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The Mission Command Capability Gap of Light Infantry

As technology advances to increase the lethality of weapon systems continues to outpace

protective capabilities, the future battlefield will be chaotic and deadly. The Army’s vision of

future operations includes advanced and autonomous sensors, wide area imagery, unified

common operating picture (COP), and a fully integrated every sensor, shooter and command and

control (C2) node network (U.S. Training and Doctrine Command [TRADOC], 2018).

Combined with mission command systems, these capabilities will provide Soldiers near real-time

access to thousands of data points about the operational environment, live reports, and mission

orders if a unit possesses the tools to access the information. For example, infantry companies in

Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) have one mission command system for over a hundred

Soldiers. This ratio puts maneuver Soldiers at a distinct tactical disadvantage by bottlenecking

information flow and access at the tactical level. The purpose of this paper is to examine the lack

of mission command systems capability and propose a solution for dismounted infantry.

Context

The current infantry company relies on radio voice communications to send and receive

information and direction. This method allows immediate transmission of tactical guidance and

reports, but the information is often unclear or time-consuming when conveying a COP or

mission order. As more mission command systems integrate and link various sensors and data

streams, higher echelons inundate company command posts with data. However, they have no

efficient means to provide the information to the bulk of the force, resulting in a situation

counter-intuitive to mission command, which requires shared understanding to exploit

opportunities and maintain the initiative. Dismounted infantry possesses strengths that create

tactical problems for the enemy and exploit opportunities.

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The flexibility to approach from or operate almost anywhere without heavy logistical

demands or high detectability poses a unique problem set for the enemy (Department of the

Army, 2018). Additionally, the Army’s advanced technology’s additional situation awareness

and shared understanding maximize combat effectiveness and mission command. Tactical

flexibility combined with enhanced understanding and awareness provides the basis for

achieving combined arms overmatch (TRADOC, 2017). Achieving overmatch during conflicts

with advanced militaries requires leveraging every possible advantage simultaneously. Thus, the

lack of capability in the dismounted infantry poses a real problem.

Problem

The lack of tactical mission command systems in the dismounted infantry creates a

severe disadvantage in meeting the demands of the future operating. Success in future conflicts

requires maneuver elements to operate obscured and dispersed with communication, intelligence,

and mission command as mission-critical tasks (TRADOC, 2017). Tactical infantry element’s

lack of access to information capabilities directly conflicts with these principal requirements for

success. Disseminating large quantities of information via voice communication systems is

inefficient and increases the electromagnetic spectrum footprint, increasing enemy targeting

opportunities. With no digital redundancy, tactical radio system failure, or enemy disruption

requires in-person distribution of data limiting operational dispersion and reach. Additionally,

infantry echelons below the company level do not possess the ability to transmit or access

multimedia data hindering communications. This capability gap requires a force management

solution.

Solution
The solution to the lack of systems capability for dismounted infantry encompasses

several areas of force management, including material, doctrine, organization, and training. The

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AN/PRC 152 radio set provides part of the material solution, utilizing satellite communications,

sending and receiving multimedia data, and can incorporate a visual display (L3Harris, n.d.).

However, the system is not currently interoperable with the Army’s primary mission command

system, the Joint Battle Command-Platform, limiting information sharing. Therefore, a material

solution enabling cross-platform communication is likely the most efficient and fiscally

responsible material solution. However, integrating any material solution to this capability gap

requires further changes.

Even though the material component exists in the Army supply system, it is unavailable

to dismounted infantry units. The modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) does

not authorize the dismounted infantry unit’s access to this or any other material solution.

Additionally, integrating any equipment into a unit requires updated training for unit-level users

and maintainers. Doctrinal support in the form of reference cards, training and user manuals

support training initiatives. Conducting a comprehensive review of materials is vital to ensure

new users without specific occupational knowledge can understand them. These supporting

changes set conditions for future infantry operations to maximize their effect on the multi-

domain battlefield.

Conclusion

The purpose of this paper was to examine the lack of mission command systems

capability and propose a solution for dismounted infantry. Current information technology does

not facilitate information flow down to the tactical level. The limited mission command

capabilities put dismounted infantry at a tactical disadvantage on the multi-domain battlefield

hindering their ability to maximize their operational strengths. A partial material solution exists

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but requires additional support from force management’s material, organizational, training, and

doctrinal aspects to enable future multi-domain success.

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References

Department of the Army. (2018). Infantry rifle company (ATP 3-21.10).

https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN8519_ATP%203-

21x10%20Final%20Web.pdf

L3Harris (n.d.) L3harris falcon III an/pr-152a type 1 wideband networking handheld radio

datasheet. Retrieved November 3, 2021, from

https://www.l3harris.com/sites/default/files/2021-01/cs-tcom-falcon-iii-an-prc-152a-

wideband-networking-handheld-radio-datasheet.pdf

U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. (2017). The U.S. Army functional concept for

movement and maneuver 2020-2040 (TP 525-3-6). Department of the Army.

https://adminpubs.tradoc.army.mil/pamphlets/TP525-3-6.pdf

U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. (2018). The U.S. Army in multi-domain operations

2028 (TP 525-3-1). Department of the Army.

https://sgm-a.blackboard.com/bbcswebdav/pid-1075523-dt-content-rid-25838575_1/xid-

25838575_1

U.S. Army War College. (2020). How the Army runs: A senior leader reference handbook, 2019-

2020. https://sgm-a.blackboard.com/bbcswebdav/pid-1256374-dt-content-rid-

28991420_1/courses/SGM-A_SMC_DL_AY21-22_PH2_MASTER/HTAR%202019-

2020%20%28Online%20Version%29%281%29.pdf

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