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Theory of Prototypes and Categories: Research Proposal

Research Proposal · April 2020

DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.33168.56329

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Mohammed Nihad Ahmed

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 Theory of Prototypes and Categories
Research Proposal

1
Mohammed Nihad Ahmed (PhD)

Categories as theories
It is theory of human categorization that was posited by Eleanor
Rosch in order to account for experimental findings that she and her
colleagues uncovered during the 1970s. Prototype Theory holds that there
are two basic principles that guide the formation of categories in the
human mind: (1) the principle of cognitive economy; and (2) the
principle of perceived world structure. These principles together give
rise to the human categorization system.
The first principle, the principle of cognitive economy, states that
an organism like a human being attempts to gain as much information as
possible about its environment, while minimizing cognitive effort and
resources. This cost-benefit balance drives category formation. In other
words, rather than storing separate information about every individual
stimulus experienced, humans can group similar stimuli into categories,
which maintains economy in cognitive representation. The consequence
of this is that human’s privilege categories formed at a certain level of
informational inclusiveness or complexity. This level of categorization is
known as the basic level of categorization.
The second principle, the principle of perceived world structure,
posits that the world around us has correlational structure. For instance,
it is a fact about the world that wings most frequently co-occur with
feathers and the ability to fly (as in birds) rather than with fur or the

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Assistant Professor at Department of Basic Sciences / College of Dentistry (University of
Mosul), he is teaching English for medical terminologies.
ability to breathe underwater. This principle states that humans rely upon
correlation structure of this kind in order to form and organize categories.
This correlation structure gives rise to a prototype.
Since the 1970s Rosch’s findings and claims have been called into
question. Today, Prototype Theory is no longer seen as an accurate view
of categorization. Nevertheless, it was historically important for the
development of cognitive semantics. Lakoff (1987) prototype theory
thus permits us to state the general principles that provide the semantic
basis of syntactic categories. In a classical theory of categories, one
would be forced to say that there is no semantic basis at all. The reason is
that classical categories have a homogeneous structure-there are no
prototypes-and everything that is not completely predictable must be
arbitrary. The role of background knowledge in categorization is
exemplified in Sweetser’s (1987) reanalysis of Coleman and Kay’s
(1981) study of the verb to lie. Sweetser proposes that lying should be
understood against an idealized model of communication, in which
information is deemed to be true if one has reasons to believe it, the
transfer of true information is believed to benefit the hearer, and
communication is supposed to be cooperative.
Rosch et al., (1976) offer a theory of the ways in which human
beings and other organisms deal cognitively with their perceptions of the
world 'out there'. "The world consists of a virtually infinite number of
discriminatingly different stimuli. One of the most basic functions of all
organisms is the cutting up of the environment into classifications by
which non-identical stimuli can be treated as equivalent".
They claim that this process is principled and depends on the 'real-
world attributes' of what is perceived, and also upon the characteristics of
the perceptual. apparatus itself (i.e. We can only categorize on the basis
of what we can perceive and, all things being equal, that which is more
easily perceived will be of greater significance to the categorization
process). Prototype theory can be extended beyond lexical and
grammatical levels to discourse and textual levels of analysis.
Brown and Yule (1983) summarize much of the recent literature on
'story, grammars', 'frames', 'schema', 'scripts', 'scenarios' and 'schemata'.
These notions like the work of Sacks and others on turn-taking, appear to
suggest that all 'grammars of expectancy' are based upon what Lakoff,
borrowing from Fillmore, calls Idealized Cognitive Models and which are
essentially prototypical informational interactive structures as opposed to
grammatical or lexical entities. However, while noting that the
application of the theory may be wider; this paper restricts the discussion
to the area traditionally associated with pedagogical grammars.
Prototype theory therefore seems to suit the needs of some linguists
very well. It provides a theoretical framework within which it is possible
to solve at least some of the problems associated with adding the
semantic dimension to linguistic investigation.
The fact that this theory is relevant to linguistic theory does not of
course make it necessarily relevant to language teaching and learning.
The differences between these two enterprises, in terms of participants
and goals, product and process, have been emphasized frequently and
judiciously over the last twenty years. Applied Linguistics has turned
increasingly towards Psycholinguistics and the processes of language
acquisition for inspiration and for theoretical support. It is interesting
therefore to note that prototype theory has also been extended to the study
of meaning of many words as described as a whole set of features, no one
of which is individually either necessary or sufficient. The concept is then
held together by what some philosophers call a family resemblance
structure.
Categories as Prototypes
In a series of papers published from 1971 to 1978, Rosch argued
that this view of the relation between a word and its referents (and the
view of word meaning which it entailed) simply does not hold up. While
she continued to be sympathetic to the role of features (or “attributes”) in
the characterization of categories, her research indicated that these
features, taken individually, need not be necessary, nor is the presence of
a certain set of features always sufficient for category membership.
Importantly, she demonstrated that categories have an internal structure,
in the sense that some members might be “better,” or “more
representative” (i.e., more “prototypical”) examples of the category than
others.
Some of Rosch’s statements (especially if taken out of context) are
liable to encourage the view that a category may be represented simply in
terms of its prototype. In Heider (1971), she surmises that “much actual
learning of semantic reference, particularly in perceptual domains, may
occur through generalization from focal exemplars” (p. 455). Later, she
writes of “conceiving of each category in terms of its clear cases rather
than its boundaries” (Rosch, 1978, pp. 35–36), and states that “categories
tend to become defined in terms of prototypes or prototypical instances”
(p. 30). One approach to the relation of prototypes to word meanings,
then, would be to claim that the prototypical category member is the
word’s meaning and that the referential potential of a word is a function
of similarity to the prototype. The boundaries of the category would be
set by the presence of neighboring, contrasting categories. There are some
categories for which this account may have some plausibility, such as the
basic color categories, and perhaps also the vessels (cups, bowls, and
vases) studied by Labov (1973). As a vessel morphs from a prototypical
cup into a prototypical bowl, categorization as cup gradually decreases,
offset by increased categorization as bowl.
In general, however, the view that a category can be defined solely
in terms of its prototype raises a number of problems. First, for many sets
of words, the mosaic metaphor is not applicable. This is most obviously
the case with near synonyms, that is, words whose usage ranges overlap,
sometimes considerably, but which nevertheless can be associated with
distinct prototypes. Take the pair high and tall. Tall applies prototypically
to humans (tall man), high to inanimate (high mountain). Yet the words
do not mutually define each other at their boundaries. Many entities can
be described equally well as tall or high. Similar problems arise in
connection with some of the senses of over. In the sense “vertical to, not
in contact with,” over competes with above, while in the sense “from one
side to the other” (the bridge over the river) the word overlaps with
across.

Syntactic categories
The use of diagnostic tests is standard practice in syntactic
analysis. There are tests for determining whether a group of words make
up a syntactic constituent; whether a constituent is a noun phrase, verb
phrase, or whatever; whether a noun phrase is the subject of a verb;
whether a particular word is noun or adjective, and, if a noun, whether it
is a count noun or a mass noun, and so on.

Prototypes and the basic level

Words are most likely used to name things. The first perspective
goes from word to thing; it is a referential or semasiological perspective.
This is the methodology used by Rosch, and it underlies the notion of
prototype. Thus, the prototype might be characterized as the entity (or
kind of entity) that is most likely to be referred to by a word. The second
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perspective goes from thing to word; it is a naming, or onomasiological

perceptive. This is the perspective employed in much color research, as
when, for example, subjects are shown a series of color chips which they
are asked to name. The onomasiological perspective underlies the notion
of basic level term. The basic level is the level in a taxonomy at which
things are normally named (in the absence of reasons to the contrary), for
example, as a chair, rather than as furniture, or as a kitchen chair.
Polysemy
An important development within Cognitive Linguistics has been
the status accorded to constructions. As is to be expected, we find
disagreement on what, precisely, is to come under the purview of the
concept (Taylor, 2004). For our purposes, we can take constructions to be
patterns for the combination of smaller linguistic units, such as words,
morphemes, and phrases.

References

Ahmed, M. (2011). The Conceptual Components of Prototype Theory

in Translating Process. Journal of Education and science, 18: 2
(15 – 28).
Lakoff, J. (1987). Women, Fire and Dangerous Things: What
Categories Reveal About the Mind. Chicago
Robinson, P. and Ellis, N. (2009). Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics
and Second Language Acquisition. Routledge