NATO: AN

ALTERNATIVE
STRATEGIC
CONCEPT
A CONTRIBUTION FROM THE LEFT

E X A R C H E I A | M AY 2 0 2 2

ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC CONCEPT | 1


Who is this report for?
Everyone not currently entitled
to see or amend the NATO Draft
Strategic Concept currently in
formulation for the Madrid
Summit.
It is a discussion document to
stimulate engagement by
politicians and civil society
bodies in NATO member and
applicant countries.
SUMMARY
As we approach the Madrid Summit, civil society needs to have
its say in the formulation of a new NATO Strategic Concept. This
report proposes the following major changes.
• NATO to adopt democratic resilience as its primary task, co-
equal with deterrence and defence.
• NATO to disavow significant out of area operations beyond
the immediate periphery.
• NATO to incorporate the EU, and its goal of strategic
autonomy, into the formulation of Western strategy, with
EU represented on NATO council.
• NATO to seek security co-operation with China, while
actively deterring the immediate and acute threat from
Russia.
• All three NATO nuclear powers to pledge no first use of
nuclear weapons and make "sole purpose" declarations
• NATO to adopt Austin/Blinken conflict goals with regard to
Russia/Ukraine.
• Human security, climate change mitigation and democratic
resilience to be adopted as non-negotiable objectives.
• Enlarged conventional forces deployed in three sub-theatres
(Nordic, eFP, Black Sea) with clear signalling and deterrent
intent.
• Allied defence spending to rise to 3% GDP by 2025, with
standardised forms of measurement, state directed
investment and wider use of reserve/territorial forces.
• NATO to adopt goal of achieving global dominance in EDTs
and EDT countermeasures.
• NATO countries to collaborate in adapting to the current
Revolution in Military Affairs
The express purpose of these proposals is to address the major
weakness of the alliance: the erosion of democracy, social
cohesion and rule of law within our own societies - and the
erosion of consent for military action.
To mobilise the populations of Allied countries in an era of
systemic competition, NATO strategy must be primarily
defensive, and focused on threats to the Euro-Atlantic area.
ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC CONCEPT | 2

Russia has invaded Ukraine. It has
demanded the rollback of 30 years
of democratisation and collective
security in Eastern Europe. It has
declared NATO its adversary
INTRODUCTION
Soviet policy in the 1930s, wrote the historian Mark Harrison, "prepared
continually for war. At the same time, this was not preparation for any
particular war, forecast or planned for any specific time and place, but
insurance against the possibility of war in general." (Barber and Harrison,
p16)
Surveying the text of the NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept, we can make the
same retrospective judgement. Its authors could not see even the
beginnings of the threat we now face. "Today," began their survey of the
security environment, "the Euro-Atlantic area is at peace and the threat of a
conventional attack against NATO territory is low" (NATO, 2010, p10).
As a result, they designed NATO as an insurance policy against war in
general. Global south instability, cyberwarfare and terrorism were the
biggest blips on the threat radar. Out-of-area crisis management remained
the core obsession. The current revolution in military technology was barely
anticipated: lasers, electronic warfare and access to space were referenced.
Artificial intelligence, robotics and hypersonic missiles were not.
Today, NATO faces a real war on its doorstep, with existential consequences.
Russia has invaded Ukraine. It has demanded the rollback of 30 years of
democratization and collective security in Eastern Europe. It has declared
NATO its adversary. It is mounting hybrid offensives inside our civil societies.
Meanwhile key out-of-area interventions - in Libya, Iraq and Afghanistan -
have tangibly failed, leaving large parts of the electorate in NATO's core
countries disillusioned and even hostile to crisis management operations.
China has emerged as a systemic competitor to the USA on a global scale,
causing some to argue that Washington should deprioritize the defence of
Europe, or load the main burden onto European states.
And some NATO countries are clearly failing to live up to the democratic and
rule-of-law aspirations of the North Atlantic Treaty - including Turkey,
Hungary, Poland and, most dangerously, the USA itself, which has failed to
bring to justice the politicians responsible for inciting the attempted 6
January coup.
In response to the changed situation, the 2010 Strategic Concept will not
only have to be replaced at Madrid, but the whole purpose of the NATO
reworked.
However, even the official milestones to Madrid - the NATO Reflection
Group report, the Brussels 2021 declaration and the NATO Parliamentary
Assembly's contribution, written just prior to the Ukraine war - have failed to
capture the scale of the transformation needed.
ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC CONCEPT | 3

What NATO needs is not a concept
but a strategy - agreed between
politicians and with the debate
opened up to civil society
WHAT CAN BE SOLVED AT
MADRID?
What NATO needs is not a concept but a strategy. That strategy needs to be
publicly agreed between politicians, debated by parliaments and civil
society, and implemented - as always - in classified Military Committee
Guidance, and through more efficient and transparent NATO structures.
At one level, the emergence of a clear, conventional threat demands a
return to the Cold War-style formation of strategy: assess the threat, decide
the priorities, design and deploy the forces, procure the capabilities, frame
the command structure and set a readiness posture. The proximity and
severity of the threat demands a clear break with the practice of producing
consensual, anodyne, principles-based documents, which mask strategic
tensions instead of resolving them.
But at the political level we cannot go back to the Cold War routine. The USA
threatened to walk away from the Alliance as late as 2018. Its own
democracy remains fragile - and any strategy document based on a realistic
risk assessment must include contingencies for the emergence of an
isolationist/authoritarian Presidency after 2024.
Meanwhile, in practical terms, it is the USA that has set the pace of Western
response to Russian aggression and, from late April 2022 onwards, specified
a clear war aim. NATO, by contrast does not have the structures or authority
to originate grand strategy, and one of the ambitions of Madrid should be to
resolve this problem.
The challenge at Madrid is to produce consensus over Western geopolitical
strategy and turn this into a diplomatic, military, intelligence and
procurement mandate, incorporating commitments to human security,
decarbonization, democracy and the rule of law as non-optional
components. Doing that requires political leadership of a kind that was not
needed during the first Cold War.
Until 1989, the portion of NATO's Eastern flank bordering its direct
adversaries consisted only of Germany, Greece and Turkey. In each of these
countries there was a distinct "Cold War" political settlement, with a political
establishment compliant with US wishes and a deep state dedicated to
containing those who were not. Put bluntly, the USA could easily square the
governments of these three front line countries with the demands of
forward defence.
In 2022, by contrast, with the accession of Finland and Sweden, NATO's land
flank alone will stretch continuously from the Arctic Circle to the Black Sea,
placing eight former Warsaw Pact states, with highly diverse political and
military "styles", on the front line, alongside Turkey where democracy is
seriously attenuated, and Finland which may be reluctant to host foreign
troops and nuclear weapons.
The militarization of the Arctic turns Canada into a frontline country. In
addition, a key structural partner - the European Union - has expressed its
desire for strategic autonomy, in part driven by fears over the durability of
the US commitment to NATO.
ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC CONCEPT | 4

How did we get from blithe
assumptions about the permanence
of peace to the disorder at Kabul
airport and the sudden military
aggresion against Ukraine?
So the Strategic Concept 2022 has to be a diplomatic agreement on
geostrategic goals first; a force generation, doctrine and deployment plan
second. And it must be infused throughout with the founding democratic,
universalist and legal principles of the Alliance.
In the process of making it, NATO's leaders have to address honestly the
question: how did we get from 2010 to here? How did we get from blithe
assumptions about the permanence of peace, to Western troops scrambling
to escape the collapsing order in Kabul, and the sudden eruption of military
aggression from Russia, with all traditional deterrent measures failing?
Almost nothing within the official process asks that question. The author has
no access to the internal documents, but of the public ones only the NATO-
PA report explicitly queries the conduct of the Afghan mission, and the
former obsession with out-of-area operations.
As a result, the Madrid Summit stands at risk of showing that, while NATO
may be an adaptive organization, it is not a learning one. It may change tack
abruptly, but never explain to itself, or its component electorates, why.
THE SHADOW
CONTRIBUTIONS
As to the various "shadow" contributions that have achieved reference
status in the run-up to Madrid, they contain useful insights, but pull in
different directions and are out of date:
The Reflection Group report (TRG), completed in November 2020 identifies,
albeit in euphemistic language, the major problem: that democratic
resilience within NATO is threatened by the emergence of numerous anti-
democratic actors (implicitly Hungary, Turkey). As a result, though it stands
in need of exerting quasi-sovereignty over its members - in terms of
contribution, interoperability, collaborative R&D in emerging technologies -
the risk is that the Alliance shatters under the strain of systemic conflict with
Russia and systemic competition with China.
The Alphen Group report (TAG) leans towards solving this problem by
mandating the European and Canadian allies to achieve tough resource goals
- e.g. contributing 50% of all combat power by 2030 - which it labels
"strategic responsibilities". The TAG report's clear agenda is to allow the USA
to face towards China as a priority, leaving NATO's centre of gravity in
Europe, with consequent need to upgrade of Europe's military capabilities
and spending. This "China hawk" agenda, though on the back burner
because of Ukraine, remains strong within American security thinking.
The Elcano Institut Real (EIR) "One Plus Four" report, mandates NATO to
focus on one overarching goal - building alliance cohesion - and add
democratic resilience to its present three core tasks (deterrence, crisis
management and co-operation). Published in December 2021, it is the most
recent shadow contribution and summarizes NATO's diplomatic challenges
as (1) Democratic resilience (2) China (3) European strategic autonomy (4)
Learning the lessons of Afghanistan, (5) the future of arms control, including
emerging disruptive tech (EDT).
ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC CONCEPT | 5
 Two of these reports push for the centrality of democratic resilience - both
as a practical countermeasure to Russian hybrid warfare and as a means of
solidifying support for deterrence among the Allied populations.

All three reports mention human security and climate change, though
without much in the way of concrete proposals.

But all of the public contributions so far fail accurately to express the actual
decision that lies before NATO, which is: where to fight, where not to fight,
how to formulate strategy between fractious allies, how prevent the erosion
of the democratic principles we are supposed to be fighting for, and how to
How can NATO defend its
mobilize populations jaded by two decades of "out of area" warfare in the
territories, values and economic global south, with questionable outcomes.
security while enhancing
This report, written after the Russian attack on Ukraine, proposes an
democratic resilience? Alternative Strategic Concept. Its purpose to show what NATO could be like
if the democratic, high-welfare societies who will form the European centre
of gravity could - in alliance with their Canadian and US liberal political allies
- set the agenda.

It is a social-democratic answer to the question: "how can NATO defend its

territories, its values and the economic security of its member states, while
taking the peoples of the Allied countries with us on the journey?"

Its structure is based on that of the 2010 document for reference, as it is

likely that the official draft will follow that structure.

THE RUSSIAN THREAT

The nature of the threat is clear and urgent. Russia has attacked Ukraine,
ripped up the NATO-Russia Founding Act, withdrawn from key components
of the global security architecture, breached the Geneva Conventions,
buried the Helsinki Final Act, made the unilateral threat of nuclear attack
against NATO, and stands credibly accused of crimes against humanity and
genocide.

Putin's strategic aim is not simply to dismember and "de-Ukrainize" Ukraine,

but to divide NATO, sideline the EU and force the USA to deal direct with
both Moscow and Beijing in a rules-free game of great power politics.

That is the intent NATO must adapt to and thwart.

So far, Russia has failed. NATO countries have displayed unprecedented

resolve and unity. They have - separately, through ad-hoc alliances and
through NATO itself - imposed the most severe economic sanctions in post-
1945 history. They have, in response to the escalating criminality of Russia's
aggression, moved from the supply of small arms, intelligence and training to
the large scale re-equipment, training and supply of Ukraine's armed forces.

Having begun in crisis management mode, key countries within NATO moved
to active deterrence of the Russian threat.

ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC CONCEPT | 6


The route back to security co-
operation with Russia lies through
the withdrawal of Putin's draft
treaties and a comprehensive
settlement with Ukraine
In April 2022 the USA clarified its goal in the conflict:
• To weaken Russia militarily and economically so that it cannot pose a
future threat to any neighboring country on the scale of the Ukraine
operation.
• To ensure Ukraine remains an independent, sovereign country capable
of defending its own territory.
At the Madrid Summit, NATO should formally adopt these goals as its short-
to-mid term strategy.
Until the Russian aggression is decisively deterred, there can be no talk of a
"dual track approach" to Russia - i.e. firm deterrence combined with the
ambition to de-escalate towards a new co-operative security arrangement.
The route to security co-operation with Russia and Belarus lies through the
withdrawal of the two draft treaties; withdrawal of Russian troops from all
Ukrainian territory; the payment of reparations by Russia to Ukraine and
other countries affected by disruptions to energy and food security; the
return of over a million abducted Ukrainian citizens; and Russia's assent to
new security guarantees for Ukraine.
NATO should not aim to change the government of the Russian Federation
by force; nor should it wish to destabilize Russia beyond what is necessary
for its defeat in Ukraine; nor does it have any territorial claim on Russia.
However, at the Madrid Summit it should reiterate the clear warnings
already given to Vladimir Putin: that any use of WMDs against Ukraine would
trigger an active military response by NATO; and that any military aggression
against a NATO member would trigger full and immediate military defence
of the country targeted, under Article V.
As states scramble to find resources to meet the challenge of these conflict
goals, they should rethink defence and EDT spending as investments, seeking
to create positive multipliers thorugh industrial strategy and industrial
planning.
Though each state brings its own defence/security tradition to these tasks, a
social-democratic solution to generating and sustaining the larger forces,
and longer logistic routes needed for forward defence would favour the
creation of territorial defence, trained reserves and democratically
controlled gendarmeries alongside professional armed forces.
STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES
The Alternative Strategic Concept is framed around the following principles,
formulated as answers to the challenges outlined in the EIR's "One Plus
Four" report.
1. NATO's goal is to maintain cohesion, capable of mounting effective
deterrence against the Russian threat, and capable of formulating strategy
on a timetable relevant to the threat.
2. Maintaining and enhancing democratic resilience should become a new
core task. Our biggest vulnerability is the lack of commitment of large parts
ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC CONCEPT | 7
of our civil societies to collective defence. Putin (and Xi Jin Ping) know this
and have poured billions into influence and disruption operations to exploit
this fundamental weakness of the Alliance.

3. Building co-operative security with China, and countering the systemic

challenge it laid down in the 4 February joint declaration is a secondary task
for NATO. By committing to the strategy outlined below, NATO is making a
choice similar to the one made by President Roosevelt in 1941: Europe first,
Pacific second. Deterring Russia is a priority over containing China. And
NATO cannot become a global-scale military power: its founding purpose is
the security of the Euro-Atlantic area.

4. NATO and the EU should formalize their relationships so that the EU is

able to participate in the formulation of grand strategy. The EU has a
justifiable fear that US democracy, and indeed the Federal government, are
so fragile that, under a different president, the task of collective self-defence
will fall to Europe. The EU should outline explicitly the implications of
European Strategic Autonomy at diplomatic, technological and military level
over the next 10 years, and wherever possible align itself with the NATO
strategy.

5. The lesson of Afghanistan, and indeed 20 years of expeditionary warfare

that succeeded militarily and then failed politically, is to refrain from major
operations beyond the immediate periphery of the Euro-Atlantic Area
wherever possible. The "out of area or out of business" doctrine should be
repudiated. The threat is on the Eastern Flank; the signal weakness of the
Alliance is lack of public trust in the political and military institutions that left
Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya devastated and chaotic.

5. There will be no comprehensive arms control agreement this side of

democratic political movements emerging in Russia and Belarus (aka "colour
revolutions"). Nor will we be able to make multilateral agreements and
refocus NATO on human security as proposed by Kaldor (NATO, 2021). We
should keep trying with arms limitation, particularly in space, but Russia is
now a rogue actor in all domains of conflict, incapable of sticking to any
treaty.

On the basis of these principles, governments, political parties and social

movements should discuss the following Alternative Strategic Concept
during the Madrid Process.

The author has no access to non-public documents. This is essentially a

political document, and thus avoids diplomatic language. Its suggestions for
force size and structure are notional, and are made in order to suggest the
kind of military technical commitments the parties at Madrid may have to
make.

The proposed text is outlined in the right column - with key proposals and
changes from 2010 pointed out on the left.

ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC CONCEPT | 8


The nature of the threat has
changed from general
instability to systemic
competition and conflict.
Democratic resilience is key to
survival.
Defensive nature of the Alliance
is stressed.
As in 2010 but emphasises
universality of our principles.
Clear primary focus on Euro-
Atlantic area. Clear
deprioritisation of crisis
management beyond the
periphery.
CORE TASKS AND PRINCIPLES
1.
NATO's fundamental and enduring purpose is to secure the freedom and
security of all its member states, and their peoples, through political and
military means.
In a world destabilised by emerging Great Power rivalries and totalitarian
dictatorships, NATO is committed to restoring the rules-based global order,
and to seeking strategic security co-operation with all countries committed
to dialogue and peace.
In the process, its members recommit themselves to the practice of
democracy, to observance of international law, and to non-selective
membership of the core institutions of that order, including the ICC.
We reiterate NATO's fundamental purpose: it an alliance for self-defence
only, and not for power projection beyond its immediate periphery.
2.
NATO member states form a unique community of values, committed to
the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of
law. We regard these principles to be universal.
The Alliance is firmly committed to the purposes and principles of the
Charter of the United Nations, and to the Washington Treaty, which affirms
the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace and security.
3.
NATO is a Euro-Atlantic security alliance. Its strategy over the next 10 years
will be to deter threats to peace and security in the North Atlantic, the High
North, Europe, the Mediterranean and the Black Sea (hereafter called the
Euro-Atlantic Area).
Given the emergence of an aggressive, criminal systemic threat from the
Russian Federation - which has issued existential threats against the
Alliance - defence of the Euro-Atlantic area shall be NATO's primary focus
for the foreseeable future.
It is unlikely that NATO (as opposed to individual member states or alliances
of such states) will take part in stabilization or crisis management beyond
the Euro-Atlantic area and its periphery.
ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC CONCEPT | 9

Adds democratic reslience as a core
task and reprioritises to focus on
deterrence at the expense of crisis
management, rejecting any Indo-
Pacific tilt
4.
Since 2018, the security environment has changed dramatically, due to:
Russia's invasion of Ukraine; Russia's issuance of two Draft Treaties (17
December 2021), effectively demanding the revocation of NATO expansion
post 1997; the joint declaration of 4 February, by Russia and China,
declaring an end to a single rules-based global order; and the withdrawal of
Russia from the Council of Europe. Secondary effects of the war, and
Western sanctions, could further erode global security: debt defaults, the
disruption of energy and food security; the effective paralysis of the UN.
Russia's attack was designed as an overt challenge: to our collective security
pledge under Article V; to all commonly accepted assumptions about
nuclear deterrence; and to NATO's right to offer an open door to all
European democracies that meet NATO's standards. In response, NATO
must reformulate and reorder its core tasks.
4.1. NATO's primary task is collective defence through active deterrence.
NATO members will always assist each other against attack, in accordance
with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. That commitment remains firm and
binding. NATO will deter and defend against any threat of aggression, and
against emerging security challenges where they threaten the fundamental
security of individual Allies or the Alliance as a whole. This commitment will
apply across all five domains of warfare.
4.2. Co-equal with the military defence of the NATO area, our core task is to
maintain healthy multiparty democracies, observing the highest standards
of press freedom, human rights, human security, electoral practice, the rule
of law and the active decarbonisation of energy supply. Only common and
active adherence to these ideals, and peer pressure on those who stray
from them, gives us the right to impose on each other obligations that
could lead to global conflict.
4.3. NATO remains committed to seeking co-operative security agreements
with our neighbours, allies and emerging global powers, including India and
China. It will make no co-operative security agreement with Russia until the
Draft Treaties of December 2021 are withdrawn; until all Russian troops are
withdrawn from Ukraine's sovereign territory; until reparations are paid to
Ukraine; and Russia accepts Ukraine's post-war security guarantees.
4.4. NATO will deprioritise crisis management beyond its immediate
periphery. It will not actively seek participation in out-of-area deployments,
unless requested by the UN or by a sovereign and legitimate government.
We specifically repudiate the "out of area or out of business" philosophy
advocated by some during the past 25 years.
We will launch a self-critical review of NATO operations in Afghanistan,
Libya and Iraq, and commit to the mandatory application of lessons learned
to the practice of any future crisis management operations.
ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC CONCEPT | 10

Specific committments to reduce
intra-NATO tensions and allow EU
into grand strategy role. Gives
NATO co-ordinating role in EDTs
5.
NATO remains the unique and essential transatlantic forum for
consultations on all matters that affect the territorial integrity, political
independence and security of its members, as set out in Article 4 of the
Washington Treaty.
Any security issue of interest to any Ally can be brought to the NATO table,
to share information, exchange views and, where appropriate, forge
common approaches.
At the Madrid Summit, all NATO members hereby renounce claims on
each other's territory and territorial waters.
At the Madrid Summit, NATO and the EU will aim to integrate their
geopolitical strategies and decision-making processes.
6.
The scale of the threats outlined above requires not only the
modernisation of NATO armed forces, and enhanced inter-operability, but
the substantial expansion of available combat power.
The Military Committee will be tasked to author a new strategic posture
and doctrine, covering the full spectrum of the hybrid, conventional,
cyber, space and nuclear domains.
NATO governments will actively collaborate to achieve and maintain
leadership over our competitors in emergent disruptive technologies
(EDTs).
In addition NATO will develop a centralised capability to make grand
strategy, including an Economic Warfare Directorate.
To mobilise the people and resources needed to meet this challenge, all
defence and research investment should aim to achieve social and
economic multiplier effects, boosting growth, productivity and social
cohesion.
It is likely, given the scale of the forces needed, that national
gendarmeries, territorial reserves and fire & rescue capabilities and some
civilian sectors of the economy will be required to play a part in NATO's
readiness plans.
7.
The Euro-Atlantic area is today under threat of conventional, nuclear and
hybrid attack by Russia and its allies. The threat from Russia is currently
high. This situation results from the failure of the deterrence strategies
ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC CONCEPT | 11
outlined in the 2010 Strategic Concept and should be the object of study
both by the military, political leaders and civil society. By responding to
the results of such studies, NATO can prove to its adversaries, allies and
the populations of member countries that it is not just an adaptive
organisation but a learning one.

8.
The immediate conventional threat is that Russia, in its unfinished war
against Ukraine, escalates to conventional strikes against supply routes in
NATO countries, airspace or territorial waters, or against the space
platforms of NATO countries. The immediate nuclear, biological, and
chemical threat consists of repeated Russian signalling of its intent to cross
these thresholds, under the guise of a false-flag attack by NATO, and in
repeated calls by members of the Russian power vertical for a pre-
emptive, tactical nuclear strike on one or more NATO members.

8.A
China's emergence as a rival superpower to the USA, with global military
reach, has altered the power balance decisively. While China is not NATO's
adversary, it has - in the 4 February 2022 joint declaration with Russia -
declared an era of systemic competition with the West, not just over
spheres of influence but over the values of democracy, universality, and
individual freedom.

China and Russia's stated aim is to replace the rules-based global order,
based on universal rights, with a three (or four) great power game, where
all values become relative.

NATO reiterates its commitment to the rules based international order

based on the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
Bretton Woods institutions and strategic arms limitation. It welcomes the
economic rise of China, India and the global south and pledges to seek
permanent co-operative security arrangements with all states which
abjure illegal wars of aggression.

It advises all member states to ratify the statutes of the ICC.

9.
The proliferation of nuclear weapons and other WMDs, and their delivery
methods, threatens incalculable consequences for global stability.

Russia's threat of first nuclear use, should NATO come directly to the aid
of Ukraine, changes the terms of reference for deterrence. It requires that
NATO respond with a new, integrated concept of deterrence, including
intelligence, economic warfare, conventional deterrence across all five
domains and an enhanced mix of weapons and platforms - alongside
proactive and explicit signalling to deter any pre-emptive use of nuclear
weapons.

ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC CONCEPT | 12

The Madrid Summit reiterates and endorses the statement by the USA
that any use of WMDs against Ukraine would be met with a devastating
response.

10.
Terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO
countries, and to international stability and prosperity more broadly.
Extremist groups - not just jihadi extremists but also from the domestic
and international far right - continue to spread to areas of strategic
importance to the Alliance, and within the alliance itself. Modern
technology increases the threat and potential impact of terrorist attacks,
in particular if terrorists were to acquire nuclear, chemical, biological or
radiological capabilities.

11.
Instability or conflict beyond NATO borders can directly threaten Alliance
security, including by fostering extremism, terrorism, and trans-national
illegal activities such as trafficking in arms, narcotics and people.

However, NATO's capacity to intervene militarily in crisis management

operations has been curtailed by withdrawal of consent for such
operations by the electorates of those countries traditionally prepared to
do so.

The US pullout from Kabul in August 2021 was a defeat for a key member
of the alliance, squandering such gains that were achieved by ISAF/OP
RESOLUTE FREEDOM, from which NATO itself must draw lessons.

Because of Russian aggression, and the need for NATO governments to

build domestic support for countering it, for the foreseeable future the bar
for out of area interventions will be set much higher. This is a clear change
of focus for NATO.

While it does not prevent member states convening "alliances of the

willing" for specific crisis interventions, we ask members to take note of
the urgent/important nature of the Russian threat and its call on
resources.

ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC CONCEPT | 13


Updates the position on cyber,
including offensive cyber. Identifies
economic warfare as a capability of
NATO.
12.
The start of the Russia-Ukraine war saw concerted cyberattacks by Russia
and its allies (eg DPRK, China) on the civil and military structures of NATO
countries and allies.
This came after a decade in which state and state-aligned offensive cyber
capabilities proliferated rapidly. This year alone, Ukraine, the Marshall
Islands, Andorra, Pakistan, Greece have all been victims of offensive cyber
by state or quasi-state actors.
Numerous NATO members now have centres of excellence for defensive
cyber operations, and even cyber commands. In the future NATO will
develop a co-ordinated cyber command, and states its readiness to
undertake offensive cyber operations against any declared adversary, with
or without provocation.
13.
The biggest strategic change triggered by the Russia-Ukraine war will be in
patterns of trade and energy consumption.
In response to the invasion, major NATO countries collaborated with the
EU and others to: shut down access to the SWIFT interbank payments
system; freeze and in some cases seize assets worth tens of billions of
dollars belonging to members of the Russian oligarchy and power vertical;
freeze around half of Russia's foreign exchange reserves; impose trade
embargoes on essential goods and materials.
In addition, numerous individual states have pledged, and begun to
implement, oil and gas boycotts against Russia, raising the risks to their
own energy security.
In response to the West's trade and energy actions, China has begun to
agitate for an "anti-sanctions bloc" - described by some proxy supporters
of Beijing as a "new non-aligned movement".
The result of these financial, trade and energy realignments has been to
seriously reverse the process of globalization; to stimulate the formation
of politicized trading blocs centred on two totalitarian states (Russia and
China).
It is likely, in the process, that damage to the supply side of the world
economy will begin to stimulate debt defaults by states against each other,
and against the private sector, and disruptions to energy and food security,
raising the risk of a serious global recession.
In response, the Madrid Summit advises members to begin the co-
ordination of national energy and food security strategies.
ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC CONCEPT | 14

Outlines a theory of the current
revolution in military affairs
14.
The past decade has seen four, linked developments in defence and
civilian technologies that have begun radically to change the nature of
warfare. Each of them is rooted in the digital revolution.
(a) The emergence of ubiquitous smart devices - primarily the
smartphone and the internet of things (IoT) - enabling both state and non-
state actors to gather data on civilians and military formations in real time.
This massively enhances the asymmetry between those with the power to
gather and analyze data, and the users of the devices. It allows both the
IoT and the civilian smartphone to be "weaponized", to become as Ford
and Hoskins (2022) argue "nodes in a kill chain", and massively alters the
way war is represented, both by the military and civilians.
(b) The rise of anti-access/area denial (A2AD) weaponry, with associated
operational goals and strategies. This was driven by China and Russia's
response to US proficiency in expeditionary warfare, leading them to
develop long range missiles, backed by cyber and space operations, to
prevent the USA maneuvering in critical areas in of sea, air and potentially
outer space. Combined with the capability for precision strike, this has
altered the operational practice of all major armed forces.
(c) Emerging and Disruptive Technologies (EDT) including artificial
intelligence, hypersonic missiles, autonomous drone systems, quantum
computing and ma- chine learning, robotics, big-data analytics,
nanotechnologies, biotechnologies and bioengineering. These present
states and non-state actors with ways to attack and threaten NATO
countries, requiring NATO to achieve technological superiority and to
develop counter-strategies against their use.
Of these technologies, the rise of cheap UAVs, produced by second tier
powers (eg the Turkish Bayraktar 2) or even by adapting commercial
drones (as in Ukraine) has tangibly and swiftly altered the balance
between unmanned systems and expensive armoured vehicles, and even
warships, forcing all militaries into an urgent search for countermeasures,
and throwing long-term procurement decisions into disarray.
(d) Russia's turn to hybrid warfare and its evolution into an existential
challenge for Western democracies. Through a mixture of financial
manipulation, corruption, organized crime, disinformation, cyberattacks,
economic sabotage, electoral interference, blackmail, assassinations,
irregular armed forces and regular forces, Russia has developed a modus
operandi for rendering a "victim state" powerless to resist its diplomatic
demands and military aggression.
Taken together, these four developments constitute a new "revolution in
military affairs" (RMA).
However, unlike in the 1980s/90s, where military theorists drove a one-off
doctrinal change in response to a set of quantifiable and predictable
technological changes, this one is being driven "from below" - by
improvised uses of the technology itself, and by spontaneous behaviors.
ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC CONCEPT | 15

Identifies climate change both as a
responsibility of NATO and a driver
of instability. Adds human security
as an objective.
Because it is based on digital technology, whose capacities in some
respects develop exponentially, it is unlikely that this revolution stabilizes
into the kind of "new normal" force structures designed in the 1980s/90s.
Sharing advanced technological knowledge, and keeping that knowledge
secure from the threat, will be a major priority for NATO as it confronts
the new RMA.
15.
Climate change, together with the economic and social disruptions
triggered by the Covid-19 pandemic, has become a major driver of
instability, not only at the periphery of NATO but in its core countries.
Extreme weather events, droughts, fires and melting ice caps all
potentially create new dynamics of conflict, and new demands on the
military to provide support to the civil power.
The IPCC's Special Report on Global Warming (2018) mandates the world
to achieve zero net carbon target by 2050. The military, which is estimated
to emit 6% of all carbon, has a duty to adapt, both by reducing and
offsetting its emissions. While such competencies will remain national,
NATO has a role to play both in situational awareness of climate risks,
pandemic risks and wider biological security.
The combination of war, totalitarianism, climate change, biosphere
instability and economic hardship is threatening human security across the
world. NATO's ultimate aim - if the conflict with Russia can be settled -
must be to restore multilateralism, the international rule of law, and
enhance human security for everyone on the planet.
ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC CONCEPT | 16

Critiques the democratic decay of
NATO countries and mandates
democratic resiliance as
precondition of effective self
defence.
Adopts democratic resilience as
fourth core task
15. A
The most profound threat to the security of NATO countries arises from
democratic decay. The attempted coup in Washington on 6 January 2020;
the attempted coup in Turkey in 2016, and the resulting authoritarian
crackdown; tangible Russian electoral interreference across NATO
countries; the EU's inability to impose the rule of law on Poland and
Hungary; the pervasive influence of Russian-backed disinformation outlets
are all signs of a profound destabilization.
Their causes are not just Russian or Chinese soft power and hybrid
aggression, but a decade of austerity, rising inequality, the emergence of
unaccountable platform monopolies prepared to weaponize dissent, and
the atomization of old hierarchies by the emergence of the networked
individual.
This, in turn, undermines NATO's capacity for collective self-defence. It
undermines the raison d'etre - the defence of democracies; it undermines
consent for military intervention; it undermines the cohesiveness of some
societies; it fuels the desire for independence and autonomy among
national and religious minorities.
Therefore at Madrid, NATO will adopt democratic resilience as its fourth
core task.
ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC CONCEPT | 17

Identifies Russia as primary threat.
Removes "we have no adversaries".
Reiterates strong commitment to
collective self-defence.
Reiterates commitment to nuclear
weapons, adds intent to develop
dominance in EDTs and
countermeasures
Major commitment: No first use of
nuclear weapons and "sole
purpose" statement.
DEFENCE AND
DETERRENCE
16.
The greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our
territory and our populations against attack, as set out in Article V of the
Washington Treaty.
Until Russia withdraws its troops from Ukraine, and the two Draft Treaties
of December 2021, the Alliance will consider the Russian Federation to be
its declared adversary and the primary threat to global security.
NATO makes no claims on Russian territory. It remains primarily defensive
alliance. It has no strategic objectives beyond the Euro-Atlantic area, other
than to maintain co-operative security, collaboratively manage crises and
avert terrorism.
If any country attacks a NATO member, whether by conventional armed
force, sponsorship of terrorism or weapons of mass destruction, every
country in the Alliance will take military action in collective self-defence.
17.
Deterrence is the core element of NATO's strategy. In response to the
breakdown of the nuclear non-proliferation/strategic arms limitation
architecture, the commonly accepted norms of strategic deterrence have
been disrupted. Deterrence is further disrupted by the rise of EDTs.
This requires NATO, led by its three nuclear-armed members, to develop a
new concept of integrated deterrence: a practice and doctrine of active
deterrence, matching capabilities to threats all the way up the chain from
terrorism and cyber-attacks to nuclear warfare.
So long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. So
long as nuclear armed countries possess and develop tactical nuclear
weapons, NATO countries reserve the right to do so.
So long as adversaries and potential threats go on developing EDTs,
NATO's goal will be to remain dominant in these technologies and the
required countermeasures.
NATO, and its member countries, reiterate their refusal to use or store
chemical and biological weapons, and call on all other countries to match
this commitment.
At the Madrid conference, NATO's three nuclear powers hereby commit
themselves to no first use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are held
for the sole purpose of deterring nuclear attack on NATO and its member
states.
ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC CONCEPT | 18

Specific proposals on capabilities
and force size. These are notional,
but represent an increase on the 30
-30- 30 plan (30 battalions,
warships and air squadrons)
Though it is not in the text, a left
"solution" to the problem of
generating a force of this size
would be to develop, alongside
professional armies, paramilitary
gendarmeries and extensive
trained reserves.
3% GDP spending commitment.
18.
The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the
strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United
States; the independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom
and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the
overall deterrence and security of the Allies.
19.
We will ensure that NATO has the full range of capabilities necessary to
deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of our
populations. Therefore, we will:
• Maintain and modernize our nuclear forces (within existing
commitments to the NPT); enhance and modernize our conventional
forces across all five domains; and aim to achieve strategic superiority
and sovereignty in the sphere of Emerging and Disruptive
Technologies.
• Transform the enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) into a Strategic
Forward Presence, deploying no fewer than 10 Brigades/BCTs [subject
to risk assessment by the military arm] to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania
and Poland; and a further 3x Brigade/BCT sized Southern Rapid
Reaction Force to Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey.
• The deployed BCTs will form warfighting divisions.
• Transform the Joint Expeditionary Force into a NATO-led Northern
Rapid Reaction Force for the defence of the Arctic and Nordic regions.
• Enlarge both Standing NATO Maritime Groups into forces capable of
conducting strategic access operations.
• Create an air/missile capability of at least 30 squadrons designed both
for the defence of Euro-Atlantic airspace and the attrition/interdiction
of Russian threats across all domains.
• Continue to invest heavily in missile defence.
• Create a Black Sea Littoral Defence force capable of significant A2/AD
operations in the Western Black Sea.
• Create a central offensive cyber capability.
The purpose of this new force structure is deterrence through
overwhelming power.
Both the people and leadership of the Russian Federation must be left in
no doubt that NATO will meet any attempt to seize NATO territory, or to
deny freedom of navigation at sea, with the comprehensive destruction of
any force that attacks us.
To achieve these goals, NATO countries commit at Madrid to increase
defence spending to at least 3% of GDP by 2025.
ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC CONCEPT | 19

Crisis management secondary to
democratic resilience and
defence/deterrence.
Commitment to learn lessons from
out of area operations.
Commitment to lessons learned
from failure of diplomacy,
deterrence and risk assessment
over Russia.
Critique of Afghanistan/Libya.
SECURITY THROUGH
CRISIS MANAGEMENT
20.
Crises and conflicts beyond NATO’s borders can pose a direct threat to the
security of Alliance territory and populations. NATO will therefore engage,
when necessary, to prevent crises, manage crises, stabilize post-conflict
situations and support reconstruction.
However, in the new circumstances of systemic competition and conflict,
NATO's crisis management function will be secondary to the core tasks of
democratic resilience and deterring the Russian threat. For the forseeable
future NATO's crisis management functions will be focused on its
immediate geographic periphery.
21.
NATO's interventions into Afghanistan, Libya and Iraq have failed. Each
was a military success, at great human cost, but a geo-strategic failure. In
the process, these interventions undermined the consent of Allied
populations for military actions, and fuelled the ability of Russia and China
to portray NATO as a global aggressor.
We commit to a comprehensive lesson-learning process from the out of
area operations, both at military/intelligence level and in terms of human
security, global stability and strategic decision making.
We will prove to the world, and to the Allied electorates, that NATO is a
learning organisation.
22.
The best way to manage conflicts is to prevent them from happening.
NATO will continually monitor and analyse the international environment
to anticipate crises and, where appropriate, take active steps to prevent
them from becoming larger conflicts. We will conduct a lessons-learned
study into the years 2014-22, during which NATO's signalling to the
Russian Federation did not produce stability in the Black Sea region.
23.
NATO hereby rejects the concept of "conflict management" beyond its
immediate periphery. The conflicts in Libya and Afghanistan were not
effectively managed. All localised conflict is now, effectively, subsumed
within the systemic conflict declared by Russia/China, and all interventions
have to be calibrated against the core goals: deter Russia, contain China,
enhance democratic resilience and Alliance cohesion.
ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC CONCEPT | 20

Commitment to strategic approach
to re-establishment of security co-
operation with post-conflict Russia,
and to multilateral reconstruction
effort for Ukraine.
Scale back out of area crisis
management functions and
ambitions.
24.
When the Ukraine conflict comes to an end, the international community
must often provide continued support, to create the conditions for lasting
stability. NATO will contribute to stabilisation and reconstruction in
Ukraine, in close cooperation and consultation wherever possible with the
EU and United Nations.
25.
NATO will develop a crisis management module consisting of
• globally deployable rapid reaction force consisting of military, medical,
crisis relief and humanitarian capability
• enhanced intelligence sharing
• an integrated doctrine for civilian, military and information operations
drawing on the lessons of Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya
• a training capability for local forces in crisis zones, with the aim of
handing control and ownership of crisis management to local forces as
soon as the crisis is stabilized.
ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC CONCEPT | 21

Recognises existence of systemic
competition and conflict.
No first use.
Realism on conventional
disarmament. Off agenda until
security co-operation is
established.
Commitment to climate and human
security.
Commitment to democratic
resilience within armed forces, and
building greater social legitimacy.
SECURITY THROUGH
CO-OPERATION
26.
NATO seeks its security at the lowest possible level of forces. Arms
control, disarmament and non-proliferation contribute to peace, security
and stability, and should ensure undiminished security for all Alliance
members.
However the declaration of systemic competition against the West by
Russia and China, and the massive military and technological investments
they have made since 2010, significantly alters the conditions under which
these goals can be achieved.
We remain resolved to seek a safer world for all and to create the
conditions for a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the
goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in a way that promotes
international stability, and is based on the principle of undiminished
security for all.
As a contribution to that goal, despite the severe provocations of Russia,
and its deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in the European theatre,
NATO countries hereby commit to no first use of nuclear weapons.
In return, we demand that Russia re-enters all previously signed nuclear
arms control agreements. We will work towards the mutual withdrawal of
tactical nuclear weapons from Europe.
We will continue to play our part in reinforcing global arms control,
nuclear non-proliferation and in promoting disarmament of both
conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, as well as non-
proliferation efforts.
However, in response to the increased threat, we recognize that, for all
member states conventional disarmament is currently off the agenda.
As NATO countries increase arms spending, and grow their armed forces,
will take steps to ensure the need for increased resources does not
conflict with the vital tasks of combating climate change and enhancing
human security.
We will encourage all NATO's armed forces to maintain high levels of
transparency, rule of law, accountability and demographic diversity, so
that as we generate the forces and combat power required to deter
Russia, Western society never again becomes home to politicized
militarism or extremist paramilitarism.
ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC CONCEPT | 22

New conditions on open door
policy, implicitly critical of NATO
diplomacy pre-24 February.
Open exit door for countries that
do not live up to democratic
principles.
27.
NATO’s enlargement has contributed substantially to the security of Allies;
the prospect of further enlargement and the spirit of cooperative security
have advanced stability in Europe more broadly, but has been seized on by
Russia and its proxies as the purported casus belli against Ukraine and
potentially Georgia.
Today, the enlargement project is strategically challenged by Russia.
Our goal of a Europe whole and free, and sharing common values, would
be best served by the eventual integration of all European countries that
so desire into Euro-Atlantic structures.
However, we recognise that there are legitimate reservations among
Alliance electorates about extending collective security guarantee into
regions currently plagued by conflict, instability and anti-democratic
forces.
Therefore we amend the open door formulation as follows:
The door to NATO membership remains open to all European democracies
which:
• share the values of our alliance;
• are willing to assume the responsibilities and obligations of
membership;
• whose territorial borders are not subject to conflict;
• which are at peace;
• which can demonstrate high standards of democratic resilience and
• whose inclusion can contribute to common security and stability.
Each candidate country will be subject to an independent and rigorous risk
analysis by a consortium of research groups and think tanks.
Further, we amend NATO's statutes to allow the suspension of military co-
operation, where a country stands flagrantly in breach of its obligations to
uphold democracy and the rule of law.
This is a major change, and its intent is to express to the peoples of the
Alliance that our commitment to democratic values, open-ness, the rule of
law and the rules-based international order is non-selective.
28.
The promotion of Euro-Atlantic security is best assured through a wide
network of partner relationships with countries and organizations around
the globe. These partnerships make a concrete and valued contribution to
the success of NATO’s fundamental tasks.
ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC CONCEPT | 23

Recognition of desire for strategic
autonomy in response to US
democratic fragility and
isolationism.
EU to become NATO member.
29.
Dialogue and cooperation with partners can make a concrete contribution
to enhancing international security, to defending the values on which our
Alliance is based, to NATO’s operations, and to preparing interested
nations for membership of NATO. These relationships will be based on
reciprocity, mutual benefit and mutual respect. In all relationships with
partners, NATO will insist on progress towards democracy and the rule of
law as a condition for further collaboration.
30.
We will enhance our partnerships through flexible formats that bring
NATO and partners together – across and beyond existing frameworks:
• We are prepared to develop political dialogue and practical cooperation
with any nations and relevant organisations across the globe that share
our interest in peaceful international relations and democracy.
• We will be open to consultation with any partner country on security
issues of common concern.
• We will give our operational partners a structural role in shaping
strategy and decisions on NATO-led missions to which they contribute.
• We will further develop our existing partnerships while preserving their
specificity.
31.
Cooperation between NATO and the United Nations continues to make a
substantial contribution to security in operations around the world. The
Alliance aims to deepen political dialogue and practical cooperation with
the UN, as set out in the UN-NATO Declaration signed in 2008, including
through:
• enhanced liaison between the two Headquarters;
• more regular political consultation; and
• enhanced practical cooperation in managing crises where both
organizations are engaged.
ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC CONCEPT | 24

Recognises European desire for
strategic autonomy.
Places EU on NATO Council.
States conflict aim with regard to
Russia/Ukraine.
32.
An active and effective European Union contributes to the overall security
of the Euro- Atlantic area. Therefore the EU is a unique and essential
partner for NATO. The two organisations share a majority of members,
and all members of both organisations share common values. NATO
recognizes the importance of a stronger and more capable European
defence.
We welcome the durabilaty of the Lisbon Treaty, which provides a
framework for strengthening the EU’s capacities to address common
security challenges, and we welcome progress made to strengthen foreign
and security policy since 2010.
We note the exit of the UK from the EU, and recognise that it will
continute to make a significant contribution to these efforts, as will other
non-EU allies.
NATO and the EU can play a mutually reinforcing and supporting role in
restoring peace and security.
However we recognise the emergence of potentially divergent concepts of
grand strategy, as the European Union pursues "strategic autonomy".
In response we commit to the removal of all barriers to collaborative
policymaking between NATO and the EU.
We resolve that the Council of the European Union shall have a
permanent representative and delegation on the North Atlantic Council,
co-equal with that of individual member states.
33.
NATO will remain fully alert to deter aggression from Russia across all five
domains of warfare, and in the hybrid space of democratic resilience, food
and energy security.
NATO poses no threat to Russia. But it stands ready to deter further
Russian aggression.
NATO's overt aim in the Ukraine conflict, compliant with our duty to
ensure the collective security of Alliance members, will remain as follows
until a comprehensive peace agreement is reached with Ukraine:
• To weaken Russia militarily and economically so that it cannot
pose a future threat to any neighbouring country on the scale of
the Ukraine operation.
• To ensure Ukraine remains an independent, sovereign country
capable of defending its own territory.
• To build the capacity of the Russian people for a transition to
democratic government and compliance with the rule of law
Once Russia returns to the norms and standards of international
behaviour we want to see a strategic partnership between NATO and
ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC CONCEPT | 25

States longterm desire for security
co-operation with Russia, and
conditions for it.
Russia, based on the soveriegnty of every state, the observance of
international law, and the prosecution of war crimes committed during
the invasion of Ukraine.
34.
The Russian Federation has violated the principles and commitments of
the NATO-Russia Founding Act. It has reversed the democratization of
society; its security doctrine is based on aggression; it has escalated both
its conventional and nuclear capabilities, while waging an overt hybrid
offensive against the West; it has broken every pledge to reduce nuclear
and conventional forces; it has destroyed the biggest OSCE monitoring
mission. It has issued two unilateral draft treaties demanding the reversal
of democratization and sovereignty in Eastern Europe and a veto over all
future developments in the security of Europe.
It has illegally annexed Crimea, unlawfully supported the breakaway
Republics in Donbas and on 24 February 2022 committed the crime of
aggression by invading Ukraine, followed by numerous well documented
war crimes, crimes against humanity and possible genocide.
Any future common security arrangement between NATO and Russia lies
at the other side of a comprehensive reversal of these behaviors. Having
ended formal co-operation in 2014, NATO hereby states that it regards
Russia in breach of the NATO-Russia Founding Act.
ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC CONCEPT | 26

This section lifted from 2010 and
would need expert update mapping
all NATO's current formal
relationships.
Recognises NATO's global
responsibilities.
35.
The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace are
central to our vision of Europe whole, free and in peace.
We are firmly committed to the development of friendly and cooperative
relations with all countries of the Mediterranean, and we intend to further
develop the Mediterranean Dialogue in the coming years.
We attach great importance to peace and stability in the Gulf region, and
we intend to strengthen our cooperation in the Istanbul Cooperation
Initiative. We will aim to:
• Enhance consultations and practical military cooperation with our
partners in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council;
• Broker an agreement for multilateral security guarantees for Ukraine,
once an interim peace agreement has been reached with Russia;
maintain the long-term offer of membership action plans for Ukraine
and Georgia subject to the new conditionality outlined above.
• Facilitate the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Western Balkans, with
the aim to ensure lasting peace and stability based on democratic
values, regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations;
• Deepen the cooperation with current members of the Mediterranean
Dialogue and be open to the inclusion in the Mediterranean Dialogue
of other countries of the region;
• Develop a deeper security partnership with our Gulf partners and
remain ready to welcome new partners in the Istanbul Cooperation
Initiative.
[NB This section needsto be updated with an inventory of current
collaboration and partnership agreements.]
36.
Unique in history, NATO is a security Alliance that fields military forces
able to operate together in any environment; that can control operations
anywhere through its integrated military command structure; and that has
at its disposal core capabilities that few Allies could afford individually.
In future this unique capability will develop command structures
integrated across all five domains, together with a co-ordination funciton
for national counter-hybrid strategies.
Having regard to this unique geostrategic power, NATO pledges to use it
for the common good of all humanity.
ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC CONCEPT | 27

Commits to 3% GDP by 2025. A left
government implementing this
would use Keynesian multipliers to
achieve social benefit and offset
fiscal impact on non-defence public
services.
Cohesion and interoperability.
Stresses the need to defend
democracy, mitigate climate
change and enhance human
security as non-negotiable tasks.
Commits to democratic scrutiny
and oversight of counter-hybrid,
which remains at national level.
37.
NATO must have sufficient resources – financial, military and human – to
carry out its missions, which are essential to the security of Alliance
populations and territory. Those resources must, however, be used in the
most efficient and effective way possible. We will:
• Commit to at least 3% of GDP defence spending by 2025, with
common standards as to the measurement of the defence
contribution.
• Maximize the readiness of our forces, and their capacity to sustain
operations in the field, including by undertaking focused efforts to
meet specific force contribution targets specified in a revised
Readiness Action Plan [TBC]
• Ensure the maximum cohesion in defence industrial strategy, research
and force design, to reduce unnecessary duplication, and to focus our
capability development on modern requirements;
• Develop and operate capabilities jointly, for reasons of cost-
effectiveness and as a manifestation of solidarity;
• Preserve and strengthen the common capabilities, standards,
structures and funding that bind us together;
• Engage in a process of continual reform, to streamline structures,
improve working methods and maximise efficiency.
38.
We, the political leaders of NATO, are determined to continue renewal of
our Alliance so that it is fit for purpose in addressing the 21st Century
security challenges, namely:
• the defence of democracy, the rule of law and the rules-based
international order
• mitigating climate change and the challenges to economic stability and
human security it is creating
Our Alliance thrives as a source of hope because it is based on common
values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law,
and because our common essential and enduring purpose is to safeguard
the freedom and security of its members. These values and objectives are
universal and perpetual, and we are determined to defend them through
rigorous self-criticism, reflection, and continuous progress against
commonly accepted scorecards on freedom, democracy and tolerance.
In addition to five-domain deterrence, we recognize that counter-hybrid
strategies must be formulated at national level, balancing the urgent need
to counter Russian and Chinese disinformation and other hybrid threats,
with the need for democratic scrutiny and oversight.
We remain committed to the widest forms of political freedom, freedom
of speech and association.
ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC CONCEPT | 28

Rejects Putin-Xi joint declaration.
Commits to independent
monitoring of democratic decay in
member countries.
Restates purpose. A defensive
democratic alliance against
totalitarianism and aggression.
Our express purpose is to maintain and defend politically heterogenous
societies and thriving multiparty democracies.
We reject the division of the world into "multiple modernities", in which
rights regarded as universal since 1948 are cancelled in the name of
cultural or political relativism.
We pledge to the Alliance populations that we will uphold the highest
standards of democracy in all member states, making the workings of
NATO itself as transparent as possible to the diverse actors within civil
society, and maintaining strong peer pressure on each other to maintain
democratic standards.
NATO will act as a defensive shield against the rise of totalitarianism
globally. We will defend every citizen of the Allied states against
totalitarianism and aggression. We regard every human being as having
inalienable, universal rights as enshrined in the UN Declaration of Human
Rights.
REFERENCES
Ford and Hoskins: Radical War: Data, Attention and Control in the Twenty-
First Century (2022)
Barber and Harrison: The Soviet Home Front 1914-1945: A Social and
Economic History of the USSR in World War (1991)
AUTHOR
Paul Mason is a journalist and author based in London, a member of
Britain's Labour Party and active in Ukraine Solidarity Campaign. Published
on Medium and as PDF by Exarcheia Ltd. @paulmasonnews
ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC CONCEPT | 29