RELIGIOUS THOUGHT OF SIR SAYYID AHMAD KHAN

MAZHERUDDIN SIDDIQI
Islamic Studies

Vol. 6, No. 3 (SEPTEMBER 1967), pp. 289-308 

The basic motivation behind Sir Sayyid's religious ideology seems to have been a keen desire to
effect a religious reformation in the Muslim world parallel to the Protestant Reformation in Europe.
He had undertaken the reformation of Muslim society in India by publishing a journal, Tahzib-ul-
Akhlaq, on the lines of Spectator and Tatler published by Steele and Addison in England. The Tahzib-
ul-Akhlaq was not meant to be a forum of religious discussion, but merely an organ in which the
prevailing customs and social habits of the Muslims were to be discussed from a rationalistic and
utilitarian view-point. But as time went on, Sir Sayyid felt that it was impossible to avoid religious
controversies. The reason, he says, is that our customs and social habits are so inter twined with
religion that it is impossible to take any step forward on the way to social reform without starting
some religious controversy. When people, he adds, are asked to give up some of their customs, they
reply that these customs carry with them the promise of reward in the Hereafter. Similarly, if they
are asked to learn something new, they will say that it is religiously prohibited. Therefore, discussion
of religious problems becomes necessary. But when once some minor point of religion comes under
discussion, it leads to the discussion of important principles. Thus, sometimes we have to discuss
Figh, sometimes the principles underlying the Fiqh. Similarly, sometimes Hadith comes under
discussion and sometimes the principles of exegesis (Usul al-Tafsir) have to be discussed. "The fact is
that India needs not merely a Steele or an Addison but also and, primarily, a Luther."2

In this connection, Sir Sayyid points to the fact that the great majority of the Ahl al-Sunnah-wa 'l-
Jama'ah in India can be divided into two sections, one of whom is like the Jews, while the other is
like the Roman Catholics. The first group consists of Wahhabis, while the second consists of Bid'atis
(innovators). The Wahhabis possess doctrinal rectitude, because their tenets approximate to pure
Islam, although they are preoccupied only with the externals of religion and are marked by hard
heartedness and a highly prejudiced nature that leaves no room for inner goodness. Their condition
is the same as that of the Jewish scholars. The other section has some core of internal goodness; it is
also punctilious in observing the customs of its forefathers, but it is so much accustomed to
following innovations that it has outstripped the Roman Catholics.3 "Both these things stand in our
way, because we want to eradicate Judaism and Roman Catholicism so far as it has corroded the
Muslims and believe that without true and unmixed Islam, it is not possible to achieve anything
good."4 Writing in the same strain, he says in another place that we, Muslims, have been influenced
in a great measure by the ancient stories of the Jews, by the doctrines and tenets of the Roman
Catholics and by the customs and social habits of the Hindus. Moreover, our own temperaments and
nature and our misunderstandings have. resulted in many new additions to Islam of which real Islam
is quite innocent. All this has brought about degeneration among the Muslims.5

Under these conditions he sets out to revive pure Islam and complains that the people have set up
as another god, by the side of one God, the customs of their forefathers and their own accepted
usages. Similarly, they have created many prophets by the side of the last Prophet, Muhammad, and
accepted many Qur'āns besides the Qur'an revealed to the Prophet. "We shall do with this false god,
these supposed prophets and these forged Qur'ans what our ancestor Abraham had done to the
idols of his father and we shall re-establish in the world the obedience of one true God, that of His
true Prophet, Muhammad, and of His true book".6
It is not very clear from these writings what his conception of pure Islam was to which he wished to
return. Some of his own writings and the remarks made by his biographer, Mawlānā Ḥāli, about his
religious beliefs lead us to the conclusion that he tried to eliminate from his creed and code of
practice all the additional material that had entered into Islam through the efforts of the Muslim
jurists, commentators of the Qur'an, the Muslim dialecticians (Ahl al-Kalam) and the Sufis, confining
himself only to the Qur'an and a few authentic Hadith provided they could stand the test of reason
(dirayah) thus taking up the position of the Ahl-i-Qur'an. But, at other times, he appears to be far
more radical and denies that religion has anything to do with cultural matters or social habits. In
later sections of this article, we shall try to bring out this second strand of thought in him.

His biographer, Ḥāli, says that he had come to the definite conclusion that only that part of Islam
need be studied in the light of science and reason, which the Muslims regard as being divinely
revealed and about which they are certain that it has reached them through the Prophet in exactly
the same condition in which it was revealed to him without any addition or modification. If anything
in this part of Islam runs counter to philosophy and science, then we should try to reconcile them or
we should prove that science and philosophy have gone wrong in their claims and assertions.? In
accordance with this trend of thought and following the remark of 'Umar that the Book of God was
sufficient for us, he wanted to use the Qur'an as material for a new science of dialectics ('Ilm al-
Kalam), because he thought that Islam was co-terminous with the Qur'an. As regards Hadith, he
thought that no Hadith could claim equal authenticity with the Qur'an. Similarly, he removed from
his field of discussion all the opinions and judgements of the 'ulama' and the commentators (of the
Qur'an) and all the decisions of the jurists, on the ground that Islam is not responsible for those
opinions, judgements and decisions.

About the Qur'an he is certain that it is unchangeable. He says that the Qur'an has been revealed on
such marvellous principles that it will never at any time need any amendment. Of course, the
decisions and judgements of the 'ulama' may be wrong and, therefore, stand in need of revision, but
the revision of these decisions and judgement does not touch the Qur'an, and it would be a mistake
to regard the Qur'an also as being liable to revision or amendment.8

So far as Hadith is concerned, Sir Sayyid points out that the vast majority of the Prophet's traditions
were not verbally transmitted to the later generations. Even the Companions and their successors
did not relate traditions from the Prophet in the exact words which the Prophet had used in making
his statements. The narrators of the traditions used their own words to convey the sense of the
Prophet's utterances. Similarly, the second narrator did not use the phraseology of the first narrator
but conveyed in his own words the meaning and sense of the statement he had heard from the first
narrator. The third, fourth and all subsequent narrators did the same. Thus, the traditions
incorporated in the books of Hadith contain the phraseology employed by the last narrator and it is
difficult to say how many changes the words have undergone in this process from the original words
used by the Prophet. It should not surprise us if some of the narrators have not been able to catch
the sense of the preceding narrator or have misunderstood them, thus changing the entire sense of
the tradition. Even the Companions of the Prophet misunderstood him sometimes as is evident from
what happened with regard to the tradition concerning the question whether it is possible to hear
the dead or the tradition concerning the punishment of the dead, if their dear ones loudly wept Sir
Sayyid further makes the bold assertion that history is more authentic than Hadith. He says that if an
incident takes place at any time, then, provided it is an incident of such a nature that the people
continually keep talking about it, it gathers additional materials, that is, new facts and accompanying
details are added to it. This happens rarely with historical incidents having no religious significance.
That is the reason why incidents relating to monarchs, empires and countries are reported factually
without much addition or alteration, but incidents having a religious significance are continually
talked about and people's interest in them never flags. Therefore, new additions and accretions
enter into the reports made about them. It is true that the traditionists tried to sift out the true from
the false Hadith. But they relied merely on their own judgements about the narrators, that is,
whether a narrator was or was not reliable. But it is difficult, if not impossible, to judge the reliability
or otherwise of a narrator who is dead and gone in a such a manner as to inspire confidence and
conviction among those who scrutinize Hadith. Again, the traditionists never cared to judge Hadith
by their internal content. At the time, when the traditionists were doing their work, all the religions
of the world believed in supernatural events. Even the Muslims believed that God's being all-
powerful meant that God could bring about supernatural events. Therefore, supernatural incidents
of all kinds found their way in the books of Hadith. At this stage Sir Sayyid poses a question. What
should a seeker after truth do if he wants to sift out the true from the false Hadith? If he takes his
stand on reason, the only alternative open to him is that he should search for contemporary writings
incorporating all that the Prophet said, so that he should be able to compare them with the oral
traditions, and if he finds that an oral tradition contradicts those writings, he should dismiss them as
fabrications. Where are those writings to be found except in the Qur'an?-he asks? 10

He is not inclined to accept Hadith unless it is tested by reasoning (dirayah). He says that there is
nowadays a sect which calls itself Ahl-i-Hadith, although its opponents designate it as the Wahhabis.
This sect is opposed to Taqlid and claims to follow the Hadith, but the truth of the matter is that it is
itself guilty of Taqlid, because it has given up the habit of testing Hadith on the basis of reason
(dirayah) and believes implicitly in what the scholars of the past generations have said about the
authenticity of individual Hadith.11

His final conclusion about Hadith is that excepting traditions which draw human attention to the life-
hereafter, no other Hadith is binding on the Muslim community, 12 Sir Sayyid declares that he has
great respect for the doings and sayings of the Prophet (embodied in the Hadith) but emphasizes the
fact that these have nothing to do with his function as a prophet. It is clear that he adopts the
position of the Ahl-i-Qur'an who reject the authority of the Hadith. The main argument of Sir Sayyid
in favour of the virtual repudiation of Hadith is that the Prophet himself made it quite clear that not
all what he said or did (the Qur'an alone excepted) constitutes revelation because revelation is that
which has a bearing on the function of prophethood or which has been specified as such by the
Prophet, or which concerns such matters as religious morals or things concerning the Hereafter. In
this way, he refuses to attach any religious significance to Hadith, except such as mention the life-
hereafter or deal strictly with moral questions or specify doctrinal matters, 13

As far as the Muslim Fiqh is concerned, Sir Sayyid rejects it totally. He says that in the past religious-
minded scholars thought that, as far as possible, everything should be done with the support of
some religious authority. Therefore, when any problem arose, they searched for some religious
sanction and with the help of far-fetched arguments or interpretations they placed it under some
religious ruling or subjected it to some general principle laid down by themselves. The sayings and
arguments of these religious scholars began to be collected and assumed the shape of Fiqh and
books relating to the principles of Fiqh. In those days the people did not regard the arguments and
sayings of these scholars as more than their personal opinions, but gradually these arguments and
sayings came to constitute an authority in themselves and, after some time, this collection of
'ulama's opinions came to be known as Islam and was called the Shari'ah.14

Sir Sayyid goes on to point out, that this situation led to the general misunderstanding that Islam
concerns itself with all worldly matters. and no worldly work should be undertaken without some
religious sanction or permission. The decisions of the 'ulama' which were based on analogy (Qiyas)
and independent judgement (Ijtihäd) and in which allowance had been made for the habits of the
people and the requirements of the time should have been given the status of the opinions held by
the 'ulama', the judges, the gadis and the muftis, but what happened was that these decisions came
to constitute the Islamic religion itself. Thus, the position of the law-giver came to be held by many
other people, besides the Prophet of Islam. When these decisions of the jurists and the 'ulama', Sir
Sayyid goes on to add, came to be identified with Islam, it followed necessarily that they constituted
a perfect code of life. This led to the general belief that the books of jurisprudence are adequate for
the purpose of running the affairs of a country and we need no Civil Code, Civil Procedure Code,
Criminal Code or Criminal Procedure Code, and neither Revenue Code nor Trade Code, although the
books of jurisprudence are not adequate for any of these purposes. All the Muslim states sank into
degeneration as a result of this false prejudice.15

We now take up the second strand in Sir Sayyid's religious thought. Here he appears far more radical
and seems to abandon the position of the Ahl-i-Qur'an. Referring to a tract which he had written in
the earlier period of his life, when he was under the influence of Wahhabism and which was entitled
"Rah-i-Sunnat" (the way of the Sunnah), he says:

“This tract can be split under two heads, one which concerns the tenets of Islam and modes of
worship. This is what I now call religion. The second concerns social habits and other things
concerning such matters, as modes. of eating, drinking, dressing, dealing with other people and all
matters relating to culture (tamaddun) and social habits (mu'asharat). All that I have written about
religious tenets and modes of worship, I still stand by it. But the rest of the matters, relating to
culture (tamaddun) and social habits (mu'asharat) which I included in religion, do not, I think, come
under this head. I regard it as a great mistake (to have included those things in religion). The fact is
that since the inception of my educational career, the idea had become ingrained in me that religion
is concerned both with the din (strictly religious matters) and the dunya (world) and when I wrote
this Risalah (tract) I was still under the same impression. Therefore, I wrote about both the din and
dunya (without making any demarcation between the two). After much careful thought and after
pondering over the injunctions of God and of the Prophet, I learnt to make a distinction between the
two. Now I think that it is a great mistake not to differentiate between matters concerning din and
matters relating to dunya and to treat them on a level of equality as if both of them constitute
religion”. 16

This statement shows that in his later phase of thought Sir Sayyid confined religion and Islam to
matters of belief and modes of worship, leaving the rest of the field to purely secular thought and
practice. Of course, he includes morals in religion, as is evident from his statement that he was
concerned with two kinds of matters in life, spiritual and physical, or say, those that concern Din and
those which concern dunya (world). True religion does not involve itself in worldly matters. Of
course, it deals with some important matters which mostly affect morals, even though they may be
related to the worldly affairs.17 "There is no doubt that Islam which is undoubtedly a true religion is
founded on these principles and our Prophet's declaration that whatever I tell you about matters of
religion, accept it and whatever I forbid you from (concerning religion), desist from it, is a conclusive
proof of this", 18

Following this strain of thought, he reduces religion to a matter of private beliefs. He says there are
two parts of man, one which relates to God and another which relates to his fellow-beings. Man's
heart or his belief or what we call his religion is the part which belongs to God exclusively. If his
beliefs are good or bad, only God is concerned with them. Neither his brother nor his son has
anything to do with them. Therefore, we should not concern ourselves with this part of man of
which the effects are limited to his individual person. We should entertain no hatred or ill-feeling
towards a man on the ground of his being a Shi'ah, or a Sunni, or a Wahhabi or because he is a
Bid'ati (practises innovations) or because he has no religion, or because he is a Muqallid or because
he is a naturalist. So long as he believes in God and His Prophet, we should not break the bonds of
brotherhood which have been established by God (among all Muslims). We should concern
ourselves with that part of man which relates to his fellow-beings and this part is concerned with
mutual love, friendship and cooperation which is collectively known as national sympathy. 19

This semi-secular trend in his thought receives more explicit expression when he comes to discuss
the political and administrative work of the Prophet of Islam. He is of the definite view that although
the Arabs made great cultural progress under the Prophet, still cultural reforms formed no part of
the Prophet's mission. He says that the administrative work of the Prophet was merely a worldly
work. It was concerned with the protection of life and property and as a worldly work, it reached
great heights of progress, according to the conditions of the time. For the continuation of the work
in future the Prophet made provision in the Hadith, "You have a better knowledge of the affairs
which concern your worldly life". It is a great mistake, concludes Sir Sayyid, to think that worldly
matters and the administrative work of the state were part of the function of Prophethood. 20

According to Sir Sayyid, the Prophet of Islam, even more than Moses, was pressed by circumstances
to assume the worldly leadership of his community, although this was not a part of his function as a
prophet. All the peoples of Arabia were in the habit of obeying their Sheikh or the head of their tribe
in mundane affairs. It was, therefore, natural for the Arabs to treat the Prophet as their worldly
leader and the Prophet, too, was under the compulsion of circumstances to assume mundane leader
ship. But as in the case of Moses two functions were united in one person, so in the case of the
Prophet, too, one person had assumed two separate functions.21 As far as his function as a
mundane leader was concerned, the Prophet issued commands after consulting his companions and
keeping in view the needs and conditions of the time. But the Muslims, following the Jews,
understood the worldly doings of the Prophet, as if they were divinely inspired commands and
people completely forgot the clear statement of the Prophet that they (the people) had better
knowledge of their worldly affairs.22

Sir Sayyid is emphatic that the great misfortune of the people always has been to incorporate
worldly matters in religion which is essentially unchangeable. This, he says, is testified by the history
of every nation. The Christian nations which are nowadays considered the highest (in respect of
culture) continued to fall in degeneration so long as they stuck to this idea. The Hindus, once a highly
civilized people, suffered from the same misfortune. The Muslims, once leaders of civilization, fell
into decay for the same reason. The last stage of their decay was witnessed by us in the misfortunes
which befell Ottoman Turkey.23

His explanation of why the people are inclined to commit this mistake of incorporating worldly
matters in religion is that, according to popular belief, healthy social customs when they become
part of religion, receive a fresh stability and people think that religion would ensure their being
practised systematically and for all time. But in this they are mistaken. The nature of religious
injunctions is different from that of injunctions connected with social living. Religious injunctions are
related to spiritual morality and spiritual culture and they are. eternal, while matters connected with
social living undergo constant changes.24

Coming to the Qur'an, Sir Sayyid says that not all the contents of the Qur'an are related to religion. If
some of the commentators are to be believed, there are five hundred and even less verses in the
Qur'an which are in the nature of religious commands. Therefore, the fact that worldly matters have
been mentioned in the Qur'an does not prove that they are a part of religion. 25

As far as politics is concerned, Sir Sayyid separates it completely from religion. He says that at no
time did the Muslims regard matters concerning politics to have anything to do with revelation. The
Prophet himself consulted his companions on all such matters and acted in accordance therewith.
Even after the Prophet's time, no one thought that the traditions concerning political matters were
part of the divine revelation. The Qur'an and the Prophet have given a free hand to the rulers in all
matters concerning the political and administrative set-up of their country requiring them only to
consult the intelligent people of the Community, 26

Basic to the religious thought of Sir Sayyid is his idea of the world as governed by the interaction of
cause and effect. It is this belief in scientific causation which lies at the bottom of his naturalism, his
rationalism and his idea of universal predetermination. His conception of God is that of the First
Cause from which a series of effects follow each of which is interdependent, being cause as well as
effect. The Creator of all existents, he says, or their ultimate cause is God, whom we call Allah. All
that exists of which we can have some knowledge or which we can understand and conceive of, is a
system of which the various parts are interdependent. It is essential that this system should be
supported by some ultimate existent or cause. This ultimate existent is God, the nourisher of all the
worlds. 27 He proves the existence of God from the indestructibility of matter. He says that no real
existent ever passes into non-existence. There is a change of forms only. Therefore, if all the
qualities which mark an individual or a species disappear, that which remains will not be subject to
decay. Of course, he points out, it is not easy to decide whether the existent that remains after the
qualities pertaining to all individual or species have disappeared, is a unity or a plurality, but if it is a
plurality, the question will have to be decided whether the characteristic of receiving qualities lies in
each of them separately or in some other existent. We cannot accept the position that each of them
has the characteristic of receiving qualities separately, because we see that all existents cooperate
with each other. Therefore, the existents that remain, after the qualities pertaining to individuals
and species disappear, will also cooperate with each other. But there should be some common cause
for their behaving in this manner. It is clear that this common cause which leads to the cooperation
of various existents is some other existent and this existent is God. If, on the other hand, the existent
that remains after the qualities pertaining to all individuals and species have disappeared is a unity,
the question will arise whether the characteristic of receiving qualities lies in the self-same existent
or this characteristic has been caused by some other existent. If it lies in the self-same existent, that
existent is God. If some other existent is the cause of this characteristic (of receiving qualities) then
this cause of causes is God.28

Sir Sayyid's conception of God is that of a ruler who is bound by His own laws and by the constitution
which He has framed for the world. He says the laws of nature (framed by God) never fail in their
effect. Although He can frame any kind of natural law, but once He has laid down a natural law,
nothing can happen which would contravene it. There is no ruler besides God, but this does not
mean that God issues orders and injunctions without some purpose or end in view. Therefore, it is
an absurd doctrine to hold that the good and evil in things depend upon divine injunctions or that
reward and punishment is the result of divine commands and prohibitions. On the other hand, the
good and evil in things and the reward or punishment that follows human deeds are based on
natural laws and the commands of God are merely an explanation of those laws. Some of these laws
are discoverable by human reason while others become known only after the Prophet explains them
to mankind. 29
Sir Sayyid explains prophethood in accordance with the same deterministic and naturalist scheme.
The early 'ulama', he says, held that prophethood is an office which is given by God to the person
whom He selects for this purpose. "But I consider prophethood to be a natural phenomenon". Like
all other natural faculties, this faculty of prophethood resides in the Prophet. The man who is gifted
with this faculty is a prophet and whoever is a prophet is necessarily gifted with this faculty, and as
all human faculties depend upon the physical constitution of man, so is the faculty of prophethood
intimately related to the prophet's physical constitution. The prophet is a prophet while he is still in
the womb of his mother. This fact is not peculiar to the faculty of prophethood. Man is gifted with
innumerable faculties. Sometimes some faculty becomes so powerful in some particular man that he
is called a prophet in his own special field.30

For the same reason Sir Sayyid believes that although prophethood has ended with Muhammad, the
prophetic faculty in mankind still keeps functioning. "Whatever the Prophet of Islam has said about
the spiritual progress or spiritual culture of man, that is the last word that has been said in this
regard. That is what makes him the khatim (the last Prophet). If a thousand people are now born
gifted with the prophetic faculty they cannot say anything more (than what Muhammad has said).
However, the faculty of prophethood and the grace of God have not come to their end. On the other
hand, the words of the Prophet: the saints of my Community are like the prophets of Israel, show
that the faculty of prophethood will continue to function till the Last Day, although prophethood has
come to an end".31

Since the prophetic faculty is inborn and not acquired, it is not possible for any man to arrive at the
correct moral judgement merely by the help of his own efforts and acquisitions. It is true, Sir Sayyid
states, that the right kind of morality can be discovered by careful consideration and analysis of the
laws of nature. But this is possible only when the knowledge of man has sufficiently progressed and
man has discovered the secrets of the faculties which the Creator has lodged in him. But not all
human beings are capable of plumbing these depths. Very few, indeed, are the people who can
reach this degree of perfection. If a person not gifted with the prophetic faculty is able to arrive at a
correct view of morality, he can do so only by pondering over the universe, expanding the area of his
knowledge and profiting by the knowledge of his predecessors. But in spite of all his efforts, he is not
able to attain certainty. On the other hand, the prophet does not attain perfection by his efforts or
acquisition. The prophetic faculty is inborn in him. There fore, when he ponders over something
relating to morality or, say din, he is able to arrive at conclusions which are clear, correct and certain
and which represent the will of Him who has framed the laws of nature. This inspiration is of many
kinds and accords with natural laws.32

Having thus explained inspiration (Wahy or Ilham) as process, Sir Sayyid notes another difference
between the Prophet a natural and the man who arrives at a correct view of morality by his own
efforts but lacks the prophetic faculty. The latter explains his philosophy to the people in technical
terms, using the language of the books he has studied. Therefore, he is unable to reach the masses
who do not under stand technicalities. The Prophet, on the other hand, explains the deepest
problems of life in a language understandable to the common people, because he is gifted with an
inborn faculty which does not stand in need of philosophical jargon or abstruse technical terms.

In conformity with his naturalistic explanation of prophethood, he denies that any angel acts as an
intermediary between God and the Prophet or brings messages from God for delivery to the
Prophet. It is not any angel but the prophetic faculty itself which is in contact with God. It is the
prophetic faculty which hears the Divine words. It is the prophetic faculty, again, which is the seat of
revelation and to which revelation is vouchsafed.34 He says that although God has mentioned
Gabriel several times in the Qur'an, He has explained the true nature of Gabriel in the Chapter al-
Baqarah, where it is said: "The angel, Gabriel, has brought it down to thy heart with God's
permission". That which puts an idea in the mind or heart of man must be something belonging to
man's own inmost nature. It cannot be anything external to man and foreign to the nature of the
man to whom revelation is vouchsafed.5 In short, Sir Sayyid is of the opinion that the Qur'anic verses
bearing on the nature of revelation show that there is no intermediary between God and His
Prophet. God alone puts in the heart of the Prophet all that He would like to communicate to His
creatures, God alone reads the verses and interprets them. All this is the work of that natural
prophetic faculty which God has lodged in the prophets, like other human faculties.36 Again, the
prophetic faculty comes into play, like any other human faculty in the most natural manner. All
human faculties are set in action when something happens in the external world and causes them to
act. So does the prophetic faculty. We have in our minds' deepest layers, hundreds of ideas and
images. We remember thousands of verses. We can recall to our mind innumerable persons and
places that we have seen. But there must be some incident, some happening in nature, some cause
external to ourselves to push up before our mind's eye those ideas, images and impressions. It is
exactly the same with the prophetic faculty. The Prophet eats, drinks, sleeps, wakes up like any other
man, but when some incident happens which sets in motion his prophetic faculty, it is then that this
prophetic faculty starts functioning.37

As far as the religion of Islam is concerned, Sir Sayyid is of the opinion that it is based on nature, but
he does not clarify his concept of nature. beyond saying that Nature is the work of God. The Qur'an,
on the other hand, is the word of God and the two cannot contradict each other. "If there is some
apparent contradiction, then the work of God is always before us, and we cannot deny it. In this case
the word of God will be proved false which is impossible and, therefore, the two must be in
conformity with each other".38 It is not clear from this whether he would have the Qur'an judged by
nature or vice versa and which would be considered final authority, in case the two contradict each
other. Perhaps he believes that contradiction between the two is impossible. However, our
understanding of the Qur'an and our understanding of nature may clash with each other.

About the laws of nature, Sir Sayyid says that they are the promises of God, and when God makes a
promise, He does not go back on it. But God describes Himself as (the doer of what He wills) in spite
of His oft-repeated declaration that He does not break His promises. This means that His being All-
powerful does not stand in His way of fulfilling His promises. Just as God does not go back on the
promises He has made in the Qur'an, so He does not break His promises in the natural world, that is,
He does not break the laws of Nature. Some of these laws of Nature or promises of God have been
made known to man by the Qur'an. Examples of the general laws of nature enunciated in the Qur'an
are the following, according to Sir Sayyid: We have made everything according to measure ‫انا كل شيء‬
‫خلقناه بقدر‬. For every community there is a term of life ‫و لكل امة اجل‬. There is no change in the words (or
creation) of God.

These are the general laws of nature. But, according to Sir Sayyid, the Qur'an has specified more
particular or detailed laws. For example, the Qur'an says, "Verily, We created man from a product of
wet earth, then placed him as a drop (of seed) in a safe lodging. Then fashioned We the drop a clot,
then fashioned We the clot a little lump." (XXIII: 12, 13, 14). There are many other verses of the
Qur'an on the same subject which show that man's birth takes place according to a law and nothing
can happen contrary to this law. Similarly, the Qur'an says: "But the answer of his folk was that they
said only: Kill him or burn him". (XXIX: 24) and "And a fiery whirlwind striketh it and it is all
consumed by fire" (II: 267). In these two verses God has pointed to the law of nature that fire burns.
So long as this law of nature holds, nothing contrary to it can take place, just as God's verbal
promises must be fulfilled under all circumstances. In the story of Moses the Qur'an says, "When We
brought you through the sea and rescued you and drowned the folk of Pharaoh in your sight" (II :50).
This and similar verses in the Qur'an show that it is the law of nature created by God that heavy
articles sink in water. So long as this law continues to exist, nothing can stop heavy articles from
sinking in water.39

Apart from the laws of nature stated in the Qur'an, there are, adds Sir Sayyid, other laws which man
has discovered by his own experience. It is true that man cannot claim to have discovered all the
laws of nature. There are many laws which are hitherto undiscovered. It is possible to argue, of
course, that there may be exceptions to the laws of nature described in the Qur'an or discovered by
man through experience. As far as the laws of nature stated by the Qur'an are concerned, Sir Sayyid
claims that it is impossible to prove from the Qur'an that there are exceptions to those laws. As far
as other natural laws are concerned, we may admit the possibility of there being exceptions to these
laws, but mere theoretical possibility is something other than the actual existence of those
exceptions. Besides the idea of possibility can be applied to something which may or may not occur.
But if an exception has never occurred, it is an absurdity to describe it as being possible. In short,
those who admit the possibility of there being exceptions to the laws of nature must prove that
those exceptions have actually come to pass. 40

Sir Sayyid goes on to extend the scope of his naturalistic conception of Islam so far that it becomes
indistinguishable from atheism. He says that if there is nothing in naturalism beyond the fact that
one should confirm his belief in God by pondering over the conclusions that flow from the study of
the universe and the interrelations of its various components, then the Shari'ah directs man to take
to naturalism.41 God has said in the Qur'an, "Have they not considered the dominions of the earth
and the heavens and what things Allah hath created?" (VII:185) This verse plainly tells us to adopt a
naturalistic outlook. Then God told us about the greatness of Abraham, because he was a naturalist.
"Thus did We show Abraham the kingdom of the heavens and the earth" (VI:75). In fact God went on
to command us that we should all be naturalists. "Will they not regard the camels how they are
created? And the heaven how it is raised? And the hills how they are set up? And the earth how it is
spread"? (LXXXVIII: 20). From this he concludes that nature which God has called 'fitrah' is another
name of Islam and "Islam is such a simple and broad religion that what the people regard as atheism
is Islam in reality."42 Even a man with no religion must have some religion and that is Islam. Religion
is known by its restrictions and rites which form its distinguishing features. Atheism or irreligiousness
is known by its rejection of these restrictions and rites. Therefore, if we strip religion of all its
distinguishing features, that is, features which mark off one religion from another, then something
will remain, which will not be associated with any particular religion. This something that remains is
irreligiousness and that is Islam as well as nature.

Sir Sayyid proceeds from this argue that all those who do not believe in God are Muslims. In the first
place, it is not true to say that they do not believe in God, because it is natural for man to believe in
God and man cannot divest himself of his nature. The Qur'an says, "Unto Him submitteth whosoever
is in the heavens and the earth, willingly or and unto Him they will be returned" (III: 83). Secondly, it
is a false accusation against them that they reject the belief in God. They do not say that there is no
God. What they say is that we have no proof of His existence. This is not a denial of His existence but
a denial of the knowledge of His existence. As creations of nature they confirm in the heart of their
hearts the truth of God's existence. They are free from any taint of polytheism. What remains then
which could exclude them from the company of those who are blessed with an eternity of bliss?43
Sir Sayyid's naturalism finally finds expression in a most rigid determination wherein all things are
bound in an iron chain of cause and effect. He says that man's acts flow from his physical
constitution and, therefore, men are not free to act and behave as they like. "If a kind-hearted
person with noble disposition, had been endowed with a constitution like that of an evil-minded and
hard-hearted person, his behaviour would have been the same as that of the latter. If a foolish
person and a wise person could exchange their physical constitution, then the foolish man would act
like the wise man and vice versa."44 He further points out that those scientists and scholars who
have studied human nature have found that man lacks freedom of will in two respects. One of them
relates to external factors, such as his attachment to his social, national and cultural norms. From
childhood man is conditioned by these external factors and, secondly, by the training and education
he receives. He is constrained to act in the manner prescribed by these external factors, but he has
no feeling of constraint, because outwardly he has not been placed under any particular constraint.
But the fact is that his choice and will is already predetermined by these factors, and when he thinks
he is acting freely and exercising freedom of choice, the fact remains that his choice has already
been fixed for him by these external factors.45

Although sceptical of Hadith in general, Sir Sayyid finds support for his predeterminism in Hadith. For
example, he says that a man's nature is fixed and determined for him in his mother's womb. All the
organs of the child's body including his heart and mind are fashioned in the womb of his mother in
such a way that all his later acts flow from this peculiar fashioning which he has already received
prior to his birth. The Hadith says the same thing, "For every man that work has been made easy for
which he has been created".46 He further quotes the Hadith. "The good man is he who is disposed
to goodness (by nature) while he is in the womb of his mother and the wicked man is he whose
wickedness is fixed for him, while he is in the womb of his mother" and goes on to remark that
whatever the present condition of a man may be, whether good or evil, he has brought it with him
from the womb of his mother. The prophethood of the Prophets, the prayerfulness of the
worshippers, the asceticism of the ascetics, the beauty of form enjoyed by handsome persons, the
poetry of the poets, the wickedness of the evil-doers and the disbelief of the disbelievers all this has
come out of the mother's womb. Therefore, every one of these, the prophet, the worshipper, the
ascetic, the wicked and the disbeliever must necessarily and by nature act appropriately to the
manner in which he has been fashioned by nature. He cannot, in fact, desist from acting in the
manner prescribed for him. Man's salvation depends on whether or not he exercises all the faculties
lodged in him. If the angelic faculties are weak in him and the animal faculties are strong, he should
not keep his weak faculties in a state of idleness, but exercise them to the full. This is how he can
wash out his sins.47

Sir Sayyid applies his deterministic theory of action to the life of nations. He says that decay and
degeneration among the nations is a natural process like that of aging in the individuals. Just as the
ills which are incident to old age cannot be cured, so decay among the nations is an incurable
malady.48

However, this determinism of Sir Sayyid is based on his belief in the invariability and necessity of
causal sequence. He does not seek support for his deterministic views from the Qur'an. In fact, he
rejects the view that the Qur'an teaches predeterminism. In the Qur'an, Sir Sayyid writes, God has
ascribed to Himself all the acts of His creatures. Whatever acts are committed by the creatures, the
Qur'an says about them that their doer is God. Similarly, with regard to things and phenomena
which are caused by some cause, the Qur'an says that God has caused them, thus eliminating
immediate and intermediate causes and referring everything to the First Cause. The Qur'an says God
caused the rain to fall, God planted the trees and God caused the rivers to flow. This mode of speech
does not mean that there were no inter mediate causes and the Qur'an has no intention of proving
or disproving free-will or predetermination. The object of the Qur'an is merely to impress the
greatness of God on the human mind or to show that in the ultimate analysis everything is caused by
God who is the First or the Ultimate cause of all things. Therefore, it is not right to argue from the
Qur'ân in favour of free-will or predetermination.49

CONCLUSION

We have studied the religious views of Sir Sayyid and we find from this brief study that his thought is
governed primarily by his belief in natural causation. The world and life therein is governed,
according to him, by a series of causes and effects in an ascending order until at last we reach the
idea of God who is the cause of all causes, that is, the first and the final cause. But God conceived of
as the First Cause is not a living and communicating God, that is, the God posited by religion. The
belief in prophethood is tenable only if we hold that God communicates His will to those whom we
call the prophets. The conception of God as the First Cause does not fulfil this requirement and,
therefore, leaves no room for belief in prophethood.

Again, belief in God must have some meaning for the life here and now. If it does not have this
meaning, we can hardly have much interest in it, and the notion of the First Cause gives us no clue as
to the nature of life in this world or the manner in which it ought to be shaped. What Sir Sayyid and
many other people overlook is that the doctrine of God is a way of explaining the world and life
therein. Belief in God is necessary because it throws light on the nature of life and on the values
which should enter into the organizing of man's social existence. In revealing Himself to the
prophets, God reveals to them also His modes of dealing with the world and man, and it is upon this
body of spiritual perceptions relating to God's workings in history that every prophet struggles to
organize the community in which he is born. It is, therefore, not true to say that the prophets are
unconcerned with politics or that they deal with strictly moral matters alone, that is, preach merely
individual morality and leave the rest of life to be organized by powerful individuals according to
their whims and caprices or the exigencies of the moment. Morality that is merely individualistic is of
little consequence to the general fate of man kind. Morality becomes effective only when it is
embodied in laws and institutions. Thus, if we wish to work for the moral uplift of mankind, the only
method open to us is to change the laws which they obey and modify their institutions, because the
institutions under which people live enter into their moral dispositions. Therefore, when Sir Sayyid
says that the Prophet of Islam, like Moses, was pressed by circumstances. to assume the two
functions of worldly rule and prophetic preaching, which were, in effect, separate, he is forgetting
the fact that the Prophet could not have changed the morality of his people without giving them
new laws and institutions, and he could not give them new laws and institutions without assuming
political authority so that his worldly function as a ruler was necessitated by his mission as a
prophet.

If religion, which is based on belief in God and has something to say about the values which shape or
ought to shape mass collective existence, is not unconcerned with the laws and institutions under
which men live, then it becomes very difficult to draw an exact line of demarcation between things
which constitute din (Faith) and those which constitute the dunya (World). In a way, whatever is
related to the world and life therein, is also related to Faith and Religion. When worldly life becomes
organized on the basis of the deepest spiritual perceptions of mankind, it becomes din. When, not so
organized, din remains an empty word, whatever noble doctrines of God, mankind may continue to
hold, for God cannot be set apart from the world. It is, however, an undeniable fact that religions
have a tendency to degenerate into mere theoretical tenets, without affecting in any vital way the
life and institutions of mankind. When this happens, rival theories of life take the field, because
human life has to be organized on some principle, religious or non-religious.

Sir Sayyid identifies Islam with nature but his conception of nature is rather vague. It is not clear
whether by nature he means physical nature as it exists in the outside world or human nature as it
exists in man within society. As far as physical nature is concerned, it is for the most part amoral.
Only with the appearance of society, morality becomes a matter of importance. It is human nature
as it manifests itself in society and history that can provide us with some moral standards. But Sir
Sayyid makes no attempt to derive natural laws from the history of social evolution and compare
them with Islamic teachings. Therefore, his assertion that Islam and nature cannot contradict each
other remains a mere assertion without proof.

He is on surer ground in his approach to Hadith and Fiqh. However, a total repudiation of Hadidh or
Fiqh is uncalled for, because both contain valuable elements of guidance for the Muslims even
today. It is for the Muslim Community as a whole to decide which parts of Hadith and Figh have
become irrelevant to our contemporary life, and which constitute valuable material for the framing
of new laws. Those who repudiate Hadith and Fiqh in toto are guilty of rejecting their own history.
Both Hadith and Fiqh should be viewed in their historical development and accorded a place in our
contemporary system, provided they fit in with the general outlook and spirit of the Qur'an and the
Sunnah.