger, Kurt (1980). The History of Introspection Reconsidered. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences. 16 (3): 241-262. doi:10.1002/1520-6696(198007)16:3<241::aid-jhbs2300160306>3.0.co;2-o. PMID 11610711. Wilhelm
Wundt. Psychological studies. 60 (2): 244–248. A b c Costal, A (2006). 'Introspectionism' and the mythical origins of scientific psychology. Bewusstsein und Kognition. 15 (4): 634–654. </241::aid-jhbs2300160306> </241::aid-jhbs2300160306> PMID 17174788. A b Clegg, Joshua (2013). Selbstbeobachtung in der Sozialwissenschaft. New Jersey:
Transaktion. Wilson, Robert Andrew; Frank C. Keil, Eds. (2001). The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences. Cambridge (Massachusetts). ISBN 9780262731447. Hayes, S.C. (1986). The case of the silent dog–Verbal reports and the analysis of rules: A review of Ericsson and Simon es Protocol Analysis: Verbal Reports as Data1. Journal of the
Experimental Analysis of Behavior. 45 (3): 351–363. doi:10.1901/jeab.1986.45-351. PMC 1348244. Vgl. Thomas Sturm, Kant und die Wissenschaften vom Menschen (Paderborn: Mentis, 2009), ch.s 2 und 4. * A b Nisbett, Richard E.; Timothy D. Wilson. Mehr erzählen, als wir wissen können: Verbale Berichte über mentale Prozesse (PDF). Psychologische
Überprüfung. 84 (3): 231–259. doi:10.1037/0033-295x.84.3.231. hdl:2027.42/92167., nachgedruckt in David Lewis Hamilton, Ed.; Soziale Erkenntnis: Schlüssellesungen. Psychologie Presse. ISBN 978-0-86377-591-8. Johansson, Petter; Lars Hall; Sverker Sikström; Betty Tärning; Andreas Lind. Wie kann man etwas sagen, wenn man mehr sagt, als wir
wissen können: Auf Wahl Blindheit und Introspektion. Bewusstsein und Kognition. 15 (4): 673–692. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2006.09.004. PMID 17049881. Peter A. White: White. Mehr darüber zu wissen, was wir sagen können: 'Introspektiver Zugriff' und Kausalberichtsgenauigkeit 10 Jahre später. British Journal of Psychology. 79 (1): 13–45.
doi:10.1111/j.2044-8295.1988.tb02271.x. * Wilson, Timothy D.; Elizabeth W. Dunn. Self-Knowledge: Its Limits, Value, and Potential for Improvement. Annual Review of Psychology. 55: 493–518. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.55.090902.141954. PMID 14744224. * Schooler, Jonathan W. (2002). Eine legitime Beziehung zur Introspektion herstellen. Trends in
den Kognitionswissenschaften. 6 (9): 371–372. doi:10.1016/S1364-6613(02)01970-8. PMID 12200175. * Wilson, Timothy D.; Yoav Bar-Anan (22. August 2008). The Unseen Mind. Wissenschaft. 321 (5892): 1046–1047. doi:10.1126/science.1163029. PMID 18719269. * Pronin, Emily (Januar 2007). Wahrnehmung und Fehlwahrnehmung von
Voreingenommenheit im menschlichen Urteilsvermögen. Trends in den Kognitionswissenschaften. 11 (1): 37–43. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2006.11.001. ISSN 1364-6613. PMID 17129749. Wegner, Daniel M. (2008). Selbst ist Magie (PDF). In John Baer; James C. Kaufman; Roy F. Baumeister (Anm.). Sind wir frei?: Psychologie und freier Wille. New York: Oxford
University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-518963-6. Abgerufen 2008-07-02. a b c d Pronin, Emily; Matthew B. Kugler (Juli 2007). Gedanken bewerten, Verhalten ignorieren: Die Introspektionsillusion als Quelle der voreingenommenen blinden Stelle. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. 43 (4): 565–578. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2006.05.011. ISSN 0022-1031. *
Pronin, Emily; Jonah Berger; Sarah Molouki. Alone in a Crowd of Sheep: Asymmetric Perceptions of Conformity and Their Roots in an Introspection Illusion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 92 585–595. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.92.4.585. Issn Issn PMID 17469946. * Browne, Renni; King, David. Self-editing for fiction writers: How to edit yourself
in print. New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers Inc. ISBN 978-0-06-054569-7. * Kress, Nancy (2003). Make Em Think. Writer's Digest (August): 38. Jack M. Bickham(1993). Scene & Structure. Oh Cincinnati: Writer's Digest Books. Pps. 12-22, 50-58. ISBN 978-0-89879-551-6. Further reading Boring, Edwin G. (1953). A history of introspection (PDF).
Psychological bulletin. 50 (3): 169-189. doi:10.1037/h0090793. PMID 13056096. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2011-06-10. Retrieved 2009-07-17. Gillespie, Alex (2006). Descartes' Demon: A dialogical analysis of 'Meditations on First Philosophy (PDF). Theory & Psychology. 16 (6): 761-781. doi:10.1177/0959354306070527. hdl:1893/705.
Gillespie, Alex (2007). Valsiner, Jaan; Rosa, Alberto (note). The social basis of self-reflection. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 678-691. Jack, Anthony; Roepstorff, Andreas, eds. (2003). Relying on the topic?: The use of introspective evidence in cognitive science. Imprint Academic. ISBN 978-0-907845-56-0. Wilson, Timothy (2002). Strangers to
Ourselves: Discovering the Adaptive Unconscious. Cambridge: Belknap Press. ISBN 978-0-674-00936-3. Timothy D. Wilson Wilson: Wilson Sara D. Hodges. postures as temporary constructions. In Leonard L. Martin; Abraham Tesser (note). The construction of social judgments. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. ISBN 978-0-8058-1149-0. External links
Wikiquote has quotes related to: Introspection Look up Introspection in Wiktionary, the free dictionary. Introspection entry by Amy Kind in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy Schwitzgebel, Eric. Introspection. In Zalta, Edward N. (note). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. From

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