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2/6/2021 Complete 911 Timeline: FBI's Penttbom 9/11 Investigation and Identification of Alleged Hijackers
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Complete 911 Timeline Key Events
FBI's Penttbom 9/11 Investigation and Identification of Alleged Hijackers Key Day of 9/11 Events
Project: Complete 911 Timeline (102)
Open-Content project managed by matt, Derek, Paul, KJF, mtuck, paxvector Key Hijacker Events (145)
Key Warnings (95)
Day of 9/11
add event | references All Day of 9/11 Events
(1414)
Page 2 of 2 (154 events) Dick Cheney (57)
previous | 1, 2 | next Donald Rumsfeld (37)
Flight AA 11 (146)
Flight AA 77 (157)
Flight UA 175 (87)
December 21, 2001: FBI Won’t Release Flight 93 Black Box Flight UA 93 (243)
Information George Bush (132)
The FBI reveals that it knows what is on the Flight 93 black boxes, but refuses to Passenger Phone Calls (74)
Pentagon (140)
release the transcript or audio recording. Families of the victims have requested Richard Clarke (35)
to hear the cockpit voice recording, but the FBI says, “[W]e do not believe that Shanksville, Pennsylvania
the horror captured on the cockpit voice recording will console them in any (25)
way.” [CNN, 12/21/2001] Accuracy in Media immediately submits a Freedom of Training Exercises (56)
World Trade Center (91)
Information Act request to have the transcript released, but the FBI turns it
The Alleged 9/11 Hijackers
down because a release “could reasonably be expected to interfere with
Alhazmi and Almihdhar
enforcement proceedings.” The Philadelphia Daily News asks, “What (345)
enforcement proceedings?” and suggests the FBI may be covering up a Marwan Alshehhi (133)
shootdown of the plane. [PHILADELPHIA DAILY NEWS, 12/28/2001] The recordings are Mohamed Atta (207)
later played, but only in private to victims’ relatives and the 9/11 Commission. Hani Hanjour (73)
Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Federal Bureau of Investigation Ziad Jarrah (74)
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Other 9/11 Hijackers
Category Tags: FBI 9/11 Investigation, 9/11 Investigations
(175)
Possible Hijacker
Associates in US (79)
2002: Witness Possibly Connects Hijackers Alhazmi and Alleged Hijackers' Flight
Almihdhar to Saudi Consulate Official Training (73)
Hijacker Contact w
The FBI interviews Qualid Government in US (33)
Benomrane, an Arabic- Possible 9/11 Hijacker
speaking taxi driver who Funding (42)
had done chauffeur work Hijacker Visas and
Immigration (135)
for the Saudi consulate in
Alhazmi and Almihdhar:
Los Angeles. Benomrane is Specific Cases
shown pictures of young Bayoumi and Basnan Saudi
Arab men and asked if he Connection (51)
recognizes any of them. He CIA Hiding Alhazmi &
quickly picks hijackers Almihdhar (120)
Search for Alhazmi/
Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar in US (39)
Almihdhar out of the line- Projects and Programs
Qualid Benomrane’s 2001 tax driver license. [Source: FBI] up. After realizing they
historycommons.org/timeline.jsp?timeline=complete_911_timeline&investigations:_a_detailed_look=penttbom&startpos=100 1/28
were 9/11 hijackers, he denies knowing them. The FBI asks him about his ties to Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit
Fahad al Thumairy, an official at the Saudi consulate suspected of a link with (172)
Able Danger (60)
those two hijackers. Benomrane says that al Thumairy introduced him to two Sibel Edmonds (61)
young Saudi men who had just arrived in the US and needed help. Benomrane Phoenix Memo (27)
drove them to places in Los Angeles and San Diego, including Sea World, a Randy Glass/
theme park in San Diego. [SHENON, 2008, PP. 309] (Curiously, these two hijackers Diamondback (8)
Robert Wright and Vulgar
bought season passes to Sea World.) [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 9/1/2002] 9/11 Commission Betrayal (67)
staffers will later conclude it is highly likely that the two men were Alhazmi and Remote Surveillance (241)
Almihdhar, despite Benomrane’s later denial. This would mean al Thumairy knew Yemen Hub (75)
the two hijackers. [SHENON, 2008, PP. 309] However, the 9/11 Commission will fail Before 9/11
to mention anything about this in their final report. Soviet-Afghan War (105)
Entity Tags: Nawaf Alhazmi, Fahad al Thumairy, Qualid Benomrane, Khalid Almihdhar Warning Signs (470)
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Insider Trading/
Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Bayoumi and Basnan Saudi Connection, 9/11 Foreknowledge (53)
Investigations, 9/11 Commission, FBI 9/11 Investigation, Saudi Arabia US Air Security (81)
Military Exercises (88)
Pipeline Politics (67)
January 11-16, 2002: 9/11 Suspect Freed after Proof Emerges of Other Pre-9/11 Events
His Innocence (66)
Egyptian national Abdallah Higazy (see December 17, 2001), who has falsely Counterterrorism before
9/11
confessed to owning a transceiver that may connect him to the 9/11 plot in Hunt for Bin Laden (158)
order to save his family from being tortured (see December 27, 2001), is Counterterrorism Action
charged with making false statements connected to the 9/11 attacks. Higazy has Before 9/11 (225)
given three different versions of how he obtained the radio; the FBI is sure he is Counterterrorism
lying about not being complicit in the plot. Three days after Higazy is charged, Policy/Politics (255)
an airline pilot from Ohio claims the suspect transceiver as his own, and Warning Signs: Specific Cases
unknowingly vindicates Higazy. Higazy is released two days later, and a hotel Foreign Intelligence
Warnings (35)
security guard is eventually charged with lying to the FBI about the location of Bush's Aug. 6, 2001 PDB
the radio. Higazy’s lawyer, Jonathan Abady, later says: “What if that pilot had (39)
not walked into the Millennium Hotel? We know that Mr. Higazy could have spent Presidential Level
the rest of his life in prison.” In 2007, Higazy will say that he chose to confess to Warnings (31)
the ownership of the suspect transceiver because he knew the FBI could have his The Post-9/11 World
family turned over to Egyptian intelligence agents for torture. “I knew I couldn’t 9/11 Investigations (666)
9/11 Related Criminal
prove my innocence, and I knew my family was in danger,” he will recall. “If I Proceedings (22)
say this device is mine, I’m screwed and my family is going to be safe. If I say 9/11 Denials (30)
this device is not mine, I’m screwed and my family’s in danger. And [FBI] Agent US Government and 9/11
[Michael] Templeton made it quite clear that ‘cooperate’ had to mean saying Criticism (67)
something else other than this device is not mine.” Higazy’s subsequent lawsuit 9/11 Related Lawsuits
(24)
against the hotel (prompted by a hotel employee lying to the FBI about him) will Media (47)
eventually be settled out of court; his suit against the FBI will still be pending in Other Post-9/11 Events
October 2007 (see October 18, 2007). [WASHINGTON POST, 10/25/2007] (80)
Entity Tags: Michael Templeton, Abdallah Higazy, Jonathan Abady, Federal Bureau of Investigations: Specific Cases
Investigation 9/11 Commission (257)
Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives Role of Philip Zelikow (87)
Category Tags: FBI 9/11 Investigation, 9/11 Investigations 9/11 Congressional Inquiry
(41)
CIA OIG 9/11 Report (16)
April 2002: Al-Qaeda Leader Zubaida Confeseses to FBI that KSM FBI 9/11 Investigation
Is 9/11 Mastermind (154)
FBI agents are able to get prisoner Abu Zubaida to confess that Khalid Shaikh WTC Investigation (111)
Mohammed (KSM) is the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks. Zubaida, captured in Other 9/11 Investigations
(135)
Pakistan in March 2002 (see March 28, 2002), is considered a high-ranking
Possible Al-Qaeda-Linked
prisoner, although there is controversy over just how important he was to al- Moles or Informants
Qaeda (see Shortly After March 28, 2002). FBI agents Ali Soufan and Steve Abu Hamza Al-Masri (103)
Gaudin have been interrogating Zubaida using traditional non-coercive Abu Qatada (36)
interrogation methods, while he is being held in a secret CIA prison in Thailand Ali Mohamed (78)
Haroon Rashid Aswat (17)
(see Late March through Early June, 2002). A CIA interrogation team is expected Khalil Deek (20)
but has not yet arrived. Soufan shows Zubaida a sheaf of pictures of high priority Luai Sakra (12)
suspects; Zubaida points at KSM’s photo and says, “That’s Mukhtar… the one Mamoun Darkazanli (36)
behind 9/11.” Shortly before 9/11, US intelligence had learned that the alias Nabil Al-Marabh (41)
“Mukhtar” was frequently used by KSM (see August 28, 2001), but this is Omar Bakri & Al-
Muhajiroun (25)
important confirmation. The more stunning revelation is that KSM is “the one Reda Hassaine (23)
behind 9/11.” [MAYER, 2008, PP. 155; NEW YORK TIMES, 4/22/2009; NEWSWEEK, 4/25/2009] Other Possible Moles or
Zubaida proceeds to lay out more details of the 9/11 plot, although exactly Informants (169)
what and how much he says is unknown. [VANITY FAIR, 7/17/2007] It is unclear how Other Al-Qaeda-Linked
Figures
much US intelligence knew about KSM’s role in the 9/11 attacks prior to this, Abu Zubaida (99)
although at least some was known (see (December 2001)). Anwar Al-Awlaki (17)
Entity Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Abu Zubaida, Ali Soufan, Federal Bureau of Ayman Al-Zawahiri (81)
Investigation, Steve Gaudin, Central Intelligence Agency Hambali (39)
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Khalid Shaikh Mohammed
Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, FBI 9/11 Investigation, Abu Zubaida, Khalid Shaikh (140)
Mohammed Mohammed Haydar
Zammar (46)
Mohammed Jamal Khalifa
April 15, 2002: Video of 9/11 Hijacker Vowing to Be a Martyr in (47)
US ‘Heartland’ Is Released; Video Implies Al-Qaeda Was Behind Osama Bin Laden (229)
9/11 Attacks Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh (106)
Ramzi Yousef (67)
A martyr video of 9/11 hijacker Sheikh Omar Abdul-
Ahmed Alhaznawi is shown by the Rahman (57)
Al Jazeera television network. Victor Bout (23)
Alhaznawi does not mention details Wadih El-Hage (45)
of the 9/11 plot, but he pledges to Zacarias Moussaoui (159)
send a “bloodied message” to Al-Qaeda by Region
Americans. He says, “It is time to "Lackawanna Six" (13)

Al-Qaeda in Balkans (168)
kill the Americans on their own Al-Qaeda in Germany
ground among their families and (190)
soldiers… The time of humiliation Al-Qaeda in Italy (55)
and subjugation is over. It’s time to Al-Qaeda in Southeast
Asia (149)
kill Americans in their heartland.… Al-Qaeda in Spain (121)
Ahmed Alhaznawi in his martyr video. [Source: Al Lord I regard myself as a martyr for Islamist Militancy in
Jazeera]
you to accept me as such.” A Chechnya (50)
picture of the World Trade Center exploding appears behind him during his Specific Alleged Al-Qaeda
entire speech. It is believed that he recorded the video around March 2001, the Linked Attacks or Plots
same time most other 9/11 hijackers recorded similar videos (see (December 1993 WTC Bombing (73)
1993 Somalia Fighting (13)
2000-March 2001)), and the background was added in digitally after 9/11. Al 1995 Bojinka Plot (78)
Jazeera says they received the video about a week earlier, along with videos 1998 US Embassy
from top al-Qaeda leaders Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, as part of a Bombings (121)
documentary prepared by al-Qaeda. The Guardian notes that “The al-Qaeda Millennium Bomb Plots
tapes broadcast by [Al Jazeera since 9/11] have gradually moved towards (43)
2000 USS Cole Bombing
acknowledging the organization’s role in the September 11 conspiracy,” and (114)
“Alhaznawi’s statement comes close to a full admission…” [GUARDIAN, 4/16/2002] 2001 Attempted Shoe
Entity Tags: Ahmed Alhaznawi, Al Jazeera, Al-Qaeda Bombing (23)
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline 2002 Bali Bombings (36)
Category Tags: Other 9/11 Hijackers, 9/11 Investigations, FBI 9/11 Investigation, 2004 Madrid Train
Alleged Al-Qaeda Media Statements Bombings (82)
2005 7/7 London
Bombings (87)
April 18, 2002: Private Showing of Flight 93 Recordings Fails to Miscellaneous Al-Qaeda
Quell Confusions Issues
The FBI allows relatives of passengers on Flight 93 to listen to the 31-minutes of Alleged Al-Qaeda Linked
tape from the plane’s cockpit voice recorder and see a written transcript of the Attacks (89)
Alleged Al-Qaeda Media
recording. About 70 relatives do so. They are allowed to take notes, but not to Statements (102)
make recordings because the tape might be used in the trial of Zacarias Key Captures and Deaths
Moussaoui. [CNN, 4/19/2002; GUARDIAN, 4/19/2002; PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 4/21/2002] (124)
The San Francisco Chronicle responds: “Is there even a dollop of logic in that Geopolitics and Islamic
explanation? It’s like saying we can’t watch video of the planes crashing into the Militancy
World Trade Center because that video might be used in a trial.” [SAN FRANCISCO US Dominance (112)
Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda
CHRONICLE, 6/3/2002] Much of the tape is reportedly unintelligible. According to Links (255)
the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, “the voices were muddled and the ambient noise of Iraq War Impact on
the wind rushing by the speeding plane often made it impossible to distinguish Counterterrorism (83)
individuals, even when they were yelling.” [DAILY TELEGRAPH, 4/20/2002; PITTSBURGH Israel (60)
Pakistan and the ISI (470)
POST-GAZETTE, 4/21/2002] New York Times reporter Jere Longman writes the book
Saudi Arabia (249)
Among The Heroes based in part on interviews with relatives who hear the Terrorism Financing (312)
cockpit voice recording, along with several government officials and
investigators. The recording reveals new details of the passengers’ struggle on Londonistan - UK
board Flight 93, but the government still has not officially stated if it believes Counterterrorism (322)
US Intel Links to Islamic
they took over the plane or not. [WASHINGTON POST, 4/19/2002; MSNBC, 7/30/2002; DAILY Militancy (69)
TELEGRAPH, 7/31/2002]
Algerian Militant Collusion
Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Zacarias Moussaoui, Jere Longman
(41)
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Indonesian Militant
Category Tags: FBI 9/11 Investigation, 9/11 Investigations Collusion (20)
Philippine Militant
Collusion (74)
April 19, 2002: FBI Director Improbably Claims Hijacker Yemeni Militant Collusion
Computer Use Offered No Evidence
(47)
FBI Director Mueller states: “In our investigation, we have not uncovered a Other Government-
single piece of paper either here in the United States or in the treasure trove of Militant Collusion (23)
information that has turned up in Afghanistan and elsewhere that mentioned Pakistan / ISI: Specific Cases
any aspect of the September 11 plot.” He also claims that the attackers used Pakistani Nukes & Islamic
“extraordinary secrecy” and “investigators have found no computers, laptops, Militancy (37)
Pakistani ISI Links to 9/11
hard drives or other storage media that may have been used by the hijackers, (73)
who hid their communications by using hundreds of pay phones and cell phones, Saeed Sheikh (59)
coupled with hard-to-trace prepaid calling cards.” [FEDERAL BUREAU OF Mahmood Ahmed (30)
INVESTIGATION, 4/19/2002; LOS ANGELES TIMES, 4/22/2002] However, before 9/11, CIA Haven in Pakistan Tribal
Region (179)
Director Tenet told the Senate that al-Qaeda is “embracing the opportunities 2008 Kabul Indian
offered by recent leaps in information technology” [US CONGRESS, 3/21/2000] ; the Embassy Bombing (10)
FBI broke the al-Qaeda computer encryption before February 2001 [UNITED PRESS Hunt for Bin Laden in
INTERNATIONAL, 2/13/2001] ; witnesses report seeing the hijackers use computers for Pakistan (154)
e-mail at public libraries in Florida and Maine [SOUTH FLORIDA SUN-SENTINEL, Terrorism Financing: Specific
Cases
9/16/2001; BOSTON HERALD, 10/5/2001] ; in October 2001 there were many reports
Al Taqwa Bank (29)
that hundreds of e-mails discussing the 9/11 plot had been found (see October Al-Kifah/MAK (54)
2001); Moussaoui’s laptop was found to contain important information (see (Late BCCI (37)
July-Early August, 2002)), and so on. BIF (28)
Entity Tags: George J. Tenet, Robert S. Mueller III, Al-Qaeda, Federal Bureau of BMI and Ptech (21)
Investigation Bin Laden Family (62)
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Drugs (71)
Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, FBI 9/11 Investigation 'War on Terrorism' Outside
Iraq
Afghanistan (300)
May-December 5, 2002: US Investigators Pressed to Look Into Drone Use in Pakistan /
Ptech Afghanistan (53)
In October 2001, Ptech insiders attempted to warn the Destruction of CIA Tapes
(92)
FBI that suspected terrorist financier Yassin al-Qadi had Escape From Afghanistan
funded Ptech (see Shortly After October 12, 2001). Then (61)
Indira Singh, an employee at JP Morgan Chase bank, High Value Detainees
develops her own suspicions about Ptech after her bank (179)
assigned her to investigate Ptech for a potential business Terror Alerts (50)
Counterterrorism Action
deal. In May 2002, she speaks with the FBI about her After 9/11 (353)
concerns. Weeks later, she learns the FBI still has not Counterterrorism
told any other government agencies about the potential Policy/Politics (432)
Ptech security threat. She later will recall, “the Internal US Security After
language, the kind of language law enforcement, 9/11 (125)
Indira Singh. [Source:
Michael Kane] counterterrorism, and the FBI agents themselves were
using basically indicated to me that absolutely no
investigation was going on, that it was totally at a standstill, at which point my Email Updates
hair stood on end.” She contacts a Boston CBS television station, WBZ-TV, and a
Receive weekly email updates
reporter for the station named Joe Bergantino begins investigating Ptech. summarizing what contributors
[BOSTON GLOBE, 12/7/2002; NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, 12/8/2002; WBZ 4 (BOSTON), 12/9/2002] have added to the History
Around the same time, a former government official with contacts in the Bush Commons database
administration tells officials at the National Security Council about the Ptech Email Address Here Go
allegations. By late August, Operation Greenquest then opens its own Ptech
investigation. The FBI then tries “to muscle its way back into the probe once it Donate
[becomes] clear that [Greenquest is] taking the case seriously.” [NEWSWEEK,
Developing and maintaining
12/6/2002; WBZ 4 (BOSTON), 12/9/2002] Beginning in late November, US agents begin this site is very labor
calling Ptech officials and asking them if they have ties to money laundering, intensive. If you find it useful,
please give us a hand and
thus tipping them off. Ptech will also be notified when a December raid will be
occurring before it happens. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 1/3/2003] WBZ-TV prepared a story donate what you can.
Donate Now
on Ptech, but withheld it from the public for more than three months after
receiving “calls from federal law enforcement agencies, some at the highest
levels.” The station claims the government launched its Ptech probe in August Volunteer
2002, after they “got wind of our investigation” and “asked us to hold the story If you would like to help us
so they could come out and do their raid and look like they’re ahead of the with this effort, please
contact us. We need help with
game.” [BOSTON GLOBE, 12/7/2002; WBZ 4 (BOSTON), 12/9/2002] programming (Java, JDO,
Entity Tags: Operation Greenquest, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Ptech Inc., mysql, and xml), design,
National Security Council, Indira Singh networking, and publicity. If
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline you want to contribute
information to this site, click
Category Tags: BMI and Ptech, Terrorism Financing, FBI 9/11 Investigation, 9/11
the register link at the top of
Investigations the page, and start
contributing.
Contact Us
May 21-22, 2002: Prisoner Told FBI of Imminent Al-Qaeda Attacks
before 9/11
Walid Arkeh, a prisoner in Florida, is interviewed by a
group of FBI agents in New York City. The agents seek
information regarding the 1988 US embassy bombings
and are there to interview him about information he
learned from three al-Qaeda prisoners he had
befriended. During the interview, Arkeh claims that,
in August 2001, he told the FBI that al-Qaeda was
likely to attack the WTC and other targets soon, but
he was dismissed (see August 21, 2001). After 9/11,
his warning still was not taken seriously by the local
FBI. The New York FBI agents are stunned. One says to
him: “Let me tell you something. If you know what
happened in New York, we are all in deep sh_t. We are
Walid Arkeh. [Source: Orlando
in deep trouble.” Arkeh tells the agents that these
Sentinel / Bureau of Prisons] prisoners hinted that the WTC would be attacked, and
targets in Washington were mentioned as well.
However, they did not tell him a date or that airplanes would be used. The New
York FBI later will inform him that they find his information credible. [ORLANDO
SENTINEL, 10/30/2002] Arkeh is later deported to Jordan despite a Responsible
Cooperators Program promising visas to those who provided important
information to US-designated terrorist groups. (It is unclear whether any one
ever has been given a reward through this program.) [ORLANDO SENTINEL, 11/10/2002;
ORLANDO SENTINEL, 1/11/2003; ORLANDO SENTINEL, 3/12/2003]
Entity Tags: World Trade Center, Walid Arkeh, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Al-Qaeda
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: Warning Signs, FBI 9/11 Investigation, 9/11 Investigations
May 27, 2002: FBI Still Has ‘No Breakthrough’ in Understanding

9/11 Plot
Journalist Seymour Hersh writes in the New Yorker, “In a recent conversation, a
senior FBI official acknowledged that there had been ‘no breakthrough’ inside
the government, in terms of establishing how the September 11th suicide teams
were organized and how they operated.” The recent war in Afghanistan “has yet
to produce significant information about the planning and execution of the
attacks. US forces are known to have captured thousands of pages of documents
and computer hard drives from al-Qaeda redoubts, but so far none of this
material—which remains highly classified—has enabled the Justice Department
to broaden its understanding of how the attack occurred, or even to bring an
indictment of a conspirator.” [NEW YORKER, 5/27/2002] It has never been made clear
if, how, and/or when the FBI subsequently made a breakthrough in
understanding the 9/11 plot.
Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation
Summer 2002: Pennsylvania Coroner Receives Inquiry from

Relative of Flight 93 Hijacker about Remains
Wallace Miller, the coroner in Somerset County, Pennsylvania, where Flight 93
crashed on 9/11, is contacted by an uncle of one of the Flight 93 hijackers, who
asks him if any remains of his nephew have been recovered. According to Miller:
“I got a call from Beirut at 4 a.m. He said he was an uncle of one of them and
wanted to know what the situation was. I said if he sent a DNA sample, we’d
make a cross-reference to confirm, but I never heard anything more from him.”
In 2008, Miller will say that he cannot recall the name of the caller or who his
nephew was. However, only one of the Flight 93 hijackers—Ziad Jarrah—was
from Beirut, while the others were apparently Saudis (see 1980s and 1990s).
Miller will say that the uncle’s inquiry was apparently prompted by a British or
South African journalist who had put the man on the phone after interviewing
him about the events of 9/11. This appears to be the only attempt ever made by
a relative to claim the remains of a hijacker (see September 21, 2008). [NEW YORK
TIMES, 9/21/2008]
Entity Tags: Wallace Miller, Ziad Jarrah
June 3, 2002: Results of 9/11 Related Insider Trading Inquiries

Are Still Unknown
A rare follow-up article about insider trading based on 9/11 foreknowledge
confirms that numerous inquiries in the US and around the world are still
ongoing. However, “all are treating these inquiries as if they were state
secrets.” The author speculates: “The silence from the investigating camps
could mean any of several things: Either terrorists are responsible for the puts
on the airline stocks; others besides terrorists had foreknowledge; the puts were
just lucky bets by credible investors; or, there is nothing whatsoever to support
the insider-trading rumors.” [INSIGHT, 6/3/2002] Another article notes that
Deutsche Bank Alex Brown, the American investment banking arm of German
giant Deutsche Bank, purchased at least some of these options. Deutsche Bank
Alex Brown was once headed by “Buzzy” Krongard, who quit that company in
March 2001 and became Executive Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA). “This fact may not be significant. And then again, it may. After all, there
has traditionally been a close link between the CIA, big banks, and the
brokerage business.” [BUSINESS LINE, 2/11/2002]
Entity Tags: A.B. (“Buzzy”) Krongard, Deutsche Bank, Central Intelligence Agency
Category Tags: Insider Trading/ Foreknowledge, 9/11 Investigations, FBI 9/11
Investigation, Other 9/11 Investigations
Early July 2002: Moussaoui Expresses Willingness to Talk, Offer Is

Rejected by Justice Department
Zacarias Moussaoui indicates that he is willing to disclose information to the US
authorities, but his overtures are rejected by the FBI and the Justice
Department. After learning of Moussaoui’s offer, Minneapolis FBI counsel Coleen
Rowley contacts assistants to FBI director Robert Mueller and to Justice
Department manager Michael Chertoff. She says she is worried about
Moussaoui’s research into cropdusting and wind patterns, and that the
information he could provide may prove useful averting a second strike by al-
Qaeda. Rowley will later comment: “But by that time Moussaoui had been
charged with the death penalty and I deduced that [attorney general John]
Ashcroft would not allow any potential for bargaining leverage to be injected
into the case.” [HUFFINGTON POST, 5/2/2007]
Entity Tags: Michael Chertoff, Coleen Rowley, FBI Minnesota field office, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, John Ashcroft, Zacarias Moussaoui, Robert S. Mueller III, US
Department of Justice
Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui, FBI 9/11 Investigation, 9/11 Investigations, 9/11
Related Criminal Proceedings
(Late July-Early August, 2002): Moussaoui E-mails May Have

Vanished
Although US authorities are aware that Zacarias Moussaoui has one e-mail
account and recover e-mails from it, he now says that he has another two, but
the FBI is unable to find any trace of them (see August 17-November 11, 2001
and After). E-mails sent from the first address, pilotz123@hotmail.com, have
been recovered and will be produced at his trial. However, the other two
addresses, xdesertman@hotmail.com and olimahammed@hotmail.com, were not
uncovered by the FBI’s post-9/11 investigation and US authorities only learn of
them from a statement made at this time by Moussaoui, who says the e-mails
could provide him with an alibi and that he accessed the accounts from various
computers, including his laptop, one at a Kinko’s outlet, and one at the
University of Oklahoma. However, Microsoft, which operates Hotmail, says it is
unable to locate any records of the accounts and that they do not exist. As the
accounts have been inactive for over a year and all data for a hotmail account is
deleted after 90 days of inactivity, no e-mails can be retrieved. Had the FBI
asked Microsoft about the addresses within the 90-day period, they may have
found information about the e-mails, but they did not do so because they did
not know about them—the FBI decided not to interview Moussaoui after 9/11
(see September 11-12, 2001 and Early July 2002). The hard drives at the Kinko’s
outlet had been wiped by the time the FBI arrived in September 2001 and no
record of Moussaoui’s computer use there is found. Moussaoui had a receipt for
the Kinko’s outlet with him when he was arrested, so the FBI might have been
able to examine the Kinko’s computers before the hard drives were wiped if
they had acted more promptly (see August 17-November 11, 2001 and After).
[WIRED NEWS, 8/30/2002; INTERNETNEWS (.COM), 8/30/2002; CNN, 9/4/2002; CNN, 12/31/2002;
US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006]
Entity Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui, FBI 9/11 Investigation, 9/11 Investigations
July 31, 2002: Sheriff Raids Business that Supplied 9/11

Hijackers with Fake ID
A business owned by Mohamed el-Atriss, who supplied the
9/11 hijackers with fake IDs (see (July-August 2001)), is
raided by the Passaic County Sheriff’s Department. The
raids are carried out in a blaze of publicity and are strongly
opposed by the US attorney’s office for New Jersey and the
FBI, which has a relationship with el-Atriss (see July 31,
2002 and After, September 13, 2001-Mid 2002). [BERGEN
RECORD, 8/7/2002] The sheriff is suspicious of el-Atriss and
raids his business because, in addition to providing
hijackers Abdulaziz Alomari and Khalid Almihdhar with at
Passaic County Sheriff least two pieces of fake ID, el-Atriss:
Jerry Speziale. [Source: Talked repeatedly on the phone to another hijacker (see
Triborochamber]
(July-August 2001));
Is an associate of an unindicted co-conspirator in the 1993 ‘Landmarks’ bomb
plot (see Before September 11, 2001);
Wired $29,000 to the Arab National Bank in Mecca in 2002; [WASHINGTON POST,
1/3/2003]
Made inquiries to a parts manufacturer about navigational systems for
commercial jetliners to be shipped to Egypt in 1999; [NEWARK STAR-LEDGER,
10/20/2003]
Downloaded a list of the 9/11 hijackers from the Internet after 9/11,
underlined some names, and circled Khalid Almihdhar’s. [NEWARK STAR-LEDGER,
10/20/2003]
El-Atriss is not present during the raid, having traveled to Egypt a short time
before, but later returns to the US and is arrested at JFK airport in New York.
[CBS NEWS, 7/31/2002; BBC, 8/21/2002] He will later say that he came back to the US
to clear his name after learning of the raid while in Egypt. He will be charged
with over two dozen counts of selling false documents. [NEWARK STAR-LEDGER,
10/20/2003] Secret evidence will be used against him at the trial. He will plead
guilty to one of charges, while the rest will be dropped. (see November 2002-
June 2003).
Entity Tags: Mohamed el-Atriss, Khalid Almihdhar, Passaic County Sheriff’s Department
Category Tags: FBI 9/11 Investigation, Internal US Security After 9/11, Counterterrorism
Action After 9/11, 9/11 Investigations
July 31, 2002 and After: US Attorney Threatens to Arrest Local

Sheriff in Row over Raid on Hijackers’ Associate, FBI Also Highly
Critical
Both the FBI and the US attorney’s office for New Jersey
are highly critical of a raid by the Passaic County sheriff’s
office on the business of Mohamed el-Atriss, who supplied
the 9/11 hijackers with false IDs (see (July-August 2001)
and July 31, 2002). El-Atriss is later arrested and will plead
guilty to selling fake IDs (see November 2002-June 2003).
According to the sheriff, when US attorney for New Jersey
Christopher Christie learns the sheriff intends to hold a
news conference about the raid, he tells the sheriff that
“he [will] be arrested and the US attorney [will] come
down and shut down the Sheriff’s Department.” However, a
US attorney for New spokesman for Christie will deny this. [NEWARK STAR-LEDGER,
Jersey Christopher
Christie opposed a raid 10/20/2003] The FBI also hammers the sheriff in the media
on an associate of the after the arrest, calling the raid, in which officers were
9/11 hijackers. [Source:
Public domain] accompanied by several press representatives, a “shameful
media grab” and saying that the sheriff killed an FBI
investigation. The Bergen County Record will point out that this is unusual, as
“the feds don’t make a habit of lambasting other law enforcement officials
publicly or of confirming the existence of secret investigations.” [BERGEN RECORD,
8/7/2002] Federal officials then tell the sheriff’s department not to proceed with
any investigations related to el-Atriss until they get clearance from the FBI.
[NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, 10/20/2003] El-Atriss cooperated with the FBI after 9/11 and
promised to “keep his eyes and ears open” for other terrorists (see September
13, 2001-Mid 2002).
Entity Tags: US Attorney’s Office for the District of New Jersey, Mohamed el-Atriss,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Christopher J. (“Chris”) Christie, Passaic County
Sheriff’s Department
Category Tags: FBI 9/11 Investigation, Internal US Security After 9/11, Counterterrorism
Action After 9/11, 9/11 Investigations
August 2, 2002: FBI Questions Members of 9/11 Congressional

Inquiry about 9/11 Leaks
The Washington Post reveals that FBI agents have
questioned nearly all 37 senators and
congresspeople making up the 9/1 Congressional
Inquiry about 9/11-related information leaks. In
particular, in June 2002 the media reported that
the day before 9/11 the NSA intercepted the
messages “The match is about to begin” and
“Tomorrow is zero hour”(see September 10, 2001).
The FBI has asked the members to submit to lie
detector tests but most have refused.
Congresspeople express “grave concern” for this
historically unprecedented move. A law professor
states: “Now the FBI can open dossiers on every
member and staffer and develop full information on Senator Richard Shelby. [Source:
them. It creates a great chilling effect on those US Senate]
who would be critical of the FBI.” [WASHINGTON POST, 8/2/2002] Senator John McCain
(R-AZ) suggests that “the constitutional separation of powers is being violated in
spirit if not in the letter. ‘What you have here is an organization compiling
dossiers on people who are investigating the same organization. The
administration bitterly complains about some leaks out of a committee, but
meanwhile leaks abound about secret war plans for fighting a war against
Saddam Hussein. What’s that about? There’s a bit of a contradiction here, if not
a double standard.’” [WASHINGTON POST, 8/3/2002] Later the search for the source of
the leak intensifies to unprecedented levels as the FBI asks 17 senators to turn
over phone records, appointment calendars, and schedules that would reveal
their possible contact with reporters. [WASHINGTON POST, 8/24/2002] Most, if not all,
turn over the records, even as some complain that the request breaches the
separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches. One
senator says the FBI is “trying to put a damper on our activities and I think they
will be successful.” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/29/2002] In January 2004, it will be
reported that the probe is focusing on Sen. Richard Shelby (R-AL). He will not be
charged with any crime relating to the leak. [WASHINGTON POST, 1/22/2004] In
November 2005, the Senate Ethics Committee will announce it has dropped a
probe of Shelby, citing insufficient evidence. [REUTERS, 11/13/2005] Inquiry co-chair
Sen. Bob Graham (D-FL) will write in a book in late 2004 that, at the time, he
guessed “the leak was intended to sabotage [the inquiry’s] efforts. I am not by
nature a conspiracy theorist, but the fact that we were hit with this disclosure
at the moment we began to make things uncomfortable for the Bush
administration has stuck with me. Over a year later, I asked [inquiry co-chair]
Congressman [Porter] Goss (R-FL) whether he thought we had been set up.
Nodding, he replied, ‘I often wonder that myself.’” [GRAHAM AND NUSSBAUM, 2004,
PP. 140] Author Philip Shenon will observe that this tactic of intimidation worked,
as “Members of the joint committee and their staffs were frightened into
silence about the investigation.” [SHENON, 2008, PP. 55]
Entity Tags: 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Daniel Robert
(“Bob”) Graham, Philip Shenon, Porter J. Goss, Richard Shelby, John McCain, House
Intelligence Committee
Category Tags: 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, FBI 9/11 Investigation, 9/11 Investigations
September 9, 2002: New Video Footage of 911 Hijackers Shown;

New Audio of Bin Laden Praising Them
Al Jazeera television broadcasts video footage in which bin Laden appears to
take credit for the 9/11 attacks. Some of the video footage shows some 9/11
hijackers, including Ahmed Alnami, Hamza Alghamdi, Saeed Alghamdi, Waleed
Alshehri, and Wail Alshehri, talking with each other and studying maps and flight
manuals. At one point, hands are shown over maps of the US and the Pentagon,
but no faces are shown as this happens. One section of the video is hijacker
Abdulaziz Alomari reading last will and testament in which he praises Osama bin
Laden (see September 9, 2002). Al Jazeera says the video was filmed in
Kandahar, Afghanistan, in early 2001. Additional footage has bin Laden hailing
the hijackers as heroes, but there is no video footage of him saying this, only his
voice over still photographs of the hijackers. The Financial Times will report,
“But analysts cited the crude editing of the tapes and the timing of the
broadcasts as reasons to be suspicious about their authenticity. The skepticism
was deepened by Al Jazeera’s silence yesterday about how it had obtained the
videos.” [FINANCIAL TIMES, 9/11/2002] Al Jazeera shows an interview of al-Qaeda
leaders Ramzi bin al-Shibh and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) around the same
time (see September 8-11, 2002). Yosri Fouda, who allegedly was the one who
interviewed bin al-Shibh and KSM several months earlier, will later claim that
parts of the documentary were narrated by bin al-Shibh, although the voice is
not identified as his. And bin al-Shibh was working on the documentary when
the interview took place. [FOUDA AND FIELDING, 2003, PP. 158-159]
Entity Tags: Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Waleed Alshehri, Hamza Alghamdi, Saeed Alghamdi,
Ahmed Alnami, Osama bin Laden, Wail Alshehri
Category Tags: Other 9/11 Hijackers, 9/11
Investigations, FBI 9/11 Investigation, Osama
Bin Laden, Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh, Alleged Al-
Qaeda Media Statements
The top picture is of Waleed Alshehri. The

bottom two pictures are said to be of
hijackers planning the 9/11 attacks, but no
faces are shown to help confirm this.
[Source: Spiegel TV]
September 9, 2002: Video of 9/11 Hijacker Cursing US and

Praising Bin Laden Is Released
A martyr video of 9/11 hijacker
Abdulaziz Alomari is broadcast on
the Al Jazeera satellite network. In
it, Alomari gives a speech that he
calls his last will and testament, and
says: “I am writing this with my full
conscience and I am writing this in
expectation of the end, which is
near. An end that is really a
beginning.” He implores the US to
“take your fat hands off the land of
Arabs.… We will get you. We will
Abdulaziz Alomari in his martyr video. [Source: Al humiliate you. We will never stop
Jazeera]
following you.… God praise
everybody who trained and helped me, namely the leader Sheikh Osama bin
Laden. May God bless him. May God accept our deeds.” It is believed that
Alomari recorded the video around March 2001, the same time most of the other
9/11 hijackers recorded similar videos (see March 2001), and the background of
a burning Pentagon was added digitally after 9/11. [CNN, 9/9/2002; WASHINGTON
POST, 9/11/2002] Alomari’s speech is part of an hour-long al-Qaeda video broadcast
on Al Jazeera (see September 9, 2002).
Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, Abdulaziz Alomari, Al Jazeera, Al-Qaeda
Category Tags: Other 9/11 Hijackers, 9/11 Investigations, FBI 9/11 Investigation,
Alleged Al-Qaeda Media Statements
September 18, 2002: 9/11 Victims’ Relatives Raise Questions

about US Agencies’ Conduct
Two 9/11 victims’ relatives testify before the
Congressional 9/11 inquiry. Kristen Breitweiser, whose
husband Ronald died at the WTC, asks how the FBI
was so quickly able to assemble information on the
hijackers. She cites a New York Times article stating
that agents descended on flight schools within hours
of the attacks. “How did the FBI know where to go a
few hours after the attacks?” she asks. “Were any of
the hijackers already under surveillance?” [MSNBC,
9/18/2002] She adds, “Our intelligence agencies
suffered an utter collapse in their duties and
responsibilities leading up to and on September 11th.
But their negligence does not stand alone. Agencies
like the Port Authority, the City of NY, the FAA, the
INS, the Secret Service, NORAD, the Air Force, and
Kristen Breitweiser. [Source: the airlines also failed our nation that morning.” [US
Hyungwon Kang/ Reuters]
CONGRESS, 9/18/2002] Stephen Push states, “If the
intelligence community had been doing its job, my wife, Lisa Raines, would be
alive today.” He cites the government’s failure to place Khalid Almihdhar and
Nawaf Alhazmi on a terrorist watch list until long after they were photographed
meeting with alleged al-Qaeda operatives in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000 and
Shortly After). [MSNBC, 9/18/2002]
Entity Tags: Stephen Push, US Secret Service, Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey, US Department of the Air Force, Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, Kristen
Breitweiser, Al-Qaeda, Federal Aviation Administration, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, US Immigration and Naturalization Service, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry,
City of New York, Lisa Raines
October 2002: FBI Inexplicably Fails to Detain Imam Al-Awlaki

Linked to 9/11 Hijackers, Lets Him Leave US
Shortly after 9/11, the FBI begins to suspect
that Anwar al-Awlaki, an imam to several of the
9/11 hijackers, may have had some connection
to the 9/11 plot. They interview him
repeatedly, but cannot find enough evidence to
charge him, and he cannot be deported since he
is a US citizen. Investigators discover he had
been arrested more than once for soliciting
prostitutes. They learn he is consorting with
prostitutes in Virginia, and contemplate jailing
him on an obscure law against transporting
prostitutes across state lines. However, this plan
Ali al Timini. [Source: Fox News] collapses when he leaves the US unexpectedly
in March 2002. [US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT,
6/13/2004] But on October 10, 2002, he makes a surprise return to the US. His
name is on a terrorist watch list and he is detained when his plane lands in New
York City. Customs agents notify the FBI, but they are told that his name was
taken off the watch list just the day before. He is released after only three
hours. It has not been explained why he name was taken off the list. Throughout
2002, al-Awlaki is also the subject of an active Customs investigation into money
laundering called Operation Greenquest, but he is not arrested for this either, or
for the earlier contemplated prostitution charges. [WORLDNETDAILY, 8/16/2003] At
the time, the FBI is fighting Greenquest, and Customs officials will later accuse
the FBI of sabotaging Greenquest investigations (see After March 20, 2002-Early
2003). While in the US, al-Awlaki visits the Fairfax, Virginia, home of Ali al
Timimi, the leader of a nearby Islamic center. According to a later court filing,
al-Awlaki attempts to get al Timimi to discuss the recruitment of young Muslims
for militant causes, but al Timimi does not show interest. Al Timimi will later be
sentenced to life in prison in the US for inciting young Muslims to fight in
Afghanistan shortly after 9/11. [WASHINGTON POST, 2/27/2008] Al-Awlaki then leaves
the US again. The FBI will later admit they were “very interested” in al-Awlaki
and yet failed to stop him from leaving the country. One FBI source says, “We
don’t know how he got out.” [US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 6/13/2004] He will
allegedly take part in other militant attacks (see September 15, 2006). By 2008,
US intelligence will conclude that he is linked to al-Qaeda (see February 27,
2008).
Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, US Customs Service, Operation Greenquest, Anwar al-Awlaki,
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Category Tags: Possible Hijacker Associates in US, 9/11 Investigations, FBI 9/11
Investigation, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11, Internal US Security After 9/11,
Anwar Al-Awlaki
Late 2002-2004: Imam Al-Awlaki Lives Openly in Britain, despite

Growing Evidence of Link to 9/11 Plot
Anwar al-Awlaki, the imam for three of the 9/11 hijackers in the US, lives
openly in Britain.
Growing Suspicions about Al-Awlaki in US - After 9/11, US investigators
increasingly suspect that al-Awlaki’s links with hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid
Almihdhar, and Hani Hanjour in the US were more than just a coincidence. In
October 2002, al-Awlaki is briefly detained while visiting the US but is not
arrested, even though there is an outstanding warrant for his arrest (see
October 2002). The FBI as a whole does not believe he was involved in the 9/11
plot. However, some disagree. One detective tells the 9/11 Commission in 2003
or 2004 that al-Awlaki “was at the center of the 9/11 story.” The 9/11
Congressional Inquiry releases its final report in 2003, and it states that al-
Awlaki “was a central figure in a support network that aided [Alhazmi and
Almihdhar]” (see August 1-3, 2003).
No Attempt to Arrest Him Living Openly in Britain - Al-Awlaki does not visit the
US again, after his near arrest. But he lives openly in Britain, a close US ally. He
teaches Islam to students in London and adopts an increasingly religious
fundamentalist stance. His lectures grow in popularity, especially through sales
of CDs of recorded speeches. He travels widely through Britain giving lectures.
But despite growing evidence against him in the US, there is no known attempt
to have him arrested in Britain. At some point in 2004, he moves to Yemen to
preach and study there. [NEW YORK TIMES, 5/8/2010]
Entity Tags: Anwar al-Awlaki, 9/11 Commission, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Hani Hanjour, Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar
Category Tags: Possible Hijacker Associates in US, 9/11 Investigations, 9/11
Commission, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, FBI 9/11 Investigation, Anwar Al-Awlaki
November 2002-June 2003: Secret Evidence Used against

Hijackers’ Associate Attracts Criticism, Most Charges Are Dropped
The case of Mohamed el-Atriss, who was arrested for selling false ID cards to
two of the 9/11 hijackers (see (July-August 2001)) and was an associate of an
unindicted co-conspirator in the ‘Landmarks’ bomb plot trial (see Before
September 11, 2001), becomes controversial when secret evidence is used
against him at a series of hearings. The evidence is presented without el-Atriss
or his attorney being present and such secrecy is said to be unusual even after
9/11. Based on the secret evidence, el-Atriss’ bond is set at $500,000, which the
Washington Post calls “an amount consistent with a charge of capital murder—
even though most of the charges against him [are] misdemeanors.” The secret
evidence rule is invoked for national security

reasons based on a request by the sheriff’s office,
while el-Atriss is being held in prison for six
months. However, the FBI, which has a relationship
with el-Atriss (see September 13, 2001-Mid 2002)
and does not back the use of the secret evidence,
insists that el-Atriss is not connected to terrorism.
An appeals judge rules that the secret evidence
cannot be used on the say-so of local officials.
According to the judge, the secret information is
inaccurate and could have been rebutted by el-
Judge Marilyn Clark heard the case Atriss if he had seen it. Transcripts of the secret
of Mohamed el-Atriss. [Source:
newjerseycourtsonline] hearings are later released to the media
[WASHINGTON POST, 2/5/2003; WASHINGTON POST, 6/25/2003]
In January 2003 el-Atriss pleads guilty to a charge of selling false identification
documents to two hijackers, Khalid Almihdhar and Abdulaziz Alomari, and is
sentenced to five years’ probation, with credit for the six months in jail he has
already served, and a $15,000 fine. Although he admits selling the cards not just
to the two hijackers, but also to hundreds of illegal immigrants, the other 26
charges against him are dropped by prosecutors. [WASHINGTON POST, 2/5/2003;
NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, 10/20/2003]
Entity Tags: Mohamed el-Atriss
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline, Civil Liberties
Category Tags: FBI 9/11 Investigation, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11, Internal US
Security After 9/11, Possible Hijacker Associates in US, 9/11 Investigations
November 24, 2002: Terrorism Suspects Held Without Charge as

‘Material Witnesses’
The Washington Post reports that the US is using an obscure statute to detain
and investigate terrorism suspects without having to charge them with a crime.
At least 44 people, some of them US citizens, have been held as “material
witnesses.” Some have been held for months, and some have been held in
maximum-security conditions. Most in fact have never testified, even though
that is supposedly why they were held. [WASHINGTON POST, 11/24/2002]
Entity Tags: United States
Timeline Tags: Civil Liberties
December 5, 2002: Software Company with Access to

Government Secrets Raided
Federal agents search the offices of
Ptech, Inc., a Boston computer
software company, looking for
evidence of links to Osama bin
Laden. A senior Ptech official
confirms that Yassin al-Qadi, one of
12 Saudi businessmen on a secret
CIA list suspected of funneling
millions of dollars to al-Qaeda, was
an investor in the company,
beginning in 1994. Ptech appears to
have connections to other potential
terrorist financiers (see 1994). In
particular, there seem to be many
FBI agents raid Ptech offices. [Source: ABC News] ties between Ptech and BMI Inc., a
New Jersey-based company whose
list of investors has been called a “who’s who of designated terrorists and
Islamic extremists” (see 1986-October 1999). [NEWSWEEK, 12/6/2002; WBZ 4 (BOSTON),
12/9/2002] A former FBI counterterrorism official states, “For someone like [al-
Qadi] to be involved in a capacity, in an organization, a company that has access
to classified information, that has access to government open or classified

computer systems, would be of grave concern.” [WBZ 4 (BOSTON), 12/9/2002] On the
day after the raid, US authorities will claim that Ptech’s software has been
scrutinized and poses no danger. But security expert John Pike comments,
“When you look at all of the different military security agencies that they have
as customers, it’s very difficult to imagine how they would not be encountering
sensitive information, classified information.” [NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, 12/8/2002]
The search into Ptech is part of Operation Greenquest, which has served 114
search warrants in the past 14 months involving suspected terrorist financing.
Fifty arrests have been made and $27.4 million seized. [FORBES, 12/6/2002]
However, the raid appears to have been largely for show. Ptech was notified by
US officials in November that they were being investigated, and they were told
in advance exactly when the raid would take place (see May-December 5, 2002).
Top officials in the US government appear to have made up their minds before
the results of the raid can even be examined. White House Press Secretary Ari
Fleischer comments on the Ptech raid only hours after it ends: “The one thing I
can share with you is that the products that were supplied by this company to
the government all fell in the nonclassified area. None of it involved any
classified products used by the government. The material has been reviewed by
the appropriate government agencies, and they have detected absolutely
nothing in their reports to the White House that would lead to any concern
about any of the products purchased from this company.” [WHITE HOUSE, 12/6/2002]
The fact that the raid takes place at all appears to be due to the persistence of
Operation Greenquest investigators, who are engaged at this time in a
bureaucratic battle with other investigators over who will control US
government investigations into terrorist financing (see After March 20, 2002-
Early 2003). Greenquest will lose this battle early in 2003 and get shut down
(see May 13-June 30, 2003). In his 2003 book Black Ice, author Dan Verton will
call Ptech an “innocent” casualty of Operation Greenquest’s “scorched-earth”
tactics. [VERTON, 2003, PP. 223] No charges will be brought against Ptech, and the
company will continue fulfilling sensitive government contracts under a new
name (see May 14, 2004).
Entity Tags: Operation Greenquest, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Yassin al-Qadi,
Central Intelligence Agency, Ari Fleischer, BMI Inc., Ptech Inc.
Category Tags: Terrorism Financing, BMI and Ptech, FBI 9/11 Investigation, 9/11
Investigations
January 22, 2003: House of 9/11 Suspect Finally Searched by FBI

The FBI conducts a very public search of a Miami, Florida, house belonging to
Mohammed Almasri and his Saudi family. Having lived in Miami since July 2000,
on September 9, 2001, they said they were returning to Saudi Arabia, hurriedly
put their luggage in a van, and sped away, according to neighbors. A son named
Turki Almasri was enrolled at Huffman Aviation in Venice, Florida, where
hijackers Atta and Marwan Alshehhi also studied. [WASHINGTON POST, 1/23/2003; PALM
BEACH POST, 1/23/2003] Neighbors repeatedly called the FBI after 9/11 to report
their suspicions, but the FBI only began to search the house in October 2002.
The house had remained abandoned, but not sold, since they left just before
9/11. [PALM BEACH POST, 1/22/2003; SOUTH FLORIDA SUN-SENTINEL, 1/22/2003; WASHINGTON
POST, 1/23/2003; PALM BEACH POST, 1/23/2003] The FBI returned for more thorough
searches in January 2003, with some agents dressed in white biohazard suits.
[WASHINGTON POST, 1/23/2003] US Representative Robert Wexler (D-FL), later says,
“This scenario is screaming out one question: Where was the FBI for 15 months?”
The FBI determines there is no terrorism connection, and apologizes to the
family. [UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 1/24/2003] An editorial notes the “ineptitude”
of the FBI in not reaching family members over the telephone, as reporters were
easily able to do. [PALM BEACH POST, 2/1/2003]
Entity Tags: Robert Wexler, Turki Almasri, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mohammed
Almasri
Category Tags: FBI 9/11 Investigation, 9/11 Investigations, Possible Hijacker Associates
in US
Late February 2003: DNA Identifies Passenger Remains, but

Hijacker DNA Is Not Tested
Medical examiners match human remains to the DNA of two of the hijackers that
flew on Flights 11 and/or 175 into the WTC. The names of the two hijackers are
not released. The FBI gave the examiners DNA profiles of all ten hijackers on
those flights a few weeks earlier. Genetic profiles of five hijackers from Flight
77 and the four from Flight 93 that did not match any of the passengers’ profiles
have been given to the FBI, but the FBI has not given any DNA profiles with
which to match them. [CNN, 2/27/2003]
Between March 16 and 20, 2003: Associate of 9/11 Hijackers

Possibly Escapes US
Suspect Adnan Shukrijumah is able to escape the US
despite growing evidence of his involvement with
al-Qaeda and even his connection with some 9/11
hijackers. Shukrijumah lives in Miramar, Florida,
and neighbors claim to have seen him as recently as
March 15 and 16, 2003. For instance, one neighbor,
Orville Campbell, says he saw Shukrijumah at a
neighborhood barbeque on the afternoon of March
16. On March 20, just four days later, the FBI
announces a $5 million reward for Shukrijumah,
after he apparently has left the country (see March
21, 2003 and After). Just after the announcement,
Gulshair Shukrijumah, Adnan’s the New York Times reports, “Residents of Miramar,
father. [Source: Fox News]
Fla., said a man who appeared to be Mr.
Shukrijumah was living there as recently as last weekend.” [NEW YORK TIMES,
3/21/2003] It is unclear why Shukrijumah was not monitored closely enough to
prevent him leaving the US. CNN reports that Shukrijumah’s name first came up
in documents recovered after 9/11 associate Ramzi bin al-Shibh was arrested in
Pakistan in September 2002. Additionally, his name came up again in documents
seized in early March 2003 when 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was
arrested in Pakistan. Those documents referred to him as someone who would
carry out a suicide attack. Additionally, by March 19, Mohammed identified him
as one of his deputies. [CNN, 3/22/2003; US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 3/30/2003] But
those were hardly the first times US intelligence saw a link between
Shukrijumah and al-Qaeda.
His father, Gulshair Shukrijumah, was the imam of a Florida mosque, and
appears to have been under suspicion before 9/11 because of his links to the
“Blind Sheikh,” Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman, and others convicted of roles in the
1993 World Trade Center bombing (2000-2001).
From November 2000 to the spring of 2002, the FBI in Florida investigated a
group of Muslims it suspected of being terrorists, including Adnan Shukrijumah.
Two members of the group were arrested in May 2002 and later found guilty and
given prison sentences (see November 2000-Spring 2002). In April and May 2001,
the focus was on Shukrijumah, but he was careful and the FBI was only able to
prove that he lied on his green card application regarding a prior arrest (see
April-May 2001).
An FBI informant, Elie Assaad, infiltrated the mosque run by Adnan’s father in
early 2001, and grew suspicious of Adnan and his friend, 9/11 hijacker Mohamed
Atta. However, his FBI handlers assigned him easier targets instead (see Early
2001). Assaad claims that shortly after 9/11, he grew very upset after he
realized that Atta was one of the hijackers. “I curse on everybody. I destroyed
half of my furniture. Uh, I went crazy.” Presumably Assaad would have told his
FBI superiors about the link between Shukrijumah and Atta, if they didn’t know
about it already. [ABC NEWS, 9/10/2009]
It appears that 9/11 hijacker Marwan al-Shehhi attended the same small
mosque as Adnan Shukrijumah and Atta. Shortly after 9/11, the FBI visited the
mosque and asked Adnan’s parents if they recognized any of the hijackers and if
Adnan knew Atta or had mentioned trips to Pakistan and Afghanistan (see 2000-
2001).
In the spring of 2001, the FBI also investigated Shukrijumah in connection with
another Florida-based Islamist militant group. While the FBI developed evidence
against others in the group, Shukrijumah kept his distance from the main
plotters and he could not be linked to their plans (see (Spring 2001)).
Shukrijumah was also seen going to the Miami District Immigration Office with
Atta and one other man, who may have been 9/11 hijacker Ziad Jarrah (see May
2, 2001).
One article published in March 2003, shortly after the announcement of the
reward money to find Shukrijumah, claims that in the months after 9/11, US
agents went to his parents’ Florida home six times to ask about him, but he was
never there. Furthermore, his parents claimed he had been gone since before
9/11 and rarely called. His parents also claim he is innocent of any links to
Islamic militancy. [US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 3/30/2003] It is unclear if the
neighbors who knew Shukrijumah were mistaken that he was still in Florida well
after 9/11, or if he was able to stay in the US for a long time without the FBI
finding him.
Entity Tags: Marwan Alshehhi, Gulshair Shukrijumah, Elie Assaad, Ziad Jarrah, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Mohamed Atta, Adnan Shukrijumah
Investigation
May 6-8, 2003: Saudi Official with Possible 9/11 Ties Is Deported
from US
Fahad al Thumairy, a Saudi official suspected of contacts with two 9/11
hijackers, is deported from the US. Al Thumairy had worked at the Saudi
consulate in Los Angeles since 1996. In March 2003, he was secretly put on a
watch list due to suspected terrorist links. He then left the US to visit Saudi
Arabia. When he returns on May 6, he is stopped at the Los Angeles International
Airport and detained, despite having a special diplomatic visa. He is held in
custody for two days and questioned for several hours, but apparently he says
very little. Then he is deported to Saudi Arabia. [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 5/10/2003] Al
Thumairy was in frequent contact with hijacker associate Omar al-Bayoumi (see
December 1998-December 2000), and the FBI gained evidence he could have
been in contact with hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar (see 2002),
as well as al-Qaeda figure Khallad bin Attash (see June 9, 2000). Journalist
Philip Shenon will later comment that al Thumairy “had a reputation as
fanatically anti-American.” [SHENON, 2008, PP. 53]
Entity Tags: Fahad al Thumairy
Category Tags: Bayoumi and Basnan Saudi Connection, Saudi Arabia, FBI 9/11
Investigation, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11, Internal US Security After 9/11,
Possible Hijacker Associates in US, 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Related Criminal
Proceedings
July 27, 2003: Still Many 9/11 Mysteries after 9/11 Congressional
Inquiry’s Report
Shortly after the public release of the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry’s final report
(see July 24, 2003), the Los Angeles Times claims that “for all that it answers
about the attacks, the nearly 900-page report is stocked with reminders of the
many questions that remain—about other puzzling aspects of the [9/11] plot,
the possible role of foreign governments, and even such politically charged
matters as what Presidents Clinton and Bush had been told about al-Qaeda.…
[E]ven lawmakers privy to the fuller, classified version of the report…
acknowledge that the picture is incomplete.” Representative Porter Goss (R-FL),

co-chairman of the Congressional Inquiry, says, “I can tell you right now that I
don’t know exactly how the plot was hatched. I don’t know the where, the
when and the why and the who in every instance. That’s after two years of
trying. And we will someday have the documents to exploit, we will have the
people to interrogate, we will have ways to get more information to put the rest
of the pieces of this puzzle on the table. But right now, we don’t have it.”
Congressman Tim Roemer (D-IN), also part of the Congressional Inquiry, says, “I
still don’t think we know about the 19 hijackers—where they were, why they did
certain things.” [LOS ANGELES TIMES, 7/27/2003]
Entity Tags: Porter J. Goss, Tim Roemer, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry
September 19, 2003: FBI Finds No Proof of 9/11 Insider Trading

Spokesperson Paul Bresson announces that the FBI has concluded that there was
no insider trading in US securities markets by people with advance knowledge of
the 9/11 attacks. According to Bresson, the “vast majority” of a pre-attack
surge of trading in options that bet on a drop in the stock of AMR Corp., which
owns American Airlines, and UAL Corp., which owns United Airlines, was
conducted by investment hedge funds implementing bearish investment
strategies or hedging a line position of common stock, and was not linked to
terrorists. [9/11 COMMISSION, 8/18/2003 ; ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 9/19/2003; WASHINGTON
POST, 9/19/2003] However, seven months later, a paper by a professor of finance at
the University of Illinois will conclude that “there is evidence of unusual option
market activity in the days leading up to September 11” (see April 25, 2004).
[POTESHMAN, 3/10/2004]
Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, American Airlines, Paul Bresson, United
Airlines
Category Tags: Insider Trading/ Foreknowledge, FBI 9/11 Investigation, 9/11
Investigations
October 24, 2003: 9/11 Hijacker Associate Is Deported to Yemen

Omar Bakarbashat is quietly deported to Yemen after spending two years in US
prisons. Bakarbashat, a Yemeni citizen, was arrested shortly after 9/11 and held
as a material witness. He knew and worked with 9/11 hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi at
a gas station (see Autumn 2000). He was eventually charged with an immigration
violation. He pled guilty to creating phony immigration documents and a Social
Security card, and then served a six-month sentence. However, he chose to
remain imprisoned so he could fight deportation. But after two years in prison,
he gives up and agrees to be deported. According to his lawyer, he is
interrogated and briefly jailed in Yemen, and then is let go. After that, he
moves to Saudi Arabia. [SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, 5/26/2004] It has been claimed
that one day before the 9/11 attacks, Bakarbashat and others appeared to be
celebrating the upcoming attacks (see Late August-September 10, 2001).
Entity Tags: Nawaf Alhazmi, Omar Bakarbashat
Category Tags: Possible Hijacker Associates in US, 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Related
Criminal Proceedings, FBI 9/11 Investigation
January 2004: DNA Tests Indicate Hijackers Could Be Middle

Eastern or European
The Armed Forces DNA Identification Laboratory (AFDIL) publishes a report on
the examination of DNA of the presumed hijackers of Flight 77, which hit the
Pentagon on 9/11, and Flight 93, which went down near Shanksville,
Pennsylvania. The hijackers’ DNA is identified by a process of elimination, i.e. it
is presumed to be that which does not match the samples provided by the
passengers’ relatives. Samples are not requested from the hijackers’ families
(see After September 11, 2001), but it is determined that the DNA may have
come from Middle Eastern men, although in two cases current but not very
comprehensive databases indicate they are more likely to

come from Europeans. Also, the DNA samples from the
Pentagon indicate that two of the presumed hijackers may
well have been brothers. Presumably this refers to Nawaf and
Salem Alhazmi. [ARMED FORCES DNA IDENTIFICATION LABORATORY,
1/2004, PP. 82-84 ]
Entity Tags: Armed Forces DNA Identification Laboratory
The Armed Forces

DNA Identification
Laboratory logo.
[Source: Armed
Forces Institure of
Pathology]
March 24, 2004-May 2004: FBI Says Saudi Associates of Hijackers

Not Involved in Plot; This Conclusion Is Disputed
It is reported that the FBI has closed down their investigation into Saudis Omar
al-Bayoumi and Osama Basnan. The Associated Press reports, “The FBI
concluded at most the two Saudi men occasionally provided information to their
kingdom or helped Saudi visitors settle into the United States, but did so in
compliance with Muslim custom of being kind to strangers rather than out of
some relationship with Saudi intelligence.” [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 3/24/2004] Sen. Bob
Graham (D-FL) had cochaired the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry that found
considerable evidence tying these two men to two 9/11 hijackers and also to
the Saudi government. When he sees this news report, he contacts the FBI and is
told the report is not correct and that the investigation into the two men is still
ongoing. A month later, FBI Director Robert Mueller tells Graham that the report
was correct, and the case has been closed. Graham asks Mueller to speak to the
two FBI agents who reached this conclusion and find out why they reached it. He
asks that he should be allowed the same access to them that the Associated
Press had been given. Both Mueller and Attorney General John Ashcroft refuse to
give clearance for the agents to speak to Graham. Graham then writes a letter
with Sen. Arlen Specter (R-PA), again asking for clarification and the right to
meet with the agents. Their request is denied. Graham concludes that this is
something it “seems that neither the FBI nor the Bush administration wants the
American people to find out about.” [GRAHAM AND NUSSBAUM, 2004, PP. 224-227]
Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Osama Basnan, Omar al-Bayoumi
Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Bayoumi and Basnan Saudi Connection, 9/11
Congressional Inquiry, FBI 9/11 Investigation, Saudi Arabia, 9/11 Investigations
May 21, 2004: 9/11 Hijacker Associate Is Deported to Yemen;

Later Evidence Will Renew Suspicions He Was Involved in 9/11
Plot
Mohdar Abdullah is quietly deported to Yemen after spending nearly three years
in US prisons. Abdullah was arrested shortly after 9/11 and held as a material
witness. He was eventually charged with an immigration violation. He pled
guilty to lying on an asylum application and then served a six-month sentence.
However, he chose to remain imprisoned so he could fight deportation. He is a
Yemeni citizen, and the US wanted to deport him to Yemen, but the Yemeni
government would not take him. According to his lawyer, Yemen twice refused
to admit him and only finally agreed after intense pressure from the US State
Department. [SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, 5/26/2004]
Suspicious Links to 9/11 Hijackers - Officials said in court documents that
Abdullah regularly dined and prayed with 9/11 hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid
Almihdhar, and Hani Hanjour. Additionally, he helped Alhazmi and Almihdhar
adjust to life in the US in a variety of ways, including help with: interpreting,

computer use, finding a job, finding a place to live, obtaining Social Security
cards, and obtaining driver licenses. He also worked with Alhazmi at a gas
station where many other radical Islamists worked, including some who had
been investigated by the FBI (see Autumn 2000). [SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE,
5/26/2004; SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, 6/2/2004]
9/11 Commission Not Allowed to Interview Him before Deportation - The 9/11
Commission’s work is almost done by the time that Abdullah is deported; its
final report will be released two months later. However, the Commission is not
allowed to interview Abdullah even though he is being held in a US prison (and
not in Guantanamo or some secret overseas prison). 9/11 Commission co-chair
Tom Kean will later say, “He should not have been let out of the country when
the 9/11 Commission wanted to interview him.” Kean will not comment on why
the Commission does not or is not able to interview him before his deportation.
[MSNBC, 9/8/2006]
Justice Department Will Not Delay Deportation to Help Investigation - In late
2003, new evidence emerged that Abdullah may have had foreknowledge of the
9/11 attacks. But US prosecutors decided not to charge him based on that new
evidence, and the Justice Department does not even try to delay his deportation
to allow investigators time to pursue the new leads (see September 2003-May
21, 2004).
FBI Will Reopen Investigation into Abdullah - The new evidence suggested that
Abdullah may have learned about the 9/11 attack plans as early as the spring of
2000 (see Early 2000). He also seemed to show foreknowledge of the attacks
shortly before they occurred (see Late August-September 10, 2001). By October
2004, it will be discovered that he cased the Los Angeles airport with Alhazmi
and an unknown man (see June 10, 2000), and this revelation will cause the FBI
to reopen its investigation into him—after he is deported (see September 2003-
May 21, 2004). In September 2006, it will be reported that the investigation is
still continuing. [MSNBC, 9/8/2006]
Entity Tags: Nawaf Alhazmi, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 9/11 Commission, Hani
Hanjour, Mohdar Abdullah, US Department of State, Khalid Almihdhar, Thomas Kean,
US Department of Justice
Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Possible Hijacker Associates in US, 9/11
Investigations, 9/11 Related Criminal Proceedings, FBI 9/11 Investigation
June 4, 2004: Victims’ Families Listen to 9/11 Phone Recordings

When the recording of flight attendant Betty Ong is played in public before the
9/11 Commission in January 2004, family members demand that the FBI honor
the family members’ rights under the Victims Assistance Act to hear any and all
phone calls made from the hijacked airplanes. So, on this date, about 130
victims’ relatives gather in Princeton, New Jersey, and hear previously
unavailable calls. But the Justice Department only plays what it decided are
“relevant” calls. However, attendees are ordered not to disclose what they hear
lest it compromise the prosecution of Zacarias Moussaoui. [CNN, 5/28/2004;
ASSOCIATED PRESS, 6/5/2004; NEW YORK OBSERVER, 6/20/2004] Some family members
nonetheless later discuss what they have heard. Witnesses describe one
recording of two American Airlines managers who are told details of flight
attendant Amy Sweeney’s call from Flight 11 shortly after the first hijacking has
begun. Rather than report news of a possible hijacking to other government
agencies so they can learn what to do in case there is a crisis, the managers say
things like, “don’t spread this around. Keep it close,” and “Keep it quiet” (see
8:25 a.m. September 11, 2001) [NEW YORK OBSERVER, 6/20/2004]
Entity Tags: American Airlines, Zacarias Moussaoui, Madeline (“Amy”) Sweeney, US
Department of Justice
June 14, 2004: FBI 9/11 Investigation Still Continues at Reduced

Level
The Washington Post reports
that the FBI’s 9/11 investigation
still continues, though at a
reduced level. Originally, the
investigation, named
PENTTBOM, was staffed by
about 70 full time FBI agents
and analysts. The team now has
only about ten members. Some
observers complain the FBI has
not done enough. Mary Galligan,
By 2004, the FBI’s 9/11 investigation is contained in this who headed the investigation
ten person office. [Source: Washington Post] until early 2004, emphasizes
how much is still unknown about
the plot. She says, “There is still information coming in, and we still have so
many unanswered questions.” [WASHINGTON POST, 6/14/2004]
Entity Tags: Mary Galligan, Federal Bureau of Investigation, PENTTBOM
June 27, 2004: FBI Finally Admits Possibility of Al-Qaeda Sleeper

Cell in Boston
It is reported that the FBI’s Boston office is investigating if there may have been
an al-Qaeda sleeper cell in Boston and whether it may have had connections to
the 9/11 attacks. The Boston FBI had previously denied the existence of any
Boston cell, even though they knew before 9/11 that four Boston taxi drivers—
Nabil al-Marabh, Raed Hijazi, Mohamad Kamal Elzahabi, and Bassam Kanj—all
knew each other well and were all connected to al-Qaeda (see January 2001;
Mid-August 2001). But the FBI shows new interest in the possibility after
indicting Elzahabi in Minnesota a few days earlier (see April 16, 2004-June 25,
2004). The Boston Globe comments, “The possibility that unknown people in
Boston were providing support to terrorists, including the 10 who hijacked the
two planes out of Logan Airport, has been the subject of much conjecture
among law enforcement officials.” [BOSTON GLOBE, 6/27/2004] Unofficially, it seems
that even before 9/11, some in the FBI thought that al-Qaeda had cells in
Boston. On September 12, 2001, an anonymous long-time Boston FBI agent told
the Boston Globe that there were “a lot of terrorist cells in [the Boston] area.…
It’s a facilitator for terrorist activity. There have been cells here of bin Laden’s
associates. They’re entrenched here.” [BOSTON GLOBE, 9/12/2001] Former
counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke says, “We uncovered plots in December
of 1999 that also involved Boston cab drivers around the millennium rollover. I
think there is a high probability the Boston FBI missed a major cell there.” [WCVB
5 (BOSTON), 6/28/2004]
Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Al-Qaeda, Richard A. Clarke
Category Tags: Millennium Bomb Plots, Nabil Al-Marabh, FBI 9/11 Investigation, Internal
US Security After 9/11, 9/11 Investigations
July 24, 2004: FBI Officials Say 9/11 Hijackers Had No Witting
Help in San Diego
FBI officials maintain that 9/11 hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar
did not have anyone knowingly supporting their al-Qaeda activities when they
lived in San Diego in 2000 and 2001.
FBI: Hijackers Had No Witting Support in San Diego - Larry Mefford, who was the
FBI’s head of counterterrorism until November 2003, says: “Maybe there’s been
something new. But as of the time of my retirement, there was no credible
indication that anyone in Southern California helped the two terrorists with
knowledge of the 9/11 plot.” And Richard Garcia, head of the FBI in Los
Angeles, says, “If there was support, I think it was

unwitting.” Garcia says that whatever support the
hijackers received was from Muslims innocently
helping other Muslims.
9/11 Commission Suggests Otherwise - However, the
9/11 Commission’s final report, published the same
day as these comments, suggests otherwise. The
report details extensive help the hijackers received,
and strongly implies that at least some of their
helpers, such as Mohdar Abdullah and Anwar al-
Awlaki, were radical Islamists with a similar agenda as
the hijackers. For instance, the report comments,
Larry Mefford. [Source: James “We believe it is unlikely that [Alhazmi] and
Kegley / San Francisco
Chronicle] Almihdhar… would have come to the United States
without arranging to receive assistance from one or
more individuals informed in advance of their arrival.” [LOS ANGELES TIMES,
7/24/2004]
9/11 Congressional Inquiry Also Suggests Otherwise - The 9/11 Congressional
Inquiry’s final report concluded that at least six 9/11 hijackers received
“substantial assistance” from associates in the US, though it is “not known to
what extent any of these contacts in the United States were aware of the plot.”
The inquiry focused on associates in San Diego, including Abdullah and al-Awlaki
(see July 24, 2003). [US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003 ]
What about Abdullah and Al-Awlaki? - In late 2003, new evidence emerged that
Abdullah might have had foreknowledge of the 9/11 attacks, but he was
deported anyway, in May 2004 (see May 21, 2004). In late 2004, several months
after the comments by Mefford and Garcia, more evidence against him will
emerge, causing the FBI to reopen its investigation into him (see September
2003-May 21, 2004). In 2008, US intelligence will finally conclude that al-Awlaki
is an al-Qaeda operative (see February 27, 2008), and he will be connected to a
number of attacks in the US.
Entity Tags: Anwar al-Awlaki, Richard Garcia, Nawaf Alhazmi, Mohdar Abdullah, Khalid
Almihdhar, 9/11 Commission, Larry Mefford
Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Possible Hijacker Associates in US, 9/11
Investigations, 9/11 Commission, FBI 9/11 Investigation, Anwar Al-Awlaki
November 2004: Head of FBI’s 9/11 Investigation Says 9/11

Attacks Were Virtually Unstoppable
Mary Galligan, the head of the FBI’s 9/11
investigation, says that the 9/11 attacks were
virtually unstoppable. Galligan was the head of
the FBI’s domestic terror squad in the summer of
2001, and then headed PENTTBOM, the FBI’s 9/11
investigation from just after the 9/11 attacks
until early 2004 (see June 14, 2004). [FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 7/1/2010] She says: “If I had
[9/11 hijacker Mohamed] Atta—say, we got a call
from a next-door neighbor, and we sent a guy out
there—he’s not gonna give us the plan, so the
agent is gonna come back to me and say, ‘Mary,
Mary Galligan. [Source: FBI] he’s nothing.’ And what could I do? Nothing. Or
let’s assume we learned the hijackers’ names in
2000. We would have surveilled them and listened to their conversations. But
we know now they didn’t even know the plan at that time. If we approached
them, they would have left the country. Would bin Laden then have sent more
people? Yes.” [VANITY FAIR, 11/2004] Galligan’s comment that the hijackers didn’t
know the plan for 9/11 is contradicted by much evidence. For instance, in March
2001, most of them recorded videos in which they pledged to die martyrs in the
US, and some of these videos were made public in 2002 and 2003 (see
(December 2000-March 2001)).
Entity Tags: PENTTBOM, Mary Galligan
Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Denials, FBI 9/11 Investigation
Autumn 2005 or Before: Fears Over CIA Evidence Cause FBI to

Build Cases against Guantanamo Detainees
The FBI begins to build cases against high value detainees held by the US in
Guantanamo Bay, due to Defense Department fears that evidence obtained from
the detainees by the CIA will be inadmissible or too controversial to present at
their upcoming war crimes tribunals. The investigation, which involves up to 300
agents in a “Guantanamo task force,” runs for at least two years and FBI agents
travel widely to collect evidence. According to former officials and legal
experts, “The [FBI] process is an embarrassment for the Bush administration,
which for years held the men incommunicado overseas and allowed the CIA to
use coercive means to extract information from them that would not be
admissible in a US court of law—and might not be allowed in their military
commissions….” In fact, the techniques used to extract the confessions even
cause some CIA officials to question whether they are believable, much less
sustainable in court, particularly as CIA officers are not trained to obtain
evidence that can be used in such a setting. In addition, if the information is
used, this may focus the trials on the actions of the CIA and not the accused.
The detainees will be designated enemy combatants in 2007 in preparation for
military commissions (see March 9-April 28, 2007 and August 9, 2007), but this
process will be questioned by a judge (see June 4, 2007). The Los Angeles Times
will also comment, “The FBI’s efforts appear in part to be a hedge in case the
commissions are ruled unconstitutional or never occur, or the US military
detention center at Guantanamo Bay is closed. Under those scenarios,
authorities would have to free the detainees, transfer them to military custody
elsewhere, send them to another country, or have enough evidence gathered by
law enforcement officials to charge them with terrorism in US federal courts.”
[LOS ANGELES TIMES, 10/21/2007]
Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, US
Department of Defense
Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, 9/11 Timeline, Civil Liberties
Category Tags: FBI 9/11 Investigation, High Value Detainees, Counterterrorism
Policy/Politics, 9/11 Investigations
October 4, 2005: Book Describes Scientific Effort to Identify 9/11

Victims
Robert Shaler, the scientist who led the forensic
examination by the New York City medical examiner’s
office to identify 9/11 victims, releases a book about this
investigation, called Who They Were: Inside the World
Trade Center DNA Story: The Unprecedented Effort to
Identify the Missing. According to Shaler the investigation
eventually identified three of the 9/11 hijackers.
However, he writes that they were not identified by
name because the ten DNA profiles supplied by the FBI
had no names attached. Shaler writes, “No names, just a
K code, which is how the FBI designates ‘knowns,’ or
Robert Shaler. [Source: specimens it knows the origins of. Of course, we had no
Publicity photo] direct knowledge of how the FBI obtained the terrorists’
DNA.” He also believes the three hijackers they identified were in the backs of
the planes, stating, “I still doubt the pilots have anything remaining to collect or
analyze.” [PUBLISHERS WEEKLY, 8/22/2005; NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, 10/12/2005] The medical
examiner’s office concluded its efforts at identifying the remains of those killed
at Ground Zero in February 2005, having been able to identify 1,588 of the 2,749
victims. [SHALER, 2005; NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, 2/23/2005]
Entity Tags: Robert Shaler, Federal Bureau of Investigation
March 2006: Apparently Dead 9/11 Hijackers Still on No-Fly List

When journalists Joe and Susan Trento obtain a copy of the US international no-
fly list, which the Transportation Security Administration uses to prevent known
terrorists from flying to the US and other countries, they find that 14 of the
alleged 9/11 hijackers are still on it. They are: Satam Al Suqami, Waleed
Alshehri, Wail Alshehri, Abdulaziz Alomari, Hamza Alghamdi, Fayez Ahmed
Banihammad, Ahmed Alghamdi, Mohand Alshehri, Majed Moqed, Hani Hanjour,
Salem Alhazmi, Saeed Alghamdi, Ahmed Alnami, and Ahmed Alhaznawi. Shortly
after 9/11, it was reported that some of the hijackers were still alive (see
September 16-23, 2001) and this may be the reason for the apparent error,
although the set of hijackers reported to be still alive and the set of 14
hijackers still on the no-fly list only partially overlap. [TRENTO AND TRENTO, 2006, PP.
189-192] The no-fly list also contains manifold problems and at least one other
dead terrorist is on it (see March 2006).
Entity Tags: Salem Alhazmi, Satam Al Suqami, Wail Alshehri, Waleed Alshehri, Susan
Trento, Mohand Alshehri, Saeed Alghamdi, Joseph Trento, Majed Moqed, Ahmed
Alhaznawi, Abdulaziz Alomari, Ahmed Alnami, Hamza Alghamdi, Hani Hanjour, Fayez
Ahmed Banihammad, Ahmed Alghamdi
Category Tags: Internal US Security After 9/11, FBI 9/11 Investigation, 9/11
Investigations
March 23-April 20, 2006 and July 31, 2006: Evidence from
Moussaoui Trial Published on Internet
During the trial of Zacarias
Moussaoui (see March 6-May 4,
2006), the Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the
Press publishes a significant
portion of the exhibits used
during the trial. [REPORTERS
COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE
Previously, only
PRESS, 12/4/2006]
a few items of the evidence
linking the attacks to al-Qaeda
were made public. For
example, the 9/11
Ahmed Alnami’s youth hosteling card found in the Flight 93
crash site. [Source: FBI] Commission’s Terrorist Travel
Monograph contained 18
documents of the alleged hijackers and their associates. [9/11 COMMISSION,
8/21/2004, PP. 171-195 ] The published exhibits include:
Items belonging to the alleged hijackers that were recovered from the crash
sites and Logan airport;
Some details of the hijackers’ movements in the US;
Graphic photos of dead victims and body parts in the Pentagon and WTC ruins;
Substitutions for testimony from some of the main plotters such as Khalid
Shaikh Mohammed;
The missing chapter from the Justice Department’s Office of Inspector
General’s review of the FBI’s performance before 9/11 (see June 9, 2005); and
FBI and CIA documents. [REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, 12/4/2006]
At the end of July, the US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia,
Alexandria Division, publishes more of the exhibits used in the trial. The
additionally published exhibits include, for example:
Documents of the hijackers found at the crash sites and Logan airport, such as
Satam Al Suqami’s passport (see After 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001), Ahmed
Alnami’s youth hosteling card, and old correspondence between Mohamed Atta
and the German authorities;

Recordings of calls made by the passengers from the flights and recordings of
the hijacker pilots talking to the passengers;
Documents about the alleged hijackers prepared by the FBI such as a True
Name Usage Chart for 2001 and chronologies for eleven of the hijackers from
August 16-September 11, 2001;
Documents from the hijackers’ flight schools;
A small sample of the hijackers’ banking and phone records.
However, some of the exhibits are not disclosed. For example, the cockpit voice
recording from United 93 is sealed and only a transcript is made available. [US
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, 7/31/2006]
Entity Tags: Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press
April 12, 2006: United 93 Cockpit Recording Played in Court,

Transcript Released
The cockpit voice recorder tape from United 93, which crashed in Shanksville,
Pennsylvania (see (10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001), is played at the trial of
Zacarias Moussaoui (see March 6-May 4, 2006) just before the prosecution rests
its case. Translations are displayed on a screen along with information taken
from the plane’s flight data recorder, such as speed, altitude, and steering yoke
position. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 4/12/2006; LONDON TIMES, 4/12/2006] The recording is
sealed by the judge and a transcript is made available to the public. [US DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006] This is a big
media event and it receives lots of coverage. CNN, for example, calls it “an
absolutely spellbinding, unforgettable day in court.” Many of the passages are
unintelligible, but the recording seems to indicate that the hijackers murdered
a flight attendant. [CNN, 4/12/2006; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 ] Some of the victims’ relatives previously
heard the recording at a private meeting (see April 18, 2002).
Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui, FBI 9/11 Investigation, 9/11 Investigations
May 4, 2006: US Jury Finds 9/11 Hijacker Associate Not Guilty of

Lying
Osama Awadallah, an alleged associate of two 9/11 hijackers in San Diego, is
acquitted in a US trial. Awadallah, a Jordanian living in the US since 1999, was
not accused of terrorist activity, but was merely charged with lying to a grand
jury investigating the 9/11 attacks. Nine days after 9/11, he was interviewed by
the FBI, and he admitted that he knew 9/11 hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi. However,
he denied knowing hijacker Khalid Almihdhar, who lived with Alhazmi in San
Diego. Awadallah was detained as a material witness. After 9/11, his old phone
number was found in a car used by some of the hijackers. Eleven jurors wanted
to convict him, but one did not, so a mistrial was declared after jurors made
clear they could not reach a unanimous verdict. Had he been convicted, he
would have faced little to no jail time, and then deportation. Instead, he will
continue his studies at San Diego State University. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 5/5/2006] It
has been claimed that one day before the 9/11 attacks, Awadallah and others
appeared to be celebrating the upcoming attacks (see Late August-September
10, 2001).
Entity Tags: Khalid Almihdhar, Osama Awadallah, Nawaf Alhazmi
Category Tags: Possible Hijacker Associates in US, 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Related
Criminal Proceedings, FBI 9/11 Investigation
June 6, 2006: FBI Spokesman Says ‘No Hard Evidence’ Connects

Bin Laden to 9/11
When asked why Osama bin Laden’s wanted poster only mentions his alleged
involvement in the East African embassy bombings, but not 9/11, Rex Tomb of
the FBI’s public affairs unit says, “The reason why 9/11 is not mentioned on
Osama bin Laden’s Most Wanted page is because the FBI has no hard evidence
connecting bin Laden to 9/11.” [MILLI GAZETTE, 6/11/2006] The Washington Post will
later pick up this story and say that bin Laden’s alleged involvement in the 9/11
operation is not mentioned on the poster because he has not been indicted for it
(see August 28, 2006).
Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Osama bin Laden, Rex Tomb
Category Tags: Osama Bin Laden, FBI 9/11 Investigation, 9/11 Investigations
August 28, 2006: Bin Laden Still Not Indicted for 9/11
The Washington Post notes that Osama bin Laden has still not been indicted for
his alleged role in 9/11 and that his entry in the FBI’s Ten Most Wanted list only
mentions his involvement in the 1998 African embassy bombings. The FBI says
the reason bin Laden is not officially wanted for 9/11 or the bombing of the USS
Cole is that he has not yet been charged with involvement in the operations by
the US. Bin Laden’s entry on a separate list, of the 25 most wanted terrorists,
also fails to mention his alleged involvement in 9/11. According to the Post,
“The curious omission underscores the Justice Department’s decision, so far, to
not seek formal criminal charges against bin Laden” for 9/11. [WASHINGTON POST,
8/28/2006]
Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Osama bin Laden
Category Tags: Osama Bin Laden, FBI 9/11 Investigation, 9/11 Investigations
Early September 2006-December 2007: Imam Al-Awlaki Linked to

9/11 Hijackers Is Arrested in Yemen, Then Let Go with US
Approval
In early September 2006, Anwar al-Awlaki is arrested in Yemen at the request of
the US government. Al-Awlaki served as imam to several of the 9/11 hijackers
when they lived in the US (see March 2001 and After). [AUSTRALIAN, 11/4/2006]
However, al-Awlaki is released in December 2007. The US was limited in how
much it could pressure the government of Yemen to keep holding him, because
he has never been formally charged with any crime. In a taped interview shortly
after his release, he claims that while he was imprisoned in Yemen, he was
interrogated by the FBI multiple times and asked about his dealings with the
9/11 hijackers. [WASHINGTON POST, 2/27/2008] According to the New York Times, “by
the end of 2007, American officials, some of whom were disturbed at the
imprisonment without charges of a United States citizen, signaled that they no
longer insisted on al-Awlaki’s incarceration, and he was released.” [NEW YORK
TIMES, 5/8/2010] By February 2008, just two months after US officials approved his
release, US intelligence will conclude that al-Awlaki is linked to al-Qaeda (see
February 27, 2008).
Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Anwar al-Awlaki
Investigation, Yemeni Militant Collusion, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11, Anwar Al-
Awlaki
(Shortly Before October 2006): FBI Says It Is Unsure Who

Perpetrated 9/11
The FBI admits it is uncertain about who was responsible for the 9/11 attacks. In
a book published in October 2006, investigative journalists Joseph Trento and
Susan Trento will report that the US government’s no-fly list, which comprises
the names of people who are prohibited from boarding commercial aircraft that
depart from or arrive in the United States, still includes the names of 14 of the
19 men accused of being responsible for the 9/11 hijackings in official accounts,
even though these men supposedly died five years ago (see March 2006). They
will suggest that a possible reason for this anomaly is that “the FBI has never
been able to confirm the real identities of many of the 9/11 hijackers” and note
that on September 21, 2001, CNN reported that FBI Director Robert Mueller
“acknowledged that some of those behind [the 9/11 attacks] may have stolen
the identification of other people.” They will add that a “top FBI official” said
there is uncertainty over who was responsible for 9/11. According to the
unnamed official, “There is a real fear we have no assurances as to who really
carried out the attacks.” [CNN, 9/21/2001; TRENTO AND TRENTO, 2006, PP. 189-190, 192]
The FBI has also stated that it has found “no hard evidence connecting [Osama]
bin Laden to 9/11” (see June 6, 2006). [MILLI GAZETTE, 6/11/2006]
Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, FBI 9/11 Investigation
February 2008: Considerable Video Footage of 9/11 Hijackers

Remains Unreleased
An FBI timeline of the
9/11 hijackers’
activities compiled in
late 2001 and released
this month indicates
that considerable video
footage of the hijackers
has yet to be released.
Most of the footage
appears to come from
surveillance video
discovered after the
9/11 attacks. So far, the
only known footage
made public has been
two video stills of Hani
Hanjour and Majed
Moqed using an ATM
Hani Hanjour (left) and Majed Moqed (right) captured by surveillance machine, one still each
video on September 5, 2001. [Source: FBI]
of Waleed Alshehri and
Satam Al Suqami, several stills of Mohamed Atta and Abdulaziz Alomari in
Portland the night before 9/11 (see September 10, 2001), and a few more stills
and footage of several hijackers in airports on the morning of 9/11 (see
(Between 5:45 a.m. and 5:53 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and 7:18 a.m.
September 11, 2001). But the FBI’s timeline reveals video footage that has never
even been publicly hinted at:
Mohamed Atta used an ATM in Palm Beach, Florida, on July 19, 2001.
Salem Alhazmi and Ahmed Alghamdi used an ATM in Alexandria, Virginia, on
August 2.
Hanjour and Mojed used a Kinko’s for half an hour in College Park, Maryland,
on August 10.
Moqed and Nawaf Alhazmi shopped at an Exxon gas station in Joppa, Maryland,
on August 28.
Waleed and Wail Alshehri wandered around a Target store in Fort Lauderdale,
Florida, on September 4.
Atta and Abdulaziz Alomari were in a Florida bank lobby on September 4, and
the audio of Atta calling Saudi Arabia was even recorded in the process.
Fayez Ahmed Banihammad used an ATM on September 7 in Deerfield Beach,
Florida.
Salem Alhazmi was at the Falls Church DMV on September 7. Low quality
surveillance video at the Milner Hotel in Boston showed Marwan Alshehhi and
possibly Mohand Alshehri on multiple occasions in the days just before 9/11.
Ziad Jarrah and possibly Saeed Alghamdi were videotaped using a Kinko’s for
about an hour near Newark on September 10. [FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
10/2001 ]
Additionally, an FBI document will later be made public that indicates there is
footage of Saeed Alghamdi entering the Marriott Hotel at the Newark

International Airport on September 8, carrying a black roll along bag (he will not
have any checked luggage on 9/11).
This same document indicates Ziad Jarrah is also seen on videotape shortly
after midnight on September 8 at the same Marriott Hotel, making credit card
and cash payments for two hotel rooms. He is accompanied by two young men,
who most likely are Saeed Alghamdi and Ahmed Alnami. [INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES
DIVISION, FBI HEADQUARTERS, 4/19/2002]
Entity Tags: Saeed Alghamdi, Wail Alshehri, Waleed Alshehri, Ziad Jarrah, Salem
Alhazmi, Nawaf Alhazmi, Mohamed Atta, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Abdulaziz
Alomari, Mohand Alshehri, Ahmed Alghamdi, Fayez Ahmed Banihammad, Ahmed
Alnami, Marwan Alshehhi
Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Marwan Alshehhi, Mohamed Atta, Hani Hanjour,
Ziad Jarrah, Other 9/11 Hijackers, FBI 9/11 Investigation, 9/11 Investigations
February 27, 2008: Report: US Finally Decides Imam to 9/11

Hijackers Is Linked to Al-Qaeda
The Washington Post reports that US intelligence has finally determined that
Anwar al-Awlaki is linked to al-Qaeda. Al-Awlaki was an imam at two different
mosques attended by hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, and Hani
Hanjour, and he has been suspected of assisting the 9/11 plot. An anonymous US
counterterrorism official tells the Post, “There is good reason to believe Anwar
al-Awlaki has been involved in very serious terrorist activities since leaving the
United States [after 9/11], including plotting attacks against America and our
allies.” However, the US apparently did not ask Yemen to extradite him when he
was arrested there in 2006, because there was no pending legal case against
him. He continues to reside in Yemen and apparently still has not been charged
with any crime. [WASHINGTON POST, 2/27/2008] In December 2007, just two months
before this article, the US approved the release of al-Awlaki in Yemen,
apparently because there still was no pending legal case against him (see Early
September 2006-December 2007). He also does not appear to be on any public
wanted list.
Entity Tags: Anwar al-Awlaki, Al-Qaeda
Category Tags: FBI 9/11 Investigation, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11, Possible
Hijacker Associates in US, 9/11 Investigations, Anwar Al-Awlaki
September 21, 2008: Remains of 13 Hijackers Still in US Custody

The New York Times reports that the FBI and the New York City medical
examiner’s office have identified the remains of 13 of the 9/11 hijackers. The
remains are still in their custody because no one has claimed them (see Summer
2002). The FBI holds the remains of the nine hijackers who took over Flight 77
and Flight 93, which were recovered from the Pentagon and Shanksville crash
sites. The identity of the remains was established indirectly. First, investigators
identified the victims using DNA profiles provided by relatives. Those remains
that could not be matched to any profile were assumed to belong to the
hijackers. The New York City medical examiner’s office also has the remains of
four hijackers recovered from the World Trade Center site. A DNA profile for
each of the 10 hijackers who took part in the New York attacks was established
by the FBI from recovered personal items, such as luggage and cigarette butts
left in a rental car. The FBI then supplied these profiles to the medical
examiner’s office but without naming them. Therefore, the examiner’s office
could only match the four recovered sets of remains but could not identify them
by name. Both the FBI and the medical examiner’s office refuse to disclose
where exactly the remains are being kept. [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/21/2008; NEWSWEEK,
1/12/2009]
Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Medical Examiner’s Office, New York City
February 11, 2010: Secret US Cable Discusses Previously

Unknown Possible 9/11 Accomplices
A State Department official sends a secret cable from the US Embassy in Doha,
Qatar, to the FBI, CIA, and Department for Homeland Security in Washington,
DC. The contents of the cable will be made public by the Daily Telegraph and
WikiLeaks in early 2011. The cable recommends that a United Arab Emirates
man named Mohamed al Mansoori be watchlisted because he is “currently under
investigation by the FBI for his possible involvement in the [9/11 attacks]. He is
suspected of aiding people who entered the US before the attacks to conduct
surveillance of possible targets and providing other support to the hijackers.”
The cable mentions that Mansoori’s US visa had been revoked at some earlier
point. Mansoori spent about a week with three Qatari men—Meshal Al Hajri,
Fhad Abdulla, and Ali Al Fehaid—several weeks before 9/11. The three men
traveled in the US for several weeks and left the day before 9/11. Their
behavior raised suspicions amongst the staff at one Los Angeles hotel, and their
trip was funded by Al Hajri’s brother, who was living in Virginia but later would
be suspected as a terrorist and deported (see August 15-September 10, 2001).
[DAILY TELEGRAPH, 2/1/2011] In 2011, law enforcement officials will tell NBC News
that the cable was prompted because the three Qataris were planning to return
to the US. The Qataris ended up not coming to the US, but Mansoori presumably
was added to the watchlist. These officials will also claim that there is no active
investigation of Mansoori or the Qataris. No hard evidence has linked any of
them to the 9/11 plot. However, an official claims that Mansoori was deported
from the US several years after 9/11, and the FBI apparently continued to have
suspicions about him. [MSNBC, 2/2/2011]
Entity Tags: Meshal Al Hajri, Ali Al Fehaid, Central Intelligence Agency, Fhad Abdulla,
US Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation, US Department
of State, Mohamed al Mansoori
Category Tags: FBI 9/11 Investigation, Possible Hijacker Associates in US, 9/11
Investigations
Page 2 of 2 (154 events)

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2/6/2021 Complete 911 Timeline: FBI's Penttbom 9/11 Investigation and Identification of Alleged Hijackers

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Americans. He says, “It is time to "Lackawanna Six" (13)

May 27, 2002: FBI Still Has ‘No Breakthrough’ in Understanding

Summer 2002: Pennsylvania Coroner Receives Inquiry from

June 3, 2002: Results of 9/11 Related Insider Trading Inquiries

Early July 2002: Moussaoui Expresses Willingness to Talk, Offer Is

(Late July-Early August, 2002): Moussaoui E-mails May Have

July 31, 2002: Sheriff Raids Business that Supplied 9/11

July 31, 2002 and After: US Attorney Threatens to Arrest Local

August 2, 2002: FBI Questions Members of 9/11 Congressional

September 9, 2002: New Video Footage of 911 Hijackers Shown;

The top picture is of Waleed Alshehri. The

September 9, 2002: Video of 9/11 Hijacker Cursing US and

September 18, 2002: 9/11 Victims’ Relatives Raise Questions

October 2002: FBI Inexplicably Fails to Detain Imam Al-Awlaki

Late 2002-2004: Imam Al-Awlaki Lives Openly in Britain, despite

November 2002-June 2003: Secret Evidence Used against

evidence rule is invoked for national security

November 24, 2002: Terrorism Suspects Held Without Charge as

December 5, 2002: Software Company with Access to

to classified information, that has access to government open or classified

January 22, 2003: House of 9/11 Suspect Finally Searched by FBI

Late February 2003: DNA Identifies Passenger Remains, but

Between March 16 and 20, 2003: Associate of 9/11 Hijackers

acknowledge that the picture is incomplete.” Representative Porter Goss (R-FL),

September 19, 2003: FBI Finds No Proof of 9/11 Insider Trading

October 24, 2003: 9/11 Hijacker Associate Is Deported to Yemen

January 2004: DNA Tests Indicate Hijackers Could Be Middle

comprehensive databases indicate they are more likely to

The Armed Forces

March 24, 2004-May 2004: FBI Says Saudi Associates of Hijackers

May 21, 2004: 9/11 Hijacker Associate Is Deported to Yemen;

adjust to life in the US in a variety of ways, including help with: interpreting,

June 4, 2004: Victims’ Families Listen to 9/11 Phone Recordings

June 14, 2004: FBI 9/11 Investigation Still Continues at Reduced

June 27, 2004: FBI Finally Admits Possibility of Al-Qaeda Sleeper

Angeles, says, “If there was support, I think it was

November 2004: Head of FBI’s 9/11 Investigation Says 9/11

Autumn 2005 or Before: Fears Over CIA Evidence Cause FBI to

October 4, 2005: Book Describes Scientific Effort to Identify 9/11

March 2006: Apparently Dead 9/11 Hijackers Still on No-Fly List

and the German authorities;

April 12, 2006: United 93 Cockpit Recording Played in Court,

May 4, 2006: US Jury Finds 9/11 Hijacker Associate Not Guilty of

June 6, 2006: FBI Spokesman Says ‘No Hard Evidence’ Connects

Early September 2006-December 2007: Imam Al-Awlaki Linked to

(Shortly Before October 2006): FBI Says It Is Unsure Who

February 2008: Considerable Video Footage of 9/11 Hijackers

footage of Saeed Alghamdi entering the Marriott Hotel at the Newark

February 27, 2008: Report: US Finally Decides Imam to 9/11

September 21, 2008: Remains of 13 Hijackers Still in US Custody

February 11, 2010: Secret US Cable Discusses Previously

Page 2 of 2 (154 events)

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