“ADVOCATE GENERAL,

ANDHRA PRADESH

V.

D. SESHAGIRI RAO”

AIR 1966 AP 167

INTRODUCTION

 Article 19(1)(a) of the constitution gives the right of freedom of speech & expressions
to all citizens, but on the other hand Articles 129 and 215 give the power of contempt
 of court to the higher judiciary and this power limits the freedom granted by article
19(1) (a).

 Contempt of court is any behavior or wrongdoing that conflicts with or challenges the
authority, integrity, and superiority of the court. These acts might include failure to
comply with requests, witness tampering, withholding evidence, interruption of
proceedings, or defying a court order. These wrongful acts may be committed by
attorneys, officers of the court, court personnel, jurors, witnesses, protestors, or any
party involved in a court proceeding.

 Contempt of Court is a wider term that incorporates a lot of act and is upon the sole
discretion of the judges.

 The Advocate General, Andhra Pradesh, has filed this petition against D. Seshagiri
Rao, the respondent herein, for action under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Contempt of
Courts Act. 

 The respondent is said to have committed contempt of court by reason of the

scurrilous attacks which he made against the Additional Sessions Judge,
Rajahmundry, and the Judicial Second-Class Magistrate, Kakinada in the letters
which he addressed to them on 30-10-1964.

 The Court held the person guilty of contempt and because he was old and fragile,
made him pay only the fine and did not let him undergo any punishment.

 The Court had made him pay Rs 200 as a fine for contempt of the Court.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The facts of the case are such that the respondent filed a criminal complaint against
the officials of Gurazanapalli Salt Factory, near Kakinada in East Godavari District under
Sections 447, 506 and 500 I. P C. and Section 22-D of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944
alleging that without any manner of justification they trespassed upon the land (salt pan) and
prevented him from manufacturing salt for a day. He claimed title to the land, and also
contended that he was under no obligation to take a licence from the department for
manufacturing salt on the ground that no notification was issued by the Government to that
effect in respect of the land in question The trial Magistrate held that the salt officials
committed the acts alleged in the exercise of their duty and that no injury had been caused to
the respondent, and acquitted the accused. The officers gave notice to the respondent and
sought the help of the police in order to prevent manufacture of salt as they believed that the
respondent sublet the pan, and they acted bona fide in the discharge of their duties They did
not bear any grudge towards the respondent and were not interested in dispossessing him or
inducting some other person, and soon after the police refused to interfere in the matter, the
department withdrew then peons from the site, and the work was not stopped for more than a
day. The learned Judge, therefore, held that there was no criminal intention on the part of the
officers when they entered upon the property, and that they were not liable for an offence
under Section 447 I P. C., and con-finned the judgment of the Magistrate.

Even during the pendency of Criminal Appeal 266 of 1961, The salt factory officer,
Guruzatiapalli filed C. C. No. 834 of 1962 on the file of the Additional Judicial II Class
Magistrate, Kakinada, against the respondent on the ground that he contravened Section 6 of
the Act, read with Rule 102 of the Rules made thereunder, and that he committed an offence
punishable under Section 9 of the Act. Thereafter, in the month of January 1962, the
respondent manufactured salt in that land with hired labour, contravening the above
provisions of law. The Magistrate, by his judgment dated 6-9-1962, found the respondent
guilty, and sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs. 100/-, or in default to suffer simple
imprisonment for six weeks.

Against that judgment, an appeal was preferred to the Court of Sessions Judge,
Rajahmundry, which was transferred to the Additional Sessions Judge, and registered as
Criminal Appeal No. 304 of 1962 on his file. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, in an
elaborate judgment found that the factory officer had authority under the rules to file the
complaint. Placing reliance on the provisions of the Act and the rules framed there under, the
Madras Salt Act, 1889, Section 2 of the Central Excise (Repealing and Amending) Act, II of
1948, and the notifications of the Government of India. he found that individuals or groups
may freely produce salt in a land to which they have lawful access for the purpose of
construction of salt pans, provided the total area of the land is not more than 10 acres, and
that no licence was needed in such cases, and the provisions of the Act would not apply.
Against this judgment, Criminal Revision Case No. 538 of 1963. was preferred to this court,
and Mohammed Mirza J., by his judgment dated 23-6-64, found that under Section 6(2)(e) of
the Salt Cess Act, 1953, and as per notifications, Exs. D. 12 and D. 13 since the extent of the
land is less than 10 acres the respondent is exempt from salt cess. The learned judge also
found that the notification under which the petitioner was obliged to obtain a licence for
manufacturing salt no longer existed, and that since he was manufacturing salt only in an area
of 3 acres, he was exempt from paying cess. In that view, the learned Judge allowed the
revision and acquitted the accused.

After this judgment was rendered, the respondent sent two registered notices dated
30-10-1964, one to Sri M. Satyanarayana, Additional Sessions Judge, and another Sri B.
Sitaram Sastry, Judicial II Class Magistrate, Kakinada. By the notice to the Additional
Sessions Judge, he called upon him to show, cause within a week why no legal action should
be taken against him for violating the fundamental rights of the respondent, and for defaming
him. By the other notice the respondent asked the Magistrate to show cause why civil and
criminal action should not be taken against him. It is the imputations and allegations in these
notices that are said to constitute contempt of court.

The Advocate General, Andhra Pradesh, has filed this petition against D.
Seshagirirao, the respondent herein, for action under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Contempt of
Courts Act. The respondent is said to have committed contempt of court by reason of the
scurrilous attacks which he made against the Additional Sessions Judge, Rajahmundry, and
the Judicial Second-Class Magistrate, Kakinada in the letters which he addressed to them on
30-10-1964.
 ISSUES INVOLVED

 Whether the act of the appellant constitutes an attack on the competence and integrity
of the judicial officers and thereby invokes contempt proceedings?

 Whether the observation of the High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 266 of 1961 that
there was no notification under Section 6 of the Act is apt and just?

CASES REFERRED
 Emperor v. Murali Manohar Prasad. AIR 1929 Pat 72

 Amrita Bazar Patrika, (1917) ILR 45 Cal 169; (AIR 1918 Cal 988 (FB)

 Thusliar Kanti Ghosh, AIR 1935 Cal 419 (FB) 

 Re Motilal Ghose, (1918) ILR 45 Cal 169: (AIR 1918 Cal 988 (FB))

 Re. K. L. Gauba, AIR 1942 Lah 105 (FB)

 J.&P. Coats v. Chandwick, (1894) 1 Ch. D 347

 M. G. Kadir v. Kesri Narain, AIR 1945 All 67

 PROVISIONS OF LAW

The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

 Section 3: Innocent publication and distribution of matter not contempt.— (1) A

person shall not be guilty of contempt of court on the ground that he has published
(whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or
otherwise) any matter which interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends
to obstruct, the course of justice in connection with any civil or criminal proceeding
pending at that time of publication, if at that time he had no reasonable grounds for
believing that the proceeding was pending. —(1) A person shall not be guilty of
contempt of court on the ground that he has published (whether by words, spoken or
written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise) any matter which
interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the course of
justice in connection with any civil or criminal proceeding pending at that time of
publication, if at that time he had no reasonable grounds for believing that the
proceeding was pending." (2) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in
this Act or any other law for the time being in force, the publication of any such
matter as is mentioned in sub-section (1) in connection with any civil or criminal
proceeding which is not pending at the time of publication shall not be deemed to
constitute contempt of court. (3) A person shall not be guilty of contempt of court on
the ground that he has distributed a publication containing any such matter as is
mentioned in sub-section (1), if at the time of distribution he had no reasonable
grounds for believing that it contained or was likely to contain any such matter as
aforesaid: Provided that this sub-section shall not apply in respect of the distribution
of— (i) any publication which is a book or paper printed or published otherwise than
in conformity with the rules contained in section 3 of the Press and Registration of
Books Act, 1867 (25 of 1867); (ii) any publication which is a newspaper published
otherwise than in conformity with the rules contained in section 5 of the said Act.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, a judicial proceeding— (a) is said to
be pending— (A) in the case of a civil proceeding, when it is instituted by the filing of
a plaint or otherwise, (B) in the case of a criminal proceeding under the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898), or any other law— (i) where it relates to the
commission of an offence, when the charge-sheet or challan is filed, or when the court
issues summons or warrant, as the case may be, against the accused, and (ii) in any
 other case, when the court takes cognizance of the matter to which the proceeding
relates, and in the case of a civil or criminal proceeding, shall be deemed to continue
to be pending until it is heard and finally decided, that is to say, in a case where an
appeal or revision is competent, until the appeal or revision is heard and finally
decided or, where no appeal or revision is preferred, until the period of limitation
prescribed for such appeal or revision has expired; (b) which has been heard and
finally decided shall not be deemed to be pending merely by reason of the fact that
proceedings for the execution of the decree, order or sentence passed therein are
pending.

 Section 4. Fair and accurate report of judicial proceeding not contempt.—Subject to

the provisions contained in section 7, a person shall not be guilty of contempt of court
for publishing a fair and accurate report of a judicial proceeding or any stage thereof.
—Subject to the provisions contained in section 7, a person shall not be guilty of
contempt of court for publishing a fair and accurate report of a judicial proceeding or
any stage thereof."

 Section 5. Fair criticism of judicial act not contempt.—A person shall not be guilty of
contempt of court for publishing any fair comment on the merits of any case which
has been heard and finally decided. —A person shall not be guilty of contempt of
court for publishing any fair comment on the merits of any case which has been heard
and finally decided."

 Section 6. Complaint against presiding officers of subordinate courts when not

contempt.—A person shall not be guilty of contempt of court in respect of any
statement made by him in good faith concerning the presiding officer of any
subordinate court to— (a) any other subordinate court, or (b) the High Court, to which
it is subordinate. Explanation.—In this section, “subordinate court” means any court
subordinate to a High Court.

 Section 9. Act not to imply enlargement of scope of contempt.—Nothing contained in

this Act shall be construed as implying that any disobedience, breach, publication or
other act is punishable as contempt of court which would not be so punishable a part
from this Act. —Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed as implying that any
 disobedience, breach, publication or other act is punishable as contempt of court
which would not be so punishable a part from this Act."

The Central Excise Act 1944

 Section 9. Offences and penalties.—[(1) ] Whoever commits any of the following

offences, namely:— [(a) contravenes any of the provisions of section 8 or of a rule
made under clause (iii) or clause (xxvii) of sub-section (2) of section 37;] (b) evades
the payment of any duty payable under this Act; 3[(bb) removes any excisable goods
in contravention of any of the provisions of this Act or any rule made there under or
in any way concerns himself with such removal; (bbb) acquires possession of, or in
any way concerns himself in transporting, depositing, keeping, concealing, selling or
purchasing, or in any other manner deals with, any excisable goods which he knows
or has reason to believe are liable to confiscation under this Act or any rule made
thereunder;] [(bbbb) contravenes any of the provisions of this Act or the rules made
thereunder in relation to credit of any duty allowed to be utilised towards payment of
excise duty on final products;] (c) fails to supply any information which he is required
by rules made under this Act to supply, or (unless with a reasonable belief, the burden
of proving which shall be upon him, that the information supplied by him is true)
supplies false information; (d) attempts to commit, or abets the commission of, any of
the offences mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of this section; 5[shall be punishable,—
(i) in the case of an offence relating to any excisable goods, the duty leviable thereon
under this Act exceeds one lakh of rupees, with imprisonment for a term which may
extend to seven years and with fine: Provided that in the absence of special and
adequate reasons to the contrary to be recorded in the judgment of the Court such
imprisonment shall not be for a term of less than six months; (ii) in any other case,
with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or with fine or with
both.] 6[(2) If any person convicted of an offence under this section is again convicted
of an offence under this section, then, he shall be punishable for the second and for
every subsequent offence with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven
years and with fine: Provided that in the absence of special and adequate reasons to
the contrary to be recorded in the judgment of the Court such imprisonment shall not
be for a term of less than six months. (3) For the purposes of sub-sections (1) and (2),
 the following shall not be considered as special and adequate reasons for awarding a
sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six months, namely:— (i) the fact
that the accused has been convicted for the first time for an offence under this Act;
(ii) the fact that in any proceeding under this Act, other than a prosecution, the
accused has been ordered to pay a penalty or the goods in relation to such proceedings
have been ordered to be confiscated or any other action has been taken against him for
the same act which constitutes the offence; (iii) the fact that the accused was not the
principal offender and was acting merely as a carrier of goods or otherwise was a
secondary party in the commission of the offence; (iv) the age of the accused.]

 Section 22: Vexatious search, seizure, etc., by Central Excise Officer.—Any Central
Excise or other officer exercising powers under this Act or under the rules made
thereunder who— (a) without reasonable ground of suspicion searches or causes to be
searched any house, boat or place; (b) vexatious and unnecessarily detains, searches
or arrests any person; (c) vexatious and unnecessarily seizes the movable property of
any person, on pretence of seizing or searching for any article liable to confiscation
under this Act; (d) commits, as such officer, any other act to the injury of any person,
without having reason to believe that such act is required for the execution of his duty,
shall, for every such offence, be punishable with fine which may extend to two
thousand rupees. Any person wilfully and maliciously giving false information and so
causing an arrest or a search to be made under this Act shall be punishable with fine
which may extend to two thousand rupees or with imprisonment for a term which may
extend to two years or with both.
 ARGUMENT BY APPELLANTS

The contentions on behalf of the appellant counsels were that the averments in the
letters constitute contempt of court. There was publication of the imputations, and they were
not made in notices sent by the respondent before taking legal proceedings against the two
judicial officers, and amount to contempt. The imputations in the notices are not true, and
were not bona fide believed by the respondent having regard to the circumstances of the case.
 ARGUMENT BY RESPONDENT

The respondent counsel argued while dealing elaborately with the merits of the case,
and emphasising the fact that since the public prosecutor conceded in this court in Criminal
Appeal No. 266 of 61 that there was no notification made under Section 6 of the Act, and
since the area was less than 10 acres, he had not committed any offence, that the officer who
made the complaint had no jurisdiction to do so, and that on evidence and the several legal
provisions he could not have been convicted. It was also contended that the Magistrate and
the Sessions Judge had no jurisdiction to render those judgments, and that his criticism of
their conduct in the judgments, did not constitute contempt. He alleged that he did not impute
incompetence, but bias against him (the respondent) and in favour of the salt officers, who
filed the case against him in revenge for his publishing the Telegu pamphlet dated 14-1-1962.
The respondent gave a number of reasons to justify the averment that there was abuse of the
process of the court that they acted without jurisdiction and with bias or partiality to the Salt
officer, who inducted a "rich Komati Woman" with an unlawful licence. The judgment of the
Magistrate, he said, emboldened the officers to publish a notice by "tom tom" on 6-12-62 that
the respondent was convicted for want of a licence, and that nobody should help the
respondent to cultivate salt. The respondent also published a notice on 8-1-1963, warning the
officials against inducting Gollapudi Mangaraju as it was illegal according to the judgment of
the High Court dated 16-10-1962. The respondent also contended that the officials published
the notice on 6-12-1962 even though they were aware that an appeal was filed on 10-10-1962
and was pending in the Sessions Court. The respondent averred that the Sessions Judge
deliberately omitted to refer to several pieces of evidence and provisions of law in his favour,
and convicted him. All that suggested bias and help towards the "Komati Woman" inducted
into his land on 11-12-1962. The opinion of the Sessions Judge was against the judgment of
the High Court in C. A. No. 266 of 1961 dated 16-10-1962, even though a copy of that
judgment was communicated to the Additional Sessions Judge, and he was aware of the same
when he heard the appeal. The respondent also complained that the Additional Sessions
Judge made observations slighting him.

Learned counsel for the opponent has argued that no offence was committed, not even
contempt of court, because these allegations were contained in a notice under Section 80,
which the opponent was bound to submit before bringing a suit. But without very strong
authority and no authority has been cited in that connection we are not prepared to say that a
man merely by filing or threatening to file a suit and calling his communication a notice
under Section 80 can insult and vilify a judge in this manner. The opponent must have
known, or ought to have known, being a practitioner of the law, that his suit was
unmaintainable even apart from the technical flaw of want of sanction under the Government
of India Act. No suit of the kind lies for anything said or done by a judge in his jurisdiction,
or in a bona fide belief that he has jurisdiction, and there can be no sort of question but that a
judge has jurisdiction to criticise a witness. The fact therefore that these scandalous
allegations were contained in a notice under Section 80 does not in our opinion prevent them
from being contempt of court. As for the plea of absolute privilege, that only means that the
opponent could not be proceeded against for defamation, not that he is immune from any sort
of penalty.
 JUDGMENT OF THE CASE

The Court held that, “Having failed to get justice in the courts below, the condemner
felt that his position was vindicated only by the judgment of the High Court, and, he thought,
though mistakenly that hr could take legal proceedings against the two judicial officers and
sent the notices in question. The above circumstances can be taken in plea of mitigation, as
also the fact that the notices were sent only to the concerned officers, and there was no other
publication. We, therefore, find the respondent guilty of contempt of court and oppress our
strongest disapproval of his con duct. Having regard to the fact that he is at the far end of his
life, absolutely crippled in health and mental powers, and all the other circumstances which
we have referred we impose on him a fine of Rs. 200 payables within a week from today.”
 REASON FOR THE DECISION

The Court held the contemnor guilty of contempt of Court and reasoned as, “When
attacks or comments are made on a Judge or Judges, disparaging in character and derogatory
to their dignity, care should be taken to distinguish between what is a libel on the Judge and
what amounts really to contempt of court. The fact that a statement is defamatory so far as the
Judge is concerned does not necessarily make it contempt. The position therefore is that a
defamatory attack on a Judge may be a libel so far as the Judge is concerned and it would be
open to him to proceed against the libeller in a proper action if he so chooses. If, however, the
publication of the disparaging statement is calculated to interfere with the due course of
justice or proper administration of law by such court, it can be punished summarily as
contempt. One is a wrong done to the Judge personally while the other is a wrong done to the
public. It will be an injury to the public if it tends to create an apprehension in the minds of
the people regarding the integrity, ability or fairness of the Judge or to deter actual and
prospective litigants from placing complete reliance upon the court's administration of
justice, or if it is likely to cause embarrassment in the mind of the judge himself in the
discharge of his judicial duties. It is well established that it is not necessary to prove
affirmatively that there has been an actual interference with the administration of justice by
reason of such defamatory statements; it is enough if it is likely or tends in any way, to
interfere with the proper administration of law.'' It may be mentioned that on the facts of that
case the Supreme Court held that it was difficult to say that the representation by the
members of the Executive Committee of the Bar Association was likely to have injurious
effect on the minds of the public or of the judiciary itself, thereby leading to interference with
the administration of justice. It was also held that, considering the fact that in that case no
publicity was given to the resolution except its communication to the authorities, not even to
the officers themselves, the contempt if any was of a technical character. This authoritative
pronouncement of the Supreme Court far from giving any assistance to the petitioner
establishes that the case comes within the purview of the law of contempt. In our opinion,
imputing improper motives to a judicial officer in proceedings in a court of law is a sufficient
publication so as to attract the Contempt of Courts Act and it is not necessary that they should
be published in a newspaper.

In regard to the second contention, the Court reasoned that the observation of the
High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 266 of 1961, that there was no notification under Section
6 of the Act would have been a complete answer to the prosecution case. It was urged that the
Additional Sessions Judge did not care even to refer to that judgment, even though a carbon
copy of it was produced before him. In order to support this allegation. Sri Suryaprakasarao
filed the affidavit already referred to. We have no reason to disbelieve the statement of a
Senior Advocate like Sri Suryaprakasarao. But that circumstance is of no relevance in the
present context. The question here is not whether in spite of a reference to that judgment the
learned Additional Sessions Judge failed to refer to it or follow it. The prejudice and illegality
resulting therefrom can always be remedied by approaching the higher court, and in fact in
this case, this court reversed the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge But that
circumstance would not in any way, justify the making of a scurrilous attack against the
officer concerned. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has given a number oi reasons for
the conclusion he arrived at and he might not have thought it necessary to refer to the
admission to the Public Prosecutor in the High Court that there was no notification
under Section 6 of the Act. That circumstance by itself would not justify imputing bias,
dishonesty, etc to the officer.
 CRITICAL COMMENT

The people of India have a lot of faith in the judiciary which is primarily entrusted
with the duty of administering justice. The main purpose for giving courts contempt
jurisdiction is that to uphold the majesty and dignity of the courts and their image in the
minds of the public. If such confidence and faith were allowed to be shaken then this would
have serious repercussions on the judicial system of our country. The law of contempt
provides the necessary tool to the courts to check unwarranted attacks or efforts that tends to
undermine the rule of law. Contempt of court is a matter concerning the fair administration of
justice, and aims to punish any act hurting the dignity and authority of judicial tribunals. Lord
Diplock defines it in a following way: Although criminal contempt of court may take a
variety of forms they all share a common characteristic: they involve an interference with the
due administration of justice, either in a particular case or more generally as a continuing
process. It is justice itself that is flouted by contempt of court, not the individual court or
judge who is attempting to administer it. Contempt of court because of its peculiar and
contentious nature had led to contradictory opinions among scholars, jurists and various
masses, hence no satisfactory definition of contempt of court can be had. The term contempt
of court is a generic term descriptive of conduct in relation to particular proceedings in a
court of law which tends to undermine that system or inhibit citizens from availing
themselves of it for the settlement of their disputes.

In this case, the judiciary has held a person responsible for the contempt of Court even
though he alleged that the allegations he made against the judicial officers are true and just.
The varied observations, orders and judgments of the higher judiciary is clearly indicative of
the fact that it wants to have ‘one-foot stand on two boats. One boat is indicative of
judiciary’s effort in promoting free speech and forwarding the idea of undisturbed
administration of law. The other boat is indicative of courts apprehension and self-doubt
regarding its own image in front of the people wherein they have many times linked symbols
of the judicial system with the administration of justice. This multitasking isn’t good for the
development of a civil society, institutional frameworks and rule of law.

Judiciary needs to have a broader perspective when it comes to judging the ability of
our people to differentiate between bad criticism and good criticism. It is only then will there
be respect towards our judicial institutions grow manifold. Law on criminal contempt is
pivotal, but when it compromises the basic tenets of public life and constitution, then
elements going in contravention to these principles have to be amputated from the general
statutory corpus as has been done by the legislatures of other jurisdictions.

Thus this could not be termed as an appropriate case rather it could be construed as a
case wherein the judiciary exercised wide powers in punishing a man for contempt of Court
even though after knowing that the person has made proper allegations and thus thereby,
through this judgment the judiciary is just saving its image in front of people rather than
going into the correct intricacies of the case which also paves way for a lot of incorrect
decisions in such cases as the present case which talks about contempt of Court.