CASE COMMENT

State of Madras vs Champakam Dorairajan

EQUIVALENT CITATIONS: AIR 1951 SC 226

AUTHOR: SHEJAL SHARMA

PETITIONER: …………………………………………..“ SMT. CHAMPAKAM DORALRAJAN”

v.

RESPONDENT:……………………………………….. “ STATE OF MADRAS“

DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 09/04/1951

BENCH:
HIRALAL J. KANIA, C.J.;
SAIYID FAZAL ALI, J.;
M. PATANJALI SASTRI, J.;
MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, J.;
VIVIAN BOSE, J.;
B. K. MUKHERJEA, J.

CITATION:
1951 AIR 226
1951 SCR 525

CITATOR INFO :
F 1954 SC 561 (14,16)
F 1958 SC 731 (12)
R 1958 SC 956 (8)
R 1959 SC 648 (26)
R 1962 SC1621 (73,108)
R 1963 SC 649 (17)
RF 1967 SC1643 (22,164,227)
E 1968 SC1379 (2)
R 1970 SC2079 (16)
RF 1972 SC1375 (81)
RF 1973 SC1461 (506,648,1704,1714,1901,1918)
RF 1975 SC 563 (13)
O 1976 SC 490 (67,69,71,159)
R 1979 SC 83 (5)
RF 1980 SC1789 (115)
RF 1985 SC1495 (8)
RF 1988 SC 305 (7)

Introduction

State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan is a landmark judgment of the Supreme court of India This judgment
led to the First Amendment of the constitution of India It was the first major judgment
regarding reservations in theRepublic of India. In its ruling, the Supreme Court upheld the Madras high
court judgment, which in turn had struck down the Government Order (G.O) passed in 1927 in the [Madras
Presidency]. The G.O provided caste-based reservation in government jobs and college seats. The Supreme Court's
verdict held that providing such reservations violated Article 29 (2) of the Indian Constitution.

Here, the court held that Directive Principles of State Policy have to conform to and run as a subsidiary of the
Chapter of Fundamental Rights. The chapter on Fundamental Rights was sacrosanct, and DPSPs as in article 37 is
expressly made unenforceable by a Court. Hence, cannot override the provisions found in Part III, notwithstanding
other provisions are expressly made enforceable by appropriate Writs, Orders, or directions under article 32. DPSP
can only be implemented as long as there is no infringement of Fundamental Rights under Part III, subject to
limitations to legislative and executive powers provided under different parts of the Constitution. In Minerva Mills’s
case, a balance between Fundamental Rights and DPSP was sought.

Provisions of Law involved

Constitution of India, Arts. 13, 16 (4), 29 (2), 46—Admission to educational institutions--Executive Order fixing
several seats for particular communities--Invalidity—Fundamental right against discrimination on the ground of
religion only—Directive principles of State policy--Value of.

Issues

1. Is the Communal G.O. issued by the State of Madras Constitutionally valid?

2. Can a State make a reservation of seats in the educational institutions based on caste or religion?

Facts of the case

1. In 1950 in Madras, there existed a quota system for admission to the colleges. The State maintained four
medical colleges and four engineering colleges.
2. The admission in that was on the basis where for every fourteen seats, 6 were to be given to non-Brahmins,
2 to backward classes, 2 to Brahmins, 2 to Harijans, 1 to Anglo-Indians and Indian Christians, and 1 to
Muslim.
3. At that time, the State of Madras maintained had only four Medical Colleges with a total of 330 seats Out
of these seats, 17 were reserved for students coming from outside the state and 12 for discretionary
allotment by the state.
4. Similarly, the Madras state-maintained four Engineering Colleges, and only 395 seats were available in
those colleges. Out of these, 21 seats are reserved for students coming from outside the state and 12 for
discretionary allotment by the state.
5. Rest of the seats in the Medical and Engineering colleges were apportioned based on the Communal GO of
1927.
6. This was based on the order issued by the Province of Madras or Madras Presidency in 1927, before
independence, which was called as Communal Government Order (Communal G. O.).
7. The admission was based on the reservation on the ground of caste of a person in government colleges and
jobs. The State of Madras alleged that they were allowed to maintain and enforce the Communal
Government Order as under Article 46 which is the Directive Principles of State Policy, they are entitled to
maintain the order for the promotion of the educational interest of Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and
other weaker sections in the society.
8. Shrimathi Champakam Dorairajan, a Brahmin, filed a petition in the High Court of Madras under Article
226 relating to the infringement of her fundamental right of admission to the college.
 9. She alleged that she was not able to get admission to the Medical College despite her scoring enough
marks.
10. Shrimathi Champakam alleged that her fundamental rights under Article 15(1) and Article 29(2) were
violated.
11. She requested for the writ of Mandamus to be issued restraining the State of Madras from enforcing the
Communal G. O. Another petition was filed in the High Court of Madras by C. R. Srinivasan relating to
his admission to the Engineering College.
12. He also alleged the issue of a Writ of Mandamus. The High Court of Madras struck down the impugned
Communal Government Order as it was a caste-based reservation and against the Constitution of India.
Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court, the present appeal was filed in the Supreme Court.

Contentions

Arguments given by Petitioner

 It was stated that the entire idea of reserving seats was based on caste, religion, and race. Article 46 of the
Constitution, targets giving schooling to the more fragile segment and the retrogressive class of the general
public society i.e. the scheduled caste and the scheduled tribes.

 This provision is stated and is counted in part IV of the Constitution and includes certain provisions of
directive state policy that are not generally enforced by the court. Article 46 which provides education to
the weaker section also takes them towards social injustice and their exploitation in society. 

 Petitioner argued that the denial of admission into the educational institution maintained by the state on the
grounds of caste violated her fundamental rights under Article 15(1) and Article 29(2) of the Constitution
Article 15(1) prohibits discrimination on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of
them.

Arguments given by Respondent

 In Article 16 of the Constitution aims at providing equality to all at all levels and with no discrimination
based on caste color, creed religion, sex, and race. It aims at equality for all in the places of employment,
education, and other services so that no one as a citizen of the country is left untreated. All the backward
 class people are benefitted from the same keeping in mind the view of the G.O communal which was
formed and favored by the respondent. 

 Article 16 (4) states that nothing can prevent the state from making laws for the reservation of the
backward classes as citizens which is the opinion of the state and the law and they can be appointed to the
place of their choice. This is the service of the state that is fulfilled under the clause.

 It is contended that the applicants are not denied admission simply because they are Brahmins however for
an assortment of reasons, e.g., (a) they are Brahmins, (b) Brahmins have a portion of just two seats out of
14 and (c) the two seats have proactively been topped off by more meritorious Brahmin up-and-comers.
This might be valid such long ways as these two seats held for the Brahmins are concerned yet this line of
contention can have no power when we come to consider the seats saved for competitors of different
networks, for, most definitely, the candidates are denied entrance into any of them not on any ground other
than the sole ground of their being Brahmins and not being individuals from the local area parcel whom
those reservations have been made.

 The State of Madras further contended that Article 46 under Part IV of the Constitution, however not
enforceable by any court of law, is key for the administration of the nation Article 37 puts principles on the
state to apply those standards in making regulations. The state is qualified to keep up with the Communal
Go, fixing proportionate seats for various communities, and the request is legitimate in regulation and not
infringing upon the Constitution.

 In this manner, assuming an individual can't get entrance into the instructive Institutions due to the
Communal G.O, there is no encroachment of their fundamental rights.

Observations

The Court observed that the proportion fixed in the old communal G.O. has been adhered to even after the
commencement of the Constitution on January 26, 1950. Indeed G.O. No. 2208 dated June 16, 1950, laying down
rules for the selection of candidates for admission into the Medical Colleges substantially reproduces the communal
proportion fixed in the old communal G.O.

The Court said that it does not appear that the petitioner had applied for admission to that college. She states that on
inquiry she came to know that she would not be admitted to the College as she belongs to the Brahmin community.
However, the Court does not take any objection to it.
The Court observed that Article 29 clause 1 protects the language, script, or culture of a section of the citizens, and
clause 2 guarantees the fundamental right of an individual citizen. The right to get admission into any educational
institution of the kind mentioned in clause 2 is a right that an individual citizen has as a citizen and not as a member
of any community. [2]

This right is not to be denied to the citizens on the ground of religion or caste. This is only applicable to those who
have the required qualification for admission to any educational institution. Therefore, in this case, there is a
complete breach of the fundamental right.

Judgment

 The Court was of the view that the order in the Communal G.O. given by the govt. Based on religion, race
and caste is against the Constitution and are essentially a reasonable infringement of fundamental rights.

 The Supreme Court held that the Communal o constituted an infringement of the fundamental right
ensured to the residents of India by Article 29(2) of the Constitution and was hence void under Article 13.

 Supreme Court held that 'Provision (2) under Article 29 ensures the basic right of a resident. The option to
get admission into any educational institution of the sort referenced in clause (2) is a right that a resident
has as a citizen and not as an individual from any local area or class of residents. This right isn't assumed
to be denied to the resident on the grounds just of religion, race, caste, language, or any of them.

 The Supreme Court further held that the directive principles of State policy laid down in Part IV of the
Constitution cannot in any way override or abridge the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part I.

 The Supreme Court said that the Directive Principles of State Policy, which by Article 37 are explicitly
made enforceable by a Court can't supersede the provisions found in Part III which despite different
provisions are explicitly made enforceable by suitable Writ, Orders, or direction under Article 32.

 Thus, the Court held that the characterization in the Communal GO proceeds based on religion, race, and
caste. The grouping made In the Communal Co s went against the Constitution and constitutes a clear
infringement of the fundamental rights ensured to the resident under Article 29(2), the Communal to being
conflicting with the provisions of Article 29(2) In Part II of the Constitution is void under Article 13 Thus,
it maintained the Judgment of the High Court of Madras.

Impact Of The Judgement

Champakam Dorairajan's case chose the subject of Supremacy between the Fundamental Rights and the Directive
Principles of State Policy. One of the first cases managed the topic of reservation in admission to the educational
institution. Champakam Dorairajan’s case along with Romesh Thappar’s case necessitated constitutional
amendments. The first amendment to the Indian Constitution undid the effect of the two cases. The first amendment,
among other changes, inserted Clause (4) into Article 15.

Conclusion
This judgment proves to be of major significance as to has been initiated as a method to distinguish when there is a
conflict between fundamental rights and directive principles of state policy. The court also struck down the Communal
Government Order that still existed even after the Constitution was in force. That communal order was against the
fundamental right of the Constitution and was thus, declared void. Article 13 became an operation where legislation is
proved to be not in conformity with the Constitution and was enacted before it came into force, will be struck down.