Journal of Asian Economics 20 (2009) 69–76

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Asian Economics

Modernization, inter-caste marriage, and dowry: An analytical

perspective
Sharmistha Self a,*, Richard Grabowski b
a
Department of Economics, Missouri State University, Springfield, MO 65897, United States
b
Department of Economics, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, IL 62901, United States

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Article history: As economic growth and development occurs in India, it has been thought that dowry
Received 28 January 2008 would decline as an institution. However, the practice of dowry has rapidly spread to
Received in revised form 3 July 2008 regions in India where previously it was not extensively practiced and dowry inflation may
Accepted 13 July 2008
be occurring. In this paper, a simple analytical model of dowry, based upon caste
determined status differentials, is developed. The model assumes that some inter-caste
JEL classification: marriage occurs. The implications of the model are that gross dowry inflation is fueled by
O12
economic growth, but net dowry remains unchanged. More importantly, unequal growth
O53
stimulates an expansion of the practice of dowry to lower castes.
Keywords: ß 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Dowry
Inter-caste marriage
Modernization
Marriage premium
Social status

1. Introduction

The practice of dowry, prevalent in much of South Asia, is a payment made by the parents of the bride to the groom’s
family at the time of marriage. One would think that economic growth and development would lead to a decline in the
practice of dowry. However, the evidence that is available points to dowry inflation and dowry related domestic violence
being on the rise in India. Real dowry payments have been found to be rising across South Asia for the last four decades
(Deolaker & Rao, 1998; Epstein, 1973; Lindenbaum, 1981; Maitra, in press; Rao, 1993a,b). In addition, the practice of dowry
has spread geographically and socially into other regions of India where it was not extensively practiced earlier (Srinivasan,
2005). Moreover, the worst form of dowry related violence, dowry deaths,1 has also been on the rise. ‘‘During 1999–2003 the
National Crime Records Bureau of the government of India reported approximately 6000–7000 dowry related deaths every
year and about 43,000–50,000 cases of mental and physical torture’’ (Srinivasan & Bedi, 2007).
There is also some empirical evidence that indicates that dowry inflation (and whether or not it occurs) is dependent upon
how dowry is defined. Edlund (2006) distinguishes between gross and net dowry. Gross dowry represents the assets the
bride brings at the time of marriage while net dowry is gross dowry minus any groom payments. Empirical estimations

* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: sself@missouristate.edu (S. Self), ricardo@siu.edu (R. Grabowski).
1
Such deaths often occur as the result of disagreements after the marriage on the amounts and types of items that were to be paid in the dowry. In
addition, the husband’s family will often demand additional payments after the marriage. The inability of the wife or her family to provide additional
payments or to resolve disagreements (after the marriage) often leads to violence.

1049-0078/$ – see front matter ß 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.asieco.2008.07.001
70 S. Self, R. Grabowski / Journal of Asian Economics 20 (2009) 69–76

indicate no inflation in net dowry, while gross dowries have indeed risen steeply. Finally, Dalmia and Lawrence (2005)
actually find some evidence of dowry deflation.
Much of the literature on this topic ignores the role of caste and the possibility of inter-caste marriages. Caste implies that
there is a social status attached to various social levels and that if one can move from a lower to higher level (caste), social
status will be gained. Typically one’s social status or caste is determined by birth. However, unlike men, women have an
opportunity to change their caste status. Thus, when a lower caste bride marries into a higher caste, she and her children are
inducted into the groom’s caste. Similarly, if a bride from a higher caste marries a groom from a lower caste, she and her
children from the marriage forgo the caste the bride was born into and assume membership in the lower caste. Typically,
therefore, society does not support a woman from a higher caste marrying a man from a lower caste, though a woman from a
lower caste is encouraged to marry into an upper caste (Avasthi, 1979; Rao & Rao, 1982).
That inter-caste marriage occurs is supported by work from a number of sources. Inter-caste marriages were written into
law in India by the Special Marriage Act of 1872 and recognized by the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955. There is evidence of inter-
caste marriages from ancient India (Chakraborti, 1999) as well as in modern India (Carrithers, 1996). Recent empirical
evidence gathered by Munshi and Rosenzweig (2005) indicates that among 25–40 year olds such marriages were 7.6% of all
marriages in Bombay city in 2001, 6.2% in South Indian tea plantations in 2003, and 9.1% for the rural Indian population in 16
major states of India in 1999.
Using these ideas this paper constructs a model based upon a theoretical structure similar to that developed by Todaro
(1969) with respect to migration. In that model there is a differential between rural and urban wages that never is reduced.
Thus migration from the former to the latter will continue until the expected wage in the urban sector falls and this occurs as
a result of a fall in the probability of getting employment in the urban area.2 In the same manner, one can think of two castes,
upper and lower. There is a gain in social status for any women in the latter that can marry a groom in the former. The status
gain to such a move is fixed and unchanging. Thus equilibrium in this market occurs when the probability of getting an upper
caste husband declines such that the expected gain from marrying into the upper caste is equal to the return to the women
from marrying in the lower castes. Economic growth, which increases wealth, will increase dowries paid in the lower and
upper caste (gross dowry inflation), but the differential (net dowry) will remain constant. Net dowry will decline only under
two conditions. First, the status differential attached to upper caste disappears. Second, improvement in relative
opportunities (education, economic) for women takes place. Available evidence indicates that neither is occurring
sufficiently in India.
The paper is divided in the following manner. The next section will review the relevant literature. Section 3 will discuss
the model and its implications. Section 4 will examine the empirical evidence concerning caste and relative gender
differentials. The last section of the paper will provide a summary.

2. Some literature

There have been a number of theories put forward to try and explain dowry (net dowry) inflation. Rao (1993a) has argued
that the main reason for this inflation is the marriage squeeze. He has pointed out that women tend to marry older men and,
therefore, in a rapidly growing population the number of younger women seeking to marry older men is likely to rise, since
brides reach marriageable age ahead of grooms. Thus, there will be an excess demand for older grooms resulting in a rise in
their price (dowry). Specifically, the relevant ages of marriage are generally 10–19 for women and 20–29 for men. As the ratio
of the first to the second rises with population growth, dowry inflation occurs. Empirical analysis carried out by Rao seemed
to support this hypothesis.
Edlund (2000) has criticized the above analysis. First, her empirical work indicated that Rao’s results could not be
duplicated.3 Second, as stated in the previous section, she distinguishes between net dowry, calculated as the difference
between bride and groom family transfers to the couple and gross dowry, the bride’s family transfers to the couple at the
time of marriage (Edlund, 2006). Her analysis indicates that there is no net dowry inflation, but there is gross dowry inflation.
This is related to her view that daughters do not inherit, instead they are given dowries. Thus parents transfer wealth to
daughters sooner than sons. Later, the grooms receive their inheritance, thus net transfers are more equalized.
Edlund’s work presumes that the main motive behind dowry is bequest in nature rather than dowry serving as a groom
price. Both of these factors are likely to play a role. However, the work of Arunachalam and Logan (2006) indicates that
bequest dowries have declined in importance. In addition, recent analysis reinforces the notion that the practice of dowry is
spreading and real inflation (net dowry) is taking place (Srinivasan, 2005).
Anderson (2003) accepts the idea that real dowry inflation (net dowries are rising) is occurring in South Asia. She makes a
distinction between caste and non-caste based societies. In the latter, wealth is the primary determinant of status, while in
the former there is an inherited component of status that is, to some extent, independent of wealth. In a simple version of the

2
There are other ways that the wage gap can be narrowed in the Todaro model. If labor laws are what keep the actual wage in the urban area higher than
in the rural area, reforms of such laws would narrow the wage gap. Also instead of a rise in unemployment occurring and thus equilibrating the market, an
informal sector may develop in the urban sectors to provide employment opportunities for low income workers.
3
In addition, she also developed a model that regressed dowry on individual traits instead of differences (brides vs. grooms). The model fit improves
significantly.
 S. Self, R. Grabowski / Journal of Asian Economics 20 (2009) 69–76 71

model, it is assumed that there are two castes, upper and lower, and brides rank grooms on the basis of wealth and caste.
Lower caste brides are assumed to be less sensitive, relative to upper caste brides, to income differences in upper caste
grooms. That is, lower caste brides are mostly interested in the status gain to be achieved by marrying up.
Anderson argues that economic development causes grooms in the upper caste to experience a greater dispersion in their
income levels. Thus low income, upper caste grooms will find their value decline in the eyes of upper cast brides. However,
lower caste brides are not very concerned with this issue. For simplicity, we can assume that they don’t care about this at all.
They are still willing to pay a substantially higher price (net dowry) for these grooms (to gain the status of higher caste). As a
consequence, upper caste brides, unwilling to give up their caste by marrying in to the lower caste, have to match the higher
real payment offered to the poorer upper caste groom. This is due to the fact that she cannot marry down. The other grooms
in the high caste in turn also receive higher equilibrium payments. The result then is that average net dowry payments
increase.
Anderson’s (2003) analysis is quite clever in terms of analyzing net dowry inflation. It predicts that broadly based growth
(reducing income dispersion) should eliminate net dowry inflation. A decline in dowry is caused, in Anderson’s model, by a
rise in the economic value of women in the marriage market through the accumulation of human capital.
The analysis presented above is based upon a matching model in which no inter-caste marriage occurs. Lower caste brides
can certainly bid for upper caste husbands, but it is presumed that upper caste brides pay a premium for poorer upper caste
husbands, thus preventing inter-caste marriages. However, as discussed above, inter-caste marriages do occur. Although
they seem to make up a relatively small share of all marriages, they are occurring and, in terms of absolute numbers, are large
and rising. Thus, it would seem that in order to construct an appropriate model allowance needs to be made for such
marriages. In addition, dowry not only persists, it seems to be rapidly spreading to other parts of India. An explanation for the
spread of dowry needs to be provided.
One must be careful in interpreting the evidence concerning the spread of dowry. As Srinivasan (2005) has pointed out, in
southern India in earlier times, obligatory gifts from the bride’s family to the groom occurred. They were, however, usually
seen as being symbolic, with well off families giving larger amounts. ‘‘Modern dowry comprises demands that far exceed
what families can afford, exploiting its symbolic obligatory nature . . .’’ (p. 599). ‘‘Besides being extractive, a distinct feature of
modern dowries is the inclusion of large amounts of gold, cash, and consumer goods . . .’’ (p. 599). Thus payments, symbolic in
nature, have existed for some time in Southern India, but the size of these payments has changed dramatically.
The next section of this paper will develop a simple model of dowry which allows for inter-caste marriage. The
implications concerning the cause of dowry inflation (net and gross) are simple and straightforward. In addition, an
explanation for the spread of dowry is provided.

3. Model

For simplicity this model is based on a society where there are only two castes, the upper and lower caste, denoted by
subscripts u and ‘, respectively. Caste, which is a deep rooted cultural aspect of Indian Hindu society, is used to denote status.
Women inherit the status of their husband upon marriage. It is assumed that higher caste brings with it a higher and more
respectable status in society while a lower caste is associated with a status loss for all upper caste women marrying down
and no gain or a small gain for brides born into and marrying in the lower caste. It is presumed that the loss of status by
marrying down for a high caste bride is so high as to prevent such marriages. Thus inter-caste marriage occurs only when
lower caste brides are able to successfully bid for upper caste husbands.4
Dowry, which is a payment made by the bride’s family to the grooms family at the time of marriage, is thought to be
determined by a number of different factors. In most dowry related papers it is assumed to be a function of bridal
characteristics and bridal family wealth. In this paper, a caste based premium is included and represents a positive price or
premium that is attached to being a member of the upper caste. This premium is assumed to be fixed and unchanging.5 It is
further presumed that being a member of the lower caste does not increase a bride’s (lower caste) status and accordingly
there is no premium attached. In addition, it is presumed that the earning potential of the bride influences dowry in two
ways. Greater earnings potential of the bride implies that higher dowry can be paid. However, as the differential between
groom and bride’s potential income declines, dowry will fall (due to a rise in relative value of bride). The factor determining
dowry (D) are therefore given by

D ¼ f ðb; g; w; yb ; yg  yb ; cÞ; (1)

where b represents a vector of bridal characteristics, g is the vector of groom’s characteristics, w is bridal family wealth, yb is
the bride’s income, yg  yb is the difference between groom and bride’s income potential, and c represents the caste

4
It would be useful to actually have data on the ratio of women marrying up to that of women marrying down in caste. However, that data is not
available.
5
The assumption of the fixed premium associated with marriage into a higher caste is done for simplicity. If economic growth and development reduce
this premium, then dowry will decline. However, it is argued in the next section of the paper that the practice of caste does not seem to be on decline in India.
72 S. Self, R. Grabowski / Journal of Asian Economics 20 (2009) 69–76

premium. One can make the distinction between upper and lower caste dowry in the following manner:

Du ¼ F u ðb; g; w; yb ; yg  yb ; cÞ (2)

and

D‘ ¼ F ‘ ðb; g; w; yb ; yg  yb ; 0Þ; (3)

where u and ‘ represent upper and lower caste, respectively. It should be clear that

Du > D‘ (4)

and

Du  D‘ ¼ c; (5)

where c is the caste premium (holding everything else constant). One can see at the very outset that price discrimination
prevails in the marriage market based on membership in the upper caste. There is a natural barrier to entry for males from
lower caste to higher caste since caste is determined at birth. However, for females entry into the upper caste is possible, but
it comes with a price, the caste premium c.
With the above in mind, let’s begin the discussion by presuming that the dowry system does not exist, but the caste
system does. That is, there is a premium to belonging to the upper caste (c), but no payments are made from brides to grooms.
In this case, the status return to lower caste brides marrying upper caste grooms can be written as

R‘;u ¼ c; (6)

while the status return to lower caste brides of marrying a lower caste groom is assumed to be R‘, ‘, which is likely very low,
approaching zero. In this situation, there would be an excess supply of lower caste brides seeking upper caste grooms.
Without an equilibrating mechanism this would continue to foster lower caste brides to seek upper caste grooms.
Equilibrium in this situation can only be restored by focusing on the expected returns to lower caste women. This could be
written as

EðR‘;u Þ ¼ c  PðG‘;u Þ; (7)

where P(G‘,u) would represent the probability of a lower caste bride finding an upper caste groom. Thus as additional lower
caste women seek upper caste men the probability of finding such declines, excess supply of lower caste brides increases. The
end result then is that

EðR‘;u Þ ¼ R‘;‘ : (8)

This equilibrium is characterized by an excess supply of lower caste brides or, in other words, an excess demand for upper
caste grooms.
In a caste bound society this situation implies that there are a proportion of women who will be unable to find acceptable
partners. This situation within a traditional society would not be tolerable since the family structure would be threatened.
The payment of dowry represents an alternative mechanism for restoring equilibrium. As the dowry payment to marry
upper caste males rises, the return to lower caste females will fall as the difference between the status gain of the upper class
designation and the dowry payment becomes less and less. Ultimately, the difference will become zero and at this point
equilibrium in the marriage market has been restored. Lower caste women will no longer have an incentive to seek out upper
caste men. However, in this equilibrium there is no excess supply of lower caste women and thus no excess demand for
upper caste men. Family stability is restored.
The implication of the above is that caste and dowry are linked together. The status connected with being a member of the
upper caste creates the premium which eventually must be paid to marry into the caste. Thus without caste, a system of
dowry would not have a function and would likely wither away. The implication then is that laws aimed at eliminating
dowry are likely to be ignored and thus fail, as long as caste persists.
In this situation, how is one to explain the process of dowry inflation, net or gross? Economic growth, in this context, will
automatically lead to gross dowry inflation. This can be easily seen. In equilibrium the difference between the lower and
upper caste dowry must always be equal to c, the caste premium. Thus growth in both lower and upper caste wealth will
cause dowry for both castes to rise, with the differential remaining constant. The differential (c) corresponds to Edlund’s
concept of net dowry, the real price of an upper caste husband. The model implies no net dowry inflation which is consistent
with Edlund’s empirical results.
The above analysis presumes that a growth occurs in an equitable way. If the growth is biased toward the lower caste, a
similar process unfolds, but with different implications. As the wealth of lower caste families rises, gross dowries in this caste
will rise reducing the differential with the upper caste. However, the differential must remain fixed at c. Thus competition
from lower caste women for upper caste grooms will force gross dowries in the upper caste to rise. The burden of dowry for
the upper caste will increase since their wealth has not (in the extreme case where the wealth of the upper caste remains
unchanged).
 S. Self, R. Grabowski / Journal of Asian Economics 20 (2009) 69–76 73

A more interesting case arises if economic growth enhances the wealth of the upper caste, but not the lower caste. In this
case, the increased wealth pushes dowry in the upper caste up, the differential would tend to exceed c, which cannot
continue in equilibrium. Thus, greater number of lower caste women will turn to marrying lower caste men, pushing up the
lower caste dowry rate and generating a dowry differential of c in equilibrium. The implication in this case then is that dowry
will become increasingly burdensome for lower caste families. Their wealth has not increased, but they are driven to pay
higher dowry amounts.
This can be used to explain the spread of dowry to lower caste groups. Assume that the lower caste pays no gross dowry
while the upper caste pay dowry such that the differential between lower and upper caste is c. Unequal growth will raise the
upper caste gross dowry and this will lead to dowry being paid among the lower caste (it is positive) in order to keep c
constant.
The growth that has recently occurred in India is thought by many scholars to be highly unequal. Data on recent trends in
inequality are hard to come by, but recent work by Chaudhuri and Ravallion (2006) would seem to indicate that indeed
inequality is worsening. Growth has been uneven across states in India, it has been sectorally uneven, and it has been uneven
over households (with incomes rising at the top much faster than those at the bottom). Thus the Gini Index for India rose in
the 1990s.
The increasing burden imposed by dowry on lower income families is really what observers have been noting. For
example, in the work by Srinivasan (2005) referred to earlier, the point is made that the practice of dowries had spread to
South India in recent years. However, the point actually being made was that, in the past and in practice, significant dowry
payments were usually made only by upper caste families. The payments made by lower caste families were ‘‘symbolic’’ in
nature, not involving significant (for the bride’s family) transfers of value. However, with the recent economic growth lower
caste families feel obliged to provide a significantly greater transfer of value and this has become increasingly burdensome
for lower caste families. The model of this paper indicates that the increased burden of dowry stems from unequal nature of
recent growth.
An additional implication of the model is that economic growth will not lead to the elimination of dowry. Dowry will
persist as long as there is a significant status gain available to moving from the lower to the upper caste. If the status gain to
the upper caste position disappears, then c would become zero. Dowry differentials would disappear. In addition, the
function that dowry has performed will no longer exist. If the reader will remember, the status premium for marrying into
the upper caste was c. Without dowry, lower caste women would continue to seek upper caste men until the expected return
from such activity was equal to the return from marrying into the lower caste. For this to happen, there would have to be an
excess of supply of lower caste women seeking upper caste grooms (an excess demand for the latter). This proportion of
unmarried women threatens traditional family structure. Dowry evolves as a mechanism for providing equilibrium without
threatening traditional family structure.
Of course, social customs which no longer fulfill a particular function often persist for long periods of time. This may be
due to what one might think of as lock-in effects. That is, most norms are enforced via social retaliation schemes. Thus a
family which breaks the social rule concerning the payment of dowry may be socially ostracized and thus bear a heavy cost.
Thus social norms which no longer fulfill a social function may persist (Ray, 1998). Thus if caste ceases to provide a status
gain (c = 0), then dowry no longer serves a useful social function, but it may still persist. However, in this case government
reform is much more likely to succeed. That is, the government can coordinate expectations among participants leading to
successful reform. If dowry continues to perform an important social function (c > 0), then reform via government
coordination is much less likely.
The possibility for elimination of dowry would thus seem to be dependent on the decline of caste as a source of social
status, combined with government reform. However, there is an additional mechanism by which dowry reform may be
possible. If the reader will refer back to Eqs. (1)–(3), there are several variables which have yet to be discussed in any detail.
First, yb represents the earning potential of the bride. One would expect that the higher earnings upon the part of the female
would increase the income available for paying dowry. Thus this variable is likely to be positive in its impact on the level of
dowry paid. Indeed empirical estimations carried out by Edlund (2000) and Arunachalam and Logan (2006) do find that the
women’s education has a positive impact on the size of dowry.
The second variable that needs to be discussed is yg  yb, the earnings differential between the bride and groom. As this
difference increases, one can see that ceteris paribus, the relative value of the groom rises and thus the ability of the women
to achieve status on her own has declined. She will thus be more dependent upon marriage as a mechanism for achieving
status and thus dowry payments are likely to rise, both for lower caste and upper caste grooms (with the differential c
persisting).
A different scenario emerges if yg  yb declines in value. This would imply that the income earning power of the potential
brides is rising relative to that of grooms. Thus women will increasingly find other avenues for increasing status, through
earned income, compared to marriage and dowry. In other words, the quality of potential brides has risen relative to
potential grooms. In this case, one would expect dowry payments to decline, for both upper and lower caste brides, with the
status differential between lower and upper remaining fixed at c. In fact, this conclusion is supported by empirical work
carried out by Rao (1993a,b).
The implication of the above is that relative gender achievement in terms of education and health care is likely to be a
critical variable in the determination of dowry. The relative income difference between potential grooms and brides (yg  yb)
is dependent upon relative education levels achieved, relative amounts of health care provided, etc. If gender gaps between
74 S. Self, R. Grabowski / Journal of Asian Economics 20 (2009) 69–76

men and women in education and health are reduced, the earnings gap will decline and according to the analysis presented
above, dowry for lower and upper caste brides will decline.
In summary, two main factors drive dowry, the caste system and gender gaps in education and health care. If the caste
system ceases to function, then the main reason for dowry disappears. A government coordinated reform campaign is likely
to lead to the elimination of the practice of dowry. Alternatively, if gender differences in education and health are reduced
then differences in income earned by the potential groom and potential bride will also decline. Women will find alternatives
to caste in terms of enhancing social status and dowry payments will decline. What are the prospects for these two
possibilities in present day India? The next section addresses this topic.

4. Caste and relative gender differences

While there is an association between Hinduism and the practice of caste, the two are not synonymous. That is, the caste
system is practiced and has been practiced by a wide variety of religions including Islam, Buddhism, and Jainism. The caste
system has been able to absorb or integrate itself with these other religious practices. The British, during the colonial period,
sought to classify caste by social ranking in a series of censuses carried out in 1889, 1891, 1901, and 1911. ‘‘The 1911 census
was a defining moment in that it contained a list of 10 tests for assessing whether a social group qualified as a depressed
class. It was estimated that 42.57 million people passed at least one of the tests and were so classified’’ (Osborne, 2001). The
British also reserved seats in the legislature for certain communities.
With independence the new leaders in India wanted to rid the country of the caste system. However, according to
Osborne (2001), a critical mistake was made. The Congress party continued reserving seats in the legislature for certain
groups and they created a list of disadvantaged castes and tribes that would be eligible for additional government assistance
(reservations in government employment, political representation, and education). ‘‘In the end, however, article 341 and 342
of the constitution of India empowered the Indian president to establish lists of Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes
(ST), respectively, that were eligible for reservations’’ (Osborne, 2001).
This has led, over the years to a curious contradiction. Initially caste was based upon an economic division of labor.
Certain castes performed certain economic tasks, while others had different tasks. As economic growth and development
occurred this function of caste increasingly became irrelevant. The relationship between caste and occupation decreased and
it will only continue to decline in the future. ‘‘The reason is that an increasingly urbanized and technologically sophisticated
India will find that occupational rigidity based on caste will be progressively more costly’’ (Osborne, 2001, p. 667). However,
the political importance of caste has increased dramatically over time. This is due to the fact that the reservation system
established at independence provided substantial rewards to individuals based on their caste or tribal affiliation. As a result
there has been a constant pressure to expand those groups eligible for reservations. The end result is that a large proportion
of the population is now eligible for reserved positions in education and public employment (Osborne, 2001).
As a result of the processes outlined above, caste is becoming increasingly important in Indian society. Thus instead of
caste declining with economic growth and development, it seems to be strengthening and expanding. Thus, it is not
surprising that as caste becomes more entrenched, so does the spread and practice of dowry. The previous section of this
paper argued that the fate of dowry is inextricably linked to caste. Thus as caste declines, so would dowry and vice versa.
However, the reverse seems to be occurring. That is, economic growth in India has occurred within the context of increased
political pressures aimed at solidifying caste distinctions. Thus, the practice of dowry has actually been strengthened.
The theoretical analysis of the previous section pointed to a second mechanism which would undermine the practice of
dowry. If relative gender gaps in education and health would be closed, the relative gender gap in earnings would also be
closed. This would reduce dowry since the relative value of women would rise as a result of the creation of alternative
avenues (alternative to marriage) of gaining status (economic opportunities).
Relative gender gaps in health and education in societies seem to be strongly related to cultural practices which favor
males over females. Lahiri and Self (2005), Lahiri and Self (2007) find such bias arising from son preference, linked to the
extended family system and parent’s dependence on some as a source of support for the future. In addition, Das Gupta (2003)
has compared son preference attitudes in China, India, and South Korea. In a comparative, historical analysis the author finds
that such preference persists in South Korea despite the sweeping economic and social change which accompanied dramatic
increases in prosperity. It is argued that the cultural factor driving this preference is that sons provide the main source of old
age support. There is no intrinsic reason why parents cannot seek such support from daughters, however, culture dictates
otherwise. In order to eliminate this behavior daughters and sons must be viewed as equally valuable to parents. According
to Das Gupta, this would eventually become a reality through decades of urbanization and its effects on family arrangements.
However, for agrarian societies like China and India this process of change would likely be very slow.
Rahman and Rao (2002) utilized survey data to analyze the impact of culture, economics, and public action on women’s
agency in India. Their measures of female agency are measures of female mobility and the context in which the female
participates in household decision making. There are a number of interesting results which are derived. Higher female wages
make women better off in terms of agency (greater mobility and greater influence in household decision making). However,
higher wages for males make women worse off. This result is consistent with household decision making theories where the
sharing of resources is dependent on the fall-back options of members. It is also consistent with the theory outlined in the
previous section. That is, the relative value or importance of women is determined by their relative earning power. Thus a
society, where cultural factors bias economic opportunities towards men, is a society in which women’s agency will be
 S. Self, R. Grabowski / Journal of Asian Economics 20 (2009) 69–76 75

reduced. With respect to the issues addressed in this paper, growth and modernization filtered through a culture favoring
men is likely to strengthen dowry practices rather than reduce them.
Recent work by Filmer, King, and Pritchett (1998) comes to similar conclusions concerning relative gender disparities.
They use data drawn from the Demographic Health Surveys from a number of countries in South Asia and the national Family
Health Surveys from individual states of India to create a data set on indicators of gender disparity in the areas of health
outcomes and educational enrollments. They find that South Asia is the region of the world in which gender disparities are
noticeably the worst.
The most important conclusion of Filmer et al. is that gender disparities are not correlated with GDP per capita, either
across countries or within countries in South Asia. This has several important implications. In trying to explain gender
disparity in South Asia, low income does not seem to work since, on average, they do not find poor countries or regions to
have worse gender disparity compared to high income countries. Also, within India the high income areas are not, on
average, found to exhibit less gender disparity. They do find that the absolute levels of health and education outcomes for
women are strongly related to economic conditions. However, the disparities between females and males are not.
In terms of the analysis in this paper, the above results are very important. They indicate that relative gender disparities in
education or health do not disappear with higher per capita incomes. Thus earnings differentials are also unlikely to be
significantly reduced. This implies that the dowry system is likely to persist as marrying up will represent one of the few
mechanisms for status enhancement available to women.

5. Summary and conclusion

Dowry as an institution in India has not withered away with economic growth and development. Instead, it has spread
throughout parts of India where previously such practices were of minimal importance or of only symbolic value and the size
of the dowries (gross) themselves seem to be inflating over time. Thus, the institution not only persists, but seems to be
thriving.
In this paper, a simple model was developed to try and explain the phenomenon. The model is based on the assumptions
that there is a strong connection between caste and dowry and that some inter-caste marriage occurs. In this situation, the
equilibrium in the marriage market is examined. If there is a status premium to being a member of the upper caste, then in
the absence of dowry lower caste women will seek to marry upper caste men, because of the net gain in status. Some will
succeed and some will not. Equilibrium will occur in the marriage market when the expected return to lower caste women
seeking upper caste husbands is equal to the return to such women from marrying lower caste men. The expected return for
lower caste women seeking upper caste grooms will decline as the probability of finding such grooms declines. In other
words, as more and more lower caste women attempt to marry higher caste men (to achieve higher status), this will lead to a
falling probability of succeeding. The problem with this equilibrating mechanism is that it leaves a number of lower caste
women unmarried, thus threatening the traditional family structure.
In the model, dowry serves as an alternative equilibrating mechanism. Lower caste women seeking to marry upper caste
grooms will drive up the price (dowry) and this will generate equilibrium, with the dowry differential between upper and
lower caste equaling c, the upper caste status premium. In this situation, as growth occurs and the wealth of upper and lower
caste families rises, this will push up gross dowry in both lower and upper castes (with the differential of c, net dowry,
maintained). If growth is biased, benefiting upper caste relative to lower caste families, gross dowry inflation will still occur,
but the burden of dowry will rise dramatically for the lower caste families.
India’s recent growth experience has certainly been unequal. The implication of the model is that this unequal growth
will lead to the spread of the practice of dowry. Thus low income, lower caste groups which previously did not extensively
practice dowry will now find themselves more deeply involved in the system.
The process discussed above occurs because women have few alternatives, other than marrying up, to achieve significant
status gains. Differentials between males and females (in terms of income earning potential) place women in situations of
lower status with women having fewer opportunities for improvement. Differences in income earning potential are in turn
related to differentials in access to educational opportunities and effective health care.
Whether dowry thrives or declines as an institution in India thus depends on two factors. The first is caste. If the caste
system ceases to function, the status premium (c) will disappear and dowry will cease to serve as a mechanism for status
gains. The main functional reason for dowry will disappear, thus making government reform much more likely to succeed.
The difficulty here is that caste as a social institution is strengthening in India, not declining in importance. This is partly the
result of government policy aimed at reserving access to education and public employment opportunities to individuals
based upon their caste or tribal affiliation.
The second mechanism by which dowry would be undermined would result from declines in the differentials in income
earning potential of men relative to women. As this occurs, alternative opportunities for status enhancement become
available to women. Thus dowry declines in importance. This will likely occur if differentials in access to education and
health between men and women also decline. Unfortunately, evidence seems to indicate that these relative differentials
show no sign of being reduced.
The model developed in this paper specifies those factors likely to enhance or reduce the practice of dowry. The empirical
evidence and experience in India seems to imply, given the context of the model, that dowry will continue to strengthen as a
practice and that its spread to lower castes implies significant burdens for lower income families.
76 S. Self, R. Grabowski / Journal of Asian Economics 20 (2009) 69–76

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