Every second counts...

Isle of Wight Council

Delegated Decision to
Transfer of the
Isle of Wight Fire Control Centre
to Surrey Fire & Rescue Service

Fire Won’t Wait

Why Should YOU?
www.firewontwait.com
Consultation
For a major communications
project, this has been lacking:
• Monday 21 September 2010:
Councillors and public given 24
hours notice of intention to include
proposal to transfer IW Fire Control
to Surrey, with ‘Paper B’ added just
24 hours before the Full Council
Meeting.
• Tuesday 22 September 2010:
Full Council Meeting; IW Councillors
vote for a delegated decision.
• Friday 15 April 2011: Fire Control
Business Case published by the Isle
of Wight Council/Isle of Wight Fire
& Rescue Service.
• Friday 15 April 2011: Public had
just 10 working days to comment on
proposal via their Councillors.
• However, with four bank holidays
and two weekends during this period,
they had just five working days to
comment by Tuesday 26 April
2011.
• Tuesday 3 May 2011: Delegated
decision made by Cllr Barry Abraham,
IW Council cabinet member.
• August/September 2011: Transfer
of the Isle of Wight Fire Control
Centre to Reigate, Surrey (Surrey Fire
& Rescue Service) is due to take place
(at the time of going to print).
There is no evidence that ‘Stakeholders’
(general public, firefighters, unions, media,
partner agencies, voluntary organisations,
businesses, schools, emergency services,
Parish Councils, Town Councils etc.) have
been consulted, on the transfer, through a
structured, auditable and open process.
Key Audiences and Stakeholders
‘To ensure we most fully
understand the needs of the diverse
communities we serve, we will
closely engage and communicate
with relevant audiences in our
communities...’
6.1 Communicate and consult
with all stakeholders.
6.4 Continually consult and
seek the views, opinions and
involvement of stakeholders in
order to deliver improvements
and make the island safer.
source:
Isle of Wight Fire & Rescue Service Communications
and Engagement Strategy 2011-2012
published 19 April 2011
‘They have made the decision
anyway, before they get anyone’s
opinion!
It is such a stupid idea, how can
it make the response time quicker,
we’ll have to spell everything out to
someone in Surrey and then explain
excactly where it is, as I have had to
do when I phoned the police about
a burglary in Adgestone.
We are an island and things are
different here, we need to be kept
separate.’
Judith Roberts
posted 5 May 2011 on
facebook.com/fbufirewontwait
Public &
Firefighter Safety
• Mis-mobilisations (wrong address,
therefore wrong fire appliance),
resulting in unnecessary emergency
blue-light driving, increasing the risk to
other road users and firefighters alike,
as well as diversion and availability of
fire service resources.
• Surrey Fire Control Operators will
be without local knowledge - the loss
of valuable local knowledge in an
emergency control.
• Delay in response due to inevitable
longer call taking times leads to more
developed and serious incidents
increasing the risk for the Isle of Wight
public, businesses, visitors and Island
firefighters alike.
• Surrey call takers, who DO NOT have
local knowledge will therefore need to
ask more questions of the caller to try
and confirm the correct location of the
incident, thereby extending the call
taking time.
‘I know my own postcode and
address, and the name of some of
the roads on the Island, but mostly
I just know where I am.
How am I supposed to describe to
someone in Surrey just where I am if
I am in need of a fire appliance?
I don’t think something like
“the crossroads just north of the
Brownrigg farm on the way to
Niton” will cut it, do you?’
Annie
posted 4 May 2011 on ventnorblog.com
Risks
Fire Control Business Case,
published 15 April 2011:
18 uncontrolled risks identified
10 high/very high risks
6 medium risks
2 low risks
VERY HIGH RISK:
Poor transfer damages
reputation of the
Isle of Wight
Fire & Rescue Ser vice.
HIGH RISK:
System failure exacerbating
death or injur y.
source: Annex E of Appendix A ,
Fire Control Business Case
published by the Isle of Wight Council/
Isle of Wight Fire & Rescue Service, April 2011
1,800 plus
signatories (collected over five weeks
from 14 March 2011) on the ongoing
‘Save the Isle of Wight Fire Control
Centre’ petition submitted to Cllr
Abraham on 27 April 2011.
This shows strong public opinion
against the transfer of the Isle of
Wight Fire Control Centre to the
mainland.
100 plus
serving Isle of Wight Fire & Rescue
Service staff sign the petition,
including firefighters (wholetime,
retained and control), officers and
civilian staff.
Technical 30km radius:
It has been stated that automated caller
location technology will outperform
and compensate for the loss of vital
local knowledge. 42km/26
42km/26 miles
miles

• Automated caller location technology

only assists with call handling; it
does NOT replace local knowledge,
30km/19miles
which is vital for accurate and timely accuracy of
emergency call-taking. automated caller
location technology
• Automated caller location technology in rural areas
CANNOT locate callers not at an
incident, inter-emergency services,
inter-agency, VoIP or emergency
roamer calls. source:
Four major U.K. mobile phone network providers
• Triangulation of mobile phone

signals frequently locates calls in
the Solent or English Channel for
Isle of Wight land based calls. Local
knowledge ensures these calls are dealt
with accurately and quickly by staff in
the Isle of Wight Fire Control Centre.
• Isle of Wight Firefighters may have
local knowledge on the fire appliance,
BUT if they are given the incorrect
address, incident location or incident
information by the Surrey Fire Control
operator, then the local knowledge
possessed by the Isle of Wight
Firefighters on the fire appliance is all
but useless.
40 minutes
recorded and reported time taken
to locate a semi-conscious caller
in Gloucestershire via her mobile
phone signal; initial 4km radius
accuracy for automated caller
location technology.
‘This is Gloucestershire’
26 January 2011
source:
http://www.thisisgloucestershire.co.uk/news/
Paramedics-tracked-woman-mobile-phone-signal/
article-3143165-detail/article.html

‘There’s no sense in a controller in Surrey trying to work out where a call is

coming from when its somebody who is frightened and confused on the other
end.
LOCAL KNOWLEDGE SAVES LIVES.’
Dave Quigley
posted 28 March 2011 on facebook.com/fbufirewontwait
 Plan to pinpoint
VoIP 999 calls
“fraught with
problems”
‘There is still no easy way to ensure
emergency calls over VoIP are geo-
taggable, according to ISP Timico.
That could cause a major safety
issue as more homes and businesses
move to VoIP telephony.
Ofcom confirmed to PC Pro that it
had commissioned research company
Analysys Mason to review the
technical feasibility of ensuring 999
calls made over VoIP services could
be accurately positioned.
This solution stems really from
network architectures familiar to large
telcos and my first reaction is that it is
very expensive.
Unlike landline calls, which can be
positioned by the physical start point
of the call, VoIP calls are far harder to
pinpoint, which means ambulances
[and other emergency services] might
not easily be able to locate victims if
there was confusion over an address.
However, any solution is likely to be
expensive and unwieldy, according to
Trefor Davies, CTO of Timico.’
pcpro.co.uk, 13 April 2011
source:
http://www.pcpro.co.uk/news/366760/plan-to-
pinpoint-voip-999-calls-fraught-with-problems
The
Golden
Hour
It has long been established
within the medical and emergency
services that ‘The Golden Hour’ is
imperitive to the trauma care of
seriously injured patients:
‘Trauma is the leading cause of death in the first
four decades of life within modern industrialized
countries.
Death from trauma has a trimodal distribution:
1. within seconds to minutes,
2. minutes to hours (GOLDEN HOUR),
3. several days or weeks after the initial injury.
Trauma cuts across the entire field of medicine,
requiring the physician to have a broad
knowledge base of treatment principles and an
appreciation for multiple varieties of injury. An
organized consistent approach to the trauma
patient affords an optimal outcome.
The Advanced Trauma Life Support (ATLS)
Course was developed in Nebraska and soon
adopted by the American College of Surgeons
in 1979. The primary focus of ATLS is on the
first hour of trauma management, when rapid
assessment and resuscitation can be carried out
to reduce deaths within the Golden Hour.’
source:
http://www.trauma.org/archive/anaesthesia/initialassess.
html
Any delay or inaccuracy in the
emergency call taking procedure
and subsequent arrival of the Fire &
Rescue Service could have serious
implications for the trauma care of
those seriously injured at incidents.
Alternatives
Other alternatives have not
been fully investigated and
costed.
Only one option has been
investigated and costed (i.e. transfer
to Surrey Fire & Rescue Service).
There is no evidence that other
options to work with other Fire
& Rescue Services or emergency
services have been fully investigated
and costed.
• Isle of Wight Ambulance Service to
open a new emergency control centre
in Newport, Isle of Wight, Summer
2011. This option would allow for:
• Shared facilities, some systems and
technology/costs.
• Joint and new ways of working
between Island emergency services.
• Retain local knowledge and
experience within the Isle of Wight
Fire Control of the building.
• Very resilient, especially if coupled
with a ‘buddy’ Fire and Rescue
Service control from outside of the
geographical area as a back-up.
• Works very effectively and efficiently
in the Isle of Man, Jersey and Guernsey,
as well as a tri-service control in
Gloucester.
• Like other options, this option has
not been fully investigated, costed nor
reported upon.
Tri-service:
A colleague from the tri-service
control in Gloucester explains
the benefits:
• How does it saves costs?
‘There are cost savings in having a shared
building, only one lot of utility payments,
savings of scale, a common ICCS, only
one set of rates etc.
• Joint working:
This has been the biggest positive of the
Tri-Service environment. There is a much
better flow of information between the
Controls as a result of sharing the building,
and a much better understanding of each
others roles. Whilst we still transfer initial
calls via phone for audit purposes, there is
a lot of face to face communication which
prevents some of the misunderstandings
that used to occur.
• Mobilising systems:
In the early days, we were all going to use
the same system (Steria Storm), but were
unable to get this to work for Fire. Police
and Ambulance did use the Storm system,
but since moving to a regional trust the
Ambulance have moved onto their own
system.
• Resilience:
The building is very resilient in terms of
power supplies and alternate routings for
telephone lines and comms generally. All
three services have their own independent
fall back arrangements.
• Local knowledge:
This is retained by all three services
and used on a day to day basis. Having
a large number of people in the work
environment means that a wider breadth
of local knowledge is present across all
three services if required.
• Efficiencies:
• Improvement over single service/
individual controls and in what way?
Yes. We have access to information and
equipment we never had before (Air
Ambulance/ Police Helicopter Camera
footage and CCTV are 2 examples). As
indicated earlier, there is better exchange
of information relating to incidents. From
a staff wellbeing point of view, there are a
wider variety of social contacts and outlets
available and a busier and more vibrant
environment.
• Technical complexity?
I can’t really comment on this, but any
project of this nature is going to be
technically complex. How complex will
depend on what approach is taken to
shared systems.
• Technology - EISEC, BOSS, AVLS -
how effective, reliable, faults, enhancing
the call taking process or just an aid to call
taking?
We currently have EISEC available
through our ICCS. It is a useful aid to
calltaking. We have no AVLS ourselves
currently, but having the ability to
see Ambulance locations is useful in
determining locations of incidents and
establishing ETAs more accurately.
• Spate conditions:
Being in a shared facility means that
the other services are more aware of
our workload when experiencing spate
conditions and can provide practical help.
It also enables us to liaise with the Police
regarding road conditions etc.
• Advantages:
Everything above, coupled with a new
building with modern facilities.
• Disadvantages:
It’s noisier, and occasionally we can be
seen as a tenant rather than a true partner
by some Police staff.’
Simon Harris
Control Room Manager
Wiltshire Fire & Rescue Service
9 March 2011
‘Ever tried to find someone trapped
in a building who doesn’t know
where they are[?]. All they can do is
look out of the window and describe
what they can see.
Thankfully local knowledge means
there is a chance of finding them.
Technology works most of the time
but not always. Maybe Surrey has a
lot of crystal balls.’
Wendy Newnham
posted 15 March 2011 on:
facebook.com/fbufirewontwait
Learning the Lessons of History
History shows a reliance on technology without detailed
local knowledge can lead to misunderstanding, delays and
mis-mobilisation or non mobilisation of fire appliances:

Coroner’s Inquest into the

London Bombings of 7 July 2005
published 6th May 2011

134.
In respect of the LFB [London Fire Brigade], while by-and-large their control room
coped with the increased radio traffic, there were delays in deployment of resources
to 29 King’s Cross and, to a lesser extent, Edgware Road. Should an incident occur
in a tunnel on the London Underground, the LFB apply a tried, tested and trusted
system of ‘split attendance’ in which three appliances are mobilised to the primary
underground station and a single appliance to the secondary underground station.
In July 2005, to assist in any deployment, the LFB operated a computer
mobilising system known as ProCad. This matched potential addresses for an
incident on the information provided. Addresses would include the possibility
of a split attendance being required, such as “Liverpool Street tunnels, Aldgate
Station”. This system worked effectively in respect of the incident at Aldgate, where
the first appliance arrived at 09.00, but it was less successful in respect of the
incidents at King’s Cross and Edgware Road.

135.
The ProCad system for King’s Cross included forty four different possible
addresses; one of which was Euston Square Underground Station (because it had
tunnels which linked to King’s Cross). In a conversation between the Network
Control Centre and the LFB there was a misunderstanding that was not
corrected. This resulted in the LFB’s mobilising a split attendance with Euston
Square as the primary station and King’s Cross as the secondary station (rather
than King’s Cross as the primary station and Russell Square as the secondary
station). Consequently, three LFB appliances were initially deployed to Euston
Square, a single appliance was deployed to King’s Cross (arriving at 09.13) and no
appliances were deployed to Russell Square. It was not until 09.42, nearly an
hour after detonation of the bomb that a second appliance arrived at King’s
Cross. In the interim, further appliances continued to be deployed to Euston
Square, where their services were not required.
136.
A combination of human and computer error also contributed to delays in
deployment of LFB resources to Edgware Road. Edgware Road Underground
Station is in two separate locations; the Circle and Hammersmith line station is
located on Chapel Street and the Bakerloo line station is situated on the Edgware
Road. Opposite Chapel Street, on the other side of the Edgware Road, is Praed
Street. At 08.58 the LFB was initially alerted by a member of the public to a
suspected gas explosion at Praed Street. Unbeknown to the LFB at the time this
reported explosion was actually the explosion on the westbound Circle line train,
as the tunnel ran under Praed Street.

137.
At 09.07 the Network Control Centre contacted the LFB Control, requested their
attendance at Edgware Road Underground Station, and provided the address of
Chapel Street. It also made specific reference to the Circle and Hammersmith line.
Initially, the LFB did not mobilise any further resources. They believed this
was a duplicate request for attendance to the suspected gas explosion at Praed
Street. However, once it was established that the Network Control Centre’s
request was not a duplicate request, resources were incorrectly mobilised
at 09.13 to the Edgware Road Bakerloo line station, in part because the
ProCad system did not include Chapel Street amongst the possible matches
for Edgware Road Underground Station. The first LFB appliance arrived at the
correct Edgware Road Underground Station at 09.18.

218.
There is one last matter that has been specifically raised in connection with the
attendance of the emergency services at London Underground stations, and
it concerns the LFB. Difficulties were encountered by the first four-man LFB
vehicle (a pump machine) at King’s Cross. It arrived around 09.13 as part of a
split attendance between King’s Cross and, erroneously, ‘Euston Square’. Yet
its crew was forced to wait until a second appliance had arrived at King’s Cross
before they were able to use breathing apparatus and thus fully deploy into the
tunnels. The second appliance (a pump ladder) did not arrive until 09.42, the
delay, acknowledged by the LFB, being brought about by confusion as to the
location of the incident.

The Rt. Hon Lady Justice Hallett DBE

H.M. Coroner
Coroner’s Inquest into the
London Bombings of 7 July 2005
Report under Rule 43 of The Coroner’s Rules 1984
6th May 2011
Costs
• Full Business Case refers to ‘cost per
call’ - a crude, erroneous, disingenuous
and misleading analogy.

• In addition to transitional costs of

£208,000, I.W. residents would be
paying £216,000 per annum subsidizing
38p
the Surrey Fire Control.
* Price at Sainsburys, Newport, Isle of Wight: February 2011

• Full costs not in the public domain A small 150g tin of baked beans.
as stated as ‘commercial in confidence’.
With only one supplier this does not
hold true.

• Costs beyond 5 year contract with The current Island

Surrey Fire & Rescue Service are
unknown.
• £130,000 invested in I.W. Fire
Control Centre in 2010; to allow for
additional capability.
• Indemnity costs could be high in
the event of litigation or corporate
manslaughter charges brought against
the Isle of Wight Fire & Rescue
Service/Isle of Wight Council, in the
event of ‘system failure exacerbating
death or injury’.
37p Fire Control Centre
costs just 37 pence
per month per island
resident. For a family
of four that’s £17.76 per year, as
per the Fire Control Business Case
costings, April 2011.
A small price to pay for local
people, delivering a quality local
service to the Island residents,
businesses and visitors; all for
less than the price of a small tin of
Heinz baked beans per month.

‘High risk if we get it wrong.

Island Fire Control
High cost if we get it wrong.’
30p Centre cost per
island resident per
Paul Street month, as declared
Chief Fire Officer by Department for
Isle of Wight Fire & Rescue Service
Culture and Local Government,
26 April 2011
Summer 2009.
 Fire
Brigades
Union
concerns
• The lack of full, formal and auditable
public consultation process.
• The reports and process have not been
independently audited and assessed.
• The process pre-empts the ongoing
Department for Communities and
Local Government consultation and
report into the future of U.K. Fire and
Rescue emergency fire control centres.
‘Buddying’ arrangements are thought
to be the focus and recommendation of
the report.
• ‘Buddying’ arrangements would see
local emergency fire control centres
‘buddied’ with emergency fire controls
centres out of the geographical area;
this avoids the issues surrounding spate
conditions overloading a fire control in
the same region and is far more resilient
as it retains local knowledge in the
home fire and rescue service county,
only reverting to the ‘buddy’ control in
the event of overload.
• No statistics for how many times the
the Surrey mobilising system (Fortek)
has experienced problems over the last
year. How can elected members make
decisions without being fully appraised
of the effectiveness of another fire and
rescue service’s mobilising system?
‘This decision is an absolute disgrace.’ Marie Sheldrake
• There are no details of Surrey’s fall-
back arrangements contained within
the Business case therefore a ‘like for
like’ resilience comparison cannot be
made.
• Lack of clarity what will happen to Isle
of Wight Fire Calls, when Surrey Fire &
Rescue Service are experiencing high
call volumes, extended call handling
conditions (which will happen on a
regular basis) or protracted incidents?
• Will the call be placed in a queue
(which is likely to happen on a regular
basis), or will it be passed through to
another Fire & Rescue Service like
London, Essex, Oxfordshire?
• The importance of local knowledge
and the impact of its loss in relation to
accurate emergency call taking, rapid
and correct appliance mobilisation and
incident handling has and continues to
be grossly underestimated.
• All risks have not been identified
within the ‘Fire Control Business Case’
published 15 April 2011.
• Risks identified other than in the
report have not been heeded nor
investigated.
• The impact of the transfer, and any
delay in the emergency call taking
process, on the established protocol
of ensuring maximum care within
‘The Golden Hour’ when dealing with
trauma patients, has not been examined
or the associated risks identified
(see ‘The Golden Hour’, page 5).
posted 4 May 2011 on ventnorblog.com
 9 May 2011

Fire Brigades Union observations and comments on

Isle of Wight Council – Delegated Decision Report 15/11 (15 April 2011)
Transfer of Fire Control to Surrey Fire and Rescue Service

Outcomes - Section 2 of the report states:

‘The increased resilience offered as a result of the proposed transfer to Surrey Fire Control,
alongside the advanced technology which will be employed, will decrease risk to the
community and improve the safety of the Island’.

The FBU strongly dispute this statement and argue that this decision will actually
increase the risk to the Island’s community.

The technology that is referred is not guaranteed to improve the response to emergency
calls. There is no proven technical evidence to support this and the loss of vital local
knowledge has been dismissed without supporting evidence.

The loss of local knowledge could, in fact, have a detrimental effect on emergency
call handling times and in any emergency situation a delay could have fatal
consequences.

Background - Section 3 of the report states: 24 hours notice

for Councillors and the
‘The Full Council meeting of 22 September 2010 resolved public of the inclusion
that an in-principle decision was made to combine the of ‘Paper B’ (proposal
Isle of Wight’s fire control centre with that of anotherto transfer Fire Control)
authority in order to deliver a cost effective service and
to the agenda for the
improve resilience’.
Full Council meeting of
We wish to bring it to your attention that the proposal 22 September 2010.
(‘Paper B’) to the meeting agenda was submitted just
24 hours prior to the meeting and it would have been inconceivable that members
of the public and councillors could have sufficient opportunity to fully appraise the
document and its implications. No outline business case was submitted to this meeting
to support the proposal.

‘We should be making open ‘We are community leaders,

and transparent decisions.’ not community followers.’
Councillor Paul Fuller J.P. Councillor Barry Abraham
26 April 2011 26 April 2011
Background - Section 4 of the report states:

‘There is much discussion nationally amongst fire services concerning mergers and
transfers based on regional and/or technological grounds. However, these discussions are
generally at an early stage and are unlikely to proceed to implementation until 2012/13
for many fire and rescue services’.

Currently mainland FRSs are awaiting the outcomes of a DCLG consultation exercise.
The Delegated Decision is pre-emptive of the outcomes that could see major changes
to the Fire Control structure throughout the United Kingdom. There are questions
over the future of Surrey Fire control as a result of London Fire Service moving
into the RCC building, located in Merton, Surrey. London is seeking alternative
arrangements for their control function including the outsourcing to the private
sector or collaboration with bordering FRSs.

Consultation - Section 10 of the report states that:

‘The transfer of Fire Control has been subject to consultation with the Fire Brigades’ Union,
the senior management team of the Fire and Rescue Service and Fire Control staff ’.

This statement is incorrect. The FBU have not been involved in any meaningful
consultation process. If consultation had taken place the FBU comments should
be contained within the business case to assist with the making of an informed and
subjective decision.

The Delegated Decision Report was published at close of business on Friday 15th
April 2011 with just ten days for responses. The recent extended Bank Holidays
restricted the window of opportunity for response for members of the public via their
councillors to just five days.

The FBU highlighted this issue and extended an invite to the Cabinet Member with
responsibility for the decision, Cllr. Barry Abraham, to meet with us to discuss our
concerns.

Despite repeated invites Cllr. Abraham failed to respond to us and has proceeded to
make the decision without seeking the views of the professionals that have served Isle
of Wight residents without failure over numerous years.

ACAS Definition: Consultation

Consultation involves taking account of as well as listening to the views of employees and must
therefore take place before decisions are made. Making a pretence of consulting on issues that have
already been decided is unproductive and engenders suspicion and mistrust about the process
amongst staff. It will be helpful to decide upon the degree of consultation first and to inform
people what the decision making process will be. http://www.acas.org.uk/index.aspx?articleid=675
Financial/Budget Implications – Section 12-16

The FBU are very concerned about the accuracy of the financial data contained in the
business case. The calculations are based on assumptions and are omitted from the
business case presented on the IW Council website (www.iwight.com). We are unable
to confirm that councillors have had access to this information.

The stated ongoing costs of the current IW Fire Control function contained within the
business case are £610,000. The FBU are concerned about an apparent discrepancy
between this figure and the stated costs to DCLG in summer 2009 of the IW fire
control function of just £489,000.

Likewise, the annual number of emergency calls for Surrey decreased from 28,000
to less than 12,000 between the initial statement in the Outline Business Case of
September 2010 to Fire Control Business Case April 2011. This fundamentally affects
the ‘cost per call’ analogy repeatedly stated by Councillors and IWFRS Officers alike.

Further issues of concern and areas for consideration that have been over-looked in the
reports:

Surrey Fire and Rescue Service (SFRS)

SFRS are currently engaged in an extensive and controversial modernisation program

across their entire service as detailed in their Public Safety Plan. The plan is being met with
strong opposition by both the public and representative bodies. There would be a serious
threat to the ability of SFRS to deal with IWFRS emergency calls should any industrial
action be taken in response to SFRS’s plans.

Extract from Surrey Public Safety Plan:

Mobilising Control
10.13 In the same way and for the same reasons that we wish our firefighters to
provide more flexibility when the public requires our services most we also wish
to provide the appropriate number of mobilising staff during busy times. We also
need to provide an ability to increase this number during times of unusually high
call volumes or exceptional conditions. A cadre of staff , available during the busiest
times could also provide a pool of people that can engage in data and intelligence
gathering or analysis that will enhance our front line response to the public and
will continue to improve our mobilising system that enables us to automatically
identify the fire engines and resources that can respond quickest to an emergency
(attribute and dynamic mobilising), this is a move away from the traditional fixed
point deployment thus providing an improved level of service that is more efficient.
The number of shifts will be determined through discussion and negotiation with
our staff.
SFRS are currently planning £2.7m budget cuts to their
service over four years and Surrey County Council need
£2.7m
of budget cuts for Surrey
to make £200m savings over the same period.
Fire & Rescue Service
Surrey’s Control Room budget is required to make over four years.
£140,000 savings this year. By paying £216,000 per
annum to transfer IWFRS emergency calls to SFRS the
£200m
residents of the Isle of Wight would be subsidising Surrey
of budget cuts for
residents and SFRS. Surrey County Council
over four years.
Resilience

Currently the IWFRS Control has a fall-back arrangement with Hampshire Fire and
Rescue Service whereby calls that can’t be answered automatically ‘smart’ divert to the
Hampshire’s control where they can be answered by emergency fire control staff. The
incident details can then be passed to IWFRS by radio or phone for mobilisation. IWFRS
Fire Control also has a secondary control based at their HQ (approx ½ mile away) that
can be utilised in the event main control being out of service.

There are no details of Surrey’s fall-back arrangements contained within the Fire Control
Business Case, therefore a ‘like for like’ resilience comparison cannot be made.

Service Level Agreement

Should SFRS not meet the SLA what option would IWFRS have to withdraw from the
agreement and find alternative arrangements?

What alternative arrangements would then be available to IWFRS having made redundant
their highly experienced emergency control staff?

The report also omits any detail of the familiarisation or technical training that SFRS
control staff will receive in order for the transfer to take place in a safe and controlled
manner. The mechanism for competency testing of this vital training is also not detailed
within the report.

Total Reliance on NLPG

The Surrey Fire & Rescue Service Control, in Reigate, will be totally reliant on the
NLPG (National Land and Property Gazetteer).

Unfortunately, Island hamlets (i.e. Horringford, Merstone etc.) are not included in the
NLPG (nor is there any capability for inclusion). Without detailed local knowledge
for the emergency 999 fire calls there will inevitably be delays, inaccuracies and
confusion (see ‘Learning the Lessons of History’, on page 8 & 9 in this leaflet).
Every second counts...
“For a successful technology reality must take precedence over public relations,
for nature cannot be fooled.”
Professor Richard P. Feynman
Rogers Commission, NASA Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster 1986

“As a native Islander, I feel very strongly about working within our own shores.
Because of its defining characteristics as an Island, the IW should retain
the chief executive post here on the Island.” Mr Pugh said.
Cllr David Pugh, Leader, Isle of Wight Council - Cabinet Meeting on Tuesday 1 March 2011
reported in the Isle of Wight County Press (iwcp.co.uk), Friday 11 March 2011

Please write to:

Cllr Barry Abraham Rt. Hon Andrew Turner M.P.
Kite Hill Farm Riverside Centre
Wootton Bridge The Quay
RYDE NEWPORT
Isle of Wight Isle of Wight
PO33 4LE PO30 2QR
e-mail: barry.abraham@iow.gov.uk e-mail: mail@islandmp.com

Please speak with, write to or e-mail your local Councillor

You local Councillor can be found at iwight.com. Please copy your correspondence sent to Councillors to
Jonathan Baker in the Democratic Services Team, Isle of Wight Council:
Jonathan.Baker@iow.gov.uk or
Democratic Services, County Hall, Newport, Isle of Wight, PO30 9TD

Isle of Wight Branch

Fire Brigades Union
Fire Station
South Street
NEWPORT
Isle of Wight Published May 2011
PO30 1JQ ©: 2011 Fire Brigades Union. All rights reserved.

Telephone: 01983 525 121 (Fire Control) www.firewontwait.com

e-mail: control@isleofwightfbu.com www.isleofwightfbu.com
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