Nupi Lan: Manipur Women's Agitation, 1939

Author(s): Sanamani Yambem

Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 11, No. 8 (Feb. 21, 1976), pp. 325-327+329-331
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly
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 SPECIAL ARTICLES

Nupi Lan: Manipur Womens Agitation, 1939

Sanamani Yanmbem
The Nupi Lan, which started as an agitation by Manipulri women against the econtomic policies of
the Alaharaja and the Marwari monopolists, later on changed its character to become ca movement for con-
stitutional and administrative reformn in Manipur.
The original demands of the wonmeni were confined to the banning of rice exports, but later their
demands also included changes in, the Darbar and the administrative set-lup.
The importance of the Nupi Lan lies in tZhe fact that it prepared the ground for the leading. role
played by the wonmen of Manipur in the emergence of a newv Manipur after the end of the Seconld War.

ers, but also to the woreaen folk. In Political Agent, it was the women of
the agrarian economy of Manipur, rice Imphal that rose up in protest. The
Introduction plays a crucial role, and the division violent agitations and demonstrations

TO apologists of the combined feuda- cf labour between the farmer who led by the market women had to be

listic-imperialist raie of the Maharaja grows it and the women who sell the dispersed by the use of force but ulti-
of Manipur and his Political Agent, final product is a traditional one. The mately the British had to buiild the
the outbreak of the Nupi Lan or the involvement of women wNith the pro- houses at their own expense.4 When,
women's Agitation of 1939 in Mani- duction and marketing of rice is an in 1925, the state authorities increas-

pur was merely an awkward situation integrated one, from the time of trans- ed the water tax, there were widespread

which Gimson (Political Agent in plantation upto the selling of the demonstrations against this measure.

Manipur, 1933-45), had to face;' but final produce. The role of women in 'The main participants in this agita-

to the people of Manipur it marked the economy of the state is indeed tion were again women.5 The point to

a dividing lie between the oppressive crucial, and a boycott of the market be noticed here is that these agita-

economic and administrative Policies by them would mean a virtual hartal tions were all led by the tradeswomen,

followed by the Maharaia and the Poli- of the whole bazar, severely affecting similar to those that were to take a

tical Agent, and -he new Manipur the economy. leading role in the women's agitation

which emerged out of the Nupi Lan. of 1939.

The event also showed that political
consciousness had grown among the
people of Manipur.
The Nupi Lan, cun perhaps be better
understood if we have sonme idea of
the position of women in Manipuri
society. Women in Manipur hold a
high and free position, and all internal
trade of the country is managed by
them. The practice in Maaipur is to
have bazars at convenient spots by
the roadside where a group of women
gather either in the morning or in the
evening and sell rice, vegetables, fish,
tobacco, salt, oil, baskets and other
things. In Imphal, the capital of Mani-
pur, there is a mark.et wh.ch is be-
lieved to have been founded by Kha-
gemba about the year 1580.2 In this
market, known as Kliwairamband Bazar,
over two thousand women occupy re-
gular stalls while an even larger num-
ber are seated outside. The whole mar-
ket has always been managed by the
women; this practice is still continu-
ing. Apart from the economic activi-
ties, the market is alNo an important
venue of social and political interac-
tion. It was this aspect of the Khwai-
ramband Bazar which played a crucial
role in the oiutbreak of the Nupi Lan
in 1939.
Rice provides a means of livelihood
not merely to the producers, the farm-
However, in contrast to this high
level of participation of the women
in the economy of the state, their so-
cial status is not enviable. After the
Manipuri-Burmese War of 1817, and
the sevenl years of devastation of the
Marnipuri countryside that followed it,
the male population of Manipur was
greatly reduced. This probably led to
the ieady social sanction given tc the
practice of polygamy. The result was
that Manipuri women, even while they
poisitively contributed to the economic
prosperity of the state, also needed to
look for a husband to gain social secu-
rity. IThus the woman of Manipur,
despite her economic 'indepetndence',
cannot be termed as an emancipated,
satisfied participant in Manipuri so-
ciety and economy. The Anglo-Mani-
puri War of 1891, further reduced the
male population of Manipur3 result-
ing in the greater acceptance of the
practice of polygamy, and increased
dependence on women for the upkeep
of the family. The Manipuri women
also, continued to cherish the feelings
of political independence even after
Manipur's 'annexation'. When, in 1904
(just 13 years after 'annexation') the
Political Agent, Maxwell, tried to re-
introduce Lalup (a system of forced
labour which had bJeen abolished) and
force the people of Imphal to rebuild
the burnt-down house of the Assistant
II
Politics of Rice
British interest in Manipur at the
early stage of their conquest was
purely strategic, anld the taking over
of the administration in their hands
was a sequel to the Anglo-Manipuri
War of 1891.6 Unlike in Mysore and
Baroda where the relations cf these
states with the British Government
were allowed to remain more or less
unchanged, Manipur was considered as
a state which had rebelled against the
British as a whole.7 Manipur, in Bri-
tish eyes, had foifeited its rights to
exist as a separate state.
Direct British administration con-
tinued upto 1907 when Churachand
was installed as the Maharaja. After
the Kuki rebellion of 1919,8 British
administration began to acquire two
major characteristics:
(a) The Maharaja was made respon-
sible for the administration of
the state and was assisted by
a Darbar, the President of
which was selected by the Gov-
ernor of Assam. The Maharaja,
however, had the power to veto
any resolution of the Darbar.
(b) The Darbar was the highest ori-

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 February 21, 1976
ginal and appellate court, both
in civil and criminal matters.
The administration of the hill areas and
the British Reserve Are- was under
the control of the Political Agent, and
was beyond the jurisdiction of the
Darbar.
The opening up of Alanipur by the
British had its own economic implica-
tions. The valley area of Manipur is a
rice growing area and rice is its main
product. While trade between Manipur
and the outside areas in Assam was
conducted even before 1891, it was
only after 1891 that large-scale explort
of rice began. It was reported as early
as 1892-93 that rice was being freelv
exported to Kohima;9 and it is record-
ed that in 1894-95 some 8,000 maunds
of rice were exported to Kohima."'
Upto the turn of the century the
export of rice from Manipur was
restricted to the Kohima area; and
considering the fact that at times of
scarcity in the valley there was no
way of importing foodgrains, this ex-
port of rice was considerably checked
and regulated. Apprehensicns were ex-
pressed by Maxwell, the Political
Agent, about the possibilities of rice
scarcity. "I still think that when
thousapds of people are on the verge
of starvation and there is no means of
importing food to the valley, the ex-
port of rice, however small, should be
prohibited. Let me express the hope
that the occasion may not arise to fight
out this disputed point." Even so, rice
exports for that year (1898-99) was re-
corded as 36,430 maunds.t1
With the turn of the century we
notice that the rice export policy began,
to assume a peculiar character. Till the
introduction of motor vehicles, rice was
carried mainly in bullock and hand
carts. But with the introduction of
mator vehicular transportation the rice
export trade was captured by the im-
migrant Marwari entrepreneurs. As
long as the rice trade was under the
control of the local popujlation there
was little resentment against it; but
once the Marwaris and the motor vehi-
cles took over, the whole character of
the export trade changed. The first
major impact of the motor vehicular
traffic on the export of rice was felt
in 1925 when export of rice was per-
mitted for a period of only six months,
and was subsequently stopped from
February 1, 1926, because of the rise
in the price of rice22 It may be noted
that export of riCe had been stopped
earlier, in 1921; but while the earlier
embargo was due to genuine scarcity,
the 1925-26 embargo was due to price
rise consequent upon the increased
326
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ECONOMIC AND
outflow of rice by motorised transport.
The question of rice export from
Manipur to British India is closely
linked with the growvth of Marwari
capital in Manipur. The Marwari busi-
ness community began their business
at the beginning of this century and
were settled in the British Reserve
Area beyond the juirisdiction of the
State Police. They gradually captured
the cotton and handloom trade. PrQ-
minent Marwaris were Kasturichand
and Sons, Ganeshlal, Guru Dayal and
others.'3 The Marwaris excelled in the
export of rice tnrough the growing
vehicular traffic. They made further
progress when the Maharaja and the
Darbar gave them the monopoly of
the Cart Tax, a levy on rice exported.
In 1933 the Cart Tax contract was
transferred from Sadasakh Mansukha
Roy Saroagi to Mangolchand Meghraj.
The following year, Meghraj made a
profit of Rs 33,215 from the Cart Tax
monopoly after paying Rs 73,000 to the
State.14 A year later the state collect-
ed Rs 91,250, out of the total amount
of Rs 1,24,865 realised by the Cart Tax
monopolist.'5
Rice export came under two catego-
ries - the Cart Tax and the Lal Pass.
The former allowed free movement of
rice, the exporters merely paying the
levy known as the Cart Tax. Under
the latter category rice was exported
under a contract between the Manipur
State and the Government of Assam.
Under the Govetrnment contract rice
was exported to the Kohima Civil Sta-
tion, the Assam Rifles posted at
Kohima, Sadia and other parts of
Assam. We thus notice that there were
two parallel monopolies for the export
of rice: the Cart Tax, a Marwari mono-
poly, and the Lal Pass, a State mono-
poly.
The area under rice cultivation in
Manipur between 1921 and 1939 in-
creased by merely 18,838 acres, while
the volume of rice exported increased
by 2,92,174 maunds. Rice export from
Manipur reached an all-time record of
3,72,174 maunds in 1938, the year
before the outbreak of the Nupi Lan.
A situation had thus arisen where any
failure of the harvest in the following
year would result in severe shortages.
The accompanying Table indicates the
nature and trend of rice export fromn
Manipur.
In 1939, while the world saw the
outbreak of the Second World WVar,
Manipur witnessed the uprising of its
women.'6 Excessive rain during July-
August of that year had seriously
danN aged standing crops. Fulrther heavy
rains in September-Q)utober had an
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POLITICAL WEEKLY
adverse effect upon the harvesting of
early paddy. Again, in mid-November
hailstorm destroyed most of the stand-
ing crops ready for harvesting, and
the harvest was badly affected.'7 This
combined with the large quantity of
rice exported in the previous year,
resulted in severe shortages.
In view of the anticipated bad har-
vest the Darbar in its meeting of Sept-
ember 13, 1939 passed a resolution de-
manding that export of rice be stop-
ped.'8 The urgency of the matter was
perhaps realised by the Darbar, for this
particular resolution was placed in ad-
vance of other resolutions of the day.'9
The resolution had to gain the concur-
rence of the Maharaja before it be-
came an order; and the Maharaja while
concurring with the Resolution pointed
out that the ban on export would not
apply to the Government contract with
Assam Rifles in Kohima and Sadiya.20
The Darbar which again met on Sept-
ember 23 agreed to the request of the
Political Agent for the export of rice
to the Kohima Civil Station." The
Darbar, however, reserved the right to
stop this export anytime; it also ex-
pressed apprehensions about famine in
Manipur. Under another resolution
passed on the same day, the Darbar
approved a scheme whereby no rice
could be exported from Manipur with-
out the permission of the Political
Agent. It also defined 'export' as the
movement of rice along the Manipur-
Dimapur Road to any plice beyond
Sekmai.22 The Darbar also refused to
grant permission f(or the export of
chira and ushana (flattened aind par-
boiled rice) apprehending that this
would lead to export of rice after be-
ing converted to chir a and ushana.23
But the Maharaja, while approving
other resolutions of September 23,
1939, did not give his consent to re-
solution No 4, pertaining to the ex-
port o!f chira anld ushana. He argued
that the quantity of ushana and chira
in stock was small anid, if they were
not exported ithin a reasonable
period they would rot, as they were
not consumed by the people of Mani-
pur and Kohima.24 Meanwhile the
Darbar also refused an appeal from
the Maharaja for allowing export of
rice to the Dacca Battalion.25 Applica-
tions from individuals asking for the
re-opening of the rice export were also
refused by the Darhar.28 In fact, at
this period, the Darbar was consider-
ing the idea of having the rice trade
as a state monopoly.27 However, when
the Darbar met on November 9, 1939,
there was a dramatic reversal in the
rice export policy. Export of rice *was
 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY February 21, 1976

TABLE: EXPORT OF RICE FROM MANIPUR, 1922-23 TO 1939 thousand women gathered under the
guidance of those women who had been
Year Area under Quantity of Remarks responsible for the rounding up of bul-
Rice Cultivation Rice Exporteo
( cres) (maunds) lock-cart drivers who had tried to sell
iice to the Marwaris. The Darbar ap-
1922-23 1,69,537 80,000 Amount exported from 31.3.22 prehended that there would be famine
to Dec 1922. Export banned Dec
1922.
in Manipur unless the export of rice
1923-24 1,72,893 1,81,370 Embargo lifted April 1, 1923. was banned. It asked the Land Settle-
1924-25 1,74,215 1,99,710 ment Officer and Land Revenue Officer
1925-26 1,75,537 1,55,014 Quantity exported upto Feb 1926, to give an early report on the size of
banned subsequently.
the year's harvest.34 The President of
1926-27 1,77,058 40,729 Export restrictea to Government
Contract areas. the Darbar was also asked to ascertain
1927-28 1,77,670 47,499 Export restrictea to Kohima Civil the quantity of rice available in the
Station and Sibsagar. market, and the average quantity of
1928-29 1,78,118 1,65,983 Embargo lifted. rice being exported.3- The near famine
1929-30 1,78,473 1,64,510
1930-31 1,78,291 1,51,725 condition, and the general apprehen-
1931-32 1,80,116 2,05,287 sions of the people, could perhaps have
1932-33 1,79,648 2,77,389 been controlled had the Darbar and
1933-34 1,79,841 2,23,523
the Maharaja taken immediate preven-
1934-35 1,79,346 2,54,619
1935-36 Report not available tive measures. Ilowever, no such
1936-37 1,83,486 2,40,625 preventive measures were taken.
1937-38 2,61,716
1938-39 1,85,213 3,72,174 While the Darbar was in session, the
1939-40 1,85,859 46,359 Banned on 13.12.1939. women demonstrators who had gather-
ed around the office began shouting
Source: Administrative Reports for the State of Manipur for the years citeci.
slogans - "Stop the export of rice
to be resumed from November 24, stocks of rice to the Marwaris. There immediately", "Stop the running of
1939;28 following the orders of the was also a great scarcity of purchase- mills", etc. The members of the Darbar
Maharaja, it was in fact resumed from able rice. The women who traded in fled through the back-door. But
November 21, 1939.-9 rice and paddy were now deprived of Sharpe, the President of the Darbar,
Thus the rice export was stopped their means of livelihood. Meanwhile was immediately surrounded by the
only for a period of forty days - all available stocks of rice were being women and had to face them alone.
from September 14 to November 21, bought by the foreign traders. (Persons He told them that orders for a ban on
1939. As the discussions and resolutions other than the original inhabitants of the export of rice could not be issued
passed by the Darbar indicate, the Manipur were categorised as foreigners, without the sanction of the Maharaja
Darbar was in favour of state mono- and a separate office to deal with them who was away at Nawadeep on pilgrim-
poly of rice export trade as a measure was maintained by the State.) Foreign age. The women - whose number
to control it. However, there was traders had set up rice mills to mill had by then swollen to about 4,000
strong opposition to it from the and export rice. This combined with - then went along with Sharpe to the
Maharaja. It would perhaps not be the bad harvest hit the poor people telegraph office, and confined him, the
wrong, therefore, to assume that the hard.32 Civil Surgeon and other officers there.36
decision to re-open rice export trade On December 11, just before the out- They refused to allow the President of
by the Darbar on November 21 was break, many small traders arrived as the Darbar and other officers to leave
taken under heavy pressure from the usual at the Khwairamband Bazar, but the telegraph office until the receipt of
Maharaja, who in turn was pressurised there was not even a Merulk (one meruk the necessary orders from the Maharaja.
by the Cart Tax monopolists and other is almost equal to one seer) of rice for They also, prevented the Commandant
merchants. This re-opening of the rice sale. There were fifty to sixty women of the 4th Assam Rifles who had arrived
export was directly responsible for the retailers that evening and they were all there on hearing about the confinement
outbreak of Nupi Lan on December disappointed to find that there was no of the officers) from rescuing the con-
13, 1939. rice to buy. However, they all prepared fined men. At about 2.45 in the after-
for an agitation the next dav. Other noon, when a platoon of the Assam Ri-
III camp;aigns against the price rise were fles arrived the women seemed to weak-
on the move. L Kanhai and L Babun en a little at the sight of guns and bay-
Nupi Lan
campaigned for a boycott of the cimema onets. At this moment one of the wo-
Before the outbreak of Nupi Lan, halls because of the famine conditions. men from the crowd repeatedly shouted
the price of rice was Rs 1.12.0 per They also met the disappointed women "Vande Mataram" and "Manipur Mata
maund; this rose to two rupees a retailers. They immediately went to the Ki Jai".37 This raised their morale and
maund just before the December foreign traders' houses to check any buy- they became more militant and aggres-
upsurge.30 According to some partici- ing of rice from the local farmers. A sive. The situation became so dangerous
pants in Nupi Lan, the price of rice rumour meanwhile had spread that some that the sentry on the steps of the office
was even higher. The price of paddy bullock cart drivers were being rounded sounded his bugle, and the troops charg-
too rose sharply.31 Conditions were fast up by the women and handed over to ed in to clear the grounds. Amidst a
approaching a near famine situation the police.33 fusilade of stone, the women were push-
and the main sufferers were the pea- On December 12, thousands of women ed back. But althouigh the ground was
sants. Since there was no other source began gathering around the Darbar cleared the women did not disperse;
of income or means of livelihood, the office petitioning for the immediate stop- they remained on the road outside the
peasants were forced to sell their page of the export of rice. About two compound. It was not until midnighst

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 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY February 21, 1976
that the officers could leave the tele-
graph office. In the event, 21 women
were seriously injured, some receiving
bayonet wounds.38 This was denied by
the officials; five women were removed
to the Civil IHospital while the others
received first aid in the compound of
the telegraph office.39 The magnitude
and intensity of the women's agitation
can perhaps be judged from the fact that
troops had to be called to disperse them
and maintain law and order. The firm-
ness of conviction and the singleminded
ness of the women who agitated that
day cannot be underestimated, especial-
ly in view of the fact that this was
achieved without male leadership or
participation.
It would be proper at this point to
consider whether the agitations of
December 12 were wholly spontaneous.
The women possessed a high degree of
consciousness and it is possible that
they themselves organised the agitation.
Some women even lav down in front
of the lorries loaded with rice and
ready to move out. It is thus clear
that Manipur women never lacked mili-
tancy once they were convinced of their
purpose.
On December 14 the President of
the Darbar received a message from
the Maharaja asking the Political
Agent to stop the export of rice, and
an order banning it was promptly
issued. The women then turned their
attention to the rice, mills. They were
able to extract written promises from
the mill owners that they would not
run their mills. However news of a
mill owner who had soaked rice and
boiled some paddy to convert it into
par-boiled rice, led to some 10,000
women marching that night to cne of
the largest rice mills. It was only after
the removal,. of electrical connections
to the mills that the women could be
persuaded to go home.
On December 15 the Darbar con-
sidered whether the telegram of the
Maharaja implied a ban on the export
of rice to the Kohima Civil Station and
Assam Rifles at Kohima and Sadiya.
This was not clearly indicated in the
Maharaja's telegram. In view of the
agitation a resolution sanctioning
thirty state military police and fifteen
Dolai Pabas at the disposal of the
Police Member was adopted. The
Darbar's action showed that it was not
always necessary to receive the Maha-
raja's prior approval for the implementa-
tion of an order. The women agitators
therefore had a point when they urged
that the Darbar need not wait for the
Maharaja's sanction for the imposition
of an emnbargo on rice export.
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IV
Role of Manipuri Men
While the women of Manipur were
agitating, what were the men doing?
On the evening of December 12, the
Branch Secretary of the Nikhil Mani-
puri Mahasabha, L Kanhai Singh, and
T Ibotolmbi Singh, along with others
requested the elders of the Mahasabha
tc discuss the agitation of the women.
The Mahasabha, however, said that it
had nothing to do with it. On the
contrary, it suggested that an appeal
should be made to the Judicial Mem-
ber of the Darbar. These young mem-
bers of the Mahasabha had therefore
no alternative but to wait for the
arrival of the President of the Maha-
sabha Hijam Irabot Singh, who was
then away at Cachar. On December 13,
a meeting called by the dissenting
members of the Mahasabha was held at
the Police Bazar, as the Khwairamband
Bazar market was under a hartal. Ihis
was a small gathering which passed off
peacefully.
With the arrival of Irabot Singh at
Imphal on December 16, the Nupi Lan
entered a new phase. The upsurge
which so far had been led solely by
the women, now received male sup-
port. The day after his arrival Irabot
called a meeting of the working com-
mittee of the Nikhil Manipuri Maha-
sabha to discuss the Nuzpi Lan; in this
meeting, sharp differences between
Irabot and other members were
revealed. The other members of the
Mahasabha were against the move-
ment, and Irabot opted out of the
Mahasabha. On December 24 he form-
ed a new political organisation called
Manipur Praja Samelini at a meeting
held at the Police Grounds.40
The tempo of this movement, parti-
cularly among the women, was further
revived on December 29. Scme rice
carters who had been thrown into the
gutters by the women agitators lodged
a complaint with the Political Agent
and named five women as the assail-
ants. The Agency police thereupon
asked the State police to produce the
women for recording their statements.
A large crowd of women objected to
this. They beseiged the Inspector of
the State Police Thana for several hours
for having kicked a Manipuri Brahmin
woman, Chhabi, in front of the
people."4
From December 13 the women had
boycotted the Khwairamband Bazar.
Large public meetings were organised
with Irabot as the principal speaker.
Under his leadership, .Manipuri men
also took part in the movement. At a
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meeting held at the Police Bazar on
January 9, 1940, Irabot was arrested
under sectioni 124 of the Indian Penal
Code. He was charged with making
inflammatory speeches. On March 22
the Darbar passed a resolution to keep
Irabot under arrest for three years. He
was to be kept at the Imphal Jail for
some time before being taken to
Cachar Jail. The Darbar passed another
order prohibiting all public gatherings
in the Police Bazar from Janujary 13,
1940. This, however, did not deter the
people from organising meetings at
places other than the Police Bazar.
After the arrest of Irabot, his follow-
ers took up the cause cf the women. L
Kanhai led and organised numerous
meetings all over Imphal except the
Police Bazar. A form of Civil Dis-
obedience movement then followed,
and many people began. refusing to
pay the feudal dues and taxes like the
Panchanapet (five anna) tax. In May
1910, the members of the Praja Same-
lini built a bamboo bridge at Naharup,
thereby defying the ferry tax order.
Thus the movement initiated by the
womien received active support from
their male counterparts.
The boycott of the Khwairamband
Bazar continued and this became a
matter of concern to the authorities
since the economy of the state would
suffer if women continued the boycott.
The situation did not improve through-
ouit 1940. This led the Governor of
Assam to demand a full detailed report
on the situation.4- Gimson in his reply
to J P Mills, pointed- out that the boy-
cott of the Bazar began on December
12, 1939, as a spontaneous protest
against what was called the "Bayonet
Charge" and continued as a protest
against foreign merchants. As long as
the leaders of the agitation were
active, the boycott was complete. But
after the arrest of four women leaders
in January 1940, the situation was
near normal. though the Women's
Bazar continued to be empty. In
August, the Political Agent issued an
order that, since the stalls in the
Women's Bazar had been empty for so
long, he would allot them to anyone he
chose. Even this threat did nct bring
back the women, though it gave rise
to some excitement. However, Gimson
did not make any new allotment as that
would have led to ill-feeling and resent-
ment.43
After the order of August 1940, the
women filed a petition signed by Ku-
nmari and Rajani of Sagolband, Maipak-
pi of Thangmeiband, Sanatombi of
Bramhapur, Nainbi of Segalambi and
Ibemcha of Nougmeibung. IThey point-
 February 21, 1976 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLX

ed out that their main grievances were
(a) the unfitness of the present Darbar
members, (b) the unfitness of the Police
Member, (c) the illegal action cf the
Inspector of Police, (d) the illegal con-
viction of the four women, (e) the
unexpected police assualt on the public
on January 14, 1940, and (f) the illegal
action of Dulap Singh, Amin. They
assured that as soon as these grievances
were redressed they would attend the
Bazar.44
The handling of the Women's Boy-
cott, in contrast to the Bayonet Charge,
showed that the authorities had some
appreciation of the militancy of the
women of Manipur. Gimson noted
that "economic distress or political ex-
citement may lead the women of Mani-
pur to take up other forms of agita-
tions, as they had done in the past."'5
By the time the boycott was in full
swing, the state authorities had begun
to consider the women as a force to
reckon with. Their handling of the
boycott showed a far greater degree of
caution than the action taken by them
in the telegraph office incident of
December 12, 1939.
The grievances of the women were

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last year 1.33 lakh per- -
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Today there is ample > <>

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330

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 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY F'ebruary 21, 1976
not immediately redressed; but the
women certainly made themselves felt.
Btut the boycott itself came to an end,
with most of the population of Imphal
fleeing for safety as the War approach-
ed Manipur.
V Notes
Conclusions
The Nupi Lap miovement of 1939
was based on genuine fears and ap-
prehensions arising out of uncontrolled
export of rice from Manipur. These
fears were further aggravated by the
heavy rains and floods of 1939. The
immediate cause of the movement,
therefore, was the initial impact of
the price rise and scarcity conditions on
the women, who were more vocal and
volatile than the male section of the
Manipuri society. It was they who
initiated the agitation and sustained
it.
While a movement for constitutional
reforms in Manipur had been initiated
in 1938, it was the Nupi Lanz which
brought the matter to a head and
focussed on the inadequacies in both
the economic and administrative
policies of the Manipur State. While
the original demands of the women
were confined to the banning of rice
export, their later demands also in-
cluded changes in the Darbar and
administrative set-up. The Nupi Lan,
while postponing consideration of
further reforms, nevertheless emphasis-
ed the need for them. In so far as the
male participation and the role cf
Irabot is concerned, it is quite likely
that had Irabot not appeared at that
particular moment on the scene, the
movement of rhe women might not
have received the required political
support. It might have remained a
purely women's agitation. - But despite
the role of Trabot and the participation
of the males, it was the women who
rose up in protest and who kept the
mcovement alive. The boycott of the
market for more than one and a half
years certainly convinced the state
authorities that the women of Manipur
could take up any form of agitaticn
once they were convinced of their pur-
pose.
It would perhaps not be very far
from the truth to conclude that the
Nupi Lan, which started as a rice agita-
tion directed against the economic
policies of the Maharaja and the Mar-
wari monopolists, later on changed its
character to become a movement for
constitutional and administrative re-
forms in Manipur. The uniqueness of
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the movement, hcwever, lies in the
fact that in the emnergence of a new
Manipur after the end of the Second
World WVar, it was the women of Mani-
pur who were in the vanguard of
change.
1 Evans, Geoffery and Brat, James
Anthony, "Imphal", London, 1962,
p 20.
2 Hudson, T C, "The Meiteis",
London, 1908, p 23.
3 The actual population figures are
not available as the records of the
1891 Census held before the War
were destroyed in the Anglo-
Manipuri War of 1891.
4 Ried, Robert, "History of the
Frontier Areas Bordering Assam",
Shillong, 1942, p 89.
5 Administrative Report on the
State of Manipur, 1923-24, Imphal.
6 Laldena, "British Policy Towards
Manipur, 1891-1919", unpublished
M Phil thesis, Jawaharlal Nehru
University, 1973, pp 18, 58.
7 Ried, Robert, op cit, p 71.
8 See G Bhadra, "Kuki Uprising: Its
Causes and Nature", paper for
private circulation.
9 Administrative Report for the
State of Manipur, 1892-93, p 6.
10 Administrative Report for the
State of Manipur, 1894-95, p 5.
] 1 Administrative Report for the
State of Manipur, 1898-99, p 2.
12 Administrative Report for the
State of Manipur, 1925-26, p 5.
1 3 "Nupi Lan, 1939", The Lamyanba,
Vol 5, No 51, December 1973.
14 Administrative Report for the
State of Manipur, 1933-34, p 7.
15 Administrative Report for the
State of Manipur, 1934-35, p 6.
16 It was a strong belief among the
Manipuris that the years 1939-
1940 and 1941 would be years of
trouble in Manipur. They further
believed that this was in accord-
ance with the predictions of the
Ptuanas. The outbreak of the
Women's WVar in 1939 confirmed
this belief among the local popula-
tion.
17 Administrative Report fcr the
State of Manipur, 1939-40, p 5.
18 Manipur State Darbar Resolution
No 11, Memo No 10589 of 13-9-
1939.
19 Sharpe, President, Manipur State
Darbar, to Churachand, the Maha-
raja of Manipur, 13-9-1939; here-
inafter referred to as Sharpe to
Churachand or vice versa.
20 Churachand to Sharpe, Memo No
287, p 1, dated 14-9-1939.
21 Manipur State Darbar Resolution
No 1 of 23-9-1939.
22 Manipur State Darbar Resolution
No 3 of 23-9-1939.
23 Manipur State Darbar Resolution
No 4 of 23-9-1939; Sharpe to
Churachand Memo No 1120 G of
24-9-1939.
24 Churachand to Sharpe, Memo No
.329, PT-i. dated 24-9-1939.
25 Manipur State Darbar Resolution
No 15 of 4-10-1939; and Private
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
Secretary/Churachand to Sharpe,
Memo No 2698-S & J of 28-9-1939.
26 Manipur State Darbar Resolution
No 17 of 16-10-1939.
27 Manipur State Darbar Resolution
No 13 of 1-11-19.39, Memo
1416G/lB-1 of 3-11-1939.
28 Manipur State Darbar Resolution
No 1 of November 9, 1939, Memo
No 1433G/1-Bl of Ncvember 9,
1939.
29 Memo No 501 PI-1 dated Novem-
ber 21, 1939.
30 Administrative Report for the State
of Manipur, 1940-41.
31 Ehou, (Manipuri Daily), 12-12-
1973: interview with L Kanhai
Singh, p 2.
32 Administrative Report for the
State of Manip-ur, 1939-40.
33 Lamyanba, op cit, p 33-4.
34 According to the report submitted
to the Darbar by the Land Settle-
ment Officer and Land Revenue
Officer on the size of the harvest
of the year 1 939, there were ap-
proximately 7,400 paris of land un-
der rice cultivation, (one pari be-
ing about 2.5 acres). The area
damaged by floods was about 900
paris, and the aw7erage yield per
pari was 29 pots (one pot being
about 65 seers). Thus the amount
of paddy available for consump-
tion was about 17,50,000 pots; and
putting the population of the
State at 3.00,000 (1931 Census
figure being 2,84,843), and the per
capita consumption per year at 6
pots, the minimum requirement
was less than 18,00,000 pots. And
considering that fact that already
a large quantity had already been
exported, the Darbar did not rule
out the possibility of rice scarcity
in Manipur before the following
vear's harvest. (Manipur State
Darbar Resolution No 12 of Janu-
ary 10, 1940, Memo No 221 OG/
IB-1 of January 12, 1940.)
35 Manipur State Darbar Resolution
No 1 of December 12, 1939,
Memo No 1973-G/IB-1 of Decem-
ber 15, 1939.
36 The Hindu, AMadras, 18-12-1939.
37 Lam yanba, op cit, p 37.
38 Ibid.
39 The Pioneer, Lucknow, 19-12-
1939.
40 "Manipur Itihasta Nupi Lan",
40 Lamyanba, Vol 5, No 52, January
1974.
41 Administrative Report for the
State of Manipur, 1939-40, p 2;
and Petition filed by the women
of Manipur to the Political Agent,
Imphal, dated September 25, 1940.
42 Mills, Secretary to the Governor
of Assam to Gimson Political
Agent in Manipur, Confidential,
DO No 710C Shillong, dated 13-11-
1940, hereinafter referred to as
Mills to Gimson or vice versa.
3-1 Gimson to Mills, Confidential DO
No 5660 GA Imphal dated 21-3-
1941.
44 Petition filed bv the women mass
of Manipur to the Political Agent,
dated 25-9-l1940.
45 Gimson to Mills, op cit.
331