Fichte developed his philosophy of German Idealism in response to Kant. He rejected Kant's concept of the "thing-in-itself" and asserted that reality is constructed by thought and consciousness alone. For Fichte, the self or "I" is the ultimate reality, and all knowledge comes from self-awareness and the subject-object identity within consciousness. Fichte aimed to demonstrate through his "doctrine of knowledge" or Wissenschaftslehre that infinite intelligence is the ground of all being through thought and reason alone.
Fichte developed his philosophy of German Idealism in response to Kant. He rejected Kant's concept of the "thing-in-itself" and asserted that reality is constructed by thought and consciousness alone. For Fichte, the self or "I" is the ultimate reality, and all knowledge comes from self-awareness and the subject-object identity within consciousness. Fichte aimed to demonstrate through his "doctrine of knowledge" or Wissenschaftslehre that infinite intelligence is the ground of all being through thought and reason alone.
Fichte developed his philosophy of German Idealism in response to Kant. He rejected Kant's concept of the "thing-in-itself" and asserted that reality is constructed by thought and consciousness alone. For Fichte, the self or "I" is the ultimate reality, and all knowledge comes from self-awareness and the subject-object identity within consciousness. Fichte aimed to demonstrate through his "doctrine of knowledge" or Wissenschaftslehre that infinite intelligence is the ground of all being through thought and reason alone.
Before one goes on to explain what Fichte understands by self-consciousness, self-awareness, one has to look at German Idealism. German Idealism was a philosophical movement which was centered in Germany during the period of enlightenment in the late 18th and early 19th century. This movement basically developed out of the works of Immanuel Kant. Apart from Kant, the other thinkers who contributed to German Idealism, had all been influenced by Kant and their philosophies reflected to a great extent their agreement or disagreement with Kant. One amongst those thinkers was Johann Gottlieb Fichte, apart from Hegel, Schelling and many others. The German idealists were not satisfied with the idealism that had been put forward by Berkley and Kant did try to bridge rationalism and empiricism, when he put forward his transcendental idealism. Transcendental Idealism claimed that one knows more than ideas in one’s minds and that we do know about the actual phenomena which we perceive but which are not necessarily real, and we can never know how things are in themselves or Noumena. German philosophers at that time used Kant’s works as a starting point and added their own interpretations and Fichte was one among them. Fichte went on to assert that he did not agree with Kant’s concept of a Noumenon or thing in itself, and this became the point of departure and the beginning of his own thought. Fichte held that Kant’s concept of thing in itself which we can never know but whose existence Kant went on to affirm was basically a dogmatic position and he decided that he would simply do away with the concept of Noumenon and instead assert that consciousness does not have grounding in a so-called real world. Fichte actually got a lot of recognition for arguing/stating that the consciousness, self-awareness is not dependent on anything outside of itself. Thus, for Fichte, the ultimate reality is something the conscious subject recognizes spontaneously. Further, the self can not only know the ultimate reality which is within itself and this led to what is termed as knowing self- observation or Fichte’s system – the Wissenschaftslehre or the doctrine of knowledge. One must know however that this is not the title of one book, rather, it is the name of his life-long project which he introduced in 1794 and went on to give more than 10 different versions. As stated in the article, Fichte in the second person focuses on the idea that all our consciousness is conditioned or determined by our immediate consciousness. He begins by thinking how one is able to think “I” and as soon as one does this, one discovers that one’s consciousness is determined internally in a manner whereby we try to understand what we would like to put under the concept of “I”. Fichte, while addressing the readers is not concerned with what one may have included in the concept “I” than what he may have thought about. All that he is focusing on is that when one is engaged in an act of thinking where one moves from the thinking of the eye, to thinking about the chair or table, one is immediately able to note the activity and the freedom. In other words, the individual is immediately aware of how one has made a jump to how one is acting when one is thinking of something. Here, Fichte is emphasizing that how thinking is an acting, and when one thinks of some specific thing, one acts in a specific manner. His doctrine of knowledge basically is to be understood that not only Fichte believed himself to be Kantian yet his views were different from that of Kant. Fichte, as stated earlier, rejected the concept of thing in itself but how the world is to be looked at. As he rejected the thing in itself, Fichte has to give a metaphysical account of the world and according to him, one can do this simply by understanding the nature of thought or reason. In other words, Fichte sees all reality as the product of thought. As Fichte regarded reality as the product of thought or the “I”, the aim of Wissenschaftslehre is to demonstrate that the ground of all beings is an infinite intelligence. Fichte is not wanting to explain why anything exists at all, rather he wants to answer the question how can we have knowledge of the external world and tis is dependent on Fichte’s view of self-consciousness. Fichte’s self-consciousness is characterized by the subject-object identity. Fichte in chapter one of the fourth installment of an attempt at a new presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre asks the reader what they understand by “I”. He points out how we are conscious when we are thinking of “I” and how he is not concerned with what one may have included in the concept “I”. His concern is whether the concept of “I” is inclusive of what Fichte by “I”. He goes on to explain that how when one is thinking and when one is engaged in the act of thinking, one may say for example thinking of the table and how one is aware of the activity of one is immediately conscious when one is thinking. Here, Fichte is asserting that thinking is like acting because whenever we think of some specific object we act in a specific manner. Then, his task is to focus on how one is to proceed when one thinks I (self-conscious/self-awareness). Here, Fichte elaborates what he thinks is involved in this particular thought “I”. He states how when we are thinking of the table or our wall, we are involved as a thinking subject who is involved in this act of thinking and thereby, we made a distinction between the thinking subject and what we thought of. “In short the thinking subject and what is thought of are two distinct things.” In contrast, when you redirect and think of yourself, you are not only the thinking subject but you are also that about which you are thinking. Therefore, the subject and object of thinking are one and the same. Thus, Fichte states that the concept of the “I” simply involves acting upon itself and nothing more. When our thinking turns back upon your own self as the thinking subject, this concept of self-reverting simply demonstrates what the “I” stands for. It is this method of self-reverting that Fichte is following in his enquiry. “The only “I” that I am is concerned with here is the one that comes into being through the sheer self-reverting act of your own thinking.” While stressing that his focus is only on what immediately appears within my consciousness or the concept of I, Fichte is stating that he is not concerned with any being the “I” may have. Fichte adds the phrase for the “I” to criticize Descartes by stating how he has stated one had to exist in order to think. According to Fichte, he went on to postulate an existence one’s own self that was independent of thinking and if one can exist before one can actually think this argument seems redundant. After Fichte postulated the self-positing “I” as the explanatory ground of all experience, he went on what exactly the construction of self-positing “I” involved. The “I”, so far as Fichte explains is aware of itself not only as an object but also as a subject which is free and it becomes aware of a difference between representations of objective world from our representations of it, and representations that are a product of our own mental activity. The point Fichte here is making is that although the “I” is free, yet it somehow comes to posit itself as limited by something other than itself and these limitations hinder its activity. He next asks his reader that he must pay attention to what he focused on in the enquiry when he paid attention to yourself. This attentiveness, thinking of yourself was something which was common as a subjective element between the reader and Fichte. The reason Fichte is emphasizing on this act of attending to self-positing is because unless one understands this, Fichte asserts one would not be able to understand his theory which is based upon this. Therefore, he asks the reader to guide him and place Fichte close to what he is going to observe. Fichte, then, goes on to explain why he has issues regarding how consciousness has been accounted for by Philosophers. They went on to distinguish in every consciousness the subject and the object, which means that we are conscious of ourselves as a subject and of something that is aware -- the object. According to Fichte, one can never fully understand consciousness in such a manner. Therefore, he does away with the subject object distinction and states: "There is a type of consciousness in which what is subjective and what is objective...are absolutely one and the same." As Fichte explains that the consciousness he is talking about the subjective and the objective are united. However, how will one represent this? In other words, one is conscious of one's own thinking and this self-consciousness, which is immediate, is often referred to in scientific terms as 'Intuition'. For Fichte, the fact that self-consciousness is the same as being conscious of one's own thinking is important to be understood for that is what forms the basis of the system that he's presenting in the Wissenschaftslehre. Thus, according to Fichte, unless one has understood this unity between the subject and the object, one will fail to understand what consciousness is. Therefore, any Philosophy which does not do this would be superficial and incomplete. Thus, Fichte's focus is on the "I", the intuition, the self-positing, the awareness and here he criticizes Kant, without taking his name, by stating that the most famous Philosopher had asserted the existence of a thing, which continued to exist independently of consciousness. The reason Fichte is critical is because, in his opinion, if one cannot talk about anything of which we are not conscious, will amount to saying that we are talking of something without knowing anything about it; and further, whatever we are aware or conscious of cannot be conditioned or determined by some determinate object. Thus, as Fichte states, one is talking of Transcendental idealism, but where the intellect is self-intuiting itself. He prefers to use the term "I would" or the "self" reverting activity. For Fichte, the word "self" presupposes the concept of "I". Fichte states how one discovered yourself in the act of representing an object and in the act representing yourself, and how the mind was active in both these representations. As Fichte had asked the reader to think of "your table, your wall" and the reader had successfully succeeded in producing the thoughts of those objects, Fichte asked the reader to "think of yourself and pay special attention to this act of thinking". For the reader to focus on the act of thinking, the reader had to distance itself from the contemplative state and refocus on the act of thinking. Fichte says that all that he can do is to try and make you understand through your own inner intuition, to focus on something that can exist only within you. Fichte, here, is explaining that how through the process of self-reverting, the reader understood the meaning of the term "I", and once the meaning was understood, how your thinking was also involved in your activity and thus, through the process of self-reverting activity, you were able to grasp "I". "The concept of "I" is the self-reverting activity, grasped as something stable and enduring." Thus, for Fichte, it is only through this self-reverting activity, which he terms as 'intuition', that "I" as active and "I" as the object of my activity coincide. Hence, Fichte explains in the fourth published installment of "Wissenschaftslehre" his understanding of consciousness.