DAMODARAM SANJIVAYYA NATIONAL

LAW UNIVERSITY
VISAKHAPATNAM, ANDHRA PRADESH, INDIA

PROJECT TITLE
POSTPONEMENT OF PRIOR MORTGAGE

SUBJECT
TRANSFER OF PROPERTY

NAME OF THE FACULTY

PROF. P JOGI NAIDU

NAME OF THE STUDENT

MOHAMMED MINHAJ NAZEER
ROLL NO.:20LLB063
SEMESTER:4

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 ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I'd need to offer my genuine thanks to my instructor, Mr. Jogi Naidu, for furnishing me with the amazing
an open door to chip away at this fabulous undertaking about POSTPONEMENT OF PRIOR
MORTGAGEE. A one next to the other examination of old and new code.' I have made each endeavor to
introduce a reasonable image of the current subject. Besides, this topic permitted me to have an intensive
comprehension of the climate of the legitimate peculiarities that are connected with the gave subject.

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS..............................................................................................................4

ACKNOWLEDGMENT...............................................................................................................3

Abstract.............................................................................................Error! Bookmark not defined.

Research Methodology Aims and objective................................................................................6

Scope and limitation......................................................................................................................6

Review of Literature......................................................................................................................6

INTRODUCTION.........................................................................................................................1

Elements of Mortgage:..................................................................................................................8

DOCTRINE OF PRIORITYS......................................................................................................8

(I) MEANING....................................................................................................................................8

(II) PRINCIPLE..................................................................................................................................8

PRIORITY OF MORTGAGE......................................................................................................9

(III) Fraud...........................................................................................................................................10

(IV) Misrepresentation........................................................................................................................10

(V) Gross Negligence........................................................................................................................10

(VI) Notice..........................................................................................................................................11

Case laws.......................................................................................................................................11

(VII) Lloyds Bank, Ltd. vs P.E. Guzdar And Co,............................................................................11

a) Facts.........................................................................................................................................11

b) Issues.......................................................................................................................................12

c) Reasoning................................................................................................................................12

d) Judgement................................................................................................................................13

e) Rangasami Naiken v. Annamalai Mudali and others..............................................................13

f) Facts............................................................................................................................................13
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 g) Held.........................................................................................................................................14

(VIII) Indian Bank v M/S. Punjab National Bank.............................................................................14

h) Facts.........................................................................................................................................14

i) Issues...........................................................................................................................................15

j) Contention of Indian Bank..........................................................................................................15

k) Contention of Punjab Bank.....................................................................................................15

l) Observation and Reasoning........................................................................................................15

m) Held.........................................................................................................................................16

(IX) C.K. Samarapuri Chetty vs P. Thangavelu Chetty and Anr........................................................17

n) Facts.........................................................................................................................................17

o) Issue.........................................................................................................................................18

p) Reasoning................................................................................................................................18

q) Held.........................................................................................................................................19

CONCLUSION............................................................................................................................19

BIBILOGRAPHY........................................................................................................................20

r) Books referred.............................................................................................................................20

s) Web links....................................................................................................................................20

t) Online database...........................................................................................................................20

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 ABSTRACT

This paper discusses the doctrine of apriority. As the title itself suggests, the doctrine talks about
who would be given the priority over others or who would be preferred first. The courts have
face d and still face a lot of problems in determining as to who would be preferred first. The co
urts have faced and still face a lot of problems in determining as to whose rights are to be given
the priority over the other when parties before the court have conflicting interests. The doctrine
of Priority solves this problem faced by the courts to a large extent.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The methodology adopted for the study is doctrinaire. The approach is analytical and not empirical.
Elaborate explanations and discussions are provided relating to “POSTPONEMENT OF PRIOR
MORTGAGEE”.

OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

The objective of this is study to analyze, how doctrine of propriety w.r.t to section 78 of transfer
of property act, deal with the prisoner confined and detained in jail and their rights under the act.

SCOPE AND LIMITATION

The limitations of the study are,

 “Sample size of the study is too small as the scope of research is restricted only to Transfer of
property act.1872 in India”.
 “The scope of the research study is also very narrow that the sources from which information is
been collected are mostly from secondary sources due to time constraints”

REVIEW OF LITERATURE –

The “primary sources of the study include relevant original text of legislations and rules and Secondary
resources include text books of noted authors, journals, periodicals, articles and newspapers. The tertiary
sources in the form of websites have been browsed to get the information and literature on the topic of
the study at national level”

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1. Subject - Property, Title - Doctrine of Priority in Property Law Author - Mr. Karandeep Makkar,
Published by manupatra.com

The Article talks about the doctrine of priority in property law and the relevant provisions in the
Transfer of Property Act and also deals with the exceptions of the same.

INTRODUCTION

Mortgage is the one kind of transfer and it is the one kind of title transfer of specific immovable
property. Mortgage is a conveyance of title to property that is given as security for the payment of a debt
or the performance of a duty and that will become void upon payment or performance according to the
stipulated terms1 . In the words of Mahmood J. 2 , “mortgage as understood cannot be defined better than
by the definition of adopted by the Legislature in Sec. 58 of the Transfer of Property act.” According to
section 58(a) of the Transfer of Property Act 1882, “A mortgage is the transfer of an interest in specific
immoveable property for the purpose of securing the payment of money advanced or to be advanced by
way of loan, an existing or future debt, or the performance of an engagement which may give rise to a
pecuniary liability”3 .

1 Bouvier. (1914). Bouvier's Law Dictionary. Michigan: Franklin Classics

2 Gopal v. Parsotam, (1883) 5 All 121 (137) (FB). 3 Shukla, S. N. (2014)
3 Shukla, S. N. (2014). The Transfer of Property Act. Allahabad: Allahabad Law Agency 4 PLD 1958
(WP) Lah. 1023

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In the case of Salehon V. Muhammad4, it was held that A mortgage is a transfer of interest which comes
into existence, when the contract of mortgage is entered into and not necessarily when the consideration is
said.

DOCTRINE OF PRIORITYS.

Priority of rights created by transfer. —“Where a person purports to create by transfer at different
times rights in or over the same immoveable property, and such rights cannot all exist or be exercised to
their full extent together, each later created right shall, in the absence of a special contract or
reservation binding the earlier transferees, be subject to the rights previously created”.

(I) MEANING

The phrase "purports to create" implies that the rights created cannot coexist. The term "rights
over the same property" refers to the fact that the rights created for one of the two transferees do
not convey the complete interest. In this scenario, the doctrine of primacy cannot be applied
because one of the two transferees receives nothing, preventing the transferees from giving
equally. "Cannot exist together" means that the two objectives cannot be pursued in a mutually
beneficial manner without causing harm to one another.

(II)PRINCIPLE

It is a natural justice notion that if rights are formed in favor of two people at separate times, the one
who has the advantage in time should also have an advantage in law. This criterion, on the other hand,
only applies when the opposing equities are otherwise equal. The TP Act's Section 48 is based on the
key idea that

4
AIR 1925 Lah 9

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No one can express a better title than the one he currently holds. If a person has already made a transfer,
he cannot renege on his grant and deal with the property derived from the earlier transaction's rights. In its
wording, Section 48 is absolute, and it contains no safeguard or reservation for a subsequent transferee
who has no information of the prior transfer.

PRIORITY OF MORTGAGE

Section 78 and 79 deal with priority of mortgage. They deal with exceptions to the priority rule. Priority
arises when the same mortgaged property is subsequently mortgaged or transferred, affecting the earlier
mortgagee's interest. In such instances, in addition to the rights of the mortgagor and mortgagee, the
inter se rights and responsibilities of the mortgagees themselves are involved, and priority and
marshalling are examples of such rights. A property can be financed by two or more people. The
mortgagor may mortgage the property to one person for a specific amount of money, then mortgage it to
another person for a different loan. Section 78 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, is an exception to
the general rule of priority. It reads

78. Postponement of prior mortgagee.—“Where, through the fraud, misrepresentation or gross neglect
of prior mortgagee, another person has been induced to advance money on the security of the
mortgaged property, the prior mortgagee shall be postponed to the subsequent mortgagee”.

It says that where a subsequent mortgage is induced to give money to the mortgagor due to fraud,
misrepresentation or gross neglect of the mortgagee prior to him, the prior mortgagee shall be postponed
to the subsequent mortgagee i.e., the subsequent mortgagee will be repaid

Rights of Subsequent Mortgagees: A property may be mortgaged to two or more persons one after
another it largely depends on the value of property.

(I) FRAUD

The term ‘Fraud’ is defined under section 17 of Indian Contract Act,1872 and has the
same meaning in the Transfer of Property Act,1882 as well. It requires an intent to
deceive, or an intent to induce a contract.

b) Active concealment of a fact, with knowledge or belief of the fact. In order to affect
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 the mortgagee with the consequences of the fraud of his agent, it must be shown that the
relation existed at the time when the fraud was practiced, and that the fraud was
committed by him while acting within the scope of the authority.

MISREPRESENTATION

Misrepresentation, in addition to fraud, involves a shift in priorities. This term is defined in section 18 of
the Indian Contract Act. Making a statement knowing it is false but believing it to be true is a
misrepresentation, whereas making a statement knowing it is false and believing it to be true is fraud.

GROSS NEGLIGENCE
The Act does not define the term. It indicates that a prior mortgagee's failure to take reasonable
safeguards against a future mortgagee's fraud renders it unreasonable for the prior mortgagee to keep
his title. A simple act of neglect is unintentional and does not constitute a breach of the duty. Gross
neglect, on the other hand, is visible on the surface of the transaction. In Lloyds Bank Ltd. v P.E.
Guzdar and Co., for example, a person obtained a loan from a bank by depositing title deeds. After
persuading the bank, he reclaimed the title in order to sell the property and repay the bank's debt. The
previous mortgagee in this instance was committed gross negligence so subsequent mortgagee
will get priority over him.

NOTICE

Section, on the other hand, does not apply if the succeeding mortgagee was given notice of the preceding
mortgage. A notice of a past mortgage cannot be construed as an inducement for a future mortgagee to
advance funds. When a mortgagee learns that the mortgagor is dealing with the property, he does not have
to go out of his way to give notice of his security. However, if the mortgagee commits any constructive
fraud, whether direct or indirect, he is relegated to the next mortgagee.

CASE LAWS

(II)LLOYDS BANK, LTD. VS P.E. GUZDAR AND CO,

a) Facts
This is a case of conflicting equities. The defendant firm P.E. Guzdar & Co. mortgaged 42,
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Chowringhee Road, Calcutta, to the National Bank of India by delivery of the title deeds to secure an
overdraft in their current account with the bank, and afterwards, having regained possession of the title
deeds, mortgaged the property in like manner to Lloyds Bank to secure a loan of Rs. 5,00,000. This is a

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case of conflicting equities. The defendant firm P.E. Guzdar & Co. mortgaged 42, Chowringhee Road,
Calcutta, to the National Bank of India by delivery of the title deeds to secure an overdraft in their current
account with the bank, and afterwards, having regained possession of the title deeds, mortgaged the
property in like manner to Lloyds Bank to secure a loan of Rs. 5,00,000. It appears from the
evidence that Guzdar was the only representative of the firm who had any dealings personally with
either of the banks, and in the transaction relating to the mortgages in suit J.E. Guzdar alone was
interviewed by the officials of the banks Issue

b) Issues
whether in circumstances the mortgage to the defendant bank is to be postponed to that of the plaintiff
bank?

c) Reasoning
first the circumstances attending the creation of the mortgage in favor of Lloyds Bank, the plaintiff. It
is common ground that at all material times prior to 3rd July 1928, when P.E. Guzdar & Co., failed, the
defendant firm was regarded as a sound and reliable commercial undertaking, and that neither bank,
where the deeds were deposited, was under the impression that the firm would not be able to carry out
its obligations. It appears that since 1926 the firm had been customers of the plaintiff bank, and from
time to time had obtained loans from the bank, which had duly been repaid. In the early part of June
1928, J.E. Guzdar obtained an interview with Thomas, the manager of the bank, and informed him that
Guzdar & Co., would be requiring a temporary loan at the end of June for the purpose of floating a
limited company to acquire their aluminum business, and Thomas said that the bank would provide the
necessary accommodation if reasonable security was forthcoming. At that time the current account of
the firm was in debit to the extent of about Rs. 60,000. On 20th June, J.B. Guzdar called at the bank;
produced the title deeds of 42, Chowringhee Road; asked Thomas to satisfy himself that there were no
encumbrances upon the property, and said that he would return in a few days and formally deposit the
deeds.

Now, it is of importance to bear in mind that under Section 59, T.P. Act, a mortgage may be created by
delivering to the mortgagee the documents of title to immovable property in Calcutta and in certain other
districts. Such mortgages being created merely by depositing the title deeds ex necessitate rei would not
be registered, and Thomas stated that when J.E. Guzdar referred to "encumbrances upon the property"
he understood him to mean registered encumbrances, and not mortgages by way of the deposit of title
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deeds which in India are commonly, though loosely and inaccurately, called equitable mortgages. On
21st June the plaintiff bank instructed their solicitors, Morgan & Co., to have the registers searched for
encumbrances, and were informed, though not before 30th June that no encumbrances had been
registered. Meanwhile, on 26th June, J.E. Guzdar personally deposited the title deeds with the bank by
way of security for a loan of live lacs, and signed a promissory note for that amount in the name of the
firm. The loan was placed in deposit account, and against the five lakhs so deposited J.E. Guzdar
became entitled to overdraw on the firm's current account. On 27 June, J.E. Guzdar drew cheques
against the loan of five lacs, and the total sum due from the firm to the plaintiff bank in respect of the
loan and the current account when the present suit was filed was Rs. 4,65,747-3-

d) Judgement
It cannot be doubted, that the action of Allan in surrendering the deeds to J.E. Guzdar brings the present
case within the principle of this rule of equity. It is apparent from the evidence that Allan intended that
J.E. Guzdar should use the title deeds for the purpose of raising money by the sale of the property, and if
the sale was completed that J.E. Guzdar should not be under any obligation to restore the title deeds to
the defendant bank. To permit the defendant bank to retain priority for its mortgage, when it deliberately
had entrusted J.E. Guzdar with the indicia of title for the purpose of dealing with the property in order to
raise money to reduce the bank's overdraft and thereby had directly enabled Guzdar to obtain a mortgage
from the plaintiff bank upon the security of the property, would be against the plainest equity. For these
reasons, therefore, the mortgage of the defendant bank must be postponed to that of the plaintiff bank,
and there will be a declaration to that effect in favour of the plaintiff bank.

e) Rangasami Naiken v. Annamalai Mudali and others

f) Facts
A mortgaged property to B on 21st December 1896 and subsequently mortgaged the same property
to C on 20th January 1897. A willfully delayed the registration of the mortgage-deed to B, which was
finally registered on the 21st April 1897. The title deeds of the property were not given to B, but were
given, to C when the property was mortgaged to him. The mortgage was executed outside Madras and

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was in respect of property in the mofussil. In a suit by C to recover the amount due on his mortgage
deed, C claimed priority over B on the ground that B was guilty of gross negligence in not obtaining
possession of the title deeds:

g) Held:
That the failure on B's part to obtain the title-deeds from A did not, under the circumstances, amount to
gross negligence within the meaning of section 78 of the Transfer of Property Act and did not postpone
his mortgage to that of C.

That the delay in the registration being due to the default of A which B could not have anticipated, did
not make B's failure in obtaining the title-deeds amount to gross negligence.

What amounts to gross negligence must be determined according to the circumstances of each case; and
one of the circumstances to be taken into consideration in this country is that a universal system of
registration is established by law. As registration guts subsequent income branches in a position, with
the exercise of reasonable care, to find out prior encumbrances, failure on the part of the prior mortgagee
to get possession of the title-deeds must not be imputed to him as gross negligence.

The system of registration having caused mortgagees to attach little importance to the possession of
title-deeds. An existence of a practice by which the title-deeds are left with the mortgagor must also be
taken into consideration. Another fact to be considered is that the possession of title-deeds in the
Presidency towns where mortgages may be created by depositing them is of greater importance than in
the mofussil.

(III) INDIAN BANK V M/S. PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK5

h) Facts
This writ petition is a fight between two Nationalized Banks, namely Indian Bank and Punjab National
Bank, in the matter relating to applicability of Section 78 of the Transfer of Property Act. The secured
property in question was mortgaged by the undisputed owner with the Indian Bank on 10.5.1989, the
petitioner in the present writ petition, by depositing certified copies of the title deeds. The very same

5 WRIT PETITION NO.25502 OF 2007

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owner of the property subsequently created another equitable mortgage over the very same property by
depositing the original title deeds with Punjab National Bank, on 10.6.1989When the Punjab National
Bank took steps to put the property for sale, objection was raised by Indian Bank. The Debt Recovery
Officer faced with the conundrum directed that the matter should be placed before the Presiding Officer
of the Debt Recovery Tribunal.

i) Issues
whether the Indian Bank can be said to have acted in a grossly negligent manner by accepting creation
of equitable mortgage on the basis of certified copies of the original title deeds.

j) Contention of Indian Bank

Learned counsel appearing for the Indian Bank / appellant submitted that since creation of equitable
mortgage by deposit of certified copies of the documents of title is permissible, it cannot be said that
there was any negligence far less gross negligence on the part of the Indian Bank in creation of the
mortgage and, therefore, the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal is not sustainable.

k) Contention of Punjab Bank

Learned counsel appearing for Punjab National Bank, on the other hand, submitted that DRAT has
considered the relevant facts and circumstances and come to the proper conclusion by applying the
principle enshrined in Section 78 of the Transfer of Property Act and, therefore, there is no error of law
in such order, justifying interference by the High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution.

l) Observation and Reasoning

Punjab National Bank had not proved that Indian Bank was in gross neglect while creating equitable
mortgage and further Indian Bank had shown due diligence by obtaining sworn

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affidavit from the owner that the title deeds have been lost. Accordingly, it observed that from out of the
sale proceeds of the mortgaged property, the debt in favour of the Indian Bank has to be met and
thereafter the surplus can be applied towards the debt in favour of Punjab National Bank. This decision
of the DRT was the subject matter of challenge in Appeal No.8 of 2002 filed before the Debt Recovery
Appellate Tribunal (DRAT) by the Punjab National Bank.

The DRAT, while reversing the judgment of the DRT, observed that Indian Bank had not taken proper
care and caution while accepting the certified copies of the sale deed and the Will for creation of the
equitable mortgage. By applying the principle of Section 78 of the Transfer of Property Act, DRAT has
concluded that since Indian Bank was not diligent in getting proper documents from the borrower and
the original owner took advantage by producing the original deeds before Punjab National Bank for
obtaining subsequent loan by deposit of original title deeds, the Punjab National Bank was entitled to
have priority as contemplated in Section 78 of the Act.

Though initially there was some difference of opinion expressed by various High Courts in India
relating to validity of creation of equitable mortgage on deposit of certified copies of the original title
deeds, it can be now taken to be well settled that there is no legal embargo for creation of the equitable
mortgage by deposit of certified copies of original title deeds. At least this position appears to be well
accepted so far as Madras High Court is concerned as apparent from several decisions such

The only question, therefore, is notwithstanding the fact that a valid equitable mortgage had been
created in favour of Indian Bank in anterior point of time, whether it can be postponed in favour of the
subsequent mortgagee, namely, Punjab National Bank, by applying the principle of Section 78 of the
Act. In the present case, there is no question of fraud or misrepresentation. The only requirement is
whether it can be said that because of any gross neglect of the prior mortgagee, namely, the Indian Bank,
Punjab National Bank had been induced to advance money on the security of the very same mortgaged
property.

m) Held
In the present case, there is no dispute that the owner claims title by virtue of a sale deed of the year
1935 and a subsequent registered Will. However, at the time of creation of the equitable mortgage, dated

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0.5.1989, the Indian Bank does not appear to have acted in a manner expected of a man of ordinary
prudence. It is no doubt true that about two months after creation of such equitable mortgage, the Indian
Bank had obtained an affidavit from the original owner that the original title deeds were lost. This,
however, instead of fortifying the case of the Indian Bank on the question of negligence, in our opinion,
it would only be a circumstance to prove that at the time of creation of equitable mortgage, the Indian
Bank had not acted prudently as would have been expected from a nationalized bank.

(IV) C.K. SAMARAPURI CHETTY VS P. THANGAVELU CHETTY AND ANR6.

n) Facts

Defendant 1 admittedly was a person who became indebted some time prior to 1927 and this is
evidenced by the fact that there was a sum of Rs. 2,000 for principal and interest due to one Motichand:
vide Ex. Section It is stated that the amount due to Motichand was also secured by an equitable
mortgage evidenced It is the case of defendant 2 that in order to discharge this equitable mortgage,
defendant 1 borrowed from him a sum of Rs. 2,000 on 9th March 1927 on a promissory note bearing the
said date and as security for repayment thereof executed also an equitable mortgage evidenced by but he
was also desiring to take a registered simple mortgage after he got an encumbrance certificate, assuring
himself that there were no encumbrances on the property. This encumbrance certificate was obtained
and delivered on 11th May 1927 which disclosed no registered encumbrances on the property. On 12th
May 1927 a simple mortgage was executed in his favour for a sum of Rs. 2,500 part thereof being a sum
of Rs. 2,185-15-0 being the amount stated to be due in respect of the loan already advanced by him and
part thereof Rs. 314-0-2 advanced on the date of the mortgage. This mortgage was duly registered.

His case further is that on his mortgage he obtained a decree and brought the properties to sale, and at
the time when he brought the properties to sale in execution of his decree, he found that there was a
mortgage in favour of the plaintiff, but in the meanwhile the plaintiff has instituted this suit on his
mortgage.

6 AIR 1938 Mad 87

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 o) Issue

The question is what is the act or omission which can be attributed to the prior mortgagee which would
render his conduct to be grossly negligent?

p) Reasoning

In court opinion, 'gross neglect ‘in Section 78 means and involves failure on the part of the prior
mortgagee to take such reasonable precautions against the risk of a subsequent encumbrancer being
deceived as in the circumstances renders it unjust that the earlier mortgage should retain its priority.

In his mortgage dated 10th March 1927 the mortgagor assured him that there was no alienation in favour
of anybody. In token of that assurance there is the following recital "in support hereof I have delivered
four title deeds to you," and it is a fact that the title deeds were not delivered on that date. It is no doubt,
as pointed out in Rangaswami Naicken v. Annamalai Mudali (1908) 31 Mad 7 that the mere failure to
secure possession of the title deeds may not be such evidence of gross negligence as would defeat his
right to get the money secured on his mortgage in preference to other subsequent mortgagees, but the
matter does not rest on the mere failure to secure possession of the title deeds. He has delayed
registration of his document until June 1927. The case in 31 Mad 72 is again relied on by Mr. Somayya
for the position that even though he may have delayed registration, still the delay coupled with the fact
of his not securing the title deeds would not amount to gross negligence as laid down in that decision,
but as that decision itself points out, there must not have been any conduct on the part of the mortgagee
which would disentitle him to the relief which he can justly claim by reason of his being a prior
mortgagee, that is, he must not have been guilty of any act or conduct on his part which would have the
effect of inducing a subsequent mortgagee advance money on the faith that it was not encumbered. He
must not be himself a party to any act by which the mortgagor would be enabled to deal with the
property. Failure to secure the title deeds or the delay in registration are circumstances each standing by
itself may not be evidence of negligence, but both circumstances taken together, coupled with the other
conduct, may be evidence of gross negligence.

P a g e 17 | 21
 q) Held.

Held, in present case, there was no reason for disallowing priority under Section 78 in respect of entire
amount on facts as found - Defendant 2 was declared entitled to priority in respect of sum allowed by
first Court - Therefore, decree would be varied by allowing priority to Defendant 2 in respect of this
amount - In regard to question of costs, it was found that Defendant 2 was entirely to blame in not
specifically raising this plea in written statement and he left it for giving him relief on facts deposed to
by Plaintiff - Appeal dismissed. Under Section 78 in respect of the entire amount on the facts as found. I
therefore set aside his decree. Defendant 2 is hereby declared entitled to priority in respect of the sum of
Rupees 2,938-13-4 allowed by the first Court. Therefore, the decree of the learned District Judge will be
varied by allowing priority to defendant 2 in respect of this amount. In regard to the question of costs, I
think defendant 2 is entirely to blame in not specifically raising this plea in the written statement and he
left it to the Courts to give him the relief on the facts deposed to by the plaintiff. In the circumstances I
direct each party to bear his own costs throughout. The memorandum of objections is dismissed but
without costs.

CONCLUSION

A home loan is the exchange of an interest in a particular piece of land as security for the reimbursement
of an obligation. This obligation could emerge from cash previously progressed or to be progressed,
future obligation, or financial responsibility getting from the inability to play out any commitment. The
Hypotheca of Roman Law compares to a home loan. The overall standard was articulated in area 48.
Whoever is on top of things as far as time is on the ball as far as privileges, and that implies that who is on
top of things as far as time is on top of things regarding freedoms. To sum up, these segments address the
subject of what the situation with a moderate home loan would be, as well as the conditions under which
such a middle of the road home loan would outweigh further advances in regard of the first.

The following can be concluded from the project

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  Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1872 lays down the basic doctrine of priority in
property law.

However, there are a number of exceptions to this rule. Section 78 of the Transfer of Property Act is
one of the exceptions and says that where, through the fraud, misrepresentation or gross neglect of prior
mortgagee, another person has been induced to advance money on the security of the mortgaged
property, the prior mortgagee shall be postponed to the subsequent mortgagee.

BIBILOGRAPHY

r) Books referred –
1. Property Law by Dr. Poonam Pradhan

2. Textbook on the Transfer of Property Act by Avtar Singh

3. The Transfer of Property Act (Mulla) by Sir Dinshaw Fardunji Mulla

4. B.B. Mitra and Sengupta on Transfer of Property Act

s) Web links –
1. http://www.lexisnexis.com/

2. https://indiankanoon.org

3. http://heinonline.org/

4. http://www.manupatrafast.com/

5. http://www.legalemperors.com/

6. http://advocateselvakumar.com/

t) Online database
 Manupatra
 SCC online

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 Jstor
 Heinonline
 LegalserviceIndia.

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