In Re: Almacen

G.R. No. L-2765 February 18, 1970

In the Matter of Proceedings for Disciplinary Action against Atty. Vicente Raul
Almacen in L-27654, Antonio H. Calero,
Vs
Virginia Y. Yaptinchay.
Facts:
Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen filed a “Petition to Surrender the Lawyer’s Certificate
of Title” to the Supreme Court as a sign of his protest as against to what he call a
tribunal “peopled by people who are calloused to our pleas for justice…’. He also
expressed strong words as against the judiciary like “justice…is not only blind, but
also deaf and dumb.” The petition rooted from the case he lost due to the absence
of time and place in his motion in the trial court. His appeal was dismissed in the
Court of Appeals by reason of jurisprudence. In a petition for certiorari in the
Supreme Court, it was again dismissed thru a minute resolution. With the
disappointments, he thought of his sacrificial move. He claimed that this petition to
surrender his title is only in trust, and that he may obtain the title as soon as he
retained confidence in the justice system.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Almacen should be given disciplinary actions.
Ruling:
Yes, indefinite suspension should be imposed. It has been pointed out by the
Supreme Court that there is no one to blame but Atty. Almacen himself because of
his negligence. Even if the intention of his accusations are so noble, in speaking of
the truth and alleged injustices, so as not to condemn the sinners but the sin, it has
already caused enough damage and disrepute to the judiciary. Between disbarment
and suspension, the latter was imposed. Indefinite suspension may only be lifted
until further orders, after Atty. Almacen may be able to prove that he is again fit to
resume the practice of law
.
Gatchalian Promotions Vs Naldoza
Admin. Case No. 4017 September 29, 1999
Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc., complainant,
Vs
Atty. Primo R. Naldoza, respondent
Facts:
A petition for disbarment was filed by the complainant against the respondent.
Respondent as a counsel for complainant, appealing a decision of the POEA. The
said case was resolved in favor of the complainant. The respondent knowing fully
well that the said decision had already become final and unappealable, convinced
the complainant to appeal the case before the Supreme Court. When respondent
filed the said appeal, he misrepresented to the complainant that it had to pay a cash
bond. In order to cover up his misrepresentation, respondent presented complainant
a fake xerox copy of an alleged Supreme Court receipt representing payment of
$2,555.00.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Naldoza be disbarred.
Ruling:
Yes, Atty. Naldoza was declared disbarred. Not only did he misappropriate the
money entrusted to him, he also faked a reason to cajole his client to part with his
money. Worse, he had the gall to falsify the official receipt of the Supreme Court
to cover up his misdeeds. Clearly, he does not deserve to continue being a member
of the bar. The acts committed by respondent definitely constitute malpractice and
gross misconduct in his office as attorney. These acts are noted with disapproval
by the Court; they are in violation of his duty, as a lawyer, to uphold the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession and to engage in no conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law.
Gerona vs Datingaling
Admin Case No. 4801 February 27, 2003
Mena C. Gerona, complainant,
Vs
Atty. Alfredo Datingaing, respondent.
Facts:
Complaint for disbarment of Atty. Datingaling for falsifying a complaint-affidavit
and notarizing it afterwards when in fact the complainant and siblings did not
appear before the respondents. This affidavit concerns “Consent to Quarry”, and
agreement of complainant and her party composed of several people and
represented by Engr. Melo to enter or occupy a portion to their property on
Batangas and engage in a “quarry” business and related activities.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Datingaling shall be administratively liable.
Ruling:
Yes, but Supreme Court modifies his penalty to 1-year suspension with
disqualification for appointment as Notary Public for 2 years from receipt of
notice. Conviction in a criminal case is not necessary for finding a member
administratively liable. Findings of IBP regarding violation of Act. No. 2103
(acknowledgment must be made before a notary public or officer duly authorized
by law) are fully supported by evidence. Respondent was also not able to
controvert complainant’s evidence regarding falsifications.
In Re: Atty, Leon Maquera
Bar Matter No. 793 July 30, 2004
In Re: Suspension from the practice of law in the territory of Guam of Atty. Leon
G. Maquera
Facts:
Maquera was suspended in Guam for misconduct, acquiring his client’s property as
payment for his legal services then sold it and as a consequence obtained an
unreasonably high fee for handling his client’s case. IBP indefinitely suspends
Maquera from practice of law within the Philippines until and unless he updates
and pays his IBP membership in full.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent has violated the Code of Professional Ethics in the
Philippines.
Ruling:
Yes. Canon 17 for fidelity to client’s cause and trust and Rule 1.01 for good moral
character. Similar prohibition in Guam exists in the Philippines. The Civil Code
prohibits lawyer’s acquisition by assignment of client’s property which is subject
of the litigation. The prohibition extends to sales in legal redemption. This express
prohibition is founded in public policy because Atty. may easily take advantage of
the credulity and ignorance of his client and unduly enrich himself.
In Re: Tionko
March 17, 1922
In Re: Attorney Eusebio Tionko
Attorney-General Villa-Real for the Government.
Rector, Casal & Ozaeta for respondent.
Facts:
Atty. Tionko agreed to obtain for Alvarado and Casion the registration of 2 parcels
of land and for which he received legal fee of P114.00. After more than a year of
not hearing from him, a letter was sent to him calling his attention to the period
allowed for presentation of their claims. Still, the clients did not receive any
answer. Another letter was sent, but still no answer. So, they hired another
attorney. The clients informed Atty. Tionko about their change of counsel and
required him to give to new attorney previously paid to him but failed to bring
results.
Issue:
Whether or not Supreme Court should sanction respondent.
Ruling:
No, the serious consequence of disbarment or suspension should follow only where
there is a clear preponderance of evidence against the respondent. Atty. Tionko
was actually diligent in taking the necessary steps to obtain the plans he desired
from the Bureau of Lands wherein he paid certain amount of money for the plans.
The presumption is that the attorney is innocent of the charges preferred and has
performed his duty as an office of the court in accordance with his oath. However,
this does not relieve him of all responsibilities for her complacently waited for 2
years for the 2 plans. He was guilty of repeatedly disdaining to answer the
communications of his client.
Navarro vs Meneses III
CBD Admin. Case No. 313 January 30, 1998
Atty. Augusto G. Navarro, for and in behalf of Pan-Asia International
Commodities, Inc., complainant
Vs
Atty. Rosendo Meneses III, respondent.
Facts:
Respondent while serving as a counsel of the complainant handled various cases
and was properly compensated in accordance with their retainer agreement. In one
of the case handled, despite the repeated requests, respondent failed to present the
receipt to his client acknowledging from the offended party received the amount. A
verification by the RTC also revealed that there was no motion to dismiss filed and
the supposed amicable settlement was not finalized and concluded.
Issue:
Whether of not Atty. Navarro may file for Pan-Asia.
Ruling:
Yes. Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis for
judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the charge. The evidence submitted by
complainant before the Commission on Bar Discipline sufficed to sustain its
resolution and recommended sanctions. Section 1 Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court
provides that proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of
attorney’s may be taken by the Supreme Court moto propio of the IBP upon the
verified complainant of any person. The right to institute a disbarment proceeding
is not confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining suffered
injury from the alleged wrongdoing.
Fernandez vs Novero, Jr.
Admin. Case No. 5394 December 2, 2002
Rizalino Fernandez, complainant,
Vs
Atty. Reynaldo Novero, Jr., respondent.
Facts:
Complainant alleges that respondent did not attend a scheduled hearing nor seek a
postponement thereof for which reason the trial court considered respondent to
have waived further presentation of his evidence and directed him to formally offer
his exhibits for admission on a later date which he also failed to do so. Moreover,
he filed a MR outside of the reglementary period causing it to be denied. When the
complainant asked about the MR, the respondent lied that it had not been resolved
by the trial court. Respondent attended only 1 hearing.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Novero, Jr. be admonished.
Ruling:
Yes, the Court found him to be negligent in the performance of his duty which is
under Canon 17 for fidelity to client’s cause and 18 for competence and diligence,
adequate preparation, not neglect legal matter. As to the contention of respondent
that the letter-complaint was not verified, as required in Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court on Disbarment and Discipline of Attorney, suffice it say that such constitutes
only a formal defect and does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court over the
subject matter of the complaint. The verification is merely a formal requirement
intended to secure an assurance that matters which are alleged are true and correct.
Bautista vs Gonzales
Admin. Case No. 1625 February 12, 1990
Angel L. Bautista, complainant,
Vs
Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales, respondent.
Facts:
Respondent was charged with malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and violation
of lawyer’s oath. Respondent accepted a case wherein he agreed with his clients to
pay all expenses including court fees, for a contingent fee of 50% of the value of
the property in litigation. Respondent also, induced complainant, who was his
former client, to enter into a contract with him for the development into a
residential subdivision of the land involved in the civil case, claiming he acquired
50% interest thereof as attorney’s fees while knowing fully well that the said
property was already sold at a public auction.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Gonzales committed serious misconduct.
Ruling:
Yes, the Court finds the agreement as contrary to Canon 42 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics which provides that a lawyer may not properly agree with a
client to pay or bear the expenses of litigation. Although a lawyer may in good
faith, advance the expenses of litigation, the same should be subject to
reimbursement. Such agreements are against public policy especially where, as in
this case, the attorney has agreed to carry on the action at his own expense in
consideration of some bargain to have part of the thing in dispute. The execution of
these contracts violates the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his
client, for which the former must incur administrative sanctions.
Investment and Management Services Corp vs Ramos
Admin Case No. 1417 April 17, 1996
Investment and Management Services Corporation, petitioner
Vs
Leodegario V. Roxas, respondent.
Facts:
In 1975, a case was filed by the petitioner against Roxas for managing 3
corporations while he was still petitioner’s legal officer which he misappropriated
or appropriated for his own use and benefit certain sums of money or checks which
he received in trust from the 3 corporations and he also issued bouncing checks to
pay personal obligations. Suspension of 5 years was recommended by OSG and
Assistant Solgen while IBP ordered Roxas 1-month suspension.
Issue:
Whether or not IBP has the right to suspend Roxas.
Ruling:
No. Under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court governing Disbarment and Discipline
of Attorney’s, if the IBP Board of Governors, by a majority vote of its total
members, determines that a lawyer should be suspended from the practice of law
or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and
recommendations, and together with the whole record of the case, this shall then be
transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action IBP decision ordering the 1-
month suspension of respondent to be merely recommendatory.
Dumadag vs Lumaya
Admin Case No. 2614 June 29, 2020
Maximo Dumadag, petitioner,
Vs
Ernesto L. Lumaya, respondent.
Facts:
The respondent has failed to prepare and file appropriate motion for execution
when asked by the petitioner, and it was through the assistance of the court
stenographer, Mr. Eleuterio Catubig, that petitioner himself signed and filed the
motion and later obtained the writ of execution. When the writ of execution was
issued, Deputy Sheriff Rogelio Dongiapon, according to the petitioner, instead of
serving the same on the Avellanosas, connived with respondent attorney by selling
a 1-hectare portion of the land subject of a civil case to one Eleonora Astudillo to
satisfy complainant’s claim out of the proceeds of the sale, without the petitioner’s
knowledge and consent.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Lumaya be suspended from service.
Ruling:
Yes. Even Atty. Lumaya consistently denied liability to Dumadag, his former
client, the records abundantly point to his receipt of and failure to deliver the
amount of payment to his client, the herein petitioner-complainant, a clear breach
of the canons of professional responsibility. Under the CPR, Canon 16, a lawyer
shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client
and shall keep the funds of each client separated and apart from his own and those
of others kept by him.
Ingles vs De la Serna
Admin Case No. 5763 December 31, 2002
Gabriel T. Ingles, complainant,
Vs
Atty. Victor De la Serna, respondent.
Facts:
The complainant filed a complaint filed before the IBP against the respondent in
connection with a memorandum submitted by Atty. De la Serna in a civil case
entitled Cattleya Land, Inc. vs Carmelita Fudot Singpit and Atty. Narciso De la
Serna, when it turned out that Tecson had already sold lot 2-A to Fudot in 1986.
Cattleya can blame only its lawyers, Atty. Federico Cabilao and Atty. Ingles who
apparently fooling Cattleya so that they can get their commission and overprice
immediately. When Atty. De la Serna learned of the resolution from IBP, he
promptly filed an appeal before the court claiming investigation having been
conducted before it issued a resolution recommending his 6-month suspension
from the practice of law.
Issue:
Whether or not a formal investigation of IBP is indispensable in this case.
Ruling:
Yes. The procedures outlined by the Rules are meant to ensure that the innocents
are sparred from wrongful condemnation and that only the guilty are meted their
just due. Obviously, these requirements cannot be taken lightly. Subject to such
highly exceptional cases as it might deem warranted, the court here reiterates the
indispensability for a formal investigation of complaints against members of the
Bar where the IBP would recommend the serious penalty of suspension from the
practice of law.
Talens-Dabon vs Arcea
A.M. No. RTJ-96-1336 July 25, 1996
Jocelyn Talens-Dabon, complainant,
Vs
Judge Hermin E. Arceo, respondent.
Facts:
A sworn-complaint was filed by Jocelyn C. Talens-Dabon, Clerk of Court V of the
RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga, charging the respondent, Judge Arceo, the
Executive Judge thereat with gross misconduct and was later amended to include
immorality. Judge Arceo filed his answer with counter-complaint to the main
complaint and his answer to the amended complaint and submitted affidavits of his
witnesses, and after considering the answers, the Court issued a Resolution dated
February 1, 1996 referring the case to Associate Justice Portia Aliñ-Hormachuelos
of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendations and placing
Judge Arcea under preventive suspension.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Arceo be dismissed from the service.
Ruling:
Yes. He has violated the Code of Judicial Conduct which requires every judge to
be embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence and to avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Having tarnished the
image of Judiciary, respondent, the Court holds without hesitation, must be meted
out the severest form of disciplinary sanction which is the dismissal from service.
Dir. of Prisons vs Ang Cho Kio
G.R. No. L-3001 June 23, 1970
The Director of Prisons and the Executive Secretary, petitioners,
Vs
Ang Cho Koi @ Ang Ming Huy and the Court of Appeals, respondents.
Facts:
The respondent has been charged, tried and convicted of various offenses
committed in the Philippines and after serving 6 and ½ years of his sentence, he
was granted conditional pardon on July 4, 1959 by the President of the Philippines
on a condition that he will voluntarily leave the Philippines upon his release and
never return. However, on July 5, 1966, the Executive Secretary ordered him
recommitted to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence that were imposed to
him, having violated the condition of his pardon by returning to the Philippines
under the name of “Ang Ming Huy”. The CFI of Rizal rendered a decision
dismissing the petition of habeas corpus which was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals with a majority opinion allowing Ang Cho Kio to leave the country in the
first available transportation.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in giving the recommendation.
Ruling:
Yes. The better practice should be that the decision of a court should contain only
opinion that is relevant to the question of law that is before the court for decision.
After all, courts are not concerned with the wisdom or morality of laws, but only in
the interpretation and application of the law. Judges should refrain from expressing
irrelevant opinions in the decision which reflect unfavorably their competence.
Pico vs Combong, Jr.
A.M. No. RTJ-91-764 November 6, 1992
Pete M. Pico, complainant,
Vs
Judge Alfonso V. Combong, Jr., RTC Branch 63 of La Corlota City, Negros
Occidental, respondent.
Facts:
Complainant is the brother of Father Narciso M. Pico who was brutally shot to
death on January 10, 1991 in his parish. On July 17, 1991, respondent Judge issued
a warrant for the arrest of the accused, Eddie Villegas with no bail recommended,
however, on August 2, 1991, the accused has been released upon posting a bond
and had granted a bail.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge is guilty of gross misconduct.
Ruling:
Yes. Respondent Judge’s acts were inconsistent with the Code of Judicial Conduct.
The Code required judges to act with competence, integrity, and independence and
so to behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary. Respondent Judge should have diligently ascertained
the whereabouts of the applicant and that he indeed had jurisdiction over the body
of the accused before considering the application for bail.
OCA vs Estacion, Jr.
A.M. No. RTJ-87-104 August 23, 1995
Office of the Court Administrator, petitioner,
Vs
Judge Jose M. Estacion, Jr., respondent.
Facts:
The respondent, Judge of RTC of Dumaguete City, concealed from the appointing
authority, at the time he applied for the judicial post until his appointment,
information regarding the criminal charges for homicide and attempted homicide
filed against him. After a complaint of one Mrs. Ruth L. Vda. De Sison, mother of
one of the victims, the Court in its January 11, 1990 per Curiam Decision
dismissed respondent from the service for gross misrepresentation. Now comes his
“Motion to Request for Clemency, Compassion and Mercy with Leave” highlights
his active membership and involvement in certain religious and civil organizations/
activities.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent’s dismissal should be reversed.
Ruling:
No. Judges are held to higher standards of integrity and ethical conduct than
attorneys or other persons not invested with the public trust. They should inspire
trust and confidence, and bring honor to the judiciary. Respondent’s good
reputation in his community hardly mitigates the gravity of the offense he
committed. What respondent did, or omitted to do, was a calculated deception not
only against the Court but against the public as well, clearly indicative of his lack
of moral rectitude to sit as magistrate.
Gutierrez vs Belan
A.M. No. MTJ-95-1059 August 7, 1998
Ruferto Gutierrez and Maritess Passion, complainants,
Vs
Judge Estanislao S. Belen, Municipal Trial Court, Biñan, Laguna, respondent.
Facts:
A concerned citizen of Biñan, Laguna charged respondent MTC Judge with
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for he committed perjury for
failure to disclose a previous charge for two criminal offenses in his written
application to the Judicial and Bar Council.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent Judge should be dismissed from service.
Ruling:
Yes. Every prospective appointee to the judiciary must apprise the appointing
authority of every matter being on his fitness for judicial office, including such
circumstances as may reflect on his integrity and probity. The act of concealing the
two criminal cases against him is a clear proof of his lack of the said qualification
and renders him unworthy to sit as a judge even if he was ultimately acquitted. He
is not being chastened for having a pending criminal case at the time of his
application for a judicial position but for his dishonesty and misrepresentation in
the process of seeking that office.
Albos vs Alaba
A.M. No. MTJ-91517 March 11, 1994
Nimfa Albos, complainant,
Vs
Judge Eugenio Alaba, respondent.
Facts:
For not favorably acting on the motion of the private prosecutor that respondent
Judge inhibit him from acting on the case and, ultimately, dismissing the case, the
complainant filed administrative case with the Office of the Court Administrator
against the latter for grave misconduct, conduct of unbecoming of a MTC Judge,
oppression and gross inefficiency.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge’s failure to inhibit himself despite the motion is a
ground to be admonished to be more cautious and extra careful in his official acts.
Ruling:
Yes. A judge is bound never to consider lightly a motion for his inhibition that
questions or puts to doubt, however insignificant, his supposed predilection to a
case pending before him. While he must exercise great prudence and utmost
caution in considering and evaluating a challenge to his impartiality. He is
expected, nevertheless, to act with good dispatch. Any delay, let alone an inaction,
on his part can only fuel, whether justified or not, an intensified distrust on his
capability to render dispassionate judgement on the case.
People vs Sesbreño
G.R. No. 121764 September 9, 1999
People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee,
Vs
Atty. Raul H. Sesbreño, accused-appellant.
Facts:
On appeal is the decision dated August 15, 1995, of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch
18, in a criminal case finding the herein appellant, guilty of the crime murder and
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, for the death of one Luciano Amparado.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial Judge erred in refusing to disqualify himself from hearing
the case.
Ruling:
No. The grounds for disqualification of inhibition of judges provided in Section 1
of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, and none was applicable to him. Though the
Rule provides other just and valid grounds on which a judge may disqualify
himself. They are addressed to his sound discretion, and there was no abuse of
discretion. We can only claim that the trial Judge did not err in refusing to inhibit
himself in the case at bar and that the trial Judge opted to believe the prosecution’s
evidence rather than that of the defense is not sign of bias.
Maliwat vs CA
G.R. No. 107041 May 15, 1996
Feliciano Maliwat, petitioner,
Vs
Hon. Court of Appeals, Former Special First Division, and the Republic of the
Philippines, respondents.
Facts:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is the decision of public respondent Court of Appeals in its decision and
resolution affirming the decision of the RTC of Cavite City which convicted herein
petitioner of falsification of public documents. Petitioner filed a motion for
declaration mistrial, pleading for the first time that his constitutional right to due
process was impaired when Judge Rolando Diaz rendered the judgment of
conviction in criminal cases knowing fully well that he previously testified against
the petitioner, and filed a motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and inhibition against Judge Diaz.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Diaz should be disqualified from sitting and deciding the
case.
Ruling:
No. Under Rule 137, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, Judge Diaz previous
actuations did not render him legally disqualified from sitting and deciding the
case. The suggestion that he is not wholly free, disinterested and independent could
have been buttressed by the exercise of his sound discretion voluntarily
disqualifying himself. Yet, the manner in which he exhibited himself during the
trial negates any suspicion of prejudgment in the case.

Villaluz vs Mijares
A.M. No. RTJ-98-1402 April 3, 1998
Onofre A. Villaluz, complainant,
Vs
Judge Priscilla C. Mijares, RTC, Branch 108, Pasay City, respondent.
Facts:
Through a verified letter-complaint dated September 12, 1995, retired Justice of
the Court of Appeals, Onofre A. Villaluz, charged Judge Priscilla C. Mijares with
dishonesty, corrupt practices, grave misconduct and immorality. Judge Mijares
took cognizance of and decided a petition for correction of entry in the birth record
of her grandson, notwithstanding such close relationship and spirit of the Code of
Judicial Ethics, should have made her refuse the assignment and procure the
transfer of the case to any of the five other branches of the Court equally qualified
to take over and decide the case.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty for grave misconduct.
Ruling:
Yes. Respondent is clearly disqualified from trying the case under Section 1 of
Rule 137 of the Rules of Court and also under Rule 3.12 (d) Canon 3 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct, being related within the sixth degree of consanguinity to one
of the parties in Special Proceedings No. 9346. It was mandatory for respondent to
have inhibited herself from hearing the case. A judge shall not allow family, social
or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment and the prestige of
judicial officer shall not be used to advance private interests of others.

CIR vs CA
G.R. No. 119322 February 6, 1997
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, et al. petitioners,
Vs
The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al. respondents.
Facts:
After deliberating on petitioner’s motion to disqualify Mr. Justice Santiago M.
Kapunan from this case, petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the Court’s
decision dated June 4, 1996 as well as all pleadings filed by the parties subsequent
thereto, the Court resolved to deny said motion to disqualify.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court erred in denying the motion to disqualify Justice
Kapunan.
Ruling:
No. In the present case, the so-called grounds relied upon for the disqualification of
Justice Kapunan, i.e., his having served under Atty. Estelito Mendoza when the
latter was the Solicitor General, and their having had business relations in
connection with the operation of small restaurant, even if true, could not constitute
compulsory grounds for Justice Kapunan’s accusation. It is for him alone to
determine his qualifications and furthermore, the present motion for inhibition was
filed after the case at bar had already been decided by the First Division of this
Court and Justice Kapunan had duly participated and cast his vote therein sans any
objection from any source.

Javier vs De Guzman
A.M. No. RTJ-89-380 December 19, 1990
Efren Javier and Pedro Javier, complainants,
Vs
Judge Salvador P. De Guzman, Jr. respondent.
Facts:
Complainants alleged that on December 7, 1987, Efren Javier, and his mother,
Lolita Javier, borrowed P200,000.00 from respondent Judge with interest of 10%
monthly, however, upon default, they had a partial payment of P177,000.00, thus
the respondent Judge instituted a suit for the recovery of the sum of P220,000.00
with 20% interest/ penalty a month compounded monthly computed at
P622,871.67. Feeling harassed, a disbarment proceeding on the ground of
dishonorable conduct were instituted on August 1989 before the Committee on Bar
Discipline of the IBP by the complainants.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent Judge should be sanctioned for the irresponsible,
improper and dishonorable conduct.
Ruling:
Yes. Respondent is not a hard-boiled and callous businessman, he is a Judge. A
Judge’s official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his
personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial
duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach. While respondent
Judge may have had reasons of convenience for filing his collection suit in Makati
where he sits as one of the Trial Judges, a sense of propriety should have impelled
him to desist.

Dawa, et al. vs De Asa

A.M. No. MTJ-98-1144 July 22, 1998
Floride Dawa, Noraliz L. Jorgensen, Feminina Lazaro-Barreto, complainants,
Vs
Judge Armando C. De Asa, MTC Branch 51, Caloocan City, respondent.
Facts:
The respondent was charged with sexual harassment and/or act of lasciviousness in
a letter-complaint dated August 15, 1997, filed by Floride Dawa, Feminina Lazaro-
Barreto and Noraliz L. Jorgensen. Also, Atty. Mona-Lisa A. Buencamino, who
assisted the complainants, also filed an affidavit-complaints against respondent for
sexual harassment/ acts of lasciviousness, grave or serious misconduct, and
violation of the high standards of moral demanded by judicial ethics.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge be dismissed from service.
Ruling:
Yes. The respondent Judge acted beyond the bounds of decency, morality and
propriety and violated the Code of Judicial Conduct. It was found totally
unacceptable the temerity of the respondent Judge in subjecting herein
complainants, his subordinates all, to his unwelcome sexual advances and acts of
lasciviousness and his severely abusive and outrageous acts, which are an affront
to women, unmistakably constitute sexual harassment because they necessarily
result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the employees.

Balayon, Jr. vs Ocampo

A.M. No. MTJ-91-619 January 29, 1993
Atty. Hugolino V. Balayon, Jr. petitioner,
Vs
Judge Gaydifredo O. Ocampo, respondent.
Facts:
A charge which is grounded on eight complaints was filed by the petitioner against
the respondent for ignorance of the law and grave misconduct. One of the charges
arose when one of the petitioners client sought the help of respondent Judge for
protection while his dispute was still ongoing, and what the respondent Judge did
was to write one Lt. Sulam, the Police Station Commander of Tupi, South
Cotabato. Complainant contends that what respondent Judge did amounts to
private practice which is in conflict with his position of being a municipal judge
and further accuses respondent Judge of using his influence as incumbent Judge to
pressure the Police Station Commander as a result of which the sacks of copra
were sold with respondent Judge reportedly having been given a share in the
proceeds.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge’s act should be admonished.
Ruling:
Yes. Under Canon 2 of the 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct, respondent Judge
should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his activities.
While respondent Judge was found to be in good faith in writing the Police Station
Commander of Tupi, South Cotabato, he should refrain from engaging in such
activity and other similar ones, so as not to tarnish the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary.

Alfonso vs Juanson
A.M. No. RTJ-92-904 December 7, 1993
Dr. Norbert L. Alfonso, complainant,
Vs
Judge Modesto C. Juanson, Branch 30 RTC Manila, respondent.
Facts:
On September 15, 1992, the complainant, a doctor of medicine by profession, filed
a complaint charging the respondent with immorality and violation of the Code of
Judicial Ethics. He accuses the respondent of maintaining illicit sexual relations
with his wife, Sol Dinglasan Alfonso, and he alleges that their married life was
peaceful and happy until the discovery of the sordid affair.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent violated the Code of Judicial Ethics.
Ruling:
Yes. The respondent suddenly became indiscreet. He succumbed to the sweet
memories of the past and he was unable to disappoint Sol who asked for his legal
advice on a matter which involved her employment. Such indiscretions indubitably
cast upon his conduct an appearance of impropriety, thus violated Canon 3 of the
Canon of Judicial Ethics and Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The ethical
principles of propriety of a judge are essential to the preservation of the faith of the
people in the judiciary.

Co vs Calimag
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1493 June 20, 2000
Jaime L. Co, complainant,
Vs
Judge Demetrio D. Calimag, Jr., respondent.
Facts:
An administrative complaint was filed by the complainant charging the respondent
Judge of serious misconduct and inefficiency in office. A complaint was filed by
Eva Co, wife of the herein complainant, for legal separation, on which the
complainant filed an objection to the Temporary Restraining Order/Injunction and
Administration. Eva Co filed a supplemental motion for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction, then, the respondent required the parties to submit, their
respective affidavits to suspend hearing. The complainant alleges that respondent
asked him for money in exchange for the non-issuance of the injunction.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge is guilty of inefficiency in office.
Ruling:
Yes. The respondent should have first endorsed the writ of preliminary injunction
to the Clerk of Court so that the same could be properly recorded in the general
docket. Rather than doing so, however, respondent personally and immediately
furnished the complainant’s wife, a copy of the order of injunction on the same
date that he signed and issued the same. This act is highly irregular, giving rise to
the suspicion that the judge is partial to one of the parties in the case pending
before him which is in violation of Canon 2 of the Judicial Conduct.

Re: Badoy, Jr.

A.M. No. 01-12-01-SC January 16, 2003
In The Matter of the alleged improper conduct of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice
Anacleto D. Badoy, Jr., taking an ambulance but proceeding to the GMA TV
Station for an interview instead of proceeding forthwith to the hospital.
A.M. No. SB-02-10-J January 16, 2003
Joseph E. Estrada, Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, Serafin R. Cuevas, Rene A.V.
Saguisag, Jose B. Flaminiano, Pacifico A. Agabin, Felix D. Carao, Jr., Cleofe V.
Verzola, Delia H. Hermoso and Raymund P. Fortun, complainants,
Vs
Associate Justices Anacleto D. Badoy, Jr., and Teresita Leonardo-De Castro,
respondents.
Facts:
On November 29, 2001, Justice Anaclet D. Badoy Jr., aboard an ambulance,
"whisked himself" to the GMA Broadcast Station in Quezon City for a live
interview in the news program Saksi. There, he announced the loss of a Resolution
he penned in connection with the plunder case against former President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada and others.
Issue:
Whether or not Justice Badoy is guilty of conduct unbecoming a Judge.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court adjudged Justice Badoy guilty of conduct unbecoming a Justice.
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that "a judge should avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities." He should behave
at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity of the Judiciary. A
judge should adopt the usual and expected method of doing justice, and not seek to
be spectacular or sensational in the conduct of his court. If lawyers are prohibited
from making public statements in the media regarding a pending case to arouse
public opinion for or against a party, with more reason should judges be prohibited
from seeking publicity. Judges are not actors or politicians who thrive by publicity.
Publicity undermines the dignity and impartiality of a judge.
Ramos vs Barot
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1338 January 21, 2004
Rogelio R. Ramos, complainant,
Vs
Judge Eusebio M. Barot, Presiding Judge, 8th Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Branch 2, Aparri-Calayan, Cagayan, respondent.
Facts:
Complainant Rogelio R. Ramos together with one Dominador C. Ramos alleged
that they are the owners, possessors and cultivators of two parcels of land located
in Gabun, Lasam, Cagayan and another parcel of land registered in the name of
one Romeo. These three parcels of land, according to complainant, formerly
formed part of the Estate of Florencio Barut but were later covered by
Emancipation Patents issued by the DAR. According to the complaint, certain
individuals entered their rice fields and, without authority, harvested the standing
rice crops, upon the unlawful orders of one Atty. Nuelino B. Ranchez and
respondent judge. Complainant further averred that respondent judge acted as
attorney-in-fact for his uncle, Florencio Barot (now deceased).
Issue:
Whether or not respondent judge violated the rules on Canon of Judicial Ethics
acting as attorney-in-fact of his late uncle.
Ruling:
Yes. Respondent judge had violated Rule 5.06, Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct. A judge holds a position in the community that is looked up to with
honor and privilege.  The Code of Judicial Conduct lays down the guidelines with
respect to fiduciary activities that judges may engage in. As a general rule, judges
cannot serve as executor, administrator, trustee, guardian or other fiduciary, except
if he acts in a fiduciary capacity for the estate, trust or person of a member of his
immediate family. The Code defines "immediate family" as being limited to the
spouse and relatives within the second degree of consanguinity. Clearly,
respondent's paternal uncle does not fall under "immediate family" as herein
defined. Hence, his appointment as attorney-in-fact for his uncle is not a valid
exception to the rule.
Maquiran vs Grageda
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1888 February 11, 2005
Edgardo O. Maquiran, complainant,
Vs
Judge Jesus L. Grageda, respondent.
Facts:
Complainant is the Chairman of the Banned Chemical Research and Information
Center, Inc., association of Filipino claimants’ banana plantation workers who
were exposed to a certain chemical which caused ill-effects on their reproductive
organs. One of the civil cases was raffled to respondent. Respondent issued an
Omnibus Order approving the Settlement by way of a judgment on compromise.
Respondent himself oversee and monitor the photocopying, certification and
authentication of the individual release and other related settlement documents
which are in the safekeeping of the law firm in Houston, Texas,
U.S.A. Respondent issued an Order granting defendants’ separate motions for
reception of evidence in the U.S., at the expense of defendant corporations; and
stating that further implementation of the writ of execution which was returned
unsatisfied is held in abeyance or suspended until the proceedings in the U.S. shall
have been terminated and/or completed.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of violation of Canons of Judicial
Conduct.
Ruling:

No. The respondent judge is not guilty of violation of Canons of Judicial Conduct.
Although respondent erroneously conducted the proceedings abroad, we find that
his action was done in good faith. He was of the honest belief that it was
sanctioned by law. Respondent went to the U.S. for the purpose of conducting the
proceedings, his travel was paid for by the defendant corporations pursuant to his
June 30, 2003 Order wherein it was provided that the expenses, facilities,
equipment and support personnel who would carry out in full the court proceedings
in the U.S. shall be borne proportionately by the defendants as manifested by them.
Thus, the payment of respondent’s expenses for the U.S. trip cannot be considered
as acceptance of favors.

Macalital vs Teh
A.M. No. RTJ-97-1375 October 16, 1997
Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal, complainant,
Vs
Judge Angelito C. Teh, Regional Trial Court, Branch 87, Rosario, Batangas,
respondent.
Facts:
Complainant lawyer in this administrative case, questioned the actuation of
respondent relative to Election Case No. R-95-001. Respondent judge issued a
resolution adverse to the client of the complainant. The latter questioned the
resolution via petition for certiorari, before the Comelec. While the case was
pending at the Comelec, respondent actively participated in the proceedings by
filing his comment on the petition and, still later an urgent manifestation.
Complainant filed a motion for respondent’s inhibition in the election case. Instead
of acting on the motion, respondent hired his own lawyer, filed his answer to the
motion before his own court, and forthwith denied the same, ordering, at the same
time, the complainant to pay P100,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses for compelling the respondent Judge to engage the services of counsel.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
Ruling:
Yes. The respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law. Respondent’s active
participation in the certiorari proceedings, being merely a nominal or formal party,
is not called for. Respondent Judge acted both as a party litigant and as a judge
before his own court. Respondent’s gross deviation from the acceptable norm for
judges is clearly manifest. Respondent Judge should be reminded that decisions of
courts need not only be just but must be perceived to be just and completely free
from suspicion or doubt both in its fairness and integrity.

Yulo-Tuvilla vs Balgos
A.M. No. MTJ-98-1149 March 31, 1998
Socorro Yulo-Tuvilla, complainant,
Vs
Judge Rolando V. Balgos, respondent.
Facts:
Complainant charged respondet with Grave Abuse of Discretion and Improper
Conduct. The complaint stemmed from a case brought before respondent for
preliminary examination. Complainant Tuvilla alleged that Myra Gumban, then 14
years old, was kidnapped and brought to the house of one Norman Mapagay where
she was detained and raped by several men. A complaint was thereafter filed
before respondent Judge who conducted a preliminary examination leading to the
issuance of warrants of arrest against Mapagay and his companions. Mapagay,
through counsel, filed a motion to recall the warrant of arrest issued against him.
This incident was immediately heard and granted by Judge Balgos without the
presence of private complainant for the purpose of identifying Mapagay.
Complainant Tuvilla argued that respondent judge should not have acted on the
motion filed by Mapagay and should instead have inhibited himself from hearing
the same since Mapagay's counsel, Atty. Manlapao, is the lawyer of the family of
Judge Balgos in a civil case pending before the RTC of Himamaylan, Negros
Occidental.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent is guilty of violation of Code of Judicial Conduct.
Ruling:
Yes. His act was indeed a violation of Rule 2.03 of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct which states that: A judge shall not allow family, social or other
relationship to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial
office shall not be based or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor
convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in special position
to influence the judge. Judges should endeavor to maintain at all times the
confidence and high respect accorded to those who wield the gavel. It is imperative
that a judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety,
and that his personal behavior in everyday life shown to be beyond reproach.
Gacayan vs Pamintuan
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1483 September 17, 1999
Atty. Lauro D. Gacayan and Noel Sarol, complainants,
Vs
Hon. Fernando Vil Pamintuan in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 3, Baguio City, respondent.
Facts:
Complainant Noel Sarol is the accused in Criminal Case No. 14549-R, for
Homicide, which was filed before the RTC Branch 3, Baguio City. He was
arraigned and thereafter, trial followed. After the prosecution rested its case, the
then Presiding Judge Hon. Joven Costales, directed the accused to present his
evidence on March 2, 1998 at 8:30 in the morning. Complainant Sarol through
counsel instead of presenting his evidence filed a Motion for Leave to File
Demurrer to Evidence with the Demurrer to Evidence already attached to said
Motion. On March 2, 1998, the Demurrer to Evidence was scheduled for hearing.
The Trial Prosecutor, however, asked for ten (10) days within which to submit his
Opposition thereto. Meanwhile, the Honorable Fernando Vil Pamintuan took over
as the Presiding Judge. He subpoenaed witnesses to appear before him in his own
initiative and directed them to testify on what they know about the case. Atty.
Cagayan manifested his objections to the procedure being followed by the
respondent Judge considering that the prosecution had long rested its case.
Whether or not the respondent Judge was violative of Canons 2 and 3 of Judicial
Ethics.
Ruling:
Yes. The complainants have all the reasons to doubt the impartiality of respondent
Judge. The people's confidence in the judicial system is founded not only on the
magnitude of legal knowledge and the diligence of the members of the bench, but
also on the highest standard of integrity and moral uprightness they are expected to
possess. A judge is not only required to be impartial; he must appear to be
impartial. Fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this appearance. It was, thus, held
that it is improper for a judge to meet privately with the accused without the
presence of the complainant.
Padilla vs Zantua Jr.
A.M. No. MTJ-93-8888 October 24, 1994
Mayor Roger S. Padilla, complainant,
Vs
Hon. Roberto V. Zantua, Jr., Municipal Trial Court, Jose Panganiban, Camarines
Norte, respondent.
Facts:
Mayor Roger S. Padilla of the Municipality of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte
charges respondent Judge with serious irregularities and grave misconduct in the
performance of his official duties for: (1) failure to decide cases within the
prescribed period; (2) unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases which have
been prejudicial to litigants; (3) manifest partiality in favor of a litigant and (4)
fraternizing with lawyers who have pending cases in his sala. The opposing
counsel, Atty. Augusto B. Schneider is always seen eating and drinking in the
constant company of respondent Judge in public establishments in the Municipality
of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte. Also, complainant complains that these
cases have been pending since 1991.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent Judge was violative of Code of Judicial Conduct.
Ruling:
Yes. Constant company with a lawyer tends to breed intimacy and camaraderie to
the point that favors in the future may be asked from respondent judge which he
may find hard to resist. The actuation of respondent Judge of eating and drinking in
public places with a lawyer who has pending cases in his sala may well arouse
suspicion in the public mind, thus tending to erode the trust of the litigants in the
impartiality of the judge. A judge should behave at all times as to inspire public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. The prestige of judicial
office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor
convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position
to influence the judge. Public confidence in the Judiciary is eroded by irresponsible
or improper conduct of judges.

OCA vs De Guzman Jr.

A.M. No. RTJ-93-1021 January 31, 1997
Office of The Court Administrator, complainant,
Vs
Judge Salvador P. De Guzman, Jr., Presiding Judge Regional Trial Court Branch
142. City of Makati, Metro Manila, respondent.
Facts:
The Office of the Court Administrator filed an administrative case against
respondent Judge for serious misconduct in connection with the lifting of the
notice of lis pendens in the case of Norvic Incorporated, represented by its
president. Norvic filed a civil case which was assigned to the sala of Judge Cosico
for the annulment of the Deed of Conveyance and Exchange on the ground that the
transfer of the Yakal property was fraudulent. Due to the filing of this case, Norvic
caused the annotation of lis pendens. SMIIT and SMIRM, the defendants in this
Civil Case, filed a motion to cancel the notice of lis pendens, but the same was
denied by Judge Cosico. When case was re-raffled due to Cosico’s retirement to
Judge de Guzman, the latter eventually cancelled the annotation of lis pendens
thereby showing keen personal interest on the said case to the prejudice of the
administration of justice.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent Judge is guilty of serious misconduct.
Ruling:
Yes. The respondent is guilty of serious misconduct for influencing the course of
litigation in Civil Case in evident violation of Rule 2.04, Canon 2 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct. As the visible representation of law and justice, judges are
expected to conduct themselves in a manner that would enhance the respect and
confidence of our people in the judicial system. Being the dispensers of justice,
judges should not act in a way that would cast suspicion in order to preserve faith
in the administration of justice. They should avoid impropriety and the appearance
of impropriety in all activities. In the case at bar, the act of interference by
respondent De Guzman with the subject case pending in the sala of Judge Cosico
clearly tarnishes the integrity and independence of the judiciary and subverts the
people's faith in our judicial process.
Vistan vs Nicolas
A.M. No. MTJ-87-79 September 13, 1991
Leonila A. Vistan, complainant,
Vs
Judge Ruben T. Nicolas, Municipal Trial Court, Pandi, Bulacan, respondent.
Facts:
It is an administrative case charged to respondent Judge for gross ignorance of the
law and grave abuse of authority and immorality. Complainant alleged that
Respondent, as the then MTC Judge of Guiguinto, Bulacan, rendered a Decision in
Criminal Case No. 3073 for Forcible Abduction with Consent, acquitting the
accused therein, despite the fact that Respondent had not yet ruled on the accused's
written offer of evidence. Said Decision, Complainant contended, manifested
Respondent's gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of authority and
discretion. Further, Complainant stated that Respondent was maintaining an illicit
relationship with a woman not his wife and with whom he has a child.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge should be sanctioned for violating Code of
Judicial Conduct.
Ruling:
Yes. A Judge's official conduct should be free from impropriety or any appearance
thereof. His personal behavior in the performance of official duty, as well as
everyday life, should be beyond reproach. High ethical principles and a sense of
propriety should be maintained, without which the faith of the people in the
judiciary so indispensable in an orderly society cannot be preserved. In the instant
case, all reveal that subject Judge and Angelita de Castro have indeed openly and
publicly represented themselves to be husband and wife. But because they know
him to be a judge with considerable influence in the community, the residents of
Bocaue, Bulacan, just kept silent about it despite their knowledge that Judge
Nicolas is legally and lawfully married to one Pacita S. Nicolas and is living with
the former at Malolos, Bocaue, Bulacan. Where preponderance of evidence
suffices and considering the exacting and stringent standards exacted of occupants
of the Bench, the supreme sanction is called for.
Ruiz vs Bringas
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1266 April 6, 2000
Prosecutor Salvador C. Ruiz, complainant,
Vs
Judge Agelio L. Bringas, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, Butuan City,
respondent.
Facts:
Respondent is fond of insulting and maligning both young lawyers and old
including the prosecutors who appear before him in the presence of party litigants
and lawyers. He berated new practicing lawyers like Atty. Clementino C. Rabor,
Atty. Roy Orlando Doyon. He insulted an old lawyer, Atty. Ismael Sanchez by
uttering to the latter ‘you go to hell.’ These incidents were just left unnoticed by
the aforementioned lawyers lest they would lose their cases pending before
respondent Judge. Complainant also claims that respondent misrepresented himself
as a graduate of the Ateneo Law School when the fact is that respondent judge's
name does not appear in the directory of the graduates of that school from 1963 to
1965. Finally, complainant says that respondent has changed the name of his court
from MTC in Cities to City Trial Court, notwithstanding the fact that the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1988 changed the name of previous City Trial Courts.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge should be found guilty of serious misconduct.
Ruling:
Yes. Judge Bringas should be found guilty of serious misconduct. The use of the
phrase "whether he is in hell or in purgatory" in referring to Prosecutor Salise in
Criminal Cases No. 17691 and 17692 is obviously uncalled for considering that it
does not appear from the records that Pros. Salise is the one in-charge of the cases.
Anent the charge of changing the designation of his court from Municipal Trial
Court in Cities to "City Trial Court", the same could lead to confusion among
litigants and lawyers as such designation is really not within the provisions of
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. The duty to maintain respect for the dignity
of the court applies to members of the bar and bench alike. A judge should be
courteous both in his conduct and in his language especially to those appearing
before him.
Dela Cruz vs Concepcion
A.M. No. RTJ-93-1062 August 5, 1994
Eliza Ratilla De La Cruz, assisted by Enriqueta R. De La Cruz, Edeline Cuison,
assisted by Estrella Cuison, Ana Maria Cruz, assisted by Nieves Cruz and Lolita
Santiago, assisted by Epifania Del Rosario, complainants,
Vs
Judge Crisanto C. Concepcion, Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Malolos,
Bulacan, respondent.
Facts:
Complainants alleged that they were summoned by their coach, accused Loreto
Estrella, Jr., together with other volleyball players, to inspect their private parts for
the presence of pubic hair as required by MEC (now DECS) memorandum
circulars. Their coach told them to enter the "health corner room" where they
removed their shorts and panties and showed their private parts to him which he
touched and stroked. Respondent Judge acquit the accused coach upon hearing the
prosecution and the defense, observed that the girls consented, without any force
employed upon them, to strip themselves from waist down because of their desire
to be in the team considering that according to MEC Regional Memo. No. 90,
Series of 1981, failure to submit to physical examination would automatically
disqualify a candidate from the volleyball team.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge committed gross ignorance of the law.
Ruling:
No. To constitute gross ignorance of the law, the subject decision, order or
actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties must not only be
contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, most importantly, he must be
moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. There is no liability at all for a
mere error. It is well settled that a judicial officer, when required to exercise his
judgment or discretion, is not liable criminally for any error which he commits,
provided he acts in good faith. Mere errors in the appreciation of evidence, unless
so gross and patent as to produce an inference of ignorance or bad faith.

Ualat vs Ramos
A.M. No. MTJ-91-567 December 6, 1996
Modesto T. Ualat, complainant,
Vs
Judge Jose O. Ramos, respondent.
Facts:
Complainant Ualat alleges that he is Quirino Sabio's caretaker of an agricultural
lease. Sabio filed with the DARAB a complaint for Recovery of Possession. The
DARAB ruled in favor of complainant Sabio declaring that the right of the
complainant as the tenant-tiller to peaceful possession and cultivation should not
be disturbed. However, respondent Judge rendered a decision in favor of the
landowner, Leonardo Coma, ordering the complainants, to vacate the property.
Complainant Ualat alleges that as the result of the unjust decision, his residential
house which is not the subject of the lease was levied upon by the sheriff, and
argued that as mere caretaker, he could not be held "jointly and severally" liable to
pay the obligations of Quirino Sabio as agricultural tenant. Complainant contends
that, notwithstanding knowledge of the Department Agrarian Reform (DAR)
resolution, and the fact that Civil Case No. 827 falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the DAR, respondent Judge, using his "power and authority," took
cognizance of the case because of personal interest and motive. They claim that
during the pendency of the case, respondent Judge, thru his son and brother,
cultivated a portion of the land subject matter of the case.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
Ruling:
Yes. Respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law. His failure to refer
the case to the DAR upon receipt of the answer of complainants, despite the clear
mandate of the two agrarian laws, can in no wise be justified by respondent Judge.
What even more embarrassing is his seeming lack of awareness of the Civil Code
provision making a sub-lessee merely subsidiarily liable for unpaid rentals, to the
extent of the rentals due from him under the sub-lease, at the time of the lessor's
extrajudicial demand. It is a pressing responsibility of judges to keep abreast with
the law and changes therein, as well as with the latest decisions of this Court. One
cannot seek refuge in having a mere cursory acquaintance with statutes and
procedural rules. Ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to know, excuses
no one-certainly not judges. Ignorantia Juris Quod Quisque Scire Tenetur Non
Excusat. When the law is elementary, so elementary, not to know it constitutes
gross ignorance of the law.
Callar vs Salvador
A.M. No. RTJ-97-1369 February 17, 1997
Atty. Octavio Del Callar, complainant,
Vs
Judge Ignacio L. Salvador and Deputy Sheriff Angel L. Doroni, respondents.
Facts:
Respondent Deputy Sheriff was alleged to be adamant refused to comply with his
ministerial and mandatory duties under Section 17, Rule 39, Revised Rules of
Court, RE: proceedings where levied property is claimed by a third person. While
the complaint against respondent Judge stems from his inaction on a motion to set
aside the execution pending appeal which is based on two basic grounds namely:
(a) the court had lost its jurisdiction over the case; and (b) the special order
granting execution pending appeal contains no good reason for the immediate
implementation of the decision. Complainant manifests that by reason of the
inaction of the respondent Judge, his client, Mr. Reynaldo A. Lim, has been
deprived of his right to use, enjoy, possess and dispose his P1.9 million Toyota
Land Cruiser which the Sheriff seized under a writ of execution which was issued
pursuant to respondent’s special order granting execution pending appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge erred on his judgment.
Ruling:
Yes. The respondent Judge erred on his judgment. The respondent Judge's fault lies
in his failure to state in his Special Order "good reasons" to justify the issuance of
the writ of execution. This is in clear violation of Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court, which requires that there be a good reason for issuing a writ of execution
pending appeal and that the good reason be stated in a special order. As a judge,
who is called upon to administer the law and apply it to the facts, he should be
studious of the principles of law and diligent in endeavoring to ascertain the facts.
He should exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and
procedural rules. To merit disciplinary sanction, the error or mistake must be gross
or patent, malicious, deliberate, or in bad faith.

State Prosecutors vs Muro

A.M. No. RTJ-92-876 December 1, 1995
State Prosecutors, complainants,
Vs
Judge Manuel T. Muro, Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, Manila, respondent.
Facts:
Respondent judge issued an Order dismissing eleven (11) criminal cases filed by
the undersigned complainant prosecutors for Violation of Central Bank Foreign
Exchange Restrictions, as consolidated in CB Circular No. 960, in relation to the
penal provisions of Sec. 34 of R.A. 265, as amended. That respondent Judge issued
his Order solely on the basis of newspaper reports, aiming that the reported
announcement of the Executive Department on the lifting of foreign exchange
restrictions by two newspapers which are reputable and of national circulation had
the effect of repealing Central Bank Circular No. 960, as allegedly supported by
Supreme Court decisions. He contends that the announcement of the President as
published in the newspaper has made such fact a public knowledge that is
sufficient for the judge to take judicial notice which is discretionary on his part.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
Ruling:
Yes. Respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law. In the guise of
exercising discretion and on the basis of a mere newspaper account which is
sometimes even referred to as hearsay evidence twice removed, respondent Judge
took judicial notice of the supposed lifting of foreign exchange controls, a matter
which was not and cannot be considered of common knowledge or of general
notoriety. Worse, he took cognizance of an administrative regulation which was
not yet in force when the order of dismissal was issued. Jurisprudence dictates that
judicial notice cannot be taken of a statute before it becomes effective. The reason
is simple. A law which is not yet in force and hence, still inexistent, cannot be of
common knowledge capable of ready and unquestionable demonstration, which is
one of the requirements before a court can take judicial notice of a fact.

Del Rosario vs Cedillo

A.M. No. MTJ-04-1557 October 21, 2004
Martin Del Rosario, complainant,
Vs
Judge Eranio G. Cedillo, Municipal Trial Court, Meycauayan, Bulacan,
respondent.
Facts:
Complainant alleged that he extended 12-million-peso-loan to Filipina A. Estrella,
secured by 3 postdated Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) checks and 2
real estate mortgages. It turned out, however, that the transfer certificate title of the
lots was fake. A criminal case for falsification of public document against Estrella
is pending with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. On the other hand, the criminal case
for violation of BP 22 against Estrella was filed when the 3 checks were
dishonored for insufficiency of funds upon presentment on their due dates. The
cases were raffled to Branch 1 of the MTC of Meycauayan, Bulacan, presided by
respondent Judge. The respondent Judge rendered a decision which dismissed the
civil case including the criminal case on the ground of absence of preponderance of
evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge committed gross ignorance of the law.
Ruling:
No. The Court will have no basis to conclude whether or not respondent judge is
indeed guilty of the charges of gross ignorance of the law and knowingly rendering
an unjust judgment. In the case at bar, the respondent Judge correctly dismissed the
criminal aspect of the BP 22 cases for failure to establish that Estrella received the
notice of dishonor in the form of a demand letter. The presentation of the said letter
and the registry receipt, with an unauthenticated signature, do not meet the
required proof beyond reasonable doubt that Estrella received such notice,
especially considering that she denied receipt thereof. However, administrative
liability of respondent Judge cannot be ruled yet for dismissing the civil aspect of
the BP 22 cases because said issue is still the subject of complainant’s petition for
relief from judgment with motion to withdraw motion for reconsideration pending
and awaiting the designation of another Judge in view of respondent Judge’s
inhibition.

Dela Cruz vs Concepcion

Supra
Eliza Ratilla De La Cruz, assisted by Enriqueta R. De La Cruz, Edeline Cuison,
assisted by Estrella Cuison, Ana Maria Cruz, assisted by Nieves Cruz and Lolita
Santiago, assisted by Epifania Del Rosario, complainants,
Vs
Judge Crisanto C. Concepcion, Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Malolos,
Bulacan, respondent.
Facts:
Complainants alleged before the trial court that they were summoned by their
coach, accused Loreto Estrella, Jr., together with other volleyball players, to
inspect their private parts for the presence of pubic hair as required by MEC (now
DECS) memorandum circulars. Their coach told them to enter the "health corner
room" where they removed their shorts and panties and showed their private parts
to him which he touched and stroked. Respondent Judge acquit the accused coach
upon hearing the prosecution and the defense, observed that the girls consented,
without any force employed upon them, to strip themselves from waist down
although with understandable reluctance because of their desire to be in the team
considering that according to MEC Regional Memorandum No. 90, Series of 1981,
failure to submit to physical examination would automatically disqualify a
candidate from the volleyball team.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge was guilty of rendering an unjust judgment.
Ruling:
No. Respondent Judge is not guilty of rendering an unjust judgment. In the case
before us, the administrative complaint does not even allege that the erroneous
decision of respondent was thus motivated. It is well settled that a judicial officer,
when required to exercise his judgment or discretion, is not liable criminally for
any error which he commits, provided he acts in good faith. Mere errors in the
appreciation of evidence, unless so gross and patent as to produce an inference of
ignorance or bad faith, or that the judge knowingly rendered an unjust decision, are
irrelevant and immaterial in an administrative proceeding against him.
People vs Gacott Jr.
G.R. No. 116049 March 20, 1995
People of The Philippines, petitioner,
Vs
Hon. Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 47, Puerto Princesa
City, Arne Strom and Grace Reyes, respondents.
Facts:
Rebuffed by the Court through the annulment of an order dismissing Criminal
Case No. 11529 of the court a quo, complemented with a reprimand and a fine of
P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law by failure to check citations of the
prosecution, respondent Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. has filed a motion for
reconsideration, and a supplemental motion for reconsideration. In the judgment
which was sought to be reconsidered, the Second Division of the Court, through
Mr. Justice Abdulwahid A. Bidin, specified that the only issue to be resolved in the
case was whether or not respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in granting
the motion to quash the aforementioned criminal case. The pertinent portions of the
ponencia not only for easy reference but to serve as a basis for determining
whether the sanctions imposed were commensurate to the administrative offense.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge has committed an inexcusable negligence of his
failure to check citations of the prosecution.
Ruling:
Yes. Obviously, respondent judge did not even bother to read the text of the cited
LOI; otherwise, he would have readily acknowledged the validity of the argument
advanced by the prosecution. The respondent judge's utter inexcusable neglect to
check the citations of the prosecution is the mistaken belief that the duty to inform
the court on the applicable law to a particular case devolves solely upon the
prosecution or whoever may be the advocate before the court. Respondent judge
should be reminded that courts are duty bound to take judicial notice of all the laws
of the land (Sec. 1, Rule 129, Rules of Court). Being the trier of facts, judges are
presumed to be well-informed of the existing laws and recent enactments.

People vs Veneracion
G.R. Nos. 119987-88 October 12, 1995
The People of the Philippines, petitioner,
Vs
Hon. Lorenzo B. Veneracion, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 47, Manila, Henry Lagarto Y Petilla and
Ernesto Cordero, respondents.
Facts:
After trial and presentation of the evidence of the prosecution and the defense, the
trial court rendered a decision finding the defendants Henry Lagarto y Petilla and
Ernesto Cordero y Maristela guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape
with Homicide and sentenced both accused with the "penalty of reclusion perpetua
with all the accessories provided for by law." Disagreeing with the sentence
imposed, the City Prosecutor of Manila, filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
praying that the Decision be "modified in that the penalty of death be imposed"
against respondents Lagarto and Cordero, in place of the original penalty
(reclusion perpetua). Refusing to act on the merits of the said Motion for
Reconsideration, respondent Judge, issued an Order denying the same for lack of
jurisdiction. Respondent judge, after weighing the evidence of the prosecution and
the defendant at trial found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Rape with Homicide.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent Judge failed to obey the existing laws.
Ruling:
Yes. The Rules of Court mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the judge
should impose the proper penalty and civil liability provided for by the law on the
accused. This is not a case of a magistrate ignorant of the law. This is a case in
which a judge, fully aware of the appropriate provisions of the law, refuses to
impose a penalty to which he disagrees. In so doing, respondent judge acted
without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to a lack of jurisdiction in imposing the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua where the
law clearly imposes the penalty of Death. The only function of the judiciary is to
interpret the laws.
Rodriguez vs Barro
A.M. No. 1587-CTJ August 23, 1978
Francisco Rodriguez, complainant,
Vs
Hon. Silvino Lu. Barro of the City Court of Gingoog City, respondent.
Facts:
The complainant, a concerned citizen and allegedly acting at the behest of Alicia
Ostia, an accused for adultery, filed a complaint with the President against the
respondent Judge for neglect of duty and/or gross ignorance of the law for having
failed to act sooner upon the motion to dismiss filed by Special Counsel Downey
C. Valdevilla and as a consequence of which the accused Alicia Ostia languished
in jail for more than one (1) month. It also prayed for the dismissal of the
respondent judge from the service. The said complaint was referred to the Court by
the Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge had incurred delay on the disposition of the case.
Ruling:
Yes. The respondent Judge’s explanation for not acting upon the motion to dismiss
earlier is not satisfactory. It is the duty of judges to judiciously apportion the
court's time to achieve speedy dispatch of cases consistent with justice. This is
implied in the mandate that "justice shall be impartially administered without
unnecessary delay." His allegation that it is hard to serve a process in Gingoog City
is belied by the "SUBPOENA ON A MOTION TO DISMISS", issued on August
27,1976, which appears to have been served upon the addressees on the same date.
The court has time and again enjoined judges to be more circumspect and diligent
in the performance of their functions, and the respondent Judge had been
previously "severely reprimanded for his carelessness and negligence, and enjoined
to exercise henceforth due care and diligence in the discharge of his function, with
a warning that a repetition of such misconduct would be dealt with more severely."
Notwithstanding such admonition and warning, the respondent Judge has again
been found to be remiss in the performance of his duties. A more severe penalty
than a reprimand is, therefore, called for.
Yulo-Asensi vs Villanueva
A.M. No. MTJ-001245 January 19, 2000
Antonio Yu-Asensi, complainant,
Vs
Judge Francisco D. Villanueva, MTC, Branch 36, Quezon City, respondent.
Facts:
Complainant filed a letter-complaint with the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) charging respondent Judge with serious misconduct and/or inefficiency
particularly violating the Canons of Judicial Ethics on promptness and punctuality.
The complaint was filed in connection with Criminal Case No. 5400 for Reckless
Imprudence resulting in Serious Physical Injuries pending before Branch 36 of the
MTC of Quezon City presided by respondent Judge. That during the proceedings,
from arraignment up to the present stage of trial, Judge Villanueva consistently
arrives one to one and a half hour late from the scheduled 2:00 p.m. hearing.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge is in violation of Canons of Judicial Ethics for
promptness and punctuality.
Ruling:
Yes. Respondent Judge was found guilty of habitual tardiness which amounts to
serious misconduct and inefficiency in violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics
and recommended that he be meted the corresponding penalty. Judges are enjoined
to be punctual in the performance of their judicial duties, recognizing that the time
of litigants, witnesses, and attorneys are of value, and that if the judge is not
punctual in his habits, he sets a bad example to the bar and tends to create
dissatisfaction in the administration of justice. The Code of Judicial Conduct
decrees that a judge should administer justice impartially and without delay. A
judge should likewise be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the
discharge of his obligation to promptly administer justice. The trial court judges
being the paradigms of justice in the first instance have, time and again, been
exhorted to dispose of the court's business promptly and to decide cases within the
required period because delay results in undermining the people's faith in the
judiciary.
Moya vs Tensuan
A.M. No. 2507-CFI August 10, 1981
Ricardo B. Moya, complainant,
Vs
Judge Ricardo Tensuan, District Judge, CFI, Q.C., respondent.
Facts:
Delay in the disposition of Criminal Case No. Q-4882, is the grievance of the
complainant against respondent Judge in the instant administrative proceeding. The
complainant alleged that during the months of August, 1979, until March 1980, the
respondent judge has issued a certificate that he has no pending motions or
incidence or decisions when in truth and in fact, the aforementioned criminal case
remained unresolved until April 1980, in violation of the provisions of Section 5 of
the Judiciary Act.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge has failed to render a decision of the case within
the mandatory 90-day period.
Ruling:
Yes. Respondent Judge has failed to render a decision of the case within the
mandatory 90-day period. Whether or not the charge at bar arose from a suspicion
as to the partiality of the Judge, or as an act of retaliation to the acquittal of the
accused, the interest of justice would have been served and no complaint for delay
would have arisen had respondent Judge promptly set the promulgation of his
decision within the month of February after he had signed it on February 4, 1980,
or even March, 1980. While it is possible that because of the number of cases in
his sala ,1,000 pending cases, respondent failed to direct the Clerk of Court to set
immediately the case for the promulgation of the decision, nevertheless, more care
and punctuality in the performance of his duties is required under the
circumstances. Judges must be cautioned that it is not the date of signing the
decision but the date of receipt by the Clerk of Court that must be reckoned from
the date of submission of the case for decision in order to comply with the ninety-
day (90) period under Section 5 of the Judiciary Act. A conscientious and
responsible effort should have been made and exerted to avoid delay.
Salvador vs Salamanca
A.M. No. R-177-MTJ September 24, 1986
Zenaida C. Salvador, complainant,
Vs
Hon. Bienvenido S. Salamanca, Presiding Judge, Branch Xiv, Metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila, respondent.
Facts:
Therein plaintiffs prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction which prayer was reiterated in a motion filed on May 16, 1983. On
April 5, 1984, or after almost two years of litigation, the parties rested their case
for final adjudication by respondent judge. The parties agreed to simultaneously
submit their respective memoranda within twenty (20) days from receipt of the last
copy of the transcript of stenographic notes. On April 18, 1984, complainant and
her co-plaintiffs filed an urgent motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction, and on May 3, 1984, they submitted their memorandum. On
May 16, 1984, respondent judge issued an Order which defers action on plaintiffs'
motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. On June 25, 1984,
when no memorandum was submitted by therein defendants within the period
agreed upon, complainant manifested such failure to respondent judge and moved
for the resolution of the case without defendants' memorandum. On September 20,
1984, complainant instituted the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge is guilty of the delay of rendition of judgment.
Ruling:
Yes. Respondent Judge is guilty of the delay of rendition of judgment. The facts
irrefutably establish that there was a delay in the resolution of both the motions for
preliminary injunction and the case itself. The urgency of the relief sought through
a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in a forcible entry case requires that an
application therefor be resolved with dispatch one way or another. Section 3, Rule
70 of the Rules of Court specifically provides for its disposition within thirty days
from the filing thereof. Evidently, respondent judge failed to respond to the
situation with the speed required by the Rules.
Query of Judge Danilo M. Tenerife
A.M. No. 94-5-42-MTC March 20, 1996
Query of Judge Danilo M. Tenerife, Mtc, Pontevedra, Negros Occidental as to
who should decide the cases submitted for decision in said Court.
Facts:
When Judge Danilo M. Tenerife assumed office as Acting Judge of the MTCC,
Branch II, Bacolod City on April 13, 1994, he caused a physical inventory of all
cases pending in said court. He found that cases, civil and criminal, numbering 82
in all have been submitted for decision and were left undecided by his predecessor
Judge Demosthenes L. Magallanes who was promoted to the RTC at Bacolod City.
In a letter dated May 2, 1994 addressed to the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA), Judge Tenerife inquired as to who shall decide the cases submitted for
decision during the incumbency of Judge Magallanes. In an En Banc Resolution
dated June 7, 1994, the Court resolved that the said cases should be raffled among
the seven (7) branches of the MTCC, Bacolod City for rendition of judgment
thereon, and Judge Magallanes was directed to explain and show cause why no
disciplinary action should be taken against him for his failure to decide the said
cases within ninety (90) days from their respective dates of submission as required
by law.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Magallanes was violative of Code of Judicial Conduct for
gross inefficiency.
Ruling:
Yes. The failure of a judge to decide a case within the said prescribed period is
inexcusable and constitutes gross inefficiency. Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct requires judges to dispose of the Court's business promptly and
decide cases within the period specified in the Constitution, that is, three (3)
months or ninety (90) days from the filing of the last pleading, brief or
memorandum. The explanation of Judge Magallanes that his failure to decide the
said cases within the prescribed period was due to the delay in the transcription of
stenographic notes is unsatisfactory and deserves scant consideration. As
previously held by the Court, the delay in the transcription of stenographic notes
by a stenographic reporter under the judge's supervision and control cannot be
considered a valid reason for the delay in rendering judgment in a case.
Re: Report on the Judicial Audit conducted in the RTC, Br. 144, Makati City
A.M. No. 03-11-628-RTC November 25, 2004
Facts:
It originated from the judicial audit of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 144) of
Makati City, conducted by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in view of
the compulsory retirement of Judge Villanueva on October 4, 2003. Filed after
respondent’s retirement, the OCA Report dated November 3, 2003, stated that out
of six hundred sixty-five (665) active cases in the Branch, there were one hundred
seventy-seven (177) cases submitted for decision; in addition, motions in sixty-five
(65) cases were unresolved, in violation of the 90-day period mandated by the
Constitution. Thus, the OCA recommended that its Report be docketed as a
Complaint against Judge Candido P. Villanueva for gross inefficiency. On May 17,
2004, this Court required respondent to show cause why his retirement benefits
should not be withheld in view of the audit findings of the OCA. In his June 25,
2004 Comment, Judge Villanueva explained that his case load had been unusually
high. He attributed this fact to the sending to his Branch of cases formerly
cognizable by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts (JDRC). He further
clarified that his failure to decide the cases within the required 90-day period was
also due to his pairing judges’ successive resignations, which had forced him to act
upon cases or incidents in another Branch until a successor was appointed. Finally,
he explained that he was hampered by the lack of personnel and the many
unfounded administrative cases filed against him that he had to address.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge is guilty of gross negligence.
Ruling:
No. Respondent Judge is not guilty of gross negligence. Failure to decide a case
within the required period is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency. The
Code of Judicial Conduct admonishes all judges to dispose of the court’s business
promptly and decide cases within the period fixed by law. They are called to be
faithful to the law and maintain professional competence. However, the Court finds
merit in the explanation of Judge Villanueva that: 1) Branch 144 had been
designated as a Special Family Court with a heavy case load; 2) Respondent Judge
wrote a letter requesting permission not to conduct court hearings to be able to
devote more time to cases that had been submitted for decision in which the Court
has granted via Administrative Order No. 99-2003; and, 3) Respondent Judge
decided more than three hundred fifty (350) cases during the time he was allowed
not to conduct hearings. This fact alone shows that he was overburdened with
work, not grossly inefficient as imputed by the OCA. Under the circumstances and
within the limited time available, no amount of efficiency would have enabled him
to dispose of the cases that were just simply too many.
Tan vs Madayag
A.M. No. RTJ-93-1995 March 11, 1994
Vicente T. Tan, complainant,
Vs
Judge Job B. Madayag and Servillano E. Banayad, Jr., respondents.
Hector P. Corpus for complainant.
Facts:
The complainant charged respondent Judge Madayag and then acting officer-in-
charge Banayad, with neglect of duty. Specifically, complainant alleged that
respondents deliberately and maliciously failed to give notice to the movant-
intervenors of the denial of their motion for intervention (where complainant is co-
movant) and have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence by either hiding or concealing and refusing to give movants
a copy of the said order of denial, thus allegedly depriving them of the opportunity
to take the necessary legal action to prevent the original parties in Civil Case No.
92-2198 from entering into a settlement which was executed without their
(movants') knowledge.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge is guilty of the delay in the service to the counsel
of the complainant.
Ruling:
Yes. Respondents' neglect of duty is a matter of record. A judge cannot simply take
refuse behind the inefficiency or mismanagement of his court personnel. Proper
and efficient court management is definitely his responsibility. He is directly
responsible for the proper discharge of their official functions. "Court personnel
are not the guardians of a Judge's responsibilities. The efficient administration of
justice cannot accept as an excuse the shifting of blame from one court personnel
to another. In this case, the delay complained of could have been avoided had the
respondents adopted the system of maintaining even a simple checklist of all
matters submitted for resolution, and that definitely includes the prompt sending
out of notices of court orders to all the parties in the case to satisfy the
requirements of due process.
Request of Judge Cartagera
A.M. No. 95-9-98-MCTC December 4, 1997
Request of Judge Eduardo F. Cartagena, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Lamitan,
Basilan, for two months leave without pay from 10 August to 01 November 1995.
Facts:
This administrative matter came about following the receipt by Deputy Court
Administrator Bernardo P. Abesamis of a letter of Judge Eduardo F. Cartagena, of
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Lamitan-Tipo-tipo and Tuburan, Basilan,
applying for a two-month leave without pay from 10 August to 01 November
1995. In the letter, evidently sent from the USA, Judge Cartagena wrote to say that
after attending a seminar in Tagaytay City, he had to immediately depart for Los
Angeles, USA, upon being informed by his daughter that his mother was gravely
ill. He said that he had failed to get an authority to travel from the Office of the
Court Administrator because he took a direct flight from Zamboanga City and
stayed in Manila only for some minutes for the connecting flight. He likewise
mentioned about having to promptly keep an appointment at the LACUSC Medical
Center in connection with his prostate gland ailment and another consultation with
an EENT specialist regarding his hearing problem.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent Judge is guilty of gross misconduct.
Ruling:

Yes. Respondent Judge is guilty of misconduct. Judge Cartagena's attitude betrays

his lack of concern for his office. Judge Cartagena's travels have been neither on
official time nor for official business. He undoubtedly should have been more
conscious of his court duties, as well as more cautious of his actuations, than he
has heretofore exhibited. He should have been aware that, in regularly leaving his
station, he continually has caused great disservice to countless litigants and has
denied them speedy justice. In departing for abroad without the knowledge, let
alone the permission, of the Court, Judge Cartagena has violated Memorandum
Order No. 26 which mandates that request for permission to travel abroad from
members and employees of the judiciary should be obtained from the Supreme
Court. In addition, Judge Cartagena has chosen to be unmindful of the authority of
his immediate superior, Judge Memoracion, whom he apparently did not even
notify of his travels.

ROC Rule 140

A.M. Reso. 02-9-02 SC September 17, 2002
Re: Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative Cases Against Justices of the
CA & the Sandiganbayan et al.
Facts:
This is a resolution on the conversion of some administrative cases against Justices
of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special
Courts; and Court Officials who are lawyers as disciplinary proceedings against
them both as such officials and as members of the Philippine Bar.
Issue:
Whether or not administrative cases against Judges of the CA and the
Sandiganbayan et al. also be considered as disciplinary action.
Ruling:
Yes. Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts; and the court officials who
are lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary
action of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such
other forms of breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized as
grounds for the discipline of lawyers. In any of the foregoing instances, the
administrative case shall also be considered a disciplinary action against the
respondent justice, judge or court official concerned as a member of the Bar. The
respondent may forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and show
cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary
sanctioned as a member of the Bar. Judgment in both respects may be incorporated
in one decision or resolution. Before the Court approved this resolution,
administrative and disbarment cases against members of the bar who were likewise
members of the court were treated separately. Thus, pursuant to the new rule,
administrative cases against erring justices of the CA and the Sandiganbayan,
judges, and lawyers in the government service may be automatically treated as
disbarment cases. The Resolution, which took effect on October 1, 2002, also
provides that it shall supplement Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and shall apply to
administrative cases already filed where the respondents have not yet been required
to comment on the complaints.
Imbang vs Del Rosario
A.M. No. 03-1515-MTJ November 19, 2004
Dolores Imbang, complainant,
Vs
Judge Deogracias K. Del Rosario, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Patnongon,
Antique, respondent.
Facts:
The complainant charged respondent Judge with failure to decide Civil Case No.
318 for collection of sum of money in a sworn Letter-Complaint dated July 31,
1998. The OCA thereafter issued a 1st Tracer on February 3, 2000 reiterating its
order requiring the respondent to submit his comment. The respondent failed to
comply. The Court Administrator reiterated the previous orders in a Letter dated
August 10, 2001, and warned the respondent that the OCA would recommend to
the Court that he be cited for contempt in case of failure to comply therewith. The
respondent alleged that his poor health condition affected his competency and
efficiency, and that he found it difficult to travel three (3) times a week from San
Jose, Antique, to his regular station in Patnongon, Antique.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge has violated the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Ruling:
Yes. Respondent Judge has violated the Code of Judicial Conduct. The explanation
of Judge Del Rosario was found to be unsatisfactory. His excuses, viz, poor time
management and poor health conditions are not sufficient justifications for his
failure to comply with the directives of the Court. Assuming that he was burdened
with heavy workload and is suffering from numerous health problems, it is wrong
that such lawful orders of the Court could have been ignored by him. Clearly,
Judge Del Rosario’s contumacious conduct and blatant disregard of the Court’s
mandate for more than five (5) years amounts to defiance and insubordination. The
respondent’s failure to comply with the Court’s directive to file his comment to the
letter-complaint against him constitutes a blatant display of his indifference to the
lawful directives of the Court.

OCA vs Fuentes
A.M. No. RTJ-94-1270 August 23, 1995
Office of The Court Administrator, complainant,
Vs
Judge Renato A. Fuentes and Sheriff Iv Norberto Paralisan, Both of The Regional
Trial Court of Davao City (Branch XVII), And Atty. Warelito Cartagena, DPWH-
Regional Legal Officer, respondents.
Facts:

The records show that pursuant to the government's plan to construct its first fly-
over in Davao City, the Republic of the Philippines represented by the DPWH filed
an expropriation case against the owners of the properties affected by the project,
and presided by Judge Renato A. Fuentes. The government won the expropriation
case. The OSG was not furnished with copies of the notices of levy and auction
sale, although Attorney Warelito Cartagena received the Sheriff's Notice of Sale on
behalf of the DPWH-Region XI. Allegedly, the auction sale pushed through as
scheduled at the DPWH depot in Panacan, Davao City. Alex Bacquial emerged as
the highest bidder, besting two other bidders. The OSG sent a telegram to
respondent Sheriff Paralisan, to hold in abeyance all execution/auction
proceedings. Alex Bacquial filed an ex-parte urgent motion for the issuance of a
"break through" order to enable him to effect the withdrawal of the auctioned
properties. The motion was granted by Judge Fuentes on even date. Bacquial and
his men again took several heavy equipment from the depot and had succeeded in
taking various junk/disposable equipment, including a repairable equipment. 

Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
Ruling:
No. Judge Fuentes has not been charged by any interested party, in relation to the
issuance of the writs of execution against the government, particularly, the DPWH.
The imposition of fine against Judge Fuentes will deny him procedural due
process. The Office of the Court Administrator is directed to conduct an
investigation on Judge Renato Fuentes and to charge him if the result of the
investigation so warrants.

Gallo vs Cordero
A.M. No. MTJ-95-1035 June 21, 1995
Emeterio Gallo through counsel Atty. Francisco C. Aurillo, complainant,
Vs
Judge Jose Cordero, Mtc, Babatñgon, Leyte, respondent.
Facts:
The complaint is made in connection with Criminal Case No. 2194 which
complainant filed in respondent judge's court on August 23, 1994 for violation of
P.D. No. 772 (Anti-Squatting Law). On August 26, 1994, respondent issued
a subpoena to complainant requiring him to appear and to testify regarding his
affidavit and to bring with him documents attesting to his ownership of the land.
Complainant charges that (a) in violation of art. 207 (malicious delay in the
administration of justice) and art. 208 (negligence and tolerance in the prosecution
of crimes) of the Revised Penal Code respondent judge refused to order the arrest
of the accused in Criminal Case No. 2194; (b) that respondent privately conferred
with the accused in his office on August 31, 1994 which "logically and naturally
arouses suspicion of graft and rank favoritism;" and (c) that he acted with bias and
ignorance of the law in telling complainant, "You cannot eject tenants now under
the law," and that even if the accused were not tenants, "nobody can eject them."
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
Ruling:
Yes. Respondent judge not only has shown gross ignorance of law and procedure
but has also failed to live up to the norm that judges should not only be impartial
but should also appear impartial. It was improper for respondent judge to meet the
four accused without the presence of the complainant. As already stated, the
subpoena required the accused to appear in court on August 31, 1994 to give their
testimony. But no hearing was set on that date. In fact complainant's son, Roger,
merely chanced on the accused in the office of the judge on August 31, 1994
because he had been sent by his father to deliver the latter's letter inquiring whether
the judge had yet issued a warrant for the arrest of the accused. He violated Canon
2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
OCA vs Sumilang
A.M. No. MTJ-94-989 April 18, 1997
Office of The Court Administrator, Complainant,
Vs
Judge Augusto Sumilang, Interpreter Felicidad Malla, Steno-Reporter Edelita
Lagmay and Steno-Reporter Nieva Mercado, respondents.
Facts:
Respondents are court employees of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pila, Laguna
were charged for misappropriating funds deposited by the plaintiff in Civil Case
No. 858. On September 1, 1993, Rebecca Avanzado assumed the position of
officer in charge and it was during her tenure that an on-the-spot audit examination
was conducted by the Fiscal Audit Division of the Office of Court Administrator.
Then, several anomalous transactions were discovered. One involved a manager's
check deposited in the name of Teodorico Dizon in connection with Civil Case No.
858, wherein Entero Villarica, entrusted the amount of P240,000.00 to said
respondent Malla instead of handling it over to the Clerk of Court. Malla admitted
that she lent the amount of P87,000.00 to steno-reporter Lagmay, P40,000.00 to
steno-reporter Mercado, and P81,000.00 to Mrs. Sumilang, wife of Judge
Sumilang. She spent P32,000.00 for the hospitalization of her husband and the
remaining balance for personal purposes. Later on, she executed an affidavit
stating that only Lagmay and Mercado borrowed P55,000.00 and P40,000.00,
respectively. On the other hand, she used P100,000.00 for her personal needs. In
his proffered explanation, respondent Judge averred that his wife did not borrow
any money from Malla and that he had no knowledge of the irregularities involving
members of his own staff.  It bears emphasizing that this is not the first time that
respondent judge has been charged with an administrative case. 
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge is guilty of gross negligence in this matter.
Ruling:
Yes. The evidence against Judge Sumilang adequately proves his gross negligence
in this matter. A judge must always remember that as the administrator of his
court, he is responsible for the conduct and management thereof. He has the duty
to supervise his court personnel to ensure prompt and efficient dispatch of business
in his court.  The ignorance of respondent Judge as to the irregularities occurring in
his own backyard constitutes serious breach of judicial ethics. Judge Sumilang's
excuse, that upon learning of the irregularities being committed by his court
personnel, he immediately acted with haste and instructed Malla to turn over the
money, is specious and unconvincing. His admission that he had no knowledge
regarding the anomalies going on in his court underscores his inefficiency and
incompetence. It clearly demonstrates a lack of control expected of a judge
exercising proper office management.
Heck vs Santos
A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657 February 23, 2004
Heinz R. Heck, complainant,
Vs
Judge Anthony E. Santos, Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan De Oro City,
respondent.
Facts:
A letter complaint was filed by the complainant for the disbarment of the
respondent Judge. The complainant alleged that prior to the respondent’s
appointment as RTC judge on April 11, 1989, he violated the notarial law, for he
was not duly commissioned as notary public until January 9, 1984 but still
subscribed and forwarded (on a non-regular basis) notarized documents to the
Clerk of Court VI starting January 1980 uncommissioned until the 9th of January
1984. The respondent judge categorically denied the charges against him. He also
submitted a certification from Clerk of Court, Atty. Sabio-Beja, to prove that there
was no proper recording of the commissioned lawyers in the City of Cagayan de
Oro as well as the submitted notarized documents/notarial register.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent Judge is guilty of notarizing documents without the
requisite notarial commission.
Ruling:
Yes. Respondent Judge is guilty of notarizing documents without the requisite
notarial commission. It must be remembered that notarization is not an empty,
meaningless, routinary act. On the contrary, it is invested with substantive public
interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notary
public. Notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public
one, making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of
its authenticity and due execution. The Court has characterized a lawyer’s act of
notarizing documents without the requisite commission therefore as reprehensible,
constituting as it does not only malpractice, but also the crime of falsification of
public documents.

Bartolome vs De Borja
A.M. No. 1096-CFI May 31, 1976
Rolando Bartolome, complainant,
Vs
Hon. Juan De Borja, District Judge, Branch XX, Court of First Instance, Manila,
respondent.
Facts:
Respondent Judge was accused by complainant Bartolome, who identifies himself
as a labor regulation officer in the Department of Labor, of oppression and
deliberate violation of the penal laws, gross ignorance of the law and deliberate
intent to place the Secretary of Labor and the Office of the President in a very bad
light, as well as grave misconduct in the proceedings had with reference to a
certiorari petition. Respondent Judge allowed the replay of a taped telephone
conversation between complainant and Adelina Velasco who with her father was
accused of violating the Minimum Wage Law and found guilty thereof by the
Department of Labor. The matter was then elevated in a petition for prohibition
and mandamus filed with the Court of First Instance and assigned to the sala of
respondent Judge to show the grave abuse of discretion as well as the motivation of
the complainant against them. Permission was sought for and was granted by the
lower court. Certain portions of the testimony of Adelina Velasco were likewise
damaging to his reputation. Complainant accused respondent Judge's actuation as
not only oppressive in character but likewise violative of the aforesaid penal
statutes. It was also characterized by him as manifesting gross ignorance of the law
as well as deliberate intent to place the Secretary of Labor and the President "in a
very bad light," all of which he summarized as constituting grave misconduct that
would justify the removal of respondent Judge.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge is guilty of serious misconduct.
Ruling:
No. After a study of the records of the case, this Court is of the opinion that no
disciplinary action is warranted. The charge of serious misconduct is without
support, even on the assumption that no exaggeration was indulged in by
complainants. That is evidently the case as far as the alleged grievance of Rolando
Bartolome is concerned. What was objected to by him was the replay of a tape-
recording which did cast reflection on his actuations. It is his contention that
thereby respondent Judge was guilty of oppression. Clearly it would be to impart a
novel concept to the accepted meaning of what is oppressive to assent to such a
view. There is a constitutional guarantee that requires then complaints against
officialdom be seriously attended to. Where meritorious, the remedy could be
supplied. If found to be devoid of substance, the party charged is vindicated with
the complainant having the satisfaction of at least having been listened to. There is
thus fidelity to what the Constitution ordains.
Salcedo vs Inting
A.M. No. 1810-CTJ June 29, 1979
Angelina S. Salcedo, complainant,
Vs
Judge Enrique B. Inting, respondent.
Facts:
The complainant charged the respondent Judge with violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019) and Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
Specifically, the charges are: (1) that the respondent, from July 1, 1964 to June 30,
1965 and January 1, 1967 to September 30, 1974, had collected from the
government overpayments of his to which he had no right, using the said amount
for his own personal benefit, to the prejudice of the Republic of the Philippines so
that he is liable under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Revised
Penal Code; and (2) that in a series of applications for leave of absence with pay
filed with the Supreme Court, the respondent judge made it appear that he had no
pending administrative case, said representation being false because of the
existence of an administrative case which is not yet terminated.
Issue:
Whether or not charges against respondent Judge be dismissed.
Ruling:
Yes. A perusal of the record of the case shows that the respondent judge may not
be held criminally or administratively liable for the overpayments of his salary.
The respondent judge and the other city judges who received overpayments had
not in any manner intervened or participated one way or the other in the issuance
of their treasury warrants. The respondent cannot be held liable in this
administrative case filed against him because the elements of malice, corrupt or
fraudulent acts were found to be lacking. The mere receipt and appropriation of the
proceeds of the various treasury warrants by the respondent payee herein,
motivated by his honest and firm belief that they were legally due him, does not
prove the existence of mala fide to subject him to administrative sanction.

Icasiano vs SB
G.R. No. 95642 May 28, 1992
Aurelio G. Icasiano, Jr., petitioner,
Vs
Hon. Sandiganbayan (First Division) And People of the Philippines, respondents.
J.C. Baldoz & Associates for Petitioner.
Facts:
Romana Magbago filed an administrative complaint with the Supreme court
against then acting Municipal Trial Court Judge of Naic, Cavite, herein petitioner
for grave abuse of authority, manifest partiality and incompetence. This was
dismissed by the Supreme Court for lack of merit. Meanwhile, complainant
Magbago also filed with the Office of the Ombudsman the same letter-complaint
earlier filed with the Supreme Court; this time, she claimed violation by Judge
Icasiano, Jr. of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The corresponding
information against herein petitioner was thereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan.
After said information was filed, petitioner filed a motion for reinvestigation which
resulted in the issuance of two (2) separate resolutions from the respondent
Sandiganbayan. But denied by the respondent Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner had the defense of double jeopardy in the criminal
case.
Ruling:

No. The Court is of the view that the distinction between administrative and
criminal proceedings must be upheld, and that a prosecution in one is not a bar to
the other. The fundamental requisites of double jeopardy must have: (a) a valid
complaint or information; (b) a competent court; (c) a valid arraignment; (d) the
defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (e) the defendant was acquitted, or
convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent. It is, therefore, correct for the Sandiganbayan to hold that
double jeopardy does not apply in the present controversy because the Supreme
Court case was administrative in character while the Sandiganbayan case also
against said petitioner is criminal in nature.

Maceda vs Vasquez
G.R. No. 102781 April 22, 1993
Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding Judge, Branch 12, Regional Trial Court,
Antique, petitioner,
Vs
Hon. Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez and Atty. Napoleon A. Abiera,
respondents.
Bonifacio Sanz Maceda for and in his own behalf.
Public Attorney's Office for Private Respondent.
Facts:
In his affidavit-complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, respondent
Napoleon A. Abiera of the Public Attorney's Office alleged that petitioner had
falsified his Certificate of Service , by certifying that all civil and criminal cases
which have been submitted for decision or determination for a period of 90 days
have been determined and decided, when in truth and in fact, petitioner knew that
no decision had been rendered in five (5) civil and ten (10) criminal cases that have
been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera further alleged that petitioner
similarly falsified his certificates of service for a total of seventeen (17) months.
Issue:
Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain a criminal complaint
for the alleged falsification of a judge's certification submitted to the Supreme
Court, and assuming that it can, whether a referral should be made first to the
Supreme Court.
Ruling:
No, in the absence of any administrative action taken against the petitioner by this
Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted
by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of administrative
supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of
separation of powers. Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively
vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court
personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest
municipal trial court clerk.