DET NORSKE VERITAS

Report on

Consequence Analysis Study for Water

Treatment Plant – Paradip Refinery
Project

Indian Oil Corporation Limited

Paradip, India

DNV Reg. No.: 1-3HQ9AO

July 1, 2011
DET NORSKE VERITAS
Consequence analysis for WTP of Paradip Refinery

Consequence Analysis for WTP of Paradip Refinery DET NORSKE VERITAS, INDIA BRANCH
Project CLEANER ENERGY & NATURAL GAS
For: H. NO- 8-2-618/2, FIRST FLOOR
500034 HYDERABAD, INDIA
TEL: +91 40 44745555 / 44745550
Indian Oil Corporation Limited , Paradip FAX: +91 40 44745577 / 44745579
HTTP://WWW.DNV.COM
ORG. NO:PCGIN820

Account Ref.: 10091574 / W/O No: 4400016027

Date of First Issue: July 4, 2011 Project No. PP017847

Report No.: 1 Organisation Unit: Cleaner Energy & Natural Gas ,India
Revision No.: 0 Subject Group: SHE Risk Management
Summary:
This report details consequence analysis performed for Indian Oil Corporation Limited, for their water treatment
plant of Paradip Refinery Project. This consequence analysis study aims to determine the impact of chlorine
dispersion in the event of a leak or rupture due to storage and chlorination activity in the water treatment plant.

Prepared by: Name and Position Signature

Vishalakshi Daine, Consultant
Verified by Name and Position Signature
Raghunathan Ramani, Consultant
Approved by: Name and Position Signature
Debashish Dash, Consultant

No distribution without permission from the client or responsible

organisational unit (however, free distribution for internal use within Indexing Terms
DNV after 3 years)

No distribution without permission from the client or responsible Key Consequence Analysis
organisational unit Words

Service
Strictly confidential Area SHE Risk Management

Market Power
Unrestricted distribution Segment

Rev. No. / Date: Reason for Issue: Prepared by: Verified by: Approved by:

Rev 0 /July 4, 2011 Report submission VD RR DD

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Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY...................................................................................................... 1

GLOSSARY .............................................................................................................................. 3

1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 4

2 SCOPE OF WORK ........................................................................................................... 4

3 DETAILED APPROACH................................................................................................. 4
3.1 System Definition, Hazard Identification & Failure Scenarios.................................. 4
3.1.1 General Introduction............................................................................................ 4
3.1.2 Hazard Identification ........................................................................................... 6
3.2 Consequence Modelling/Phast Software.................................................................... 7

4 RESULTS OF CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS ............................................................... 9

5 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 15

6 RECOMMENDATION................................................................................................... 16

7 REFERENCES ................................................................................................................ 17

APPENDIX I :ASSUMPTION REGISTER

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List of Tables

Table 3-1: Effects of Toxic exposure for chlorine ...................................................................................................7

Table 4-1: Dispersion Distance due to chlorine release in the atmosphere from different locations .....................10

List of Figures

Figure 3-1: Plant layout of Paradip Refinery ...........................................................................................................8

Figure 4-1: Dispersion zone for 25mm leak from chlorine cylinder at D 5 m/s weather condition.......................11

Figure 4-2: Dispersion zone for chlorine cylinder rupture at D 5 m/s weather condition......................................12

Figure 4-3:: Dispersion zone for 25mm leak from valve at D 5 m/s weather condition ........................................13

Figure 4-4:: Dispersion zone for 25 mm leak in chlorine gas header at D 5 m/s weather condition......................14

Figure 4-5:: Dispersion zone for 5 mm leak from tube at D 5 m/s weather condition ...........................................15

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. is setting up a 15 MMTPA grass root refinery under the name of
Paradip Refinery Project (Indian PDRP) in the state of Orissa near Paradip Port on the east
coast of India. The project site is at 8 Km distance from Paradip Port and at 5 Km from the
nearest railway station. The raw water for PDRP is sourced from upstream of Jobra barrage
over Mahanadi River at Cuttack. Orissa Govt. has accorded in-principle, approval for drawing
water from Mahanadi River at Cuttack for the project.
Infrastructure Leasing & Financial Services (IL&FS) has been awarded the work to construct
the water treatment plant (WTP). The water is treated in suitable manner for different
requirements and one on the treatment requires chlorination. Chlorine being toxic in nature
needs to be quantified for the HSE risk involved due to the chlorination plant. LANCO, a sub-
contractor of IL&FS, had invited Det Norske Veritas (DNV) Cleaner Energy & Natural Gas,
Hyderabad to carry out a consequence analysis for the Water Treatment Plant of IOCL
Paradip Refinery.
Chlorine is highly hazardous and harmful in nature. Therefore exceptional precaution needs to
be taken in the Water Treatment Plant where chlorine is stored and handled. Even low
concentration exposure for a prolonged period can cause grave health problems to plant
personnel.
Chlorine leak if not arrested in time gets worse, corroding costly plant machinery.

Based on the consequence results, chlorine cylinders (rupture) has the highest impact on the
surroundings in terms of dispersion of chlorine gas calculated at 10 ppm.

Below are some of the preventive and mitigating measures for Chlorine release but not
limiting to these:

Planned inspection and periodic maintenance schedule for reliability and longevity
of the plant machinery.

Suitable Emergency Kits containing devices and tools to contain chlorine leaks in
and around cylinder valves, tonners, pressure relief valves etc. should be available in
case of emergencies.

Incorporating chlorine leak detector in the safety systems design for early chlorine
release detection to minimize the impact.

Safety devices like self contained breathing apparatus, emergency eye wash &
shower and PPEs like PVC suits, gloves and gum boots etc should be readily available.

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It is recommended that working personnel should be made aware of the

occupational hazards through frequent safety awareness programmes.

Use of display charts, warning signage, do’s and don’t etc can be good
administrative controls to spread awareness about the associated risk in chlorination
plant.

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GLOSSARY

DNV : Det Norske Veritas

HSE : Health Safety Environment
MAH : Major Accident Hazard
P&ID : Piping and Instrumentation Diagram
ppm : Parts Per Million
PPE : Personal Protective Equipment
PVC : Poly-Vinyl Chloride
PRDP : Paradip Refinery Project
UK HSE : UK Health and safety Executive
WTP : Water Treatment Plant
IOCL : Indian Oil Corporation Limited
IL&FS : Infrastructure Leasing & Financial Services
LOC : Loss of Containment

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1 INTRODUCTION
IOCL is setting up a 15 MMTPA grass root refinery under the name of Paradip Refinery
Project (Indian PDRP) in the state of Orissa near Paradip Port on the east coast of India. The
project site is at 8 Km distance from Paradip Port and at 5 Km from the nearest railway
station. The nearest airport is in the city of Bhubaneswar at approx. 125 Km away from
project site. The raw water for PDRP is sourced from upstream of Jobra barrage over
Mahanadi River at Cuttack. Orissa Govt. has accorded in-principle approval for drawing
water from Mahanadi River at Cuttack for the project. An Intake structure is proposed to be
developed at Cuttack to collect raw water from Mahanadi river and to transfer the water by
pumping through an approximately 40” dia – 93 Km cross country pipeline from Cuttack to
Paradip.
LANCO, a sub-contractor of IL&FS, has invited Det Norske Veritas (DNV) Cleaner Energy
& natural Gas, Hyderabad to carry out a consequence analysis study for their Water Treatment
Plant for IOCL Paradip Refinery.
This report presents the findings from the consequence study performed for the toxic material
chlorine.

2 SCOPE OF WORK

The specific objectives of the study are to:

Identify the hazards associated with the water treatment plant

Consequence analysis for the identified hazards

3 DETAILED APPROACH

3.1 System Definition, Hazard Identification & Failure Scenarios

3.1.1 General Introduction

This stage of the study involves a review of the process facilities in order to define the failure
cases in each unit. The failure cases in the facilities are defined in terms of loss of
containment scenarios, i.e. accidental releases of toxic fluids into the atmosphere (Chlorine in
this study). This may include various sizes of process leaks, full bore rupture and catastrophic
rupture of vessels. For each failure case, the release rate and release duration is defined. This

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will determine the amount of material being released to the atmosphere, and hence the
potential impact of the failure scenario.

The duration of release is dependent on the time to detect the released fluids, time to isolate
the leaking segment and the time to discharge remaining inventory in the segment. The total
release duration is the sum of these three periods. Further it can be argued that the time to
detect depends on:

Monitoring of process conditions, which may indicate any leak in process and/or
pipeline sections

Availability of a toxic gas detection system and/or leak detection system in a
pipeline

Surveillance of the process area, either by operator routine patrol or by a remote
surveillance system

While the time to isolate is determined by the availability of ESD system, which
includes:

ESD activation logic (i.e. manual or automatic)

Remote or local activation (push button location) for manual
intervention, and

Location of the isolatable segment

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3.1.2 Hazard Identification

Hazard identification is the structured study of a plant in order to produce a list of foreseeable,
potentially hazardous releases. In a plant, there is a wide range of substances that, if released,
could cause injury or fatality. The hazards applicable for the plant have been identified
through:

Knowledge transfer from other risk assessments carried out by DNV within
the applicable confidentiality constraints

Site specific parameters

The selection of appropriate hazards considered a range of issues,
including:

Nature of potential hazards

Position of plant in relation to the surrounding community

Complexity of the process

For this study, the concerns are associated with the risks to people both offsite and onsite.
DNV has concentrated on the toxic hazards of Chlorine.

A list of the main process streams is defined from the Process Flow Schemes (PFS). Of these,
some were considered to be non-hazardous were not analyzed further. The streams identified
to be hazardous were further analyzed.

The range of possible releases for a given stream covers a wide spectrum, from a pinhole leak
up to a catastrophic rupture (of a vessel) or full bore rupture (of a pipe). It is both time-
consuming and unnecessary to consider every part of the range; instead, a finite number of
failure cases are generated to characterize each unit. The number of specific cases and the
distribution of the cases in terms of the size which are analyzed quantitatively take into
account the potential consequences and the format of the frequency data that are being used.

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3.2 Consequence Modelling/Phast Software

The consequence analysis is performed using DNV proprietary software PHAST 6.54.
PHAST is a consequence and impact assessment module integrated within DNV risk
calculation software PhastRisk 6.54. PHAST calculates wide range of possible consequences
from the LOC events, including:

Toxic dispersion

Various factors affecting the extent of consequence are also considered within the PHAST
model which includes:

Atmospheric conditions, including solar radiation flux, ambient

temperature, humidity and wind speed/direction as well as weather stability

Release location

Release orientation

Detailed findings of the consequence analysis for selected failure cases are presented in
Section 4. The qualitative levels of toxic effects are described in Table 3-1. Plant Layout of
the Paradip Refinery in given in Figure 3-1.

Table 3-1: Effects of Toxic exposure for chlorine

Chlorine
concentration
Effects on Human Health
(PPM)

1 Minimum concentration causing slight symptoms after several hours

3.5 Minimum concentration detectable by odor
4 Minimum concentration that can be breathed for 1 hour without damage
15 Minimum concentration causing throat irritation
30 Minimum concentration causing coughing
40-60 Concentration dangerous in 30 minutes
1000 Concentration likely to be fatal after a few deep breaths

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Figure 3-1: Plant layout of Paradip Refinery

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4 RESULTS OF CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS

Accidental release of toxic substances would lead to dispersion of gas cloud in the prevailing
wind direction. An insight into physical effects resulting from the release of hazardous
substances can be calculated by means of various models. Here in case toxic effects due to
accidental release of chlorine has been calculated for the IDLH (Immediately Dangerous to
Life and Health) value 10ppm. This value is available from NIOSH (NIOSH Pocket Guide To
Chemical Hazards, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Sept 2005).

The latest IDLH value for chlorine is 10ppm and the same in the model to find the distance of
impact during the different types of release (Ref. doc no. PDRP4280-8150-PR-0008 REV-A3,
Sec 7.2.8). Table 4-1 shows dispersion distances from different locations. However figure 4-1
to 4-5 represents contours for dispersion zones at D5m/s weather condition.

Data considered and assumptions made while carrying out this study is given in the
assumption register in details.

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Table 4-1: Dispersion Distance due to chlorine release in the atmosphere from different
locations
Maximum Dispersion Distance equivalent to toxic
dose (IDLH 100 ppm) for different weather cases
Failure Scenario ID Hole Size (in metres)

D 3m/s D 5 m/s

25 mm leak (from nozzle) 965 789

Chlorine Cylinder
Rupture 1406 1322

Tube Leak 5 mm leak 186 143

Leak from valve 25mm 965 789

Chlorine gas header 25 mm 179 171

Pre-Chlorine Solution Header 32 mm No Hazard No Hazard

Post-Chlorine Solution Header 32 mm No Hazard No Hazard

5 mm No Hazard No Hazard

Chlorinator 25 mm leak No Hazard No Hazard

Rupture No Hazard No Hazard

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Figure 4-1: Dispersion zone for 25mm leak from chlorine cylinder at D 5 m/s weather
condition

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Figure 4-2: Dispersion zone for chlorine cylinder rupture at D 5 m/s weather condition

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Figure 4-3:: Dispersion zone for 25mm leak from valve at D 5 m/s weather condition

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Figure 4-4:: Dispersion zone for 25 mm leak in chlorine gas header at D 5 m/s weather
condition

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Figure 4-5: Dispersion zone for 5 mm leak from tube at D 5 m/s weather condition

5 CONCLUSION

Based on the consequence results, the dispersion distance due to chlorine cylinders (rupture)
is 1406 m and 1322 m at D 3m/s and D 5m/s respectively and has the highest impact on the
surroundings in terms of dispersion of chlorine gas calculated at 10ppm.

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6 RECOMMENDATION

Below are some of the preventive and mitigating measures for Chlorine release but not
limiting to these:

Planned inspection and periodic maintenance schedule for reliability and

longevity of the plant machinery.

Suitable Emergency Kits containing devices and tools to contain chlorine leaks in
and around cylinder valves, tonners, pressure relief valves etc. should be available in
case of emergencies.

Incorporating chlorine leak detector in the safety systems design for early chlorine
release detection to minimize the impact.

Safety devices like self contained breathing apparatus, emergency eye wash &
shower and PPEs like PVC suits, gloves and gum boots etc should be readily
available.

It is recommended that working personnel should be made aware of the
occupational hazards through frequent safety awareness programmes.

Use of display charts, warning signage, do’s and don’t etc can be good
administrative controls to spread awareness about the associated risk in chlorination
plant.
Following Table provides some best practices that should be implemented at WTP ato
prevent leak and rupture cases.

Failure Mode Control Measures

* proper corrosion inspection & monitoring

Internal corrosion
* chemical injection system

* protection against water table / level

External corrosion
* protection against damage to external coating

* quality inspection and checking, skilled workforce, site supervision, quality assurance &
Weld Failure
certification

* quality inspection and checking, skilled workforce, site supervision, quality assurance &
Joints
certification

* defining the safe operating envelop of the pipeline, controls in place upstream where
Overpressure
fluid is sent into line, pressure monitoring upstream and downstream

* quality inspection and checking, skilled workforce, site supervision, quality assurance &
certification
Pipe Failure
* protection against pipeline failure due to material selection, procurement, testing,
construction, weld quality& integrity, HIC stress cracking, leak detector

* quality inspection and checking, skilled workforce, site supervision, quality assurance &
Valve/fitting
certification

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7 REFERENCES

SL. No REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

Centre for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS), Guidelines for Hazard
1
Evaluation Procedures 2nd Edition.
2 Overall Plot Plan

3 Software PHAST v 6.54

Robin Pitblado, Andreas Falck, Phil Crossthwaite, David Worthington,

4
“Consequence Handbook”, Report no.:70037714, August 2008
“Methods for the calculation of physical effects – due to releases of
5 hazardous materials (liquids and gases)” TNO Yellow Book, CPR –
14E, 2005
PDRP4280-8150-PR-0008_REV_A2 – Paradip Refinery Risk Analysis
6
Procedure

7 PDRP4200-8150-RP-1003 Rev A1

8 QRD PDRP 4280-8150-SC-4321-001 Rev E4

Chlorine: Effects on Health and The Environment, 3rd edition

9
November 1999. The chlorine Institute, Inc.

10 Safety document provided by LANCO

11 MSDS from M/s Matheson Tri Gas, Inc

12 IS :15656 : IS standard for Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis

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APPENDIX
I
ASSUMPTION REGISTER

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______________________________________________________________________________

Consequence Modelling/Phast Software

The consequence analysis is performed using DNV proprietary software PHAST 6.54. PHAST is
a consequence and impact assessment module integrated within DNV risk calculation software
PHAST Risk.

PHAST is a consequence modelling package that can be used to assess situations which present
potential hazards to life, property and the environment and to quantify their severity.

PHAST examines the progress of a potential incident from the initial release to far-field
dispersion including modelling of toxic effects & pool spreading and evaporation. The results
from the analysis can be displayed in tabular & graphical form, so the extent of the impact can be
seen, and the effect of the release on the population and/or workforce and environment can be
assessed.

PHAST calculates wide range of possible consequences from the LOC events, including:

Jet Fire, causing thermal radiation impact (N/A in this case)

Pool Fire, causing thermal radiation impact (N/A in this case)

Flash Fire, causing thermal radiation impact within the flammable cloud
envelope (N/A in this case)

Explosion, causing overpressure impact (N/A in this case)

Toxic dispersion

Various factors affecting the extent of consequence are also considered within the PHAST model
which includes:

Atmospheric conditions, including solar radiation flux, ambient temperature,

humidity and wind speed/direction as well as weather stability

Release location

Release orientation

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______________________________________________________________________________
Meteorological Data

Data on the wind speed and stability category have been obtained from the client and this will be
used for this particular consequence study. There are two different weather classes which are
listed below (Ref. doc no. PDRP4280-8150-PR-0008 REV-A3, Sec 7.2.2):

Weather Class

- D3 : D stability (neutral) and 3 m/s wind speed.

- D5 : D stability (neutral) and 5 m/s wind speed.

Referring to the same study, the following meteorological parameters will be applied:

An average ambient condition as follow is used in the study:

- Atmospheric temperature : 30°C

- Humidity : 70%

- Surface roughness (surface type) : 0.1m

Toxic Consequences

In the event of a release of toxic material (eg. CL2) not being ignited, the concentration of
material in the cloud is progressively reduced by dilution with air until the concentration is well
below any toxic effects. Such Unignited releases do not directly affect the plant, but cloud affect
people enveloped by the cloud. Distances to 3% fatality level, the IDLH concentration and the
exposure limit have been calculated using the dispersion models.

The probit equation is of the form Y= A+B ln( C^n.t); where Y is the probability measure A,B,n
are constants , C is a concentration in ppm and t is the time duration.

Phast uses the value, A =-4.81, B=0.5 and n= 2.75 for calculating the probit value for chlorine.
Chlorine being on of the most toxic material, has the following significant hazard on health

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______________________________________________________________________________
Chlorine
concentration
(PPM) Effects
1 Minimum concentration causing slight symptoms after several hours
3.5 Minimum concentration detectable by odor
4 Minimum concentration that can be breathed for 1 hour without damage
15 Minimum concentration causing throat irritation
30 Minimum concentration causing coughing
40-60 Concentration dangerous in 30 minutes
1000 Concentration likely to be fate after a few deep breaths

The latest IDLH value for chlorine is 10ppm and the same in the model to find the distance of
impact during the different types of release (Ref. doc no. PDRP4280-8150-PR-0008 REV-A3,Sec
7.2.8).
Material Composition
The material composition used for the study is chlorine.

Total no. of the cylinder: 16 nos.

General Parameters

The following tables describe the various details that has been used in the model
Table 5.1 1: failure case details
Isolation
Elevation Temp. Pressure and diction
Capacity(kg) Material time
(m) (oC) (bar)
(min)

Leak (5mm) and rupture cylinder Chlorine

(900 kg each ) 0.5 35 8 10
Tube leak (5 mm) Chlorine 0.5 35 8 10
Leak from Valve (25 mm) Chlorine 0.5 35 8 10
Chlorine gas header (25 mm) Chlorine 1 35 8 10
Chlorine solution header (25 Water+ chlorine Underground 35 0.3
10
mm) 0.5 mm buried
Chlorinator 4 no. (water + Water+ chlorine 35 0.3
Chlorine) 10
Chlorine Flow rate: 10kg/hr 1.3

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______________________________________________________________________________
Chlorine Solution header:
Diameter: 32 mm
Pre chlorination: 12.30 kg/hr 3ppm coc. 4 cylinders connected
Post chlorination: 19.75 kg/hr, 5 ppm conc. 4 cylinders

Chlorine gas Header: Diameter: 25mm

Flow rate: 10kg/hr
Elevation from ground: 1 m
Temperature: 35 C
Pressure: less than 0.5 bar

Chlorinator: Flow Rate: 10 kg/hr

Diameter of Chlorinator (mm): 760 mm
Height: 1.3 m
Elevation from the ground (m): 1.3
Water + chlorine quantity (kg): 1500 lit 1% cl2
Temperature (C): 35 C
Pressure (bar): 0.3 bar
Note:
• Inventory for each cylinder will be considered as 900 kg for consequence analysis and not
for all, total 16 no of cylinders as chlorine is only toxic in nature and it won’t cascade in
worst case. However inventory considered for headers will be static and dynamic
inventory based on volume of the header and flow rate of the inventory in header per unit
time.

• Consequence results will be drawn based on horizontal type of release from each failure
case.

• From chlorine cylinders 5mm leak from nozzle and rupture of cylinder will be consider
for study.

Release Sizes

The following representative leak sizes have been applied: (Ref. doc no. PDRP4280-8150-SC-
4321-001- REV-E4, Sec 14.4):

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______________________________________________________________________________
- Pinhole release through 5 mm equivalent hole
- Flange or valve Leak through 25 mm hole
- Catastrophic Rupture at vessel diameter/ Full bore release (>150mm)

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______________________________________________________________________________

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