Sec. 27.

Attorneys removed or suspended by the Supreme Court

on what grounds. — A member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or
for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at
law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

In order to hold the lawyer amenable to disbarment by reason of

his or her having committed a crime involving moral turpitude, it
is not enough to show that there is a pending case involving moral
turpitude against him or her because Section 27 of Rule 138
expressly requires that he or she must have been found by final
judgment guilty of the crime involving moral turpitude.

PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, Complainant,

vs.

ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:

This is a complaint for disbarment1 filed by Pedro Linsangan of

the Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty.
Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment
of professional services.
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal
Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients2  to transfer legal
representation. Respondent promised them financial
assistance3 and expeditious collection on their claims.4 To induce
them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent
them text messages.
To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn
affidavit5 of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail
upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant
and utilize respondent’s services instead, in exchange for a loan of
₱50,000. Complainant also attached "respondent’s" calling card:6
Front
NICOMEDES TOLENTINO

LAW OFFFICE

CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES


W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

Fe Marie L. Labiano

Paralegal
Back
SERVICES OFFERED:

CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE


TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN

REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,

INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH

AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS

ABROAD.
1avvphi1

(emphasis supplied)
Hence, this complaint.

Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and

authorizing the printing and circulation of the said calling card.7
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.8
Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its
report and recommendation,9  found that respondent had
encroached on the professional practice of complainant, violating
Rule 8.0210  and other canons11  of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against
soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or
brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 13812 of the Rules of Court.
Hence, the CBD recommended that respondent be reprimanded
with a stern warning that any repetition would merit a heavier
penalty.
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of
respondent but we modify the recommended penalty.
The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by
respondent into complainant’s professional practice in violation
of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by
respondent in furtherance of the said misconduct themselves
constituted distinct violations of ethical rules.
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere
to, including the manner by which a lawyer’s services are to be
made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:
CANON 3 - A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use
only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or
statement of facts.

Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of
law is a profession and not a business; lawyers should not
advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares.13  To
allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize
the practice of law, degrade the profession in the public’s
estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high
character of service to which every member of the bar is called.14
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:

RULE 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act

designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers.15  Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for
disbarment.16

Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the

CPR which provides:
RULE 1.03. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest,
encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man’s cause.
This rule proscribes "ambulance chasing" (the solicitation of
almost any kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or
through an agent in order to gain employment)17 as a measure to
protect the community from barratry and champerty.18
Complainant presented substantial evidence19  (consisting of the
sworn statements of the very same persons coaxed by Labiano
and referred to respondent’s office) to prove that respondent
indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals’
suits.

Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his

answer, he later admitted it during the mandatory hearing.
Through Labiano’s actions, respondent’s law practice was
benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer representation
on the strength of Labiano’s word that respondent could produce
a more favorable result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment
violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.1avvphi1
With regard to respondent’s violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR,
settled is the rule that a lawyer should not steal another lawyer’s
client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better
service, good result or reduced fees for his services.20  Again the
Court notes that respondent never denied having these seafarers
in his client list nor receiving benefits from Labiano’s "referrals."
Furthermore, he never denied Labiano’s connection to his office.
21  Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into

another’s legal practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule

8.02 of the CPR.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his
clients as borrowers, respondent violated Rule 16.04:
Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client
unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the
case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money
to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to
advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for
the client.

The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The
only exception is, when in the interest of justice, he has to
advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographer’s
fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium
for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the
client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of
mind so that the free exercise of his judgment may not be
adversely affected.22 It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to
the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to
the client’s cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in
connection with the client’s case, the lawyer in effect acquires an
interest in the subject matter of the case or an additional stake in
its outcome.23 Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer
to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to
accept a settlement which may take care of his interest in the
verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of
undivided fidelity to the client’s cause.24
As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes
malpractice25  which calls for the exercise of the Court’s
disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes
warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective
client for the purpose of obtaining employment.26  Thus, in this
jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the public from the
Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to
uphold the nobility of the legal profession.
Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including
violation of the prohibition on lending money to clients), the
sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy
slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly
incommensurate to its findings.
A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by
petitioner. A lawyer’s best advertisement is a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on
his character and conduct.27  For this reason, lawyers are only
allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable law
lists or use of simple professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
(a) lawyer’s name;
(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.28
Labiano’s calling card contained the phrase "with financial
assistance." The phrase was clearly used to entice clients (who
already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of
loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure
clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage
of their financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass
commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no
place in the legal profession. However, in the absence of
substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not
prepared to rule that respondent was personally and directly
responsible for the printing and distribution of Labiano’s calling
cards.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for
violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of one year  effective immediately from
receipt of this resolution. He is  STERNLY WARNED  that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt
with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the
Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines,
and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
Villatuya vs. Atty. Tabalingcos, A.C. No. 6622 – Case
Digest
FACTS
Manuel G. Villatuya filed a Complaint for Disbarment on
December 06, 2004 against  Tabalingcos, Atty. Bede S.
Tabalingcos. In a resolution, the court required the Tabalingcos
to file a comment, which the Tabalingcos did. The complaint was
then referred to the   Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation. In a mandatory conference called for by   the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, Villatuya and his
counsel, and the Tabalingcos appeared and submitted issues for
resolution. 
The commission ordered the parties to submit their verified
position papers. In the position  paper submitted by Villatuya on
August 1, 2005, he averred that he was employed by  Tabalingcos
as financial consultant to assist Tabalingcos in a number of
corporate  rehabilitation cases. Villatuya claimed that they had a
verbal agreement whereby he would   be entitled to ₱50,000 for
every Stay Order issued by the court in the cases they would
 handle, in addition to ten percent (10%) of the fees paid by their
clients. Notwithstanding,  18 Stay Orders that was issued by the
courts as a result of his work and Tabalingcos being  able to rake
in millions from the cases that they were working on together, the
latter did  not pay the amount due to him. He also alleged that
Tabalingcos engaged in unlawful  solicitation of cases by setting
up two financial consultancy firms as fronts for his legal services.
On the third charge of gross immorality, Villatuya accused
Tabalingcos of   committing two counts of bigamy for having
married two other women while his first  marriage was subsisting. 
In his defense, Tabalingcos denied charges against him and
asserted that the Villatuya was not an employee of his law firm
but rather an employee of Jesi and Jane Management,  Inc., one
of the financial consultancy firms. Tabalingcos alleged Villatuya
was  unprofessional and incompetent in performing his job and
that there was no verbal  agreement between them regarding the
payment of fees and the sharing of professional  fees paid by his
clients. Tabalingcos also denied committing any unlawful
solicitation. To   support his contention, Tabalingcos attached a
Joint Venture Agreement and an affidavit executed by the Vice-
President for operations of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc. On
the  charge of gross immorality, Tabalingcos assailed the Affidavit
of a dismissed messenger  of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., as
having no probative value, since it had been   retracted by the
affiant himself.

ISSUES

1. Whether or not Tabalingcos violated the rule

against unlawful solicitation
2. Whether or not Tabalingcos is guilty of gross
immoral conduct for having married thrice.

RULING
On the first issue.
YES. Unlawful solicitation of clients. (RULE 2.03) In its Report,
the IBP established the   truth of these allegations and ruled that
Tabalingcos had violated the rule on the    solicitation of clients,
but it failed to point out the  specific  provision that was
breached.  Based on the facts of the case, he violated Rule 2.03 of
the Code,  which  prohibits    lawyers from soliciting cases for the
purpose of profit. 

A lawyer is not prohibited from  engaging  in business or other

lawful occupation.  Impropriety arises, though, when the business
is of  such  a nature or is conducted in  such a manner as to be
inconsistent with the lawyer’s duties as a member of the bar.  This
inconsistency arises when the business is one that can readily lend
itself to the  procurement  of professional employment for the
lawyer, or that can be used as a cloak for indirect solicitation on
the lawyer’s behalf; or is of a nature that, if handled by a  lawyer,
would be regarded as the practice of law. 
It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by Villatuya
that Jesi & Jane  Management, Inc., which purports to be a
financial and legal consultant, was indeed a   vehicle used by
Tabalingcos as a means toprocure professional employment;
 specifically for corporate rehabilitation cases.
On the second issue.

YES.  The SC held that his acts of  committing bigamy twice
constituted grossly  immoral conduct and are grounds
for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138  of the Revised Rules
o f C o u r t .  T h e S u p r e m e C o u r t a d o p t e d
the  recommendation  of  the IBP to disbar the respondent and
ordered that his name be stricken from the Roll of  Attorneys. 

This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be

an attorney at one  time  and  a mere citizen at another. He is
expected to be competent, honorable, and  reliable at all times
since  he  who cannot apply and abide by the laws in his
private  affairs, can hardly be expected to do so in
his professional dealings nor lead others in doing so. Professional
honesty and honor are not to be expected  as  the
accompaniment  of dishonesty and dishonor in other relations.
Tabalingcos exhibited a deplorable lack  of that degree of
morality required of him as  a  member of the bar. He made a
mockery  of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect
and dignity.

Rule 2.04. A lawyer shall not charge rates lower than those customarily
prescribed unless the circumstances so warrant.

Ratio: The practice of law is a profession and not a trade. It is improper to lower
legal rates just because another lawyer has offered a lower legal fee. [Lex Pareto
(2014)] This rule prohibits the competition in the matter of charging professional
fees for the purpose of attracting clients in favor of the lawyer who offers lower
rates. The rule does not prohibit a lawyer from charging a reduced fee or none at
all to an indigent or to a person who would have difficulty paying the fee usually
charged for such services [Agpalo (2004)].

True, honest, fair, dignified, and objective information on legal services

CANON 3. A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true,
honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts.
Note: Canon 3 is 5th top source of Questions on CPR; it was asked 16 times in the
last 25 years as of 2017 [Lex Pareto (2017)].

Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or
claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.

Allowable advertisement

1. Ordinary simple professional card;

2. Publication in reputable law list with brief biographical and other informative
data which may include:
1. Name;
2. Associates;
3. Address;
4. Phone numbers;
5. Branches of law practiced;
6. Birthday;
7. Day admitted to the bar;
8. Schools and dates attended;
9. Degrees and distinctions;
10. Public or quasi-public offices;
11. Posts of honor;
12. Legal authorships;
13. Teaching positions;
14. Associations;
15. Legal fraternities and societies;
16. References and regularly represented clients must be published for that
purpose [Ulep v. The Legal Clinic, Inc., supra
3. Publication of simple announcement of opening of law firm, change of firm;
4. Listing in telephone directory but not under designation of special branch of
law;
5. if acting as an associate (specializing in a branch of law), may publish a brief
and dignified announcement to lawyers (law list, law journal);
6. If in media, those acts incidental to his practice and not of his own initiative;
7. Writing legal articles;
8. Activity of an association for the purpose of legal representation.

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it
cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or
periodical which is published primarily for other purposes.
Prohibited Advertisements [Sec. 27, Canon of Professional Ethics
(hereinafter, CPE)]

1. Through touters of any kind whether allied real estate firms or trust
companies advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills;
2. Offering retainers in exchange for executorships or trusteeships to be
influenced by the lawyer;
3. Furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments concerning the manner of their
conduct, the magnitude of the interests involved, the importance of lawyer’s
position, and all other like self-laudation.

A lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in
a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program in order to solicit legal
business. A paid advertisement in the newspaper which reads, “Annulment of
Marriage Specialist” is also prohibited [Khan v. Simbillo, A.C. No. 5299 (2003)].

The use of a card containing “As a notary public, he can execute for you a deed of
sale, can renew lost documents and can make your application for homestead and
execute any kind of affidavit. As a lawyer, he can help you collect your loans as
well as any complaint for or against you.” is a form of prohibited advertisement.
[In re: Tagorda, supra]. Where to draw the line is a question of good faith and
good taste.

Entering into other businesses

If entering into other businesses which are not inconsistent with the lawyer’s
profession, it is advisable that they be entirely separate and apart such that a
layman could distinguish between the two functions. The lawyer must make it
clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.

Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.

Rule 2.03| June 17, 1993|

Nature of Case:
SUMMARY:
Petitioner avers that the advertisements reproduced are
champertous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession,
and destructive of the confidence of the community in the
integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member
of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said
advertisement.
Respondent admits the fact of publication of said
advertisements at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in
the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support
services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers
and electronic machines.

DOCTRINE:
The services offered by respondent include various legal
problems wherein a client may avail of legal services
from simple documentation to complex litigation and
corporate undertakings. Most of these services are exclusive
functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law.

Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar and who

is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.

FACTS:
Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays for the Court "to
order the respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., to cease and
desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same
tenor as that of Annexes `A' and `B' (of said petition) and to
perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making
advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law
profession other than those allowed by law.”

Petitioner avers that the advertisements reproduced are

champertous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession,
and destructive of the confidence of the community in the
integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member
of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the
said advertisements

Respondent admits the fact of publication of said

advertisements at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in
the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support
services" through paralegals with the use of modern
computers and electronic machines.
Respondent further argues that assuming that the services
advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these
services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the
case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of
Arizona, reportedly decided by the United States Supreme
Court on June 7, 1977.

The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support

services can neither be seriously considered nor sustained.
Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of
the services it has been offering.

While some of the services being offered by respondent

corporation merely involve mechanical and technical
know-how, such as the installation of computer systems
and programs for the efficient management of law offices,
or the computerization of research aids and materials, these
will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.

It is palpably clear that respondent corporation gives out

legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that
such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more
apparent than real.

In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on

marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of
this Court that all that respondent corporation will simply do is
look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop
there as if it were merely a bookstore

It is clear that services offered by respondent fall within the ambit

of the practice of law. And only a person duly admitted as a
member of the bar and who is in good and regular stading is
entitled to practice law.

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

1.WON the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as
advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case,
whether the same can properly be the subject of the
advertisements herein complained of – YES

The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law and such

practice is not allowed.

Respondent is composed mainly of paralegals; the services it

offers include various legal problems wherein a client may
avail of legal services from simple documentation to
complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of
these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals,
but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the
practice of law. Under Philippine jurisdiction however, the
services being offered by Legal Clinic which constitute practice
of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly
admitted as a member of the bar and who is in good and regular
standing, is entitled to practice law.

RULING:
The Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN The Legal
Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or
dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of
the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and
"B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or
indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction proscribed
by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein.

NOTE:
Rule 2.03- A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act
designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Atty. Khan vs. Atty. Simbillo, A.C. No. 5299 – Case
Digest

FACTS

An investigation was conducted against Atty. Rizalino Simbillo by

Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in  his capacity as Assistant Court
Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office.
Atty  Khan then filed an administrative complaint against Atty.
Simbillo for improper advertising and  solicitation of his legal
services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code
of  Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the
Rules of Court. Based on their  investigation, Mrs. Simbillo,
claimed that her husband was an expert in handling
annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within four to
six months, provided the case will not  involve separation of
property or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her
husband charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of which is payable at
the time of filing of the case and the other half after a decision
thereon has been rendered. Further research by the Office of
the  Court Administrator and the Public Information Office
revealed that various advertisements were published in a different
issue of the newspaper. Atty. Simbilo admitted the acts
imputed  to him, but argued that advertising and solicitation per
se are not prohibited acts.

ISSUE

Whether or not respondent’s act was a violation of the

Code of Professional Responsibility.

RULING

Yes. Atty. Rizalino Simbillo is found GUILTY of violation of

Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of  Professional Responsibility
read: Rule 2.03. – A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any
act designed primarily to solicit legal business. Rule 3.01. – A
lawyer shall not  use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified,  self-laudatory or unfair
statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. It
has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a
business. It is a profession in  which duty to public service, not
money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not
primarily  meant to be a money-making venture, and law
advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields  profits. The
gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration. The
duty to public service and to the administration of justice should
be the primary consideration of lawyers,  who must subordinate
their personal interests or what they owe to themselves.

The following elements distinguish the legal profession from a

business: 1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a
by-product, and in which one may attain the highest  eminence
without making much money; 2. A relation as an “officer of the
court” to the  administration of justice involving thorough
sincerity, integrity and reliability; 3. A relation to  clients in the
highest degree of fiduciary; 4. A relation to colleagues at the bar
characterized  by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to
current business methods of advertising and  encroachment on
their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.

Such acts of respondents are a deliberate and contemptuous

affront on the Court’s  authority. What adds to the gravity of
respondent’s acts is that in advertising himself  as a self-styled
“Annulment of Marriage Specialist,” he wittingly or
unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the stability but also
the sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct despite the
contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in
assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be  obtained
in four to six months from the time of the filing of the case, he in
fact  encourages people, who might have otherwise been
disinclined and would have  refrained from dissolving their
marriage bonds, to do so.
In re LUIS B. TAGORDA,

Duran & Lim for respondent.


Attorney-General Jaranilla and Provincial Fiscal Jose for the Government.

MALCOLM, J.:

The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda, a practising attorney and a

member of the provincial board of Isabela, admits that previous
to the last general elections he made use of a card written in
Spanish and Ilocano, which, in translation, reads as follows:

LUIS B. TAGORDA

Attorney

Notary Public

CANDIDATE FOR THIRD MEMBER

Province of Isabela

(NOTE. — As notary public, he can execute for you a deed of

sale for the purchase of land as required by the cadastral office;
can renew lost documents of your animals; can make your
application and final requisites for your homestead; and can
execute any kind of affidavit. As a lawyer, he can help you collect
your loans although long overdue, as well as any complaint for or
against you. Come or write to him in his town, Echague, Isabela.
He offers free consultation, and is willing to help and serve the
poor.)

The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter

addressed to a lieutenant of barrio in his home municipality
written in Ilocano, which letter, in translation, reads as follows:

ECHAGUE, ISABELA, September 18, 1928

MY DEAR LIEUTENANT: I would like to inform you of the

approaching date for our induction into office as member of the
Provincial Board, that is on the 16th of next month. Before my
induction into office I should be very glad to hear your
suggestions or recommendations for the good of the province in
general and for your barrio in particular. You can come to my
house at any time here in Echague, to submit to me any kind of
suggestion or recommendation as you may desire.

I also inform you that despite my membership in the Board I will

have my residence here in Echague. I will attend the session of
the Board of Ilagan, but will come back home on the following
day here in Echague to live and serve with you as a lawyer and
notary public. Despite my election as member of the Provincial
Board, I will exercise my legal profession as a lawyer and notary
public. In case you cannot see me at home on any week day, I
assure you that you can always find me there on every Sunday. I
also inform you that I will receive any work regarding
preparations of documents of contract of sales and affidavits to
be sworn to before me as notary public even on Sundays.

I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason
that some people are in the belief that my residence as member
of the Board will be in Ilagan and that I would then be
disqualified to exercise my profession as lawyer and as notary
public. Such is not the case and I would make it clear that I am
free to exercise my profession as formerly and that I will have my
residence here in Echague.

I would request you kind favor to transmit this information to

your barrio people in any of your meetings or social gatherings so
that they may be informed of my desire to live and to serve with
you in my capacity as lawyer and notary public. If the people in
your locality have not as yet contracted the services of other
lawyers in connection with the registration of their land titles, I
would be willing to handle the work in court and would charge
only three pesos for every registration.

Yours respectfully,

(Sgd.) LUIS TAGORDA


Attorney

Notary Public.
The facts being conceded, it is next in order to write down the
applicable legal provisions. Section 21 of the Code of Civil
Procedure as originally conceived related to disbarments of
members of the bar. In 1919 at the instigation of the Philippine
Bar Association, said codal section was amended by Act No. 2828
by adding at the end thereof the following: "The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice."

The statute as amended conforms in principle to the Canons of

Professionals Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association in
1908 and by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917. Canons 27
and 28 of the Code of Ethics provide:

27. ADVERTISING, DIRECT OR INDIRECT. — The most

worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young
lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers, is the
establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced, but must be
the outcome of character and conduct. The publication or
circulation of ordinary simple business cards, being a matter of
personal taste or local custom, and sometimes of convenience, is
not  per se  improper. But solicitation of business by circulars or
advertisements, or by personal communications or interview not
warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional. It is equally
unprofessional to procure business by indirection through touters
of any kind, whether allied real estate firms or trust companies
advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or offering
retainers in exchange for executorships or trusteeships to be
influenced by the lawyer. Indirect advertisement for business by
furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments concerning the
manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved,
the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-
laudation, defy the traditions and lower the tone of our high
calling, and are intolerable.

28. STIRRING UP LITIGATION, DIRECTLY OR

THROUGH AGENTS. — It is unprofessional for a lawyer to
volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties
of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so. Stirring
up strife and litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is
indictable at common law. It is disreputable to hunt up defects in
titles or other causes of action and inform thereof in order to the
employed to bring suit, or to breed litigation by seeking out those
with claims for personal injuries or those having any other
grounds of action in order to secure them as clients, or to employ
agents or runners for like purposes, or to pay or reward directly
or indirectly, those who bring or influence the bringing of such
cases to his office, or to remunerate policemen, court or prison
officials, physicians, hospital attaches or others who may succeed,
under the guise of giving disinterested friendly advice, in
influencing the criminal, the sick and the injured, the ignorant or
others, to seek his professional services. A duty to the public and
to the profession devolves upon every member of the bar having
knowledge of such practices upon the part of any practitioner
immediately to inform thereof to the end that the offender may
be disbarred.

Common barratry consisting of frequently stirring up suits and

quarrels between individuals was a crime at the common law, and
one of the penalties for this offense when committed by an
attorney was disbarment. Statutes intended to reach the same evil
have been provided in a number of jurisdictions usually at the
instance of the bar itself, and have been upheld as constitutional.
The reason behind statutes of this type is not difficult to discover.
The law is a profession and not a business. The lawyer may not
seek or obtain employment by himself or through others for to do
so would be unprofessional. (State vs. Rossman [1909], 53 Wash.,
1; 17 Ann. Cas., 625; People vs. Mac Cabe [1893], 19 L. R. A.,
231; 2 R. C. L., 1097.)

It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly

practice of solicitation of cases by lawyers. It is destructive of the
honor of a great profession. It lowers the standards of that
profession. It works against the confidence of the community in
the integrity of the members of the bar. It results in needless
litigation and in incenting to strife otherwise peacefully inclined
citizens.

The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for

disbarment or suspension. That should be distinctly understood.

Giving application of the law and the Canons of Ethics to the

admitted facts, the respondent stands convicted of having
solicited cases in defiance of the law and those canons.
Accordingly, the only remaining duty of the court is to fix upon
the action which should here be taken. The provincial fiscal of
Isabela, with whom joined the representative of the Attorney-
General in the oral presentation of the case, suggests that the
respondent be only reprimanded. We think that our action should
go further than this if only to reflect our attitude toward cases of
this character of which unfortunately the respondent's is only one.
The commission of offenses of this nature would amply justify
permanent elimination from the bar. But as mitigating,
circumstances working in favor of the respondent there are, first,
his intimation that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts,
second, his youth and inexperience at the bar, and, third, his
promise not to commit a similar mistake in the future. A modest
period of suspension would seem to fit the case of the erring
attorney. But it should be distinctly understood that this result is
reached in view of the considerations which have influenced the
court to the relatively lenient in this particular instance and
should, therefore, not be taken as indicating that future
convictions of practice of this kind will not be dealt with by
disbarment.

In view of all the circumstances of this case, the judgment of the

court is that the respondent Luis B. Tagorda be and is hereby
suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the period
of one month from April 1, 1929
Sec 27.  Advertising, direct or indirect 

It is unprofessional to solicit professional employment by

circulars, advertisements, through touters, or by personal
communications or interviews not warranted by personal
relations. Indirect advertisements for professional employment
such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or
procuring his photograph to be published in connection with
causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning
the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest
involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other
like-laudation, offend the traditions and lower the tone of our
profession and are reprehensible; but the customary use of simple
professional cards is not improper.

Rule 3.02. In the choice of a firm name, no false,

misleading or assumed name shall be used. The
continued use of the name of a deceased partner is
permissible provided that the firm indicates in all its
communications that said partner is deceased.

The continued use of the name of a deceased partner is

permissible provided that the firm indicates in all its
communications that said partner is deceased [Agpalo (2004)].

Ratio: All partners by their joint efforts over a period of years

contributed to the goodwill attached to the firm name, and the
removal of the deceased partner’s name disturbs the client
goodwill built through the years. Firms may not use misleading
names showing association with other firms to purport
legalservices of highest quality and ties with multinational
business enterprise especially when such firm attached as an
associate cannot legally practice law in the Philippines.

Rule 3.03. Where a partner accepts public office, he

shall withdraw from the firm and his name shall be
dropped from the firm name unless the law allows him
to practice law concurrently.
Purpose: To prevent the law firm from using his name to attract
legal business and to avoid suspicion of undue influence. A civil
service officer or employee whose duty or responsibility does not
require his entire time to be at the disposal of the government
may not engage in the private practice of law without the written
permit from the head of the department concerned [Agpalo
(2004)].

It is unlawful for a public official or employee to, among others,

engage in the private practice of their profession, unless
authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice
will not conflict or tend to conflict with official functions. The
inclusion or retention of the public official’s name in the
professional card constitutes as an unlawful continuance of
engagement in private practice.

Absolute and relative prohibition of public officials from practice

of law When any of those absolutely prohibited officials is
appointed/elected/qualified, he ceases, as a general rule, to
engage in the private practice of law and his right to practice is
suspended during his tenure in office.

JULIETA BORROMEO SAMONTE, complainant,


vs.

ATTY. ROLANDO R. GATDULA, Branch Clerk of
Court, respondent.

RESOLUTION

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

The complaint filed by Julieta Borremeo Samonte charges

Rolando R. Gatdula, RTC, Branch 220, Quezon City with grave
misconduct consisting in the alleged engaging in the private
practice of law which is in conflict with his official functions as
Branch Clerk of Court.
Complainant alleges that she is the authorized representative of
her sister Flor Borromeo de Leon, the plaintiff, in Civil Case No.
37-14552 for ejectment, filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 37. A typographical error was
committed in the complaint which stated that the address of
defendant is No. 63-C instead of 63-B, P. Tuazon Blvd., Cubao,
Quezon City. The mistake was rectified by the filing of an
amended complaint which was admitted by the Court. A decision
was rendered in favor of the plaintiff who subsequently filed a
motion for execution. Complainant, however, was surprised to
receive a temporary restraining order signed by Judge Prudencio
Castillo of Branch 220, RTC, Quezon City, where Atty. Rolando
Gatdula is the Branch Clerk Court, enjoining the execution of
the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court. Complainant
alleges that the issuance of the temporary restraining order was
hasty and irregular as she was never notified of the application
for preliminary injunction.

Complainant further alleges that when she went to Branch 220,

RTC, Quezon City, to inquire about the reason for the issuance
of the temporary restraining order, respondent Atty. Rolando
Gatdula, blamed her lawyer for writing the wrong address in the
complaint for ejectment, and told her that if she wanted the
execution to proceed, she should change her lawyer and retain
the law office of respondent, at the same time giving his calling
card with the name "Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and
Celera" with office at Rm. 220 Mariwasa Bldg., 717 Aurora
Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City; otherwise she will not be able to eject
the defendant Dave Knope. Complainant told respondent that
she could not decide because she was only representing her sister.
To her consternation, the RTC Branch 220 issued an order
granting the preliminary injunction as threatened by the
respondent despite the fact that the MTC, Brach 37 had issued
an Order directing the execution of the Decision in Civil Case
No. 37-14552.

Asked to comment, respondent Atty. Gatdula recited the

antecedents in the ejectment case and the issuance of the
restraining order by the Regional Trial Court, and claimed that
contrary to complainant Samonte's allegation that she was not
notified of the raffle and the hearing, the Notice of Hearing on
the motion for the issuance of a Temporary Retraining Order
was duly served upon the parties, and that the application for
injunctive relief was heard before the temporary restraining order
was issued. The preliminary injunction was also set for hearing on
August 7, 1996.

The respondent's version of the incident is that sometime before

the hearing of the motion for the issuance of the temporary
restraining order, complainant Samonte went to court "very mad"
because of the issuance of the order stopping the execution of
the decision in the ejectment case. Respondent tried to calm her
down, and assured her that the restraining order was only
temporary and that the application for preliminary injunction
would still be heard. Later the Regional Trial Court granted the
application for a writ of preliminary injunction. The complainant
went back to court "fuming mad" because of the alleged
unreasonableness of the court in issuing the injunction.

Respondent Gatdula claims that thereafter complainant returned

to his office, and informed him that she wanted to change counsel
and that a friend of hers recommended the Law Firm of
"Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera," at the same
time showing a calling card, and asking if he could handle her
case. Respondent refused as he was not connected with the law
firm, although he was invited to join but he choose to remain in
the judiciary. Complainant returned to court a few days later and
told him that if he cannot convince the judge to recall the writ of
preliminary injunction, she will file an administrative case against
respondent and the judge. The threat was repeated but the
respondent refused to be pressured. Meanwhile, the
Complainant's Motion to Dissolve the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction was denied. Respondent Gatdula claims that the
complainant must have filed this administrative charge because of
her frustration in procuring the ejectment of the defendant lessee
from the premises. Respondent prays for the dismissal of the
complainant against him.

The case was referred to Executive Judge Estrella Estrada, RTC,

Quezon City, for investigation, report and recommendation.

In her report, Judge Estrada states that the case was set for
hearing three times, on September 7, 1997, on September 17,
and on September 24, 1997, but neither complainant nor her
counsel appeared, despite due notice. The return of service of
the Order setting the last hearing stated that complainant is still
abroad. There being no definite time conveyed to the court for
the return of the complainant, the investigating Judge proceeded
with the investigation by "conducting searching question" upon
respondent based on the allegations in the complaint, and asked
for the record of Civil Case No. Q-96-28187 for evaluation. The
case was set for hearing for the last time on October 22, 1997, to
give complainant a last chance to appear, but there was again no
appearance despite notice.

The respondent testified in his own behalf to affirm the

statements in his Comment, and submitted documentary
evidence consisting mainly of the pleadings in MTC Civil Case
No. 37-14552, and in RTC Civil Case No. Q-9628187 to show
that the questioned orders of the court were not improperly
issued.

The investigating judge made the following findings:

For failure of the complainant to appear at the several hearings

despite notice, she failed to substantiate her allegations in the
complaint, particularly that herein respondent gave her his calling
card and tried to convince her to change her lawyer. This being
the case, it cannot be established with certainty that respondent
indeed gave her his calling card even convinced her to change her
lawyer. Moreover, as borne by the records of the Civil Case No.
Q-96-28187, complainant was duly notified of all the proceedings
leading to the issuance of the TRO and the subsequent orders of
Judge Prudencio Altre Castillo, Jr. of RTC, Branch 220.
Complainant's lack of interest in prosecuting this administrative
case could be an indication that her filing of the charge against
the respondent is only intended to harass the respondent for her
failure to obtain a favorable decision from the Court.

However, based on the record of this administrative case, the

calling card attached as Annex "B" of the complainant's affidavit
dated September 25, 1996 allegedly given by respondent to
complainant would show that the name of herein respondent was
indeed include in the BALIGOD, GATDULA, TACARDON,
DIMAILIG & CELERA LAW OFFICES. While respondent
denied having assumed any position in said office, the fact
remains that his name is included therein which may therefore
tend to show that he has dealings with said office. Thus, while he
may not be actually and directly employed with the firm, the fact
that his name appears on the calling card as partner in the
Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig & Celera Law Offices give
the impression that he is connected therein and may constitute an
act of solicitation and private practice which is declared unlawful
under Republic Act. No. 6713. It is to be noted, however, that
complainant failed to establish by convincing evidence that
respondent actually offered to her the services of their law office.
Thus, the violation committed by respondent in having his name
included/retained in the calling card may only be considered as a
minor infraction for which he must also be administratively
sanctioned.

and recommended that Atty. Gatdula be admonished and

censured for the minor infraction he has committed.

Finding: We agree with the investigating judge that the respondent

is guilty of an infraction. The complainant by her failure to
appear at the hearings, failed to substantiate her allegation that it
was the respondent who gave her calling card "Baligod, Gatdula,
Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera Law Offices" and that he tried to
convince her to change counsels. We find however, that while the
respondent vehemently denies the complainant's allegations, he
does not deny that his name appears on the calling card attached
to the complaint, which admittedly came into the hands of the
complainant. The respondent testified before the Investigating
Judge as follows:

Q: How about your statement that you even gave her a calling
card of the "Baligod, Gatdula, Pardo, Dimailig and Celera law
Offices at Room 220 Mariwasa building?

A: I vehemently deny the allegation of the complainant that I

gave her a calling card. I was surprised when she presented (it) to
me during one of her follow-ups of the case before the court. She
told me that a friend of hers recommended such firm and she
found out that my name is included in that firm. I told her that I
have not assumed any position in the law firm. And I am with the
Judiciary since I passed the bar. It is impossible for me to enter an
appearance as her counsel in the very same court where I am the
Branch Clerk of Court.

The above explanation tendered by the Respondent is an

admission that it is his name appears on the calling card, a
permissible form of advertising or solicitation of legal
services.  1  Respondent does not claim that the calling card was
printed without his knowledge or consent, and the calling
card  2  carries his name primarily and the name "Baligod,
Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera with address at 220
Mariwasa Bldg., 717 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City" in the
left corner. The card clearly gives the impression that he is
connected with the said law firm. The inclusion/retention of his
name in the professional card constitutes an act of solicitation
which violates Section 7 sub-par. (b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713,
otherwise known as "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
the Public Officials and Employees" which declares it unlawful for
a public official or employee to, among others:

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless

authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice
will not conflict or tend to conflict with official functions.
Time and again this Court has said that the conduct and
behavior of every one connected with an office charged with the
dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest
clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility. His conduct, at all times must only be characterized
by propriety and decorum but above all else must be above
suspicion. 3

WHEREFORE, respondent Rolando R. Gatdula. Branch Clerk

of Court, RTC, Branch 220, Quezon City is hereby reprimanded
for engaging in the private practice of law with the warning that
a repetition of the same offense will be dealt with more severely.
He is further ordered to cause the exclusion of his name in the
firm name of any office engaged in the private practice of law.

SO ORDERED.

Rule 3.04. A lawyer shall not pay or give anything of

value to representatives of the mass media in
anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract
legal business.

Purpose: To prevent some lawyers from gaining an unfair

advantage over others through the use of gimmickry, press
agentry or other artificial means. This rule prohibits making
indirect publicity gimmickry, such as furnishing or inspiring
newspaper comments, procuring his photograph to be published
in connection with cases which he is handling, making a
courtroom scene to attract the attention of newspapermen, or
arranging for the purpose an interview with him by the media
[Agpalo 2004].

Participation in the improvements and reforms in the

legal system

CANON 4. A lawyer shall participate in the

development of the legal system by initiating or
supporting ef forts in law refor m and in the
improvement of the administration of justice.
This is a duty that flows from the lawyer’s sense of public
responsibility [Agpalo (2004)]. Examples:
● Presenting position papers or resolutions for the introduction of
pertinent bills in Congress;
● Submitting petitions to the Supreme Court for the of the RoC;
● Writing legal publications or books as an avenue of improving
the legal system

Participation in legal education program

CANON 5. A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal

developments, participate in continuing legal education
programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in
law schools as well as in the practical training of law
students and assist in disseminating information
regarding the law and jurisprudence.

Purpose: The lawyer’s life is one of continuous and laborious

study; otherwise, his skill and knowledge of law and related
disciplines will lag behind and become obscure due to
obsoleteness.

Mandatory Continuing Legal Education [hereinafter,

MCLE] Program

A program which requires lawyers to show proof of having

undertaken improvement in their knowledge as a precondition for
renewing their license to practiceThere is no doubt that Atty.
Flores failed to obey the trial court’s order to submit proof of his
MCLE compliance notwithstanding the several opportunities
given him. Court orders are to be respected not because the
judges who issue them should be respected, but because of the
respect and consideration that should be extended to the judicial
branch of the Government [Rodriguez-Manahan v. Flores, A.C.
No. 8954 (2013)].
Atty. Echanez’s acts of: (a) not complying with two MCLEs for
two compliance periods; (b) repeatedly indicating false MCLE
compliance numbers in his pleadings before the trial courts; and,
(c) repeatedly failing to obey legal orders of trial court, IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline and also the Supreme Court
despite due notice, taken together, constitute serious cases that
merit disbarment [Mapalad v. Atty. Echanez; A.C. No. 10911
(2017)]

MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION

1. Purpose Continuing legal education is required of members

of the IBP to:
1. Ensure that throughout their career, they keep abreast
with law and jurisprudence;
2. Maintain the ethics of the profession; and
3. Enhance the standards of the practice of law [Sec. 1, Rule
1, B.M. No. 850].

2. Requirements

Members of the IBP shall complete, every three years, at least 36

hours of continuing legal education activities approved by the
MCLE Committee. Of the 36 hours.

Exemptions

Exempted members from the MCLE

a. The President and the Vice President of the Philippines, and

the Secretaries and Undersecretaries of Executives
Departments;
b. Senators and Members of the House of Representatives;
c. The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court, incumbent and retired members of the judiciary,
incumbent members of the Judicial and Bar Council and
incumbent court lawyers covered by the Philippine Judicial
Academy program of continuing judicial education;
d. The Chief State Counsel, Chief State Prosecutor and
Assistant Secretaries of the Department of Justice;
e. The Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitor General;
f. The Government Corporate Counsel, Deputy and Assistant
Government Corporate Counsel;
g. The Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional
Commissions;
h. The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman, the
Deputy Ombudsmen and the Special Prosecutor of the
Office of the Ombudsman;
i. Heads of government agencies exercising quasi-judicial
functions;
j. Incumbent deans, bar reviewers and professors of law who
have teaching experience for at least ten years accredited law
schools;
k. The Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and members of the Corps
of Professors and Professorial Lectures of the Philippine
Judicial Academy;
l. Governors and Mayors;
m. Those who are not in law practice, private or public;
n. Those who have retired from law practice with the approval
of the IBP Board of Governors; and
o. Those granted exemption for good cause in accordance with
Sec 3, Rule 7 of the MCLE Rules [Sec. 1 and 2, Rule 7, B.M.
No. 850]

A member may file a verified request setting forth good cause for
exemption (e.g., physical disability, illness, post graduate study
abroad, proven expertise in law) from compliance with or
modification of any of the requirements, including an extension
of time for compliance, in accordance with a procedure to be
established by the MCLE Committee [Sec. 3, Rule 7, B.M. No.
850].

Applications for exemption from or modification of the MCLE

requirement shall be under oath and supported by documents
[Sec. 5, Rule 7, B.M. No. 850]. When a member ceases to be
exempt, the compliance period begins on the first day of the
month in which he ceases to be exempt and shall end on the same
day as that of all other members in the same Compliance Group
[Sec. 4, Rule 7, B.M. No. 850].

Section 1. Composition

The MCLE Committee shall be composed of five (5) members,

namely: a retired Justice of the Supreme Court, as Chair, and
four (4) members, respectively, nominated by the IBP, the
Philippine Judicial Academy, a law center designated by the
Supreme Court and associations of law schools and/or law
professors.
The members of the Committee shall be of proven probity and
integrity. They shall be appointed by the Supreme Court for a
term of three (3) years and shall receive such compensation as
may be determined by the Court.

Section 2. Duty of the Committee

The MCLE Committee shall administer and adopt such
implementing rules as may be necessary subject to the approval
by the Supreme Court. It shall, in consultation with the IBP
Board of Governors, prescribe a schedule of MCLE fees with the
approval of the Supreme Court.

Section 3. Staff of the IBP

The IBP shall employ such staff as may be necessary to perform
the record-keeping, auditing, reporting, approval and other
necessary functions.

Section 4. Submission of annual budget

The IBP shall submit to the Supreme Court an annual budget for
a subsidy to establish, operate and maintain the MCLE Program.

This resolution shall take effect in October 2000, following its

publication in two (2) newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines.
HON. MARIBETH RODRIGUEZ-MANAHAN, Presiding
Judge, Municipal Trial Court, San Mateo,
Rizal, Complainant,

vs.

ATTY. RODOLFO FLORES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Respondent Atty. Rodolto Flores (Atty. Flores) was counsel for the
defendant in Civil Case No. 1863 captioned as Marsha Aranas
plaintiff versus Arnold Balmores defendant a suit for damages
filed before the Municipal Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal and
presided by herein complainant Judge Maribeth Rodriguez-
Manahan (Judge Manahan). During the proceedings in Civil
Case No. 1863, Judge Manahan issued an Order1 dated January
12, 2011, whereby she voluntarily inhibited from hearing Civil
Case No. 1863. The said Order reads in part, viz:

More than mere contempt do his (Atty. Flores) unethical

actuations, his traits of dishonesty and discourtesy not only to his
own brethren in the legal profession, but also to the bench and
judges, would amount to grave misconduct, if not a malpractice
of law, a serious ground for disciplinary action of a member of
the bar pursuant to Rules 139 a & b.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, furnish a copy of this Order to the Bar

Discipline Committee, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, to the
Supreme Court en banc, for appropriate investigation and
sanction.2

Upon receipt of the copy of the above Order, the Office of the
Bar Confidant (OBC) deemed the pronouncements of Judge
Manahan as a formal administrative Complaint against Atty.
Flores. Docketed as A.C. No. 8954, the case was referred to the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal for
investigation, report and recommendation.3
In her Investigation, Report and Recommendation,4 Investigating
Judge Josephine Zarate Fernandez (Investigating Judge) narrated
the antecedents of the case as follows:

A complaint for Damages was filed before the Municipal Trial

Court (MTC) of San Mateo, Rizal docketed as Civil Case No.
1863, entitled Marsha Aranas vs. Arnold Balmores. The Public
Attorney’s Office (PAO) thru Atty. Ferdinand P. Censon
represented the complainant while Atty. Rodolfo Flores appeared
as counsel for the defendant.

x x x During the Preliminary Conference x x x, respondent Atty.

Flores entered his appearance and was given time to file a Pre-
Trial Brief. x x x On May 24, 2010, respondent Atty. Flores filed
his Pre-Trial Brief but without proof of MCLE compliance
hence it was expunged from the records without prejudice to the
filing of another Pre-Trial Brief containing the required MCLE
compliance. x x x Atty. Flores asked for ten (10) days to submit
proof.

The preliminary conference was reset several times (August 11,

September 8) for failure of respondent Atty. Flores to appear and
submit his Pre-Trial Brief indicating thereon his MCLE
compliance. The court a quo likewise issued Orders dated
September 15 and October 20, 2010 giving respondent Atty.
Flores a last chance to submit his Pre-Trial Brief with stern
warning that failure to do so shall be considered a waiver on his
part.

Meanwhile, respondent Atty. Flores filed a Manifestation in Court

dated September 14, 2010 stating among others, the following
allegations:

xxxx

4. When you took your oath as member of the Bar, you promised
to serve truth, justice and fair play. Do you think you are being
truthful, just and fair by serving a cheater?
5. Ignorance of the law excuses no one for which reason even
Erap was convicted by the Sandiganbayan.1âwphi1  But even
worse is a lawyer who violates the law.

6. Last but not the least, God said Thou shall not lie. Again the
Philippine Constitution commands: Give every Filipino his due.
The act of refusal by the plaintiff is violative of the foregoing
divine and human laws.

xxxx

Respondent Atty. Flores later filed his Pre-Trial Brief bearing an

MCLE number which was merely superimposed without
indicating the date and place of compliance. During the
preliminary conference on November 24, 2010, respondent Atty.
Flores manifested that he will submit proof of compliance of his
MCLE on the following day. On December 1, 2010, respondent
Atty. Flores again failed to appear and to submit the said
promised proof of MCLE compliance. In its stead, respondent
Atty. Flores filed a Letter of even date stating as follows:

If only to give your Honor another chance to prove your pro

plaintiff sentiment, I am hereby filing the attached Motion which
you may once more assign to the waste basket of nonchalance.

With the small respect that still remains, I have asked the
defendant to look for another lawyer to represent him for I am no
longer interested in this case because I feel I cannot do anything
right in your sala.5

The Investigating Judge found Atty. Flores to have failed to give

due respect to the court by failing to obey court orders, by failing
to submit proof of his compliance with the Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) requirement, and for using
intemperate language in his pleadings. The Investigating Judge
recommended that Atty. Flores be suspended from the practice of
law for one year.6
The OBC adopted the findings and recommendation of the
Investigating Judge.7

Our Ruling

There is no doubt that Atty. Flores failed to obey the trial court’s
order to submit proof of his MCLE compliance notwithstanding
the several opportunities given him. "Court orders are to be
respected not because the judges who issue them should be
respected, but because of the respect and consideration that
should be extended to the judicial branch of the Government.
This is absolutely essential if our Government is to be a
government of laws and not of men. Respect must be had not
because of the incumbents to the positions, but because of the
authority that vests in them. Disrespect to judicial incumbents is
disrespect to that branc the Government to which they belong, as
well as to the State which has instituted the judicial system."8

Atty. Flores also employed intemperate language in his pleadings.

As an officer of the court, Atty. Flores is expected to be
circumspect in his language. Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility enjoins all attorneys to abstain from
scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before
the Courts. Atty. Flores failed in this respect.

At this juncture, it is well to remind respondent that:

While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client full
devotion to his client's genuine interest and warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his client's rights, as well as the
exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only
within the bounds of law. A lawyer is entitled to voice his
c1iticism within the context of the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of speech which must be exercised responsibly. After all,
every right carries with it the corresponding obligation. Freedom
is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility.
The lawyer's fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the
expense of truth and orderly administration of justice. It must be
done within the confines of reason and common sense.9

However, we find the recommended penalty too harsh and not

commensurate with the infractions committed by the respondent.
It appears that this is the first infraction committed by
respondent. Also, we are not prepared to impose on the
respondent the penalty of one-year suspension for humanitarian
reasons. Respondent manifested before this Court that he has
been in the practice of law for half a century.10  Thus, he is
already in his twilight years. Considering the foregoing, we deem
it proper to fine respondent in the amount of ₱5,000.00 and to
remind him to be more circumspect in his acts and to obey and
respect court processes.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Rodolfo Flores is FINED in

the amount of ₱5,000.00 with STERN WARNING that the
repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
VIRGILIO J. MAPALAD, SR., Complainant, v. ATTY. ANSELMO
S. ECHANEZ, Respondent.

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

This administrative case arose from a verified Complaint for

disbarment dated October 16, 2009 filed by complainant Virgilio
Mapalad, Sr. against respondent Atty. Anselmo S. Echanez before the
Integrated Bar ofthe Philippines (IBP).

The Facts

Complainant alleged that in an action for Recovery of Possession and

Damages with Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction docketed as
Civil Case No. 1635-1-784 before the Municipal Trial Court in
Santiago City, Isabela, complainant was one of the plaintiffs while
respondent was the defendants' counsel therein. As the said case was
decided in favor of the plaintiffs, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal
dated May 22, 2009, in which respondent indicated his Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Compliance No. II-0014038
without indicating the date of issue thereof.2  On appeal, respondent
filed the appellants' brief, again only indicating his MCLE
Compliance Number.3

In another case docketed as Special Civil Action No. 3573,

respondent, for the same clients, filed a Petition for Injunction wherein
he once again only indicated his MCLE Compliance Number.
4  Respondent also filed a Motion for Leave of Court dated July 13,

2009 in the said special civil action, indicating his MCLE Compliance
Number without the date of issue.5

Upon inquiry with the MCLE Office, complainant discovered that

respondent had no MCLE compliance yet. The MCLE Office then
issued a  Certification dated September 30, 2009, stating that
respondent had not yet complied with his MCLE requirements for the
First Compliance Period (April 15, 2001 to April 14, 2004) and
Second Compliance Period (April 15, 2004 to April 14, 2007).6

Hence, this complaint. Complainant argues that respondent's act of

deliberately and unlawfully misleading the courts, parties, and
counsels concerned into believing that he had complied with the
MCLE requirements when in truth he had not, is a serious
malpractice and grave misconduct.7 The complainant, thus, prayed for
the IBP to recommend respondent's disbarment to this Court.8

In a resolution dated February 10, 2010, this Court required the

respondent to file a comment on the complaint within 10 days from
notice.9 Despite receipt thereof, however, respondent failed to comply
with the said resolution.10 This Court, thus, issued another resolution
dated July 11, 2011 requiring the respondent to show cause why he
should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such
failure and, again, to file a comment to the complaint.11 However, the
respondent again failed to comply.12

On August 14, 2013, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-

CBD) issued a Notice of Mandatory Conference/Hearing.13  On the
date of the hearing, however, none of the parties appeared despite due
notice.14  Nonetheless, the IBP directed the parties to submit their
respective position papers within 10 days from notice.15  Only the
complainant filed his position paper, reiterating the allegations and
arguments in his complaint.16

After investigation, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD

rendered a report17  dated December 17, 2013 with the following
recommendation, to wit:

WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation of the pieces of evidence

submitted by the complainant, it is recommended that ATTY.
ANSELMO S. ECHANEZ be DISBARRED and that his name be
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys upon finality of the decision.

SO ORDERED.18
On September 28, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors issued
Resolution No. XXI-2014-685, adopting and approving the report
and recommendation of the CBD-IBP Investig ating
Commissioner, viz.:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED

and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the
recommendation to be fully supported by the evidence on record and
applicable laws, and for Respondent's violation of the Lawyer's Oath,
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility when he falsified his MCLE Compliance
Number and used it in his pleadings in Court, including his having
ignored the Orders and notices of the Commission on Bar Discipline
and his having been previously sanctioned twice by the IBP, Atty.
Anselmo Echanez is hereby DISBARRED and his name stricken
from the Roll of Attorneys.19

No motion for reconsideration was filed by either party.

The Issue

Should respondent be administratively disciplined based on the

allegations in the complaint and evidence on record?

The Ruling

We answer in the affirmative.

Preliminarily, let it be stated that there is no denying that the

respondent was given ample opportunity to answer the imputations
against him and defend himself but he did not do so despite due
notices.

At any rate, respondent's acts of misconduct are clearly manifest, thus,

warranting the exercise by this Court of its disciplinary power.
First.  It was clearly established that respondent violated Bar Matter
No. 85020. No less than the MCLE Office had issued a certification
stating that respondent had not complied with the first and second
compliance period of the MCLE.21

Second. Despite such non-compliance, respondent repeatedly indicated

a false MCLE compliance number in his pleadings before the trial
courts.22  In indicating patently false information in pleadings filed
before the courts of law, not only once but four times, as per records,
the respondent acted in manifest bad faith, dishonesty, and deceit. In
so doing, he indeed misled the courts, litigants – his own clients
included – professional colleagues, and all others who may have relied
on such pleadings containing false information.23

Respondent's act of filing pleadings that he fully knew to contain false

information is a mockery of the courts, especially this Court,
considering that it is this Court that authored the rules and regulations
that the respondent violated.24

The Lawyer's Oath in Rule 138, Section 3 of the Rules of Court

requires commitment to obeying laws and legal orders, doing no
falsehood, and acting with fidelity to both court and client, among
others, viz.:

I, x x x do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the

Republic of the Philippine, I will support the Constitution and obey
the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities
therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless,
false, or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay
no man for money or malice, and  will conduct myself as a
lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to
my clients;  and I impose upon myself these, voluntary obligations
without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me
God. (emphasis supplied)
Also, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR) provides:

CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of

the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral

or deceitful conduct.

Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the CPR likewise states:

CANON 10 – A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the

court.

Rule 10.01 – A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be
mislead by any artifice.

In using a false MCLE compliance number in his pleadings,

respondent also put his own clients at risk. Such deficiency in
pleadings can be fatal to the client's cause as pleadings with such false
information produce no legal effect.25 In so doing, respondent violated
his duty to his clients.26Canons 17 and 18 of the CPR provide:

CANON 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and

shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him.

CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and

diligence.

Third.  The respondent also repeatedly failed to obey legal orders of

the trial court, the IBP-CBD, and also this Court despite due notice. In
the special civil action above-cited, the trial court directed the
respondent to file a comment on a motion which raised in issue
respondent's use of a false MCLE compliance number in his pleadings
but he did not file any.27 This Court also directed respondent to file a
comment on the instant complaint but he failed to do so.28  We then
issued a show cause order against the respondent to explain why he
should not be disciplined or held in contempt for failing to file the
required comment but again, respondent did not heed this court's
order.29 The IBP-CBD also notified the respondent to appear before it
for mandatory conference/hearing but the said notice was also
ignored.30

Court orders should be respected not only because the authorities who
issued them should be respected, but because of the respect and
consideration that should be extended to the judicial branch of the
government, which is absolutely essential if our government is to be a
government of laws and not of men.31

Clearly, respondent's act of ignoring the said court orders despite

notice violates the lawyer's oath and runs counter to the precepts of
the CPR. By his repeated dismissive conduct, the respondent exhibited
an unpardonable lack of respect for the authority of the Court.

Respondent's culpability is further highlighted by the fact that, as cited

by the IBP Board of Governors in its resolution, respondent had
already been sanctioned by the IBP twice. In a decision dated April
11, 2013 by this Court  en banc,  respondent was found guilty of
engaging in notarial practice without a notarial commission, and was
thus suspended from the practice of law for two years with the
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall
merit a more severe sanction.32  In another decision dated May 31,
2016, this Court en banc again found respondent guilty of performing
notarial acts without a notarial commission and was thus suspended
from the practice of law for two years and barred permanently from
being commissioned as notary public with a stem warning that a
repetition of the same shall be dealt with severely.33  It is noteworthy
that in both cases, respondent already manifested his lack of regard,
not only for the charges against him, but most importantly to the
orders of the IBP and the courts. In the said cases, the respondent
likewise failed to file answers, comments, or position papers, or
attended mandatory conferences despite due notices.34

Taken altogether, considering respondent's act of using a false MCLE

compliance number in his pleadings35, his repeated failure to obey
legal orders36, and the fact that he had already been sanctioned twice
by this Court on separate cases37, We are constrained to affirm the IBP
Board of Governors' Resolution No. XXI-2014-685, recommending
his disbarment to prevent him from further engaging in legal practice.
38  It cannot be overstressed that lawyers are instruments in the

administration of justice.39 As vanguards of our legal system, they are

expected to maintain legal proficiency and a high standard of honesty,
integrity, and fair dealing.40  Also, of all classes and professions, the
lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws.41 He is their sworn
servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and
override the laws, to trample them underfoot and ignore the very
bonds of society, is unfaithful to his position and office and sets a
detrimental example to the society.42

W H E R E F O R E ,  r e s p o n d e n t A n s e l m o S . E c h a n e z i s
hereby  DISBARRED  from the practice of law, and his name
i s  O R D E R E D S T R I C K E N F RO M T H E RO L L O F
ATTORNEYS. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in his record
as a member of the Bar; and let notice of the same be served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

Lawyers in government service discharging their tasks

CANON 6. These canons shall apply to lawyers in

government service in the discharge of their official duties.

Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not

be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge
of his duties as a government official. However, if said misconduct as a
government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer,
then he may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar… A
member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his
professional obligations. Hence, the CPR… was not meant to govern
the conduct of private practitioners alone, but all lawyers including
those in government service. This is clear from Canon 6 of said Code.
Lawyers in government are public servants who owe the utmost
fidelity to the public service.

Thus, they should be more sensitive in the performance of their

professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant
scrutiny of the public. [Vitriolo v. Dasig, A.C. No. 4984 (2003)].

The ethical standards under the CPR are rendered even more
exacting as to government lawyers because they have the added duty
to abide by the policy of the State to promote a high standard of
ethics, competence, and professionalism in public service [Liang Fuji v.
Gemma Armi M. Dela Cruz, A.C. No. 11043 (2017)].

May a former government lawyer appear in a case against

the government? – YES, he may appear in a case unless there is a
specific ethical rule or provision of law which prohibits him from
doing so [Lex Pareto (2014)].

When may a former government lawyer be prohibited from

accepting a legal engagement?
-A lawyer shall not, after leaving the government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which
he had intervened while in said service;
-Retired members of the judiciary receiving pensions from the
government should not practice law where the government is the
adverse party or in a criminal case involving a government employee
in the performance of his duties as such [Lex Pareto (2014)].
ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, PRECILLANA J.
HONORICA, ARLEEN J. RAMOS, DR. ROGER PEREZ,
DR. IMELDA DARAUG, DR. REMIGIA NATHANIELZ,
CELEDONIA CORONACION, and JOSE
RABALO, complainants,

vs.

ATTY. FELINA DASIG, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

This is an administrative case for disbarment filed against Atty.

Felina S. Dasig,1  an official of the Commission on Higher
Education (CHED). The charge involves gross misconduct of
respondent in violation of the Attorney’s Oath for having used
her public office to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the
dignity and reputation of the CHED.

Almost all complainants in the instant case are high-ranking

officers of the CHED. In their sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed
with this Court on December 4, 1998, complainants allege that
respondent, while she was OIC of Legal Affairs Service, CHED,
committed acts that are grounds for disbarment under Section
27,2 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

a) Sometime in August 1998 and during the effectivity of

Respondent’s designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs
Service, CHED, she demanded from Betty C. Mangohon, a
teacher of Our Lady of Mariazel Educational Center in
Novaliches, Quezon City, the amount of P20,000.00 and later
reduced to P5,000.00 for the facilitation of her application for
correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service,
CHED...

b) Likewise, sometime in July to August 1998 and during the

effectivity of Respondent’s designation as Officer-in-Charge of
Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Rosalie B.
Dela Torre, a student, the amount of P18,000.00 to P20,000.00
for facilitation of her application for correction of name then
pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED…

c) Likewise, sometime in September 1998 and during the

effectivity of Respondent’s designation as Officer-in-Charge of
Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Rocella G. Eje,
a student, the amount of P5,000.00 for facilitation of her
application for correction of name then pending before the Legal
Affairs Service, CHED. . . In addition, Respondent even
suggested to Ms. Eje to register her birth anew with full
knowledge of the existence of a prior registration…

d) Likewise, sometime in August to September 1998 and during

the effectivity of Respondent’s designation as Officer-in-Charge
of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Jacqueline
N. Ng, a student, a considerable amount which was subsequently
confirmed to be P15,000.00 and initial fee of P5,000.00 more or
less for facilitation of her application for correction of name then
pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED... In addition,
the Respondent even suggested to Ms. Ng to hire a lawyer who
shall be chosen by Respondent Dasig to facilitate the application
for correction of name.3

Complainants likewise aver that respondent violated her oath as

attorney-at-law by filing eleven (11) baseless, groundless, and
unfounded suits before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City, which were subsequently dismissed.4

Further, complainants charge respondent of transgressing

subparagraph b (22), Section 365 of Presidential Decree No. 807,
for her willful failure to pay just debts owing to "Borela Tire
Supply" and "Nova’s Lining Brake & Clutch" as evidenced by the
dishonored checks she issued,6  the complaint sheet, and the
subpoena issued to respondent.7

Complainants also allege that respondent instigated the

commission of a crime against complainant Celedonia R.
Coronacion and Rodrigo Coronacion, Jr., when she encouraged
and ordered her son, Jonathan Dasig, a guard of the Bureau of
Jail Management and Penology, to draw his gun and shoot the
Coronacions on the evening of May 14, 1997. As a result of this
incident, a complaint for grave threats against the respondent and
her son, docketed as Criminal Case No. 86052, was lodged with
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 36.8

Finally, complainants allege that respondent authored and sent to

then President Joseph Estrada a libelous and unfair report, which
maligned the good names and reputation of no less than eleven
(11) CHED Directors calculated to justify her ill motive of
preventing their re-appointment and with the end view of
securing an appointment for herself.9

In our resolution of February 3, 1999, we required respondent to

file a Comment on the charges.10  A copy of said resolution was
sent to the respondent at her address at Blk. 4, Lot 12, Hobart II
Subdivision, Novaliches, Quezon City, only to be returned to this
Court with the notation "Unclaimed."11

On July 5, 1999, we directed that a copy of the resolution of

February 3, 1999, be served by registered mail to respondent at
her office address in CHED.

In a letter dated August 28, 2000, the Postmaster of the Ortigas

Center Post Office informed the Court that the said mail matter
had been delivered to, received by, and signed for by one Antonio
Molon, an authorized agent of respondent on August 27, 1999.12

On November 22, 2000, we granted complainant’s motion to

refer the complaint to the Commission on Bar Discipline,
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report,
and recommendation.

In its order dated February 6, 2001, the IBP Commission on Bar

Discipline directed respondent to submit her Answer to the
Complaint, failing which she would be considered in default and
the case heard ex parte. Respondent failed to heed said order and
on January 8, 2002, the Commission directed her anew to file her
Answer, but again she failed to comply with the directive. As a
result, the Commission ruled that she had waived her right to file
her Comment or Answer to the Complaint and the case was
mainly resolved on the basis of the documents submitted and on
record.

In its report and recommendation, dated April 5, 2002, the IBP

Commission on Bar Discipline stated as follows:

From the foregoing evidence on record, it can be concluded that

respondent in violation of her oath as a government official and
as a member of the Bar, indeed made unlawful demands or
attempted to extort money from certain people who had pending
applications/requests before her office in exchange for her
promise to act favorably on said applications/requests. Clearly,
respondent unlawfully used her public office in order to secure
financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of
the Commission on Higher Education.

For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that respondent be

suspended from the practice of law for the maximum period
allowable of three (3) years with a further warning that similar
action in the future will be a ground for disbarment of
respondent.

On August 3, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed

Resolution No. XV-2002-393, the full text of which reads as
follows:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby

ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A:; and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules; and considering that
respondent unlawfully used her public office in order to secure
financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of
the Commission on Higher Education, Respondent is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years.13

At the threshold is the query of whether respondent attorney-at-

law, as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of Legal Services, CHED, may
be disciplined by this Court for her malfeasance, considering that
her position, at the time of filing of the complaint, was "Chief
Education Program Specialist, Standards Development Division,
Office of Programs and Standards, CHED."

Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may

not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the
discharge of his duties as a government official.14 However, if said
misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation of
his oath as a lawyer, then he may be disciplined by this Court as a
member of the Bar.15

In this case, the record shows that the respondent, on various

occasions, during her tenure as OIC, Legal Services, CHED,
attempted to extort from Betty C. Mangohon, Rosalie B. Dela
Torre, Rocella G. Eje, and Jacqueline N. Ng sums of money as
consideration for her favorable action on their pending
applications or requests before her office. The evidence remains
unrefuted, given the respondent’s failure, despite the
opportunities afforded her by this Court and the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline to comment on the charges. We find that
respondent’s misconduct as a lawyer of the CHED is of such a
character as to affect her qualification as a member of the Bar, for
as a lawyer, she ought to have known that it was patently
unethical and illegal for her to demand sums of money as
consideration for the approval of applications and requests
awaiting action by her office.

The Attorney’s Oath is the source of the obligations and duties of

every lawyer and any violation thereof is a ground for
disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action. The
Attorney’s Oath imposes upon every member of the bar the duty
to delay no man for money or malice. Said duty is further stressed
in Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
16  Respondent’s demands for sums of money to facilitate the

processing of pending applications or requests before her office

violates such duty, and runs afoul of the oath she took when
admitted to the Bar. Such actions likewise run contrary to Rule
1.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his
professional obligations. Hence, the Code of Professional
Responsibility, promulgated on June 21, 1988, was not meant to
govern the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all
lawyers including those in government service. This is clear from
Canon 617  of said Code. Lawyers in government are public
servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public service. Thus,
they should be more sensitive in the performance of their
professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-
constant scrutiny of the public.

Respondent’s attempts to extort money from persons with

applications or requests pending before her office are violative of
Rule 1.0118  of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
prohibits members of the Bar from engaging or participating in
any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts
constitute a breach of Rule 6.0219  of the Code which bars
lawyers in government service from promoting their private
interests. Promotion of private interests includes soliciting gifts or
anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring the
approval of his office or which may be affected by the functions
of his office. Respondent’s conduct in office falls short of the
integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers,
specially from one occupying a high public office. For a lawyer in
public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or
omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of
the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of
the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of
honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government
service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high
degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren
in private practice.

For her violation of the Attorney’s Oath as well as of Rule 1.01

and Rule 1.03 of Canon 120  and Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly for acts of
dishonesty as well as gross misconduct as OIC, Legal Services,
CHED, we find that respondent deserves not just the penalty of
three years’ suspension from membership in the Bar as well as the
practice of law, as recommended by the IBP Board of Governors,
but outright disbarment. Her name shall be stricken off the list of
attorneys upon finality of this decision.

WHEREFORE, respondent Arty. Felina S. Dasig is found liable

for gross misconduct and dishonesty in violation of the Attorney’s
Oath as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is
hereby ordered DISBARRED.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Bar Confidant to

be spread on the records of the respondent, as well as to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its
chapters, and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 11043

LIANG FUJI, Complainant

vs

ATTY. GEMMA ARMI M. DELA CRUZ, Respondent

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

Failure to exercise utmost prudence in reviewing the immigration

records of an alien, which resulted in the alien's wrongful
detention, opens the special prosecutor in the Bureau of
Immigration to administrative liability.

Before this Court is an administrative complaint1  dated

November 23, 2015 filed by Liang Fuji (Fuji) and his family,
against Bureau of Immigration Special Prosecutor Gemma Armi
M. Dela Cruz (Special Prosecutor Dela Cruz) for gross
misconduct and gross ignorance of the law in relation to her
issuance of a Charge Sheet against Fuji for overstaying.

Through a letter2  dated December 8, 2015, Deputy Clerk of

Court and Bar Confidant Atty. Ma. Cristina B. Layusa directed
the complainants to file a verified complaint "with supporting
documents duly authenticated and/or affidavits of persons having
personal knowledge of the facts alleged"3 in the complaint.

Complainants replied4 by furnishing this Court with copies of the

Verified Petition to Reopen S.D. O. No. BOC-2015-357 (B.L.O.
No. SBM- 15-420) and for Relief of Judgment with Urgent
Prayer for Immediate Consideration, and Administrative
Complaint (Verified Petition and Administrative Complaint),
5  which Fuji filed with the Board of Commissioners of the

Bureau of Immigration, and prayed that the same be treated as

their verified complaint. Complainants further informed this
Court that they had difficulty obtaining certified true copies of
the November 21, 2013 Order of the Board of Commissioners,
which granted Fuji's Section 9(g) visa, Summary Deportation
Order dated June 17, 2015, and Warrant of Deportation from
the Bureau of Immigration personnel who just gave them the
"run[-]around."6  They alleged that the Bureau of Immigration
personnel were not particularly helpful, and did not treat Fuji's
case with urgency.7

The facts of this case show that in a Summary Deportation

Order8  dated June 17, 2015, Fuji, a Chinese national, was
ordered deported for overstaying. From the Order, it appears that
Special Prosecutor Dela Cruz was the special prosecutor who
brought the formal charge against Fuji and another person upon
her finding that Fuji's work visa had expired on May 8, 2013,
with extension expired on December 6, 2013.9 Special Prosecutor
Dela Cruz found that Fuji had overstayed for one (1) year and six
(6) months in violation of Commonwealth Act No. 613, Section
37(a)(7).10 Her investigation was triggered by a complaint-affidavit
dated April 30, 2015 of a certain Virgilio Manalo alleging that
Fuji and another person had defrauded him.11

On June 29, 2015, Fuji filed his Motion for Reconsideration.12

On July 28, 2015, the Bureau of Immigration Intelligence

Division served Fuji's Warrant of Deportation, and thereafter
arrested him at Brgy. Maloma, San Felipe, Zambales with the
assistance from local police.13 Fuji was brought to and detained at
the Bureau of Immigration Detention Facility, National Capital
Region Police Office, Taguig City.14

On October 9, 2015, the Board of Commissioners denied Fuji's

Motion for Reconsideratios.15

On November 23, 2015, Fuji filed his Verified Petition and

Administrative Complaint.16  Subsequently, on March 10, 2016,
Fuji filed an Omnibus Motion to Reopen and Lift S.D.O.
BOC-2015-357, and Release on Bail through counsel.17

On March 22, 2016, the Board of Commissioners issued a

Resolution dismissing the deportation charge against Fuji on the
ground that "[t]he records show that Liang has a working visa
valid until 30 April 2016 under Jiang Tuo Mining Philippines,
Inc. as Marketing Liason."18 Fuji was directed to be released from
Bureau of Immigration-Warden's Facility on March 23, 2016.19

In his administrative complaint, Fuji alleged that his rights to due

process were violated since he was not afforded any hearing or
summary deportation proceedings before the deportation order
was issued against him.20  Fuji further alleged that Special
Prosecutor Dela Cruz failed miserably in discharging her duties
because a simple initial review of the Bureau of Immigration
records would have revealed that he was not overstaying because
his Section 9(g) work visa was valid until April 30, 2016.21

In her August 25, 2016 Comment,22  respondent Special

Prosecutor Dela Cruz denied that she committed any grave
misconduct.23  She claimed that Fuji was accorded due process
during the summary deportation proceedings.24 He was directed,
through an Order dated May 14, 2015 of the Legal Division, to
submit his Counter-Affidavit/Memorandum, which he failed to
do.25 Fuji was also able to file his motion for reconsideration and
verified petition to reopen the case.26

Respondent further claimed that the Memorandum dated June 4,

2015 of the Bureau of Immigration - Management Information
System (BI-MIS) constituted a substantial evidence of Fuji's
overstay in the country, hence, her formal charge had legal basis.
27

Respondent added that as a civil servant, she enjoyed the

presumption of regularity in the performance of her duties.28 She
had no intention to violate any law and did not commit any
flagrant disregard of the rules, or unlawfully used her station to
procure some benefit for herself or for other persons.
29  Respondent pointed out that the Ombudsman had in fact

dismissed the complainant's charges against her.30 She added that

Fuji stated in his March 29, 2016 Affidavit of Desistance that he
had mistakenly signed some documents including the
administrative complaint.31
We find respondent administratively liable for her
negligence in her failure to ascertain the facts before
levying the formal charge against Fuji for overstaying.

Generally, this Court defers from taking cognizance of

disbarment complaints against lawyers in government service
arising from their administrative duties, and refers the complaint
first either to the proper administrative body that has disciplinary
authority over the erring public official or employee or the
Ombudsman.32

For instance, in Spouses Buffe v. Gonzales,33 this Court dismissed the

disbarment complaint against former Secretary of Justice Raul
M. Gonzalez, former Undersecretary of Justice Fidel J. Exconde,
Jr., and former

Congressman Eleandro Jesus F. Madrona, holding that the

respondents were public officials being charged for actions
involving their official functions during their tenure, which should
be resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman.34 In that case, one
(1) of the respondents sought to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of forum-shopping because he allegedly received an order
from the Office of the Ombudsman directing him to file a
counter-affidavit based on the same administrative complaint filed
before the Office of the Bar Confidant.35

Again, in the fairly recent case of  Alicias, Jr. v. Macatangay,36  the
Court dismissed the complaint against respondents - government
lawyers in the Civil Service Commission. The Court held that the
acts or omissions alleged in the complaint were "connected with
their . . . official functions in the [Civil Service Commission] and
within the administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of their
superior or the Office of the Ombudsman."37 It would seem that
the complainant directly instituted a disbarment complaint with
this Court instead of filing an administrative complaint before the
proper administrative body.
This case is an exception. Unlike the circumstances in  Spouses
Buffe and Alicias, Jr., the records here show that the Office of the
Ombudsman had previously dismissed Fuji's administrative
complaint due to the pendency of his Verified Petition and
Administrative Complaint before the Bureau of Immigration,
and considered the case closed.38

The Bureau of Immigration subsequently granted Fuji's petition

to reopen his case and ordered his release. However, it was silent
as to the culpability of respondent on the charges levelled by Fuji.

Thus, with the termination of the administrative proceedings

before the Office of the Ombudsman and the apparent inaction
of the Bureau of Immigration on complainant's administrative
complaint, this Court considers it proper to take cognizance of
this case, and to determine whether there is sufficient ground to
discipline respondent under its "plenary disciplinary
authority"39 over members of the legal profession.40

Contrary to respondent's stance, Fuji's purported Affidavit of

Desistance is not sufficient cause to dismiss this administrative
complaint. This Court has previously held that proceedings of
this nature cannot be "interrupted or terminated by reason of
desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the
charges or failure of the complainant to prosecute the
same."41  The primary object of disciplinary proceedings is to
determine the fitness of a member to remain in the Bar. It is
conducted solely for the public welfare,42  and the desistance of
the complainant is irrelevant. What will be decisive are the facts
borne out by the evidence presented by the parties. In  Rayos-
Ombac v. Rayos:43

A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of

interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is
whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the
charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly
proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary
proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in
any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and
the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings
involve no private interest and afford no redress for private
grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the
public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of
preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of
persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer
to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The
complainant or the person who called the attention of the court
to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has
generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens
may have in the proper administration of justice.44

II

Respondent Dela Cruz claimed that she issued the formal charge
against Fuji for overstaying on the basis of the Memorandum
dated June 4, 2015 of the BI-MIS.45 A copy of the Memorandum
with attachments was attached to respondent's Comment.46

However, nowhere in the Memorandum was it stated that Fuji

"overstayed" or that "Liang's working visa expired on 8 May 2013
and his TVV expired on 6 December 2013"47  as respondent
claims. Relevant portions of the Memorandum read:

For : ATTY. GEMMA ARMI M. DELA CRUZ

From : ACTING CHIEF, MIS DIVISION
Re : REQUEST FOR IMMIGRATION STATUS; VISA
EXTENSION PAYMENT, LATEST TRAVEL AND
DEROGATORY OF THE FOLLOWING:

1. MR.IMS. LIANG FUJI

2. MR./MS. CHEN XIANG HE

3. MR.IMS. JACKY CHANG HE

Date : 04 June 2015
Further to your request for verification of Immigration Status;
Visa Extension Payment and TRAVEL RECORD/S, please find
the result/s as follows:

...
Resul : 1. LIANG FUJI
t/s
- Derogatory Record Not Found

- Latest Travel Record Found (Please see the attached

files for your ready reference. NOTE:

DOB: 18 October 1991)

- Immigration Status Found

- Latest Payment Record Found in BI-Main (Please

see the attached files for your ready reference. NOTE:
DOB: 18 October 1991)48

The Memorandum merely transmitted copies of immigration

records showing details of filing of applications, such as official
receipts, - and travel record of Fuji. It was respondent Dela Cruz
who made the determination that Fuji overstayed on the basis of
the documents transmitted to her by the BI-MIS.

Among the documents transmitted by the BI-MIS were computer

print-outs showing details of official receipts dated June 14, 2013,
August 7, 2013, and November 19, 2013 for temporary visitor
visa extension and official receipt dated July 15, 2013 for an
application for change of immigration status. Also, the travel
records of Fuji show the following details:

Date & Time : 4 June 2015 3:05 PM

Verifier : DIMARUCOT J
Database : TRAVEL-ARRIVAL
 TRAVEL TRA FLI IMMI PO OFFIC ACTIO REMA
DATE VEL GH G RT ER N RKS
TIM T STA
E NO. TUS
10- 11:3 CZ3 9G NA MIJAR ALLO
FEBRU 4PM 77 IAI ES WED
ARY-201
4
06- 11:5 CZ3 9A NA PARAN ALLO
JANUAR 1PM 77 IAI GUE WED
Y-2012
22- l CZ3 9A NA NUNE ALLO
SEPTE 1:25 77 IAI Z WED4
MBER-2 PM 9
011

Fuji's travel records as of June 4, 2015, show his arrival in the

Philippines on February 10, 2014 under a work visa immigration
status.50  Simple prudence dictates that respondent Atty. Dela
Cruz should have verified whether or not the July 15, 2013
application for change of status had been approved by the Bureau
of Immigration Commissioners, especially since she had
complete and easy access to the immigration records.

Respondent failed in the performance of her basic duties. Special

prosecutors in the Bureau of Immigration should exercise such
degree of vigilance and attention in reviewing the immigration
records, whenever the legal status and documentation of an alien
are at issue. For while a deportation proceeding does not partake
of the nature of a criminal action, it is however, a harsh and
extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the freedom
and liberty of a person.511âwphi1

Respondent was expected to be reasonably thorough in her

review of the documents transmitted to her by the BI-MIS,
especially as it may ultimately result in the deprivation of liberty
of the prospective deportee. She should not have simply relied on
the handwritten note by a personnel from the BI-MIS at the
bottom portion of the receipt dated November 19, 2013 for 9A
visa extension stating "Valid until: 06-Dec-2013." Had she
inquired further, she would have discovered that Fuji's application
dated July 15, 2013 for conversion from temporary visitor visa
(9A) to work visa (9G) was approved by the Board of
Commissioners on November 21, 2013 - or one (1) year and
seven (7) months earlier - with validity until April 30, 2016. Thus,
even if Fuji's temporary visitor (9A) visa had expired on
December 6, 2013 his stay in the country was still valid under the
9G work VISa.

Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be

disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the
discharge of her duties as a government official.52  However, if
said misconduct as a government official also constitutes a
violation of her oath as a lawyer and the Code of Professional
Responsibility,53 then she may be subject to disciplinary sanction
by this Court.1avvphi1

Atty. Dela Cruz failed to observe Rule 18.03 of the Code of the
Professional Responsibility, which mandates that "a lawyer shall
not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable." As a special
prosecutor in the Bureau of Immigration, she is the
representative, not of any private party, but of the State. Her task
was to investigate and verify facts to determine whether a ground
for deportation exists, and if further administrative action - in the
form of a formal charge - should be taken against an alien.

Had respondent carefully reviewed the records of Fuji, she would

have found out about the approval of Fuji's application, which
would negate her finding of overstaying. Because of her
negligence, Fuji was deprived of his liberty for almost eight (8)
months, until his release on March 23, 2016.
Simple neglect of duty is defined as a failure to, give attention to
a task due to carelessness or indifference.54  In this case,
respondent's negligence shows her indifference to the
fundamental right of every person, including aliens, to due
process and to the consequences of her actions.

Lawyers in government service should be more conscientious with

their professional obligations consistent with the time-honored
principle of public office being a public trust.55  The ethical
standards under the Code of Professional Responsibility are
rendered even more exacting as to government lawyers because
they have the added duty to abide by the policy of the State to
promote a high standard of ethics, competence, and
professionalism in public service.56  In this case, respondent's
negligence evinces a failure to cope with the strict demands and
high standards of public service and the legal profession.

The appropriate sanction is discretionary upon this Court.

57 Under the Civil Service Rules,58 the penalty for simple neglect

of duty is suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6)
months. In previous cases,59  this Court imposed the penalty of
suspension of three (3) months to six (6) months for erring
lawyers, who were negligent in handling cases for their clients. We
find appropriate the penalty of suspension of three (3) months
considering the consequence of respondent's negligence. This
suspension includes her desistance from performing her functions
as a special prosecutor in the Bureau of Immigration.

WHEREFORE,  respondent Atty. Gemma Armi M. Dela Cruz

1s SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months.

The respondent, upon receipt of this Resolution, shall

immediately serve her suspension. She shall formally manifest to
this Court that her suspension has started, and copy furnish all
courts and quasi-judicial bodies where she has entered her
appearance, within five (5) days upon receipt of this Resolution.
Respondent shall also serve copies of her manifestation on all
adverse parties in all the cases she entered her formal appearance.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant to be attached to Atty. Gemma Armi M. Dela Cruz's
personal record. Copies of this Resolution should also be served
on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its proper disposition,
and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

Rule 6.01 - The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in

public prosecution is not to convict but to see that
justice is done. The suppression of facts or the
concealment of witnesses capable of establishing the
innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible and is
cause for disciplinary action.

Rule 6.02. A lawyer in the government service shall not

use his public position to promote or advance his
private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with
his public duties.

Government employees are expected to devote themselves

completely to public service. For this reason, the private practice
of profession is prohibited. Lawyers in government service cannot
handle private cases for they are expected to devote themselves
full-time to the work of their respective offices [Ramos v. Imbang,
A.C. No. 6788 (2007)].

Rule 6.03. A lawyer shall not, after leaving government

service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened
while in said service.

How government lawyers may leave government service:

1. Retirement;

2. Resignation;
3. Expiration of the term of office;

4. Abandonment;

5. Dismissal.

General rule: Practice of profession is allowed immediately

after leaving public service.

Exceptions: The lawyer cannot practice as to matters with

which he had connection during his term. This prohibition lasts:
- For one year, if he had not intervened;
- Permanently, if he had intervened.
The “matter” contemplated are those that are adverse-interest
conflicts (substantial relatedness and adversity between the
government matter and the new client’s matter in interest) and
congruent-interest representation conflicts (prohibits lawyers from
representing a private practice client even if the interests of the
former government client and the new client are entirely parallel).
“Intervention” should be significant and substantial which can or
have affected the interest of others (i.e. an act of a person has the
power to influence the subject proceedings) [PCGG v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 151809- 12 (2005)].

Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 6713 generally provides for the prohibited acts
and transactions of public officials and employees. Sec. 7(b)(2)
prohibits them from engaging in the private practice of their
profession during their incumbency. As an exception, a public
official or employee can engage in the practice of his or her
profession under the following conditions:

●First, the private practice is authorized by the Constitution or by

the law; and
●Second, the practice will not conflict, or tend to conflict, with his
or her official functions.
The prohibitions continue to apply for a period of one year after
the public official or employee’s resignation, retirement, or
separation from public office, except for the private practice of
profession under subsection (b)(2), which can already be
undertaken even within the one-year prohibition period. As an
exception to this exception, the one-year prohibited period
applies with respect to any matter before the office the public
officer or employee used to work with. [Query of Karen Silverio-
Buffe, A.M. No. 08-6-352-RTC (2009)].

Sec. 3(d) of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices

Act) also considers it an unlawful and corrupt practice for a
public official to accept or have any member of his family accept
employment in a private enterprise which has pending official
business with him during the pendency of his office or within one
year after its termination.

In the case of Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc. v. Paz, a

former Legal Officer and Legal Prosecutor of PARGO who
participated in the investigation of the Anti-Graft case against
Mayor Pablo Cuneta later on acted as counsel for the said Mayor
in the same antigraft case. The Court found the said counsel
guilty of representing clients with conflicting interest and
suspended him from the practice of law for 2 months [A.M. No.
1008 (1980)].

PCGG V SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS

In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK)

encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended
considerable financial support to Filcapital Development
Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its
current account with Central Bank. Despite the mega loans
GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. The
Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK
insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its
depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering its
liquidation. A public bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held
where Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid. Solicitor
General Estelito Mendoza filed a petition with the CFI
praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in
GENBANK’s liquidation as mandated by RA 265. After
EDSA Revolution I Pres Aquino established the PCGG to
recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former Pres Marcos,
his family and cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG
filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion,
reconveyance, restitution against respondents Lucio Tan,
at.al. PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on
properties allegedly acquired by them by taking advantage of
their close relationship and influence with former Pres.
Marcos. The abovementioned respondents Tan, et. al are
represented as their counsel, former Solicitor General
Mendoza. PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent
Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan et. al. with
Sandiganbayan. It was alleged that Mendoza as then Sol Gen
and counsel to Central Bank actively intervened in the
liquidation of GENBANK which was subsequently acquired
by respondents Tan et. al., which subsequently became Allied
Banking Corporation. The motions to disqualify invoked
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
prohibits former government lawyers from accepting
“engagement” or employment in connection with any matter
in which he had intervened while in the said service. The
Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denyting PCGG’s motion
to disqualify respondent Mendoza. It failed to prove the
existence of an inconsistency between respondent Mendoza’s
former function as SolGen and his present employment as
counsel of the Lucio Tan group.  PCGGs recourse to this
court assailing the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE

Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza. The
prohibition states: “A lawyer shall not, after leaving
government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while
in the said service.”

HELD

The case at bar does not involve the “adverse interest” aspect
of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no
adverse interest problem when he acted as SOlGen and later
as counsel of respondents et.al. before the Sandiganbayan.
However there is still the issue of whether there exists a
“congruent-interest conflict” sufficient to disqualify
respondent Mendoza from representing respondents et. al.
The key is unlocking the meaning of “matter” and the metes
and bounds of “intervention” that he made on the matter.
Beyond doubt that the “matter” or the act of respondent
Mendoza as SolGen involved in the case at bar is “advising
the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank’s
liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation in
CFI of Manila. The Court held that the advice given by
respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate
GENBANK is not the “matter” contemplated by Rule 6.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal
Opinion No. 342 is clear in stressing that “drafting, enforcing
or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations
and laws, or briefing abstract principles of law are acts which
do not fall within the scope of the term “matter” and cannot
disqualify. Respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the
decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. He
also did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied
Bank. The legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an
issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the
PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of
banks. Thus, the Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because
his alleged intervention while SolGen is an intervention on a
matter different from the matter involved in the Civil case of
sequestration. In the metes and bounds of the “intervention”.
The applicable meaning as the term is used in the Code of
Professional Ethics is that it is an act of a person who has the
power to influence the subject proceedings. The evil sought to
be remedied by the Code do not exist where the government
lawyer does not act which can be considered as innocuous
such as “ drafting, enforcing, or interpreting government or
agency procedures, regulations or laws or briefing abstract
principles of law.” The court rules that the intervention of
Mendoza is not significant and substantial. He merely
petitions that the court gives assistance in the liquidation of
GENBANK. The role of court is not strictly as a court of
justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in
determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding the
role of the SolGen is not that of the usual court litigator
protecting the interest of government.

Petition assailing the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is
denied.