Presidential Address: Cause for Concern in the Philippines

Author(s): Frank H. Golay

Source: The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 45, No. 5 (Nov., 1986), pp. 935-943
Published by: Association for Asian Studies
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VOL. XLV, No. 5 JOURNAL OF ASIAN STUDIES NOVEMBER 1986

Presidential Address: Cause for Concern in

the Philippines

FRANK H. GOLAY

A fter a prolonged stint in the United States Navy in World War II, I used the
"G.I. bill" to study economics at the University of Chicago. My education in
economic theory, international trade, and finance was directed toward the Marshall
Plan, which was accelerating economic development in the war-torn countries of
Western Europe.
Upon graduation from the University of Chicago in 1950, I was offered a position
in the newly established International Section in the Economic Division of the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Moreover, I was expected to engage in
research that would facilitate economic development in capitalistic Western European
countries. After three years in Washington, D.C., I was offered a joint position by
the Cornell University economics department and Southeast Asia program, which
provided funds for field research, thus enabling me to acquire knowledge of the
Philippines while gaining insight into foreign trade and investment. Over time I
discovered that the outside world considered my role to be that of a Filipinist. I shall
use this occasion to attract attention to a festering legacy of American imperialism-
the Philippines, the course of which may destabilize American interests in Southeast
Asia.
During the period of my presidency of the Association for Asian Studies in 1985-
1986, the social and economic sectors of the Philippine Republic regressed. De-
mocracy has deteriorated markedly since the election of Marcos to a second presidential
term, and the inequity in the distribution of income has provided no significant
improvement in social justice. In addition, the value added by specialization and
trade has eroded in recent years. The bureaucracy has continued to grow, and gov-
ernment expenditures have been diverted disproportionately to buildings in metro-
politan Manila. The outlawed Communist Party of the Philippines and its military
arm-the New People's Army-have gained strength and confronted the Philippine
Army in many provinces.
The American dollar, which was strong in the period immediately after World
War II, has become the vehicle for expanding international liquidity needed to fa-
cilitate expansion in world trade and payments. Over time, the so-called "dollar
shortage" has receded and more normal conditions have been restored. Moreover, as
dollar reserves have been accumulated by countries exporting more goods and services
than they have imported, the willingness of these countries to hold dollars has de-

Frank H. Golay is Professor Emeritus of Economics Association for Asian Studies on March 26, 1986,
and Asian Studies, Cornell University. This ad- at the Chicago Hilton and Towers, Chicago, Il-
dress was presented at the annual meeting of the linois.

935

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936

clined. By the late 1960s, the traditional export surplus of U.S. trade was replaced
by a large and growing export deficit, and surplus countries threatened to present
dollars to the Treasury of the United States in exchange for gold at the rate of $35
per ounce.
Faced by intractable deficits in international payments and resistance of surplus
countries against the revaluation of their currencies, the United States in August
1971 suspended the commitment to convert dollars into gold, and the dollar was
allowed to float in exchange markets. Three months later representatives of the ten
major industrial countries in the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment met in Washington and agreed that the dollar should be devalued by 10
percent; other countries agreed to revalue their currencies against the dollar by an
average of 12 percent. Upon implementation of this agreement, the convertibility
of the dollar was restored. Despite these changes, the dollar continued to face un-
certainty, and in March 1973 the system of fixed exchange rates was abandoned for
the floating exchange rate that exists today.
Events in industrial countries coincided with the formation of the Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries cartel and its increases in the price of oil. Initially
the member states deposited their oil earnings in international banks that paid liberal
interest on deposits. Banks paying interest faced the need to earn more interest by
borrowing Eurodollars from other banks, which supported multiple expansion in
international liquidity from 600 billion dollars in 1976 to one thousand six hundred
billion dollars over the six years ending in 1982. Much of the expansion of liquidity
was used to make loans to Third World countries, which incurred debts in excess of
600 billion dollars. Many of the borrowing countries behaved prudently, and they
currently have access to consortia of international banks. But less disciplined coun-
tries-Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Peru, and the Philippine Republic-incurred
debts beyond their means to repay during the recession of 1980- 1982, and liquidation
of their external debts was postponed.
President Ferdinand Marcos, who took office in 1965 when the peso was valued
at 3.9 pesos per dollar, appeared successful, as he was the first incumbent president
to be reelected. Marcos identified with the slogan "Rice, Roads, and Schools" in his
first term in office, and during his first three years in office he maintained the slogan
and Filipinos generally were content with his leadership. In the fourth year of his
first term, however, Marcos grossly expanded the money supply to engage in the
election campaign that returned him to a second term. In February 1970, two months
into his second administration, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) imposed a
devaluation of the peso to 6 pesos per dollar.
Marcos was determined to remain in power, but under the 1935 constitution he
was limited to eight years in office. In order to remain in office, Marcos extracted a
law from the Philippine Congress that called for the election of delegates to a con-
stitution assembly charged to revise or rewrite the 1935 constitution. Many of the
delegates were Nacionalista congressmen, and Marcos sought a change in the con-
stitution that would convert the existing Philippine government to a parliamentary
system.
Anticipating that the revised constitution would be submitted to a referendum,
Marcos was confident that the Nacionalista Party would be the majority party and
that he would become the prime minister of a parliamentary government. However,
opponents of Marcos in the constituent assembly were able to prevent a vote on the
revision calling for a parliamentary system. Stymied within the constituent assembly,
Marcos chose to remain in power by declaring martial law in August 1972. This

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CAUSE FOR CONCERN IN THE PHILIPPINES 937
enabled him to prorogue the Congress, to close down media opposed to his remaining
in power, and to detain his political enemies in military prisons.
The extended second term of the Marcos administration, beginning in 1969 and
ending in February 1986, introduced a highly centralized system of government as
well as major changes in economic policy, including a break in the conservative
monetary, fiscal, and trade policies of the previous two decades. Equally important
was Marcos's alienization of the "oligarchy," the traditional economic and political
elite that monopolized power under the commonwealth and the post-World War 11
republic.
Having severed his ties with the traditional elite by declaring martial law, Marcos
recruited a new elite consisting of technocrats who joined his administration in the
early 1970s and entrepreneurs who emerged during the expansion of international
liquidity in the last half of the 1970s.
The alternative economic system erected by Marcos included an industrial re-
organization of important sectors that tended to concentrations of economic power
by granting monopoly advantages to new government corporations and selected pri-
vate enterprises. These changes were associated with rapid growth in foreign bor-
rowing and multiple expansion in Philippine Central Bank lending, which sustained
a rapidly increasing share of government in total expenditure. Moreover, the inde-
pendence vested in the Central Bank eroded steadily under the Marcos regime until
the bank became a pawn of the president.
The Philippine corporate sector was hard hit in 1981-82 by falling factory output,
stagnant sales, high interest rates, weak export prices, and rising energy costs. The
government's response was to allocate badly needed financial resources to keep major
corporations afloat. The Development Bank of the Philippines was reported to have
19 billion pesos tied up in old and new mining firms while the National Development
Corporation acquired extensive holdings in copper mining and smelting, agricultural
plantations, fertilizer manufacturing, textiles, construction, and shipping.
Corporate investments became the single most important capital outlay in 1981-
82. This was related to the government's attempts to bail out large private firms that
were floundering economically. Such investments were distributed by the Philippine
Central Bank, the Philippine National Bank, the Development Bank of the Phil-
ippines, and the National Development Corporation to allow the takeover of distressed
firms or the extension of new loans to privileged firms.
The Philippine government first noted the need to transfer industries it had es-
tablished or taken over from the private sector in 1982, when the national budget
reached worrisome levels. This was evident in actions of the Philippine National Bank
and the Development Bank of the Philippines-the two financial institutions with
the greatest number of foreclosed industries-to sell most of the businesses. The
motive cited by government officials for the sales of some industries was to stop the
budget drain as most of these corporations received annual funds from the government
budget.
An example of waste in government is illustrated in the construction outlays by
ministries which became prominent after 1976, a period in which government ex-
penditures quadrupled. Capital expenditures included the Manila Bay reclamation
and building complex, an ostentatious building for the National Assembly, numerous
residences for officials, new quarters for the National Economic and Development
Authority, the Philippine National Bank, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the Manila
Governor's offices, the Central Bank Mint, the Population Center, the University of
Life, and three showcase Medical Centers, among others.

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938 FRANK H. GOLAY
For the Development Bank of the Philippines and the Philippine National Bank,
the day of reckoning arrived in 1982. Their combined assets of 154 million pesos
were considered nonperforming, and of their combined loans of 79 billion pesos,
some 75 percent were delinquent. The Philippine government was forced to provide
3.6 billion pesos to keep the Development Bank of the Philippines operating in 1984.
The strain on the Philippine National Bank was worse; 17.2 billion pesos in gov-
ernment financing were needed in 1983 and 1984. Economists knowledgeable about
the Philippines are convinced that a flood of investments that are not viable has come
near to crippling the Philippine National Bank and the Development Bank of the
Philippines. Many manufacturing and extractive-industry projects were ill-conceived
and funds of the two major banks were used to finance them.
The Marcos government also participated directly in financial markets through
government-owned banks and other financial institutions, including the Land Bank,
the Government Service Insurance System, and the Social Security System. These
institutions exerted indirect influence through selective monetary policies adopted
by the Central Bank and through special relationships between the government and
favored private banks known as "political banks."
Loans from government financial institutions to favored borrowers tended to be
large. For example, loans to the Marinduque Mining Company exceeded 15 billion
pesos at the time the debts were exchanged for equity and the mining firm became
a government corporation. A more recent bailout culminated with the Construction
Development Corporation of the Philippines, which was 5. 1 billion pesos in debt to
the Development Bank of the Philippines, the Government Service Insurance System,
the National Development Corporation, the Land Bank, and the Philippine National
Bank.
The Marcos government found itself running and substantially owning a number
of "sick" companies. From 32 in 1972, the number of government corporations rose
to 94 parent firms (with 149 subsidiaries) and single-entity firms. In fiscal year 1985,
the government expects the fifteen largest state corporations to incur a combined
deficit of some 10 billion pesos equal to $542 million dollars. Moreover, capital
outlays for state corporations are expected to total 12 billion pesos.
Many businesses favored by government financial institutions and "political
banks" encountered difficulties when lending institutions faced stringent access to
loans in the 1980s. Inefficient enterprises managed by inexperienced entrepreneurs,
men who were close to Marcos and interested in acquiring business experience,
crowded out high-productivity activities. The cost of inefficiency and waste may be
seen in the steady increase in the capital to output ratio in the Philippine economy.
Increases in gross domestic product per capita in ASEAN countries other than the
Philippines averaged 5. 1 percent over the 1960s and 1970s, whereas the Philippine
growth rate averaged only 2.8 percent.
The second focus of the Marcos development strategy was the monopolization of
various sectors of the economy, including those that were the most vital. An analysis
of the Philippine crisis by economists in the School for Economics of the University
of the Philippines tabulated 688 Presidential Decrees and 283 Letters of Instruction,
which represented one form or another of government intervention in the economy.
Among the many instruments utilized were the issuance of exclusive rights to import,
export, or exploit certain areas of activity; authority to collect large funds that were
then privately expropriated; and preferential treatment of certain firms in an industry
to extend new credit or to restructure credit. One example of an exclusive right to
trade was the assignment of the right to import peroxide to Peroxide Philippines,

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CAUSE FOR CONCERN IN THE PHILIPPINES 939
Incorporated. The government also exempted corporations-private and public-
from Philippine laws. For example, an exemption from tariffs on imported television
sets was extended to Nivico. The establishment of new public corporations, such as
the Philippine Cotton Corporation or National Fertilizer Corporation, are other in-
stances of instruments of intervention. The activities of these corporations directly
competed with private enterprise, but their operations were sustained through the
injection of government funds.
The sugar industry was converted to a monopoly following the boom in com-
modity prices in 1974, when the government intervened to impose price ceilings in
the marketing of sugar. Before the end of 1974, the government had nationalized
both domestic and export sugar trading, and the Philippine Exchange Company,
which was headed by Bobby Benedicto, a crony of Marcos, was designated the sole
buyer and exporter of sugar. Over nine subsequent crop years, ending with 1982-
83, it is estimated that the loss to sugar producers ranged between 11 and 14 billion
pesos.
If the Philippine sugar industry is to survive, the domestic market will have to
generate the bulk of revenue and producers will have to be assured a government-
mandated minimum price. The domestic price for the crop year ending in September
1986 is fixed as U.S. 12 cents a pound, in comparison with the current world market
price of 5.2 cents. The world market, where protectionism and sugar substitutes will
continue to keep prices low, is unlikely to see a turnaround in the existing situation
where prices represent less than one-half of the production costs for most Philippine
producers. Moreover, it appears unlikely that the cost of farm inputs and capital will
be reduced in the near future.
The program to rationalize the Philippine coconut industry resulted in losses to
coconut producers. The material basis of the program was the collection of a coconut
levy, legally defined as a private contribution to a stabilization fund, at an average
annual rate of 1 billion pesos. This amount is supposed to fund replanting and other
programs.
The stabilization fund, which was administered by Eduardo Cojuangco, was not
subject to public audit even though it was collected by force of law as a national
program. The replanting program to date has made no significant impact. The main
uses of the fund include the purchase of the United Coconut Planters Bank and the
organization of Unicom, a private milling and marketing company for coconut prod-
ucts. Nevertheless, Unicom paid coconut farmers 9 to 15 percent below the price it
would have paid them under competitive conditions.
The impact of monopolistic processes transferred social and economic power to
a small group in Philippine society, and this was an obvious objective of the Marcos
regime. In 1982, the Philippines incurred a trade deficit of 2.8 billion dollars, which
reflected declines in world prices of Philippine exports. Sugar fell from 30 cents per
pound to a range of 6 to 7 cents per pound; coconut oil fell from 40 cents per pound
to 18 cents per pound. At present, there is a world glut of sugar because dextrose
is taking over sugar markets, and the easing of the price of coconut oil reflects the
competition of palm oil (which has cost advantage in production).
During the second half of 1982 and through most of 1983, the Philippine Central
Bank reported that the external debt of the Philippines ranged upward to 16 billion
dollars, and over the first half of 1983 international currency reserves were reported
to be in the range of 28 billion dollars.
The Central Bank announced in October 1983 that the assassination of Benigno
Aquino on August 21, 1983, precipitated a "massive" flight of capital that drained

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940 FRANK H. GOLAY
foreign exchange reserves to a low of 430 million dollars. In mid-October, the Central
Bank sent messages to 350 foreign banks that had contributed to large Philippine
loans, requesting the banks to agree to a 90-day moratorium on the principal payments
that were owed them.
Bank representatives journeyed to Manila to confirm accounts of the Central Bank
and discovered that the Philippine government had routinely overstated its foreign-
exchange reserves and understated the external debt of the Philippines in order to
obtain new loans and credits. This pattern of deceit enabled the Philippines to obtain
337 million dollars in Special Drawing Rights from the IMF and a loan in excess of
300 million dollars from a consortium of foreign banks during the first half of 1983.
When pressed by officials of foreign banks, the Philippine government admitted
the overstatement of foreign-exchange reserves and acknowledged that the "capital
flight" of October was a fiction. These revelations infuriated the bankers, halted
negotiations on a rescue package initiated by the IMF and was the occasion for firing
Jaime Laya, the governor of the Philippine Central Bank. Representatives of foreign
banks also announced that the external debt of the Philippine government was in
excess of 25 billion dollars.
The three-month moratorium subsequently was extended to two years, which
were needed to "bail-out" the Philippine government with additional loans from the
IMF, funds from more than twenty international financial institutions in countries
committed to extending economic aid to the Philippines, and funds contributed by
a reduced consortium of foreign commercial banks.
Meanwhile the elections of members of the National Assembly faced Filipinos.
To ensure Marcos's control of the Assembly, the government borrowed 350 million
dollars from the Central Bank in the spring of 1984. On May 1, Marcos decreed a
10 percent increase in the pay of members of the civil service and armed forces. Four
days later, Mrs. Marcos promised Cebu City a heart hospital and four thousand dollars
for every district and 2 million dollars for the city treasury if the government can-
didates were all elected. The election returns jolted Marcos as the opposition won
one-third of the seats at stake and Mrs. Marcos was defeated in her constituency;
however, her husband arranged for her to have an appointive seat in the Assembly.
Once the election was over, the IMF intervened to require the government to tighten
the money supply, which had expanded rapidly during the three months before the
election, and the peso was allowed to float downward to a new equilibrium level.
For the year 1984 inflation averaged 50.3 percent, the highest in fourteen years.
Industrial production, which accounted for 34 percent of the gross domestic product,
fell by 9 percent in 1984, and the Philippines suffered its worst economic crisis since
World War II. Shutdowns and reduced business operations resulted in the layoff of
93,000 workers. The conjunction of price inflation, unemployment, and the con-
traction of total output was especially difficult in rural areas. Peasants whose family
incomes had been augmented by members working in urban centers were now the
sole support of their families.
The IMF "adjustment program," which was announced in September 1984, called
for 3.9 billion dollars of aid to the Philippines, including 630 million dollars in IMF
drawing rights; it was dependent upon the revival of a commercial bank consortium
willing to loan 1.65 billion dollars in new money-to be matched by an equal amount
from financial institutions in governments committed to extend economic assistance
to the Philippines.
The ultimate funding extended to the Philippines was not 3.9 billion dollars,
but 2.48 billion dollars; the consortium of commercial banks limited their lending

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CAUSE FOR CONCERN IN THE PHILIPPINES 941
to 925 million dollars, and government financial institutions reduced their contri-
bution to the same amount.
A look at IMF history in Manila over the last twenty years or so is instructi(;e.
The IMF signed seventeen "adjustment programs" with the Philippines, a record
exceeded by few nations. Each of these programs was an attempt to correct temporary
foreign exchange woes and to give bankers confidence to lend money. A bipartisan
Senate report issued in Washington last October, presented a bleak assessment: the
Marcos administration was "virtually bankrupt" in its ability to govern, and it stayed
in power because of military support, divisions within the opposition, and Marcos's
knack for manipulating events.
The economic setback of the Philippines has been accompanied by a resurgence
of the New People's Army (NPA) in 1984 and 1985. A pronounced gap separates
the rich and the poor throughout the Philippines, but it is especially evident in Negros
Occidental, where one-half of the nation's sugar is grown. As poverty has worsened,
the NPA has expanded more rapidly in Negros Occidental than elsewhere in the
Philippines.
In March 1985, a contingent of the NPA raided an armory in Bacolod, the capital
of Negros Occidental, and seized more than four hundred fire-arms, including rifles,
carbines, and submachine guns. This was the largest quantity of weapons seized by
Communist guerrillas to date.
The growth of the NPA insurgency has been a matter of increasing concern for
over a year. During the first five months of 1985, an average of more than ten violent
incidents a day involving the Philippine Army and the NPA occurred.
The pressure of the NPA in urban areas has not been militarily significant, but
it marks another step in the growth of insurgency. Western analysts place the strength
of the NPA at 12,000 to 15,000 armed fighters. The insurgents have doubled their
activity in the past year. The guerrillas are armed mostly with light weapons, many
of which they seized or bought from the military.
In June 1985, President Marcos stated that "he might ask the United States to
send combat troops if the Communist insurgency got out of control." However, the
mutual-security treaty concerns aggression by a foreign power, whereas the NPA is
comprised of Filipinos who for the most part went underground from colleges and
universities in the islands.
When Marcos became president in 1966, the peso exchanged at the rate of 3.9
pesos per dollar. Marcos remained in power until early in 1986, and the peso exchange
rate for dollars at that time was 20 pesos. Over the twenty years of Marcos's rule,
the peso declined in value in terms of dollars to 18 percent of the peso when he took
office.
During the three decades from 1950 to 1980 the price index of exports to imports
(1972 = 100) declined sharply during 1984 and 1985, and the Philippine gross
national product contracted by 9 percent.
Legally and illegally, the immigration of Filipinos into the United States is large
and increasing. At present there are more than a million Filipino-Americans, and
legal immigration runs to 35,000 a year. Filipinos are the second largest Asian group
in the United States. At consular offices in the Philippines, visa applications jumped
25 percent in 1985, to 181,000. There are more U.S. immigrant visas (35,000 a
year) being issued in the Philippines than in any other country.
Throughout the 1970s and the early 1980s, the Philippines encountered little
difficulty in borrowing dollars. Overseas commercial banks were open handed, and
the IMF and the World Bank endorsed Cesar Virata as an honest financial minister.

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942 FRANK H. GOLAY
The creditors convinced themselves that the Philippines needed only money and time
to shake off the corruption and favoritism surrounding President Marcos. That de-
lusion disappeared in October 1983, when the Philippines announced a moratorium
on its debts and the IMF was called in as a referee rather than as a banker. Foreign
debt was estimated in September 1983 to be 18 billion dollars, but in April of 1984
the Philippine Central Bank put total foreign debt at 26 billion dollars.
As the election of February 7, 1986 approached, a narrow majority of Filipino
voters supported Corazon Aquino, the widow of Benigno Aquino who had been mur-
dered in 1983 while a detachment of Philippine soldiers were removing him from
the airplane bringing him to Manila. Determined to remain in power and concerned
for the drawing power of Benigno Aquino, Marcos demanded obedience from the
soldiers who shot Aquino. Threatened by the narrow majority supporting Corazon
Aquino, Marcos organized his henchmen to conceal election rolls and ballot boxes
favorable to Mrs. Aquino; and the votes announced in the National Assembly by a
majority of members backing Marcos were fraudulent.
Voters flocked to the polls on February 7 amid charges of large-scale intimidation
and deceit on the part of Marcos followers. According to the Aquino partisans, voter
lists disappeared, ballots were stolen, and Marcos supporters cast multiple votes.
Three days following the election, independent observers reported that the election
was marked by fraud and violence on the Marcos side, including the beating of his
opponents. On February 15, the National Assembly, which was packed with Marcos
partisans, announced that Marcos had won the election.
Corazon Aquino contended that she won the election, and she called a nationwide
nonviolent campaign of strikes and boycotts to bring down the Marcos government.
A week later, Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and Lieutenant-General Fidel Ra-
mos, Deputy Chief of Staff, occupied the Defense Ministry in Camp Aguinaldo and
resigned from the Marcos government to protest "election fraud and years of gov-
ernment misconduct."
Post-election events took a dramatic turn. The Philippines had front page coverage
in American newspapers, while television viewers saw the remarkable human walls,
unarmed, that stopped tanks. "Cory, Cory, Cory" was a cry that echoed 'round the
world.
The Philippine people are justifiably proud of an almost bloodless revolution.
"People Power" has shown the strength of the democratic ideal. And one must ac-
knowledge that in the end Marcos showed restraint in not ordering troops to fire on
the populace.
Malacanang Palace was opened, a spectator sport for the wondering eyes of the
masses who came to view "royal" splendor. With Marcos in Hawaii, opportunities
have increased to document the greed of a regime that plundered the nation for private
gain.
The pieces of a puzzle fall in place, and now we perceive how inevitable was the
mounting fiscal problem. Problems, however, do not just go away. Remaining is the
Communist insurgency, poverty and malnutrition, and disarray in business and in-
dustry. As it has taken time to lead to the full crisis, so it will take time, dedication,
and wisdom to put the house in order. Mrs. Aquino will need able advisors, patience,
and a bit of luck. And we must wish her well!

List of References

An Analysis of the Philippine Economic Crisis: A Workshop Report, June 1984. This report
embodies the results of a series of workshops on the present economic crisis, held

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All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
CAUSE FOR CONCERN IN THE PHILIPPINES 943
between November 1983 and May 1984, in which interested faculty members
of the University of the Philippines School of Economics participated.
Callison, C. Stuart. October, 1981. Economic Assessment of the New Society and Key
Problems and Issues Facing the New Republic of the Philippines. Manila: U. S. Agency
for International Development.
Owen, Norman G., ed. The Philippine Economy and the United States, Studies in Past
and Present Interactions. Michigan Papers on South and Southeast Asia, No. 22.
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. October, 1984. The Situation in the Phil-
ippines. Staff Report. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
U.S. Agency for International Development. March, 1982. Philippine Balance of Pay-
ments, Inflation, and Macroeconomic Policy. Manila: U.S. A. I. D.
. January, 1981. "Philippines, Country Development Strategy Statement,"
in Philippine Macroeconomic Analysis, Fiscal Year 1983. Manila: U.S. A.I.D.
World Bank. December, 1980. Aspects of Poverty in the Philippines: A Review and As-
sessment. Report No. 2984-PH (in two volumes). Washington, D.C.
. March, 1982. Aspects of Poverty in the Philippines. A Review and Assessment.
In two volumes. Washington, D.C.

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