Analysis:

The Challenger Launch decision on January 28th 1986, proved to be one of the crucial
decisions ever made as it lead to one of space science's most talked about disasters. The
shuttle exploded within 73 seconds of its launch and triggered one of the biggest failures
in both the history of NASA and space science. We analyse the case and ascertain
reasons that could have eventually led to this disaster. One of the major constraints for
NASA was their budget. Due to the Vietnam war, there was a financial constraint and
they were in a position to launch at least 30 flights for them to be able to recover
costs and also stay afloat. This was one of the key reasons for NASA to go ahead for the
launch of this mission as they felt that another abort or delay in the mission would
only result in negative publicity through the media. Also NASA and Thiokol were
not on the same side when it came to taking decisions. Both of them were not able to
look in the right direction and lacked conformity. This led to communication
breakdown which perhaps is a major contributor in effective group decision making.
Thiokol from their side were not prepared for the teleconference. This was evident
from the way they approached the conference. Neither Robert Boisjoly nor his
teammates had concrete evidence as to why the launch should not be given a go ahead
at sub 20F temperature. One of the key aspects in-group decision process is being
prepared with material evidence in order to facilitate the decision making process.
Also there was an Internal communication failure within Thiokol. Though the
criticality ratings of O-Rings was raised in 1982,it was not until 1984 that Boisjoly, an
SRB expert came to know of it. With quality time lost, he had very little chance to test the
O-Rings under different conditions. There was also
lack of ownership for rectification of the critical issue relating to the O-Rings.
NASA reviewed the O-Rings case by case rather than doing a complete testing
process. Had they gone ahead with a complete test set up, they could have obtained a
clear evidence about how the rings would behave during low temperature conditions.
This was called "The Russian Roulette". This was a major flaw in the decision making
process. There was no proper way in seeking data. This also to an extent led to
communication failure between NASA and Thiokol.It is here that the concept of Group
think has played a major role in this case. Robert Boisjoly had stated his doubts over the
behaviour of O-Rings at lower temperatures. Had he stood firm and tried to convince his
team first, Thiokol would have stood by their decision to abort or delay the launch and
wait for better conditions. But Boisjoly lost his confidence when was prodded by Larry
Mulloy with regards to his findings such as correlation between low temperature and O-
Rings behaviour, colour of the soot formed. This resulted in the dilemma of
Individual v/s group decision. The group pressure and lack of self confidence
resulted in Boisjoly in submitting himself to the group's decision when he actually had a
valid alternative. NASA were right in asking questions to Boisjoly, the situation affected
him adversely thereby forcing him to conform to the group rather han standing by
his opinion which was a valid one. Here the aspect of ethics also was important. NASA
wanted to have a successful mission at the earliest, they did not focus on the safety
aspects of the mission. Though there was not that much of evidence about the O-Rings'
performance, Thiokol's doubts should have made them rethink on their strategy. This
could have made them takea decision that would have not resulted in the disaster. For
NASA , success at any cost had become their main objective.

How would you characterize the broader context surrounding the January 1986
teleconference?
What impact might that have on the group’s decision process?
On the eve of the Challenger Space Shuttle launch, engineers at Thiokol were sceptical
about the launchas the temperature for the launch was in low 20F. The engineers felt
that the launch situation was not ideal as the O-Rings that helped in sealing the
components could experience erosion, thereby triggering a blow-by. They also had
observed erosion when a previous launch at 53F of Flight-15 had taken place. One of the
key engineers Roger Boisjoly felt that the launch could prove to be a disaster as they
could not forecast how the O-Rings would behave at such low temperatures. Hence
Thiokol provided various facts and information to the NASA scientists stationed at
MSFC, Alabama, and KSC, Merrit Island. The original date of launch was July 1985, but
the mission had already been delayed to accommodate payload, and further delays due
to weather and technical reasons and finally scheduled for January 28th1986. The
scientists and NASA management were all set for the launch and did not want any delay.
Thiswas because; they had to launch the mission not just for scientific reasons, but for
economic, political and scheduling backlogs. NASA also had to launch at least 30 times
per year because the program survival depended on routine flights, recovering costs,
and making money on commercial payload. Also NASA felt that in the earlier flights
(Flight 22 and Flight 17), though there was erosion found in the O-Ring, there was no
significant reason to ground or delay the entire mission. Also Thiokol had not provided
themwith enough evidence and proof to support their claims of possible disaster. They
also felt that Thiokol mentioned this problem on the eve of the launch, when they could
have done that much earlier. This situation led to a flawed group decision making
process. Firstly, there was no strong evidence provided by Thiokol in order to delay the
launch. Secondly there was also no support for Roger Boisjoly from within Thiokol, for it
was he who raised concerns over the launch temperature. Thirdly and most importantly
NASA was in a situation where they had to go ahead with the launch without further
delaysdue to various reasons that ranged from economic to political. All this led to
Thiokol being under group pressure, where in they had to surrender themselves to
NASA, who were superior in this process since Thiokol did not have any points from
their side to substantiate their views. This resulted in the launch of Challenger Flight 51-
L, and the disaster that followed.
2.

How would you characterize group process in this teleconference? What led to
ineffective handlingof the situation?
In the Challenger space shuttle case, the group involved in the decision making process
could not arriveat a solution that was acceptable to all parties involved. Normally in a
Group process, decision making becomes meaningful only when we have the resources
to aggregate from the parties involved. But here,the resources or evidences provided
were few and not satisfactory when it came to convincing the other parties. Moreover in
the group decision making, there should be motivating views between the different
parties involved which was absent in the current case. Here the conversation was more
of a one-to manytype, which involved clash of egos. In the end of the group decision
process, normally there would be asolution and an acceptance of the same by all the
parties involved. But this was absent, since there wasonly overriding of the individual's
views. Here when Boisjoly expressed his doubts over the launchconditions and the
effects that could occur, both NASA and Thiokol decided to go ahead with themajority's
opinion. This was perhaps why the individual concern or decision of Boisjoly was
overridden.
  https://www.scribd.com/document/133267390/OB-Group3

six major factors that exerted an influence on the decision-making pro cess and ultimately
led to the launch of the Challenger. These factors include
(1) faulty shared beliefs held by Level III decision makers,
(2) questionable reasoning displayed by Level II and III decision makers,
(3) perceived pressure experienced by Level IV personnel,
(4) shift in presumption in favor of the launch,
(5) ineffective persuasive attempts by Level IV per sonnel
(6) use of ambiguous language by Level IV personnel. The essay concludes that the decision
to launch the Challenger was the result of a complex interplay among a num ber of
cognitive, psychological, and social forces constituting the decision environment.