G.R. No.

157053               August 19, 2003

ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Petitioner, vs.

IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his
capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information
Office, Respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

FACTS:

This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the July 5, 2000
issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads: "ANNULMENT OF
MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-2667."

Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme
Court, called up the published telephone number and pretended to be an interested party. She
spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert
in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within four to six months,
provided the case will not involve separation of property or custody of children. Mrs.
Simbillo also said that her husband charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the
time of filing of the case and the other half after a decision thereon has been rendered. It
appears that similar advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the
Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine Star.

On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court
Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office, filed an administrative
complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of
his legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.

Respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that advertising and solicitation per
se are not prohibited acts; that the time has come to change our views about the prohibition
on advertising and solicitation; that the interest of the public is not served by the absolute
prohibition on lawyer advertising; that the Court can lift the ban on lawyer advertising; and that
the rationale behind the decades-old prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be
exonerated from all the charges against him and that the Court promulgate a ruling that
advertisement of legal services offered by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and
public order as long as it is dignified.

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation. On June 29, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution
No. XV-2002-306, finding respondent guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court, and
suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year with the warning that a repetition
of similar acts would be dealt with more severely. Respondent filed an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration,  which was denied by the IBP, hence, the instant petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Simbillo is guilty for the violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01, Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Sec. 27, Rules of Court. (YES)

HELD:

The Court agrees with the IBP’s Resolutions, that the ruling applies to respondent.

Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility reads:

Rule 2.03. – A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit
legal business.

Rule 3.01. – A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or
legal services.

Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. – A

member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.

It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in
which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not
primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that
necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration. 

The following elements distinguish the legal profession from a business:

1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one
may attain the highest eminence without making much money;
 2. A relation as an "officer of the court" to the administration of justice involving
thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability;

3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;

4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness

to resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice,
or dealing directly with their clients.

Respondent admits that he caused the publication of the advertisements. Eight months after filing
his answer, he again advertised his legal services in the issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads
Newspaper. Ten months later, he caused the same advertisement to be published.

What adds to the gravity of respondent’s acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled
"Annulment of Marriage Specialist,". He is assuring prospective clients that an annulment
may be obtained in four to six months from the time of the filing of the case,  he in fact
encourages people, who might have otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained from
dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.

Solicitation of legal business is not forbidden, however, for solicitation to be proper, it must be
compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. (What are allowed:) Thus, the (1) use of
simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office and residence address and
fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are
permissible. (2) Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the
lawyer’s name and the names of his professional associates. (3) The law list must be a reputable
law list published primarily for that purpose. (4) The use of an ordinary simple professional card
is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm
which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced.

Respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. He is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this
Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
offense will be dealt with more severely.
G.R. No. 202666               September 29, 2014

RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA, Petitioners,

vs.
ST. THERESA'S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN
DOES, Respondents.

VELASCO, JR., J.:

FACTS:

In January 2012, Angela Tan, a high school student at St. Theresa’s College (STC), uploaded on
Facebook several pictures of her and her classmates (Nenita Daluz and Julienne Suzara)
wearing only their undergarments. Thereafter, some of their classmates reported said photos to
their teacher, Mylene Escudero. Escudero, through her students, viewed and downloaded said
pictures. Escudero reported the matter and, through one of her student’s Facebook page, showed
the photos to Kristine Rose Tigol (Tigol), STC’s Discipline-in-Charge, for appropriate action.
STC found Tan et al to have violated the student’s handbook, to wit: . possession of alcoholic
drinks outside the school campus, engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene or lewd acts, smoking
and drinking alcoholic beverages in public places, apparel that exposes the underwear, clothing
that depicts obscenity; contains sexually suggestive messages and posing and uploading pictures
on the Internet that entail ample body exposure. As part of their penalty, the school banned
them from “marching” in their graduation ceremonies scheduled in March 2012.
Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares, mother of Nenita, and the other mothers filed a petition for the
issuance of the writ of habeas data against the school. They prayed that STC be ordered to
surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of the subject data and have such
data be declared illegally obtained in violation of the children’s right to privacy.

The RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for habeas data. Petitioners failed to
prove the existence of an actual or threatened violation of the minors’ right to privacy, one of the
preconditions for the issuance of the writ of habeas data. The photos having been uploaded on
Facebook without restrictions as to who may view them, lost their privacy in some way. STC
gathered the photographs through legal means and for a legal purpose, that is, the
implementation of the school’s policies and rules on discipline. Not satisfied with the outcome,
petitioners now come before this Court pursuant to Section 19 of the Rule on Habeas Data.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy
in the life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in this case. (NO)
HELD:

The concept of privacy has, through time, greatly evolved, with technological advancements
having an influential part therein. This evolution was briefly recounted in former Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno’s speech, The Common Right to Privacy, where he explained the three
strands of the right to privacy, viz: (1) locational or situational privacy; (2) informational
privacy; and (3) decisional privacy. Of the three, what is relevant to the case at bar is the right to
informational privacy––usually defined as the right of individuals to control information about
themselves. With the availability of numerous avenues for information gathering and data
sharing nowadays, not to mention each system’s inherent vulnerability to attacks and intrusions,
there is more reason that every individual’s right to control said flow of information
should be protected and that each individual should have at least a reasonable expectation
of privacy in cyberspace.

Since gaining popularity, the online social network(OSN) phenomenon has paved the way to the
creation of various social networking sites, including the one involved in the case at bar,
www.facebook.com (Facebook). To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its
purpose, Facebook was armed with different privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility
of a user’s profile as well as information uploaded by the user. In H v. W, the South Gauteng
High Court recognized this ability of the users to “customize their privacy settings. It is through
the availability of said privacy tools that many OSN users are said to have a subjective
expectation that only those to whom they grant access to their profile will view the
information they post or upload thereto.

Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her Online Social Networking (OSN)
activity, it is first necessary that said user, in this case the children of petitioners, manifest
the intention to keep certain posts private, through the employment of measures to prevent
access thereto or to limit its visibility. And this intention can materialize in cyberspace through
the utilization of the OSN’s privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is
the manifestation, in cyber world, of the user’s invocation of his or her right to
informational privacy.

Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is “Public,” it can be surmised that the
photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that
petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If such were the case,
they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational privacy.

As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the sanctioned students’
Facebook friends, respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion
since it was the minors’ Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were
mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means of
gathering the information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had
legitimate access to the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the minors.
Curiously enough, however, neither the minors nor their parents imputed any violation of
privacy against the students who showed the images to Escudero.

In finding that respondent STC and its officials did not violate the minors' privacy rights, the
Court find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and case disposition of the court a quo.
The petition for the writ of habeas data by Rhonda Vivares is hereby DENIED. The
Decision dated July 27, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City in SP. Proc.
No. 19251-CEB is hereby AFFIRMED.