Qualifications

Section 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court. Who may practice law. – Any person
heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as
such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
Sec. 2, Rule 138. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. –
Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the
Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a
resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character; and that no charges against
him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in
the Philippines.
Requirements for admission to the Bar Under Sections 2, 5 and 6 of Rule
138, the applicant must be [C21-GRENAPOS]:
1. a Citizen of the Philippines;

2. At least 21 years of age;

3. Of Good moral character;

4. a Resident of the Philippines;

5. Must produce before the SC satisfactory Evidence of good moral

character;

6. No charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or

are 

pending in any court in the Philippines (Sec. 2, Rule 138, RRC)

7. Must have complied with the Academic requirements;

8. Must Pass the bar examinations;

9. Take the lawyer’s Oath; and 10. Sign the Roll of Attorneys.
NOTE: Being allowed to take the bar examinations, and consequently
passing the bar, does not necessarily entail being allowed to take the lawyer’s
oath of office.
Passing the Bar examination is not sufficient for admission of a person to the
Philippine Bar. He still has to take the oath of office and sign the Roll of
Attorney’s as prerequisites to admission.
Note: With regard to the requirement of good moral character, the candidate
must hold and continue to possess it even after he has been admitted to the
legal profession.
After passing the Bar examinations, the candidate shall take his lawyer’s oath
before the Supreme Court (Section 17, Rule 138, Rules of Court) followed
later by his signing of the Roll of Attorneys — in which Roll he is assigned a
permanent number. Thereafter, he is issued a certificate of membership by the
Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court. From this point in time, he is deemed
authorized to practice law in the Philippines (Section 18, Rule 132, Rules of
Court).
Legal education
Pre-law [Sec. 6, Rule 138]
Applicant must present a certificate that he or she had pursued and
satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university or
college, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts
or sciences.
• The university or college must require for admission the completion of a 4-
year high school course.
If a Filipino citizen completed and obtained his or her Bachelor of Laws
degree or its equivalent in a foreign law school, he must also present proof of
completion of a separate bachelor’s degree course.
Law Proper [Sec. 5, Rule 138]
Must satisfactorily show that they completed all the prescribed courses for a
degree of Bachelor of Laws (or its equivalent)

• In a law school or university recognized by
the government or the proper authority in the foreign jurisdiction where the
degree has been granted
Prescribed courses for a Bachelor of Laws degree:
a. Civil law

b. Commercial law

c. Remedial law

d. Criminal law

e. Public and private international law

f. Political law

g. Labor and social legislation

h. Medical jurisprudence

i. T axation

j. Legal ethics

A Filipino citizen who graduated from a foreign law school must submit to
the SC certifications showing:
a. Completion of all courses leading to the degree of Bachelor of Laws or
its equivalent degree;

b. Recognition or accreditation of the law school by the proper authority;

and

c. Completion of all the fourth year subjects in the Bachelor of Laws

academic program in a law school duly recognized by the Philippine
Government. 


Legal Education Board

Under R.A. No. 7662 (Legal Education Reform Act of 1993), the Legal
Education Board (LEB) was created in order to uplift the standards of legal
education by undertaking appropriate reforms in the legal education system,
requiring proper selection of law students, maintaining quality among law
schools, and requiring legal apprenticeship and continuing legal education.
In Dec. 2016, LEB promulgated LEB Memorandum Order No. 7, Series of
2016 which required the Philippine Law School Admission Test (PhilSAT) as
a prerequisite for admission to the basic law courses leading either to a
Bachelor of Laws or Juris Doctor degree beginning school year 2017-2018.
However, the SC declared LEB Memorandum Order No. 7 as
unconstitutional, as it “usurps the right and duty of the law school to
determine for itself the criteria for the admission of students and thereafter, to
apply such criteria on a case-to-case basis.” [Pimentel v. Legal Education
Board, G.R. Nos. 230642 & 242954 (2019)]
The following powers of the LEB were also declared unconstitutional:
● The authority over continuing legal education;

● The authority over increasing awareness among members of the legal

profession of the needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors of
society;

● The authority to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for

taking the Bar;

● The authority to adopt a system of mandatory continuing legal education;

● The act and practice of excluding, restricting, and qualifying admissions to

law schools;

● The act and practice of dictating the qualifications and classification of

faculty members and deans;

● The act and practice of dictating the policies on the establishment of legal

Bar examinations
legal internship
All applicants for admission shall file with the clerk of the Supreme Court the
evidence required under Sec. 2 at least 15 days before the beginning of the
examination. If the applicant is not covered by Secs. 3 and 4, they shall also
file within the same period the affidavit and certificate required by Sec. 5
[Sec. 7, Rule 138, RoC].
The clerk of the Supreme Court shall publish the notice of applications for
admission in newspapers published in Filipino, English and Spanish, for at
least 10 days before the beginning of the examination [Sec. 8, Rule 138,
RoC].
Examinees shall not bring papers, books or notes into the examination rooms.
The questions shall be the same for all examinees and a copy thereof, in
English or Spanish, shall be given to each examinee. Examinees shall answer
the questions personally without help from anyone.
Upon verified application made by an examinee stating that his penmanship
is so poor that it will be difficult to read his answers without much loss of
time, the Supreme Court may allow such examinee to use a typewriter in
answering the questions. Only noiseless typewriters shall be allowed to be
used.
The committee of bar examines shall take such precautions as are necessary
to prevent the substitution of papers or commission of other frauds.
Examinees shall not place their names on the examination papers. No oral
examination shall be given [Sec. 10, Rule 138, RoC].
Examination for admission to the bar of the Philippines shall take place
annually in the City of Manila. They shall be held in 4 days to be designated
by the chairman of the committee on bar examiners [Sec. 11, Rule 138, RoC].
A candidate is deemed to have passed his examinations successfully if he
obtained a general average of 75% in all subjects, without falling below 50%
in any subject [Sec. 14, Rule 138, RoC].
The relative weights of the subjects used in determining the average are as
follows:
Subject %
Civil Law 15%
Labor and Social Legislation 10%
Mercantile Law 15%
Criminal Law 10%
Political and International Law 15%
T axation 10%
Remedial Law 20%
Legal and Ethics and Practical Exercises 5

MERCURIA D. SO, COMPLAINANT, v. MA. LUCILLE P.

LEE,* RESPONDENT.


RESOLUTION

J. REYES, JR., J.:

Subject of this Resolution are the October 9, 20171 and March 15,
20192 Petitions to Retake the Lawyer's Oath and to Sign the Roll of Attorneys
of Ma. Lucille P. Lee (Lee), one of the successful examinees of the 2016 Bar
Examinations.

Factual Antecedents

On May 19, 2017, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) received a
letter3 from Mercuria D. So (So) alleging that Lee is a defendant in Civil
Case No. 740 and is not fit for admission to the Bar considering her
irresponsible attitude towards her monetary obligations. Attached in the said
letter was a copy of the Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money4 So had
filed against Lee.

In her Comment,5 Lee claimed that she was unaware of the pendency of Civil
Case No. 740 as she learned of it only when she registered for the oath
taking. She admitted that she obtained a P200,000.00 loan from So but had
already paid a total of P140,000.00 for 10 months. Lee explained that due to
the losses her business suffered, she failed to pay the subsequent monthly
payments. She pointed out that she did not intend to evade her obligation to
So, but had asked the latter to give her ample time to settle it.

In its July 11, 2017 Report,6 the OBC noted that Lee was an applicant of the
2016 Bar Examinations and in her application, she declared that a civil case
was filed against her on January 29, 2014 docketed as Civil Case No. 1436
titled "Nonoy Bolos v. Ma Lucille Lee Jao" for collection of sum of money. It
highlighted that Civil Case No. 1436 pertained to the several loans Lee had
incurred with Joseph "Nonoy" Bolos (Bolos) in the aggregate amount of
P1,450,000.00."

In its August 1, 2017 Resolution,7 the Court held in abeyance Lee's request to
be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys in view of the pendency of Civil
Case Nos. 740 and 1436, and required her to manifest the status of the
aforementioned cases.

In her October 2017 petition, Lee manifested that Civil Case No. 740 had
been dismissed in view of the Compromise Agreement she had entered into
with So. She manifested that she already paid So in accordance with the
terms and conditions of the approved Compromise Agreement.8

In her March 2019 petition, Lee reiterated the dismissal of Civil Case No.
740 and the satisfaction of her obligation in accordance with the Compromise
Agreement with So. In addition, she noted that a Judgment by Compromise
had been issued dismissing Civil Case No. 1436 in view of the Compromise
Agreement she had executed with Bolos. It was agreed upon that Lee would
pay Bolos at least P15,000.00 a month starting one month after she signs the
Roll of Attorneys.9

In its March 28, 2019 Report,10 the OBC recommended that Lee be allowed
to retake the Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys subject to the
condition that she inform the Court within one month from the time she has
made her first payment of P15,000.00 to Bolos and to inform the Court upon
full payment of the debt in accordance with the terms and conditions of the
compromise.

The Issue
WHETHER LEE SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO RETAKE THE
LAWYER'S OATH AND SIGN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.

The Court's Ruling

The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State upon
those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications
required by law for the conferment of such privilege.11 It is extended only to
the few who possess the high standards of intellectual and moral
qualifications and the Court is duty-bound to prevent the entry of undeserving
aspirants, as well as to exclude those who have been admitted but have
become a disgrace to the profession.12 Section 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court provides for the minimum requirements applicants for the admission to
the Bar must possess, to wit:

SEC. 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. - Every
applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the
Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a
resident of the Philippines, and must produce before the Supreme Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against
him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court
in the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)

Moral turpitude has been defined as an act of baselessness, vileness, or the

depravity of private and social duties that man owes to his fellow man or
society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and
duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty or good morals.13

Jurisprudence had deemed the following acts as crimes involving moral

turpitude: abduction with consent, bigamy, concubinage, smuggling, rape,
attempted bribery, profiteering, robbery, murder, estafa, theft, illicit sexual
relations with a fellow worker, issuance of bouncing checks, intriguing
against honor, violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act, perjury, forgery, direct bribery, frustrated homicide, adultery,
arson, evasion of income tax, barratry, blackmail, bribery, duelling,
embezzlement, extortion, forgery, libel, making fraudulent proof of loss on
insurance contract, mutilation of public records, fabrication of evidence,
offenses against pension laws, perjury, seduction under the promise of
marriage, falsification of public document, and estafa through falsification of
public document.14

Nevertheless, not every criminal act involves moral turpitude.15 The

determination whether there is moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact
and frequently depends on all the circumstances.16 In turn, it is for the Court
to ultimately resolve whether an act constitutes moral turpitude.17 In the same
vein, not all civil cases pertain to acts involving moral turpitude. As defined,
acts tainted with moral turpitude are of such gravity that manifests an
individual's depravity or lack of moral fiber.

As such, the pendency of a civil case alone should not be a deterrent for
successful Bar examinees to take their Lawyer's Oath and to sign the Roll of
Attorneys especially since not all charges or cases involve acts evincing
moral turpitude. The facts and circumstances of each case should be taken
into account to establish that the applicant's actions tarnished his or her moral
fitness to be a member of the Bar. If it were otherwise, one's entitlement to be
a member of the legal profession would be seriously jeopardized by the
expedient filing of civil cases, which do not necessarily reflect one's moral
character.

Thus, the pendency of Civil Case Nos. 740 and 1436 against Lee is not
enough reason to prevent her from taking her Lawyer's Oath and signing in
the Roll of Attorneys. The existence of these civil cases alone does not
establish that she committed acts tainted with moral turpitude.

It is equally important to note that all civil cases filed against Lee had been
dismissed on account of the compromise she entered into with her creditors.
Thus, there is no longer any obstacle which may hinder her in officially
becoming a member of the Bar by taking her oath and signing in the Roll of
Attorneys.

Nevertheless, Lee must still satisfactorily exhibit that she would not renege
on her monetary obligations to Bolos. As above-mentioned, Civil Case No.
1436 was dismissed after Lee had agreed to enter into a compromise with
Bolos and set the terms and conditions for her to settle her monetary
obligation. There is no question that Lee owes Bolos a sum of money.
It must be remembered that the deliberate failure to pay just debts constitutes
gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with one year
suspension from the practice of law.18 After taking her Lawyer's Oath and
signing in the Roll of Attorneys, Lee would be a full-fledged member of the
legal profession and subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Court. This
is true even if there would be no complainants, as the Court may motu
proprio initiate disciplinary proceedings.19 Concomitantly, she is bound to act
in a manner consistent with the high standards imposed on lawyers —
otherwise, she could be subjected to administrative sanctions. The
requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to
admission to the practice of law, but a continuing requirement for
membership in the legal profession.20

In sum, the pendency of civil cases alone should not prevent successful Bar
examinees to take their Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys, unless
the same involves acts or omissions which had been previously determined
by the Court to be tainted with moral turpitude. This is of course without
prejudice to the filing of any administrative action against would-be lawyers
who fail to continue to possess the required moral fitness of members of the
legal profession.

WHEREFORE, the Court adopts the recommendation of the Office of the

Bar Confidant to ALLOW Ma. Lucille P. Lee to retake the Lawyer's Oath
and sign the Roll of Attorneys subject to the condition that she: (a) notify the
Court within one (1) month from making her first monthly payment to Joseph
Bolos; and (b) inform the Court upon full satisfaction of her monetary
obligation in accordance with the terms and conditions of the January 29,
2019 Judgment by Compromise.

SO ORDERED.

EMMA T. DANTES, complainant,


vs.

ATTY. CRISPIN G. DANTES, respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:
Despite variations in the specific standards and provisions, one requirement
remains constant in all the jurisdictions where the practice of law is
regulated: the candidate must demonstrate that he or she has "good moral
character," and once he becomes a lawyer he should always behave in
accordance with the standard. In this jurisdiction too, good moral character is
not only a condition precedent1 to the practice of law, but an unending
requirement for all the members of the bar. Hence, when a lawyer is found
guilty of grossly immoral conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred.2

In an Affidavit-Complaint3 dated June 6, 2001, filed with the Integrated Bar

of the Philippines (IBP), Emma T. Dantes, sought the disbarment of her
husband, Atty. Crispin G. Dantes on the ground of immorality, abandonment,
and violation of professional ethics and law. The case was docketed as CBD
Case No. 01-851.

Complainant alleged that respondent is a philanderer. Respondent purportedly

engaged in illicit relationships with two women, one after the other, and had
illegitimate children with them. From the time respondent’s illicit affairs
started, he failed to give regular support to complainant and their children,
thus forcing complainant to work abroad to provide for their children’s needs.
Complainant pointed out that these acts of respondent constitute a violation
of his lawyer’s oath and his moral and legal obligation to be a role model to
the community.

On July 4, 2001, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued

an Order4 requiring respondent to submit his answer to the Affidavit-
Complaint.

Respondent submitted his Answer5 on November 19, 2001. Though admitting

the fact of marriage with the complainant and the birth of their children,
respondent alleged that they have mutually agreed to separate eighteen (18)
years before after complainant had abandoned him in their Balintawak
residence and fled to San Fernando, Pampanga. Respondent claimed that
when complainant returned after eighteen years, she insisted that she be
accommodated in the place where he and their children were residing. Thus,
he was forced to live alone in a rented apartment.

Respondent further alleged that he sent their children to the best school he
could afford and provided for their needs. He even bought two lots in
Pampanga for his sons, Dandelo and Dante, and gave complainant adequate
financial support even after she had abandoned him in 1983.

Respondent asserted that complainant filed this case in order to force him to
remit seventy percent (70%) of his monthly salary to her.

Subsequently, the IBP conducted its investigation and hearings on the

complaint. Complainant presented her evidence, both oral and documentary,
6 to support the allegations in her Affidavit-Complaint.

From the evidence presented by the complainant, it was established that on

January 19, 1979, complainant and respondent were married7 and lived with
the latter’s mother in Balintawak. At that time, respondent was just a fourth
year law student. To make ends meet, complainant engaged in the buy and
sell business and relied on dole-outs from the respondent’s mother.

Three children were born to the couple, namely, Dandelo, Dante and Daisy,
who were born on February 20, 1980,8 October 14, 19819 and August 11,
1983,10 respectively. Complainant narrated that their relationship was marred
by frequent quarrels because of respondent’s extra-marital affairs.
11 Sometime in 1983, she brought their children to her mother in Pampanga to

enable her to work because respondent had failed to provide adequate

support. From 1986 to 2001, complainant worked abroad as a domestic
helper.

Denying that there was a mutual agreement between her and respondent to
live separately, complainant asseverated that she was just compelled to work
abroad to support their children. When she returned to the Philippines, she
learned that respondent was living with another woman. Respondent, then
bluntly told her, that he did not want to live with her anymore and that he
preferred his mistresses.

Complainant presented documentary evidence consisting of the birth

certificates of Ray Darwin, Darling, and Christian Dave,12 all surnamed
Dantes, and the affidavits of respondent and his paramour13 to prove the fact
that respondent sired three illegitimate children out of his illicit affairs with
two different women. Letters of complainant’s legitimate children likewise
support the allegation that respondent is a womanizer.14
In an Order dated April 17, 2002, respondent was deemed to have waived his
right to cross-examine complainant, after he failed to appear during the
scheduled hearings despite due notice. He, however, submitted his Comment/
Opposition to the Complainant’s Formal Offer of Evidence with Motion to
Exclude the Evidence from the Records of the Proceedings15 on August 1,
2002.

Subsequently, on May 29, 2003, respondent submitted a Motion to Adopt

Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanism. Respondent’s motion was denied
because it was filed after the complainant had already presented her evidence.
16 Respondent was given a final chance to present his evidence on July 11,

2003. Instead of presenting evidence, respondent filed a Motion for

Reconsideration with Motion to Dismiss, which was likewise denied for
being a prohibited pleading under the Rules of Procedure of the Commission
on Bar Discipline. Respondent submitted his Position Paper on August 4,
2003.

In respondent’s Position Paper,17 he reiterated the allegations in

his Answer except that this time, he argued that in view of the resolution of
the complaint for support with alimony pendente lite18 filed against him by
the complainant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,19 the
instant administrative case should be dismissed for lack of merit.

On July 7, 2004, the IBP submitted to us through the Office of the Bar
Confidant its Report20 and Resolution No. XVI-2004-230 involving CBD
Case No. 01-851.21 The IBP recommended that the respondent be suspended
indefinitely from the practice of law.

Except for the penalty, we find the above recommendation well-taken.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

"Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct."

"Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar."
"Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession."

The Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from engaging in

unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Immoral conduct has been
defined as that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show
indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the
community.22 To be the basis of disciplinary action, the lawyer’s conduct
must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt
as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a
high degree23 or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances
as to shock the common sense of decency.24

In Barrientos vs. Daarol,25 we ruled that as officers of the court, lawyers

must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be
of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest
moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar
and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous
relationships or keeping mistresses but must also so behave himself as to
avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those
moral standards. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession
and attain its basic ideals, those enrolled in its ranks should not only master
its tenets and principles but should also, in their lives, accord continuing
fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character is of much greater
import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal
learning.

It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has three
ostensible purposes, namely: (i) to protect the public; (ii) to protect the public
image of lawyers; and (iii) to protect prospective clients. A writer added a
fourth: to protect errant lawyers from themselves.26

Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon
admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal

career, in order to maintain their good standing in this exclusive and honored
fraternity.27 They may be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred for
any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows
him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.28

Undoubtedly, respondent’s acts of engaging in illicit relationships with two

different women during the subsistence of his marriage to the complainant
constitutes grossly immoral conduct warranting the imposition appropriate
sanctions. Complainant’s testimony, taken in conjunction with the
documentary evidence, sufficiently established respondent’s commission of
marital infidelity and immorality. Evidently, respondent had breached the
high and exacting moral standards set for members of the law profession. He
has made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding
respect and dignity.29

In Toledo vs. Toledo,30 we disbarred respondent for abandoning his lawful

wife and cohabiting with another woman who had borne him a child.
Likewise, in Obusan vs. Obusan,31 we ruled that abandoning one’s wife and
resuming carnal relations with a paramour fall within that conduct which is
willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows moral indifference to the
opinion of the good and respectable members of the community.

We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova,32 that moral delinquency

which affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such, includes
conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the
community as exemplified by behavior which makes a mockery of the
inviolable social institution of marriage.

The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear
case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the
lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar.33 Where a lesser
penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired,
disbarment should never be decreed.34 However, in the present case, the
seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield its power to disbar as it
appears to be the most appropriate penalty.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing Atty. Crispin G. Dantes is

hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the
Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondent’s
record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the
Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

RE: SC DECISION DATED MAY 20, 2008 IN G.R. NO. 161455 UNDER
RULE 139-B OF THE RULES OF COURT,

vs.

ATTY. RODOLFO D. PACTOLIN, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This case resolves the question of whether or not the conviction of a lawyer
for a crime involving moral turpitude constitutes sufficient ground for his
disbarment from the practice of law under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court.

The Facts and the Case

In May 1996, Elmer Abastillas, the playing coach of the Ozamis City
volleyball team, wrote Mayor Benjamin A. Fuentes of Ozamis City,
requesting financial assistance for his team. Mayor Fuentes approved the
request and sent Abastillas’ letter to the City Treasurer for processing. Mayor
Fuentes also designated Mario R. Ferraren, a city council member, as Officer-
in-Charge (OIC) of the city while Mayor Fuentes was away. Abastillas
eventually got the ₱10,000.00 assistance for his volleyball team.

Meanwhile, respondent lawyer, Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin, then a

Sangguniang Panlalawigan member of Misamis Occidental, got a photocopy
of Abastillas’ letter and, using it, filed on June 24, 1996 a complaint with the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman-Mindanao against Ferraren for alleged
illegal disbursement of ₱10,000.00 in public funds. Atty. Pactolin attached to
the complaint a copy of what he claimed was a falsified letter of Abastillas,
which showed that it was Ferraren, not Mayor Fuentes, who approved the
disbursement.
Aggrieved, Ferraren filed with the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case 25665 a
complaint against Atty. Pactolin for falsification of public document.1 On
November 12, 2003 the Sandiganbayan found Atty. Pactolin guilty of
falsification under Article 172 and sentenced him to the indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment of 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional as minimum
to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days of prision correccional as maximum, to
suffer all the accessory penalties of prision correccional, and to pay a fine of
₱5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

Atty. Pactolin appealed to this Court but on May 20, 2008 it affirmed his
conviction.2 Since the Court treated the matter as an administrative complaint
against him as well under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, it referred the
case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for appropriate action.

Because complainant Ferraren neither appeared nor submitted any pleading

during the administrative proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline, on October 9, 2010 the IBP Board of Governors passed
Resolution XIX-2010-632, adopting and approving the Investigating
Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation that the case against Atty.
Pactolin be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

The Issue Presented

The only issue presented in this case is whether or not Atty. Pactolin should
be disbarred after conviction by final judgment of the crime of falsification.

The Court’s Ruling

In his pleadings before the Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Pactolin

reiterated the defenses he raised before the Sandiganbayan and this Court in
the falsification case. He claims that the Court glossed over the facts, that its
decision and referral to the IBP was "factually infirmed"3 and contained
"factual exaggerations and patently erroneous observation,"4 and was "too
adventurous."5

To recapitulate, this Court upheld the finding of the Sandiganbayan that the
copy of Abastillas’ letter which Atty. Pactolin attached to his complaint was
spurious. Given the clear absence of a satisfactory explanation regarding his
possession and use of the falsified Abastillas’ letter, this Court held that the
Sandiganbayan did not err in concluding that it was Atty. Pactolin who
falsified the letter. This Court relied on the settled rule that in the absence of
satisfactory explanation, one found in possession of and who used a forged
document is the forger and therefore guilty of falsification.6

This Court’s decision in said falsification case had long become final and
executory. In In Re: Disbarment of Rodolfo Pajo,7 the Court held that in
disbarment cases, it is no longer called upon to review the judgment of
conviction which has become final. The review of the conviction no longer
rests upon this Court.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be removed
or suspended on the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross
misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyer’s oath; (7) willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) corruptly or
willfully appearing as a lawyer for a party to a case without authority so to
do.

This Court has ruled that the crime of falsification of public document is
contrary to justice, honesty, and good morals and, therefore, involves moral
turpitude.8 Moral turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. It involves an act of baseness,
vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellowmen,
or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right
and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals.9

Having said that, what penalty should be imposed then on Atty. Pactolin?

As a rule, this Court exercises the power to disbar with great caution.
1âwphi1 Being the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, it is imposed
only for the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct
affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the
court and a member of the bar.10 Yet this Court has also consistently
pronounced that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final
judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude.11
Here, Atty. Pactolin’s disbarment is warranted. The Sandiganbayan has
confirmed that although his culpability for falsification has been indubitably
established, he has not yet served his sentence. His conduct only exacerbates
his offense and shows that he falls short of the exacting standards expected of
him as a vanguard of the legal profession.12

This Court once again reminds all lawyers that they, of all classes and
professions, are most sacredly bound to uphold the law.13 The privilege to
practice law is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent
intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally. As such, lawyers
must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their
clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond
reproach.14

WHEREFORE, Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin is hereby DISBARRED and his

name REMOVED from the Rolls of Attorney. Let a copy of this decision be
attached to his personal records and furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, Complainant,


vs.

EDWIN L. RANA, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite
moral integrity for membership in the legal profession. Possession of moral
integrity is of greater importance than possession of legal learning. The
practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar
candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the bar
examinations.
The Facts

Respondent Edwin L. Rana ("respondent") was among those who passed the
2000 Bar Examinations.

On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of

successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant
Donna Marie Aguirre ("complainant") filed against respondent a Petition for
Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with
unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave
misrepresentation.

The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during
the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine International
Convention Center. However, the Court ruled that respondent could not sign
the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus,
respondent took the lawyer’s oath on the scheduled date but has not signed
the Roll of Attorneys up to now.

Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave

misconduct. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer,
appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the
Municipal Board of Election Canvassers ("MBEC") of Mandaon, Masbate.
Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading
dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the
Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this
pleading, respondent represented himself as "counsel for and in behalf of
Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan," and signed the pleading as
counsel for George Bunan ("Bunan").

On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a

municipal government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to
act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant

accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George
Bunan ("Bunan") without the latter engaging respondent’s services.
Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent
the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.

On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take

the lawyer’s oath but disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys until
he is cleared of the charges against him. In the same resolution, the Court
required respondent to comment on the complaint against him.

In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his "specific

assistance" to represent him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that "he
decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who
knows the law." Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that
objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He explains,
however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself
as an "attorney" in the pleading.

On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent

claims that he submitted his resignation on 11 May 2001 which was allegedly
accepted on the same date. He submitted a copy of the Certification of
Receipt of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor
Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims that the complaint is politically
motivated considering that complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre,
the losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that
the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed to sign
the Roll of Attorneys.

On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondent’s Comment and

refuted the claim of respondent that his appearance before the MBEC was
only to extend specific assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that on 19
May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao ("Estipona-Hao") filed a petition for
proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor. Respondent signed as
counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent appeared as
counsel before the MBEC, complainant questioned his appearance on two
grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was an
employee of the government.

Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondent’s Comment) reiterating

his claim that the instant administrative case is "motivated mainly by political
vendetta."
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar
Confidant ("OBC") for evaluation, report and recommendation.

OBC’s Report and Recommendation

The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as
counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC
proceedings show that respondent actively participated in the proceedings.
The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings
even before he took the lawyer’s oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC believes
that respondent’s misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a
member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that respondent’s unauthorized
practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to the practice of law. The
OBC therefore recommends that respondent be denied admission to the
Philippine Bar.

On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which
respondent allegedly violated when he appeared as counsel for Bunan while
he was a government employee. Respondent resigned as secretary and his
resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by Bunan to
represent him before the MBEC.

The Court’s Ruling

We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve
admission to the Philippine Bar.

Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records
show that respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001,
before respondent took the lawyer’s oath. In the pleading entitled Formal
Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for
the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed as "counsel
for George Bunan." In the first paragraph of the same pleading respondent
stated that he was the "(U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice
Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN." Bunan himself wrote the
MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had "authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his
counsel to represent him" before the MBEC and similar bodies.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also "retained"
respondent as her counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao
informed the MBEC that "Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by
REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of
the said party." Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he
was entering his "appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily
Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC." On 19 May 2001,
respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the
MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning
candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.

All these happened even before respondent took the lawyer’s oath. Clearly,
respondent engaged in the practice of law without being a member of the
Philippine Bar.

In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,1 the Court elucidated that:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in

court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to
actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveyancing. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them
in matters connected with the law, incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body,
the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained
legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263).
(Italics supplied) x x x

In Cayetano v. Monsod,2 the Court held that "practice of law" means any
activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of
law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal
profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which
requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in
the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without
license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized
practice of law. Respondent called himself "counsel" knowing fully well that
he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as "counsel"
knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown
moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.3

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a

privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special
qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege
presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment,
and even public trust4 since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate
does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar
examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even
from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking
admission had practiced law without a license.5

The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr.

v. Abad,6 a candidate passed the bar examinations but had not taken his oath
and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for
practicing law even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized
practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court.7

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the
lawyer’s oath.1âwphi1 However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that
finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the
bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to
become an attorney-at-law.8 Respondent should know that two essential
requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his
lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of
Attorneys.9

On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not
allow respondent to act as counsel for a private client in any court or
administrative body since respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan.
Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan
prior to the acts complained of as constituting unauthorized practice of law.
In his letter dated 11 May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor
and presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated that he
was resigning "effective upon your acceptance."10 Vice-Mayor Relox
accepted respondent’s resignation effective 11 May 2001.11 Thus, the
evidence does not support the charge that respondent acted as counsel for a
client while serving as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows

that Bunan indeed authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel
before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no misrepresentation,
respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law.

WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the

Philippine Bar.

SO ORDERED.

IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS

MICHAEL A. MEDADO, Petitioner.


RESOLUTION

SERENO, C.J.:

We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys filed by

petitioner Michael A. Medado (Medado).

Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of
Bachelor of Laws in 19791 and passed the same year’s bar examinations with
a general weighted average of 82.7.2cralaw virtualaw library

On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the Philippine International

Convention Center (PICC) together with the successful bar examinees.3 He
was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980,4 but he failed
to do so on his scheduled date, allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice
to Sign the Roll of Attorneys5 given by the Bar Office when he went home to
his province for a vacation.6cralaw virtualaw library

Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado
found the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized
that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he had signed at the entrance
of the PICC was probably just an attendance record.7cralaw virtualaw library

By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that
he was mainly doing corporate and taxation work, and that he was not
actively involved in litigation practice. Thus, he operated “under the mistaken
belief [that] since he ha[d] already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll of
Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a lawyer”;8 and
“the matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and
compulsion, and was subsequently forgotten.”9cralaw virtualaw library

In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education

(MCLE) seminars, he was required to provide his roll number in order for his
MCLE compliances to be credited.10 Not having signed in the Roll of
Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.

About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant
Petition, praying that he be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.11cralaw
virtualaw library

The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory conference

on the matter on 21 September 201212 and submitted a Report and
Recommendation to this Court on 4 February 2013.13 The OBC
recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s gross
negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit.14 It explained that,
based on his answers during the clarificatory conference, petitioner could
offer no valid justification for his negligence in signing in the Roll of
Attorneys.15cralaw virtualaw library

After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medado’s prayer in the

instant petition, subject to the payment of a fine and the imposition of a
penalty equivalent to suspension from the practice of law.
At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys would be akin to imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of
disbarment, a penalty that we have reserved for the most serious ethical
transgressions of members of the Bar.

In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted.

For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when
he finally filed the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note
that it was not a third party who called this Court’s attention to petitioner’s
omission; rather, it was Medado himself who acknowledged his own lapse,
albeit after the passage of more than 30 years. When asked by the Bar
Confidant why it took him this long to file the instant petition, Medado very
candidly replied:chanrobles virtua1aw 1ibrary
Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what can you say?
Takot ka kung anong mangyayari sa ‘yo, you don’t know what’s gonna
happen. At the same time, it’s a combination of apprehension and anxiety of
what’s gonna happen. And, finally it’s the right thing to do. I have to come
here … sign the roll and take the oath as necessary.16
For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification
from the practice of law,17 which is more than what we can say of other
individuals who were successfully admitted as members of the Philippine
Bar. For this Court, this fact demonstrates that petitioner strove to adhere to
the strict requirements of the ethics of the profession, and that he has prima
facie shown that he possesses the character required to be a member of the
Philippine Bar.

Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner,
having held various positions at the Laurel Law Office,18 Petron, Petrophil
Corporation, the Philippine National Oil Company, and the Energy
Development Corporation.19cralaw virtualaw library

All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a full-fledged member of

the Philippine Bar. While the practice of law is not a right but a privilege,
20 this Court will not unwarrantedly withhold this privilege from individuals

who have shown mental fitness and moral fiber to withstand the rigors of the
profession.
That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all
liability for his years of inaction.

Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period
spanning more than 30 years, without having signed in the Roll of Attorneys.
21 He justifies this behavior by characterizing his acts as “neither willful nor

intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an honest error of

judgment.”22cralaw virtualaw library

We disagree.

While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the
legal consequences of his acts23 as it negates malice or evil motive,24 a
mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone
is presumed to know the law and its consequences.25 Ignorantia facti excusat;
ignorantia legis neminem excusat.

Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first
operated under an honest mistake of fact when he thought that what he had
signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already the Roll of
Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what he had signed was
merely an attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake of
fact as a valid justification. At that point, Medado should have known that he
was not a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar because of his failure to
sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the act of signing therein that would
have made him so.26 When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue
practicing law without taking the necessary steps to complete all the
requirements for admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law.

Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by one’s assuming
to be an attorney or officer of the court, and acting as such without authority,
may constitute indirect contempt of court,27 which is punishable by fine or
imprisonment or both.28 Such a finding, however, is in the nature of criminal
contempt29 and must be reached after the filing of charges and the conduct of
hearings.30 In this case, while it appears quite clearly that petitioner
committed indirect contempt of court by knowingly engaging in unauthorized
practice of law, we refrain from making any finding of liability for indirect
contempt, as no formal charge pertaining thereto has been filed against him.

Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses

Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides:chanrobles virtua1aw 1ibrary
CANON 9 – A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the
unauthorized practice of law.
While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting
in the unauthorized practice of law, the unauthorized practice of law by the
lawyer himself is subsumed under this provision, because at the heart of
Canon 9 is the lawyer’s duty to prevent the unauthorized practice of
law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates. As
aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to comport themselves in
accordance with the ethical standards of the legal profession.

Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9 have

warranted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law.31 As Medado is
not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot suspend him from the practice of
law. However, we see it fit to impose upon him a penalty akin to suspension
by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of
this Resolution. For his transgression of the prohibition against the
unauthorized practice of law, we likewise see it fit to fine him in the amount
of P32,000. During the one year period, petitioner is warned that he is not
allowed to engage in the practice of law, and is sternly warned that doing any
act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of
Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is

hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Michael A. Medado is ALLOWED to sign in
the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after receipt of this Resolution.
Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of P32,000 for his
unauthorized practice of law. During the one year period, petitioner is NOT
ALLOWED to practice law, and is STERNLY WARNED that doing any act
that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys
will be dealt with severely by this Court.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

SO ORDERED.

Why bar exams ruin legal education

By: Oscar Franklin Tan - @inquirerdotnet

Philippine Daily Inquirer / 03:21 AM October 03, 2014
This week, another batch of law students will have wasted an extra year of
their lives to study for the month-long bar exam. This is in addition to four
years of law school where every moment was defined by the bar. It is high
time the Philippines got rid of its unique obsession with what was supposed
to be a simple licensure exam that mutated into a rite of passage and national
spectacle.

We Filipinos do not realize that we are the only society that banners bar
topnotchers on the front pages of newspapers. My American classmates in
Harvard Law School openly said that every point they scored above passing
in the New York bar represented eight wasted hours of their lives. Our bar
reviewer stressed that the exam demands a lower level of intelligence.
I saw confused looks on my classmates’ faces in reaction to a Filipino citing
“bar topnotcher” as a credential. Later, I would see the same confused look
on an international law firm partner’s face, seconds before throwing away a
Filipino resumé. Note that Barack Obama is cited as the first African-
American president of the Harvard Law Review—the United States’ single
most prestigious legal credential—not as a bar topnotcher and not even as a
Harvard Law magna cum laude graduate.

I can attest that the Philippine bar exam is the most difficult in the world—for
all the wrong reasons. The New York exam has a well-defined scope and
structured questions. When I took the Philippine exam, I was asked a
question on which I wrote a thesis of over 100 pages.

The long list of required Philippine bar subjects has not changed in decades.
The exam demands basic knowledge of intercountry adoption, war crimes,
value-added taxation, and liability in car accidents, a demand that would
never arise in actual practice.

Our law school curricula naturally follow the too-long list of prescribed bar
subjects. This has destroyed legal education because there is simply no room
for anything else, especially with the entire fourth year of law school
intended for bar review subjects that are a compressed repeat of the first
three. In contrast, law is a three-year program in the United States where one
takes the most basic subjects in freshman year. The succeeding years are
purely for electives—they presume one does not need exposure to every
single field—and some have proposed two-year programs given this.

Philippine law schools must devote three units to the Negotiable Instruments
Law. This is a cruel joke because the law was intended for a time when
commercial papers were delivered by galleon or stagecoach and that class
typically ends with a summary of the brief rules for bank checks, the
instrument we far more commonly use today. In contrast to this monumental
waste of time, modern, complex laws such as the Intellectual Property and
the Securities Regulation Codes are not required reading.

The line of University of the Philippines professors once was that students
were there to study law in the grand manner, not review for the bar. Even UP
bowed to pressure from alumni fixated on the bar. Equally fixated college
seniors were attracted to schools with higher bar passing rates and topnotcher
counts. UP did well in both in recent years, but at the staggering cost of
eliminating nearly all electives in favor of mandatory bar review classes and
stricter grade requirements to remove perceived weaker students before they
could affect the all-important bar statistics.

All this has reduced law school to soulless memory games. Our unconscious
image of the abogado de campanilla is still an idiot savant who can recite
pages of rules verbatim, down to the commas. I remember a progressive
Dean Raul Pangalangan holding up a CD of compiled court decisions, then
worth about P30,000, to freshmen and reiterating the trivial market value of
the memory games.

The obsession with memorization cripples education. Teaching constitutional

law, the most philosophical of all law subjects, it is frustrating to see students
simply skip to the bottom of decisions to see who won, then memorize a
summary of the resulting doctrine, missing the essence of the very human
conflicts involved.

I spent years flying around as a New York securities lawyer and lesson No. 1
was that securities law is fundamentally different from other fields because it
involves public markets; thus, you cannot just copy financial contracts from
other fields. Given our rote education, Filipino lawyers tend to approach it as
a list of registration procedures and exemptions from registration, with less
emphasis in contracts on the central point that you can be jailed for allegedly
offering securities to retirees with misleading marketing material.

At my Harvard graduation, Dean Elena Kagan (later solicitor general and

now justice of the US Supreme Court) did not exhort a 100-percent passing
rate, pick a “bar bet,” or even read out academic honors. Instead, she read out
the number of hours my American classmates spent offering free legal aid
and recognized the student who organized all the gatherings and served as the
glue that kept the large class together. If this is good enough for Harvard Law
School and one of the most highly regarded American educators and jurists, it
should be good enough for a Philippine law school. Frustrated young
professors eagerly await the day when we do not need a straitjacket of a
standardized exam to double-check our students’ quality, and law can be
taught in its full intellectual beauty and modernity.

Upholding the dignity and integrity of the profession

CANON 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
The bar has to maintain a high standard of legal proficiency, honesty, and fair
dealing to be an effective instrument in the proper administration of justice.
In order to do so, it is necessary that every lawyer should strive to uphold the
honor and dignity of the legal profession and to improve not only the law, but
the administration of justice as well [Agpalo (2004)].
A lawyer should actively support the activities of the IBP and not limit
himself to paying dues [Agpalo (2004)].
Rule 7.01. A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false
statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with his
application for admission to the bar.
A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. While a lawyer has the solemn duty to
defend his client’s rights and is expected to display the utmost zeal in
defense of his client’s cause, his conduct must never be at the expense of
truth [Young v. Batuegas, A.C. No. 5379 (2003)].
A student aspiring to be a lawyer must study and observe the duties and
responsibilities of a lawyer. He cannot claim that the CPR does not apply to
him [Agpalo (2004)].
Penalties for knowing suppression or false representation of a material
fact in the application for admission to the bar:


1. Disqualification of the applicant from taking
2.the bar, if the concealment is discovered before he takes the bar
examinations;
3. Prohibition from taking the lawyer’s oath, if the concealment is discovered
after the candidate has taken the bar examinations; Revocation of license to
practice, if the concealment was discovered after he has taken his lawyer’s
oath [In re: Petition to Take the Lawyer’s Oath, Caesar Z. Distrito, petitioner,
B.M. No. 1209 (2003)].
If what the applicant concealed is a crime which does not involve moral
turpitude, it is the fact of concealment and not the commission of the crime
itself that makes him morally unfit to become a lawyer. It should be noted
that the application was made under oath, which he lightly took when he
made the concealment [In re: Petition to Take the Lawyer’s Oath, Caesar Z.
Distrito, petitioner, supra].

SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant,


vs.

ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court,
Marawi City, respondent.

NARVASA, C.J.:

Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or
coordinator) of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real
estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive
clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City, They were
classmates, and used to be friends.

It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the
purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to
the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in
connection therewith, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya

addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the
termination of his contract with the company. He wrote:
. . I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my
intent to terminate the Contract/Agreement entered into between me and your
company, as represented by your Sales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI,
of your company's branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds
that my consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made
said contract void ab initio. Said sales agent acting in bad faith perpetrated
such illegal and unauthorized acts which made said contract an Onerous
Contract prejudicial to my rights and interests. He then proceeded to expound
in considerable detail and quite acerbic language on the "grounds which
could evidence the bad faith. deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and
abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent . . .;" and closed with the
plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of our contract,
even as I inform you that I categorically state on record that I am terminating
the contract . . . I hope I do not have to resort to any legal action before said
onerous and manipulated contract against my interest be annulled. I was
actually fooled by your sales agent, hence the need to annul the controversial
contract."

Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at
San Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope containing it, and
which actually went through the post, bore no stamps. Instead at the right
hand corner above the description of the addressee, the words, "Free Postage
- PD 26," had been typed.

On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T.
Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit & Collection Group of the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City,
repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and
asking for cancellation of his housing loan in connection therewith, which
was payable from salary deductions at the rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among
other things, he said:

. . . (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel,

rescind and voided, the "manipulated contract" entered into between me and
the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as represented by its sales agent/
coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who maliciously and fraudulently
manipulated said contract and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing
loan without my authority and against my will. Thus, the contract itself is
deemed to be void ab initio in view of the attending circumstances, that my
consent was vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and
abuse of confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds between me
and the swindling sales agent who concealed the real facts from me.

And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he
took to be the anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.

Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated
February 21, 1996, April 15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the
same reasons already cited, he insisted on the cancellation of his housing loan
and discontinuance of deductions from his salary on account thereof. a He
also wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoñez, Head of the
Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance Division,
both of this Court, to stop deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in
question, again asserting the anomalous manner by which he was allegedly
duped into entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales agent." b

The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court
requesting it to stop deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May
1996." and began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. " for the buy-back of . . .
(Alauya's) mortgage. and . . the refund of . . (his) payments." c

On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995,

Sophia Alawi filed with this Court a verified complaint dated January 25,
1996 — to which she appended a copy of the letter, and of the above
mentioned envelope bearing the typewritten words, "Free Postage - PD
26."1 In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:

1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds

through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith;"

2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established
reputation;"

3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage . . .;" and

4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the
Philippine Bar may properly use.

She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous swindler, forger,

manipulator, etc." without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations
with the essence of truth," denouncing his imputations as irresponsible, "all
concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance and evident
bad faith," and asserting that all her dealings with Alauya had been regular
and completely transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be
dismissed from the senice, or be appropriately desciplined (sic) . . ."

The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint,

Conformably with established usage that notices of resolutions emanate from
the corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution in this
case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of
Court.2

Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment"3 in which he questioned the

authority of Atty. Marasigan to require an explanation of him, this power
pertaining, according to him, not to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court
investigating an Executive Clerk of Court." but only to the District Judge, the
Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the
Resolution was the result of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty.
Marasigan's office. He also averred that the complaint had no factual basis;
Alawi was envious of him for being not only "the Executive Clerk of Court
and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar." but also "a scion of a
Royal Family . . ."4

In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less

aggressive, even obsequious tones,5 Alauya requested the former to give him
a copy of the complaint in order that he might comment thereon.6 He stated
that his acts as clerk of court were done in good faith and within the confines
of the law; and that Sophia Alawi, as sales agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by
falsifying his signature, fraudulently bound him to a housing loan contract
entailing monthly deductions of P4,333.10 from his salary.

And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya
contended that it was he who had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish,
sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering,"
considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from
his salary.7 He declared that there was no basis for the complaint; in
communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in defense of his
rights. He denied any abuse of the franking privilege, saying that he gave
P20.00 plus transportation fare to a subordinate whom he entrusted with the
mailing of certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage - PD 26," were
typewritten on the envelope by some other person, an averment corroborated
by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to
before respondent himself, and attached to the comment as Annex J);8 and as
far as he knew, his subordinate mailed the letters with the use of the money
he had given for postage, and if those letters were indeed mixed with the
official mail of the court, this had occurred inadvertently and because of an
honest mistake.9

Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is
"lexically synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law." a title to which Shari'a
lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney"
because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal" or the
Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor.
Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.

He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected
of any man unduly prejudiced and injured." 10 He claims he was manipulated
into reposing his trust in Alawi, a classmate and friend. 11 He was induced to
sign a blank contract on Alawi's assurance that she would show the
completed document to him later for correction, but she had since avoided
him; despite "numerous letters and follow-ups" he still does not know where
the property — subject of his supposed agreement with Alawi's principal,
Villarosa & Co. — is situated; 12 He says Alawi somehow got his GSIS
policy from his wife, and although she promised to return it the next day, she
did not do so until after several months. He also claims that in connection
with his contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature on such
pertinent documents as those regarding the down payment, clearance, lay-out,
receipt of the key of the house, salary deduction, none of which he ever
saw. 13

Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya
prays for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of
"fallacious, malicious and baseless allegations." and complainant Alawi
having come to the Court with unclean hands, her complicity in the
fraudulent housing loan being apparent and demonstrable.

It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of
Court Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2)
earlier letters both dated December 15, 1996 — all of which he signed as
"Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" — in his Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use
the title but refers to himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."

The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for
evaluation, report and recommendation. 14

The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made
"malicious and libelous charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds
through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith, resulting in "undue injury
to (her) and blemishing her honor and established reputation." In those
letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:

1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross

misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"

2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated . . . illegal and unauthorized

acts . . . prejudicial to . . (his) rights and interests;"

3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had

fooled him by "deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence;" and

4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with

Villarosa & Co., and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan
without . . (his) authority and against . . (his) will," and "concealed the real
facts . . ."

Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was

merely acting in defense of his rights, and doing only what "is expected of
any man unduly prejudiced and injured," who had suffered "mental anguish,
sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering, considering
that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary. 15
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees (RA 6713) inter alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a
high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public
service. 16 Section 4 of the Code commands that "(p)ublic officials and
employees . . at all times respect the rights of others, and . . refrain from
doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public
order, public safety and public interest." 17 More than once has this Court
emphasized that "the conduct and behavior of every official and employee of
an agency involved in the administration of justice, from the presiding judge
to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be characterized by, among
others, strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the
public for the judiciary." 18

Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good
customs or public policy, or respect for the rights of others, to couch
denunciations of acts believed — however sincerely — to be deceitful,
fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent
language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of action against
Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with propriety,
without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a manner
consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy, public
order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good

faith." 19 Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to
vituperative language, or downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a
Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct more
stringent than for most other government workers. As a man of the law, he
may not use language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or
otherwise improper. 20 As a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord
respect for the person and the rights of others at all times, and that his every
act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity.
His radical deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated,
but cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction that he had been
grievously wronged.

As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had
occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged
members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a
courts. 21 While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who
has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered
"counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional
capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to
those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and
successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good
standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this
jurisdiction.

Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-
law, " because in his region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or
it is confusingly similar to that given to local legislators. The ratiocination,
valid or not, is of no moment. His disinclination to use the title of
"counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of attorney.

Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking

privilege, 22 the record contains no evidence adequately establishing the
accusation.

WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for

the use of excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e.,
language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney;
and he is warned that any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the
future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Rule 7.02. A lawyer shall not support the application for admission to the
bar of any person known by him to be unqualified in respect to
character, education, or other relevant attribute.
A lawyer should volunteer information or cooperate in any investigation
concerning alleged anomalies in the bar examination so that those candidates
who failed therein can be ferreted out and those lawyers responsible therefor
can be disbarred [In re: Parazo, G.R. No. 82027 (1948)].
A lawyer should not readily execute an affidavit of good moral character in
favor of an applicant who has not lived up to the standard set by law [Agpalo
(2004)].

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR

EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR
EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER
OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARI’A BAR, ATTY. FROILAN R.
MELENDREZ, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs, one of
which is ripe while the other has been rendered moot by a supervening event.

The antecedents follow.

On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the
Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition1 to disqualify Haron S. Meling
(Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him the
appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar.

In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition
to take the 2002 Bar Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal
cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cotabato City,
namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and 15686, both for Grave Oral
Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries.

The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May

21, 2001, when Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against
Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners and other people.
Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez’ wife causing
the injuries to the latter.

Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title
"Attorney" in his communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato
City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar. Attached to
the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows that Meling used the
appellation and appears on its face to have been received by the Sangguniang
Panglungsod of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.

Pursuant to this Court’s R E S O L U T I O N2 dated December 3, 2002,

Meling filed his Answer with the OBC.

In his Answer,3 Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases
filed against him by Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their
former professor, advised him to settle his misunderstanding with Melendrez.
Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because the said Judge
has moral ascendancy over them, he being their former professor in the
College of Law, Meling considered the three cases that actually arose from a
single incident and involving the same parties as "closed and terminated."
Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds that the acts complained of do
not involve moral turpitude.

As regards the use of the title "Attorney," Meling admits that some of his
communications really contained the word "Attorney" as they were,
according to him, typed by the office clerk.

In its Report and Recommendation4 dated December 8, 2003, the OBC

disposed of the charge of non-disclosure against Meling in this wise:

The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him
in his petition to take the Bar Examinations are ludicrous. He should have
known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a
retired judge nor a law professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are
still pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases were already
dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the Court to ascertain
his good moral character. Petitions to take the Bar Examinations are made
under oath, and should not be taken lightly by an applicant.

The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case. What
matters is his act of concealing them which constitutes dishonesty.

In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:

It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is, as
distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion generally entertained
of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is
known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to
objective reality. The standard of personal and professional integrity is not
satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty
of criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty.

The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes
him also answerable under Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which states that "a lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly
making a false statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with
his application for admission to the bar."5

As regards Meling’s use of the title "Attorney", the OBC had this to say:

Anent the issue of the use of the appellation "Attorney" in his letters, the
explanation of Meling is not acceptable. Aware that he is not a member of the
Bar, there was no valid reason why he signed as "attorney" whoever may
have typed the letters.

Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of law,

the fact is, he is signing his communications as "Atty. Haron S. Meling"
knowing fully well that he is not entitled thereto. As held by the Court in Bar
Matter 1209, the unauthorized use of the appellation "attorney" may render a
person liable for indirect contempt of court.6

Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the
Lawyer’s Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys in the event that he passes the
Bar Examinations. Further, it recommended that Meling’s membership in the
Shari’a Bar be suspended until further orders from the Court.7

We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the OBC. Meling,
however, did not pass the 2003 Bar Examinations. This renders
the Petition, insofar as it seeks to prevent Meling from taking the Lawyer’s
Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot and academic.
On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the Court to impose the
appropriate sanctions upon him as a member of the Shari’a Bar is ripe for
resolution and has to be acted upon.

Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari’a Court, is not a matter
of right but merely a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only
learned in the law but who are also known to possess good moral character.
8 The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent

to admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential

for remaining in the practice of law.9

The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the 2002
Bar Examinations requires the applicant to aver that he or she "has not been
charged with any act or omission punishable by law, rule or regulation before
a fiscal, judge, officer or administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or
convicted by any court or tribunal of, any offense or crime involving moral
turpitude; nor is there any pending case or charge against him/her." Despite
the declaration required by the form, Meling did not reveal that he has three
pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes concealment, done
under oath at that.

The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether

there is satisfactory evidence of good moral character of the applicant.10 The
nature of whatever cases are pending against the applicant would aid the
Court in determining whether he is endowed with the moral fitness demanded
of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of such cases, the applicant then
flunks the test of fitness even if the cases are ultimately proven to be
unwarranted or insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral character of
the applicant.

Meling’s concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending criminal
cases against him speaks of his lack of the requisite good moral character and
results in the forfeiture of the privilege bestowed upon him as a member of
the Shari’a Bar.

Moreover, his use of the appellation "Attorney", knowing fully well that he is
not entitled to its use, cannot go unchecked. In Alawi v. Alauya,11 the Court
had the occasion to discuss the impropriety of the use of the title "Attorney"
by members of the Shari’a Bar who are not likewise members of the
Philippine Bar. The respondent therein, an executive clerk of court of the 4th
Judicial Shari’a District in Marawi City, used the title "Attorney" in several
correspondence in connection with the rescission of a contract entered into by
him in his private capacity. The Court declared that:

…persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged members of the
Philippine Bar, hence, may only practice law before Shari’a courts. While
one who has been admitted to the Shari’a Bar, and one who has been
admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counselors," in the
sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the
latter is an "attorney." The title "attorney" is reserved to those who, having
obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the
Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only
who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.12

The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court, such as Meling
in this case. The solemn task of administering justice demands that those who
are privileged to be part of service therein, from the highest official to the
lowliest employee, must not only be competent and dedicated, but likewise
live and practice the virtues of honesty and integrity. Anything short of this
standard would diminish the public's faith in the Judiciary and constitutes
infidelity to the constitutional tenet that a public office is a public trust.

In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact of his marriage in
his application to take the Bar examinations and made conflicting
submissions before the Court. As a result, we found the respondent grossly
unfit and unworthy to continue in the practice of law and suspended him
therefrom until further orders from the Court.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted insofar as it seeks the imposition of

appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling as a member of the Philippine
Shari’a Bar. Accordingly, the membership of Haron S. Meling in the
Philippine Shari’a Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the
Court, the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks
to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the
Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same is
DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.
Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the Shari’a Courts in the
country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

ARTICLE VIII
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance
to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful

Candidates of 1946 to 1953, Albino Cunanan, et al.

A list of unsuccessful applicants to the Bar Examinations from 1946 to 1953

invoked the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953. The Law fixes the general average
passing marks for the Bar Examinations conducted in 1946 to 1955 which is
one of the requirements for admission to the Philippine Bar. The provisions
include the gradual adjustment of general average passing marks from 1946
to 1951 at 70 percent to as high as 74 percent in 1955, provided that the
applicants shall not incur a grade lower than 50 percent in all subject areas. It
also mandates that applicants who obtained grades of 75 percent in any
subject area shall be deemed to have passed the given subject and be
exempted from retaking it in the succeeding examinations. The law can
benefit 1,904 unsuccessful applicants who may have experienced difficulties
in accessing reading materials and problems in preparing for the Bar
Examinations due to the post-war ordeals in the country.
On the other hand, the Rules of Court provides that for applicants to pass the
Bar Examinations, they shall have a general average of at least 75 percent
with no grade lower than 50 percent in any subject area. In consideration of
the difficulties experienced in the country after the Second World War, the
Supreme Court adjusted the general average passing marks from 70 percent
to 74 percent at various instances in 1946 up to 1949. The general average
passing mark of 75 percent was only reinstituted by the Supreme Court in
1950. Some unsuccessful applicants sought to revise their grades which the
Supreme Court eventually denied. On the other hand, others sought to
enforce the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953.

A question of constitutionality was then resolved by the Supreme Court

whether or not the legislature has the authority to prescribe the standards in
the admission to the Philippine Bar and consequently the practice of the legal
profession.

The Supreme Court ruled for the unconstitutionality of the Bar Flunkers Act
of 1953. It argued that the authority to admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate
attorneys at law is an exclusive power of the judiciary vested in the Supreme
Court. The said act of Congress is a violation of the doctrine of separation of
powers as the judiciary’s supervision and control over the legal profession
has been explicitly provided by the Philippine Constitution. In addition, the
Supreme Court emphasized that the admission to the legal profession is not a
right but a privilege reserved only to a few. The high standards and
qualifications for admission to the Philippine Bar ensures that the legal
profession is not infiltrated by incompetents who may degrade the legal
system in the country. The duties of attorneys at law are highly demanding. It
comprises the duty to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
and uphold the Constitution and the rule of law. It affects not only the
interests of the attorney’s clients but encompasses the right to life, liberty, and
property of all persons.

The Supreme Court may adjust the passing mark in the Bar Examinations on
justifiable instances. However, the admission of more incompetents to the
legal profession serves like an acid that will eventually wear away the
foundation of the institution that it attaches to. It could degrade the legal
system and taint the integrity of attorneys at law. When it happens, there is
little that the Supreme Court can do as it is easier to prevent ineligibles from
entry to the Philippine Bar than to remove them from the body. It is a
profession coupled with utmost social responsibility to defend the rights of
every man and a moral obligation to uphold justice beyond personal interests.

PETITION OF ARTURO EFREN GARCIA for admission to the

Philippine Bar without taking the examination. ARTURO EFREN
GARCIA, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

BARRERA, J.:

Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations. In his
verified petition, he avers, among others, that he is a Filipino citizen born in
Bacolor City, Province of Negros Occidental, of Filipino parentage; that he
had taken and finished in Spain, the course of "Bachillerato Superior"; that he
was approved, selected and qualified by the "Instituto de Cervantes" for
admission to the Central University of Madrid where he studied and finished
the law course graduating there as "Licenciado En Derecho"; that thereafter
he was allowed to practice the law profession in Spain; and that under the
provision of the Treaty of Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions
between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish state, he is entitled
to practice the law profession in the Philippines without submitting to the
required bar examinations.

After due consideration, the Court resolved to deny the petition on the
following grounds:

(1) the provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of
Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State
can not be invoked by applicant. Under Article 11 thereof;

The Nationals of each of the two countries who shall have obtained
recognition of the validity of their academic degrees by virtue of the
stipulations of this Treaty, can practice their professions within the territory
of the Other, . . .. (Emphasis supplied).

from which it could clearly be discerned that said Treaty was intended to
govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice their profession in Spain, and the
citizens of Spain desiring to practice their professions in the Philippines.
Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice the legal profession in the
Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his own country and is not
entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in
the Philippines.

(2) Article I of the Treaty, in its pertinent part, provides .

The nationals of both countries who shall have obtained degree or diplomas
to practice the liberal professions in either of the Contracting States, issued
by competent national authorities, shall be deemed competent to exercise said
professions in the territory of the Other, subject to the laws and regulations of
the latter. . . ..

It is clear, therefore, that the privileges provided in the Treaty invoked by the
applicant are made expressly subject to the laws and regulations of the
contracting State in whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal
profession; and Section 1 of Rule 127, in connection with Sections 2,9, and
16 thereof, which have the force of law, require that before anyone can
practice the legal profession in the Philippine he must first successfully pass
the required bar examinations; and
(3) The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the Republic of the
Philippines and the Spanish State could not have been intended to modify the
laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines, for the reason that the Executive Department may not encroach
upon the constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules
for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, the lower to repeal,
alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the Congress of the
Philippines. (See Sec. 13, Art VIII, Phil. Constitution).