Conflict and Factionalist Dispute

Author(s): Bernard J. Siegel and Alan R. Beals

Source: The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and
Ireland , Jan. - Jun., 1960, Vol. 90, No. 1 (Jan. - Jun., 1960), pp. 107-117
Published by: Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.com/stable/2844220

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 Conflict and Factionalist Dispute

BERNARD J. SIEGEL & ALAN R. BEALS

Stanford University, California

ANALYSES OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS generally take a stable model as a point of departure.'

A group is interpreted in terms of certain structural properties which are considered to
be reflected in the functioning of social usages or customs. Emphasis is placed upon
forms, linkages, and alignments such as family, kinship, age, sex, friendship, and other
relationships, and then move to the mechanisms for ensuring conduct appropriate to
the maintenance of these alignments and values and beliefs which support them. The
social system, then, is regarded as a set of techniques for mobilizing and organizing
individual energies to cope with group problems. It maps appropriate behaviours and,
like other cultural sub-systems, inhibits random self-seeking. In most depictive or func-
tionally oriented interpretations of social structures attention tends to be directed to the
way the system works; rarely is attention directed towards the presence of disruptive
forms of social relationships such as the presence of pervasive conflict.
It is true that if conflict in human interaction were the rule and organization largely
absent, social life could scarcely exist. The case of the Kaingang, described by Jules
Henry (Henry I94I), appears to be an illustration of this. The virtual absence of struc-
tural regularities within this group at the time of Henry's observations appeared to be
leading the Kaingang toward their extinction. Such examples, perhaps, explain why the
assumption is frequently made that a social system, if viable, tends to correct centrifugal
behavioural tendencies to accord with prevailing normative expectations. Nevertheless,
not all groups fit this model very closely. Dobuans appear to be pathologically mis-
trustful of each other (Fortune I932); the Alorese are in continual and aggressive
disagreement (DuBois I 944); and the disruptive effects of clan feuding have been
observed. It is difficult to interpret conflict of this kind in terms of a crystalline model
of structure and function. In fact, so dubious is the functional value of such behaviours,
that it appears probable that such organizational types would have little survival value
in the face of new and critical problems or stresses.2
It is suggested here that what is needed for an understanding of conflict in groups is
a dynamic model which views conflict as an outcome of the interaction of external
stresses and internal strains. Using such a model it is possible to classify conflict in
several different ways. Attention is given here to a particular type of non-adaptive
inter-personal conflict which we have called factionalism.3

ATTRIBUTES OF FACTIONALISM

It has been suggested above that factionalism is a phenomenon which occurs within
groups. We use the word group to refer to an intercommunicating aggregation of
sub-units (individuals or sub-groups) having the conscious intention of perpetuating
their existence and achieving certain goals. A group consists of people assembled to-
gether for the purpose of achieving co-operation towards a common set of goals.
I07

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 io8 BERNARD J. SIEGEL & ALAN R. BEALS

Although the difference between factionalis

clear-cut, it is possible in most cases to defi
concerned. Warfare is not generally considered to divide a pre-existing group, while
factionalism is considered divisive by all concerned.
In saying that factionalism involves a conscious awareness of a division in the group,
we have suggested another attribute of factionalism, namely, that it is invariably a form
of overt conflict. It requires two or more individuals or groups consciously engaged in
verbal or physical aggression against each other. This relationship of overt conflict
is a reciprocal relationship in which those concerned have a clear and public awareness
of attack and counter-attack. The various forms of covert conflict do not involve such
an awareness, or if there is awareness, not all parties to the conflict possess it. Covert
conflict never becomes public knowledge and its existence is unrecognized. Examples
of such covert conflict would be the 'line' as used by Negroes in the American South,
witchcraft practised secretly (giving a man the evil eye when his back is turned), or
practices analogous to the psychoanalytic concept of 'over-protection'.
A third characteristic of factionalism is that it takes place between sub-units of a
group in a manner which does not conform to expectations and which does not maintain
but disrupts the co-operative enterprise. Factional conflict is not satisfactorily resolved
or regulated. It has a tendency to intensify and to interfere in ever increasing degree
with the ability of the group to achieve its goals. There is a difference between party
conflict and factionalism, for party conflict, although overt, tends to conform to expec-
tations, tends to maintain rather than disrupt the co-operative venture and tends to
be permanently or periodically resolved. Examples of party conflict are conflict between
political parties, between football teams, between intermarrying kinship groups
(exemplified in the Potlatch at marriage among the Kwakiutl of the north-west coast
of North America), between sodalities (e.g. the Lumpwoods and Foxes among the
Crow Indians of Montana), or between moieties (e.g. the town division among the
Creek Indians in south-eastern North America).
Factionalism can also be considered to differ from the expression of overt mech-
anisms of social control. Where a dominant sub-unit within the group punishes or levels
malevolent accusations at a subordinate group or individual in a manner which con-
tributes to the maintenance of the group and the success of the co-operative enterpri
the situation may resemble factionalism, but its results are quite different.
Factionalism thus differs from conflict between groups, party conflict, and the app
cation of overt social sanctions. It can be defined as overt, unregulated (unresolved) conf
which interferes with the achievement of the goals of the group. The isolation of factionali
as a particular type of conflict is not, however, intended to obscure the probable fac
that all forms of overt display of agressive behaviour are closely interrelated. Some
these interrelationships will be discussed later under the heading of strain.
Within the framework of the definition proposed above, it is possible to locate two
extremes of factionalism-schismatic and pervasive. Schismaticfactionalism is conflict be-
tween well defined and cohesive sub-groups within the larger group. Such conflict
would appear to be the result of a partial failure of mechanisms for resolving conflict
within the group. That is, there is a failure only of the mechanisms which tie together
the larger sub-units and conflict is restricted to a limited sphere. Examples of this might

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 CONFLICT AND FACTIONALIST DISPUTE IO9

be the American Civil War or the facti

factionalism is conflict which occurs not only between larger sub-units of the group, but
also within the sub-units. It reflects a failure, in most cases a partial failure, of mech-
anisms for resolving inter-personal conflict generally. Although similarities can be found
between pervasive factionalism and some aspects of 'anomie' or 'disintegration', a
conceptual distinction can be made, for factional conflict, whether pervasive or
schismatic, always involves a recognition of a need for preservation of the group. The
motivation underlying factional conflict is the re-establishment of the co-operative
venture. Factionalism is a disagreement over the means to be employed, not over the goal to
be achieved. The factional struggle is a struggle to punish or eliminate other members
of the group in such a way that the group can be reconstructed along the 'proper'
lines. The struggle is maintained in terms of the group and the value of group unity
or cohesiveness is never questioned.

STRESS OR SITUATIONAL FACTORS

Inasmuch as factionalism, in varying degree, appears to be characteristic of a broad

variety of human groups, it may prove worthwhile to examine some of the factors which
appear to be involved in the development of factionalism. First, consideration will be
given to those factors or forces external to the group which may play a role in its develop-
ment. These factors, for the purpose of the present exposition, will be labelled stress.
The concept of stress implies the existence of a dichotomy between the group viewed as
a system and the external environment. It also implies a continuity between the group
and the external environment. The view of a group and its culture in terms of stress is
taken from a position which reveals the group as neither a closed system nor a com-
pletely open system, but as a system which is always partially self-regulating and always
partially subject to external regulation. The group is viewed as a system within a larger
external system. At this point, it should be emphasized that the view of the group as a
partially self-regulating mechanism is not analogous to the view of the group as a servo-
mechanism or as an equilibrium seeking organization. After exposure to stress, the
group does not necessarily restore itself to its previous condition, and, when there is no
change in the external situation, groups actively seek to create changes. Human
motives of curiosity, exploration, and escape from boredom are all contrary to any
notion of a desire for, or automatic seeking of, equilibrium.
At the same time, the concept of equilibrium is a useful means of arriving at a defini-
tion of stress. Two systematically organized entities, the group and its situation or
environment can be imagined. As long as the interrelationships between these two en-
tities maintain a normal, patterned, and predictable character, the situation is incapable
of altering the normal behaviour of the group in any way. Change in the behaviour
of the group always implies changes in the relationship of the group and the situation.
Such changes, which can take place either as a result of problem seeking behaviour on
the part of the group or as a result of some change in the situation, are defined as stress.
Stress is any change in the group-situation relationship which has a finite efect upon the behaviour
of the group.
Stress is not necessarily any kind of thing which is perceived by the group. It is a
finite interruption of the group-situation relationship and has an impact upon the group

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 IIO BERNARD J. SIEGEL & ALAN R. BEALS

regardless of the nature of the group's perception of it. The effects of this impact are in
varying degree dependent upon the nature of the group and the nature of the group's
perceptions of the stress. Defined in such a way, stress implies the presence of an outside
observer whose perception of the nature of stress represents, theoretically at least, a closer
approximation to reality than can ordinarily be achieved by the group. For those who
consider reality to be definable only in terms of perception, stress can be regarded
as being the perception which would be entertained by the group if it had access to all r
information and could deal with it impartially.

DIMENSIONS OF STRESS

The finite nature of a stress can be described in terms of at least six dimensions:
covertness, randomness, complexity, duration, curtailment, and selectivity. The first fou
refer primarily to the finite perceptibility of the stress and the last two refer primarily
to the impact of the stress. Covertness can be defined as the relative ease with which a
stress may be perceived. A change in genotype would be more covert than a change in
phenotype; hookworm epidemics are more covert than whooping-cough epidemics. As
these examples suggest, 'absolute covertness', while it may exist, is greatly affected by
the nature of the aids to sensory perception available to a particular group. Micro-
scopes, hearing aids, and eyeglasses would greatly increase a group's potential ability to
render stress overt.
Randomness is closely linked to covertness and might be considered to be a part of it.
Randomness refers to the regularity with which a stress appears and could be expected
to have a direct effect upon the predictability of a stress and consequent effects upon
perceptibility. The daily reappearance of the sun, the periodical return of the tax
collector, and seasonal epidemics are far less random in nature than are thunder
showers or epidemics which are not seasonal.
Some kinds of stress present problems which can be solved in a few steps; others
present a large number of separate problems all of which must be solved before the stress
can be dealt with adequately. This dimension of stress is referred to here as complexity.
The problem presented by an unattached stranger, for example, would be far less com-
plex than the problem presented by a stranger who was an ambassador of a powerful
outside group.
Duration appears to have effects differing somewhat from those of covertness,
randomness, and complexity. These last three dimensions seem to be directly related
in more or less linear fashion to the perceptibility of a stress and to the ability of any
group to solve the stress. The relationship of duration to these factors is not easily
predicted. Very short duration would presumably make both resolution and perception
of stress difficult and could bar any kind of solution including a fantasy solution. A stress
of long duration would presumably be an unresolvable stress and would almost certainly
lead to the development of a fantasy solution.
The four dimensions listed above can be applied to situations in general. They are
relevant to a definition of stress only when curtailment occurs. Curtailment refers to the
impact of a stress-specifically, the extent to which the normal activities of the group
are limited or affected. A volcanic eruption or a famine would be highly curtailing while
a complicated crossword puzzle would rank low on curtailment. More than any other

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 CONFLICT AND FACTIONALIST DISPUTE III

dimension of stress, curtailment determines the group's possible choice of problem-

solving techniques, but it has no necessary effect upon solvability or perceptibility as do
the first four dimensions.
If duration is of sufficient length to permit adjustment to a stress and if covertness,
randomness, complexity, and curtailment are maximized, then it is expected that the
probability that the group would be incapable of finding a realistic solution to the
stress would be correspondingly increased. The maximization of these dimensions would
compel the group to choose 'unrealistic' solutions (i.e. solutions which do not remove the
stress or its undesired consequences), but in no way would they compel the group to
choose between factionalism, individualistic solutions, dissolution of the group, or
fantasy solutions. In other words, the maximation of these dimensions increases the
probability that factionalism will develop in the sense that they limit the group to
'unrealistic' problem solutions, only one of which is factionalism. The only exception
to this, which calls perhaps for a more detailed definition of curtailment, is a situation
in which dissolution of the group is prevented by the nature of the stress.
The sixth dimension, selectivity, stands out as the most important possible deter-
minant of factionalism. Selectivity is the extent to which a stress gives unequal treatment
to sub-units within the group. A highly selective stress would give different sub-units
different experiences of the stress. To the extent that these different experiences give
rise to differing perceptions of the stress and varying ideas conoerning possible solutions,
disagreements concerning the methods to be used in dealing with it could be expected.
When selectivity is of such a nature as to accentuate existing strains and cleavages
within the group, the group is compelled to choose between factionalism or individual-
istic solutions leading to dissolution. Even this choice may prove not to be a choice, for
some degree of factionalism may be a necessary antecedent to the individualistic
solutions.
Selectivity tends to have about it the appearance of purposiveness. Impersonal
stresses, such as famine, disease, catastrophe in the physical environment, and 'over-
population', evidently lack the kind of purposiveness which might make them selective.
It ig possible to find, as among the Kota where an epidemic selectively attacked the
religious structure (Mandelbaum I94I), examples of selectivity in impersonal stresses,
but such selectivity would appear to be on the whole improbable.
It is necessary in most cases to seek the source of selectivity in stresses which are
imposed by an outside group. Even here, a great many possible acculturative stresses
must be regarded as basically impersonal. Gradual diffusion of new values, beliefs, and
techniques would not ordinarily be selective in nature or particularly high on the other
dimensions of stress. Of somewhat more interest is the kind of situation where diffusion
appears to be almost calculated to accentuate internal strain. The introduction of highly
effective public health techniques without concurrent introduction of improved techno-
logies in other fields is almost certain to lead to 'over-population' and a maximization
of stress. Such an occurrence could accentuate existing cleavages when they proved to
be more advantageous to one social class than to another.
Situations of 'forced cultural change' are again not necessarily selective and may be
quite impersonal. Imprisonment on reservations, the prevention of emigration, the
forbidding of certain kinds of acculturation, the banning of head-hunting or the forced
H R.A.T. J.

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 II2 BERNARD J. SJEGEL & ALAN R. BEALS

introduction of Christianity carry with them no necessary implication of selectivity

and may even contribute to cohesiveness rather than reduce it. A highly overt stress is
not likely to be conducive to factionalism. On the other hand, it appears likely that
force need not be, in fact usually is not, applied in an impersonal manner.
It can be concluded that the situation most likely to lead to the development offactionalism
is one in which a dominant external society selectively influences the group in a manner whic
covert and which tends to accentuate existing cleavages within the group. While it would no
surprising if factionalism occurred under other conditions, we should ordinarily expect
to find it in acculturation situations where a subordinated group is being selectively
influenced by a group or groups capable of exercising high constraint over a consider-
able period of time in a covert, random, and complicated manner.

THE ROLE OF STRAIN IN SOCIAL SYSTEMS

Although the nature of stress may contribute greatly to the development of factionalism,
it is probable that stress alone cannot make the development of factionalism inevitable.
Under even the most extreme pressures of the kind most conducive to factionalism,
certain groups may not develop it. Other groups may develop factionalism under the
application of relatively mild stresses. This kind of differential response to external
stress appears to be traceable to the kind and variety of strains in a particular social
system. The word 'strain' is used here to refer to potential conflicts concerning acceptable tec
for the solution of either traditional problems or stresses.
However stable a social system may be, the norms of (or models for) conduct will
often accord differential satisfactions to sub-units of the group or impose dilemmas in
role-playing for which there are no clear-cut definitions of appropriate behaviour.
Firth, for example, records the case of a Tikopian man who found himself simul-
taneously in the position of kinsman to a bride and in affinal relationship to the groom.
Conflicting role responsibilities necessitated personal choice in this situation (Firth
I95I, pp. 57-6I). Role expectations and interaction between brothers in an East
Indian village may also involve strain when loyalty to the older brother comes into
conflict with other expectations of the younger. In the eastern pueblos of New Mexico,
authority relationships between generations are marked and generally effective, but
many young men give evidences of frustration and disagreement with the decisions with
which they feel they must ultimately comply. In general whenever individuals are
subjected to social sanctions for the wrong choice of response in such ambiguous or
unequally rewarding role-playing situations, the relationship can be considered to
involve strain. It could be said that the universal existence of punitive sanctions is
evidence for the existence of strain, for they would be unnecessary if sub-units within
the group were not placed in situations where appropriate behaviours were ambigu-
ously defined.
Similarly the existence of any kind of overt conflict can be taken as evidence of the
existence of strain. Where there are patterns of feud and warfare, the presence of an
external threat is frequently used as a mechanism to support powerful punitive sanctions
in the existing social system. The removal of the external threat then necessitates a
major reorientation. Where overt conflict exists between moieties or political parties
and is periodically resolved by means of overt social controls, the removal of these

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 CONFLICT AND FACTIONALIST DISPUTE II3

controls leads to the development of unregulated conflict. Hence, although overt

conflict may often have a functional value under certain conditions, a relatively minor
change in the nature of the stress to which the group is subjected will provoke major
changes in the social organization of the group.
Strains such as those described above reflect potential social cleavages inherent in
key role and group alignments. They appear to become functionally important when a
group is subjected to stress. Consequently an analysis of types of reaction to new prob-
lems posed for the group must take into account the interdependence of these factors.
Our feeling, based on this exploration into the subject, is that varying stress-strain
patterns will lead to different reaction tendencies. Our special concern here is to suggest
in hypothetical terms the particular patterns that are likely to eventuate in factionalism.
Initially, therefore, it will be necessary to designate recurrent classes of strains charac-
teristic of different social systems. We do not pretend to have exhausted these types, but
wish to suggest some of the types most frequently encountered in the anthropological
literature.
Taking as a point of departure the theoretical analysis of political systems provided
by Fortes & Evans-Pritchard (I 940), let us first consider lineage-clan or segmentary
systems. Societies of this kind tend to consist of a number of separate but equal unilineal
kinship segments with rights and duties similarly distributed among them. External
controls are weak or lacking, and conflict is regulated by jural and moral considerations
or by mutual group interest. A recurrent kind of tension in segmentary matrilineal
societies is derived from divided loyalties in the avunculo-matrilineal and paternal role
expectations of males. Residence norms and unilineal kin alignments in most of these
cases appear to involve uneasy compromises with the realities of developing emotional
ties. Such a situiation is described in Fortes' 'Time and Social Structure: An Ashanti
Case Study' (I949, pp. 54-84). Other sources of conflict may stem from within the
family or lineage where a headman or council may manipulate the conduct of others
or where quarrels occur between agnates. The potential lines of cleavage, then, are
between segments, kin ordinates, and affines.
A second kind of potential cleavage exists in communities where a common denomi-
nator of marked overt controls is generalized through family, religious, and political
alignments. Spanish American societies and most eastern pueblos in the south-western
United States are examples of this. Among the former, the male family head's relation-
ship to family members has a direct counterpart in the priest-follower and patron-
employee relationships. Conflict based on role frustrations is always possible in any
of these relationships and as a matter of fact nearly all appear to require the support
of actual or supernatural punitive sanctions.
Where rank differences play an important part in regulating conflict and in the
shaping and sharing of values, splits can occur where disagreement about role expecta-
tions, outlook, privileges, and responsibilities come to be openly expressed (see Bateson
I935, pp. I8I-3). Certain kinds of ranked interdependencies-particularly feudal,
quasi-feudal, and caste or caste-like systems-appear to be stable over rather long
periods of time. This can be attributed to the presence in such groups of a well-defined
hierarchy of power holders and the presence of reciprocating responsibilities linking
individuals in ranks above and below themselves. Barring the introduction of stresses,

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 II4 BERNARD J. SIEGEL & ALAN R. BEALS

latent schisms in such societies are likely to remain subordinated to shared feelings about
the common welfare.
Strain in general tends to make itself felt along lines of prescribed discrimination
in succession to rights, particularly rights to property or to positions in which decisions
are made. Conflict between brothers in East Indian villages appears to be derived from
this as did the fights for the throne in certain African and European kingdoms. Similarly
where the social distance between sub-units in the group is very great and the oppor-
tunities for upward mobility in the hierarchy of social ranks are minimal, tensions are
likely to be endemic. This is often the case in stratified societies in which several
intervening strata separate individuals at the top and bottom of the hierarchy and where
interaction tends to be formalized and infrequent.
As a final consideration, societies in which overt controls have a critical function in
supporting and regulating individual habit systems (internalized controls) face special
problems in maintaining the configuration of control. The same function appears to
be served by the kind of controls described by Adams in connexion with conflict in an
Egyptian village (Adams I957). There, conflict appears to be controlled by certain
overt cues embedded in a strict code of manners: tone pitch and voice melody, mien
and stereotyped gestures. Here, as where more overt punitive sanctions are mobilized,
sources of friction, of tension, and of cleavage in the social system tend to erupt in
increasing degree as overt controls become weakened. The efficiency of traditional
relationships is impaired and ego controls fail to inhibit expressions of conflict about
normative means for achieving agreed-upon goals.
It is precisely in such groups, especially when they are confronted with stresses
having the attributes of fairly long duration, covertness, complexity, curtailment, and
selectivity that pervasive factionalism occurs with striking regularity. Factionalism
appears to go hand in hand with the existence of an authority system supported by
strong overt punitive sanctions where the centralized authority is susceptible to the
threat of new allegiance (see also Firth I949, pp. I68-88).
On the other hand, as long as the normal range of alternatives appropriate to the
various life situations is not challenged by unusual circumstances, conventional ways of
handling strain will tend to suffice. Even though traditional techniques for solving
problems should prove inadequate for coping with stress, it is still possible that imported
or specially invented techniques can be applied in such a way that strains and cleavages
will not be accentuated. This appears to be true of the situations described by Hohenthal
& McCorkle (I955) of the many cases of formal substitution of cultural elements
without change in meaning such as the spread of Christian religious concepts or of
antagonistic acculturation (Loeb & Devereux I943).
When stress-induced exacerbations of strain are not resolved, other less adaptive
reactions tend to occur. In many cases these, occurring singly or together, may delay
or prevent the development of factionalism. For example, cumulative frustrations or
lack of consensus on decisions may lead certain individuals to leave the group. While
this may bring about change in the direction of involuting or reinforcing traditional
standards and patterns of control, it does not seriously disturb the cohesion or the
cultural orientations of those who remain. A related response may be a tendency to-
ward apathy and withdrawal from group affairs. Inability to act within the group may

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 CONFLICT AND FACTIONALIST DISPUTE II5

be evidenced by anomie, suicide, infanticide, a lowering of the birth rate, or an increase

in crime. In some cases older habits may be expressed at a much lower level of efficiency.
Strain and stress will be ignored by decreasing the intensity of interaction. Picuris
pueblo seems to be a case in point. Here the existence of strains is concealed through a
conspiracy of silence although it is apparent that deterioration in ability to handle
situations will increase unless the sources of strain are rooted out.
Individuals and groups unable to make realistic adaptations to environmental
threats and dangers may have recourse to fantasy. This can take the form of prophetic
or messianic cults or religious revitalization movements. There are numerous examples
of such tendencies. In all of these cases the social arrangements linked to actual or
perceived survival involve rigorous ritualistic or quasi-ritualistic submission to external
controls over behaviour.
Another type of reaction which may occur is what might be called malevolent accusa-
tion. This may include such behaviours as vicious gossip, chronic sorcery and witch-
craft, and the various kinds of scapegoat practices. It should be noted that these
behaviours can occur when overt controls have not been known to be strong (Eskimo,
Navaho), as well as in situations where once effective controls have been weakened as
in Zuni, Latin American mestizo or Eastern Pueblo communities. In general malevolent
accusation can be thought of as a device for justifying the failure of the group by placing
the blame on a small minority.
It is to be noted that all the maladaptive reactions to stress situations mentioned
above represent strains in the social system. Hence, although a stable social system can
be built (and most are) round such deferred solutions to internal strains or external
stresses, the presence of the artifacts of such deferred solutions render the group
increasingly likely to develop factionalism. For example, revitalistic movements with
their strong controls and tendency to encourage submissiveness often encounter severe
organizational difficulties when promised supernatural assistance is not provided.
Again, use of the technique of malevolent accusation leads to increasing social stratifica-
tion and the threat that the group accused of being at fault may ultimately reject the
goals of the group. The only maladaptive adjustment which would seem to preclude
factionalism would appear to be withdrawal leading to the dissolution of the group and
the abandonment of its goals. Ultimately it appears probable that factionalism will be
found to be a precursor of dissolution although factionalism is not necessarily followed b
dissolution.
Whether viewed as a step towards the dissolution of a group or as the end point
of a certain kind of interaction between stress and strain, factionalism appears to be
one of the more common maladaptive reactions to stress. When factionalism occurs,
potential antagonisms inherent in strains are magnified to a point where they become
publicly divisive and potential cleavages become sources of unregulated conflict. The
form that factionalism takes is dependent upon the particular nature of the social struc-
ture and its built-in strains and cleavages.

CONCLUSION

In this paper we have tried to explicate the dynamics of f

relationship to other forms of conflict resolution. Without attempting to develop a

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 I I6 BERNARD J. SIEGEL & ALAN R. BEALS

satisfactory theory of conflict, it is nevertheless possible to make the assumption from

available cross-cultural literature that dispute will originate round configurations of
rights and duties which define structural features of a society. Furthermore, as the
environmental context in which a social system functions is altered, behavioural
adaptations may take several forms as discussed above. It is argued that the particular
form taken will be a function of special relationships between stress (alterations in
pressures external to the system) and strain (sensitive points of potential disruption
within the system). Factionalist dispute is simply one of these, but it is a widespread
phenomenon-whether it occurs in an Indian village, an American Indian pueblo, an
African community, a labour Union, or a political party. We might expect, therefore,
that systematic comparative study of this process would provide a good opportunity
for securing insight into the nature of social systems.

NOTES

1 The argument for this paper was derived originally from an analysis of field w
Mysore State in southern India by A. Beals between March I952 and August I953, supported by the
Social Science Research Council; from field work by B. Siegel in Taos and Picuris pueblos during the
summers of I947 and I957; and from a project on the Codification of Acculturation Phenomena con-
ducted at Stanford University with an initial grant by the Wenner-Gren Foundation and the Stanford
Committee for Research in the Social Sciences.
2 Observations of this sort, when our knowledge is more adequate, may bear upon newer approaches
to the nature of evolution. Simpson, for example, points out that many parts of the world which have
changed little over great time spans are filled with very ancient forms of life, and that newer, more
complex forms do not tend to displace them unless clearly more adaptive to such life-spaces. Similarly
it is probable that certain forms of society and culture are viable within given environmental limits
(both human and physical), but may be displaced by more adaptive forms under environmental change.
See G. G. Simpson, The Meaning of Evolution, chapter 9; Julian Huxley, 'Evolution Cultural and Biolo-
gical', in W. L. ThomasJr. (ed.), rearbook of Anthropology (I955); also B.J. Siegel (I955).
3 Factionalism has been reported and described variously in India. Lewis's study (I954) appears to
deal with schismatic factionalism. Firth (I957) has drawn together a symposium of papers which de-
scribe adequately the operation of pervasive factionalism as it occurs in various Indian and overseas
societies. They do not provide, however, any explanatory analysis. The writers have also examined
relative case materials from the Marshall Islands (Tobin I953); Isleta Pueblo (French I948); the Skagit
of north-western North America (Collins I952); and Jamaica (Kerr I952) which describe variously
schismatic and pervasive factionalism without actually identifying the phenomena.

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