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Can Science Be An Art
Can Science Be An Art
Epistemology as the Vehicle for a Trip from Science to Art and Back
Author(s): John Stewart
Source: Leonardo, Vol. 22, No. 2 (1989), pp. 255-261
Published by: The MIT Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1575240
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Can Science Be an Art?
Epistemology as the Vehicle for a
John Stewart
? 1989 ISAST
Pergamon Presspic.PrintedinGreatBritain.
0024-094X/89$3.00+0.00 LEONARDO, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 255-261,1989 255
laboratory [5]. Lack of space pre- when a social consensus emerges, and this. Consider the extension of critical
cludes going into details here: the this in turn is likely to happen when- epistemology to knowledge in general
crux of the matter is that whenever a ever a hypothesis functions reliably as and to our perceptions in daily life in
social consensus emerges according to though there were a perfect two-way particular. As Gombrich has so aptly
which a hypothesis is 'true', the hy- correspondence between representa- remarked [8], in real-life situations we
pothesis (formulated on the basis of a tion and reality. The catch, of course, act first and think afterwards. If we
priori conceptual categories) under- lies in the 'as though'; the apparent were rash enough to try to keep a 'cor-
goes a metamorphosis and becomes a 'correspondence' is always essentially rect' critical attitude constantly in the
'fact'. There are actually two stages in contingent, being dependent on the forefront of our consciousness, we
this transformation. Firstly, the hy- strictly local context within which would be completely hamstrung. We
pothesis projects a twin image of itself various actors, complete with all their would constantly be assailed by doubts
into the 'real world out there'; and this fears, hopes, attitudes and motiva- about the wisdom of trying to go
twin, absolutely identical in every re- tions, put the hypothesis to practical through a doorway or to climb a stair-
spect with the terms of the hypothesis, use. This contingent locality is re- case, or even of getting out of bed in
takes on an independent existence in vealed by the observation that follow- the morning. When it comes to prac-
the form of a real object. Secondly, the ing a shift in the context of use, often tical action, there simply is no sensible
relationship between hypothesis and but not necessarily accompanied by alternative to common-sense realism.
object undergoes an inversion. Ini- new experiments and observations, a The result is that the would-be lessons
tially it was the hypothesis that gave 'fact' can turn back into a 'hypothesis' of critical epistemology, expressed as
rise to the object; but, rapidly, more and even perish as an 'artefact'[6]. they are in abstract, intellectual terms,
and more reality is attached to the ob- The history of science is quite littered make virtually no impression on us.
ject and less and less to the hypotheti- with examples of established 'facts' And yet common-sense realism is an
cal statement about the object, until that have been overturned by subse- illusion; and for reasons that I shall ex-
the point is reached where the object quent theories. (In twentieth-century plain shortly I think it is a pity to im-
becomes the cause of the hypothesis. physics, examples include the belief prison ourselves by believing in it un-
In practice, the conjuring trick is per- that the structure of physical space reservedly. The question is, of course,
formed so neatly that the sleight of corresponds exactly to that of three- whether anything can be done about
hand is imperceptible and no one dimensional Euclidean geometry; the it.
really notices what has happened. In belief that two events separated in
other words, we arrive at... common- space either are or are not simultane-
sense realism. ous, independent of any motion on ART
It is important to realise that this de- the part of the observer; and the belief
I shall state immediately the central
scription of howthe metamorphosis of that any object possesses both an exact
thesis of this section, to wit: art, by im-
hypothesis into 'fact' occurs in no way position and an exact momentum; to
amounts to an epistemological justifi- plementing the main insights of criti-
say nothing of the oscillation between cal epistemology in an immediately ef-
cation. The metamorphosis occurs corpuscular and wave theories of the fective way, provides us with a valuable
nature of light. Chemistry, geology
antidote to the illusion of common-
Fig. 1. John Stewart, Two silhouettesor a and biology of course furnish their
white vase?, ink on paper, 5.5 x 4.9 in, sense realism.
own examples.) In other words, the
1987. This classic example of figure- It will be well to start this section
metamorphosis of hypothesis into with an explanation of why I think the
ground reversal provides a particularly
clear illustration of perceptual 'switch- 'fact' is reversible. But as Feyerabend
illusion of common-sense realism is a
ing'. It is instructive to register mentally has pointed out [7], this means that
the switching from one perceptual mode the metamorphosis cannot be deter- pity. It is not that I have a puritanical
to the other and to exercise conscious mined by any valid set of methodologi- objection to illusion or error as such.
control over the process. Although it is It is rather that when we are under the
cal rules, because in that case the
possible to increase the frequency of spell of the particular illusion of
metamorphosis would neverbe revers- common-sense realism, when we
switching, it is rigorously impossible to be ible in this way.We are forced back on
in both modes at the same time. believe that we perceive reality itself
the conclusion that the belief in real-
ism (which is nothing other than the directly as it is, this not only bars us
from actual access to alternate modes
psychological dimension of the trans- of perception, it blinds us to the very
formation of hypothesis into 'fact') is
indeed an illusion. possibility that other modes of percep-
tion could exist. To make myself clear,
I come now to a key point in my
I will put forth a major metaphysical
argument. We have just seen that
common-sense realism is essentially postulate (which I cannot strictlyjus-
an illusion. However, what we also tify other than offering it as a value
need to realise is that it is an illusion judgement): I believe that 'reality' is
from which there is no practical infinitely richer and more diverse than
any single representation (or set of
escape. Whenever a representation or
mode of perception functions reliably, representations) that we human be-
it is humanly impossible to avoid fal- ings are capable of constructing. If this
is so, then it is indeed an impoverish-
ling into the trap of believing that we ment to imprison ourselves within the
do perceive reality directly as it is. I
limits of a single mode of perception;
cannot emphasize too strongly that
and the pity is redoubled if we are not
there are sound practical reasons for