APL Closing Arguments

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GALLIAN WELKER & BECKSTROM, L.C.

Zachary C. Lindley (#17261)


965 East 700 South, Suite 305
St. George, Utah 84790
Telephone: (435) 628-1682
Facsimile: (435) 628-9561
zlindley@utahcase.com

Attorney for Petitioner

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR


IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ANNA PAULINA LUNA, CLOSING ARGUMENTS

Petitioner,

v.

EDWARD ALEXANDER MAYERHOFER, Civil No.: 200500003

Respondent. Judge: Honorable Matthew L. Bell

Petitioner, Anna Paulina Luna, by and through counsel of record, Zachary C. Lindley of

Gallian Welker & Beckstrom, L.C., hereby files her Closing Arguments as requested by the

Court at the conclusion of the Evidentiary Hearing held on February 11, 2020 (“Hearing”), and

states as follows:

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The parties and their respective counsel of record appeared for the regularly scheduled

Evidentiary Hearing in this matter, on February 11, 2020. The Court, at the conclusion of

testimony and introduction of evidence, requested counsel for both parties to submit written
closing arguments within fourteen (14) days, summarizing their respective positions. In

accordance with said order, Petitioner submits the following written closing arguments.

INTRODUCTION

This case deals with nothing more than an estranged uncle’s personal attacks on his

niece. Respondent is Petitioner’s uncle. Petitioner is Respondent’s niece. This is not a case of

freedom of speech, and this is not a case wherein a critic simply disagrees with the stances of a

political figure. The law is unambiguous in Utah that a stalking injunction is based on a

reasonable person standard, in the victim’s circumstances, after considering the entire context of

the facts. The entire context of this case goes far beyond a simple relationship between a critic

and a political figure. Indeed, the context of this case requires the Court view the standards of

the stalking injunction statute through the eyes of a niece who has been repetitively belittled and

attacked by her estranged uncle through electronic communication. Anything beyond such view

would unduly strip Petitioner of her right to obtain the necessary protection from Respondent in

order to safeguard her career, her marriage, and herself.

LEGAL ARGUMENT

Petitioner has satisfied her burden in proving up her cause of action for a civil stalking

injunction against Respondent. In arguing for a civil stalking injunction, Petitioner was only

required to show, by no more than a preponderance of the evidence, that stalking of the

Petitioner by the Respondent occurred. See U.C.A. § 77-3a-101(6)(a). Petitioner sufficiently

demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Respondent is guilty of stalking, as

Respondent, intentionally or knowingly, engaged in a course of conduct directed at Petitioner

and knew, or should have known, that the course of conduct would cause a reasonable person in

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the Petitioner’s circumstances to (1) fear for her own safety, or (2) suffer other emotional

distress. See U.C.A. § 76-5-106.5(2).

I. Petitioner Has Met Her Burden Of Preponderance Of The Evidence

As a threshold matter, Petitioner’s burden in this case is to prove, by a preponderance of

the evidence, that Respondent is guilty of stalking, nothing more. Pursuant to Model Utah Jury

Instructions, as well as supporting case law, preponderance of the evidence in a civil matter

requires only that a party persuade the Court, by the evidence, that the fact is more likely to be

true than not true. MUJI 2nd, CV117; see also Hansen v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 931 (Utah App.

1998). More specifically, proof by the greater weight of the evidence, however slight. Id.

(emphasis added). The evidence presented satisfies the burden of proving to the Court that it is

more likely to be true than not true that Respondent is guilty of stalking—however slight.

II. Respondent Engaged In “Course Of Conduct” Under U.C.A. § 76-5-106.5

Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it is more likely to be true

than not true that Respondent has engaged in “course of conduct” directed at Petitioner.

Pursuant to U.C.A. § 76-5-106.5, “course of conduct” means two or more acts directed at or

toward the Petitioner. Such acts can be either direct or indirect, and can take the following

forms: (1) communication to or about the Petitioner; (2) contacting the Petitioner’s employer or

coworkers; (3) sending material by any means to Petitioner’s family, employer, coworker, friend

or associate of the Petitioner for purposes of obtaining or disseminating information about the

Petitioner; or (4) using a computer, internet, text messaging or any other electronic means to

commit an act part of the course of conduct. U.C.A. § 76-5-106.5(b). Respondent, at least two

times, engaged in the foregoing acts.

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The evidence shows it is more likely true than not true that Respondent communicated

directly or indirectly to Petitioner through social media platforms by electronic means. Pursuant

to the various social media platforms, when an individual uploads a post and includes an

occupied, or owned, social media “handle,” e.g. #realannapaulina or @realannapaulina, the

person or entity that owns the included handle is immediately notified and can view the post. An

individual uploading a post who wishes to include a specific handle is required to manually and

voluntarily type that specific handle in the post. According to Petitioner’s testimony given at the

Hearing, Petitioner occupies the social media handles, #realannapaulina and @realannapaulina.

Respondent directed his posts to the social media handles owned by Petitioner on more

than two occasions. On March 3, 2019, Respondent posted derogatory and demeaning

comments regarding Petitioner, personally attacking her, wherein Respondent included the

hashtag, #realannapaulina. See Exhibit A. On March 4, 2019, Respondent again posted

humiliating and degrading remarks regarding Petitioner, wherein Respondent included the

hashtag, #realannapaulina. See Exhibit B. Finally, on November 24, 2019, Respondent posted

discrediting and shameful comments regarding Petitioner, wherein Respondent tagged the social

media handle, @realannapaulina. See Exhibit C. In fact, Exhibit C shows that Respondent was

“Replying to” @realannapaulina—“reply to” is an unambiguous phrase and an individual must

voluntarily choose to click this option on the social media platforms. Accordingly, the evidence

shows it is more likely true than not true that Respondent directed communication at Petitioner.

Additionally, and perhaps more egregious, the evidence shows it is more likely true than

not true that Respondent contacted and sent material to Petitioner’s employer, associates and/or

affiliates. Petitioner, given her career as a politician running for office, works closely with her

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own campaign team. Petitioner testified at the Hearing that her campaign team helps manage the

social media platforms alongside Petitioner. Therefore, when, as shown by Exhibits A-C,

Respondent included the social media handles, #realannapaulina and @realannapaulina,

Respondent was also contacting and disseminating his derogatory comments to Petitioner’s

entire campaign team, i.e. her associates and affiliates. Additionally, at the Hearing, Petitioner

testified that she received a phone call from her employer, Turning Point U.S.A., notifying her

that they were contacted directly by Respondent. Petitioner also testified that she received notice

from a specific organization with whom she is affiliated that Respondent had contacted them as

well. Finally, in the November 24, 2019 post, Respondent tagged and was “Reply[ing] to” the

social media handle, @RepMattGaetz, which is owned by the current Florida Congressman, Matt

Gaetz, who openly endorsed Petitioner’s career. See Exhibit C. Therefore, the evidence shows

Respondent contacted and sent material to Petitioner’s employer, associates and/or affiliates.

III. A Reasonable Person In The Petitioner’s Circumstances Would Experience Fear


For Her Own Safety And Emotional Distress

Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent’s acts would

cause a reasonable person in Petitioner’s circumstances to experience emotional distress and fear

for personal safety. Importantly, under U.C.A. § 76-5-106.5(e), the “reasonable person”

standard is that of one in the “victim’s circumstances.” Case law in Utah provides that “the

offense of stalking does not focus on the particular emotional distress [a particular victim]

suffers, but rather, on how defendant’s conduct would affect a reasonable person.” Baird v.

Baird, 2014 UT 08, ¶24, 322 P.3d 728 (internal citations and quotations omitted). “[T]he

subjective effect of the respondent’s conduct on the petitioner is irrelevant,” rather the Court is to

consider the “entire context surrounding [respondent’s] conduct.” Id. at ¶26. In fact, after

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considering the “context surrounding the respondent’s conduct, acts that seem perfectly innocent

or even well intentioned may constitute stalking.” Id. The reasonable person standard in this

case must be viewed in the context of a niece being personally attacked by her estranged uncle

who has a history of inappropriate and volatile behavior with her family.

The evidence introduced shows it is more likely true than not true that a reasonable

person in Petitioner’s circumstances would experience emotional distress and fear for her own

safety. Petitioner testified at the Hearing that she has built a career in politics from the ground

up after being honorably discharged from the United States Air Force. She has worked

extremely hard to form a strong reputation—nothing has been handed to her. However, just as

Petitioner’s career began to gain traction and progress, Respondent, Petitioner’s own uncle,

sought to exploit Petitioner just as he had done in the past. As Petitioner testified, and as shown

by the photographs introduced into evidence by Respondent, the Respondent attempted to exploit

Petitioner as a teenager trying to begin a career in the United States Air Force. See Exhibit 3.

Petitioner testified that Respondent threatened Petitioner that he would go to Petitioner’s

commanding officer with the photographs in an effort to gain power over Petitioner.

Respondent’s recent conduct mirrors such attempted exploitation, while having a greater

negative impact on Petitioner’s current career given her national recognition and the difficulty of

breaking into the field of politics.

A reasonable niece in Petitioner’s circumstances would experience emotional distress as

a result of Respondent’s personal attacks through his posts on March 3, March 4 and November

24 of 2019. Such posts are degrading, discrediting, inappropriate and demeaning, and seek

nothing more than to destroy the hard-fought career of Petitioner. Importantly, despite

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Respondent’s arguments for freedom of political speech, not one of the posts in Exhibits A-C

discuss any political matter for which Petitioner advocates. Rather, Respondent personally

attacks Petitioner as an individual, using his status as her uncle to strengthen such attacks. As

shown in Exhibits A-C, Respondent seeks solely to discredit Petitioner by spreading lies,

attempting to smear her name and reputation, using phrases such as “false claim,” “making

herself out to be something she is not,” “Right’s Elizabeth Warren (Pocohontas) [sic],”

“#fraudster,” “#stopthebullshit,” and “lies.”

Even more, the March 3, March 4 and November 24 posts were sent to Petitioner’s

associates and affiliates to whom Petitioner was required to defend herself unnecessarily.

Petitioner prides herself in her heritage, and in fact, as shown by the DNA Compositions,

Petitioner is every bit what she says she is—Respondent chooses instead to continue his attacks

under false assertions, despite being a blood relative to Petitioner who has a better understanding

of her history than a politician’s random critic. See Exhibit 4. Such evidence shows it is more

likely true than not that a reasonable niece in Petitioner’s circumstances would experience

emotional distress.

Petitioner also testified that Respondent uploaded additional posts to Facebook that

degraded and demeaned Petitioner, but that Facebook removed the posts for being harassing in

nature. Facebook has a “Bullying and Harassment” policy, wherein Facebook provides the

following standard they use to determine whether to remove content:

We distinguish between public figures and private individuals because we want to


allow discussion, which often includes critical commentary or people who are
featured in the news or who have a large public audience. For public figures, we
remove attacks that are severe as well as certain attacks where the public figure is
directly tagged in the post or comment. For private individuals, our protection

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goes further: we remove content that’s meant to degrade or shame, including, for
example, claims about someone’s sexual activity.

See Exhibit D. Such standard shows that it is more likely true than not that a reasonable person

in Petitioner’s circumstances would view the posts as inappropriate and harassing, and would

experience emotional distress.

Finally, the evidence shows that a reasonable niece in Petitioner’s circumstances, who

has grown up with her uncle that has a reputation of being in financial trouble, volatile and

violent, would experience emotional distress and fear for her own safety. Petitioner, her mother,

Monica, and her father, George, all testified at the Hearing that in their opinion, Respondent had

a reputation of being violent with family members. In fact, George, Petitioner’s father, testified

that at the end of 2009, Respondent held a handgun to his head and told George he was going to

“kill him.” Testimony and evidence were also introduced that Respondent had a reputation for

being in financial trouble, and Petitioner specifically testified that she believes his recent

obsession with her is racially motivated and is a ploy for obtaining financial gain. See Exhibits

F-G.

Therefore, given the evidence and testimony, it is more likely true than not true that a

reasonable niece in Petitioner’s circumstances, taking into consideration the entire context of the

relationship, would not only experience emotional distress, but also fear for her own safety

following the personal attacks of her uncle.

IV. Petitioner Has Experienced Emotional Distress And Fear For Her Own Safety

Given the evidence and testimony introduced at the Hearing, it is more likely true than

not true that Respondent’s acts would cause emotional distress and fear for personal safety.

Emotional distress, for purposes of a stalking injunction, does not require proof of “outrageous

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and intolerable conduct.” Baird, 2014 UT 08, ¶38. Rather, the standard is only that a reasonable

person in Petitioner’s circumstances would have experienced “significant mental or

psychological suffering” as a result of Respondent’s course of conduct. U.C.A. § 76-5-

106.5(1)(c); Baird, 2014 UT 08, ¶39. Again, “the offense of stalking does not focus on the

particular emotional distress a particular victim suffers, but rather, on how [respondent’s]

conduct would affect a reasonable person” in the victim’s circumstance. Baird, 2014 UT 08,

¶24.

Petitioner testified at trial, which was supported by the affidavit of her husband, Andrew,

as well as the affidavit of her mother, Monica, that she has been extremely upset, has lost sleep,

her career has been negatively affected, and she has experienced marital and financial stress.

Evidence shows that Respondent did not address any political issues in his posts, but rather,

directly and personally attacked his niece’s integrity and reputation, and even worse, directed

such derogatory and demeaning remarks at her associates and affiliates. See Exhibits A-C.

Respondent has a history of attempting to exploit his niece, Petitioner, and Petitioner has testified

that she believes the recent conduct is another ploy at attempting to exert power over Petitioner

by destroying her career that she has worked extremely hard to build. See Exhibit 3. Testimony

at the Hearing also shows that Respondent has a history of violence and volatile behavior,

including the occasion wherein Respondent pointed a gun at Petitioner’s father’s head and said

he was going to “kill him.” In addition, Respondent has a history of being in financial trouble

and is believed to currently be in the same financial trouble. See Exhibit G.

Respondent argues that, given Petitioner’s alleged “training” in the military, along with

the alleged protection of her husband, Petitioner cannot possibly be feeling fearful of her life or

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be experiencing emotional distress—such arguments are unavailing. Again, “the offense of

stalking does not focus on the particular emotional distress a particular victim suffers, but rather,

on how [respondent’s] conduct would affect a reasonable person” in the victim’s circumstance.

Baird, 2014 UT 08, ¶24. Therefore, given the evidence and testimony introduced, and

recognizing that “the subjective effect of the respondent’s conduct on the petitioner is

irrelevant,” a reasonable niece in Petitioner’s circumstances would experience emotional distress

and fear for her own safety. Id. at ¶24.

V. It Is Not A Defense That The Conduct Was Unwanted Or No Emotional Distress


Was Intended

Notably, under U.C.A. § 76-5-106.5(4), “it is not a defense that the actor: (a) was not

given actual notice that the course of conduct was unwanted; or (b) did not intend to cause the

victim fear or other emotional distress.” Therefore, despite Respondent’s arguments that he did

not intend to cause any emotional distress or was not notified that the conduct was unwanted,

such arguments are irrelevant to the Court’s determination, and Respondent is therefore guilty of

stalking.

CONCLUSION

Pursuant to the foregoing, the evidence and testimony introduced at the Hearing, however

slight, show it is more likely true than not true that Respondent is guilty of stalking. Therefore,

Petitioner respectfully requests the Court grant her Request for Civil Stalking Injunction, and

curb Respondent’s intentionally and destructive conduct.

DATED this 25th day of February, 2020.

GALLIAN WELKER & BECKSTROM, L.C.

/s/ Zachary C. Lindley

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Zachary C. Lindley
Attorney for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On the 25th day of February, 2020, I submitted a true and correct copy of the foregoing
CLOSING ARGUMENTS to be filed with the Court and served upon the following parties via
the Utah Electronic Notification System:

Christian Jones
Wayment & Jones Law
51 East 400 North, Suite 1
Cedar City, Utah 84721
cjones@waymentandjoneslaw.com
Attorney for Respondent

/s/ Zachary C. Lindley


Attorney for Petitioner

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