8.

Four models of causation in the design of

anti-corruption policies
Guillaume Fontaine, Taymi Milán and Alejandro
Hernández-Luis

1. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF CAUSALITY IN

POLICY DESIGN

Causality is at the heart of policy design, be it for academic research or for a practical purpose,
which is why the policy design framework has produced so many different theories for the past
three decades (Peters, 2018). Yet there are many different ways to define causality, whether
scholars and designers desire to produce inferences about a relationship between two events,
to predict the effects of a decision, to give a plain explanation of a phenomena, to control the

f
confounding variables that may interfere in a causal relationship, or more generally to reason
about causal models (Illari and Russo, 2014, pp. 4–5). These distinctive conceptions of causal-
oo
ity have given rise to a broad range of methods that can be organized along two kinds of com-
plementary standard operating procedures. Difference-making methods aim at establishing
regularities between an explanans X and an explanandum Y through statistics, counterfactuals,
randomized controlled trials, etc. Production accounts strive to identify causal forces between
X and Y through process tracing, congruence analysis, informational accounts, etc. (Illari and
Russo, 2014, p. 52).
Adopting a theoretical framework does not imply adopting a method, nor does it result from
Pr

a specific methodology. For instance different neo-institutional theories are related to differ-
ent methodologies but are part of the same framework. Likewise, we may combine different
methods (quantitative and qualitative) as a way to explain or interpret causality, because this
is what a model of causation is about: a combination of difference-making and production
accounts. But we should not blend in a single theory different models of causation, based on
different ontologies. This goes against Brady’s argument, according to which a strong causal
inference should meet the following requirements: “Constant conjunction of causes and effects
required by the neo-Humean approach […] No effect when the cause is absent in the most
similar world to where the cause is present as required by the counterfactual approach […]
An effect after a cause is manipulated […] Activities and processes linking causes and effects
required by the mechanism approach” (Brady, 2010, p. 218).
Against this syncretic approach of causation, we contend that, when it comes to explaining
a policy outcome or to anticipating the effects of a policy design, we find ourselves between
a rock and a hard place: we have to stick to the right model of causation, then choose and even-
tually combine the right methods. Methods are techniques to account for causation between
events, in either an interpretive or an explanatory fashion. (Hence the importance of adopting
a pluralistic approach in our research protocols, in search of different kinds of evidence.) Yet
they derive from combinations of philosophical and scientific ontologies, whose core elements
are expected to guide scholars and practitioners. We call these combinations “methodolo-

136
 Four models of causation in the design of anti-corruption policies  137

gies” (Sartori, 1970), unlike authors to whom methodologies are but techniques (Hall, 2003;
Box-Steffensmeier et al., 2010). This distinction helps us to get a better understanding of
“models of causation”, regardless of their degree of mathematical formalization.
The problem of ontological alignment between theories and methods is twofold. On one
hand, the distinction between monist and dualist philosophical ontologies – or “philosophical
wagers” (Jackson, 2016) – separates explanatory from interpretive approaches to causality.
Dualism is the ontological ground of “classical objectivity” (Jackson, 2008, p. 132), which
states a radical separation between the world and our knowledge of the world. On the con-
trary, monism is the ontological ground of “fundamental value-orientations” (Jackson, 2008,
p. 133), which results from the continuity of knowledge within the world.
On the other hand, the division between phenomenal and transfactual scientific ontologies
separates knowledge production strictly based on observable events from that based both on
observable and non-observable but detectable events. According to the scientific ontology that
supports phenomenalism, knowledge is about organizing past experiences in order to antic-
ipate forthcoming situations, which implies these experiences cannot be transcended when
producing knowledge about the world. On the contrary, a transfactual ontology maintains that
knowledge goes beyond the facts, to grasp non-observable processes and factors that originate
these facts (Jackson, 2016, p. 40).

f
Combined with scientific ontologies, dualism emerges in two distinctive methodologies:
neo-positivism (based on phenomenalism) and critical realism (based on transfactualism).
oo
While neo-positivism favors independent and dependent variables to produce general causal
explanations, impact evaluation and agent-based models, critical realism would rather search
for causal forces, powers or mechanisms, to provide middle-range causal explanations and
realist evaluations. Likewise, monism emerges in on two distinctive methodologies: analyti-
cism (the phenomenal stance) and reflexivity (the transfactual one). While analyticism utilizes
ideal-types to build on causal configurations and actor-centered theories, reflexivity would
rather focus on discourses and representations to elaborate interpretive analyses and delibera-
Pr

tive frameworks. (For further elaboration on this application of Jackson’s typology, see Peters
and Fontaine, 2020.)
Based on this distinction, what are the ontological grounds of the policy design framework?
One way to address this problem is to consider the inputs (the data deemed valuable to provide
evidence on causality) and the outputs (the theories of causality and the choice of the accurate
methods thereof). Yet tracing the ontological alignment between theories and methods is
a tricky endeavor, since few authors actually make explicit their philosophical wagers and,
whenever they do, they may use confounding expressions from one model of causation (such
as causal case study, dependent/independent variables, most different/similar systems designs,
etc.) to describe another one. To give but one illustration of this difficulty, a simple search on
the Web of Science shows that less than 17 percent of articles on policy design (386 out of
2,275) explicitly refer to their methods in their abstract or keywords.1
In our research we use Jackson’s definitions and theories of causality by methodology to
build on a typology of models of causation in policy design (Table 8.1).
After elaborating our typology, we proceeded to test it against anti-corruption policies,
using the Web of Science2 to search for the best examples of how difference-making and pro-
duction accounts lead to different modalities of alignment between ontology and methods. We
reviewed the abstracts of 92 books, using the descriptor “corruption” in their title or keywords,
138  Research handbook of policy design

Table 8.1 Models of causation in policy design

Scientific ontology
Phenomenalism Transfactualism
Model 1: Causality as regularity Model 2: Causality as necessity
Dualism (looking for law-like generalizations (looking for causal forces for
for predictive explanations) non-predictive explanations)
Philosophical Ontology
Model 3: Causality as historical Model 4: Causality as social
Monism contingency (looking for ideal-types construction (looking for discursive
for configurational interpretations) frames for critical interpretations)

Source: Elaborated by the authors, adapted from Jackson (2016, pp. 220–221).

besides 165 abstracts from high impact journal articles, using the descriptors “corruption AND
policy” in the titles, abstracts or keywords referenced.
The remainder of this chapter presents the results of this state of the art. We selected
examples of anti-corruption policies for each model that illustrate the definitions presented
above, their methodological implications and the issues raised for policy design. We start with
causality as regularity (model 1), then we present causality as necessity (model 2), causality
as historical contingency (model 3) and finally we review examples of causality as social
construction (model 4). We conclude this chapter with a reflection on the implications of this
fourfold typology for the policy design framework.

f
oo
2. MODEL 1: CAUSALITY AS REGULARITY IN
ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICIES

2.a Methodology
Pr

Our first model of causation is based on a neo-positivist methodology. It defines causality

as regular and symmetrical relationships (if a cause is responsible for an effect, then the
absence of this cause explains the absence of this effect), based on sufficient and necessary
conditions. Research designs generally consider large-n comparison (Schmidt and Sewerin,
2020; Rose and Sohngen, 2011), randomized controlled trials and fuzzy-set QCA (Qualitative
Comparative Analysis) for external validity (Thomann et al., 2016, 2018). Common research
techniques for this model include a counterfactual treatment of observations (as opposed to
cases), econometric models (such as ordinary least-squares and panel regressions) and occa-
sionally case studies for outliers. The expected research products are formal (mathematical)
models, testing law-like theories and using statistics for predictive purpose.
The neo-positivist definition of causality relies on two core principles: evidence of a causal
connection can only appear through multiple cases; knowledge is built on successive layouts
of hypothesis building and testing. According to Jackson, the Cartesian gap between the
subject (knowing) and the object (known) implies that valid statements are related to an
independent mind (Jackson, 2016, pp. 58–60). Therefore both difference-making and causal
production procedures rely on falsifiability, which became the gold-standard in causal theories
after Karl Popper, in order to overcome the limitations of verification faced by logical positiv-
ism. From this perspective, since absolute certainty does not exist, science is about formulating
conjectures that can be empirically falsified or refuted, and empirical observations are the only
 Four models of causation in the design of anti-corruption policies  139

valid source of knowledge. The ultimate objective of science is to build on explanations (in the
mind) that correspond to the reality in the world (“on the other side of the gap”). There might
be multiple ways to proceed, but there are three questions that need to be answered: How do
inputs turn into outputs? What can be predicted from this relationship? What evidence do we
need to prove it? If causality is defined as regularity, eventually the robustness of law-like
theories depends on constant conjunctions and temporal continuity.
In political science, the neo-positivist methodology became the mainstream approach after
the experimental turn (Peters and Fontaine, 2020). From that perspective, a theory is a set
of universal statements based on a hypothesis that is submitted to methodological processes
and explicative conjectures such as theoretical frameworks, models, paradigms, and so forth
(Dowding, 2015, pp. 68–101). Models of causation are sub-types of paradigms, which are
incommensurable but replaceable when alternative theories from a rival paradigm successfully
pass empirical tests. All theories of causality grounded in neo-positivism present common
features. They make predictions (scientific hypothesis) based on simplified representations of
the world and statements formally or analytically related, that can be falsified via empirical
observations. Their reliability depends on their degree of utility, which in turn depends on
the validity of their assumptions. In that context, formalization is a way of representing the
world via manipulable symbols to reach deductive (or theory-driven) conclusions. Empirical

f
tests can be strictly quantitative or a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods; but they can
never be strictly qualitative because non-formal models have little or no external validity, even
oo
though they can provide a starting point for new hypotheses. Eventually, this model of causa-
tion provides two kinds of explanations, either based on mechanism formalization (i.e. connec-
tions between structure and behaviors to produce empirical generalizations) or the control of
independent variables (usually through ordinary least-squares or standard linear regressions).

2.b Policy Issues

Pr

Scholarship on regularity is the mainstream in corruption research (Mungiu-Pippidi and

Fazekas, 2020). It increased considerably in the 1990s after the publication of indexes to assess
governance and its most significant aspects worldwide. These efforts have been dedicated to
identifying the determinants of anti-corruption control and the social, economic, and political
consequences of corruption. Concern for the accurate measurement of corruption and confi-
dence in the data is at the heart of this tradition. Scholars generally utilize indicators created
by international organizations, NGOs or private corporations, among which the most common
are the Global Corruption Barometer and the Corruption Perception Index by Transparency
International, the World Governance Index by the World Governance Institute (an independ-
ent think tank accredited by the World Bank), the International Country Risk Guide by PRS
Group, and the Global Index from the Global Competitiveness Report by the World Economic
Forum. These indicators have attracted strong criticism for their limitations and controverted
meaning (Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 2010; Hawken and Munck, 2009; Andersson and
Heywood, 2009). Yet, as of now, they remain the most reliable source of empirical informa-
tion in the quest for law-like explanations driven by rational instrumental methods.
Research on the causes of corruption based on this model can be classified by structural
factors, institutional instruments and equilibrium models (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015). First, struc-
tural factors refer first and foremost to ethics and trust as fundamental values for development
and anti-corruption control, but they also include mineral and other natural endowment, spe-
140  Research handbook of policy design

cific modernization features such as life expectancy, urban concentration, levels of education
and democratization. Hence there is a correlation between higher corruption and lower human
development indexes. That being said, countries with a high Human Development Index such
as Argentina or Mexico are also renowned for having trouble in eradicating corruption. Other
studies indicate that middle-income countries can exhibit higher levels of corruption or the
perception thereof (Sekkat, 2018). Second, the institutional determinants include different
types of political systems (parliamentary vs. presidential) and governments (federal vs.
central), which affects the capacity of the legislative power to control government spending
(Stapenhurst et al., 2019), the legislative process and the adoption of laws of transparency
and information access, and the capacities of anti-corruption agencies. Yet these effects can
be counter-intuitive and even inconsistent with increasing corruption or perception of cor-
ruption (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015). Third, equilibrium models go back to pathbreaking research
by Robert Klitgaard (1988) and his formula: C=M+D-A (where C stands for corruption, M
for monopoly, D for discretion and A for accountability). This model was reformulated by
Mungiu-Pippidi (2015, p. 117) to include institutions as the “missing link”, which means
C=R-O (where C stands for anti-corruption control, R for legal and normative restrictions and
O for opportunities regarding power discretionally and material resources) (Kukutschka, 2020,
pp. 136–139).

f
Simultaneously, research on causal regularity in anti-corruption policies has advanced in the
explanation of the effects of corruption (Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, 2016). The economic
oo
effects usually receive major attention, given the distortions produced by corruption, as was
established during the 1997 Asian crisis. These include foreign direct investments, GDP per
capita, fiscal incomes, private consumption, productivity, etc. (Mauro, 2017). Corruption has
also negative effects on the public budget’s structure, by redirecting investments to big expan-
sive and unsustainable projects that benefit certain interest groups instead of attending to peo-
ple’s economic and social needs (Bardhan, 2017). The political consequences can be observed
through a loss of trust in the political and administrative systems, which eventually hinders
Pr

development and social cohesion of entire countries (Sekkat, 2018). A main objective of these
studies is to make visible and alert governments and the international community on public
policies’ drawbacks. Yet beyond this intention, when analyzing the literature about the causes
and consequences of corruption, it appears that inverted causation has not been overcome and
theorization remains insufficient (Rothstein, 2011), which turns out to be problematic when it
comes to providing insightful recommendations for policy design.

2.c Examples of Large-n Comparisons and Randomized Controlled Trials

Recent studies about the positive effect of professional career in the civil service on the effec-
tiveness of anti-corruption policies offer good examples of large-n comparisons (Rubin and
Whitford, 2008; Salihu, 2020; Laguna, 2011; Quah, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c; Rinnert, 2015). The
starting point here is the theoretical existence of stable, regular and statistically significant
relationships between variables measuring the structure, the institutionalization and environ-
ment in which professional bureaucrats operate, and their effects on anti-corruption measures.
Studying street-level bribery in Colombia, Langbein and Sanabria (2017) argue that civil
service professionalization, autonomy and meritocracy (as opposed to patronage) reduce the
tendency of front-line bureaucrats to accept bribes from public service users. Yet their research
does not indicate a consistent co-variance between a higher quality of the regulation and the
 Four models of causation in the design of anti-corruption policies  141

implementation of a professional career in the civil service, and the reduction of specific types
of corruption in the long run. Therefore they suggest we need to pay attention to the internal
variations of bribes demands in each country in different areas of the civil service.
Experiments that intend to capture the effects of public policies on corruption have become
a relevant input to anti-corruption policy design, by artificially reproducing the context and
conditions in which policies are formulated to anticipate possible solutions at a broader
scale. Boly and Gillanders (2018) conducted such an experiment at the Busara Centre for
Behavioural Economics in Nairobi (Kenya), in which they analyzed the incentives for design-
ers to fight against corruption in different contexts of institutional quality. Their hypothesis
was that decision-makers tend to deliberately manipulate the institutional possibilities to
detect corrupt acts thus affecting the due process and citizens’ equity before the law, as well
as control agencies. They found that the institutional environment is decisive in such manip-
ulations, as the distortion arises when the possibility of being detected does not apply the
decision-makers. Another interesting result of this experiment is to show that institutions are
manipulable and decision-makers do not assume a zero level of detection. Even when a civil
servant is not corrupted, lower levels of detection apply when his or her own actions can be
detected and sanctioned.

3. MODEL 2: CAUSALITY AS NECESSITY IN

f
oo
ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICIES

3.a Methodology

Our second model of causation is based on critical realism. It defines causality as necessary
and asymmetrical relationships (this way, only the positive relationship between the explanans
and the explanandum matters), based on INUS complexes (i.e. insufficient but non-redundant
Pr

parts of unnecessary but sufficient conditions). This model usually builds on small-n compari-
son (Vancoppenolle et al., 2015; Melloni et al., 2016) and deep within-case studies (Mavrot et
al., 2019), occasionally complemented by crisp-set and fuzzy-set QCA for typological theory
and case selection. Common research techniques include Bayesian updating, process tracing
(Fontaine et al., 2019), congruence analysis and case study for theory building or testing. The
expected products are non-formal models (i.e. regardless of mathematical formalization) for
predictive purpose, patterns of causal forces and contextual explanations.
The critical realist definition of causality goes back to the 1970s, with Roy Bhaskar’s
critique of scientific realism. At the heart of this methodology lies the idea that societies and
human interactions are open systems in which contingency is the rule rather than the excep-
tion. The basic principle supporting causality as necessity is the search for causation beyond
correlations, where transfactual objects are as good as it gets to identify causal forces. The
production of scientific knowledge still consists in bridging the mind–world gap, but critical
realism strives to overcome the limits of our phenomenological experience and to take stock
of real but non-observable objects (Jackson, 2016, pp. 83–122). As a matter of fact there is not
one single causal explanation based on non-observable objects: for instance, in history they
are utilized to unify phenomena under a common explanation, while in experimental sciences
they are utilized to produce new phenomena. However, non-observable but detectable objects
can be real entities related to actual causal processes which account for their evident behavior.
142  Research handbook of policy design

Stock examples of such objects are the state, which is a real fiction, and social structures,
which are irreducible entities that produce their elements and possible transformations. In both
cases, the objects are defined in terms of degrees of possibilities that can be observed or not.
Critical realism shares with neo-positivism a mind–world dualism, but they depart from
each other, as from a realist perspective the causal powers of objects are as real as their
empirical expressions, although they may not be perceived directly. From that perspective, the
social world is an open system that is only partly accessible to us. Quasi-experimental proce-
dures (for instance case selection for theory building and testing) are the best way to provide
explanations that preserve the notion of non-realized potential. Therefore the strategies elab-
orated by critical realism to study this world rely on the existence of laboratory conditions, to
build and test scientific theories involving non-detectable causal powers. A causal power is
a non-detectable feature of an object, that confers on this object a disposition to express certain
behaviors when interacting with other objects.
In political science, critical realism has gained renewed importance since the 2000s with
the development of multi-methods, and the debates on the probative value of deep within-case
study and small-n comparison (George and Bennett, 2005; Beach and Pedersen, 2013, 2016).
Causal case study methods, such as process tracing (the hallmark of critical realism), rely on
two ontological premises: determinism (as opposed to probability), which means things do

f
not happen casually, and asymmetry, which means the absence of a cause is no cause of the
absence of an effect. Yet they are genuinely compatible with a probabilistic epistemology,
oo
whether to increase the degree of confidence in the hypothesis or to apprehend the causal
complexity in the social world. Realist approaches of case study and small-n comparison
follow a Bayesian logic of likelihood, in search of necessary and sufficient conditions as well
as insufficient conditions (hence taking deviant cases more seriously than as exceptions or
outliers). Thus individual cases are but a starting point for causal analysis, in search of a better
explanation of what happens in the real world. As such, they are part of a reiterative process
of empirical investigation. A major implication of theorizing causation as deterministic and
Pr

asymmetric is these methods pay much attention to causal mechanisms. At the very least,
a sequential (minimalist) approach to mechanisms looks for series of events or intervening
variables to open the black box of causality; but an integral (maximalist) approach looks for
systems of entities entering in activity to produce the effect we seek to explain (Fontaine,
2020). Eventually, critical realist methods developed causal explanations based on singularity
(as opposed to the causal regularity praised by neo-positivists after David Hume), by which
causal mechanisms are contingent generalizations.

3.b Policy Issues

Research on model 2 in anti-corruption policies is quite recent, therefore it is less developed

than research on regularities. Yet it has already made significant contributions to policy design,
to overcome the limitations of strictly probabilistic approaches of the causes and effects of
corruption. A major objection made to governance indexes and the measurement of “good
governance” is they hardly capture the political dimensions of corruption, from clientelism
and the abuse of state resources to state capture (Heywood, 2020). As of now, it is commonly
accepted that these indexes are just imperfect estimations of corruption, which do not appear
to be a powerful tool to tackle corruption, since they essentially measure perceptions (Erkkilä,
2021). As a matter of fact, perceptions are influenced by factors that have little or nothing to do
 Four models of causation in the design of anti-corruption policies  143

with the actual problems raised by corruption, since they depend on different types of political
obligations and relationships, like the traditional family and patron–client based systems, or
the modern boss–follower or civic culture based systems (Heidenheimer, 2017).
A realist approach contributes to discard false evidence and proposes mechanistic expla-
nations of the alleged causal relationship. The concern for the relatively limited progress
in anti-corruption worldwide justifies this model questioning other commonsensical ideas,
such as the behaviorist strategy that consists in adjusting or changing the incentives, or the
endogenous relationship between anti-corruption control and institutional change. Scholars
insist on stepping back from “zero tolerance” approaches or any idealistic view on eradicating
corruption through a unique strategy (Heywood, 2014, 2018). Further, the common distinction
between political and administrative (or bureaucratic) corruption is useful for a contextual
analysis of the problem and to proceed with accurate interventions (Amundsen, 2019), yet it
is hardly possible to make such a distinction in practice, since the divide between the political
and the administrative is blurred.
Instead, we need to understand corruption under its multiple modalities and forms, for
instance taking into account actors and their purposes. Scholars interested in model 2 also
concur in considering causal mechanisms a fundamental object of policy analysis, as in the
study of the structure of electoral institutions by Daniel Gingerich and the multiple elements

f
that can be included in a research design (Gingerich, 2013). The aim of this research is to
identify which specific initiatives work to tackle corruption and in what contexts. In order to
oo
do that, Gingerich (2013) questions the theory regarding the electoral systems centered on
candidates producing more political corruption, such as proportional representation of open
lists. Instead, he argues, there is another way through which the ballot structure is related with
corruption. The causal mechanism explains that electoral systems centered on parties through
proportional representation of closed lists allow the earning of important state resources to
finance political activity. Finally, cross-country comparison confirms that open-list systems
generate demand-side political corruption, while closed-list systems produce supply-side
Pr

corruption. It is of the utmost importance to determine which mechanism displays properly in

which context; only in this way can causal mechanisms be replicated through different policy
designs.

3.c Examples of Small-n Comparison and Realist Process Tracing

In their study of political will as an obstacle for anti-corruption policies effectiveness,

Ankamah and Manzoor (2018) compared Singapore and Bangladesh. Political will is deemed
a necessary but insufficient condition to guarantee the success of a policy outcome. Yet, given
their complexity, both the operationalization of this concept and the causal mechanism in
between remain indeterminate in many studies. To overcome this limitation, this study raises
two questions: What are the components of political will and how can they be assessed empir-
ically? How does political will affect the outcomes of anti-corruption policies?
The starting point here is the theorization of a four-entity mechanism that forms political
will, in order to trace it across anti-corruption actions. Once this mechanism has been built
up, a cross-case comparison is conducted to identify its pattern of behavior within a typical
case (Singapore) and a deviant case (Bangladesh). Singapore is known for the leadership
and political will of former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, who was a precursor of different
strategies of the Anti-Corruption Programme in Singapore, back in the 1950s. The success,
144  Research handbook of policy design

in that case, resulted from the political will and sustained efforts of institutional building and
reforms inspired by the Prime Minister. This shows that the mechanism is consistent with the
hypothesis and explains why its absence can cause a deviation of the process. This analysis
also confirms the findings from a series of studies explaining the central role of political will
in the Asian context of anti-corruption policies (Quah, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2016).
It does not address the problem of equifinality but it shows that, in absence of the elements
of the typical pattern, as in Bangladesh, political will does not prevent corruption from becom-
ing a systemic problem. In that case, the absence of the theorized mechanism indicates that the
reforming process was triggered by external pressures regardless of the political will from the
government, which resulted in a limited comprehension and the extension of what corruption
means for the country’s development, the intermittence and low efficiency of policy instru-
ments and, eventually, its limited effectivity resulting from multiple implementation gaps.
The political culture in Bangladesh has political leaders hardly engaging in the anti-corruption
struggle because it is unpopular and costly for their possible re-election.
Another example of how realism disentangles causal mechanisms is Miroslav Beblavy’s
within-case study of the anti-corruption policy in Slovakia (Beblavy, 2009). This research
draws lessons for policy design in developing countries in transition towards democracy, to
explain policy effectiveness. It addresses the role of external actors and their incidence in

f
reforms of anti-corruption policies and programs. It combines descriptive process tracing with
congruence analysis over the 1990–2008 period, based on data panels from the World Bank
oo
and Transparency International, government reports and bilateral cooperation, legislative
debates, media archives, and individual interviews with key informants who participated in the
process. However, the collected evidence is still based on perceptions and no validation pro-
cedure is performed. Among other findings, the author underlines the importance of external
actors in having the Slovak government adopting new policy aims, hence triggering crucial
sectorial reforms through technical support in the policy design. Other evidence supports the
idea that no isolated change alone can possibly produce the expected effect; instead, the aggre-
Pr

gation of changes within the sectors most affected by corruption can have strategic effects.

4. MODEL 3: CAUSALITY AS HISTORICAL CONTINGENCY

IN ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICIES
4.a Methodology

Our third model of causation defines causality as historical contingent relationships, based on
combinations or bundles of variables. It favors medium-n comparison and QCA for external
validity, like the neo-positivist model with which it shares a phenomenological approach of
empirical data. But its theories of causality draw from the configurational interpretation of
singular events. Therefore, most common research techniques used in this model include the
counterfactual examination of cases (as opposed to observations) (Siddiki et al., 2011; Carter
et al., 2016), descriptive statistics and political economy (Silvestre, 2017), and congruence
analysis and case study for theory building or testing (Schneider, 2006). It aims at ideal-types
construction as configurational interpretations of the world.
The origin of the analyticist theories of causality can be traced back to the late 1970s in
Kenneth Waltz’s definition of constructivism, according to which theories “construct” a reality
 Four models of causation in the design of anti-corruption policies  145

but no one can actually tell if that is “the” reality (Waltz, 1979, in Jackson, 2016, p. 123), and
theories are idealizations and simplifications of the world. This definition comes after the
monist ontology, that sees the world as a set of data (not a collection of objects) and states
with which we are practically and concretely involved in a community, a tradition (of schol-
arship, etc.), rather than in the people’s lives we study. Constructivism seems a good starting
point to study the world, but this is only a practical view. Actually the concept of analyticism
captures best the phenomenalist dimension of this methodology, inasmuch as it sees scientific
endeavor as a way to organize and deal with experience (Jackson, 2016, pp. 123–170). As
a methodology, analyticism consists in desegregating and simplifying the world for a better
understanding; it uses analytical narratives to explain particular results and counterfactuals to
elaborate and to assess case-oriented narratives. Hence the linkage between this model and
Max Weber’s ideal-types, which are analytical proposals about the world providing a concep-
tual basis to understand an outcome, imaginary constructions or logical instruments grounded
in our social and cultural world, that help us to produce singular causal analyses based on pro-
visional idealizations of our values and commitments. A concrete situation always results from
a causal configuration, a combination of factors, on which we build imaginary representations,
mental constructions of series of events, according to a counterfactual logic aimed at identify-
ing critical factors in a causal configuration.

f
In political science, analyticism takes stock of historical neo-institutionalism and compar-
ative historical analysis (Hall, 1986; Mahoney, 2001; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). It brings
oo
together comparative and within-case study techniques, whether to explain causes of effects or
effects of causes (Goertz and Mahoney, 2012, pp. 41–74). The ideal-typification of the social
world requires combining statistics (to control for confounding variables) with combinatory
analysis (to sort out sufficient causes). A central issue, here, is how a given method allows
us to test symmetry, since symmetrical causation can only be established statistically and
qualitative methods can only go as far as to establish the existence of asymmetric causation.
The analytical model of causation also tries to solve the problem of equifinality, by combining
Pr

econometrics and descriptive statistics with QCA. Causal complexity is thus apprehended
through multi-methods. On the quantitative side, the model focuses on a particular independ-
ent variable to assess its average effect, as in the causality as regularity model. But unlike
model 1, driven by law-like generalizations, model 3 also includes a combinatory analysis
of the sufficient causes of an effect. The counterfactual definition of causality as regularity
implies symmetry, which is different from the use of causal counterfactual logic in qualitative
methods. While in a SLR, symmetry is defined by differences in degrees (among variables), in
set-theoretic multi-methods it is defined by differences in kind (among cases or configurations
of variables) (Schneider and Rohlfing, 2013). In the end, the ideal-typification of the social
world requires focusing on rare events, and small-n comparison, where individual events are
used for counterfactual analysis of cases.

4.b Policy Issues

The interest for model 3 in anti-corruption policies has led to a persistent question about which
conditions are necessary for anti-corruption strategies to play out. To control for the diversity
of intervening variables, scholars from the analyticist school have worked on the context of
governance. Some proposals go back to the debates about “good governance” in the wake of
the World Bank revival and the Asian crisis (Ghosh and Siddique, 2015; Mungiu-Pippidi,
146  Research handbook of policy design

2015). For instance, the review of worldwide indicators by Johnston (2014) assessed four types
of corruption that can be observed worldwide: traffic of influence, elite cartels, oligarchies and
clans, and official magnates. Unlike the taxonomy of governance contexts, these types are
not systems, therefore they can be found across different countries in terms of constitutional
regimes, economic development or time of democratic exposure. Further, this ideal-typical
taxonomy emphasizes the similarities and differences among forms and expressions of cor-
ruption, rather than to describe precisely the manifestations of the problem in each country.
Another illustration of model 3 comes from the type of corruption that can be met in a case
study. Hough (2013) wonders under what conditions certain types of anti-corruption policies
work. He compares weak institutional systems (Bangladesh and Kenya) with regular (South
Korea and Poland) and strong ones (Germany and the United Kingdom). He defined the
threshold for case selection using data from the World Governance Index, then he conducted
deep within-case analyses, paying special attention to the impact produced by regulation,
dedicated agencies and public accountability processes. Besides demonstrating the relevance
of these cases as ideal-types, his research aimed to reveal what lessons could be learnt from
these cases. His findings confirmed that a poor institutional context is likely to accompany
a high level of corruption.
The fundamental aim of the research guided by this model of causation is to classify

f
the multiple contexts of corruption. This way, one can think about specific anti-corruption
agendas and understand why the policies designed have been effective or not. If context
oo
matters then it is necessary to understand it before transferring a policy designed in context
A to context B. Eventually both Hough and Johnston reckon that, as clever and sound as it may
be, a policy design is not to be expected to operate miraculously, nor to produce immediate
results (Johnston, 2014; Hough, 2013). Therefore they recommend observing with utmost
attention the trajectory of this policy in the long run.

4.c Examples of Comparative Historical Analyses

Pr

A good example of cross-case historical analysis is provided by the study of corruption in

the police, by Aymaliev and Kosals (2016). They identify how historical experiences of suc-
cessful reforms can produce analytical premises to guide interventions in contexts of endemic
corruption. To provide recommendations to attend the infamous case of the Russian police,
they conducted a comparison with Australia based on a most-different system design, from
which they extracted causal configurations of organizational and institutional factors to build
on an ideal-type of successful reforms. Their case study was based on event structure analysis
and the reconstruction of interpretive narratives. The aim was to explain institutional change
as a sequence of events framed in a temporal contingency. Their findings show that the main
event that enhanced police corruption came from an ambiguous regulation without social
support, which created many opportunities and incentives for corruption. Thus over-regulation
can be a cause of corruption. Another factor identified in this study was the recruitment of
civil servants, which could favor the creation of networks of organizational loyalties based on
corrupt behaviors. However, because of the oversimplification of the relevant causal factors in
this model, the successful translation of this program to the Russian case remains speculative.
Another example is provided by the study of local government corruption in Spain, by
Jímenez et al., who wondered why urban planning by Spanish municipalities has been histor-
ically exposed to embezzlement (Jímenez et al., 2012). They focused on the reform of formal
 Four models of causation in the design of anti-corruption policies  147

and informal institutions, particularly the incentives and restrictions responsible for corrup-
tion. They argue that the vulnerability to corruption is causally related with a configuration of
structural factors (like the number and size of municipalities), formal institutions (like a strong
local government, a complex and ill-defined system of local integrity) and informal institu-
tions (like patronage networks and the financing system of local political parties). Spain is
a case of informal institutions affecting the performance of formal institutions. Embezzlement
at the local level is not caused by the absence of integrity systems, but by the deficient appli-
cation of norms, values and principles. Instead of informing these systems they fall under
the pressures of informal institutions serving enduring political elites in power. The main
finding of this study is that, in spite of the highly sophisticated regulation at a national level to
prevent corrupt behaviors and to inform the ethical performance of civil servants, the lack of
controlling mechanisms or public accountability agencies creates an environment of flexibility
that political leaders take advantage of for electoral purpose. The presence of strong municipal
systems and weak administrative structures provides systematic incentives to finance the
actions of political parties, to promote patronage and trading in influence.

5. MODEL 4: CAUSALITY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION IN

ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICIES

f
oo
5.a Methodology

Finally, the reflexive model of causation defines causality as a product of actors’ beliefs and
cognitive frames. Its theories of causality are subjective interpretations based on social con-
structions and power relationships, with the critical theory that underlies this model stressing
the deterministic role of structure over agency. It favors deep within-case studies and small-n
comparison for outcome explanation. The most common techniques used are ethnography
Pr

(Aragon et al., 2014; Gutberlet, 2015), descriptive statistics, discourse analysis and dialectic
hermeneutics (Ghinoi et al., 2018; Wersun, 2010), in search of discursive frames for critical
interpretation.
The starting point of model 4 lies in the challenge to combine transfactualism with a monist
ontology. What does it mean that knowledge transcends the experience, if our knowledge is
inherent to our practical experience (Jackson, 2016, p. 171)? In other words, what transfactual
knowledge can we reach, if it makes no sense to refer to a mind-independent world as the
ultimate object of our knowledge? A straightforward answer to this problem is to enhance
our self-awareness based on our values (as in the analyticist model of causality) and our com-
mitments with the social and organizational context of the scientific endeavor. The reflexive
methodology finds the basis of our empirical statements in our practices of knowledge produc-
tion, which is all about humans (as opposed to plants and rocks studied by other sciences). This
premise leads to a critique of human capacities of reflection by a reflexive science. Not only is
our knowledge grounded in our concrete implications in a set of social relationships – defined
by race, class, gender, etc. – but it can either enhance or hinder these social distinctions. Here
lies “the problem of the intellectuals” (Jackson, 2016, p. 185), according to which empirical
statements should be more expressive (value-oriented) than representative. On one hand, the
locus of scientific research engages in a dialectic relationship with the social conductions of
its production. On the other hand, these statements are not purely descriptive; instead they are
148  Research handbook of policy design

provisional articulations grounded in the present and directed at the future. Eventually, the
problem of the intellectuals has been attended in three different ways by reflexive scholarship:
as idealists in search of objectivity (see the habitus theory of Pierre Bourdieu), as agents of
revolutionary practice (see the critical theory of the Frankfurt School) or as agents of diversity
(see poststructuralism and postmodern theories from cultural studies).
In political science, the reflexive methodology is rooted in the interpretive turn and the cri-
tique of empiricism (Bobrow and Dryzek, 1987; Fischer and Forester, 1993). So far, the most
significant contribution to this model came out of Frank Fischer’s deliberative politics inspired
by the theory of communicative action by Jürgen Habermas (Fischer, 2003). It shares with the
analyticist model the core principles of social constructivism, according to which knowledge
is socially determined, reality is first and foremost a social construction, and frameworks are
but representations and interpretations of the world. But it goes beyond and develops a sort
of “radical constructivism” and a critique of the status of the scientific community. This way,
theoretical truths are interpretations or scientific beliefs based on socio-cultural contexts and
signified, rather than factual arguments.

5.b Policy Issues

f
Research on model 4 in anti-corruption policy design has been conducted with deep
within-case studies exploring the peculiarities of contradictory causal relationships, through
oo
ethnographies and discourse analysis, even if they occasionally use statistics to account for
the state of the art on the problem under investigation. Common research problems this model
deals with include the following questions: What does corruption mean in a particular context?
What meanings are in dispute in the political language? How are these meanings constructed?
In their study of the relationships between gender and corruption, Stensöta and Wängnerud
(2018) brought together a group of scholars to discuss the political implications of gender in
corruption practices. Their starting point was the statistical correlation between a low level of
Pr

corruption and a high level of participation of women in politics, which turned out to be flawed
by a lack of evidence. This contradiction led to building case studies in different regions across
the world, where social and historical conditions mediating the relationship between gender
and corruption are under scrutiny. Lindberg and Stensöta (2018) suggested rephrasing and
reformulating the definition of corruption, taking stock of the materialist theories of feminism.
An oft overlooked aspect of corruption in the literature thus came out: “sexual corruption” (i.e.
the use of sex as a currency in corruption networks). After a theoretical analysis of asymmetri-
cal structures of opportunities, conducted along categories like “gender division” and “public/
private division”, the authors argued that any inappropriate use of power should somehow be
considered as corruption. This challenges the traditional understanding of corruption in the
public sphere and it draws our attention to acts of corruption in contexts that are not usually
deemed prone to corruption, such as the space of intimacy and privacy.
Another application of model 4 in corruption studies is brought out by Marija Zurnić (2019),
who explored the meanings of corruption that were utilized in the public debate during the eco-
nomic and democratic transition in Serbia, in the aftermath of the 1990s civil war. She intended
to draw a full-screen image of the meanings network that led to a major anti-corruption
scandal, through discourse analysis. Her findings show how the debate on corruption could get
caught in a vicious circle that includes discourses about the rule of law, public accountability,
legitimacy deficit, institutions replacement, non-transparent privatizations, unequal partic-
 Four models of causation in the design of anti-corruption policies  149

ipation in economic reforms, or the lack of political will to investigate cases of corruption.
The internal dispute about meanings can be mediated by the pressure exerted by international
organizations and their standards of admission, presence and the benefits thereof. This shows
how complex it is to reach a consensus about what corruption means exactly. Further, it helps
understanding why the conceptualization of corruption in public debates can be different and
even irreconcilable with legal definitions.

5.c Examples of Participative Observation and Dialectical Hermeneutic

An example of participative observation is provided by the study of organizational trust in

Kenya by Gedion Onyango (Onyango, 2019). He argues that trust is a necessary condition for
the creation of collaborative networks of policy implementation, considering these processes
enhance the internalization, the legitimation and the commitment to accountability reforms to
fight corruption. He addressed the following questions: How is organizational trust built? How
does it influence public accountability? How do these blueprints of collaborative governance
contribute to anti-corruption and improve the relationships between controlling agencies
and government offices? Kenya is a case of incomplete decentralization, where a persisting
tradition or culture of bureaucratic centralization allows civil servants to enjoy extensive and

f
discretional privileges. The research was based on participative observation and a survey
of a random sample of civil servants from three anti-corruption agencies: the Ethics and
oo
Anti-Corruption Commission, the Commission of Justice Administration, and Transparency
International. The main findings show that organizational trust generates public trust and,
thereafter, improves the capacity, the performance and the effectiveness of public admin-
istration. The reforms aimed at reducing corruption need strengthening collaborative trust
mechanisms among organizations, both for behavioral and instrumental conduct (organization
capacity, technical support and resources allocation).
In a similar vein but using a dialectic hermeneutic, Alexandru Roman and Hugh Miller
Pr

(2014) compared the perceptions by civil servants from 28 policy areas in Moldavia. They
analyzed their discourses on corruption and anti-corruption through a technique of tags
describing the moral behavior of civil servants and how often these are exposed to corruption
opportunities because of their status, their beliefs and individual preferences proceeding from
their social, family and affective networks. Their initial premise is that, in Eastern Europe,
the “occidental” anti-corruption narrative faces serious challenges, as the image of civil
servants as charismatic agents, motivated, assertive and effective in problem solving does not
fit in the cautious discourse on probity, integrity, ethics and high moral standards within the
administration, which affects negatively the legitimacy of culturally consolidated practices.
Semi-structured interviews with actors relatively close to cases of corruption reveal their ten-
dency to interpret the meanings of corruption in terms of justification or moral blame against
the suspects. The interviewees use linguistic expressions that constitute semantic nodes
contrasting with the official discourse. The main findings of this research are threefold and go
against some commonly accepted theories. First, family links prevail over financial interests in
most cases, and corrupt behaviors scarcely result from individual decisions. Second, the occu-
pation of a public office is individually experienced as a “property” of the position, to which
some requisites are added, such as trust networks and cognitive frames that give meaning to
collective action. Eventually, corruption may appear as “evil” in the official discourse, but
150  Research handbook of policy design

from other perspectives it is described as “accurate behavior” for the sake of efficiency, hence
becoming a “necessary evil”.

6. CONCLUSIONS: THE PARADOX OF ONTOLOGICAL

ALIGNMENT IN THE POLICY DESIGN FRAMEWORK

Policy design is a framework, hence the multiple theories of causality that translate into
different models of causation. The four models identified in this chapter constitute the
cornerstones of policy design, as they cover the diversity of worldviews by stakeholders in
theory and practice. They are grounded in distinctive methodologies, that combine a monist or
a dualist philosophical ontology with a phenomenal or a transfactual scientific ontology. As
such, they often sound like scientific paradigms (Kuhn, 2012) in the literature about causality,
insofar as they state research problems, hypotheses and methods based on incommensurable
views of the world and scientific knowledge. However, we would rather think about them as
theories aligned with different ontological “wagers” (Jackson, 2016) that require different
methodological frameworks. Unlike paradigms, theories and methodological frameworks are
commensurable and therefore they can dialogue with one another instead of competing for
a single, exclusive and definitive explanation of the world.

f
The literature about anti-corruption policy offered many illustrations of how the policy
oo
design framework appears with different theoretical and methodological approaches of similar
policy problems, regarding the causes and consequences of corruption. The four models of
causation were found in our sample (even though model 1 represents the mainstream), which
indicates the diversity of philosophical wagers in the study and practice of anti-corruption pol-
icies. These approaches are based on different research problems and hypotheses in the study
of agency and structure. Eventually, these models of causation are a clear indication of how to
improve policy design to tackle corruption at many levels and in different contexts.
Pr

Eventually, coping with the many problems raised by anti-corruption policy design requires
working from different worldviews and overcoming their incommensurability. However, as
argued in this chapter, when it comes to choosing accurate methods for policy design, we
ought to stick to one model of causation at a time, and avoid blending theories grounded in
different methodologies. Only then will it be possible to cope with the policy problem at stake.

NOTES
1. Using the descriptors “policy AND design AND method”. WOS, consulted on May 4, 2020.
2. WOS, consulted from June 20 to 29, 2020.

REFERENCES
Amundsen, I. (ed.) (2019). Political Corruption in Africa: Extraction and Power Preservation.
Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Andersson, S. and Heywood, P. M. (2009). The politics of perception: Use and abuse of Transparency
International’s approach to measuring corruption. Political Studies, 57(4), 746–767.
 Four models of causation in the design of anti-corruption policies  151

Ankamah, S. and Manzoor, E. K. (2018). Political will and government anti-corruption efforts: What
does the evidence say? Public Administration and Development, 38(1), 3–14.
Aragon, C., Aranguren, M. J., Diez, M. A., Iturrioz, C., and Wilson, J. R. (2014). Participatory evalua-
tion: A useful tool for contextualising cluster policy? Policy Studies, 35(1), 1–21.
Aymaliev, I. and Kosals, L. (2016). Applying Australia’s experience to Russia’s anti-corruption policies
in the police: An event structure analysis of an Australian corrupt network. Mir Rossii –Universe of
Russia, 25(2), 98–122.
Bardhan, P. (2017). Corruption and development: A review of issues. In A. J. Heidenheimer and M.
Johnston (eds.), Political Corruption: Concepts & Contexts. New York: Routledge.
Beach, D. and Pedersen, R. B. (2013). Process Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines. Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Beach, D. and Pedersen, R. B. (2016). Causal Case Study Methods: Foundations and Guidelines for
Comparing, Matching, and Tracing. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Beblavy, M. (2009). Conditions for effective large-scale anticorruption efforts and the role of external
actors: What does the Slovak experience tell us? Public Administration and Development, 29(3),
180–192.
Bobrow, D. and Dryzek, J. (1987). Policy Analysis by Design. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Boly, A. and Gillanders, R. (2018). Anti-corruption policy making, discretionary power and institutional
quality: An experimental analysis. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 152, 314–327.
Box-Steffensmeier, J. M., Brady, H., and Collier, D. (2010). Political science methodology. In J. M.
Box-Steffensmeier, H. Brady, and D. Collier (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 3–31.

f
Brady, H. (2010). Causation and explanation in social science. In J. M. Box-Steffensmeier, H. Brady, and
D. Collier (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
oo
pp. 217–270.
Carter, D. P., Weible, C. M., Siddiki, S. N., and Basurto, X. (2016). Integrating core concepts from the
institutional analysis and development framework for the systematic analysis of policy designs: An
illustration from the US National Organic Program regulation. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 28(1),
159–185.
Dowding, K. (2015). The Philosophy and Methods of Political Science. Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Erkkilä, T. (2021). Global governance indices as policy instruments: Actionability, transparency and
Pr

comparative policy analysis. In I. Geva-May, B. G. Peters, and J. Muhleisen (eds.), Institutions and
Governance in Comparative Policy Analysis Studies (vol. 2). New York: Routledge.
Fischer, F. (2003). Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Fischer, F., and Forester, J. (eds.) (1993). The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning.
Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Fontaine, G. (2020). Process tracing for comparative policy analysis: A realist approach. In B. G. Peters
and G. Fontaine (eds.), Handbook of Research Methods and Applications in Comparative Policy
Analysis. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 273–291.
Fontaine, G., Fuentes, J. L., and Narvaez, I. (2019). Policy mixes against oil dependence: Resource
nationalism, layering and contradictions in Ecuador’s energy transition. Energy Research and Social
Science, 47, 56–68.
George, A. and Bennett, A. (2005). Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Ghinoi, S., Wesz, V. J., and Piras, S. (2018). Political debates and agricultural policies: Discourse coali-
tions behind the creation of Brazil’s Pronaf. Land Use Policy, 76, 68–80.
Ghosh, R. N. & Siddique, M. A. B. (eds.) (2015). Corruption, Good Governance and Economic
Development: Contemporary Analysis and Case Studies. Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific.
Gingerich, D. W. (2013). Political Institutions and Party-Directed Corruption in South America:
Stealing for the Team. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Goertz, G. and Mahoney, J. (2012). A Tale of Two Cultures: Qualitative and Quantitative Research in
the Social Sciences. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
152  Research handbook of policy design

Gutberlet, J. (2015). More inclusive and cleaner cities with waste management co-production: Insights
from participatory epistemologies and methods. Habitat International, 46, 234–243.
Hall, P. A. (1986). Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France.
New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hall, P. (2003). Aligning ontology and methodology in comparative politics. In J. Mahoney and D.
Rueschemeyer (eds.), Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences. New York: Cambridge
University Press, pp. 373–404.
Hawken, A. and Munck, G. L. (2009). Measuring corruption: A critical assessment and a proposal. In A.
K. Rajivan and R. Gampat (eds.), Perspectives on Corruption and Human Development. Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 71–106.
Heidenheimer, A. J. (ed.) (2017). Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis. New
York: Routledge (online resource). https://​www​.routledge​.com/​Political​-Corruption​-Readings​-in​
-Comparative​-Analysis/​Heidenheimer/​p/​book/​9780878556366.
Heywood, P. M. (2014). Measuring corruption: Perspectives, critiques and limits. In P. M. Heywood
(ed.), Routledge Handbook of Political Corruption. New York: Routledge, pp. 137–153.
Heywood, P. M. (2018). Combating corruption in the twenty-first century: New approaches. Daedalus,
147(3), 83–97.
Heywood, P. (2020). A political approach to corruption. In A. Mungiu-Pippidi and P. M. Heywood
(eds.), A Research Agenda for Studies of Corruption. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA:
Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 27–40.
Hough, D. (2013). Corruption, Anti-Corruption and Governance. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Illari, P. M. and Russo, F. (2014). Causality: Philosophical Theory Meets Scientific Practice. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.

f
Jackson, P. T. (2008). Foregrounding ontology: Dualism, monism, and IR theory. Review of International
oo
Studies, 34(1), 129–153.
Jackson, P. T. (2016). The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its
Implications for the Study of World Politics (2nd edition). Abingdon: Routledge.
Jímenez, F., Villoria, M., and Quesada, M. G. (2012). Badly designed institutions, informal rules
and perverse incentives: Local government corruption in Spain. Lex Localis: Journal of Local
Self-Government, 10(4), 363–381.
Johnston, M. (2014). Corruption, Contention, and Reform: The Power of Deep Democratization.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pr

Klitgaard, R. (1988). Controlling Corruption. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Kukutschka, M. B. (2020). The long hand of the law versus the invisible hand of the market? In
A. Mungiu-Pippidi and P. M. Heywood (eds.), A Research Agenda for Studies of Corruption.
Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 132–145.
Kuhn, T. (2012). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions: 50th Anniversary Edition. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
Laguna, M. I. D. (2011). The challenges of implementing merit-based personnel policies in Latin
America: Mexico’s civil service reform experience. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, 13(1),
51–73.
Langbein, L. and Sanabria, P. (2017). Independent professional bureaucracies and street-level bribery:
Comparing changes in civil service law and implementation in Latin America. Journal of Comparative
Policy Analysis, 19(5), 435–451.
Lindberg, H. and Stensöta, H. (2018). Corruption as exploitation: Feminist exchange theories and the
link between gender and corruption. In H. Stensöta and L. Wängnerud (eds.), Gender and Corruption:
Historical Roots and New Avenues for Research. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 237–256.
Mahoney, J. (2001). Path Dependence and Political Regimes in Central America. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press.
Mahoney, J. and Thelen, K. (eds.) (2010). Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency and
Power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mauro, P. (2017). The effects of corruption on growth and public expenditure. In A. J. Heidenheimer and
M. Johnston (eds.), Political Corruption: Concepts & Contexts. New York: Routledge, pp. 339–352.
Mavrot, C., Hadorn, S., and Sager, F. (2019). Mapping the mix: Linking instruments, settings and target
groups in the study of policy mixes. Research Policy, 48(10).
 Four models of causation in the design of anti-corruption policies  153

Melloni, E., Pesce, F., and Vasilescu, C. (2016). Are social mechanisms usable and useful in evaluation
research? Evaluation, 22(2), 209–227.
Mungiu-Pippidi, A. 2015. The Quest for Good Governance: How Societies Develop Control of
Corruption. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mungiu-Pippidi, A. and Fazekas, M. (2020). How to define and measure corruption. In A. Mungiu-Pippidi
and P. M. Heywood (eds.), A Research Agenda for Studies of Corruption. Cheltenham, UK and
Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 7–26.
Onyango, G. (2019). Organizational trust and accountability reforms in public management: Analysis
of inter-agency implementation relations in Kenya. International Journal of Public Administration,
42(14), 1159–1174.
Peters, B. G. (2018). Policy Problems and Policy Design. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA:
Edward Elgar Publishing.
Peters, B. G., and Fontaine, G. (2020). Introduction to the Handbook of Research Methods and
Applications in Comparative Policy Analysis: An introductory study. In B. G. Peters and G.
Fontaine (eds.), Handbook of Research Methods and Applications in Comparative Policy Analysis.
Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 1–18.
Quah, J. S. T. (2015a). Singapore’s Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau Four: Suggestions for
enhancing its effectiveness. Asian Education and Development Studies, 4(1), 76–100.
Quah, J. S. T. (2015b). Lee Kuan Yew’s enduring legacy of good governance in Singapore, 1959–2015.
Asian Education and Development Studies, 4(4), 374–393.
Quah, J. S. T. (2015c). Evaluating the effectiveness of anti-corruption agencies in five Asian countries:
A comparative analysis. Asian Education and Development Studies, 4(1), 143–159.

f
Quah, J. S. T. (2016). Combating corruption in six Asian countries: A comparative analysis. Asian
Education and Development Studies, 5(2), 244–262.
oo
Razafindrakoto, M. and Roubaud, F. (2010). Are international databases on corruption reliable? A com-
parison of expert opinion surveys and household surveys in sub-Saharan Africa. World Development,
38(8), 1057–1069.
Rinnert, D. (2015). The politics of civil service and administrative reforms in development: Explaining
within-country variation of reform outcomes in Georgia after the Rose Revolution. Public
Administration and Development, 35(1), 19–33.
Roman, A. V. and Miller, H. T. (2014). Building social cohesion: Family, friends, and corruption.
Administration and Society, 46(7), 775–795.
Pr

Rose, S. K. and Sohngen, B. (2011). Global forest carbon sequestration and climate policy design.
Environment and Development Economics, 16(4), 429–454.
Rose-Ackerman, S. and Palifka, B. J. (2016). Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and
Reform (2nd edition). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rothstein, B. (2011). What is quality of government? In B. Rothstein, The Quality of Government:
Corruption, Social Trust, and Inequality in International Perspective. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, pp. 1–33.
Rubin, E. V. and Whitford, A. (2008). Effects of the institutional design of the civil service: Evidence
from corruption. International Public Management Journal, 11(4), 404–425.
Salihu, H. A. (2020). Combating corruption in the Nigerian civil service: An empirical assessment of
Treasury Single Account (TSA) policy. Journal of Money Laundering Control, 23(1), 267–280.
Sartori, G. (1970). Concept mis-formation in comparative politics. The American Political Science
Review, 64(4), 1033–1053.
Schmidt, T. S. and Sewerin, S. (2019). Measuring the temporal dynamics of policy mixes: An empirical
analysis of renewable energy policy mixes’ balance and design features in nine countries. Research
Policy, 48(10).
Schneider, A. L. (2006). Patterns of change in the use of imprisonment in the American states: An inte-
gration of path dependence, punctuated equilibrium and policy design approaches. Political Research
Quarterly, 59(3), 457–470.
Schneider, C. Q. and Rohlfing, I. (2013). Combining QCA and process tracing in set-theoretic
multi-method research. Sociological Methods and Research, 42(4), 559–597.
Sekkat, K. (2018). Is Corruption Curable? London: Palgrave Macmillan. E-book.
154  Research handbook of policy design

Siddiki, S., Weible, C. M., Basurto, X., and Calanni, J. (2011). Dissecting policy designs: An application
of the institutional grammar tool. Policy Studies Journal, 39(1), 79–103.
Silvestre, H. C. (2017). (Incumbent) politics and burdens in the social construction of target groups: The
Brazilian Bolsa Familia conditional cash transfer programme. Development Policy Review, 35(5),
703–720.
Stapenhurst, R., Draman, R., Larson, B., and Staddon, A. (eds.) (2019). Anti-Corruption Evidence: The
Role of Parliaments in Curbing Corruption. Cham: Springer.
Stensöta, H. and Wängnerud, L. (eds.) (2018). Gender and Corruption: Historical Roots and New
Avenues for Research. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
Thomann, E., Lieberherr, E., and Ingold, K. (2016). Torn between state and market: Private policy imple-
mentation and conflicting institutional logics. Policy and Society, 35(1), 57–69.
Thomann, E., van Engen, N., and Tummers, L. (2018). The necessity of discretion: A behavioral eval-
uation of bottom-up implementation theory. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory,
28(4), 583–601.
Vancoppenolle, D., Sætren, H., and Hupe, P. (2015). The politics of policy design and implementation:
A comparative study of two Belgian service voucher programs. Journal of Comparative Policy
Analysis: Research and Practice, 17(2), 157–173.
Wersun, A. (2010). Triple translation: Academic and managerial discourses of knowledge transfer
policy in a new university in Scotland. Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education, 31(5),
665–682.
Zurnić, M. (2019). Corruption and Democratic Transition in Eastern Europe: The Role of Political
Scandals in Post-Milošević Serbia. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

f
oo
Pr