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The Properties and the Nature of Light: The Study of Newton’s Work and the
Teaching of Optics

Article  in  Science & Education · November 2005

DOI: 10.1007/s11191-004-5609-6

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Science & Education (2005) 14: 649–673 Ó Springer 2005
DOI 10.1007/s11191-004-5609-6

The Properties and the Nature of Light:

The Study of Newton’s Work and the Teaching
of Optics

ATHANASIOS RAFTOPOULOS1, NIKI KALYFOMMATOU2 and

CONSTANTINOS P. CONSTANTINOU2
1
Department of Psychology, University of Cyprus, P.O. BOX 20537, Nicosia 1678, Cyprus
(E-mail: raftop@ucy.ac.cy); 2Department of Educational Sciences, University of Cyprus
(E-mail: nikika@cytanet.com.cy, c.p.constantinou@ucy.ac.cy)

Abstract. The history of science shows that for each scientific issue there may be more than
one models that are simultaneously accepted by the scientific community. One such case
concerns the wave and corpuscular models of light. Newton claimed that he had proved some
properties of light based on a set of minimal assumptions, without any commitments to any
one of the two models. This set of assumptions constitutes the geometrical model of light as a
set of rays propagating in space. We discuss this model and the historical reasons for which it
had the head-primacy amongst the relevant models. We argue that this model is indispensable
in structuring the curriculum in Optics and attempt to validate it epistemologically. Finally, we
discuss an approach for alleviating the implicit assumptions that students make on the nature
of light and the subsequent interference of geometrical optics in teaching the properties of light
related to its wave-like nature.

1. Introduction
The geometrical or diagrammatic model is widely used in secondary school to
introduce students to the phenomena of light and their explanations. This
model uses lines to represent the rays of light, arrows to indicate the direction
of motion of the light and a set of mathematical equations (such as the law of
Snell) that allow one to calculate the way the light interacts with objects that
lie along its path of propagation. A set of rays constitutes a beam of light
(Rutherford 2000). This model purports to be neutral with respect to the
nature of light; that is, it makes no commitments as to whether light is wave-
like or body-like.
Teaching of optics by means of the geometrical model is hindered by many
difficulties. Students that have taken the relevant courses usually fail to ex-
plain even the simplest phenomena of light propagation by drawing the
appropriate rays of light and relating them to the source and the objects with
which the light interacts (Andersson & Karrqvist 1983; Feher & Rice 1988;
Fetherstonhaugh & Treagust 1992; Langley et al. 1997). Furthermore, it
seems as though the reliance on the geometrical model hinders subsequent
650 ATHANASIOS RAFTOPOULOS ET AL.

efforts to teach students phenomena, such as diffraction and interference,

whose explanation requires the consideration of light as a wave (Colin &
Viennot 2000; Wosilait et al. 1999). Though there are not many voices that
question the usefulness of the geometrical model of light in physics educa-
tion, if one considers the usual tendency to thoroughly revise most of the
traditional models used in education – one characteristic example is the
number line in teaching arithmetic (Ernest 1985; Liebeck 1984; Venger &
Gorbov 1993) – one may expect that the geometrical model is about to face a
similar attack.
In this paper, we defend the geometrical model of light and argue that its
role in teaching optical phenomena is indispensable provided that one takes
certain precautions and that one places it in the appropriate context. Our aim
is to show that some of the reasons that led Newton to propose his ‘‘theory-
neutral’’ model make the geometrical model suitable to introduce students to
optics. The paper aims to validate epistemologically, and thus shield, the
geometrical model against possible attacks on its effectiveness and usefulness
in teaching optics.
In the first part of the paper, we discuss the role of models in scientific
theories and scientific research programs and the way models succeed one
another. The upshot of this section is that within a given research program
there is a succession of models that progressively capture the complexity of
the phenomena under study by gradually considering more and more of the
parameters involved in the phenomena.
In Section 2, we discuss the two competing models of the nature of light,
the wave and the particle model, and we place the geometrical model of
light, the model of rays of light, in the context of the polemic between the
two models. We hasten to add that we are not interested in the develop-
ment of the notion of the light ray from the ancient Greeks to Kepler and
from there to Newton. Our aim is to delineate the role of the geometrical
model as envisaged by Newton in the specific historical context. The main
thesis advanced in this section is that Newton used this model to avoid the
polemic between the two camps, to wit the wave and the particle model, by
claiming that the geometrical model is theory neutral, though, as we shall
see, the construction of the model was guided by heavily loaded ontological
assumptions regarding the corpuscular nature of light, assumptions that
later Newton suppressed to give the aura of theoretical neutrality. By doing
this, he was fully aware that the geometrical model can explain only some
of the phenomena of light, mainly refraction and reflection. However, he
thought that by using this neutral model he could prove some of the
properties of light in a way that would convince the belligerents. Once the
explanations of these properties were unanimously accepted, they could
form the firm springboard on which one could base an inquiry as to the
nature of light.
THE PROPERTIES AND THE NATURE OF LIGHT 651

As we said in this section, models of increasing complexity succeed one

another within a given scientific research program to account for new phe-
nomena and expand the empirical power of a program. Similarly Newton
sought to expand the initial model of rays of light to explain other optical
phenomena, such as interference fringes. There, Newton found it impossible
to maintain the theoretical neutrality of the geometrical model and explain
the new phenomena and he started to endow the rays with particle properties,
abandoning thus the theoretical neutrality of the geometrical model.
In Section 3 we discuss the geometrical model of light in its instructional
setting. We review first the literature regarding high-school students con-
ceptions regarding the basic properties of the geometrical model, to wit the
propagation of light along the rays of light and its directionality. Then, we
argue first that its usefulness lies exactly where Newton (for methodological
scientific reasons of course) thought it to be; namely in the fact that, if
carefully stated, it provides a tool for addressing some of the optical phe-
nomena without committing the student to any of the theories pertaining to
the nature of light. At the same time, this discussion offers an epistemological
validation of the usage of this model in instruction. We discuss why this is
useful, by arguing that the geometrical model’s property of being presentable
in a theory independent way allows the proper scaffolding of the instructional
setting, which promotes learning.
In Section 5, we spell out the clause ‘‘if carefully stated’’ and point out that
the model should be stated in a way that is indeed theory neutral and avoids
any ontological undertones regarding the nature of light. We also argue that
before it is taught, the model should be preceded by a treatment of the ‘‘key
idea’’ of optics (Andersson & Karrqvist 1983), namely that light is a physical
something that propagates in space. Finally, we propose that familiarising
students with the role in science of a series of models of increasing complexity
and empirical power and by discussing the relationship between these mod-
els, one can avoid the problems associated with the interference of geomet-
rical optics in teaching properties of light related to its wave-like nature.

2. Models, Theories and Scientific Research Programs

The existing analyses of scientific models lead to various conflicting con-
ceptions of what these are. Despite this, there is consensus of the idea that
models and theories in science are intimately interconnected, by the fact that
scientific theories are applied to the specific phenomena inter alia by the use
of models. A model is the simplified reconstruction of the structure and
function of a system or a procedure. It includes elements of the system,
relevant concepts, as well as the relationships or interactions among them. To
construct a model a scientist selects those of the parameters involved in a
652 ATHANASIOS RAFTOPOULOS ET AL.

phenomenon that she deems to be the most important in determining the

phenomenon and which she has the theoretical and experimental means of
studying. Not all parameters involved in the phenomenon can be selected
because the problem space becomes too complicated to handle and the sci-
entist may even lack the necessary experimental theories and/or techniques
that would allow her to study the effects of these parameters on the phe-
nomenon. At the same time, the scientist assumes that the parameters that
she has chosen to neglect do not affect the phenomenon to some degree of
approximation. Or, she may know beforehand that they affect significantly
the phenomenon, in which case the model constructed is known to be a first
step in a series of progressively more elaborate models that take progressively
into account an increasing number of parameters that affect the phenomenon
under study. In this case, the initial model plays mainly a heuristic role, as a
springboard on which the scientist builds the foundation on which the other
models will be based.
In this sense, when Newton constructed the first model of planetary mo-
tion to explain the trajectory of planets by means of a gravitational force, in
which he assumed an immobile sun at the centre of the circle, he knew fully
well that neither the sun is immobile (his third law of dynamics dictated as
much) nor is the orbit circular. Thus, he never thought that his model ade-
quately described the phenomenon of planetary orbit. He used it as a sim-
plified version of reality that would allow him to prove the law of gravity.
Once he had proven the law of gravity, he proceeded to build more elaborate
models in which the parameters that he had chosen to overlook in the first
model, namely the effect of the orbiting body on the sun and the elliptic path
of the orbiting body, were incorporated in the new models, which thus be-
came more adequate to account for the phenomenon under study. The model
is at the heart of a theory that purports to explain specific phenomena under
study.
A theory explains successfully a phenomenon if it can show how the
phenomenon comes about. A theory includes, first, a set of propositions
(laws) that are coherent and describe the behaviour and interactions of the
entities involved in the phenomenon. For instance, Newton’s three laws of
dynamics describe the behaviour and interactions of solid bodies. Second, a
theory also includes a set of theories regarding experimental devices that tell
the scientist which techniques she can use to test the theory and why she can
rely on the experimental apparatus she uses. The first ingredient constitutes
the hard core of the theory, that which characterises the theory and which, if
changed, the theory changes. But a theory goes beyond these two compo-
nents. A theory also includes (Lakatos 1978, p. 4) a protective belt of aux-
iliary hypotheses that can change to accommodate new recalcitrant evidence
and a problem-solving machinery, which dictates how the theory solves the
problems it faces. This heuristic shows either how to explain new tokens of
THE PROPERTIES AND THE NATURE OF LIGHT 653

facts whose type is already accommodated by the theory, or how to address

anomalies, that is, phenomena that the theory seems not to account for; in
other words, it dictates, on the one hand, those modifications in the theory
that will allow it to account for the new phenomena, and on the other,
protects the hard core of the theory from revision. The means that suggest
ways to overcome difficulties and explain away anomalies or new phenomena
by varying those parts of the theory that can be changed constitute the
positive heuristics of the theory (Lakatos 1978, p. 50). A negative heuristic,
on the other hand, specifies the hard core of the theory that scientists have
decided to keep immune to revision.
As we have said, models are inherently approximate descriptions of real
world phenomena. A theory1 that aims to explain these phenomena com-
prises a series of increasingly complex models that progressively involve, in
the ideal case, all parameters affecting the phenomena. Each model corre-
sponds to a theory within the theory1, which is the application of the theory1
into a specific phenomenon. Thus, one could say that each time a new model
is constructed one builds a new theory (theory2) in a series of theories2 that
aim to explain certain phenomena. Since each theory2 emanates from pro-
gressively elaborating on an initial theory2 that comprised the first model in
the series, one might say that theories2 belong within the same Scientific
Research Programme (SRP), to borrow the term from Lakatos (1978), which
now replaces the term ‘theory1’. Henceforth, we reserve the term theory for
‘theory2’ and we use the term ‘SRP’ to denote the series of theories that are
constructed with a view to explaining some phenomena and are built on the
basis of an initial model. Hence a SRP consists of series of theories. To give a
specific example, Newtonian dynamics is a SRP or theory1 that consists
historically in a series of models of increasing complexity; each of these
models may be construed as a theory2 that shows how the theory1 applies to a
specific class of phenomena.
What we said above about the positive and negative heuristics, the hard
core and the auxiliary hypotheses also apply to SRPs. One can see now that
each theoretical change in a SRP keeps the hard core intact and makes the
theory more adequate in two ways. Either by incorporating in the new theory
the effects of some of the laws in the hard core (as Newton did when he took
into account the third law of his dynamics and made the body at the centre of
the planetary orbit move as a result of the action of the orbiting body on it).
Or by inserting new auxiliary hypotheses regarding the factors that affect the
phenomenon and the way they interact (as when Newton proposed a revised
theory of refraction of sunlight in the atmosphere to account for the dis-
crepancy between his predictions and the observed location of the moon in
the sky).
Consider now such a series of theories, T1, T2,. . ., each built around
models M1, M2,. . ., within a certain SRP. According to Lakatos (1978, p. 32),
654 ATHANASIOS RAFTOPOULOS ET AL.

for the theory T2 to ucceed the theory T1, T2 must fulfil three conditions. (1)
T2 must have excess empirical content over T1, in other words, it must predict
new facts; (2) T2 explains all the unrefuted content of T1. It is in this sense
that the series of theories is considered to represent a growth of knowledge;
(3) Part of the excess content of T2 is corroborated. This amounts to saying
that each model that constitutes the core of each theory must be a more
elaborate version of previous ones, which maintains its success, and at the
same time, by incorporating more parameters, yields a theory with increased
predictive power and thus empirical content.
When a rival model of the phenomena is constructed, that is, when a
model that is governed by a different hard core, a new rival SRP appears.
When, for instance, Bohr proposed a model of the atom in which the elec-
trons revolving around the nucleus do not continuously emit radiation, as
predicted by classical electromagnetism, a new SRP, that of Quantum
Mechanics, emerged in which, in its turn, the initial model of the atom was
progressively elaborated and enriched. When a SRP appears as an alternative
to an existing one, in order for the new SRP to succeed the older one it must
also satisfy the same criteria that each theory within the SRP must meet.
Thus, (1) the new SRP must explain, even as approximations, the phenomena
that the older SRP explained; (2) it must have more empirical content and
make new predictions or explain phenomena that the older SRP could not;
(3) some of the new predictions must be borne out, that is, that part of the
excess content must be corroborated.
Scientific models are the foundations of science and they constitute the
most rationalised notions for the world. This way, one could claim that
scientific explanation could be achieved through the synthesis of many at-
tempts at model making. It is hard to imagine how scientific explanation
would be achieved without the use of models. The explanatory role of models
is what has led philosophers of science in the exploration of these scientific
constructs as if they are autonomous agents of scientific explanation. In
Newtonian physics, for example, to say that a physical system obeys New-
ton’s 2nd law, that is to reiterate a pure statement of the theory, is hardly a
scientific explanation. The explanatory power is brought about by specifying
a force function for the particular physical system. But by specifying a force
function we have constructed a model for the particular physical system.
As we have seen, the replacement of scientific models is in-wrought with
the collection of data from the contact with the natural world and model
replacement within the same SRP is what constitutes the growth of knowl-
edge. The history of science is a process of reassessing and replacing theories
and models within SRPs or of competition between SRPs, which usually
results in a SRP succeeding another one. Within a given SRP, the models
that get replaced are those that are peripheral, that is, they lie at the outer
nucleus of science. There, positioned are the models that are usually based
THE PROPERTIES AND THE NATURE OF LIGHT 655

on those theses of a theory that do not constitute its hard core but lie on its
periphery; that is, the theories of the protective belt of the SRP. It is,
therefore, possible that inside the same scientific methodological program
(Lakatos 1978), or scientific paradigm (Kuhn 1962), there exist explanations
of different sets of phenomena that are mutually inconsistent, without
affecting the inner coherence of the theory. The exterior models depict these
peripheral theses.
Like the peripheral theses, these exterior models constitute the first line of
defence against the empirical disconfirmation of a theory, as they can be
replaced without endangering her hard core. Thus, there can be models that
interpret some aspects of the phenomena and some others, competitors of the
former models, which interpret other aspects of the same phenomena inside
the same research program. Consider the case of the harmonic oscillator
governed by the law F ¼ )kx. This equation defines a model in which air
resistance is ignored. The law of the harmonic oscillator belongs to the hard
core of the theory. As such, it is immune to revision should recalcitrant data
appear. It is not difficult to see that in real world situations the model fails to
predict the observed data, since it does not consider factors that affect the
pertinent phenomena. One such factor is air resistance. In order to account
for this factor, the model should be replaced by another more realistic, which
includes the parameter of air resistance and leaves the hard core, that is the
harmonic law, intact. In classical mechanics one builds a model based on the
introduction of a corrective factor in the harmonic equation, which thus
becomes F ¼ )kx + b, where b represents the resistance of the air. It is
empirically found that when the cord of the pendulum is thin, the behaviour
of the system is best approximated by a model expressed by b being a linear
function of x. When the cord is thick, a function that renders air resistance
proportionate to x2 offers a better approximation. Thus, depending on
whether the phenomenon under study includes a pendulum with a thin or a
thick cord, one applies two inconsistent models of reality, one which ex-
presses air resistance as a linear function of x and one that expresses the same
factor as a square function of x.
Kuhn (1962) notwithstanding there are many cases in the history of sci-
ence in which a unique, adequate and widely accepted model for a class of
phenomena was not developed for a long period of time. The phenomenon of
light is probably the most characteristic of such occasions, since, two dif-
ferent and mutually exclusive SRPs (until the advent of quantum mechanics),
the wave theory of light and the corpuscular theory of light, existed in par-
allel for a long time. In the next section, we will deal with the phenomenon of
the simultaneous acceptance from the scientific community of these two
complementary models concerning the nature of light, the particle and the
wave model. We will discuss the existence of a ‘‘third’’ model, which con-
siders light as a set of rays. We will refer to the reasons for which, under the
656 ATHANASIOS RAFTOPOULOS ET AL.

influence of Newton, this third model had the head-primacy amongst the
relevant models for quite some time.

3. Models of Light
The two dominant models of light are the wave and the particle model. The
former interprets light as electromagnetic waves with a certain frequency and
wavelength range. This model can explain phenomena such as interference,
diffraction, and also some phenomena that relate to colour. The latter model
considers light to comprise particles and explains the photoelectric phe-
nomenon and some other phenomena that relate to colour (Rutherford
2000). Even though in the history of the development of the respective
models we find many accounts of these phenomena that were incorrect
(including Newton’s account of refraction), both models can explain
refraction and reflection. This dualism underlines the fact that one cannot say
‘‘light is. . .’’ but only ‘‘in this situation light behaves as. . .’’.
Newton was the most ardent proponent of the particle theory of light.
However, he systematically avoided including amongst the possible expla-
nations of the phenomena of light which he studied in his first work in optics
(reflection, refraction and scattering of light), causal hypotheses concerning
the nature of light and colour. As he writes in a letter to Pardies:
The theory that I will put forward consists of only some properties of light without any
reference to hypotheses that could explain them. Because the best and safest way for one
to philosophise is to first explore with care the properties of things and prove them
experimentally and afterwards to continue more carefully to their explanation (Cohen
1958, p. 106).

In other words, according to Newton, a theory does not need to include

causal hypotheses. In particular, he appears to believe that a theory primarily
comprises the properties of objects and the experimental proofs of these
properties. Newton’s notion of causes, regarding both the nature of things
and the properties of things, is worth discussing a bit further. In Opticks
Newton (1952, pp. 404–405) distinguishes levels of causes, from partial
causes to the more general ones. The properties of things belong to the first
level of causes, to the extent that they describe their observed behaviour. To
the question ‘‘why do planets trace ellipses around the sun?’’ the answer is
‘‘because they follow the law of gravity.’’ The answer however to the question
‘‘why does gravity obey the law of the reciprocal of the squared distance?’’ is
unknown to Newton as the cause of gravity had not been discovered: ‘‘Up to
now I have not managed to discover the cause of gravity experimentally and I
don’t make hypotheses’’ (1952, p. 547). It is at this level that the explanation
of nature and things lie. In this view, Newton regarded causal hypotheses at
that stage of scientific development as mere speculations.
THE PROPERTIES AND THE NATURE OF LIGHT 657

The same claim can be made with regard to Newton’s theory of optical
phenomena. In the same letter to Pardies Newton writes ‘‘Hence it has been
here thought necessary to lay aside all [causal] hypotheses’’, and in the
Opticks, Newton writes that he proves the properties of light ‘‘without
determining what light is, or by what kind of force it is refracted’’ (Newton
1952, pp. 81–82). Newton wants to avoid any uncertain causal explanation of
the optical properties of the light rays, and tries to establish these properties
experimentaly, ‘‘to deduce them from experiments’’. These properties, fur-
thermore, must be established independently of any causal presuppositions,
and this is why Newton insists in his letter to Pardies that he lays aside all
causal speculations.
Newton confirms his firm distinction between the causes of the phenomena
and the properties of these phenomena. The properties of light include the laws
of reflection and refraction, and the analysis of white light; the causal
hypotheses, or explanations consist of accounts of the nature of light, whether,
for instance, the light consists of waves or small particles, and the nature of
colours. As far as the causal hypotheses are concerned, not only does Newton
not make any claims, but also repeatedly rejects Pardies’ and Hooke’s claims,
among others, that his [Newton’s] theory presupposes the corpuscular nature
of light. Only in his Queries, did Newton indulge in propounding his own
viewpoints regarding the nature of light and colours, and, even in that case, he
was very careful to point out immediately that these ideas are speculative
hypotheses for further research and not proven propositions.
The correspondence of Newton is full with references on this distinction.
In the same letter to Pardies (Cohen 1958, p. 106), Newton writes ‘‘Conse-
quently it has become necessary to leave aside all the causal hypotheses.’’ In
Opticks he writes: ‘‘I will prove the properties of things without determining
what light is, or from which kind of force light is refracted.’’ Moreover he
believes that, in order for the experimental proofs of the properties to be clear
and indubitable, these proofs must not depend on causal hypotheses. For this
reason, Newton insists that in his proofs causal hypotheses have played no
role, and this is what we mean by stating that Newton’s model of the rays of
light was, in his eyes, independent of any causal assumptions regarding the
nature of light.
We said that Newton thought his proofs of refraction, reflection and the
rejection of the homogeneity of white light to be independent of any
assumptions regarding the nature of light. The decision allows him to claim
that he has proved some properties of light even though he cannot prove as
yet the nature of light. This way he can extricate himself from the fruitless
discussions concerning the nature of light, which, Newton firmly believes,
could be investigated upon only if one has proved independently the prop-
erties of light. This conforms to his conception of analysis, the proper sci-
entific method, found in the Opticks (1952, pp. 404–405): ‘‘Analysis consists
658 ATHANASIOS RAFTOPOULOS ET AL.

in making experiments and observations and drawing general conclusions

from them by induction, and admitting of no objections against the con-
clusions, but such as are taken from experiments, or other certain truths.’’
The same conception of scientific inquiry is also found in a draft of an
intended preface for the 1704 Opticks
The method of resolution consists in trying experiments and considering all the
phenomena of nature relating to the subject at hand (and drawing conclusions from
them) and examining the truth of those conclusions by new experiments and drawing
new conclusions (if it may be) from those experiments and so proceeding alternately
from experiments to conclusions and from conclusions to experiments untill you come to
the general properties of the things (ADD. 3970. 3. Folio 480v, quoted by McGuire 1970,
p. 185).

According to this methodological principle, one should prove first indepen-

dently, lest circularity endangers the whole argument, the properties of things
and then on the basis of these properties to inquire as to the nature, or
general properties, of things. This is exactly what he recommends to his letter
to Pardies that we quoted above. Another advantage of his method is that it
allows him to reject any critique of his theory of white light (that it consists of
rays with different degrees of refrangibility and thus is not homogenous) that
emanates from the wave theory of light; only experimental arguments is he
willing to accept, that is criticisms based on other experimental results.
The reader should not hasten to infer from these that Newton did not use
causal hypotheses in seeking the properties of light. On the contrary, a
careful analysis of his writings shows that his conception of the particle
nature of light guided all his research work. As Shapiro (1993, pp. 85, 172,
175, 176, 178) argues, the various causal hypotheses regarding the nature of
light, and especially Newton’s conception of light as consisting of particles
that cause vibrations in the medium in which they are propagated (the ether),
play an essential role in Newton’s process of discovery of the properties of
light. However, whenever Newton set out to present his findings he tried to
eliminate all traces of the speculative hypotheses and lay forth only what, he
believed, could be proved by experiment, referring to his arguments as
‘‘experimental proofs’’. Even in the case of the interference fringes, Newton
manages to differentiate the properties of periodicity from the hypothetical
nature of the vibrating medium. The reason Newton attempts this suggests
itself. He believes that his experiments definitely prove certain properties of
light without depending, in the course of the experimental proof, on any
assumptions regarding the nature of light. The fact that his investigation was
initially guided by such assumptions does not imply that his proofs do in any
way depend on these assumptions, which thus, functioned merely as heuristic
means.
It would take us far afield to address properly the issue of whether
Newton’s ontological commitments were essential to his theory of the
THE PROPERTIES AND THE NATURE OF LIGHT 659

properties of light,1 or whether, even if they were mere heuristic aids,

would this justify his claim that his theory is theory neutral, that is,
independent of any considerations pertaining to the nature of light.
Briefly, one can note the following: in his first optical paper (Cohen 1958,
pp. 47–78), and in his correspondence with Hooke (Cohen 1958, p. 125),
Newton goes into great length to reject the theory that light is a wave
propagated in a medium (Raftopoulos 1999). Furthermore, when in the
Opticks Newton expands his model of light rays to explain other phe-
nomena of light, such as the fringes of interference, the rays of light
become heavily loaded with particle properties; they become hard bodies
that have opposite sides, not to mention some peculiar properties like fits
of early reflection and transmission, passions, and paroxysms (Shapiro
1993). In view of this one could hardly claim that Newton’s theory is
either theory neutral or that it is compatible with all existing alternative
theories about the nature of light.
For this reason, Shapiro distinguishes between the method used by
Newton in reporting and proving his results and the actual method employed
in the process of discovery of these results. Similarly, Nickles (1988, p. 35)
argues that Newton confounds the ‘‘historical mode of generation’’ of a
theory with the ‘‘logical generability or derivability’’ of this theory, which
means that the order of the arguments and experiments presented is not the
historical but the logical order which renders the arguments clearer, stronger
and less ambiguous: Newton offers a methodological reconstruction of his
actual research in the form of a linear and retrospective account of his ori-
ginal reasoning, and his ‘‘primary concern is to make the evidential argument
conform to the methodological canons of a particular experimental dis-
course’’ (Gooding 1990, p. 6). It follows that Newton’s main concern is not to
present an accurate picture of the process of formylation of his theory, but to
convince his readers of its truth.
In his correspondence with Pardies and Lucas, Newton gives a lucid ac-
count of the role of experiments, and of the way they function. On 21 May
1672, Pardies sent his second letter to Newton, raising the following objection:
But since I now see that it was in that case that the greater breadth of the colours was
observed, or that head I find no further difficulty. I say on that head; for the greater
length of the image may be otherwise accounted for, than by the different refrangibility
of the rays. For according to that hypothesis, which is explained at large by Grimaldi,
and in which it is supposed that light is a certain substance very rapidly moved, there
may take place some diffusion of the rays of light after their passage and decussation in
the hole (Cohen 1958, p. 104).

Newton’s answer came in the same year:

Hence it has been here thought necessary to lay aside all hypotheses . . . that the force of
the objection should be abstractly considered, and receive a more full and general
answer. By light therefore I understand, any being or power of being . . . which
660 ATHANASIOS RAFTOPOULOS ET AL.

proceeding directly from a lucid body, is apt to excite vision. And by the rays of light I
understand its least or indefinitely small parts, which are independent of each other . . .
This being premised, the whole force of the objection will lie in this, that colours may be
lengthened out by some certain diffusion of light beyond the hole, which does not arise
from the unequal refraction of the different rays, or of the independent parts of light.
And that the image is not otherwise lengthened, was shown in my letter in Numb. 80 of
the Transactions . . . (Cohen 1958, pp. 106–107, emphasis added).

Leaving aside the issue about hypotheses, let us concentrate on Newton’s

response to Pardies’ objection and try to reconstruct Newton’s argument.
Facing an objection as to the cause of refraction, he succinctly repeats the
proof expounded in his first optical paper of the fact that the rays of different
colours have different degrees of refrangibility. This proof consists of two
parts: (a) a set of ‘‘premises’’ concerning what Newton understands by ‘‘rays
of light’’, and (b) a series of experiments and the experimentum crucis.
The premises to which Newton refers in his second letter to Pardies are an
essential part of Newton’s experimental proofs. They include the fact that
light consists of small parts, the rays of light (which are the least parts of
light), that are independent of each other, and that the rays of light travel in
straight lines. Another assumption used by Newton is found in Book One,
Part I, of the Opticks (Newton 1952, p. 75). After experiment 15, and the
discussion in which Newton proves proposition VI, he concludes:
And this demonstration being general, without determining what light is, or by what kind
of force it is refracted, or assuming any thing farther than that the refracting body acts
upon the rays in lines perpendicular to its surface; I take it to be a very convincing
argument of the full truth of this proposition (Newton 1952, pp. 81–82, emphasis added).

Newton claims that in the experimental proofs of the properties of light, he

only uses three assumptions, or as he calls them ‘‘suppositions’’ (Newton
1952, p. 79), in the sense of premises to his proofs. First, that the rays of
light are transmitted in a straight line; second, that they consist of small
segments and third, that these segments are independent of each other. In
Opticks, Newton (1952, p. 75) adds one more, namely that the refracting
body acts upon the rays in lines perpendicular to its surface. He insists that
his proofs depend only on these premises and not on any theory of the
nature of light: ‘‘These proofs are general, and are not based on what light
is or on the determination of the type of force that causes refraction.’’
From this, one can deduce that Newton considers these assumptions to be
independent of the nature of light and compatible with any theory of the
nature of light. Also, these independent premises constitute constraints for
every suggested theory, in the sense that they have to be satisfied by the
theory.
But what are the arguments that Newton uses to support the correctness of
the premises? He knows that the validity of the proofs depends on the truth
value of these premises, as the former presuppose the latter. The texts of
THE PROPERTIES AND THE NATURE OF LIGHT 661

Newton show that he considers these assumptions almost obvious. In his

letter to Pardies, he writes that since some segments of light can be reflected or
refracted without affecting the rest, then the rays are independent of each
other. Nowhere does he attempt to establish the linear transmission of light.
The linear transmission of light was an inextricable and universally accepted
part of the notions of light in that period. And no one would conceive of
doubting the correctness of Newton’s proofs on the base of rejecting the linear
propagation of light. These premises are so obvious in light of our experiences
with the phenomena of light that they do not require further evidence. In fact,
one might argue that Newton considers them as phenomena. A definition of
‘‘phenomenon’’ is found in the prologue that he had been planning to include
in the second edition of Principia. ‘‘Phenomenon is whatever is observed or
detected by our senses, either the external or the internal’’ (McGuire 1966, pp.
238–239). Thus, Newton thinks that there is nothing hypothetical about the
epistemological status of the premises; in this sense, the fact that the proof
presupposes them does not undermine its validity. Be that as it may, the fact
that Newton considers them phenomena, something like Cartesian self-evi-
dent truths, does not amount to a proof of the propositions, which as such
remain ‘‘hypotheses’’ in any sense of the word.
The hypotheses on which Newton’s proofs are based and the proof itself,
suggest the geometric or diagrammatic (Rutherford 2000, p. 266) model of
light and they remind us of Kepler’s understanding of light. The light is a set of
rays that are represented by straight lines with an arrow on one end so that the
direction of transmission is determined. A set of rays constitutes a beam of
light. Light is emitted from a source and propagates in space along straight
lines of emission, which are the rays of light. One immediately sees that the
light as conceived here (let us call it Newton’s early model of light) has none of
the particle-like properties that Newton will endow it later on in the course of
expanding the initial model in order to explain more and more phenomena.
It is immediately apparent why Newton considers this description to be
independent of whatever theory for the nature of light and why he insists that
any theory of light should be able to account for these phenomena, that is,
indisputable propositions. By adopting this model, Newton avoids to engage
in the dispute on the nature of light and constructs proofs concerning the
properties of light that will be universally accepted. Finally, he gives us a set
of phenomena and their properties that every theory concerning the nature of
light must satisfy, as well as a solid base upon which a scientific study of the
nature of light can rely. Most importantly, the geometrical model can be
presented as such in the classroom, since it can be reconciled with either the
wave or the particle model. If light is a wave, then the ray represents the
direction of movement of the wavefront and is orthogonal to the tangent of
the waveline. If light consists of particles, then the ray represents the course
of the particles when these are emitted from a light source.
662 ATHANASIOS RAFTOPOULOS ET AL.

In the following section we examine the conceptions of pupils in elementary

and secondary school (10–14-year-olds) before and after introductory courses
in geometrical optics. Our aim is to rehearse those preinstruction conceptions
and see if they conform with the basic tenets of ‘‘the light as a set of rays’’ early
model of Newton’s (and Kepler’s), assess the effectiveness of courses on
geometrical optics, and trace any eventual ‘‘misconceptions’’ and their roots.

4. Using the Geometrical Model to Structure the Curriculum in Optics

The study of the historical development of the phenomenon of light can be a
useful didactic tool for two reasons, one methodological, the other scientific.
First, for teaching the nature of models and science, one can take advantage
of the parallel existence of two competitive models. This can help students
understand the nature and role of a scientific model is, how it is used and
when it is expanded too much (Gilbert & Boulter 2000). Furthermore, this
fact emphasises that a model cannot represent entirely a natural phenome-
non, but it only represents a part of it, and that a model or scientific
knowledge is not certain or invariable. Finally, the development of students’
ideas of a phenomenon is, in some cases, similar to the development of the
scientific models or knowledge. Second, the diagrammatic or geometrical
model of light, which is neutral as to the nature of light, can be used to
structure the sequence of teaching and learning activities in a beneficial way
by scaffolding it in a way that conforms with the cognitive profile of students.

4.1. STUDENTS’ CONCEPTIONS OF LIGHT

We will start by reviewing students’ conceptions regarding the geometrical

model of light. Research by Guesne (1985) showed that students have two
different views about the nature of light. Most students at the age of 10–
11 years old identify light as its source, its results or its condition. From 12 to
14 year old students recognise light as a separate entity in space, which exists
between the source of light and the result of illumination. Regarding the
propagation of light, Driver et al. (1985) argue that students are able to
represent light using rectilinear rays, even when they don’t know that light
travels along these rays. Most students, in order to represent light, usually
use lines (for example when they want to represent the sun, they make a circle
with small lines around emanating from it). Moreover, many students can
show the correct arrangement of the light source, an object and the shadow
of the object, something that indicates that they understand that light
propagates along rectilinear lines. Finally, many students think that straight
rectilinear lines are horizontal.
Thiberghien et al. (1980) interviewed students aged 10–11 and 13–
14 years old in order to record their ideas about reflection of light in plane
THE PROPERTIES AND THE NATURE OF LIGHT 663

mirrors. Younger students did not express any ideas about the phenome-
non, because they do not identify light as an entity that propagates in
space. The majority of the elder students mentioned that the mirror reflects
the light that a lantern is sending. When the lantern sent light onto a piece
of paper, students said that the light leaves the lantern and stays on the
paper. Thus, these students conceive of light as something that propagates
in space.
Andersson and Karrqvist (1983) working with Swedish pupils aged 12–
15 years found that the key idea of optics, that light is something physical
that exists in space and propagates in space and time, had been grasped only
by the 30% of the students. This shows that the teaching of geometrical
optics in the secondary school is not effective and that any attempt to teach
optics at a higher level may be compared to an attempt ‘‘to build a house
without laying a proper foundation’’ (Andersson & Karrqvist 1983, 398). To
implication is that, to lay a solid foundation, the students must grasp the key
idea of optics.
Working on the same theme Fetherstonhaugh and Treagust (1992) ob-
serve the same problems with students in grades 8–10 in Australia and sug-
gest a didactic intervention that guides students to change their intuitive
conceptions of light and adopt the key idea of optics. It is interesting to note
that the authors refer to Posner’s et al. (1982) four conditions for students to
experience conceptual change, which are, dissatisfaction with existing con-
ceptions and the new conception being intelligible, plausible and fruitful. It
would not be hard to trace many common themes between these conditions
and Lakatos’ (1973) conditions that a theory must fulfil in order to supersede
another theory, as we discussed in Section 1.
Langley et al. (1997) report similar results with older students and
claim that the formal model for geometrical optics ‘‘does not evolve
through chronological maturation by the refinement of adolescent presci-
entific notions;’’ school intervention must step in (Langley et al. 1997, p.
418). Prior to any instruction students have formed various models in
their effort to make sense of their experiences with the phenomena of light
and sight. These models are only partially compatible with the geometrical
model of light that students are expected to learn in introductory courses
in optics. To convince students to adopt the geometrical model and re-
place their intuitive models, one must persuade them by concrete examples
that the geometrical model is more useful in handling their experiences
with light.
Driver et al. (2000) refer to a research study by Anderson and Smith
(1984), in which 60% of a sample of 227 students aged 9–15 mentioned that
light bounces off mirrors but not off other objects. Only 20% of the sample
drew light that bounces off opaque objects, while only 2% of them mentioned
that light diffuses. In another study, students were asked to explain why a
664 ATHANASIOS RAFTOPOULOS ET AL.

pencil in a glass with water looks broken. The most usual answer was that the
water made the pencil look broken. Others mentioned that the water bends
the light rays or the shape of the glass makes the pencil look broken. These
suggest that the most common idea about light is that it consists of rays that
emerge from a source but they are not clear as to whether it propagates or it
is just there in space.
Studies by Colin and Viennot (2000) suggest that when university students
face problems whose solution demands the use of both the geometrical and
the wave model (problems involving light passing through narrow slits in
which case phenomena of diffraction and interference occur) many difficulties
arise, mainly because students fail to understand that the wave model must
be used and they try to solve the problems using only the geometrical model;
thus they fail to account for phenomena of interference.
For Wosilait et al. (1999), who also examined university students in
problems requiring the simultaneous employment of the geometrical and
the wave model (or as they call the latter ‘‘physical optics’’), it seems as
though students fail to consider whether geometrical or physical optics is
valid within a certain context and 45% of their subjects used a hybrid
model of both the ray and wave model. One way to interpret all these
studies with university students is that the geometrical model stands in the
way of applying correctly the wave model in problems whose solution re-
quire the usage of the latter.
To recapitulate, the aforementioned studies suggest that:
(1) Before instruction very few children conceive of light as something
physical that is emitted from a source, but is not identified with it, and
propagates in space. Thus these children do not grasp the concepts that
are necessary for understanding the geometrical model of light.
(2) Students between the ages of 10 and 14, with appropriate instruction, can
start building the geometrical conception of light as an entity consisting
of rays that travel in straight lines.
(3) Students’ intuitive models of light and their development reflect, to some
extent, the actual development of models of light from antiquity to
Kepler. (We have not discussed this issue in any length. For a detailed
discussion see Andersson and Karrqvist 1983, pp. 400–401.)
(4) The geometrical model interferes and hinders the correct usage of the
wave model of light, whenever the latter is required for the solution of a
problem.
We discuss now why it would be useful to explore the geometrical conception
of light, first to enhance learning of certain optical phenomena, and second to
base upon it the discussion of the two models pertaining to the nature of
light. In other words, we argue that despite the above, it is not deemed
appropriate to renege on the use of the geometrical model in optics
THE PROPERTIES AND THE NATURE OF LIGHT 665

education. In the concluding section we will comment upon ways of over-

coming the difficulties associated with the usage of the geometrical model of
light in an instructional setting.

4.2. THE GEOMETRICAL MODEL OF LIGHT EFFECTIVELY SCAFFOLDS THE

LEARNING ENVIRONMENT

Elman (1991) and Raftopoulos (1997) explored the insights connectionist

simulations provide us as to the way certain problems are solved in training
neural networks to cope with complex domains. The key to success lies in
effectively limiting the initial access of the network to the full body of
information, and in the gradual introduction of the system to the domain’s
full complexity. This ‘‘undersampling’’ of a complex domain gives the system
the opportunity to learn first the domain’s features and regularities, and
eventually build on them the more complex features which will allow it to
generalise. The ‘‘undersampling’’ may result either from the didactic inter-
vention and/or the resource limitations of the system.
This extends to children’s learning. Most developmental theories consider
development as a process in which an organism grows from an immature
(biological, behavioural, sensory, and cognitive) state to a mature one, the
latter being more perfect and ‘‘better,’’ in that the organism can perform
better and confront successfully problems that were previously unsolvable.
From this, it is only natural to infer that the early states of the organism (the
immature ones) are imperfect, and that, if it were possible for the organism to
start its life by having at its disposition the behavioural, biological and
cognitive arsenal of its mature self, then things would be eminently more
satisfactory; learning, for instance would have been much easier.
This ‘‘mainstream’’ conception implies that the earlier the organism ac-
quires its full capabilities, the better, and that its structure and function
during the early states are to be understood in terms of what they will develop
to become. The common thread in all learning is the effectiveness of
scaffolding the training environment in facilitating, or enabling learning. The
neural simulations suggest that successful learning requires that the learner
does not process the full complexity of the problem from the very beginning,
but faces instead, simpler versions of it. If this scaffolding does not occur,
then learning becomes problematic, the reason being that scaffolding results
in the simplification of the problem space, so that a heuristic search of it be
possible and effective. The learning system has the opportunity to learn first
the domain’s basic features and regularities. These basic regularities provide
the learning system with a code that will allow it to recode the information
pertaining to the complex problem.
Before we proceed, we should address a potential objection to the dis-
cussion in this section. One may wonder whether we need to go into such
666 ATHANASIOS RAFTOPOULOS ET AL.

length to justify a venerable and very old tradition in education, namely that
the instructional material should be gradually presented in order of
increasing complexity. After all, why try to prove arithmetic? Our response to
that is threefold: first, even old dogmas may prove ineffectual or based on
wrong suppositions regarding the nature of learning, the cognitive machinery
that learners bring to bear in learning, as well as the role of environment and
context. Thus, even dogmas need re-examining and validation, especially
when they are involved in discussions regarding the effectiveness of instruc-
tion in some domain or other. Second, and related to the first, education is
not a primary science, in the sense that it crucially derives knowledge from
other sciences to determine its policies and practices; thus, some of its
practices need validation from the epistemological and the cognitive per-
spective. Third, the history and philosophy of mathematics show that trying
to prove arithmetic (more precisely trying to prove that arithmetic is con-
sistent) led to wonderful and surprising results, such as Goedel and Church’s
theorems, to mention a few. To return home, suppose that the findings of the
cognitive sciences regarding the nature of concepts (such as that concepts are
not static structures that are stored in memory and retrieved for usage when
the need arises, but instead, dynamic constructs that are assembled on-line in
a way that depends crucially upon the context) become finally well en-
trenched in the cognitive and, later on, educational sciences. In that case, the
main tenets of instructional practises should undergo a thorough restruc-
turing.
The scaffolding can be effected by the instructor who structures the
learning material so that students interact with material that becomes pro-
gressively more complex. This way they do not face from the beginning the
full complexity of the domain they will have to master. The scaffolding can
also be effected even in spontaneous unsupervised learning by means of the
various resource limitations that characterise the cognitive, perceptual, and
behavioural mechanisms of children. The limitations allow students to ap-
proach the environment in a gradual and continuous way, by undersampling
it. Since, for instance, initially they cannot combine information from dif-
ferent sources, they first deal with the surface structure of the domain. Then,
having mastered logical multiplication (that is, the ability to combine such
information), they proceed to extract the embedded structure by combining
information and causal schemes. This way, children’s computational and
sensory systems are not overloaded with information they cannot process,
and they gradually build understanding of their environment, by representing
and mastering first its basic level features, and building upon them, at a later
phase, its more complex characteristics.
This conclusion conforms with Clark and Thorton’s (1997) account of
learning, in which problems can be divided into two categories: those whose
solution requires finding of the surface structure of the data, that is, of first
THE PROPERTIES AND THE NATURE OF LIGHT 667

order regularities, and those whose solution requires finding the deep
structure of the data, that is, the more abstract regularities. Clark and
Thorton call the former cases problems of type-1, and the latter, problems
of type-2.
Problems of type-1 can relatively easily be solved by means of an inductive
search of the relevant problem space that can extract the basic statistical
distributions in the data. This statistical search is the means par excellence
that we humans have to solve problems. Although learning assumes other
forms of a non-statistical nature, such as theory driven thought, all kinds of
empirical learning must be ultimately grounded in the inductive search of the
problem space. Although we often have to go beyond mere statistical regu-
larities, knowledge should be based firmly upon them. Statistical procedure
cannot be applied directly to type-2 problems. If ultimately the only means
we have for solving problems is the detection of statistical regularities, then
problems of type-2 could be solved if transformed to type-1 problems. This
can be achieved by recoding and reorganising the data so that they can
render, as it were, clear the underlying hidden structure. This reorganisation
can be initiated either by transferring knowledge from other domains (as in
analogical thought), or by means of knowledge discovered during the at-
tempts to solve the particular problem (discovery in situ).
The standard instructional practice in classroom consists, or at least used
to consist, of presenting students with the completed theory (for instance
Newtonian Dynamics), usually in the form of some basic equations, and then
ask students to use these equations to account for the various phenomena
within the theory’s scope. This makes students face the full complexity of the
domain under study, as it is described by the set of equations of the theory,
from the very beginning. Then students are asked to apply the equations in
special cases (to apply for instance the second law of Newton’s in the case of
a moving body or a pendulum).
On the contrary, the constructivist conception of learning, allows student
to start from simpler models of reality, which are elicited from the students
themselves, and gradually approach the full complexity of the domain under
study. Thus, constructivism could be construed as a special case of trans-
forming problems of type-2 to problems of type-1, in the sense that in order
for the child to uncover the hidden structure in a set of data, she must first
construct the required recoding schema, in the form of the simpler models of
reality, that will allow her access to the hidden structure. Usually, this re-
coding schema assumes the form of the first-order regularities of the relevant
domain. To understand the complex syntactical structure of sentences with
embedded clauses, for instance, the child must first differentiate the linguistic
data into categories such as ‘‘verb’’, ‘‘subject’’ etc. Then she recodes her
linguistic inputs in terms not of mere words but in terms of ‘‘verbs’’, ‘‘sub-
jects’’ and so forth.
668 ATHANASIOS RAFTOPOULOS ET AL.

In the case of magnetism, children must first learn that magnets are bodies
that can attract some objects but not others, that an object is categorised as a
magnet only if it has this property, that all other factors (such as shapes,
colours, etc) become irrelevant to the problem. Only then can they learn the
pattern of interaction between magnets, namely that magnets have two poles,
and that the same poles repel each other, whereas the opposite poles attract.
This is achieved because taking into account both attraction and repulsion
requires that children combine information from two different sources and
detect the pattern of interactions between magnets as determined by the
relative positions of the magnets. This is a type-2 problem that is difficult to
tackle. However, if the children were presented first with problems of mag-
netism involving only attraction, to attack the problem they would need to
avail themselves of only one source of information, namely the patterns of
attraction. This is type-1 problem.
Having clarified the role of attraction in defining magnets, the property to
attract other bodies becomes the recoding schema on the basis of which the
students will attack the more complex problem (more complex because
children must take into account two factors, attraction, and repulsion) of the
interaction between magnets. Once other factors have been eliminated and
the children have mastered the role of attraction in determining magnets,
children include in the picture information regarding mutual repulsion. In
other words, once ‘attraction’ has been dealt with and its role grasped,
‘repulsion’ becomes the centre of students’ attention and since it is the only
thing that matters, it becomes the only data source they have to consider and
examine. This is how the recoding scheme reduces problems of type-2 to
problems of type-1 and allows successful learning.
We think that the geometrical model of light can play a decisive role in
scaffolding the learning environment of optics in conformity with the pre-
ceding discussion, for some of the same reasons that led Newton himself to
adopt it and disregard any ‘‘hypotheses’’ regarding the nature of light. The
geometrical model can be employed in order to teach students some phe-
nomena of light, and more specifically those phenomena that Newton himself
thinks that can be examined without appealing to the nature of light, namely
reflection, refraction, the heterogeneity of white light, and the fact that dif-
ferent degrees of refrangibility correspond to different colours. Refraining
from involving the nature of light significantly simplifies the problem space,
since it eliminates a factor that otherwise should be taken into account, to wit
the wave- or particle-like properties of light. This enables the students to
work with a lower number of factors (the light rays, their directions and the
way they interact with objects), whose interrelations they must examine and
codify. In terms of models, this means that students will work with simpler
models of light than they would have, had they included in their models the
nature of light. This simplification will eventually allow them to capture the
THE PROPERTIES AND THE NATURE OF LIGHT 669

basic regularities of the domain under study, namely the laws of reflection,
refraction, etc.
Once students have mastered these basic regularities of light, they can
proceed to confront the problem of the nature of light; that is whether light is
a wave and/or a set of particles. The properties of light constitute a solid
springboard on which any further discussion will be based, since any model
of the nature of light will be examined with respect to whether it accounts for
those properties of light that have been independently established by means
of the diagrammatic theory of light. Thus, students can come to understand
that both the wave and the particle models of light can account for the
phenomena studied in geometrical optics.
Furthermore, one could show the limitations of the corpuscular theory of
light, for instance, by construing the rays of light as the paths travelled by the
light particles, that is, by extending the neutral light ray model to become a
simplified light-as-particles model. Then, one can show by using relatively
simple diffraction experiments with two slits (see Colin & Viennot 2000;
Wosilait et al. 1999) that the corpuscular model of light cannot explain the
image on the screen on which the light impinges after having passed through
the slits (fringes of interference). This may induce students to seek alternative
explanations and thus make the introduction of the wave model of light
acceptable as more plausible and useful. These proposals are far from
exhaustive of the potential of the geometrical model as the recoding scheme
that enhances the instruction of the physics of light, but they suggest some
applications. For instance the geometrical model of light lends itself to the
development of an account of the formation of shadows as well as the for-
mation of patterns of light on a screen after a light beam propagates through
a large slit of differing shapes. In addition, the geometrical model is very
valuable in developing two fundamental assumptions that are very basic to
continuing development of a student’s own understanding: the rectilinear
propagation of light and the idea that a large number of rays emanates from
every single point of an extended light source.
At this point, it would also be useful to discuss the constraints under
which the geometrical model can be used as a scaffolding for developing real
understanding in optics. It is here that Newton’s insistence on theoretical
neutrality becomes relevant. In traditional optics teaching there is an implicit
message that the geometrical model presupposes a particle nature for light. It
is this implicit message, and not the actual use of the geometrical model,
which confounds the teaching–learning process and leads to the phenomenon
of students encountering obstacles in the transition to physical optics. In
order to bypass this problem it is important to introduce explicit epistemo-
logical discourse early on in the teaching intervention: the issue of light as
particles or light as waves can be brought early into the open (preferably in a
historical context) not in order to settle the issue of the nature of light but to
670 ATHANASIOS RAFTOPOULOS ET AL.

introduce the relationship between theories and models, to highlight the

common situation of two or more models existing in parallel and to
emphasise that geometrical optics is introduced as a way of exploring how far
one can proceed with the study of the phenomena and their properties
without addressing the issue of the nature of light. This explicit epistemo-
logical argument immediately lifts the implicit link that students make be-
tween the geometrical model and the particle nature of light and leaves the
issue of the nature of light to be settled afterwards in a more productive
manner and with no intermediate epistemological obstacles.
This conforms to Newton’s demand that one should establish first the
phenomena and their properties that every theory concerning the nature of
light must satisfy, and which will form a solid base upon which a scientific
study of the nature of light can rely. These properties play the role of the
recoding scheme that structure the examination of the phenomena that
concern the nature of light.

5. Conclusion
We have elaborated on the crucial issue of effectively scaffolding the training
environment to maximise the results of instruction. We argued that successful
learning requires that the learner does not process the full complexity of the
problem from the very beginning, but faces instead, a simpler version of it. If
this scaffolding does not occur, learning becomes problematic, the reason
being that scaffolding results in the simplification of the problem space, so
that a heuristic search of it be possible and effective. The learning system has
the opportunity to learn first the domain’s basic features and regularities.
These basic regularities provide the learning system with a code that will
allow it to recode the information pertaining to the complex problem. This
recoding, as we have said, may lead to a successful reformulation, and
solution of the problem.
As was mentioned before, the majority of students before instruction, and
even after instruction, do not construe light as a physical entity that travels
in space and this seriously hinders the success of teaching the geometrical
model of light. However, the evidence suggests that there are appropriate
ways to introduce initially students to the key idea of light in a way that
allows them to solidify their conception of it as a physical something that
moves in space (Fetherstonhaugh & Treagust 1992; Goldberg & McDermott
1986, 1987; Langley et al. 1997). This can be utilised by teachers to teach the
phenomenon of light using the ray model, that is, to teach students the
geometrical model of light, especially in ages at which students are not at the
appropriate developmental level to think about the wave or the particle
model of the nature of light.
THE PROPERTIES AND THE NATURE OF LIGHT 671

The study of Newton’s development of ideas and gradual expansion of his

models in optics may show to students that there are limits as to what a given
model can explain. They can be shown why the geometrical model cannot
explain phenomena such as interference and diffraction, and, by elaborating
on its limitations, students may delineate the kinds of problems to which they
should use physical and not geometrical optics. This might stop the geo-
metrical model from interfering with physical optics and hindering students’
performance.
We use the knowledge acquired from studying Newton’s development of the
theory of light and the reasons that led him to avoid tackling, at the beginning of
his studies, for introducing the issue of the nature of light, to argue that some
among the reasons that led Newton to propose his ‘‘theory-neutral’’ model
render the geometrical model suitable for introducing students to optics, since
Newton’s neutral model of light allows the effective scaffolding of the learning
environment. As we have already seen, Newton believed that someone must
first prove the properties of light and then study the nature of light. This is how
Optics is taught in school and we recommend that it should remain thus. With
the use of the geometrical model of rays, one avoids the discussion about the
nature of light, which is very difficult for younger students, and it, also, allows
students to understand the properties of light and use them to construct later
the more complicated models of the nature of light.

Acknowledgements
We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting to us the need to discuss the
potential influence of cognitive science on the Eductional sciences.

Notes
1
For instance, in his introduction to Newton’s Opticks (1952, pp. xxiii–lxxiv), Whittaker
remarks that the proof of the law of refraction in Proposition Six of the first Book depends on
the assumption that the velocity of light is greater in a transparent medium than in vacuum,
which is a distinguishing trait of the corpuscular theory.

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