LAWS ON PUBLIC OFFICERS

By: Dean Hilario Justino F. Morales

Public Officers
01. Are the following persons considered public officers under the law and therefore can be charged
for violation of RA 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, before the Sandiganbayan:
(1) Employees and officials of the Philippine National Construction Corporation; and
(2) Chairman of the National Centennial Commission
(3) University of the Philippines Student Regent
ANSWERS:
(1) NO. Employees and officials of the PNCC are not public officers within the coverage of RA
3019, as amended, inasmuch as PNCC has no original charter as it was incorporated under the general law
on corporations and the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over them. (Macalino vs. Sandiganbayan, 376
SCRA 452)
(2) YES. The characteristics of a public office include the delegation of sovereign functions, its
creation by law and not by contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the position, scope of duties, and the
designation of the position as an office. The NCC was precisely created to ensure a more coordinated and
synchronized celebrations of the Philippine Centennial and wider participation from the government and
non-government or private organizations and to rationalize the relevance of historical links with other
countries and to carry them out into effect. Thus, the NCC performs executive functions. The executive
power “is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the
laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance.” The executive function, therefore
concerns the implementation of the policies as set forth by law. (Laurel vs. Desierto, 381 SCRA 48)
(3) YES. Although she is not a public officer with salary grade 27 and a mere regular tuition fee-paying
student, it is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in PD 1606, including presidents,
directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations. Compensation is not an essential element of public office. Delegation
of sovereign functions to be exercised by her for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer. The
administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line with Article XIV of the Constitution. (Serena vs.
Sandiganbayan, 542 SCRA 224)

02. Who is an accountable public officer? Are municipal mayors accountable public officers?
ANSWER: Under the government Auditing Code of the Philippines, an accountable public officer is a public
officer who, by reason of his office, is accountable for public funds or property. Section 340 of the Local
government Code expanded this definition by including “any officer of the local government unit whose duty
permits or requires the possession or custody of local government funds shall be accountable and
responsible for the safekeeping thereof x x x. Other local officials, though not accountable by the nature of
their duties, may likewise be similarly held accountable through their participation in the use or application
thereof.”
Thus, local government officials become accountable public officers either (1) because of the
nature of their functions or (2) on account of their participation in the use or application of public funds.

Section 102(1) of the Government Auditing Code provides that “The head of any agency of the
government is immediately and primarily responsible for all government funds and property pertaining to his
agency.” Since municipal mayors are chief executives of their respective municipalities, they are
accountable public officers. And as such, they are obliged to liquidate and settle disallowed cash advances
within the allowable period, without prejudice to their right to recover it from persons who were solidarily
liable with them. Failing to return the disallowed cash advances, the funds were deemed illegally or
improperly used or applied and they may be held liable for violation of Article 218 of the Revised penal
Code. (Frias, Sr. vs. People, GR No. 171437,October 4, 2007)
(1)
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03. Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned and controlled corporations organized and incorporated under the Corporation
Code for purposes of the provisions of RA 3019, the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act?
ANSWER: YES. The fact that the legislature, in mandating the inclusion of “presidents, directors or trustees,
or managers of government-owned and controlled corporations” within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, has consistently refrained from making distinctions with respect to the manner of their
creation clearly reveals its intention to include such officials of GOCC’s with original charters and those
organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
whenever they are involved in graft and corruption. (People vs. Sandiganbayan, 452 SCRA 413).
De Facto Officer
04. Distinguish a de facto officer from a de jure officer; a de facto from a usurper.
ANSWER: A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colourable authority to
appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face. He may also be one
who is in possession of an office, and is discharging its duties under color of authority, by which is meant
authority derived from an appointment, however, irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere
volunteer. (Funa. Agra, GR No. 191644, February 19, 2013)
A de facto officer is one who assumed office under the color of a known appointment or election
but which appointment is void for reasons that the officer is not eligible, while a de jure officer is one who is
in all respects legally appointed or elected and qualified to exercise the office. A de facto officer has
possession and performs the duties under a colorable title without being technically qualified in all points of
law to act while a de jure officer has a lawful or legal title to the office. IA de facto officer holding of office
rests on reputation while a de jure officer holding of office rests on right. A de facto officer may be ousted in
a direct proceeding (quo warranto) against him but a de jure officer cannot be removed through a direct
proceeding .
A de facto officer has color of right or title to office while a usurper has neither color of right or title
to office. The acts of a de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure, insofar as the
public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned while the acts of a usurper are absolutely
void. A de facto officer may be entitled to compensation for actual services rendered while a usurper is not
entitled at all to compensation.
05. Are the acts of a de facto officer valid? Is he entitled to compensation?
ANSWER: The lawful acts, insofar as the rights of third persons are concerned are, if done within the scope
and by the apparent authority of the office, considered valid and binding. However, the de facto officer
cannot benefit from his own status because public policy demands that unlawful assumption of public office
be discouraged. A de facto officer is entitled to emoluments for actual service rendered, and he cannot be
made to reimburse funds disbursed during his term of office because his acts are valid as those of a de jure
officer.
Appointments
06. Is the Provincial Governor empowered to designate an Assistant Provincial Treasurer?
ANSWER: NO. The Provincial Governor is without authority to designate the petitioner as Assistant
Provincial Governor for Administration, because under Section 471 of the Local Government Code, it is the
Secretary of Finance who has the power to appoint Assistant Provincial Treasurer from a list of
recommendation of the Provincial Governor. (Dimaandal vs. COA, 291 SCRA 322)
07. May the Punong Barangay validly appoint or remove the barangay treasurer, the barangay
secretary, and other appointive barangay officials without the concurrence of the majority of all the
members of the Sangguniang Barangay?
ANSWER: NO. The Local Government Code explicitly vests on the Punong Barangay, upon approval by a
majority of all members of the Sangguniang Barangay, the power to appoint or replace the barangay
treasurer, the barangay secretary, and other appointive officials. The power to appoint is to be exercised
conjointly by the punong barangay and a majority of all the members of the sangguniang barangay. Without
such conjoint action, neither appointment nor a replacement can be effectual. Applying the rule that the
power to appoint includes the power to remove, the questioned dismissal from the office of the barangay
officials by the punong barangay without the concurrence of the majority of all the members of the
Sangguniang Barangay cannot be legally justified. (Alquisola vs. Ocol, GR No. 132413, August 27, 1999)

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08. Is the constitutional prohibition on the so-called Presidential “midnight appointments” applicable to
appointments made by a local chief executive?
ANSWER: NO. The constitutional prohibition on the so-called “midnight appointments,” specifically those
made within two months immediately prior to the next presidential elections, applies only to the President or
Acting President. There is no law that prohibits local elective officials for making appointments during the
last days of their tenure absent fraud on their part, when such appointments are not tainted by irregularities
or anomalies which breach laws and regulations governing appointment. (De Rama vs. CA, 353 SCRA 650)
However, Memorandum Circular No. 9 s. 2003 issued by the Civil Service Commission pursuant to
CSC Resolution No. 030918 dated August 28, 2003, states that all appointments of whatever nature or
status issued within 45 days before any national or local elections shall be disapproved, subject to the
exception pursuant to Section 262 (g) of the Omnibus Election Code. The CSC MC further states that all
appointments issued by elective appointing officials after elections up to June 30 shall be disapproved
except if the appointee is fully qualified for the position and had undergone regular screening processes
before the Election Ban as shown in the Personnel Selection Board (PSB) report or minutes of meeting.
Nepotism
09. Who can be held liable for nepotism? What are the exceptions thereto?
ANSWER: The following can be held liable for nepotism: 1) appointing authority 2) recommending
authority 3) head of office and immediate supervisor. These persons must be related to the
appointee within the third degree (national positions) or fourth degree (local positions) of
consanguinity or affinity. By way of exception, the following shall not be covered by the prohibition
on nepotism: (1) persons employed in a confidential capacity (2) teachers (3) physocians, and
(4) members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

The prohibition against nepotism is intended to apply to natural persons. Hence,

respondent’s Cortes’ appointment as Information Officer V in the CHR by the Commission En
Banc, where his father is a member, is covered by the prohibition. Commissioner Mallari’s
abstention from voting did not cure the nepotistic character of the appointment because the evil
sought to be avoided by the prohibition still exists. His mere presence during the deliberation for
the appointment of Information Officer V created an impression of influence and cast doubt on the
impartiality and neutrality of the Commission En Banc. (Civil Service Commission v. Cortes, GR
No. 200103, April 23, 2014)
10. Does having the same family name, or middle name with the appointing authority constitute
nepotism?
ANSWER: NO. Having the same family name, or middle name with the appointing authority, does not
nepotism make. Besides, the law does not absolutely prohibit persons from being appointed to an office the
appointing authority of which is a relative so long as such relation, by consanguinity or affinity, is not within
the prohibited third degree. (Municipality of Butig, Lanao del Sur vs. Court of Appeals, 477 SCRA 115)
Security of Tenure in Career Executive Service
11. How is security of tenure acquired in the Career Executive Service?
ANSWER: The guarantee of security of tenure is a concept which is applicable only to first and second-level
employees in the civil service. For members of the Career Executive Service, security of tenure does not
extend to the particular positions to which they may be appointed but to the rank to which they are
appointed by the President. (Osea vs. Malaya, GR No. 139821, January 30, 2002; Dimayuga vs. Benedicto,
GR No. 144154, January 30, 2002 and Ignacio vs. CSC, 464 SCRA 220)
Appointments, assignments, reassignments and transfer in the Career Executive Service are
based on rank. Security of tenure in the Career Executive Service is thus acquired with respect to rank and
not to position. Mobility and flexibility in the assignment of personnel, to better cope with the exigencies of
public service, is the distinguishing feature of the Career Executive Service. (Secretary of Justice vs. Bacal,
GR No. 139382, December 6, 2000)
Grounds for disciplinary action
12. What is “just debts?” Is the wilful failure to pay just debts a ground for disciplinary action against
civil service employees?
ANSWER: The term “just debts” is defined in the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Civil Service
Law as 1) claims adjudicated by a court of law, or 2) claims the existence and justness of which are
admitted by the debtor.
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Willful failure to pay just debts is classified as a light offense and prescribes the penalty of
reprimand for the first offense, suspension for one to thirty days for the second offense and dismissal for the
third offense. (Uy vs. Magallanes Jr., AM No –00-1421, April 11, 2002; Naawan Community Rural Bank vs.
Martinez, AM No. P-02-1587, June 5, 2002 and Martinez vs. Munoz, 249 SCRA 14)
13. Are acts of lasciviousness considered misconduct in office?
ANSWER: NO. It was held that acts of lasciviousness cannot be considered misconduct in office, and may
not be the basis of an order of suspension. To constitute a ground for disciplinary action, the mayor charged
with the offense must be convicted in the criminal action. (Regidor vs. Chiongbian, 173 SCRA 507)
14. Does dishonesty, as ground of disciplinary action against a public officer, need to be committed in
the course of the performance of duty by the person charged?
ANSWER: NO. The rule is that dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal, need not be committed in the
course of the performance of duty by the person charged. If a government officer or employee is dishonest
or is guilty of oppression or misconduct, even if said defects of character are not connected with his office,
they affect his right to continue in office. The principle is that when an officer or employee is disciplined, the
object sought is not the punishment of such officer or employee but the improvement of the public service
and the preservation of the public faith and confidence in the government. (Remolana vs. CA, 362 SCRA
304)
15. Can employees in the public service engage in strike, mass leaves or walkouts?
ANSWER: NO. Employees in the public service may not engage in strike, mass leaves, walkouts and other
forms of mass action that will lead in the temporary stoppage or disruption of public service. The right of
government employees to organize is limited to the formation of unions or associations only, without
including the right to strike. (Gisete vs. CA, 444 SCRA 51)
16. Can a government official or employee who is on AWOL be dismissed from service?
ANSWER: YES. Section 63 of CSC Res. No. 983142 already allows the dismissal of a government official
or employee who is on AWOL without prior notice. But the government official or employee who is on AWOL
shall be informed of his separation from the service not later than 5 days from its effectivity. (Petilla vs. CA,
424 SCRA, 254)
Summary Dismissal
17. Who has the power to dismiss Philippine National Police members? What are the grounds for
summary dismissal of PNP members?
ANSWER: The power to dismiss PNP members is not only the prerogative of the Peoples’ Law Enforcement
Board (PLEB) but concurrently exercised by the PNP Chief and Regional Directors. Once a complaint is
filed with any of the disciplinary authorities under RA 6975, the latter shall acquire exclusive original
jurisdiction over the case although other disciplinary authority has concurrent jurisdiction over the case. The
grounds for summary dismissal of PNP members are serious charges including charges for commission of
heinous crimes and those committed by organized/syndicated crime groups wherein the PNP members are
involved, gunrunning, illegal logging, robbery, kidnapping for ransom, white slave trade; illegal recruitment,
carnapping, smuggling, piracy, drug trafficking, falsification of land title and other government forms, large
scale swindling, film piracy, counterfeiting and bank fraud. Quiambao vs. CA, 454 SCRA 17)

Abandonment
18. NAPOLCOM Commissioner CANO was removed from office by virtue of a reorganization law. He
questioned the validity his removal on the ground that it was done in bad faith. Pending resolution
of the case, he accepted the appointment as Inspector General of the Internal Affairs Division of
the PNP. The reorganization law was subsequently declared unconstitutional and the Court
ordered his reinstatement to the position of NAPOLCOM Commissioner. NAPOLCOM filed a
motion for reconsideration contending that when CANO accepted the position of Inspector General,
he ipso facto vacated and abandoned the position of Commissioner, the two positions being
incompatible, and his title to the first office is thereby terminated without any further act or
proceedings. Decide.
ANSWER: Generally speaking, a person holding a public office may abandon such office by nonuser or
acquiescence. But while deciding and intending to hold the office, and with no willful desire or intention to
abandon it, the public officer vacates it in deference to the requirements of a statute which is afterwards
declared unconstitutional, such surrender will not be deemed an abandonment and the officer may recover
the office. When a regular government employee is illegally dismissed, his position does not become vacant
and the new appointment made in order to replace him is null and void ab initio.
LAWS ON PUBLIC OFFICERS / P05
 It is a well settled rule that he who, while occupying one office, accepts another incompatible office
with the first, ipso facto vacates the first office and his title is thereby terminated without any other act or
proceeding. There is no question that the positions of NAPOLCOM Commissioner and Inspector General of
the Internal Affairs Service of the PNP are incompatible with each other, but the rule on incompatibility of
duties will not apply where at no point did the officer discharged the functions of the two offices
simultaneously. (Canonizado vs. Aguirre, 351 SCRA 659)
19. Give the effects of the following:
(1) Withdrawal of an administrative/civil complaint upon the case;
(2) Dismissal of the criminal action, upon the administrative case; and
(3) Cessation from office of respondent judge due to death, upon the administrative
complaint.
ANSWERS:
(1) The withdrawal of the complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating
respondent from administrative disciplinary action. (Aranes vs. Occiano, 380 SCRA 402 and Araza vs.
Sheriffs Garcia and Tonga, A.M. No. P-00-1363, February 8, 2000) An affidavit of desistance will not
automatically result to the dismissal of an administrative case or the exoneration of the respondent. (Jacobs
vs. Tambo, 369 SCRA 148)
A complaint for misconduct, malfeasance or misfeasance against a public officer or employee
cannot just be withdrawn at anytime by the complainant. This is because there is a need to maintain faith
and confidence of the people in the government and its agencies and instrumentalities. (Tecson vs.
Sandiganbayan, GR. No. 123045, November, 1999) Proceedings in such case should not be made to
depend on the whims and caprices of the complainants who are in a real sense, the only witness therein.
(Florendo vs. Enrile, 239 SCRA 22).
(2) Considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, the procedure to be followed and the
sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should
not necessarily be binding on the other. (Ocampo vs. Office of the Ombudsman, GR No. 114683, January
18, 2000).
(3) Cessation from office of respondent judge due to death does not per se warrant the dismissal of
the administrative complaint filed against him while he was still in the service. Since the instant
administrative complaint was filed before respondent’s death, the Court retains authority to pursue the
administrative complaint against him. The judge was ordered to pay a fine of PhP5,000.00 to be taken from
his retirement benefit in view of his demise. (Cabanero vs. Canon, 365 SCRA 425)
20. May a public officer be validly be found guilty of another offense other than the designated offense
or offenses with which he is charged in an administrative case?
ANSWER: YES. The designation of the offense or offenses with which a person is charged in an
administrative case is not controlling and one may be found guilty of another offense, where the substance
of the allegations and evidence presented sufficiently proves guilt. (Avenido vs. CSC, GR No.177666 April
30, 2008)
21. What procedure should be followed in administrative investigations involving a public school
teacher conducted by the Department of Education?
ANSWER: RA 4670 known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, which specifically cover
administrative proceedings involving public school teachers, expressly provides that the committee to hear
public school teachers’ administrative cases should be composed of the school superintendent of the
division as chairman, a representative of the local or any existing provincial or national teachers’
organization and a supervisor of the division. Where the various committees formed by the DepEd to hear
administrative charges against respondents did not include “a representative of the local or, in its absence,
any existing provincial or national teacher’s organization as required by law, these committees were
deemed to have no competent jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily void.
They could not provide any basis for the suspension or dismissal of respondents. The inclusion of a
representative of a teacher’s organization in these committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial
tribunal. It was this requirement that would have given substance and meaning to the right to be heard.
Mere membership of said teachers in their respective teachers’ organization does not ipso facto make them
authorized representatives of such organization. The teachers’ organization possesses the right to indicate
its choice of representative to be included by the DepEd in the investigating committee. Such right to
designate cannot be usurped by the secretary of education or the director of public schools or their
underlings. (Fabella vs. CA 282 SCRA256)

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 While the ruling in the Fabella applies to public school teachers charged with violations of civil
service laws, rules and regulations in administrative proceedings initiated by the DepEd Secretary, the same
does not apply where the charges against the public school teachers are for violations of RA 6713, known
as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employee, where the acts or
omissions complained of relate to respondents’ conduct as public official and employee, if not outright graft
and corruption. (Ombudsman vs. Masing, 542 SCRA 253)
Right to Formal Investigation
22. The Provincial Vice Governor and the Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan filed an
administrative complaint against the Provincial Governor with the Office of the President for grave
misconduct and abuse of authority because he allegedly tried to intimidate them to approve a bank loan.
The respondent Governor was ordered to file an answer and not a motion to dismiss. After filing three (3)
motions for extension of time to file an answer, his counsel filed a motion to dismiss which was denied and
the parties were required to submit their position papers. Respondent Governor filed his answer but it was
considered instead as his position paper. He then filed a motion for formal investigation which was also
denied. On the basis of their position papers a decision was rendered finding the governor guilty. Is the
denial of the motion for formal investigation proper?
ANSWER: NO. The denial of the motion of the Governor for formal investigation is erroneous. His right to
formal investigation is spelled out in Administrative Order No. 23. He has the right to appear and defend
himself in person or by counsel, the right to confront the witnesses and the right to compulsory attendance
of witness and the production of documentary evidence. The right of the Governor to formal investigation
was not satisfied when the complaint was decided on the basis of position papers. (Joson vs. Torres, 290
SCRA 279)
23. An administrative complaint was filed against MDA before the Office of the Ombudsman. She
requested for a formal investigation as provided for in the Administrative Code but it was denied.
She now claims she was deprived of her right to due process. Is her contention legally tenable?

ANSWER: NO. The provision in the Administrative Code cited by the petitioner in support of her theory that
she is entitled to a formal investigation apply only to cases filed before the Civil Service Commission. The
administrative complaint against petitioner was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, suggesting that a
different rules of procedure govern. Administrative Order No. 7, as amended by AO 17, particularly governs
the procedure in administrative proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman. The denial of petitioner’s
request for a formal investigation is not tantamount to a denial of her right to due process. Petitioner was
required to file a counter-affidavit and position paper and later on, was given a chance to file two motions for
reconsideration of the decision of the deputy ombudsman. (Medina vs. COA, 543 SCRA 684)
24. Who is vested with the power to remove or dismiss erring local elective officials? What is the effect
of the imposition of the penalty of dismissal in an administrative case?
ANSWER: The Office of the President is without any power to remove elected officials since such power is
exclusively vested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of Section 60 of the
Local Government Code. (Salalima vs. Guingona, 257 SCRA 55) Likewise, in Pablico vs. Villapando, 385
SCRA 601, it was held that the power to remove erring elective local officials from service is lodged
exclusively with the courts. Hence, Article 124 (b), Rule XIX of the rules and regulations implementing the
Local Government Code insofar as it vests power on the “disciplining authority” to remove from office erring
elective local officials, is void for being repugnant to the last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local
Government. Such grant to the “disciplining authority” of the power to remove elective local officials is
clearly beyond the authority of the Oversight Committee that prepared the rules and regulations. No such
regulation may alter, amend or contravene a provision of law, such as the Local Government Code.
The law on suspension and removal of elective public officials must be strictly construed and
applied, and the authority in whom such power of suspension or removal is vested must exercise it with
utmost good faith, for what is involved is not just an ordinary public official but one chosen by the people
through the exercise of their constitutional right of suffrage. Their will must not be put to naught by the
caprice or partisanship of the disciplining authority. When the disciplining authority is given only the power to
suspend and not the power to remove, it should not be permitted to manipulate the law by usurping the
power to remove. (Ibid.)
The penalty of removal from office as a result of an administrative investigation shall be considered
a bar to the candidacy of the respondent for any elective position. (Section 66 c, Local Government Code)

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25. May a Deputy Ombudsman be subjected to the administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of the
President?
ANSWER: NO. The framers of the Constitution intended that independent bodies be insulated from
political pressure to the extent that the absence of independence would result in the impairment of their core
functions., Hence, RA No. 6770 vesting authority in the President over the Deputy Ombudsman violates the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman and thus unconstitutional. (Gonzales III. Office of the
President of the Philippines, GR No. 196231, January 28, 2014)
Preventive Suspension vs. Suspension as a Penalty
26. Distinguish preventive suspension from suspension as a penalty. Can service of the former be
credited as service for the latter?
ANSWERS: Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in administrative
investigation. The purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the accused from using his position and the
powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be
vital in the prosecution of the case against him. If after such investigation, the charge is established and the
person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his suspension or removal, then he is suspended,
removed or dismissed. This is the penalty. Unlike in criminal law in case of preventive imprisonment, the
period within which one is under preventive suspension, not being a penalty, is not considered of the actual
penalty of suspension – service of the preventive suspension cannot be credited as service of the penalty.
(Quimbo vs. Gervacio, 466 SCRA 277)
27. Differentiate preventive suspension pending investigation from preventive suspension pending
appeal.
ANSWER: PSPI is not a penalty but only a means of enabling the disciplinary authority an unhampered
investigation while PSPA is punitive is character. In PSPI, the officer shall be automatically reinstated after
the lapse of the period of preventive suspension while in PSPA, if officer is exonerated, he shall be
reinstated with full pay for the period of suspension. In PSPI, the officer is not entitled to payment of salaries
during such period of suspension even if subsequently exonerated, except local elective officials, while in
PSPA, his penalty of suspension shall be treated as PSPA upon appeal but if exonerated or the penalty is
reprimand, he is entitled to back salary corresponding to the period of suspension.
28. What are the periods of preventive suspension?
ANSWER: For administrative cases: a) under CS Law, 90 days b) under the LGC, 60 or 90 days for
elective officials, and 90 days for appointive officials c) under Ombudsman Act, 6 months. For criminal
cases, under RA 3019, 90 days by analogy.
Preventive suspension and Backwages
29. Should a civil servant is preventively suspended and subsequently reinstated, is the payment of
backwages proper during the period of his preventive suspension?
ANSWER: YES. The payment of backwages during the period of preventive suspension of a civil servant
who is subsequently reinstated is proper if: (1) he is found innocent of the charges, and (2) the
suspension is unjustified. Where the two circumstances are absent, the payment of backwages is
improper. (Brugada vs. Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, 450 SCRA 225)
Appeals from Administrative Decisions
30. Can a complainant appeal a decision exonerating or absolving a civil service employee?
ANSWER: NO. The Civil Service Law does not allow a complainant to appeal a decision exonerating or
absolving a civil service employee. This doctrine, however, may have been modified to allow the Civil
Service Commission, as a party adversely affected by the decision, to appeal decisions exonerating an
employee. Nonetheless, excepting the privilege of appeal granted to the CSC, the law does not contemplate
a review of decisions exonerating officers and employees from administrative charges. (CSC vs. Dacoycoy,
306 SCRA 425 and Floria vs. Sunga, 368 SCRA 551) In National Appellate Board of the NAPOLCOM vs.
Mamauag, 466 SCRA 624, it was also held that a private complainant is not one of “either party” who can
appeal under Section 43 and 45 of RA 6975 – she has no legal personality to appeal the dismissal of the
charges against members of the PNP. The government party that can appeal is not the disciplinary authority
or tribunal which previously held the case and imposed the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the
service – it must be one that is prosecuting the administrative case.
In Civil Service Commission v. Clave, GR No. 194645 and 194665, 667 SCRA 556, both the GSIS
and the CSC were given standing to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals. In GSIS v. Chua, GR No.
202914, 682 SCRA 118, the GSIS was then allowed to bring an appeal of the modification of the penalty
with this Court. Thus, we now hold that the parties adversely affected by a decision in an administrative
case who may appeal shall include the disciplining authority whose decision dismissing the employee was
either overturned or modified by the Civil Service Commission. (LRTA v. Salvana , GR No. 192074, June
10, 2014)
LAWS ON PUBLIC OFFICERS / P08
Impeachable Officers
31. Who are the impeachable officers? Can they be prosecuted for criminal offenses?
ANSWER: As enumerated in Section 2 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, only the following are
impeachable officers: the President, the Vice President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members
of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman.
The rule that an impeachable officer cannot be criminally prosecuted for the same offense which
constitutes grounds for impeachment presupposes his continuance in office. Hence, the moment he is no
longer in office because of his removal, resignation, or permanent disability, there can be no bar to his
criminal prosecution in the courts.

Initiation of Impeachment
32. When is an impeachment complaint deemed initiated under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution? ANSWER: Initiation of impeachment proceedings takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon.
Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed
against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
Considering that the first impeachment complaint was filed by former President Estrada against the Chief
Justice, along with seven other justices of the Supreme Court, on June 2, 2003, and referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Reps. Teodoro and
Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003, violates the constitutional prohibition against
initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
(Francisco vs. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol, GR No. 160261, November 10, 2003)
33. Before the 15th Congress opened its first session, Ombudsman MMG faced an impeachment
complaint filed by RHB. A day after the opening of the 15th Congress, the Secretary General of the
House of Representatives transmitted the impeachment complaint to the House Speaker who
directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the order of Business. On the same day, RR filed
another impeachment complaint against Ombudsman MMG. On even date the House of
representatives provisionally adopted the Rules of procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the
14th Congress. The Secretary General RR’s complaint to the Speaker who also directed the
Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business. During the plenary session, the House
of Representatives simultaneously referred both complaints to the Committee. After hearing, the
Committee, by Resolution, found the two complaints sufficient in form. By a second Resolution, the
Committee found the two complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and
betrayal of public trust, sufficient in substance. Ombudsman MMG avers that 1) she was denied of
due process when the impeachment rules were published only after the Committee has ruled on
the sufficiency of form of the complaints and 2) two impeachment proceedings were initiated
against her when two impeachment complaints were filed against her in the same year. Decide.
ANSWERS:
1) Unlike the rules of procedures on inquiries in aid of legislation, the Constitution did not intend to
have the Impeachment Rules published. In the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or
specific rules, the Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of
the Congress relative thereto. Under the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, courts may not
intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature.
2) The one year bar rule under the Constitution was not violated. The term “initiate” means to file the
complaint and take initial action on it. The initial action taken by the House of Representatives on
the complaint is referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice. Contrary to Ombudsman
MMG emphasis on impeachment complaint, what the Constitution mentions is impeachment
proceedings. (Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice, GR No. 193459,
February 15, 2011)
Command Responsibility
34. Can a public officer be dismissed from service on administrative charge for gross neglect of duty
without substantial evidence to support the findings of gross neglect of duty because the duty to
monitor and inspect the project was not vested in the public officer?
ANSWER: NO. Administrative liability could not be based on the fact that a public officer was the one who
signed and approved the Environmental Compliance Certificate, without proof of actual act or omission
constituting neglect of duty. In the absence of substantial evidence of gross neglect of the public officer,
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administrative liability could not be based on the principle of command responsibility. The negligence of a
public officer’s subordinates is not tantamount to his own negligence. It was not within the mandated
responsibility of the public officer to conduct actual monitoring of projects. The principle governing public
officers under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 clearly provides that a head of a department or a
superior officer shall not be civilly liable for the wrongful acts, omissions of duty, negligence or misfeasance
of his subordinates unless he has actually authorized by written order the specific act or misconduct
complained of. (Principe vs. Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau, office of the Ombudsman, 374 SCRA
460).
35. Does the Doctrine of Command Responsibility apply to high ranking officers of the central
monetary authority?
ANSWER: NO. The principle of command responsibility itself which is an accepted notion in military or
police structural dynamics or its counter part respondeat superior in the law on quasi-delicts is not relevant
to a case involving the actual performance in the office of petitioner public officials and given the fact that
they are high ranking officers of the country’s central monetary authority. Petitioners in this case owing to
their high ranks cannot be expected to monitor the activities of their subalterns and to acquaint themselves
which such minutae as the flow of files and documents which leave their desks. Myriad details such as
those, by office practice, left to subalterns and minor employees. Delegation of function is part of sound
management practice. (Reyes vs. Rural Bank of San Miguel, 424 SCRA135)
36. Can the doctrine of command responsibility be used in amparo and habeas cases data? Can the
President, as commander-in-chief of the military be held responsible for extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances?
ANSWERS: YES. The development in the use of command responsibility in civil proceedings shows that
the application of this doctrine has been liberally extended even to cases not criminal in nature. Thus,
command responsibility may likewise find application in proceedings seeking the privilege of the writ of
amparo to ascertain responsibility and accountability in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
The doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine whether respondents are accountable for
and have the duty to address a person’s abduction in order to enable the courts to devise remedial
measures to protect his rights.
YES. The President, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses
control over the military that qualifies him as superior within the purview of the command responsibility. On
the issue of knowledge, it must be pointed out that although international tribunals apply strict standard of
knowledge, i.e., actual knowledge, such may nonetheless be established through circumstantial evidence.
In the Philippines, a more liberal view is adopted and superiors may be charged with constructive
knowledge. Under EO 226, a government official may be held liable for neglect of duty under the doctrine of
command responsibility if he has knowledge that a crime or offense shall be committed, is being committed,
or has been committed by his subordinates, or by others within his area of responsibility and, despite such
knowledge, he did not take preventive or corrective action either before, during, or immediately after its
commission. As to the issue of failure to prevent or punish, it is important to note that as the commander-in-
chief of the armed forces, the President has the power to effectively command, control and discipline the
military. (in the Matter of petition for the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data in Favor of Noriel Rodriguez v.
GM Arroyo, et al. GR No. 191805 and 193160, November 15, 2011)
Condonation
37. What do you understand by the Doctrine of Condonation or Forgiveness in the Law on Public
Officers?
ANSWER: A public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term,
since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of
cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal
cases against petitioner. (Aguinaldo vs. Santos 212 SCRA 768)
A re-elected local official may not be held administratively accountable for misconduct committed
during his prior term of office. The rationale for this holding is that when the electorate put him back into
office, it is presumed that it did so with full knowledge of his life and character, including his past
misconduct. If, armed with such knowledge, it still re-elects him, then such re-election is considered a
condonation of his past misdeed. (Mayor Alvin B. Garcia vs. Hon. Arturo C. Mojica GR No139043,
September 10, 1999)
In People vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689, the Supreme Court reiterated that the doctrine cannot apply
to criminal acts which the re-elected official may have committed during his previous term. Even assuming
that his acts constitute administrative offenses, the doctrine (a provision of the Local Government Code) still
cannot apply because he is a national and not a local elective official.
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Ombudsman
38. What is the scope and limitations of the power of the Ombudsman?
ANSWER: Scope of power: The Supreme Court upheld the authority of the Ombudsman over acts of public
officers related or not related to official duty. (Lastimosa vs. Vasquez, GR No. 116801, April 6, 1995) The
power to investigate and prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified – it
pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee, when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. (Uy vs. Sandiganbayan, 354 SCRA 651) It has the power to prosecute
not only graft cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but also those cognizable by the regular
courts. (Office of the Ombudsman vs. Enoc, 374 SCRA 691) The Ombudsman has the constitutional power
to directly remove from government service an erring public official, other than impeachable officials, and
members of Congress and the Judiciary. (Office of the Ombudsman vs. CA, GR No. 168079, July 17, 2007)
RA 6770 expressly grants the power to preventively suspend public officials and employees facing
administrative charges to the Ombudsman and his deputies. (Office of the Ombudsman vs. CA, 491 SCRA
92) Section 25 of RA 6770 gave the Office of the Ombudsman the power to impose penalties in
administrative cases.
Limitations. The office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to investigate employees of
government-owned or controlled corporations organized under the Corporation Code. (Khan vs. Office of
the Ombudsman, 495 SCRA 452).The Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to entertain criminal charges filed
against a judge of the Regional Trial Court relative to his handling cases before the court. The determination
of whether a judge has maliciously delayed the disposition of the case is exclusively a judicial function. (De
Vera vs. Hon. Pelayo, GR No. 137354, July 6, 2000) The Ombudsman must indorse the case to the
Supreme Court for appropriate action. (Judge Fuentes vs. Office of the Ombudsman - Mindanao, GR No.
124295, October 23, 2001) The Ombudsman may not pass upon errors of the prosecutor’s office in the
exercise of powers intrinsic to the resolution itself of the case as that function pertains to the power of review
of the Secretary of Justice. (Garcia-Rueda vs. Amores, GR No. 116938, September 20, 2001)
Effectivity and Finality of Decisions
39. What decisions of the Ombudsman are considered final and unappeallable?
ANSWER: Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman was further amended
which provides that decisions of the Ombudsman are immediately executory even pending appeal and in
case the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins the appeal, he shall be considered as
having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he
did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal, which provision is similar to Section 47 of the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. Section 7 now reads:
Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. – Where the respondent is
absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public
censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one
month salary, the decision shall be final, executory and unappealable. In all other cases,
the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review
under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within
fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the written Notice of Decision or Order denying the
Motion for Reconsideration.
40. Are the decisions of the Office of the President under the Local Government Code final and
executory?
ANSWER: YES. The decision of the Office of the President under the Local Government Code are
immediately executory even pending appeal because the pertinent laws under which the decisions are
rendered mandated them to be so. No motion for reconsideration is allowed by law but the parties may
appeal the decision to the Court of Appeals. The appeal, however, does not stay the execution of the
decision. Thus the DILG Secretary may validly move for its immediate execution. (Calingin vs. CA, 434
SCRA 173)
41. What is the three-fold responsibility of a public officer?
ANSWER: It is a basic principle of the law on public officers that a public official or employee is under a
three-fold responsibility for violation of a duty or for a wrongful act or omission. This simply means that a
public officer may be held civilly, criminally, and administratively liable for a wrongful doing. Thus, if such
violation or wrongful act results in damages to an individual, the public officer may be held civilly liable to
reimburse the injured party. If the law violated attaches a penal sanction, the erring officer may be punished
criminally. Finally, such violation may also lead to suspension, removal from office, or other administrative
sanctions. This administrative liability is separate and distinct from the penal and civil liabilities. (Apolinario
vs. Flores, GR No.152780, January 22, 2007)
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Preventive Suspension by the Sandiganbayan
42. Can the Sandiganbayan impose preventive suspension upon members of Congress facing charges
 for violation of RA 3019 –the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, without violating the doctrine of
separation of powers?
ANSWER: YES. The Doctrine of Separation of Powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively
excluded members of Congress from RA 3019 nor from its sanctions. The question in the case at bar does
not pertain to an affair internal to either Congress or the Executive where the Court substituted its own
judgment over that of any other two branches of government, and therefore there is no infringement of any
specific Constitutional proscription, no impairment or a clear disregard of a specific constitutional precept or
provision that can unbolt the steel door for judicial intervention. The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law
does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did
not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension. (Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan, 256 SCRA 636)
43. How may a public office be created and abolished? Distinguish abolition of an office and its
related positions from removal of an incumbent from office. Explain the test of good faith in the
abolition of a public office.
ANSWER: A public office is created by the Constitution or by law or by an officer or tribunal to which
the power to create has been delegated by the legislature. The power to create an office carries with it the
power to abolish.
Abolition and removal are mutually exclusive concepts. From a legal standpoint, there is no
occupant in an abolished office. Where there is no occupant, there is no tenure to speak of. Thus,
impairment of tenure does not arise in the abolition of office. On the other hand, removal implies that the
office and its related positions subsist and the occupants are merely separated from their positions.
A valid order of abolition must not only come from a legitimate body, it must also be made in good
faith. An abolition is made in good faith when it is not made for political or personal reasons, or when it does
not circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of civil service employees. Abolition of office may be
brought about by reasons of economy, or remove redundancy of functions, or a clear explicit constitutional
mandate for such termination of employment. Where one office is abolished and replaced with another
office vested with similar functions, the abolition if a legal nullity. The overlap in the functions of the
abolished Energy regulatory Board (ERB) and of the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) does not mean
that there is no valid abolition because the latter has new and expanded functions which are intended to
meet specific needs of a deregulated power industry. (Kapisanan ng mga Kawani ng Energy Regulatory
Board vs. Barin, 526 SCRA 1)
44. Is a civil service employee illegally terminated from the service entitled to back salaries?
ANSWER: YES. A civil service employee illegally terminated from the service is entitled to back salaries
limited only to a maximum period of five (5) years, not to full back salaries from her illegal termination up to
her reinstatement. (Adiong vs. CA, 371 SCRA 373)
45. The Executive Secretary issued a Memorandum directing all non-career officials to vacate their
positions. Pursuant to the Memorandum, ANDOK resigned from the DOF. More than a year later
he was charged before the Ombudsman due to the illegal transfer of Tax Credit Certificates. Can
the Ombudsman still institute an administrative case after a public official’s resignation from office.
ANSWER: NO. While resignation of a public servant does not preclude the finding of administrative liability
to which he or she is still answerable if the purpose is either to prevent the continuation of a case already
filed or to pre-empt the imminent filing of one. ANDOK’s resignation was neither his choice nor his own
doing; he was forced to resign. His forced resignation negates that he tried to prevent the filing of the
administrative case. Although the Ombudsman Law does not preclude the Ombudsman from conducting the
investigation, the Ombudsman can no longer institute an administrative case against ANDOK because the
latter was not a public officer at the time the case was filed. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Andutan, GR No.
164679, July 27, 2011)
46. Three consecutive-term limit
Assumption by Succession. The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the
right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough
that an individual has served three consecutive in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to
the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. (Borja vs. COMELEC,
295 SCRA 157 reiterated in Adormeo vs. COMELEC GR No.147927, February 4, 2002)
Conditions for the application of the disqualification: (1) the official concerned has been elected for
three consecutive terms in the same local government post and (2) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms. (Ibid. Latasa vs. COMELEC, 417 SCRA 574 and Ong vs. Alegre, 479 SCRA 473)
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Involuntary Severance from Office. Voluntary renunciation of a term of office does not cancel the
renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from the office
for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of
service. (Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, 311 SACRA 602) Thus, in Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, 311 SACRA 602,
while he assumed office, he voluntarily vacated when there was a declaration of failure of election and his
proclamation was a nullified. Also, he did not fully serve the term, hence, he was qualified to run for a third
term.
But in Ong vs. Alegre, 479 SCRA 473, the Supreme Court held that Ong’s assumption as mayor of
San Vicente, Camarines Sur from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001, constitutes “service of full term” and
should be counted as full term served in contemplation of the three – term limit prescribed by the
Constitution. While Ong’s opponent “won” in an election protest in the 1998 mayoralty race, and therefore
was the legally elected mayor, that disposition was without practical and legal use and values, having
been promulgated after the term of the contested office has expired. Ong’s contention that he was only a
presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation was under protest did not make him
less than a duly elected mayor. His proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers as duly elected
mayor in 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the
functions thereof from the start to finish of the term, should be legally be taken as service for a full term in
contemplation of the three-term rule.
This rule equally applies to Morales because he was the mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga
continuously for the entire period without any break notwithstanding the decision in the electoral protest
case ousting him as mayor. Such circumstance does not constitute an interruption in serving the full term,
hence he is disqualified. (Rivera III vs. COMELEC, GR No. 167591, May 6, 2007)
Voluntary Renunciation of Office v. Involuntary Severance from Office. A Punong Barangay who
had already completed two consecutive terms of office and ran for a third term in the Barangay elections of
2002, and while serving his third term as Punong Barangay, he subsequently ran and won and assumed
the position of a Sangguniang Bayan member, has effectively abandoned the position of a Punong
Barangay and he intended to forego of it. Abandonment, like resignation, is voluntary. When he voluntarily
relinquished his office as a Punong Barangay, there is voluntary renunciation of said office. (Bolos vs.
COMELEC, GR No. 184082, March 17, 2009))
In Montebon vs. COMELEC, 551 SCRA 50, SFP was elected and served three consecutive term
as municipal councilor. During his second term, he succeeded as vice-mayor due to the retirement of the
incumbent vice-mayor. His assumption as vice-mayor was considered an involuntary severance from his
office as municipal councilor resulting an interruption in his second term of service. It was held that it
could not be deemed to have been by reason of voluntary renunciation because it was by operation of law,
hence qualified to run again as municipal councilor.
Effect of Preventive Suspension on the Three-term Limit Rule. The Court held that the preventive
suspension of public officials does not interrupt their term for purposes of the three-term rule under the
Constitution and the Local Government Code since preventive suspension does not involve an effective
interruption of service within a term. (Aldovino vs. COMELEC, GR No. 184836, December 23, 2009)
Conversion of a Municipality to a New Component City. While a new component city which was
converted from a municipality acquires a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the
municipality, this does not mean however, that for the purpose of applying the constitutional provision on
term limits, the office of the municipal mayor would now be construed as a different local government post
as that of the office of the city mayor. Accordingly, the municipal mayor is barred from running for city
mayor under the three-term limit rule. (Latasa vs. COMELEC, 417 SCRA 574)
Eligibility in a Recall Election. Section 43 of RA 7160 provides that no local elective official shall
serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term
for which the elective official was elected. After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot
seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for
the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall
election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election is no longer
an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an
involuntary interruption in the continuity of service. (Socrates vs. COMELEC, 2002, 391 SCRA 457)
A necessary consequence of the interruption of service is the start of a new term following the
interruption.. An official elected in recall election serves the unexpired term of the recalled official. This
unexpired term is in itself one term for purposes of counting the three-term limit. A local official who serves a
recall term should know that the recall term is in itself one term although less than three years. This is the
inherent limitation he takes by running and winning in the recall election. (Ibid.)
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