CEBU PORTLAND CEMENT COMPANY(petitioners/plaintiff)
00, it was given a period of 10 days from
vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF NAGA, CEBU, ET
AL(defendant)
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: DISTRAINT AND LEVY;
POWER OF MUNICIPAL TREASURER TO SEIZE AND
DISTRAINT PERSONAL PROPERTY FOR FAILURE TO
PAY TAX WITHIN THE TIME REQUIRED, INSTANT
CASE. — The clear and explicit language of the Revised
Administrative Code leaves no room for doubt. The
municipal treasurer "may seize and distraint any personal
property" of the individual or entity subject to tax upon
failure "to pay the same at the time required . . . ." There
was such a failure on the part of plaintiff-appellant to pay
the municipal tax at the time required. The power of the
municipal treasurer in accordance with the above provision
therefore came into play.
Where the law speaks in clear and categorical
language, there is no room for interpretation. There is
only room for application.
FACTS:
The Treasurer of the Mun. of Naga, Cebu collected from
Cebu P ortland Cement Company (CPCC) municipal
license tax imposed by the Amended Ordinance No. 21
on cement factories located in the same municipality.
The demands made by the Treasurer were not entirely
successful and resulted to the remedies provided under
Section 2304 of the Revised Administr ative Code. The
municipal Treasurer gave CPCC 10 days to settle the
account.
The Treasurer also notified the Plant Manager of CPCC
that he was distraining 100,000 bags of Apo cement in
satisfaction of their municipal license tax in the total
amount of Php 204,300.00. At first the Plant Manager
did not agree with the letter but acknowledged the
distraint in the afternoon of the same day he was
notified.
The Treasurer signed the receipt of the goods under the
authority of 2304 of the Revised Administrative Code &
shall sell the same at a public auction to the highest
bidder. The proceeds thereof shall be utilized in part of
the satisfaction of the municipal license tax &penalties
CPCC owes to the municipality of Naga, Cebu.
The Notice of Sale was posted by the Treasurer &
stated that the public sale shall be on July 27, 1962.
However, no sale was held on the date specified & in
the appealed decision, that there was a stipulation by
the parties where the auction took place on January 30,
1962. , the property seized and distrained or levied upon
from the Cebu Portland Cement Company in satisfaction
of the municipal license taxes and penalties in the
amount of P204,300.00, specifying that what was to be
sold was 100,000 bags of Apo cement
ISSUE: Whether or not the the distraint was valid and
Whether or not the auction sale was valid.
HELD:
1. On the validity of the distraint:
In the first two errors assigned, plaintiff-appellant submits
as illegal the distraint of 100,000 bags of cement made
on July 6, 1961. Its contention is premised on the fact
that in the letter of defendant-appellee dated June 26,
1961, requiring plaintiff- appellant to settle its account of
P204,300.
receipt within which it could pay, failure to do so being the
occasion for the distraint of its property. It is now alleged
that the 10-day period of grace was not allowed to lapse,
the distraint having taken place on July 6, 1961.
It suffices to answer such a contention by referring to the
explicit language of the law. According to the Revised
Administrative Code: "The remedy by distraint shall
proceed as follows: Upon the failure of the person
owing any municipal tax or revenue to pay the same,
at the time required, the municipal treasurer may
seize and distrain any personal property belonging to
such person or any property subject to the tax lien, in
sufficient quantity to satisfy the tax or charge in
question, together with any increment thereto
incident to delinquency, and the expenses of the
distraint."
The clear and explicit language of the law leaves no
room for doubt. The municipal treasurer "may seize and
distrain any personal property" of the individual or entity
subject to the tax upon failure "to pay the same, at the
time required ..." There was such a failure on the part of
plaintiff-appellant to pay the municipal tax at the time
required. The power of the municipal treasurer in
accordance with the above provision therefore came into
play.
Whatever might have been set forth in the letter of the
municipal treasurer could not change or amend the
law it has to be enforced as written. That was what the
lower court did. What was done then cannot be rightfully
looked upon as a failure to abide by what the statutory
provision requires. Time and time again, it has been
repeatedly declared by this Court that where the law
speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no
room for interpretation. There is only room for application.
That was what occurred in this case.
2. On the validity of the auction sale:
The validity of the auction sale held on January 30, 1962
is challenged in the next two errors assigned as allegedly
committed by the lower court. Plaintiff-appellant's
argument is predicated on the fact that it was not until
January 16, 1962 that it was notified that the public
auction sale was to take place on January 29, 1962. It is
its view that under the Revised Administrative Code8 the
sale of the distrained property cannot take place "less
than twenty days after notice to the owner or possessor
of the property [distrained] ... and the publication or
posting of such notice."
3
Why such a contention could not prosper is explained
clearly by the lower court in the appealed decision. Thus:
"With respect to the claim that the auction sale held on
January 30, 1962 pursuant to the distraint was null and
void for being contrary to law because not more than
twenty days have elapsed from the date of notice, it is
believed that the defendant Municipality of Naga and
Municipal Treasurer of Naga have substantially complied
with the requirements provided for by Section 2305 of
the Revised Administrative Code. From the time that the
plaintiff was first notified of the distraint on July 6, 1961
up to the date of the sale on January 30, 1962, certainly,
more than twenty days have elapsed. If the sale did not
take place, as advertised, on July 27, 1961, but only on
January 30, 1962, it was due to the requests for
deferment made by the plaintiff which unduly delayed
the proceedings for collection of the tax, and the said
taxpayer should not be allowed now to complain that the
required period has not yet elapsed when the intention of
the tax collector was already well-publicized for many
months."9 The reasonableness of the above observation
of the lower court cannot be disputed. Under the
circumstances, the allegation that there was no
observance of the twenty-day period hardly carries
conviction.
The point is further made that the auction sale took
place not on January 29, 1962, as stated in the notice of
sale, but on the next day, January 30, 1962. According
to plaintiff-appellant: "On this score alone, the sale ...,
was illegal as it was not made on the time stated in the
notice."
There is no basis to sustain such a plea as the finding of
the lower court is otherwise. Thus: "On January 16,
1962, the defendant Treasurer informed Garaygay that
he would cause the readvertisement for sale at public
auction of the 100,000 bags of Apo cement which were
under constructive distraint ... On January 19, 1962, the
UNITED CHRISTIAN MISSIONARY SOCIETY vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION and SOCIAL SECURITY
SYSTEM
FACTS:
The five petitioners originally filed on November 20, 1964
separate petitions with respondent Commission, contesting
the social security coverage of American missionaries who
perform religious missionary work in the Philippines under
specific employment contracts with petitioners. After several
hearings, however, petitioners commendably desisted from
further contesting said coverage, manifesting that they had
adopted a policy of cooperation with the Philippine authorities
in its program of social amelioration, with which they are in
complete accord.
They instead filed their consolidated amended petition dated
May 7, 1966, praying for condonation of assessed penalties
against them for delayed social security premium remittances
in the aggregate amount of P69,446.42 for the period from
September, 1958 to September, 1963.
In support of their request for condonation, petitioners alleged
that they had labored under the impression that as
international organizations, they were not subject to coverage
under the Philippine Social Security System, but upon advice
by certain Social Security System officials, they paid to the
System in October, 1963, the total amount of P81,341.80,
representing their back premiums for the period from
September, 1958 to September, 1963.
They further claimed that the penalties assessed against
them appear to be inequitable, citing several resolutions of
respondent Commission which in the past allegedly permitted
condonation of such penalties.
On May 25, 1966, respondent System filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that "the Social Security Commission
has no power or authority to condone penalties for late
premium remittance, to which petitioners filed their opposition
of June 15, 1966, and in turn, respondent filed its reply
thereto of June 22, 1966.
Respondent Commission set the Motion to Dismiss for
hearing and oral argument on July 20, 1966. At the hearing,
petitioners' counsel made no appearance but submitted their
Memorandum in lieu of oral argument. Upon petition of the
System's Counsel, the Commission gave the parties a further
period of fifteen days to submit their Memorandum
consolidating their arguments, after which the motion would
be deemed submitted for decision.
Petitioners stood on their original memorandum, and
respondent System filed its memorandum on August 4, 1966.
On September 22, 1966, respondent Commission issued its
Order dismissing the petition and petitioners are directed to
pay the respondent System, within thirty (30) days from
receipt of this Order, the amount of P69,446.42 representing
the penalties payable by them.
ISSUE: whether or not respondent Commission erred in ruling
that it has no authority under the Social Security Act to
condone the penalty prescribed by law for late premium
said defendant issued the corresponding notice of sale,
which fixed January 30, 1962, at 10:00 A.M., as the date
of sale, posting the said notice in public places and
delivering copies thereof to the interested parties in the
previous notice, ... Ultimately, the bidding was conducted
on that day, January 30, 1962, with the representatives
of the Provincial Auditor and Provincial Treasurer
present. Only two bidders submitted sealed bids. After
the bidding, the defendant-treasurer informed the plaintiff
that an award was given to the winning bidder, ..."
This being a direct appeal to us, plaintiff-appellant must be
deemed to have accepted as conclusive what the lower
court found as established by the evidence, only questions
of law being brought to us for review. It is the established
rule that when a party appeals directly to this Court, he is
deemed to have waived the right to dispute any finding of
fact made by the court below.
remittances.
HELD:
We find no error in the Commission's action.
1. The plain text and intent of the pertinent provisions of
the Social Security Act clearly rule out petitioners' posture that
the respondent Commission should assume, as against the
mandatory imposition of the 3% penalty per month for late
payment of premium remittances, the discretionary authority
of condoning, waiving or relinquishing such penalty.
The pertinent portion of Section 22 (a) of the Social Security
Act peremptorily provides that:
SEC 22. Remittance of premiums. — (a) The contributions
imposed in the preceding sections shall be remitted to the
System within the first s4even days of each calendar month
following the month for which they are applicable or within
such time as the Commission may prescribe. "Every
employer required to deduct and to remit such contribution
shall be liable for their payment and if any contribution is not
paid to the system, as herein prescribed, he shall pay besides
the contribution a penalty thereon of three per centum per
month from the date the contribution falls due until paid . . .
No discretion or alternative is granted respondent
Commission in the enforcement of the law's mandate that the
employer who
fails to comply with his legal obligation to remit the
premiums to the System within the prescribed period
shall pay a penalty of three 3% per month. The prescribed
penalty is evidently of a punitive character, provided by the
legislature to assure that employers do not take lightly the
State's exercise of the police power in the implementation of
the Republic's declared policy "to develop, establish gradually
and perfect a social security system which shall be suitable to
the needs of the people throughout the Philippines and (to)
provide protection to employers against the hazards of
disability, sickness, old age and death."
In this concept, good faith or bad faith is rendered irrelevant,
since the law makes no distinction between an employer who
professes good reasons for delaying the remittance of
premiums and another who deliberately disregards the legal
duty imposed upon him to make such remittance. From the
moment the remittance of premiums due is delayed, the
penalty immediately attaches to the delayed premium
payments by force of law.
2. Petitioners contend that in the exercise of the
respondent Commission's power of direction and control over
the system, as provided in Section 3 of the Act, it does
have the authority to condone the penalty for late
payment under Section 4 (1), whereby it is empowered to
"perform such other acts as it may deem appropriate for the
proper enforcement of this Act."
The law does not bear out this contention. Section 4 of the
Social Security Act precisely enumerates the powers of the
Commission. Nowhere from said powers of the Commission
may it be shown that the Commission is granted expressly or
by implication the authority to condone penalties imposed by
the Act.
3. Moreover, the funds contributed to the System by
compulsion of law have already been held by us to be "funds
belonging to the members which are merely held in trust by
the Government."
Being a mere trustee of the funds of the System which
actually belong to the members, respondent Commission
cannot legally perform any acts affecting the same, including
condonation of penalties, that would diminish the property
rights of the owners and beneficiaries of such funds without
an express or specific authority therefor.
4. Where the language of the law is clear and the
intent of the legislature is equally plain, there is no room
for interpretation and construction of the statute. The
Court is therefore bound to uphold respondent Commission's
refusal to arrogate unto itself the authority to condone
penalties for late payment of social security premiums, for
otherwise we would be sanctioning the Commission's reading
into the law discretionary powers that are not actually
provided therein, and hindering and defeating the plain
purpose and intent of the legislature.
QUIJANO vs. DBP
FACTS:
A petition for mandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary
inju nction was filed by petitioners-appellants (Gedeon G.
Quijano an d Eugenia T. Quijano) to compel respondent-
appellee (Develop ment Bank of the Philippines) to accept
said petitioners- appellants’ back pay certificate payment for
their loan from the s aid appellee Bank.
It further compelled the respondent-appellee to restrain the
ex- officio sheriff of the province of Misamis Occidental from
proceed ing with the scheduled foreclosure sale of the real
properties mor tgaged by appellant spouses to appellee
Bank.
That the petitioners filed an application for an urban estate
loan with the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC),
predecessor- in-interest of the herein respondent-bank, in the
amount of P19,5 00
That the petitioners’ urban real estate loan was approved per
RF C Board Resolution No. 2533 on April 30,1953
That the mortgage contract was executedby the petitioners in
fav o5r of the respondent-bank on March 23, 1954.
That the first release of P4,200 was made on April 29, 1954,
and the other releases were made subsequent thereafter
That on July 27, 1965, petitioner (as holder of
Acknowledgment No. 10181) wrote the respondent-bank in
Manila offering to pay i n the amount of P14,000 for his
outstanding obligation with the r espondent-bank
That the respondent-bank, thru its Ozamis Branch advised
the p etitioners of the non-acceptance of his offer on the
ground that th e loan was not incurred before or subsisting on
June 20, 1953 w hen Republic Act 897 was approved
ISSUE:
Whether or not the obligation of the petitioners was subsisting
at the time of the approval of Republic Act No. 897
HELD:
The Court ruled that the obligation was subsisting at the time
of t he approval of Republic Act No. 897 since it was availed
only wh en they executed the mortgage contract in March 23,
1954 and r eceived the installments thereafter.
RATIONALE:
The Court cited the pertinent portions of the controlling
provision s of the aforementioned Back Pay Law, as
amended by Republic Act No. 897 on June 20, 1953 as
follows:
Sec 2. The Treasurer of the Philippines shall, upon
application of all persons specified in section one hereof and
within one year fr om the approval of this Amendatory Act…
(1) obligations subsisti ng at the time of the approval of this
Amendatory Act for which th e applicant may directly be liable
to the government or to any of i ts branches or
instrumentalities, or the corporations owned or co ntrolled by
the Government, or to any citizen of the Philippines, o r to any
association or corporation organized under the laws of t he
Philippines, who may be willing to accept the same for such s
ettlement,…
It is clearly stated here that the provisions expressly require
the obligations – for which certificates of indebtedness may
be acce pted as payments of – must be subsisting at the time
of the appr oval of R.A. 897. Should back pay certificates be
offered in paym ent to a government-owned corporation of an
obligation which w as not subsisting at the time of the
enactment of said amendator y Act on June 20, 1953, the
corporation may not legally be comp elled to accept such
certificates.
Although the appellants’ application for an urban real estate
loan was approved by appellee bank on April 30, 1953, the
appellants only availed it when they executed the mortgage
contract only o n March 23, 1954.
Furthermore, the Court cited the case of Rodriquez vs DBP
wher ein Rodriguez obtained a loan from DBP which he
received the s um of P5000 on May 27, 1953 as first release,
and the subseque nt releases covering P9000 were all
availed of and received later than June 1953. When a
balance of about P10000 remained un paid, Rodriguez
offered to pay the said outstanding balance of th e loan with
his back pay certificate. The Bank then accepted only the
amount of P5000 representing the portion of loan released b
efore the passage of Republic Act No. 897. So, Rodriguez
institu ed an action of mandamus to compel the Bank to
accept his bac k pay certificate as payment for his whole
outstanding obligation. The Court then ruled in favor of the
Bank since “…the amounts r eleased in July 15, 1953 and
thereafter cannot be considered as obligations subsisting in
June 1953.”
In the appellants’ case, the approved loan was availed only
abou t nine (9) months after the enactment of Republic Act
897 and th e corresponding releases were received only after
the execution of the mortgage contract dated March 23, 1954.
Therefore, only after the corresponding amounts were
released to appellants aft er March 23, 1954 did such
obligation attach thereby affirming th
at the said loan was not subsisting at the time of the approval
of Republic Act 897 on June 20, 1953.
Despite the appeal by the appellants that a more liberal
construc tion of the law would enable “many crippled or
disabled veterans
, or their wives and orphans, or those who had in one way or
ano ther unselfishly sacrificed or contributed to the cause of
war” whi ch was the purpose of the said law, the Court ruled
that there is no room for interpretation or construction in the
clear and unamb iguous language of the above-quoted
provision of law. The Court ’s first and fundamental duty is the
application of law according t o its express terms,
interpretation being called for only when suc h literal
application is impossible. It must see to it that its mandat e is
obeyed. Therefore, even before the amendment of the Back
Pay Law, the said law still limited the applicability of the back
pay certificates to “obligations subsisting at the time of the
approval o f this Act” and therefore obligations contracted
after its enactmen t on June 18,1948 cannot be considered.
REPUBLIC FLOUR MILL v COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOM
FACTS:
Petitioner, Republic Flour Mills, Inc., is a domestic
corporation, primarily engaged in the manufacture of wheat
flour, and produces pollard (darak) and bran (ipa) in the
process of milling.
During the period from December, 1963 to July, 1964,
inclusive, petitioner exported Pollard and/or bran which was
loaded from lighters alongside vessels engaged in foreign
trade while anchored near the breakwater.
The respondent assessed the petitioner by way of wharfage
dues on the said exportations in the sum of P7,948.00, which
assessment was paid by petitioner under protest."
ISSUE: whether or not such collection of wharfage dues was
in accordance with law.
HELD: The main contention before respondent Court of
petitioner was "that inasmuch as no government or private
wharves or government facilities [were] utilized in exporting
the pollard and/or bran, the collection of wharfage dues is
contrary to law."
On the other hand, the stand of respondent Commissioner of
Customs was that petitioner was liable for wharfage dues
"upon receipt or discharge of the exported goods by a vessel
engaged in foreign trade regardless of the non-use of
government-owned or private wharves."
Hence, this petition for review. The sole error assigned by
petitioner is that it should not, under its construction of the
Act, be liable for wharfage dues on its exportation of bran and
pollard as they are not "products of the Philippines", coming
as they did from wheat grain which were imported from
abroad, and being "merely parts of the wheat grain milled by
Petitioner to produce flour which had become waste."
We find, to repeat, such contention unpersuasive and affirm
the decision of respondent Court of Tax Appeals.
1. The language of Section 2802 appears to be quite explicit:
"There shall be levied, collected and paid on all articles
imported or brought into the Philippines, and on products of
the Philippines ... exported from the Philippines, a charge of
two pesos per gross metric ton as a fee for wharfage "
One category refers to what is imported. The other mentions
products of the Philippines that are exported. Even without
undue scrutiny, it does appear quite obvious that as long as
the goods are produced in the country, they fall within the
terms of the above section. Petitioner appeared to have
entertained such a nation.
In its petition for review before respondent Court, it
categorically asserted: "Petitioner is primarily engaged in the
manufacture of flour from wheat grain. In the process of
milling the wheat grain into flour, petitioner also produces
'bran' and 'pollard' which it exports abroad."
It does take a certain amount of hair-splitting to exclude from
its operation what petitioner calls "waste" resulting from the
production of flour processed from the wheat grain in
petitioner's flour mills in the Philippines.
It is always timely to remember that, as stressed by Justice
Moreland: "The first and fundamental duty of courts, in our
judgment, is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation
come only after it has been demonstrated that application is
impossible or inadequate without them." Petitioner ought to
have been aware that deference to such a doctrine precludes
an affirmative response to its contention. The law is clear; it
must be obeyed. It is as simple, as that.
Then, again, there is the fundamental postulate in statutory
construction requiring fidelity to the legislative purpose. What
Congress intended is not to be frustrated. Its objective must
be carried out. Even if there be doubt as to the meaning of
the language employed, the interpretation should not be at
war with the end sought to be attained.
No undue reflection is needed to show that if through an
ingenious argument, the scope of a statute may be
contracted, the probability that other exceptions may be
thought of is not remote. If petitioner were to prevail,
subsequent pleas motivated by the same desire to be
excluded from the operation of the Tariff and Customs Code
would likewise be entitled to sympathetic consideration.
It is desirable then that the gates to such efforts at undue
restriction of the coverage of the Act be kept closed.
Otherwise, the end result would be not respect for, but
defiance of, a clear legislative mandate. That kind of
approach in statutory construction has never recommended
itself. It does not now.
National Federation of Labor (NFL) v. Eisma
GR L-61236, 31 January 1984 (127 SCRA 419)
En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur, 1 concur with comments, 1
took no part, 1on leave
Facts:
On 5 March 1982, the National Federation of Labor filed with
the Ministry of Labor and Employment (Labor Relations
Division, Zamboanga City), a petition for direct certification as
the sole exclusive collective bargaining representative of the
monthly paid employees at the Lumbayao manufacturing
plant of the Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc.
(Zambowood).On 17 April 1982, such employees charged the
firm before the same office for underpayment of monthly
living allowances. On 3 May 1982, the union issued a notice
of strike against the firm, alleging illegal termination of
Dionisio Estioca, president of the said local union; unfair labor
practice; nonpayment of living allowances; and “employment
of oppressive alien management personnel without proper
permit. The strike began on 23 May1982.
On 9 July 1982, Zambowood filed a complaint with the trial
court against the officers and members of the union, for
“damages for obstruction of private property with prayer for
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order.” The union
filed a motion for the dismissal and for the dissolution ofthe
restraining order, and opposition to the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction, contending that the incidents of
picketing are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter pursuant to Batas Pambansa227 (Labor Code, Article
217) and not to the Court of First Instance. The motion was
denied. Hence, the petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether construction of the law is required to determine
jurisdiction.
Held:
The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law.
Construction and interpretation come only after it has been
demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate
without them. Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial
proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which
organizes the court; and it is given only bylaw. Jurisdiction is
never presumed; it must be conferred by law in words that do
not admit of doubt. Since the jurisdiction of courts and judicial
tribunals is derived exclusively from the statutes of the forum,
the issue should be resolved on the basis of the law or statute
in force. Therefore, since (1) the original wording of Article
217 vested the labor arbiters with jurisdiction; since (2)
Presidential Decree 1691 reverted the jurisdiction with
respect to money claims of workers or claims for damages
arising from employer-employee relations to the labor arbiters
after Presidential Decree1367 transferred such jurisdiction to
the ordinary courts, and since (3)
Batas Pambansa 130 made no change with respect to the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters with
respect to money claims of workers or claims for damages
arising from employer-employee relations; Article 217 is to be
applied the way it is worded. The exclusive original
jurisdiction of a labor arbiter is therein provided for explicitly. It
means, it can only mean, that a court of first instance judge
then, a regional trial court judge now, certainly acts beyond
the scope of the authority conferred on him by law when he
entertained the suit for damages, arising from picketing that
accompanied a strike. The Supreme Court, thus, granted the
writ of certiorari, and nullified and set aside the 20 July 1982
order issued by the court a quo. It granted the writ of
prohibition, and enjoined the Judge of said court, or whoever
acts in his behalf in the RTC to which this case is assigned,
from taking any further action on the civil case (Civil Case 716
[2751]), except for the purpose of dismissing it. It also made
permanent the restraining order issued on 5 August 1982
People v. Mapa
GR L-22301, 30 August 1967 (20 SCRA 1164)En Banc,
Fernando (p): 9 concur
Facts:
Mario M. Mapa was charged for illegal possession of firearm
and ammunition in an information dated 14 August 1962 in
violation of Section878 of the Revise Administrative Code in
connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative
Code, as amended by CA 56 and as further amended by RA
4. Accused admits to possession of firearm on ground of
being a secret agent of Governor Feliciano Leviste of
Batangas. On 27November 1963, the lower court rendered a
decision convicting the accused of the crime and sentenced
him to imprisonment for one year and one day to two years.
As the appeal involves a question of law, it was elevated to
the Supreme Court.
patterned, to “children.” The children thus mentioned have a
clearly defined meaning in-law and do not include
grandchildren. Well known is the rule of statutory construction
to the effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on its face
need not be interpreted. The rule is that only statutes with an
ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subjects of
statutory construction. In the present case, Roderick and
Rommel Daoang, the grandchildren of Antero Agonoy and
Amanda Ramos-Agonoy, cannot assail the adoption of
Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos by the Agonoys. The
Supreme Court denied the petition, and affirmed the
judgment of the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte
(Special Proceedings 37), without pronouncement as to costs

Issue:
Whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified
as such of the governor is exempt from the requirement of
having a license of firearm

Held:
The law is explicit that it is unlawful for any person to
possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or
ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or
intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of
firearms, or ammunition except when such firearms are
inpossession of such public officials and public servants for
use in the performance of their official duties; as those
firearms and ammunitions which are regularly and lawfully
issued to officers, soldiers, sailors or marines, the Philippines
Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of
Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant
governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers,
municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and
jails. It is the first and fundamental duty of courts to apply the
law; Construction and interpretation come only after it has
been demonstrated that application is impossible or
inadequate without them. The law cannot be any clearer,
there being no provision made for a secret agent. Reliance in
the decision in People v. Macarandang is misplaced, and the
case no longer speaks with authority to the extent that the
present decision conflicts with. It may be note that in People
v. Macarandang, a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on
the assumption that the appointment of the accused as a
secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order
campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently put him within
the category of a ‘peace officer’ equivalent even to a member
of the municipal police expressly covered by section 879,
Thus, in the present case, therefore, the conviction must
stand. The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed judgment.

Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas

GR L-34568, 28 March 1988 (159 SCRA 369)Second
Division, Padilla (p): 4 concurring

Facts:
On 23 March 1971, spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy
filed a petition with the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos
Norte seeking the adoption of minors Quirino Bonilla and
Wilson Marcos. However, minors Roderick and Rommel
Daoang, assisted by their father and guardian adlitem, the
petitioners herein filed an opposition to the said adoption.
They contended that the spouses Antero and Amanda
Agonoy had a legitimate daughter named Estrella Agonoy,
oppositors mother, who died on 1 March1971, and therefore
said spouses were disqualified to adopt under Article335 of
the Civil Code, which provides that those who have
legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children or
children by legal fiction cannot adopt.

Issue:
Whether the spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos
are disqualified to adopt under paragraph 1 of Article 335 of
the Civil Code.

Held:
The words used in paragraph (1) of Article 335 of the Civil
Code, in enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are
clear and unambiguous. When the New Civil Code was
adopted, it changed the word “descendant ,”found in the
Spanish Civil Code to which the New Civil Code was