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ANALYSIS OF THE CASE:

COLUMBIA’S FINAL MISSION
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ANALYSIS OF THE CASE:

COLUMBIA’S FINAL MISSION

Prepared for

Prepared by

MGMT 535 – Theory and Application of Managerial Communications

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University

Worldwide Campus

June 16, 2008

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TITLE FLY.........................................................................................................................i
TITLE PAGE......................................................................................................................ii
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TABLE OF CONTENTS....................................................................................................iii
INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................1
BODY.................................................................................................................................1-2
CONCLUSION...................................................................................................................2
REFERENCES...................................................................................................................3
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INTRODUCTION

Since the beginning stages of NASA’s birth, there have been numerous cases of
unfortunate but possibly preventable failure and disappointment. Looking back in time not only
at the Columbia but also the Challenger shuttle missions, one can see and briskly imagine what
went wrong and how the crises could’ve been prevented. Also, one can see how these problems
were not addressed in time and in proper manner. As we take a look back, we can pin point many
problems that occurred with communication, schedule pressure, and “true” professionalism
across diverse teams that led to the catastrophic disasters. With all this we can quickly derive to
conclusions that the poorly designed communication system was doomed for failure.
BODY

From the start, Columbia’s shuttle mission organizational team of managers and
engineers experienced tremendous pressure. The entire team had huge task responsibility’s that
not only affected their work in the way they performed their jobs but also in their ability to make
tough decisions.
The entire management team of Columbia’s mission had to analyze each individual
system of flight and respectively assess the engineers. Engineers were divided into teams of
specific expertise. All engineering teams were running into specific challenges that needed to be
corrected in time for flight. Managers heavily depended on all engineers to provide good data
that could then be prioritized in order of acceptance. On the same token, management was
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pressured by NASA to stay on course and stick to schedule. In the end it was really up to the
management team to decide what was crucial to the mission, and this is where mistakes were
made because certain engineering concerns were overlooked and unfortunately eventually
accepted.
In early NASA missions, danger of foam loss was considered as an acceptable risk by the
NASA organization. Therefore threat of foam loss on the Columbia mission was no different and
never was thought of as an “anomaly of flight”. Instead NASA considered this fact as more of an
issue that needed to be looked at and maintained once the mission was over and the ship was
back on the ground. Eventually these ruthless decisions time after time caught up with NASA’s
organization. On flight day 16 of Columbia’s mission, foam debris punctured a hole in the wing
of the shuttle and caused it to burn and break apart during reentry back to our planet. Of course,
no one particular individual is to blame for the Columbia tragedy, except for the entire NASA
organization. NASA as a whole “team” is responsible and must be accountable for this sad and
heartbreaking catastrophe. The “overlook” problem of the foam anomaly was caused by
difficulties in communication amongst engineering and management groups even though the root
cause of this issue occurred far before this particular NASA mission. Truly none of this would
have taken place if only NASA endorsed and lived by an open culture environment.
CONCLUSION

Overall, the most crucial aspect we all can learn from this tragedy is that clear
communication is gateway to great teamwork and data proven, decisive choices. In theory, if
clear communication existed between management and employees at NASA prior to the
catastrophe, problems could have been zeroed out. An open communication environment could
have allowed all members of the organization to be heard, analyzed and addressed by everyone
on the organizational chart from top to bottom. In essence, a solid organization must have a
feasible process that addresses known threats with clear and decisive communication. Also in
addition to an adequate communication environment, safety should remain the number one
priority. All problems must be fixed prior to shuttle launch and no individual risk should be
accepted. Benefits of such process can be viewed and attained by all individuals involved in a
project of great magnitude, and maybe if such process existed in NASA prior to the Columbia
launch, perhaps we wouldn’t be discussing these issues today.
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REFERENCES

AP Wire Service (2003, February 1). Space Shuttle Columbia disintegrates into flames over
Texas, killing all seven astronauts aboard: [FINAL HOME EDITION]. Tulsa World,
p. BR.  Retrieved June 16, 2008, from ProQuest Newsstand database. (Document
ID: 283094721).
Link:http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?
did=283094721&sid=3&Fmt=3&clientId=17916&RQT=309&VName=PQD

Excerpts From Report of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board: [Text]. (2003, August 27).

New York Times (Late Edition (east Coast)), p. A.18.  Retrieved June 16, 2008, from
ProQuest Newsstand database. (Document ID: 388965331).
Link:http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?
did=388965331&sid=4&Fmt=3&clientId=17916&RQT=309&VName=PQD

Marcia Dunn (2003, August 27). NASA gets shuttle blame Scathing report faults management
for the Columbia disaster: [Metro Edition]. San Antonio Express-News, p. 01A.  Retrieved
June 16, 2008, from ProQuest Newsstand database. (Document ID: 783048001).
Link:http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?
did=783048001&sid=3&Fmt=3&clientId=17916&RQT=309&VName=PQD

Marcia Dunn, Pam Easton. (2003, February 2). Tragedy in the sky; 7 die as shuttle disintegrates;

Debris rains over Texas: [ALL Edition]. Telegram & Gazette, p. A1.  Retrieved June 16,
2008, from ProQuest Newsstand database. (Document ID: 282662751).
Link:http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?
did=282662751&sid=3&Fmt=3&clientId=17916&RQT=309&VName=PQD