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Single-Neuron Correlates of Decision Confidence in The Human Medial Temporal Lobe
Single-Neuron Correlates of Decision Confidence in The Human Medial Temporal Lobe
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Single-Neuron Correlates of Decision Confidence
in the Human Medial Temporal Lobe
Alexander Unruh-Pinheiro,1 Michael R. Hill,1 Bernd Weber,1,2 Jan Boström,3 Christian E. Elger,1 and Florian Mormann1,4,*
1Department of Epileptology, University of Bonn Medical Center, Venusberg-Campus 1, 53127 Bonn, Germany
2Center for Economics and Neuroscience, University of Bonn, Venusberg-Campus 1, 53127 Bonn, Germany
3Department of Neurosurgery, University of Bonn Medical Center, Venusberg-Campus 1, 53127 Bonn, Germany
4Lead Contact
*Correspondence: florian.mormann@ukbonn.de
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2020.09.021
SUMMARY
The human medial temporal lobe (MTL) has been suggested to play a role in valuation. However, little is
known about its role in binary decisions and metacognition. We performed two decision-making tasks while
recording from neurons in the human MTL. During a break, subjects consumed their preferred food item to
satiation and subsequently repeated both tasks. We identified both a persistent and a transient modulation of
the neural activity. Two independent subpopulations of neurons showed a persistent correlation of their firing
rates with either decision confidence or reaction times. Importantly, the changes in confidence and reaction
time between experimental sets were accompanied by a correlated change in the neural activity, and this cor-
relation lasted as long as it was relevant for the behavioral task. Previous studies have suggested a transient
modulation of the neural activity in the human MTL correlated with subjective value. However, in our study,
neither subjective value nor unsigned value could explain this transient activity better than the nutritional fea-
tures of the stimuli, calling into question the role of the human MTL in valuation.
INTRODUCTION been suggested to play a role in both unsigned value [7, 8] and
nutritional features [9]. Here, we wanted to dissociate subjective
In value-based decision making, subjective value can be defined value correlates from these potential confounds.
as a function that assigns a utility to items or actions. To compute During binary decisions, subjective values of different items
subjective value, we need to integrate different internal and may be compared to guide choice and may be integrated to
external sources of information, such as hunger or the different compute several key decision variables, such as the (unsigned)
available options, onto a common scale that allows comparing difference in value or the chosen value. Moreover, during deci-
different options [1]. Subjective value also plays a key role in rein- sion making, we constantly monitor the certainty of our deci-
forcement learning, behavioral economics, the free-energy prin- sions, a metacognitive function termed decision confidence
ciple, and Bayesian brain models [2, 3]. Two previous human sin- [10]. Decision confidence has a strong influence on our deci-
gle-unit studies have suggested the presence of neural sions: it is essential for learning, decision optimization, and
correlates of subjective value in the human medial temporal sequential decisions [11–13]. Previous studies have suggested
lobe (MTL) [4, 5]. By definition, subjective value must integrate that decision confidence arises as a metacognitive readout of
both positive and negative rewards onto a common monotonic the value difference [14]. Bayesian models have also proposed
unidimensional scale [1]. Thus, neural correlates of value should that confidence could be defined as the probability that a deci-
be monotonically modulated and should span both the positive sion is correct [15, 16]. In these models, confidence represents
and the negative reward domain. However, these studies only a scalar summary statistic of the uncertainty of a decision, a
tested positive values and therefore could not show whether graded measure of belief that can be explicitly reported in an
both valuation domains were integrated at the single-neuron experiment [13, 17].
level, and they could not control for unsigned value. In the neuro- Confidence, choice, and reaction time (RT) are three of the
economics literature, unsigned value is sometimes referred to as main observables of a decision [18]. Drift-diffusion models of
salience [6], and it can be a statistical confound of subjective evidence accumulation propose a unified mechanism for the
value when testing only positive or only negative values. More- computation of these three variables [19]. Previous studies in
over, subjective value is a dynamic property of the stimuli, i.e., the macaque parietal cortex have suggested a unified neural
because our preferences need not be stable over time and mechanism of evidence accumulation for the computation of
context, a neuronal correlate of value must reflect these fluctua- choice, RT, and confidence [18, 20, 21]. Independent correlates
tions. This offers an experimental opportunity to dissociate value of confidence, however, have also been observed in the frontal
from static properties of the stimuli, such as the content of salt or cortex and subcortical areas [14, 22–28]. Interestingly, a previ-
sugar. These controls are important, because the amygdala has ous study has reported confidence correlates in the human
Current Biology 30, 1–11, December 21, 2020 ª 2020 Elsevier Inc. 1
Please cite this article in press as: Unruh-Pinheiro et al., Single-Neuron Correlates of Decision Confidence in the Human Medial Temporal Lobe, Cur-
rent Biology (2020), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2020.09.021
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RESULTS
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Figure 2. Behavioral Results
(A) Fixed-effect coefficients of a linear mixed-effect
model of confidence with predictors: unsigned
difference in mean value rating (|DV|); reaction time
(RT); and summed mean value rating of the stimuli
(sum).
(B) Fixed-effect coefficients of a logistic multi-level
model predicting the probability of choosing the
stimulus A as a function of the difference in mean
value rating (DV), confidence, sum, and the inter-
action term between DV and confidence, as well as
the interaction term between DV and sum.
(C) Logistic mixed-effect model showing the
probability of choosing the stimulus A as a function
of the mean value rating difference between stimuli
A and B. Data were split into four models, one for
each of the four possible confidence steps on the
Likert scale. Error bars represent 95% confidence
intervals. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001; two-
sided t test. See also Figure S1 and Table S1.
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Figure 3. Single Unit Correlated with Confi-
dence
(A) Located in the right EC, this unit showed a
monotonically increasing firing rate positively
correlated with the subjective confidence ratings.
Left: neuronal activity aligned to the current trial
onset is shown. Right: neuronal activity aligned to
the subsequent trial onset is shown. Top: black
horizontal bars indicate the analysis windows
during which this unit was significantly correlated
with confidence simultaneously in both experi-
mental sets and with the same sign of the corre-
lation. Middle: raster plot of action potentials is
shown. Bottom: mean instantaneous firing rates
for different confidence levels are shown
(Gaussian kernel s = 200 ms; stepsize = 10 ms).
Violet, orange, yellow, and blue lines represent the
different possible values of confidence on the
Likert scale, from 25 to 100. Shaded areas repre-
sent the SEM. Light gray vertical bars indicate the
presentation of stimulus A; the dark gray vertical
bar in between indicates presentation of stimulus
B. Inset shows the density plot of all spikes.
(B) Mean firing rate averaged across the window of
interest. Left: confidence reports for different
spatial locations of the chosen stimulus during the
response time, i.e., left versus right, did not affect
the correlation with confidence. Right: the activity
was also independent of the temporal location of
the chosen stimulus, i.e., stimulus A versus B. Error
bars represent SEM.
Confidence reports per trial varied between the two sets of in the cognitive variable is of little importance, as long as the
experiments. We tested whether these changes were accom- change in the cognitive variable is accompanied by correlated
panied by correlated changes in the neural activity. We changes in neural activity.
compared for each unit the magnitude of the Spearman corre-
lation coefficient between the actual confidence ratings and RT Correlates with the Activity of Single Neurons
the firing rates, averaged across both experimental sets, Surprisingly, we also found a significant proportion of neurons
with a surrogate version for which we swapped ratings be- correlated with RT (13.01%; p < 1015). The analysis of RT was
tween the experimental sets, meaning that firing rates from initially planned as a control. Interestingly, the neural correlate
one set were now correlated with confidence ratings of the of RT started to drop right after the binary choice was made,
corresponding trials from the other set (see STAR Methods whereas the neural correlate of confidence persisted until the
for details). If the change in confidence was accompanied confidence report (Figure 5). Regional analysis showed a signif-
by a correlated change in the neural activity, the magnitude icant effect in the four regions (A: 12.08%, p < 105; H: 13.44%,
of the actual correlation should explain the variance better p < 107; EC: 13.82%, p < 104; PHC: 11.11%, p = 0.0080; Fig-
than the swapped surrogate. We used a one-tailed Wilcoxon ure S2B). We then repeated the ‘‘actual versus swapped’’
signed-rank test to assess whether the magnitude of the signed-rank test described above to assess whether the
actual correlations was larger than their swapped surrogate changes in RT were reflected by the change in the neuronal ac-
version. We performed this analysis including all neurons tivity. We found a sustained significant effect (Figure 4B, bot-
and repeated it for the subset of neurons correlated with tom). Likewise, the proportion of neurons whose change in firing
either confidence or its swapped surrogate. We found that rate across sets significantly correlated with the change in RT
the signed-rank tests were consistently significant for a sus- was highly significant (10.12%; p < 108). We additionally tested
tained period of time (a = 0.05; Figure 4A, bottom). As an alter- whether neural correlates of RT and confidence arose during the
native analysis, we analyzed for each neuron whether the valuation task, finding no evidence for a persistent modulation of
change in firing rate between experimental sets correlated the neural activity (Figure S3). Moreover, because subjects
with the change in confidence on a trial-by-trial basis, again answered by repeatedly pressing a keyboard, motor signals
with a sliding-window Spearman’s correlation. The average arose as a potential confound of confidence. We designed
across the steps in the analysis window yielded 8.31% signif- both the valuation and decision task with the same answering
icantly correlated neurons (p < 104; one-tailed binomial test). methodology. Because no evidence of a persistent modulation
These results suggest that neurons in the human MTL were of the neural activity was found during the valuation task, motor
correlated with decision confidence and updated their state signals are an unlikely explanation of the neural activity
on the set-by-set basis. Importantly, the cause of the change (Figure S3).
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Figure 4. Population Results of the Persis-
tent Activity
Left: neuronal activity aligned to the current trial
onset is shown. Right: neuronal activity aligned to
the subsequent trial onset is shown. Light gray
vertical bars indicate the presentation of stimulus
A; the dark gray vertical bar in between indicates
presentation of stimulus B.
(A) Top: proportion of neurons significantly corre-
lated with confidence, pooled across regions (n =
830). The instantaneous firing rate of each cell was
rank correlated with the trial-by-trial confidence
report in a sliding-window correlation (Gaussian
kernel s = 200 ms; stepsize = 10 ms). The alpha
level of significantly correlated neurons was set to
5% (black dashed line), and the significance of
their proportion was assessed using a one-tailed
binomial test. The red dashed line shows the pro-
portion of cells that represent a p value of 0.001,
and all higher proportions were considered signif-
icant. A cluster-based permutation test was per-
formed to correct for multiple comparisons. The
solid curves indicate significant clusters (p < 0.01).
Bottom: in this analysis, we assessed whether the
change of confidence between experimental sets
was accompanied by a correlated change in the
neural activity (see text). p values of a Wilcoxon
signed-rank test over time are shown color coded
(steps of 10 ms). All cells were included in the top
analysis (all, n = 830), which was repeated for the subset of significantly correlated units (selected, n changes at each step). The black horizontal lines above and
below the p values indicate the significant clusters in the cluster permutation test (p < 0.01).
(B) Same analyses for reaction time (RT). See also Figures S2–S5 and Tables S3 and S4.
Confidence and RT Are Correlated with Two Different treated as a control variable (e.g., confidence), and all the
Neuronal Subpopulations units significantly correlated with this control were removed
Due to the similarity of both variables (magnitude of the correla- from the analysis. For the remaining units, we calculated the
tion between confidence and RT, averaged across subjects: r = proportion of units significantly correlated with the other vari-
0.31 ± 0.13 SD), we wondered whether only one of these vari- able (e.g., RT). Importantly, we did not remove the units from
ables could explain most of the variance of the persistent activ- the denominator of the proportion, to maintain a common
ity. If not, we wanted to know whether different subpopulations reference in the denominator and ensure comparability be-
were correlated with the two variables or whether a single pop- tween variables. This yielded conservatively lower proportions
ulation of neurons was responsible for both correlates. We per- and thus higher p values. We then repeated the same analysis
formed three analyses to test this. for the other variable. If RT were enough to fully explain the
First, we tested which of the variables could better explain the activity, we would expect a strong decrease in the proportion
persistent activity. We computed the Spearman’s rho in the of cells correlated with confidence and vice versa. Both the
above-mentioned sliding window. Because there was a partial proportion of units significantly correlated with RT and with
overlap between the cell identities, we performed a model selec- confidence remained highly significant (confidence: 8.80%,
tion on the ambivalent units: if a cell was significantly correlated p < 105; RT: 10.00%, p < 108; Figure S4B), suggesting
with the two variables at the same time, we assigned this ambiv- that two different subpopulations were responsible for the
alent unit to the variable with the larger magnitude of rho. Thus, two neural correlates.
each cell at each time bin was only included in one of the popu- Finally, we performed a rank-transformed multivariable
lations, to avoid double counting of the units. After this proced- regression with RT and confidence as predictors of the firing
ure, both signals were still highly significant (confidence: rate of each unit, to test the independence of the variables
10.12%, p < 108; RT: 11.81%, p < 1014; Figure S4A). Next, when statistically controlled at the unit level. The mean fraction
we performed a post hoc binomial test on these proportions: of units correlated with the unique variance of both variables re-
assuming a chance level of 0.5 (no preference), we tested mained highly significant (confidence: 10.12%, p < 108; RT =
whether the fraction of neurons for RT was higher than the frac- 12.53%, p < 1016; Figures S4C and S4D), suggesting indepen-
tion for confidence. We found no significant difference between dence of both signals. Taken together, these analyses suggest
the fraction of neurons (p = 0.1676; one-tailed binomial test). that the neural correlates of confidence and RT in the MTL are in-
Thus, neither of the variables was a statistically better model of dependent and represented by different subpopulations of neu-
the persistent activity. rons. Note that neurons showed a symmetric distribution of pos-
Second, we tested whether different subpopulations corre- itive and negative correlation coefficients for RT and confidence
lated with these variables. Here, one of the variables was (Figure S5).
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Figure 5. Persistent Activity Aligned to
Choice Response and Confidence
Response
Light gray vertical bars indicate the presentation of
stimulus A; the dark gray vertical bar indicates
presentation of stimulus B.
(A and B) Neural activity aligned to binary choice
response.
(C and D) Neural activity aligned to confidence
response.
(A and C) Proportion of neurons significantly
correlated with confidence, pooled across regions
(n = 830). The instantaneous firing rate of each cell
was rank correlated with the trial-by-trial confi-
dence report in a sliding-window correlation
(Gaussian kernel s = 200 ms; stepsize = 10 ms).
The alpha level of significantly correlated neurons
was set to 5% (black dashed line), and the signif-
icance of their proportion was assessed using a
one-tailed binomial test. The red dashed line
shows the proportion of cells that represent a p
value of 0.001, and all higher proportions were
considered significant. A cluster-based permuta-
tion test was performed to correct for multiple
comparisons. The solid curves indicate significant
clusters (p < 0.01). Bottom: in this analysis, we
assessed whether the change of confidence be-
tween experimental sets was accompanied by a
correlated change in the neural activity (see text). p
values of a Wilcoxon signed-rank test over time are shown (steps of 10 ms). All cells were included in the top analysis (all, n = 830), which was repeated for the
subset of significantly correlated units (selected, n changes at each step). The black horizontal lines above and below the p values indicate the significant clusters
in the cluster permutation test (p < 0.01).
(B and D) Same analyses for reaction time (RT).
Confidence and RT Explain the Variance in Neuronal unsigned difference in value (Table S4). These confirmed that
Activity Better Than Any Other Variable confidence and RT were better models of the persistent activity.
Because numerous decision variables are mechanistically
coupled and statistically dependent, we next performed a quan- Neuronal Activity Is Correlated with Subjective Value
titative analysis to compare confidence and RT against other de- and Unsigned Value but Does Not Reflect the Change in
cision variables and stimulus-related variables, such as the cho- Preference between Experimental Sets
sen value, the subjective value, and nutritional or visual features. We also found a transient modulation of the activity time locked
A total of 122 variables were compared as alternative explana- to the stimulus presentations in both the valuation and the 2AFC
tions. First, a ranking analysis was performed. We computed tasks. We quantified this neural activity as the mean proportion
the mean proportion of neurons significantly correlated with of correlated neurons between the onset and offset of each stim-
each variable, averaged across the time steps of the analysis ulus, averaged across the time steps of the sliding window, and
window mentioned above, and sorted the variables by their subsequently averaged across each of the four stimulus presen-
mean proportion. Confidence and RT showed the highest tations (valuation, A1, B, and A2). We found a significant propor-
mean proportion of neurons among all variables (RT: 13.01%; tion of units whose firing rates were significantly correlated with
confidence: 11.81%). Importantly, confidence and RT were value ratings (9.88%; p < 108; Figure 6A) and value rankings
also the leading two variables in each individual region (9.88%; p < 108; Figure S2A). We also found a weaker but sig-
(Figure S2A). nificant correlation of the neural activity with the unsigned value
To quantify the significance of confidence and RT as the best (8.55%; p < 104; Figure 6B). Regional analysis showed that A
models, we applied the first analysis from the previous section to and H were the main contributors to this transient activity
each pair of variables, i.e., we sorted the ambivalent units by the (Figure S2A).
magnitude of the correlation and subsequently performed the Next, we analyzed whether the change in value or unsigned
post hoc binomial test. As previously noted, RT proved slightly value between experimental sets was reflected in the neuronal
better than confidence, but this difference was not significant activity. We repeated the ‘‘actual versus swapped’’ signed-
(p = 0.1676). Notably, both confidence and RT were significantly rank test described above. Surprisingly, this was not significant,
better than all other tested variables (all post hoc tests p < 0.05; not even when performed on the subset of neurons significantly
Table S3). The unsigned difference in value and chosen value correlated with value or unsigned value, respectively (Figures 6A
were the third and fourth best models. We repeated the above- and 6B, bottom). We also tested the proportion of neurons
mentioned subpopulation and multivariable regression analyses whose change in firing rate between experimental sets signifi-
to compare confidence and RT with the chosen value and the cantly correlated with the change in variable and averaged
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across the analysis window. These were again not significant or the chosen value, variables previously suggested to be
(ranking: 6.14%, p = 0.0791; rating: 6.14%, p = 0.0791; unsigned involved in confidence computation [15]. RT and confidence
value: 5.54%, p = 0.2574). Therefore, we found no evidence that also explained the persistent activity significantly better than
the changes of these variables between experimental sets were 122 alternative variables, suggesting that these variables were
accompanied by correlated changes in the neural activity. directly modulating the neural activity, instead of other lower-
level stimulus properties or decision variables. Moreover, the
Value and Unsigned Value Were No Better Models Than persistent neural correlates of both RT and confidence were
Nutritional Features of the Stimuli only maintained as long as they were behaviorally relevant for
We also performed a quantitative analysis of the transient stim- the task. Whereas the neural correlate of RT was maintained until
ulus-locked activity. Here, we compared value and unsigned the binary choice was made, the correlate of confidence per-
value with other stimulus-dependent variables, such as nutri- sisted after the decision, until confidence was reported. Similar
tional and visual features of the items, amounting to a total of graded persistent activity has previously been suggested by
18 variables. In a ranking analysis, we found that taste, defined attractor models of working memory in decision making [31, 32].
as a binary variable for salty versus sweet, showed the highest Previous studies have reported choice-correlated cells in the
mean proportion of correlated units across stimulus presenta- primate amygdala [33, 34]. However, we found no evidence of
tions (9.88%; p < 108; Figure 6C), together with subjective value choice-related activity in our recorded neurons. Moreover,
(value ratings: 9.88%, p < 108; value ranking: 9.88%, p < 108). several studies have previously described behavioral and neural
These were closely followed by the content of sugar (9.28%; p < dissociation between confidence, RT, and choice [21, 28, 35–
106), salt (9.16%; p < 106), and fiber (9.04%; p < 106). Un- 37]. Here, we observed two independent subpopulations of neu-
signed value only reached the seventh position in the ranking rons correlated with either confidence or RT. Contrary to neurons
analysis (8.55%; p < 104; Figure S2A). Regional analysis in the macaque parietal cortex [20], which show an accumulation
showed that, in the amygdala, both taste (12.45%; p < 105) of evidence and at the same time represent choice, confidence,
and fiber (11.32%; p < 104) were better than subjective value and RT, neurons in the human MTL show a fragmented modula-
(value ratings: 10.98%, p < 104; value ranking: 10.98%, p < tion of the neural activity by decision observables. These results
104). Subjective value was the leading variable in the hippo- suggest that confidence is computed somewhere upstream and
campus and EC and not significant in PHC (Figure S2A). conveyed to the human MTL. On the other hand, the interpreta-
Moreover, our post hoc binomial test showed that subjective tion of a population of RT-correlated neurons is not trivial. The
value was not significantly better than taste (value ratings versus task dependence of RT correlation suggests that RT might be
taste: p = 0.4656), sugar (p = 0.2168), salt (p = 0.1692), or fiber seen as a proxy for a non-observable or non-reported decision
content (p = 0.1948; Table S3). Some nutritional features showed variable, such as subjective decision difficulty. However, the
a correlational similarity with subjective value, defined as the meaning of the activity of these cells can only be speculatively
magnitude of the correlation between both variables, averaged addressed.
across experimental sets and subjects (taste: r = 0.42 ± 0.28 It has previously been suggested that, during valuation, valua-
SD; salt: r = 0.36 ± 0.27 SD; fiber: r = 0.36 ± 0.19 SD; sugar: tion confidence arises as a quadratic expansion of subjective
r = 0.40 ± 0.25 SD). Nevertheless, this only showed a partial value [22]. We found no evidence of sustained activity correlation
overlap, which is not sufficient to fully explain our findings in with either valuation confidence or RT during the valuation task,
terms of mere collinearity because, for instance, taste was as contrary to the 2AFC task. Two hypotheses could explain this dif-
good as subjective value in the MTL, and in the amygdala, taste ference: either confidence is correlated with the neural activity
was even better than value. specifically in the context of binary decisions or explicit report of
confidence is required for the neural correlate to emerge. Notably,
DISCUSSION both behavioral tasks were presented with the same Likert scale
and same response methodology. Thus, the neural correlates of
In this study, we found neurons in the human MTL whose activity confidence and RT are unlikely to reflect motor signals.
was persistently correlated with decision confidence. Impor- The amygdala has long been considered to play an essential
tantly, the change in confidence between experimental sets role in valuation [38–44]. Additionally, several animal studies
was accompanied by a correlated change in the neural activity, have proposed that the hippocampus and EC are also involved
providing further evidence. Rutishauser et al. [29] have previ- and even necessary for reward processing [45–50]. More evi-
ously reported neuronal activity in the human amygdala and dence of the role of the amygdala in valuation has arisen from
hippocampus to be correlated with confidence. However, the its strong connection with the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), tradi-
authors found two populations of memory- and novelty- tionally acknowledged as the main neural locus for subjective
responding neurons asymmetrically correlated with confidence value [6, 51–56]. In a previous study from our group, we found
reports, depending on their response type. Thus, these cells that the firing rates of single units correlate with subjective value
could possibly have reflected memory strength rather than in the amygdala, hippocampus, and EC [5]. However, to our
confidence. Instead, we here found a spatially and temporally knowledge, no study has provided evidence that neurons in
symmetric neural correlate of confidence, independent of the human MTL reflect the changes in value. Here, we provide re-
choice. To our surprise, a different subpopulation of neurons sults confirming the existence of a task-invariant transient activ-
was persistently correlated with RT. Notably, both RT and confi- ity in the human MTL during visual stimulus presentation [5].
dence better explained the variance of the neural activity than However, we could not confirm that subjective value is the
other decision variables, such as the unsigned difference in value best explanation of this neural activity.
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We found no evidence that the changes in subjective value be- d KEY RESOURCES TABLE
tween experimental sets were accompanied by a correlated d RESOURCE AVAILABILITY
change in the neural activity, a necessary requirement for a true B Lead Contact
value correlate. A limitation of this study is that the subjective values B Materials Availability
were not as strongly perturbed between experimental sets as other B Data and Code Availability
variables, which limits the sensitivity of our analysis. However, we d EXPERIMENTAL MODEL AND SUBJECT DETAILS
also found that the transient activity could be equally well explained B Subjects and implantation schemes
by the nutritional features of the stimuli. Importantly, these nutri- d METHOD DETAILS
tional features were only partially correlated with value. Thus, B Electrophysiological setup and data preprocessing
mere collinearity cannot fully explain these results. Wang et al. [9] B Cognitive paradigm
have shown that the projections of taste cortex to the amygdala d QUANTIFICATION AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
are necessary to link value and taste. Moreover, a neural correlate B Mixed-effect hierarchical models
of the subjective content of different nutrients has been reported in B Responses were not biased by the design.
human lateral OFC [57], and the amygdala is strongly connected to B Similarity and change of cognitive variables
OFC. An alternative explanation of the transient response could be B Firing rate estimation and windows of analysis
that amygdala activity correlates with lower level nutritional fea- B Identification of relevant variables
tures and this information would then be conveyed to the lateral B Estimates of subjective value were consistent
OFC and subsequently to the medial OFC, where it would be inte- B Variable update analysis
grated as an abstract and updated subjective value. B Quantitative comparison of variables
We also assessed unsigned value, which has previously been B Subpopulation and independence analyses
suggested to be related to the amygdala [7, 58]. Unsigned value B Changes of mind
was not even among the best candidates to explain the transient
signal, and its change between sets was not accompanied by a SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
correlated change in firing rates. Note that the changes in un-
signed value of the stimuli were similar in size to those in decision Supplemental Information can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
confidence. Thus, our results regarding the lack of correlated cub.2020.09.021.
change in the firing rates between experimental sets are more
conclusive than those for subjective value. Therefore, we here ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
found no evidence for a correlate of unsigned value in the activity
We thank all patients for their participation and Gert Dehnen, Marcel Bausch,
of the recorded units, which agrees with previous neuroimaging
Iria Dominguez, and Wolfram Schultz for discussion. This research was sup-
studies investigating unsigned value [30, 59]. However, because ported by the Volkswagen Foundation and the German Research Council
we recorded only a small fraction of MTL units, neurons in other (MO930/4-2, MO930/8-1 and SFB 1089). A.U.-P. was supported by the Fun-
subregions of the amygdala and the human MTL could reveal de la Maza and the Obra Social La Caixa.
dación Barrie
value or unsigned-value correlates.
A limitation of our statistical approach is that it neglects the AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
strength of the association between cognitive variables and the
activity of single neurons. In our analysis, we focused on whether F.M. and M.R.H. designed the study. C.E.E. recruited the patients. J.B. and
the fraction of neurons significantly correlated with a cognitive F.M. implanted the electrodes. M.R.H., A.U.-P., and F.M. collected the data.
variable was higher than expected by chance. Nonetheless, A.U.-P. conceptualized and performed the data analysis. A.U.-P. and F.M.
wrote the manuscript. B.W. provided the images of the stimuli. All authors dis-
there could be small subpopulations of neurons whose activity
cussed the results and commented on the manuscript.
was strongly correlated with other cognitive variables but whose
proportion of neurons did not reach significance after correction
DECLARATION OF INTERESTS
for multiple comparisons. However, correction for multiple com-
parisons is necessary to reduce the risk of false positives. The authors declare no competing interests.
In conclusion, our results show evidence for two segregated
subpopulations of neurons in the human MTL whose activity is Received: February 25, 2020
correlated with conscious reports of confidence and with RT dur- Revised: July 17, 2020
ing decision making. Both variables showed a persistent correla- Accepted: September 7, 2020
Published: October 8, 2020
tion with the neural activity as long as these variables were relevant
for the task, and the change in neural activity between experi-
mental sets correlated with the change of these cognitive vari- REFERENCES
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STAR+METHODS
RESOURCE AVAILABILITY
Lead Contact
Further information and requests for resources should be directed to and will be fulfilled by the Lead Contact, Florian Mormann
(florian.mormann@ukbonn.de).
Materials Availability
This study did not generate new unique reagents.
METHOD DETAILS
Cognitive paradigm
Patients performed cognitive experiments on a laptop computer while sitting in bed. Every patient performed the experiment once, and
the total duration was approximately 90 minutes. Psychtoolbox was used to program the paradigm. Each experiment consisted of two
experimental sets, and each of these sets included two cognitive tasks in the following order: a valuation task and a two-alternative
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forced-choice task (2AFC). During the valuation task, high-resolution pictures of 20 junk food products (10 salty and 10 sweet) were
displayed on a laptop screen for 2 s in pseudo-random order. Patients were instructed to rate how much they wanted to eat the stimulus
on an arbitrary scale ranging from 100 to +100, in 8 steps of 25 units each. Responses were given by repeatedly pressing either the left
or the right key. The Likert scale was displayed until they pressed the OK button, without time restrictions. All answers were required to
be either a positive or a negative value. All stimuli were displayed three times in pseudo-random order, resulting in a total number of 60
trials per set. The 2AFC task consisted of a sequential presentation of two out of the same 20 stimuli. Each stimulus was displayed for 1
s. First, stimulus A was displayed for the first time (presentation A1), followed by stimulus B (presentation B), and finally stimulus A was
presented again (presentation A2). Patients were asked to report which stimulus they preferred and their confidence in each decision.
The Likert scale was displayed beneath both products, one on the left and one on the right, until the OK button was pressed, without
time restrictions. The scale was again divided in 8 steps of 25 units each: 4 steps for the right stimulus ranging from 25 to 100, and the
same for the left option. Responses were again given by repeatedly pressing either the left or the right key. The selection of the pair of
products and their temporal location as stimulus A or B was pseudo-randomly balanced. Stimulus location on the left or right during the
Likert scale was also pseudo-randomly balanced and independent of the temporal sequence of presentation. After the first set of these
two experiments, during a break, patients ate their preferred stimulus until they felt satiated. The preferred stimulus was defined as item
chosen most often in the 2AFC task, i.e., the item with the highest value ranking. In a second set of experiments, the participants
repeated the same tasks in the same order. During the 2AFC task, all possible combinations of products were presented once, resulting
in a total number of 190 different trials. For each trial, the sequence of presentation of the stimuli was maintained to ensure comparability
of trials between both experimental sets. The order of trials was pseudo-random and differed between experimental sets. Subjects were
informed during the break that after the second set of experiments they would have to consume again their preferred stimulus to sati-
ation. Note that one of the subjects declined to eat during the break, but their results were still included in our analyses since they did not
show any different behavior from the rest of the subjects (Figure S1B).
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duration throughout all experimental sets. This ensured that no overlap with the neural activity of the subsequent trial was included in
the window of analysis. For the transient neural activity, the window was defined between the onset and offset of each of the four
stimulus presentations (valuation, A1, B and A2), during both the valuation and the 2AFC tasks. All analyses were performed as a
sliding-window over the convoluted instantaneous firing rates.
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where r11 and r22 are the actual correlation coefficients and r12 and r21 are the swapped terms. The magnitude of the correlation
was computed for each unit as
r11 ðjÞ + r22 ðjÞ
ActualðjÞ = (Equation 1)
2
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First, a model selection of each cell and each step of the sliding window was performed exactly as described in the previous sec-
tion: if a cell was significantly correlated with both cognitive variables simultaneously, the neuron was only counted for the variable
exhibiting stronger effect size, as described above. A one-tailed binomial test with an expected proportion of 0.5 (no preference) was
then performed to determine whether the proportion of cells was significantly higher for one variable versus the other.
In a second analysis, one of the variables was treated as a control variable. In a first step, all the units significantly correlated with
this control variable (e.g., confidence), were removed from the analysis. For remaining units, the proportion of units significantly corre-
lated with the other variable (e.g., RT), was calculated at each step. Importantly, units correlated with the control variable were not
removed from the denominator of the proportion. This allowed maintaining a common reference in the denominator, since the num-
ber of removed correlated cells changed over time steps. Moreover, if a control variable had a high proportion of correlated units,
removing these neurons not only from the enumerator, but also from the denominator could facilitate the statistical significance of
behavioral variables that were only weakly correlated with the control variable, similar to a suppressor effect in multivariable regres-
sion. Thus, with this procedure, we used a rather conservative criterion to establish statistical significance.
Third, we performed a sliding-window multivariate regression of the instantaneous firing rate for each cell and time point using the
two cognitive variables of interest (e.g., confidence and RT) as predictors for each neuron and time step. Both dependent and inde-
pendent variables were rank-transformed and Z-scored. The variable update analysis previously described was repeated using the
standardized regression coefficients.
The significance of the proportion of cells in the three analyses was tested using a binomial test during the windows of analysis, as
described above.
Changes of mind
Across all subjects, only in 12 trials out of a total of 1440 trials did a subject change their mind during the valuation task (0.83%). For
the 2AFC task, this was the case in 22 trials out of 4560 (0.48%). We therefore decided not to analyze them separately due to the lack
of sufficient data.