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Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)
Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)
The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents.
The first complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro
Manila), of the Regional Trial Court, National capital Judicial Region against defendant
(respondent) Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Reasources
(DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of
the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They further
asseverate that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn and
asserted that continued deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of the
ecological balance and have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies.
Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber
License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs.
Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint
had no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question.
The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief
prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the
Constitution.
Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the
court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent
RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.
ISSUES:
RULING:
Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal
right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The
Court did not agree with this. The complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right --
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is incorporated in Section 16 Article
II of the Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the
environment and implies, among many other things, the judicious management and
conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the
DENR to be the primary government agency responsible for the governing and
supervising the exploration, utilization, development and conservation of the country's
natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in
Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative
Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation,
and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners
(and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's
duty to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation
to respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners
maintain that the granting of the TLA, which they claim was done with grave abuse of
discretion, violated their right to a balance and healthful ecology. Hence, the full
protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate
enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.
Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the expanded
jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule upon even on the
wisdom of the decision of the Executive and Legislature and to declare their acts as
invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.
The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare
is promoted. It is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause thus, the
non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can be validly withdraw whenever dictated
by public interest or public welfare as in this case. The granting of license does not
create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights.
The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the RTC
decision is SET ASIDE.
FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as
citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic
Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA)
and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain
provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals
and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in
section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA,
there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural
resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the
ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the
ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as
owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the
small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large
scale development and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the
public domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which
is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the
State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their
ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to
alienate the same.
Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape TanonStrait, et al v. Secretary Angelo Rey
ISSUE: Whether or not Service Contract No. 46 is violative of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and sta
FACTS: Petitioners, collectively referred to as the "Resident Marine Mammals" in the petition, are the
porpoises, and other cetacean species, which inhabit the waters in and around the Tañon Strait. They
Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio as their legal guardians and as friends (to be collectively known a
empathize with, and seek the protection of, the aforementioned marine species. Also impleaded as an
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, for her express declaration and undertaking in the ASEAN Charte
among others. On June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the DOE, entered
Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX. This contract involved geological and geophysical
studies included surface geology, sample analysis, and reprocessing of seismic and magnetic data. JA
conducted geophysical and satellite surveys, as well as oil and gas sampling in Tañon Strait. On Dece
formally converted GSEC-102 into SC-46 for the exploration, development, and production of petroleu
approximately 2,850 square kilometers offshore the Tañon Strait. JAPEX committed to drill one explora
phase of the project. On March 6, 2007, the EMB of DENR Region VII granted an ECC to the DOE and
gas exploration project in Tañon Strait.14 Months later, on November 16, 2007, JAPEX began to drill a
of 3,150 meters, near Pinamungajan town in the western Cebu Province.15 This drilling lasted until Fe
insist that SC-46 is null and void for having violated Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
DECISION: Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: This Court has previously settled the issue of whether service contracts are still
Constitution. In La Bugal, the Court held that the deletion of the words "service contracts" in the 1987 C
ban on them per se. In fact, portions of the deliberations of the members of the Constitutional Commis
deliberating on paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII, they were actually referring to service contracts as u
Constitution, albeit with safety measures to eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent during the mart
the matters discussed in the ConCom, the Court established that paragraph 4, with the safeguards in p
paragraph 1, Section 2 of Article XII. The following are the safeguards this Court enumerated in La Bug
be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils. The grant thereof is sub
among which are these requirements: (1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a ge
or uniform terms, conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a certain uniformity in provisions a
of terms disadvantageous to the country. (2) The President shall be the signatory for the government b
agreement is presented to the President for signature, it will have been vetted several times over at dif
conforms to law and can withstand public scrutiny. (3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, th
Congress to give that branch of government an opportunity to look over the agreement and interpose t
any.69cralawlawlibrary. Adhering to the aforementioned guidelines, the Court finds that SC-46 is indee
noncompliance with the requirements of the 1987 Constitution.