Karl Jason Josol TORTS & DAMAGES CASE DIGESTS Pros.

Edmund Turqueza Northwestern University Laoag College of Law

JULIAN C. SINGSON and RAMONA DEL CASTILLO vs. BPI et al. (G.R. No. L-24837 June 27, 1968)

FACTS:
Julian Sinsgon and his wife, Ramona del Castillo were one of the defendants in the Civil
Case No. 23906 of the Court of First Instance of Manila which sentenced them together with
Celso Lobregat and Villa-Abrille & Co., to pay the sum of P105,539.56 to the plaintiff therein,
Philippine Milling Co. They, except for Villa-Abrille & Co, appealed thereafter from said judgment
which in due course a Writ of Garnishment was issued against the latter to their BPI account.
Coincidentally the Singsons also had an account with BPI. A clerk of said bank thereafter, upon
receiving the Writ of Garnishment, mistakenly had a forethought that basing upon the title of the
case the Singsons are also included on said garnishment. Hence, it eventually caused the BPI
account of the Singsons to be included on those accounts that were frozen by virtue of said
garnishment. Santiago Freixas, the President of BPI, after receipt of Singson’s letter informing
the former that his account is excluded from said garnishment, remedied the wrong and
thereafter caused said garnishment to be removed.
However, the Singsons commenced an action against the Bank and its president,
Santiago Freixas, for damages in consequence of said illegal freezing of plaintiffs' accounts.
The CFI of Manila, in turn, dismissed the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs cannot recover
from the defendants upon the basis of a quasi-delict, reasoning that because the relation
between the parties is contractual in nature and that because this case does not fall under
Article 2219 of our Civil Code, upon which plaintiffs rely; and because plaintiffs have not
established the amount of damages allegedly sustained by them. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the existence of a contractual relation between the parties bar recovery of
damages

RULING:

No. The existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a
tort by the one against the order and the consequent recovery of damages therefore. The High
Court reiterated the case in Air France vs. Carrascoso, involving an airplane passenger who,
despite his first-class ticket, had been illegally ousted from his first-class accommodation and
compelled to take a seat in the tourist compartment, was held entitled to recover damages from
the air-carrier, upon the ground of tort on the latter's part, for, although the relation between a
passenger and a carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature the act that breaks the contract
may also be a tort". The judgment appealed from is reversed holding defendant BPI to pay to
the plaintiffs nominal damages, and attorney's fees, apart from the costs.
Karl Jason Josol TORTS & DAMAGES CASE DIGESTS Pros. Edmund Turqueza Northwestern University Laoag College of Law

GUILLERMO AUSTRIA, vs. COURT OF APPEALS et al. (G.R. No. L-29640 June 10,1971)

FACTS:

In January of 1961, Maria G. Abad obtained from Guillermo Austria one (1) pendant with
diamonds valued at Php 4,500.00 to be sold on commission basis or to be returned on demand as
agreement. On the way home, on the suburbs of Manila, Maria Abad, while walking home, two men hit
her then snatched her purse containing said jewelry and cash and fled. Said incident became the subject
of a criminal case against certain persons (Criminal Case No. 10649, People vs. Rene Garcia, et al.).
Thus, Abad failed to return the jewelry or pay its value notwithstanding demands prompting Guillermo
Austria to file an action against Abad and her husband for recovery of the pendant or of its value, and
damages. In response, Abad raised the defense that the alleged robbery had extinguished their
obligation.
The Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment in favor of Guillmero holding that
defendants failed to prove the fact of robbery, or, if indeed it was committed, that defendant Maria Abad
was guilty of negligence when she went home without any companion, although it was already getting
dark and she was carrying a large amount of cash and valuables on the day in question, and such
negligence did not free her from liability for damages for the loss of the jewelry. On appeal, the CA
reversed the judgment of the lower court on the basis of the lack of credibility of the two defense
witnesses who testified on the occurrence of the robbery, and holding that the facts of robbery and
defendant Maria Abad's possession of the pendant on that unfortunate day have been duly established,
declared respondents not responsible for the loss of the jewelry on account of a fortuitous event. Hence,
this petition.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the CA erred in finding that there was robbery in said case thereby
extinguishing Abad’s liability
2. Whether or not Abad was guilty of negligence
3. Whether or not the recognition of the fact of robbery in the civil case prior to a
conviction being secured in the criminal action would prejudice the latter case

RULING:

1. No. To constitute a caso fortuito that would exempt a person from responsibility, it is
necessary that (1) the event must be independent of the human will (or rather, of the
debtor's or obligor's); (2) the occurrence must render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill
the obligation in a normal manner, and that (3) the obligor must be free of participation
in, or aggravation of, the injury to the creditor. The emphasis of the provision is on the
events, not on the agents or factors responsible for them. To avail of the exemption
granted in the law, it is not necessary that the persons responsible for the occurrence
should be found or punished; it would only be sufficient to establish that the
unforeseeable event, the robbery in this case, did take place without any concurrent fault
on the debtor's part, and this can be done by preponderance of evidence.

2. No. There is no negligence. The Court explained, “It is clear that under the
circumstances prevailing at present in the City of Manila and its suburbs, with their high
incidence of crimes against persons and property that renders travel after nightfall a
matter to be sedulously avoided without suitable precaution and protection, the conduct
of respondent Maria G. Abad, in returning alone to her house in the evening, carrying
jewelry of considerable value would be negligent per se and would not exempt her from
responsibility in the case of a robbery. We are not persuaded, however, that the same
rule should obtain ten years previously, in 1961, when the robbery in question did take
place, for at that time criminality had not by far reached the levels attained in the present
day.”
Karl Jason Josol TORTS & DAMAGES CASE DIGESTS Pros. Edmund Turqueza Northwestern University Laoag College of Law

3. No. It must be realized that a court finding that a robbery has happened would not
necessarily mean that those accused in the criminal action should be found guilty of the
crime; nor would a ruling that those actually accused did not commit the robbery be
inconsistent with a finding that a robbery did take place. The evidence to establish these
facts would not necessarily be the same.

BEATRIZ P. WASSMER vs. FRANCISCO X. VELEZ (GR-L-20089 December 26, 1964)

FACTS:
On August 23, 1954 Francisco Velez (defendant) and Beatriz Wassmer (plaintiff)
because of love with one another and in observance of their mutual promise of love applied for
a license to contract marriage and after which set their wedding date to be September 4, 1954.
Thus Wassmer made the necessary preparations for the wedding including making and sending
of wedding invitations, buying of wedding dress, matrimonial bed and other apparels, and other
wedding preparations like bridal shower and likewise, gifts were given. Unfortunately two days
before the said big day, Velez left a note to Wassmer informing her that due to his mother’s
opposition he has to postpone said wedding. The next day, the very day before the wedding,
Velez wired a telegram to Wassmer saying that all is well and that nothing has changed but
soon thereafter he was never heard of. Aggrieved, Wassmer sued Velez for damages and due
to non-response of the latter he was declared in default. Ater a series of efforts for an amicable
settlement Velez declared a year later that settlement was nil. For Velez and his counsel’s
failure to appear, the Court was forced to issue an order denying defendant Velez' aforesaid
petition. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong in this case

RULING:

This is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to
marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the
preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is
quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant
must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 which provides in part “any
person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.”

And under the law, any violation of Article 21 entitles the injured party to receive an award for
moral damages as properly awarded by the lower court in this case. Further, the award of
exemplary damages is also proper. Here, the circumstances of this case show that Velez, in
breaching his promise to Wassmer, acted in wanton, reckless, and oppressive manner – this
warrants the imposition of exemplary damages against him.
Karl Jason Josol TORTS & DAMAGES CASE DIGESTS Pros. Edmund Turqueza Northwestern University Laoag College of Law

MARIA TERESA Y. CUADRA, et al vs. ALFONSO MONFORT (G.R. No. L-24101 September
30, 1970)

FACTS:

On July 9, 1962, Maria Teresa Cuadra and Maria Teresa Monfort, were classmates and were
two of the five who were assigned by their teachers at Mabini Elementary School in Negros
Occidental to weed out the grass in their school premises. While weeding out, Monfort jokingly
informed Cuadra that she found an earthworm while throwing the plastic headband she found
and immediately, Cuadra turned in time that particles hit her eye which eventually got infected
and after 23-days of stay in the hospital after surgery, Cuadra’s right eye got blinded. This turn
of events forced the parents of Cuadra to institute a civil suit based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code
in behalf of their minor daughter against Alfonso Monfort, Maria Teresa Monfort's father ordering
said parents to pay P1,703.00 as actual damages; P20,000.00 as moral damages; and
P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus the costs of the suit.

ISSUE: Whether or not Monfort is liable under Article 2180.

RULING:

No. Article 2180 provides that the father, in case of his incapacity or death, the mother, is responsible for
the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. The basis of this vicarious, although
primary, liability is fault or negligence, which is presumed from that which accompanied the causative act
or omission. The presumption is merely prima facie and may therefore be rebutted. This is the clear and
logical inference that may be drawn from the last paragraph of Article 2180, which states “that the
responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.”

In the case at bar there is nothing from which it may be inferred that Alfonso Monfort could have
prevented the damage by the observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of
his parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it. On the contrary, his
child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as he had the right to expect
her to be, under the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused the injury
was concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual among children at play and which no parent,
however careful, would have any special reason to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal
any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the child’s character which would reflect unfavorably on
her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to her parents.

HEDY GAN y YU vs. CA (GR L-44264 September 19, 1988)

FACTS:

The accused herein Hedy Gan y YuIn was driving her Toyota car along North Bay Boulevard,
Tondo, Manila when suddenly a vehicle coming from the opposite direction tried to overtake the one in
front of it thereby encroaching the lane of the car driven by Gan. To avoid a collision Gan decided to
swerve to the right and as a consequence, hit an old man pedestrian who was about to cross the street,
pinning him against the rear of one of the parked vehicles. However, the old pedestrian was pronounced
dead on arrival at the hospital. Thereafter, Gan was convicted of Homicide thru reckless imprudence. On
appeal, CA modified the trial court's decision convicting Gan of Homicide thru simple imprudence.
Karl Jason Josol TORTS & DAMAGES CASE DIGESTS Pros. Edmund Turqueza Northwestern University Laoag College of Law

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in convicting petitioner Gan for Homicide thru Simple Imprudence

RULING:

Yes. The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury
or damage results to the person or property of another is this: Would a prudent man in the
position of the person to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a
reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes the duty on
the doer to take precaution against its mischievous results and the failure to do so constitutes
negligence. A corollary rule is what is known in the law as the emergency rule. "Under that rule,
one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to
consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been
a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own
negligence."

The course of action suggested by the appellate court would seem reasonable were it not for
the fact that such suggestion did not take into account the amount of time afforded petitioner to
react to the situation she was in. For it is undeniable that the suggested course of action
presupposes sufficient time for appellant to analyze the situation confronting her and to ponder
on which of the different courses of action would result in the least possible harm to herself and
to others.

LEONARDO PALAFOX, et. al vs. PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE et al.

(G.R. No. L-10659 Jan. 31, 1958)

FACTS:

Sabas Torralba was detailed as a Chauffeur at the Province of Ilocos Norte particularly
as a freight truck driver at the Office of the District Engineer where, at the time of accident in
September 30, 1948 he was working in the construction/maintenance of roads when he
accidentally ran over one Proceto Palafox causing his fatal death. Prosecuted for homicide
through reckless imprudence, Sabas Torralba pleaded guilty and was accordingly sentenced.
Subsequently, ​the heirs of Palafox filed a civil action against the employer, the Province of Ilocos
Norte, the District Engineer and likewise the Provincial Treasurer and the driver, Sabas Torralba.
However, Judge Fidel Villaneuva quashed the case against the defendants, except Sabas
Torralba.
The appellants invoke the doctrine of respondent superior and insist that the basis of
their indemnity is under Art. 1903 of the Civil Code providing as follows: “Art.. 1903. The
obligation imposed by the next preceding articles is enforceable not only for personal acts and
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Government is liable for the death of Palafox
Whether or not the doctrine of respondeat superior is applicable in this case
Karl Jason Josol TORTS & DAMAGES CASE DIGESTS Pros. Edmund Turqueza Northwestern University Laoag College of Law

RULING:

1. No. The Government cannot be held liable if the negligent employee was engaged in the
performance of governmental duties, as distinguished from corporate or proprietary or
business functions – the government is not liable. The construction or maintenance of
roads in which the truck and the driver worked at the time of the accident are admittedly
governmental activities. Wherefore, the death of Palafox - tragic and deplorable though it
may be – imposed on the province no duty to pay monetary compensation. The reason
for the exemption according to Mr. Justice Story is that the Government “does not
undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it
employs, since that would involve in all its operations in endless embarrassments,
difficulties and losses which would be subversive of the public interest.”

2. No. The Ruling in Mendoza v. De Leon (33 Phil. 508; 513-514) made it clear that the
doctrine of respondeat superior is only applicable where the government has entered
into particular contracts where its employees are deemed as “special agents'' to which
damages may be collected from it for the torts of its officers or agents within the scope of
their employment in precisely the same manner and to the same extent as those of
private corporations or individuals. In this instance, the employee-driver is not a special
agent but instead he is on normal duty as a driver.

ANDAMO vs. IAC et al. (GR 74761 November 6, 1990)

FACTS:
Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land
situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent,
Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation. Within the land of
respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were
constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a young man to
drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the
lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and
other improvements to destruction
In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action against Efren Musngi, Orlando
Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin, officers and directors of herein respondent corporation, for
destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code. Subsequently,
on February 22, 1983, petitioners filed another action against respondent corporation, this time
a civil case for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction before the
same court.
Respondent corporation filed its answer to the complaint and opposition to the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction. However, on April 26, 1984, the trial court, acting on
respondent corporation's motion to dismiss or suspend the civil action, issued an order
suspending further hearings in Civil Case No. TG-748 until after judgment in the related Criminal
Case No. TG-907-82.
Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate Court who eventually
promulgated a decision affirming the questioned order of the trial court. A motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by the Appellate Court
Karl Jason Josol TORTS & DAMAGES CASE DIGESTS Pros. Edmund Turqueza Northwestern University Laoag College of Law

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court and the appellate court erred in dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748
since it is predicated on a quasi-delict.

RULING:
No. A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one
under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a
quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of
the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of
cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by
the plaintiff. Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by
respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore,
an assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the
damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which
may be the basis for the recovery of damages.
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not
punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or
negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of
the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.
In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held that a quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and
individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime — a distinction exists
between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa
extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from
a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual
under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely
irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course, in the event of an acquittal where the court has
declared that the fact from which the civil action arose did not exist, in which case the extinction
of the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil liability

SABINA EXCONDE v. DELFIN CAPUNO [GR L-10134, Jun 29, 1957]

FACTS:

Dante Capuno, a 15 year old boy member of the Boy Scouts Organization and also a pupil at
Balintawak Elementary School was instructed by their School Supervisor in March 1949 to attend a boy
scout parade for Dr. Jose Rizal. Upon boarding the jeep he took control of the steering wheel while the
jeepney driver was on his left which, a few moments thereon he lost control of the jeep causing it to turn
turtle thereby killing two other students, Isidoro Caperina and Amado Ticzon. Sabina Exconde, Isidoro’s
mother, sued Dante Capuno over the death of her son. Pending the criminal action, the mother reserved
her right to file a separate civil action which she subsequently filed against Dante and his father, Delfin
Capuno. Defendants set up the defense that if any one should be held liable for the death of Isidoro
Caperifia, he is Dante Capuno and not his father Delfin because at the time of the accident, the former
was not under the control, supervision and custody of the latter. This defense was sustained by the lower
court and, as a consequence, it only convicted Dante Capuno to pay the damages claimed in the
complaint. From this decision, the plaintiff appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable, jointly and severally with
his son Dante, for damages resulting from the death of Isidoro Caperifla caused by the negligent act of
minor Dante Capuno.
Karl Jason Josol TORTS & DAMAGES CASE DIGESTS Pros. Edmund Turqueza Northwestern University Laoag College of Law

RULING: Yes. The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father, and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them, is
obvious. This is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which
imposes upon the parents the “duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating them
and instructing them in proportion to their means”, while, on the other hand, gives them the “right to
correct and punish them in moderation”. The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this
liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
damage which Delfin failed to prove.

On the other hand, the school is not liable. It is true that under the law, “teachers or directors of arts and
trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their
custody”, but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic
educational institution.

NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION (NIA), vs. IAC et al. (GR 73919 Sep-18-1992)

FACTS:

Private respondents herein Andres Ventura, Antonio Fajardo, Marcelo Fajardo, Alfonso
Ventura and Florentino Ventura are leasehold tenants of a parcel of land consisting of about five
(5) hectares of riceland situated at Sitio Dagat-dagatan, Sto. Rosario, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija.
Prior to the construction project of NIA’s irrigation canal in 1967, there was only one drainage
gate, that is, the Tombo check gate which regulates supply of water to the landholdings of
herein respondents. Until the canal of the NIA was built in 1967, it has since caused inundation
on the surrounding properties of the farmers in the area attributed to the delay of almost 7 years
in installing the safety measures such as check gates, drainage, ditches and paddy drains and
has caused substantial damage to the annual harvest of the respondents amounting to 30
cavans per hectare.
To this effect the private respondents, filed a complaint on February 13, 1975 for the
abatement of nuisance with damages against petitioners NIA and/or the Administrator of the
National Irrigation Administration alleging that the two (2) outlets constructed on both sides of
the irrigation canal were not provided with gates to regulate the flow of water from the canal to
their landholdings which resulted to the inundation of said landholdings causing the former to
sustain damages consisting in the destruction of the planted palay crops and also prevented
them from planting on their landholdings
After trial on the merits, a decision was rendered by the court below finding the complaint
meritorious and thus judgment was entered: 1) Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs the
sum of P35,000.00 representing damages; 2) Ordering defendant to pay P5,000.00 for
attorney's fees and the cost of the suit. Not satisfied with said decision, petitioners elevated the
matter to the appellate court which affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, this
petition

ISSUE: Whether or not the ​appellate court erred in affirming the decision of the trial court with
petitioners reasoning out that NIA is immune from suit for quasi-delict or tort

RULING:

No. Petitioners are in error. As correctly ruled by the court below, the NIA "is not immune
from suit, by virtue of the express provision of P.D. No. 552. A reading of Section 2,
sub-paragraph (f) of P.D. No. 552,[5] amending Republic Act No. 3601 shows the granting to
NIA the power "to exercise all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as
they are not... inconsistent with the provisions of this Act." Paragraph 4 of said law also provide
Karl Jason Josol TORTS & DAMAGES CASE DIGESTS Pros. Edmund Turqueza Northwestern University Laoag College of Law

that petitioner NIA may sue and be sued in court for all kind of actions, whether contractual or
quasi-contractual, in the recovery of compensation and damages as in the instant case
considering... that private respondents' action is based on damages caused by the negligence
of petitioners. This Court had previously held that "the National Irrigation Administration is a
government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government. It is
not a mere agency of the government but a corporate body performing proprietary functions" as
it has its own assets and liabilities as well as its own corporate powers to be exercised by a
Board of Directors thus, petitioners are liable for the damages caused by their negligent act.
With regard to petitioners' contention that the respondent appellate court erred in
awarding damages to private respondents, the Court find said court's decision in accordance
with the evidence and the law. As correctly held by the appellate court: "It has been established
that the plaintiffs' landholdings were actually inundated. The testimonies by all the plaintiffs with
respect to the amount of the loss they suffered were not impugned by any contradictory
evidence of the defendant. To Our mind, these... testimonies are sufficient proof to make the
grant of damages valid and proper. Besides, the amount awarded by the lower court is but just
and reasonable considering the circumstances of the case.

EMILIANO R. DE LOS SANTOS et al. vs. CA et al. (GR L-71998-99 June 2, 1993)

FACTS:

Engr. Lorenzo Cadiente, a private contractor and likewise the Provincial Engineer of
Rizal was complained of in October 1981 for having constructed a road 9 meters wide and
128.70 meters in length thereby occupying a total area of 1,165 square meters out of the 19,061
square meters parcel of land that were co-owned by herein petitioners in Barrio Wawa,
Binangonan, Rizal without their knowledge or consent. They added that aside from the road, an
artificial creek 23.20 meters wide and 128.69 meters long was also constructed, occupying an
area of 2,906 sq meters of their property. It was constructed in a zigzag manner with the creek
meandering through their property. This prompted the petitioners to file Civil Cases Nos. 46800
and 46801 on July 13, 1982 by petitioners who are co-owners of the subject property in
question which were later consolidated.
Thereafter, the Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss both cases on several grounds,
citing that both cases were in reality, suits against the State which could not be maintained
without its consent. The lower court dismissed the petition prompting said petitioners to elevate
said case to the Supreme Court on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the damages may be awarded to petitioners by reason on the unlawful
taking of their property without consent

RULING:

Yes. The Court reiterated the Amigable case where damages may be awarded to petitioners in
the form of legal interest on the price of the land to be reckoned from the time of the unlawful
taking contrary to public respondents' belief that the property involved is public. Even though
buttressed by statements of other public officials, there is no reason for the unjust taking of
petitioners' property. As TCT No. 329945 shows, the property was registered under the Torrens
system in the names of "Emiliano R. de los Santos, married to Corazon Dayrit; and Norma
Alabastro, married to Isidro L. Padilla" as early as March 29, 1971. Had the public respondents,
including the other officials involved in the construction, performed their functions by exercising
Karl Jason Josol TORTS & DAMAGES CASE DIGESTS Pros. Edmund Turqueza Northwestern University Laoag College of Law

even the ordinary diligence expected of them as public officials, they would not have failed to
note that the property is a private one. A public infrastructure loses its laudability if, in the
process of undertaking it, private rights are disregarded. In this connection, the Court said in
Republic v. Sandiganbayan: “ It can hardly be doubted that in exercising the right of eminent
domain, the State exercises its jus imperii, as distinguished from its proprietary rights of jus
gestionis. Yet, even in that area, it has been held that where private property has been taken in
expropriation without just compensation being paid, the defense of immunity from suit cannot be
set up by the State against an action for payment by the owner.”

BALBINO CUISON vs. NORTON & HARRISON CO. et al. (G.R. No. L-32774 October 14,
1930)

FACTS:
Antonio Ora was in the business of renting out trucks and one of his customers was
Norto & Harrison Co. where he transports lumber for them and at the same time he works as a
capataz (foreman) for the same company. In the afternoon of August 9, 1928, the cargo of
lumber they were carrying suddenly fell off at the fire station in Manila City killing one Moises
Cuison, a boy seven (7) years of age on the way to school. The truck bearing the logo N-H
which stands for Norton & Harrison was driven that time by Felix Jose and with him were his two
helpers of minor age namely Telesforo Binoya and Francisco Bautista.

ISSUE: Whether or not Norton & Harrison is liable for damages

RULING:
Yes. Although the lower court did not determine the nature of relationship between Ora and
Norton it can be deduced from the testimonies given that Ora, as owner of the truck, is a contractor of
Norton. But at the same time, he is also an employee of Norton because he also acts as a foreman of the
company. This being established, Norton is liable as an employer because of Ora’s negligence in
directing his men in terms of securing the lumbers. The pertinent provisions apply:

Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another by his fault or negligence shall be liable
for the damage so done. Article 1903, paragraphs 4 and 7 of the [old Civil] Code provides: Owners or
directors of any establishment or business are, in the same way, liable for any damages caused by their
employees while engaged in the branch of the service in which they are employed, or an occasion of the
performance of their duties. The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons subject
thereto prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.

Norton failed to prove that they exercised diligence in the selection of their employees. Note further that
the basis of civil liability of an employer is not respondeat superior but the relationship of paterfamilias (or
pater familias – can be spelled both ways). The theory of paterfamilias bases the liability of the master
ultimately on his own negligence i.e. selection of employees, and not that of his servant.
Karl Jason Josol TORTS & DAMAGES CASE DIGESTS Pros. Edmund Turqueza Northwestern University Laoag College of Law

MARCIAL T. CAEDO et al. vs. YU KHE THAI and RAFAEL BERNARDO

(GRL-20392 December 18, 1968)

FACTS:
Rafael Bernardo has been employed as a driver since 1937 by Yu The Thai and prior to
that he was formerly employed also as a driver under Yutivo Sons Hardware Coin the in the
same capacity for over ten years. During that time he had no record of violation of traffic laws
and regulations until he met a mishap in March 24, 1958 on Highway 54 (now E. de los Santos
Avenue) where the Cadillac he is driving veered off to avoid a caretela on the way but
unfortunately caused a collision to the Mercury car of the Caedo family driven by Marcial Caedo
together with his wife and three daughters. On the Cadillac car is Yu Khe Thai, the employer of
Rafael Bernardo. Both sides sustained injuries. The Caedos brought an action for damages
against Bernardo and Yu Khe Thai. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs and against the defendants, Yu Khe Thai and Rafael Bernardo, jointly and severally, to
pay to plaintiffs Marcial Caedo and his family members. Both parties appealed to the Court of
Appeals, which eventually certified the case to the Supreme Court in view of the total amount of
the plaintiffs' claim.

ISSUE: Whether or not defendant Yu Khe Thai, owner of the car, who was in the car, was
solidarily liable with the driver under Art. 2184, of the Civil Code

RULING:
The applicable law is Article 2184 of the Civil Code. Under the said provision, if the
causative factor was the driver’s negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is
likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence. The
basis of the master’s liability in civil law is not respondeat superior but rather the relationship of
paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known to the master
and susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in
order to prevent injury or damage.

Negligence on the part of the owner, if any, must be sought in the immediate setting and
circumstances of the accident, that is, in his failure to detain the driver from pursuing a course
which not only gave him clear notice of the danger but also sufficient time to act upon it. We do
not see that such negligence may be imputed. The car, as has been stated, was not running at
an unreasonable speed. The road was wide and open, and devoid of traffic that early morning.
There was no reason for the car owner to be in any special state of alert. He had reason to rely
on the skill and experience of his driver. He became aware of the presence of the carretela
when his car was only twelve meters behind it, but then his failure to see it earlier did not
constitute negligence, for he was not himself at the wheel. And even when he did see it at that
distance, he could not have anticipated his driver’s sudden decision to pass the carretela on its
left side in spite of the fact that another car was approaching from the opposite direction. The
time element was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the
risks involved and warn the driver accordingly. The thought that entered his mind, he said, was
that if he sounded a sudden warning it might only make the other man nervous and make the
situation worse. It was a thought that, wise or not, connotes no absence of that due diligence
required by law to prevent the misfortune. Under the facts the owner of the car was not liable.
Karl Jason Josol TORTS & DAMAGES CASE DIGESTS Pros. Edmund Turqueza Northwestern University Laoag College of Law

GSIS vs. CA et al. G.R. No. 101439 June 21, 1999

FACTS:
National Food Authority (NFA) was the owner of a GSIS-insured Chevrolet truck to which
in May 9, 1979 at Tabon-Tabon, Butuan City, the said truck driven by Guillermo Corbeta collided
with a public utility vehicle, a Toyota Tamaraw owned and operated by Victor Uy. As a result of
the collision five (5) passengers died while ten (10) others sustained bodily injuries. Among
those injured were private respondents, Victoria Jaime Vda. de Kho and Gloria Kho Vda. de
Calabia. Among the dead were Maxima Ugmad Vda. de Kho, Roland Kho and Willie Calabia,
Sr.
Three (3) separate cases were filed with the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte
and Butuan City claiming damages against NFA, the driver Corbeta, against GSIS as insurer of
the truck, against MIGC as insurer of the Tamaraw and likewise against Uy for breach of
carriage as operator of said public utility vehicle. Subsequently, the lower court rendered its
decision holding that Corbeta's negligence was the proximate cause of the collision.
The trial court awarded Uy the total amount of P109,100.00 for damages and ordered
MIGC, Corbeta and NFA to pay plaintiff Taer, jointly and severally, the total amount of forty
thousand five hundred fifty-nine pesos and ninety four centavos (P40,559.94) for actual,
compensatory, and moral damages plus attorney's fees.
GSIS, Corbeta and NFA appealed the decision of the lower court to the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed with the conclusions of the trial court. GSIS and NFA filed their motions
for reconsideration respectively but were denied. However, only GSIS filed this petition for
review on certiorari denying solidary liability with the NFA or the negligent operator of the cargo
truck with the assertion that the NFA's liability is based on quasi-delict, while its liability is based
on the contract of insurance.

ISSUE/S:

1) Whether the respondent court erred in holding GSIS solidarily liable with the negligent
insured/owner-operator of the Chevrolet truck for damages awarded to private
respondents which are beyond the limitations of the insurance policy and the Insurance

RULING:

Petitioner’s position insofar as joint liability is concerned is not tenable. It is now

established that the injured or the heirs of a deceased victim of a vehicular accident may
sue directly the insurer of the vehicle. Note that common carriers are required to secure
Compulsory Motor Vehicle Liability Insurance [CMVLI] coverage as provided under Sec. 374
of the Insurance Code, precisely for the benefit of victims of vehicular accidents and to
extend them immediate relief. Compulsory Motor Vehicle Liability Insurance is primarily
intended to provide compensation for the death or bodily injuries suffered by innocent third
parties or passengers as a result of a negligent operation and use of motor vehicles. The
victims and/or their dependents are assured of immediate financial assistance, regardless
of the financial capacity of motor vehicle owners. However, although the victim may proceed
directly against the insurer for indemnity, the third party liability is only up to the extent of the
insurance policy and those required by law
While it is true that where the insurance contract provides for indemnity against liability to
third persons, and such third persons can directly sue the insurer, the direct liability of the
insurer under indemnity contracts against third party liability does not mean that the insurer can
be held liable in solidum with the insured and/or the other parties found at fault. For the liability
of the insurer is based on contract; that of the insured carrier or vehicle owner is based on tort.
The liability of GSIS based on the insurance contract is direct, but not solidary with that of the
NFA. The latter's liability is based separately on Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Karl Jason Josol TORTS & DAMAGES CASE DIGESTS Pros. Edmund Turqueza Northwestern University Laoag College of Law

MR. & MRS. ENGRACIO FABRE, JR. et al vs. CA (GR 111127 July 26, 1996 )

FACTS:

The Fabre couple are into the business of transportation and one of the minibus they
own is a 1982 Model Mazda which they used as a school bus in Manila which is being driven by
Porfirio Cabil. In 1984 the private respondent Word for the World Christian Fellowship Inc.
(WWCF) arranged with petitioners for the transportation of 33 members of its Young Adults
Ministry from Manila to La Union and back. On the way, the bus took a detour through the town
of Baay in Lingayen, Pangasinan as the usual route in Carmen has a bridge under repair. Near
midnight and raining, and with Cabil being unfamiliar with the road, he was caught off guard on
the sharp “siete” curve and the bus skidded, causing it to topple over and thus injuring most of
its passengers. The Lingayen police investigated the incident the next day and on the basis of
their finding they filed a criminal complaint against the driver, Porfirio Cabil. The case was later
filed with the Lingayen Regional Trial Court. Amyline Antonio, one of the passengers who was
seriously injured, brought this case to the RTC of Makati, Metro Manila. Criminal complaint was
filed against the Cabil and the Spouses Fabres were also made jointly liable. Spouses Fabre on
the other hand contended that they are not liable since they are not a common carrier.
The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court's finding that petitioner Cabil failed to
exercise due care and precaution in the operation of his vehicle considering the time and the
place of the accident. The Court of Appeals held that the Fabres were themselves
presumptively negligent. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S:

1) WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS WERE NEGLIGENT

2) WHETHER OF NOT PETITIONERS WERE LIABLE FOR THE INJURIES SUFFERED
BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
3) WHETHER OR NOT DAMAGES CAN BE AWARDED AND IN THE POSITIVE, UP TO
WHAT EXTENT.

RULING:

1) Yes. The finding that Cabil drove his bus negligently, while his employer, the Fabres, who
owned the bus, failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the
selection and supervision of their employee is fully supported by the evidence on record.
These factual findings of the two courts we regard as final and conclusive, supported as
they are by the evidence.

2) Yes. Considering the foregoing — the fact that it was raining and the road was slippery,
that it was dark, that he drove his bus at 50 kilometers an hour when even on a good
day the normal speed was only 20 kilometers an hour, and that he was unfamiliar with
the terrain, Cabil was grossly negligent and should be held liable for the injuries suffered
by private respondent Amyline Antonio. Petitioners are liable under Arts. 2176 and 2180
for quasi delict, fully justify finding them guilty of breach of contract of carriage under
Arts. 1733, 1755 and 1759 of the Civil Code. In Dangwa Trans. Co. Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 14 on facts similar to those in this case, this Court held the ​bus company and
the driver jointly and severally liable for damages for injuries suffered by a passenger.
Again, in Bachelor Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals 15 a driver found negligent in failing
to stop the bus in order to let off passengers when a fellow passenger ran amuck, as a
result of which the passengers jumped out of the speeding bus and suffered injuries,
was held also jointly and severally liable with the bus company to the injured
passengers.
Karl Jason Josol TORTS & DAMAGES CASE DIGESTS Pros. Edmund Turqueza Northwestern University Laoag College of Law

3) Yes. The Court sustained the award of damages in favor of Amyline Antonio. This case
falls squarely within the purview of Art. 2219(2) providing for the payment of moral
damages in cases of quasi delict. On the theory that petitioners are liable for breach of
contract of carriage, the award of moral damages is authorized by Art. 1764, in relation
to Art. 2220, since Cabil's gross negligence amounted to bad faith. Amyline Antonio's
testimony, as well as the testimonies of her father and co-passengers, fully establish the
physical suffering and mental anguish she endured as a result of the injuries caused by
petitioners' negligence. The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees was also
properly made

AIR FRANCE vs. RAFAEL CARRASCOSO & CA (GR L-21438 September 28, 1966)

FACTS:

The respondent herein, Rafael Carrascoso, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48
Filipino pilgrims that are bound for Lourdes, France on March 30, 1958 via defendant herein Air
France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., which issued a "first class" round
trip airplane ticket for his Manila to Rome flight. However, when in Bangkok, the Manager of the
defendant airline forced the plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying simply
because there was a "white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat.
Infuriated, Carrascoso refused which caused a commotion making other passengers nervous as
a result of the hot discussion. The Court of First Instance ruled in favor of Carrascoso stating
that the contract of transportation with plaintiff was in bad faith. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the lower court’s ruling to which cause herein petitioner Air France assails the judgment of the
CA.

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals support its judgment
2) Whether or not the award of moral damages is an averment of fraud or bad faith
3) Whether or not exemplary damages awarded against Air France is but proper

RULING:

1) Yes. Petitioner’s contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of
Carrascoso’s action, as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of
public duty by the petitioner air carrier — a case of quasi-delict. A contract to transport
passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation. And this,
because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the
traveling public. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground
for an action for damages. Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a
right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due
consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language,
indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on
the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the
carrier.

2) No. ​The Court emphasized that it is unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is sufficient
averment in the complaint to justify an award for moral damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if
any, was cured by the evidence. An amendment thereof to conform to the evidence is not even
required. Because as a result of defendant's failure to furnish First Class accommodations,
plaintiff suffered inconveniences, embarrassments, and humiliations, thereby causing plaintiff
Karl Jason Josol TORTS & DAMAGES CASE DIGESTS Pros. Edmund Turqueza Northwestern University Laoag College of Law

mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, social humiliation, and the like injury, resulting
in moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00

3) Yes. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the court ample power to
grant exemplary damages — in contracts and quasi- contracts. The only condition is that the
defendant should have "acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner." The manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this
legal precept. The right to attorney's fees is fully established. The grant of exemplary damages
justifies a similar judgment for attorneys' fees. The least that can be said is that the courts below
felt that it is but just and equitable that attorneys' fees be given. We do not intend to break faith
with the tradition that discretion well exercised — as it was here — should not be disturbed.

LEANDRO CARILLO vs. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 86890 January 21, 1994)

FACTS:
The two accused, namely, Dr. Leandro Castillo, an anesthesiologist and Dr. Emilio
Madrid, a surgeon are both doctors of Baclaran General Hospital to which the deceased
Catherine Acosta, a 13 year old girl died by reason of their malpractice and/or negligence in
following the required standard procedure, that is particularly the surgical procedure on
appendectomy to which the patient underwent in May 31, 1981. Catherine, daughter of the
spouses Domingo and Yolanda Acosta, complained of abdominal pains in the morning of 31st of
May 1981 to which, after a medical examination she was scheduled for surgical operation later
on that same date after being diagnosed with appendicitis.. When the patient was wheeled out
of the operating room after completion of surgery, she manifested signs of medical instability
(i.e., shivering, paleness, irregular breathing and weak heartbeat). She was in comatose the
next day and died on the third day without regaining consciousness. Both doctors entered pleas
of not guilty at arraignment and subsequently thereafter, the trial court promulgated its decision
convicting both the accused of the crime charged. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment of conviction, and specified that the civil liability of the two (2) accused was solidary in
nature.
Petitioner Dr. Carillo alone filed the present Petition for Review with the Court, seeking
reversal of his conviction, or in the alternative, the grant of a new trial. Dr. Madrid did not try to
appeal further the Court of Appeals Decision. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction became
final insofar as the accused surgeon Dr. Madrid is concerned.

ISSUE/S:

1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals drastically "misapprehended" the relevant,

operative facts in this case as to compel this Court to examine and resolve question(s) of
fact which would have a decisive significance for the disposition of the case
2) Whether or not the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals adequately support the
conclusion that petitioner Dr. Carillo was, along with Dr. Madrid, guilty of simple
negligence which resulted in homicide

RULING:

1) No. The rule is too firmly settled to require much documentation that only questions of
law may be raised before this Court in a petition for review on certiorari, subject to
Karl Jason Josol TORTS & DAMAGES CASE DIGESTS Pros. Edmund Turqueza Northwestern University Laoag College of Law

certain well-known exceptions. After careful scrutiny of petitioner's contentions before us

and the record of this case, we do not believe that petitioner has shown
"misapprehension of facts" on the part of the Court of Appeals which would require this
Court to overturn the judgment reached by the former.

2) Yes. As early as in People v. Vistan, the Court defined simple negligence, penalized
under what is now Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as "a mere lack of prevision in
a situation where either the threatened harm is not immediate or the danger not openly
visible." Put in a slightly different way, the gravamen of the offense of simple negligence
is the failure to exercise the diligence necessitated or called for the situation which was
not immediately life-destructive but which culminated, in the present case, in the death of
a human being three (3) days later. Such failure to exercise the necessary degree of
care and diligence is a negative ingredient of the offense charged. The rule in such
cases is that while the prosecution must prove the negative ingredient of the offense, it
needs only to present the best evidence procurable under the circumstances, in order to
shift the burden of disproving or countering the proof of the negative ingredient to the
accused, provided that such initial evidence establishes at least on a prima facie basis
the guilt of the accused. This rule is particularly applicable where the negative ingredient
of the offense is of such a nature or character as, under the circumstances, to be
specially within the knowledge or control of the accused. In the instant case, the Court is
bound to observe that the events which occurred during the surgical procedure
(including whether or not Nubain had in fact been administered as an anesthesia
immediately before or during the surgery) were peculiarly within the knowledge and
control of Dr. Carillo and Dr. Madrid. It was, therefore, incumbent upon the two (2)
accused to overturn the prima facie case which the prosecution had established, by
reciting the measures which they had actually taken to prevent or to counter the
obviously serious condition of Catherine Acosta which was evident right after surgery.
This they failed or refused to do so.

JOSE S. AMADORA et al vs. CA (GR L-47745 April 15, 1988)

FACTS:

On April 13, 1972, Afredo Amadora, a high-school student of Colegio de San

Jose-Recoletos, an academic institution of learning, was sent to the the auditorium of the said
school to show his physics experiment as a prerequisite to his graduation but was eventually
shot to death by his classmate by Pablito Daffon. The unlicensed pistol allegedly used in the
shooting was previously confiscated by the dean of the boys, Sergio Damaso, Jr from Jose
Gumban, one of the companions of Daffon but was later returned to Gumban. However, said
gun was unreported to the principal. Daffon was convicted of homicide through reckless
imprudence. Thereafter, Alfredo’s parents filed a civil action for damages under NCC 2180
against the school, its rector, the high school principal, the dean of boys, the physics teacher,
together with Pablito and two other students, through their parents. The complaint against the
students was later dropped.
Respondent Court absolved the defendants completely and reversed CFI Cebu’s
decision. The Court of Appeals stressed that NCC 2180 was not applicable since the school
was not a school of arts and trades holding likewise that the students were not in the school’s
custody at the time of the incident since the semester already ended. In addition, there was no
clear identification of the gun, and that the defendant exercised the necessary diligence in
preventing injury. Petitioners on the other hand claimed their son was under school custody
because he went to school to comply with a requirement for graduation (submission of Physics
reports). Hence, this petition.
Karl Jason Josol TORTS & DAMAGES CASE DIGESTS Pros. Edmund Turqueza Northwestern University Laoag College of Law

ISSUE: Whether or not Collegio de San Jose-Recoletos should be held liable.

HELD:
No. Petition was denied. The time Alfredo was fatally shot, he was in the custody of the
authorities of the school notwithstanding classes had formally ended when the incident
happened. It was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his physics
requirement. What was important is that he was there for a legitimate purpose. On the other
hand, the rector, high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because none
of them was the teacher-in-charge as defined in the provision. Each was exercising only a
general authority over the students and not direct control and influence exerted by the teacher
placed in-charge of particular classes. In the absence of a teacher- in charge, dean of boys
should probably be held liable considering that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun
from a student and later returned to him without taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter
to the higher authorities. Though it was clear negligence on his part, no proof was shown to
necessarily link this gun with the shooting incident. Lastly, Collegio San Jose-Recoletos cannot
directly be held liable under the provision because only the teacher or the head of school of arts
and trade is made responsible for the damage caused by the student. Hence, under the facts
disclosed, none of the respondents were held liable for the injury inflicted with Alfredo resulting
to his death.

McKee vs. IAC et al.(GR L-68102 July 16, 1992)

FACTS:

Ruben Galang was driving an International cargo truck, Loadstar, owned by Tayag and
Manalo carrying 200 hundred cavans of rice and weighing 10 metric tons which was bound for
Manila when it collided with a Ford Escort driven by Jose Kho going in the opposite direction.
The Ford Escort avoided two boys who suddenly appeared running towards the Ford and as a
result collided with the said truck resulting in multiple deaths. The collision which happened at
Pulong Pulo Bridge along MacArthur Highway between Angeles City and San Fernando,
Pampanga, resulted in the deaths of the driver of the Escort, Jose Kho, together with her
one-year-old daughter, Kim, and her babysitter, Loida Bondoc. Jose Kho’s minor children
Araceli, Christopher, and George, who were sitting in the back of the Escort, received physical
injuries from the collision.
Thereafter an information was filed against Ruben Galang, charging him for reckless
imprudence resulting in multiple homicide, physical injuries, and damage to property. Galang
was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges in the said information. Two civil
cases were filed to which the first one, by the wife and children of Jose Koh, and the second
one by Araceli and her husband for the death of Kim and injuries to Araceli and her other
children. The respondents were impleaded against as the employers of Ruben Galang –
although Galang was not included. The cases here are based on quasi-delict but were
eventually consolidated.
The lower court dismissed the civil cases and awarded the respondents damages and
attorney’s fees. On appeal, the IAC affirmed the conviction of Galang, and reversed the decision
in the civil cases, ordering the payment of damages for the death and physical injuries of the
McKee family. This was based on its finding that it was Galang’s inattentiveness or reckless
imprudence that caused the accident. However, upon filing by the respondents of an Motion for
Reconsideration, the IAC set aside its original decision and upheld that of the trial court
because the fact that Koh’s car invaded the lane of the truck and the collision occurred while still
in Galang’s lane gave rise to the presumption that Koh was negligent.
Karl Jason Josol TORTS & DAMAGES CASE DIGESTS Pros. Edmund Turqueza Northwestern University Laoag College of Law

ISSUE: Whether or not Jose Koh, the driver of the Ford Escort was negligent

RULING:

No. The test of negligence and the facts obtaining in this case, it is manifest that no
negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man would
have tried to avoid running over the two boys by swerving the car away from where they were
even if this would mean entering the opposite lane. Avoiding such immediate peril would be the
natural course to take particularly where the vehicle in the opposite lane would be several
meters away and could very well slow down, move to the side of the road and give way to the
oncoming car. Moreover, under what is known as the emergency rule, "one who suddenly finds
himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that
may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt
what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the
emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence. Considering the
sudden intrusion of the 2 boys into the lane of the car, the Court finds that Jose Koh adopted the
best means possible in the given situation to avoid hitting them. Applying the above test,
therefore, it is clear that he was not guilty of negligence.

DR. VICTORIA L. BATIQUIN v. CA (GR No. 118231, Jul 05, 1996)

FACTS:

Dr. Batiquin was a Resident Physician at the Negros Oriental Provincial Hospital, Dumaguete City
and in September 21, 1988 private respondent Mrs. Flotilde Villegas underwent a simple cesarean
operation with Dr. Batiquin to which it successfully delivered the latter’s baby. However, after leaving the
hospital, Mrs. Villegas began to suffer abdominal pains and complained of being feverish. Eventually, she
lost her appetite and she consulted Dr. Batiquin at the latter's polyclinic who prescribed for her certain
medicines which she took for three months. However, the pains still kept recurring and when the pain
became unbearable she then consulted Dr. Ma. Salud Kho at the Holy Child’s Hospital in Dumaguete City
on January 20, 1989. After examining respondent, Dr Kho suggested that Mrs.Villegas submit to another
surgery. When Dr. Kho opened the abdomen of Mrs. Villegas she found whitish-yellow discharge inside,
an ovarian cyst on each of the left and right ovaries which gave out pus, dirt and pus behind the uterus,
and a piece of rubber material which appeared to be a part of a rubber glove. It could have been a torn
section of a surgeon’s gloves or could have come from other sources. And this foreign body was the
cause of the infection of the ovaries and consequently of all the discomfort suffered by Mrs. Villegas after
her delivery on September 21, 1988. A case was filed against the petitioner Dr. Batiquin but the piece of
rubber allegedly found near the private respondent’s uterus was not presented in court. Dr. Ma. Salud
Kho testified that she sent it to a pathologist in Cebu City for examination, but it was not mentioned in the
pathologist’s Surgical Pathology Report. However, the evidence which mentioned the piece of rubber is a
Medical Certificate, a Progress Record, an Anaesthesia Record, a Nurse's Record, and a Physician's
Discharge Summary. Thus, the RTC of Negros Oriental ruled in favor of the petitioners but was
subsequently reversed by the Court of Appeals which hold Dr. Batiquin liable for being negligent and
awarded against him moral and exemplary damages therewith. Hence, this petition by petitioners who
claimed that the CA erred and committed grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Dr. Batiquin is liable for damages for being negligent,
Karl Jason Josol TORTS & DAMAGES CASE DIGESTS Pros. Edmund Turqueza Northwestern University Laoag College of Law

RULING:

Yes. Dr. Batiguin is liable. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence
is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be
established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of
negligence. The doctrine is not a rule of substantive law, but merely a mode of proof or a
mere procedural convenience. The rule, when applicable to the facts and circumstances
of a particular case, is not intended to and does not dispense with the requirement of
proof of culpable negligence on the party charged. It merely determines and regulates
what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of
proving a breach of the duty of due care. The doctrine can be invoked when and only
when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily
available.
In the instant case, all the requisites for recourse to the doctrine are present.
First, the entire proceedings of the cesarean section were under the exclusive control of
Dr. Batiquin. In this light, the private respondents were bereft of direct evidence as to the
actual culprit or the exact cause of the foreign object finding its way into private
respondent Villegas’ body, which, needless to say, does not occur unless through the
intervention of negligence. Second, since aside from the cesarean section, private
respondent Villegas underwent no other operation which could have caused the
offending piece of rubber to appear in her uterus, it stands to reason that such could only
have been a by-product of the cesarean section performed by Dr. Batiquin. The
petitioners, in this regard, failed to overcome the presumption of negligence arising from
resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Dr. Batiquin is therefore liable for negligently
leaving behind a piece of rubber in private respondent Villegas’ abdomen and for all the
adverse effects thereof.